Australian National Counter Terrorism White Paper - Current and future impact on domestic...

Australian National Counter Terrorism WhitePaper -

Current and future impact on domesticterrorism issues in Australia

Agio Pereira

A. Pereira impact of terrorism; February 2015 2

The Australian National Counter Terrorism White Paper andcurrent and future impact on domestic terrorism issues in

Australia

AbstractOnce recognised that no government can ensure that its population,assets and territory can be totally protected from terrorist attacks,it is incumbent upon the government of the day to do its best toensure that, within the realms of what is possible, to preventattacks against its population and assets in the country, or,elsewhere, and to ensure that protection is achieved to the best ofthe nation’s ability. The general structure and rationale of thecounter-terrorism strategy outlined in the recent Australian NationalCounter-Terrorism White Paper provides for effective ways to counterterrorism. The aim is effective prevention. Hence, emphasis is oncoordination within and beyond the Australian borders, as well asintensive information sharing. This acknowledges that ‘domestic’terrorism means interconnectedness with international networks andthat the operational environment of terrorisms can be beyond thecontrol of the Australian Intelligence Community. Overall, thisstrategy is promising in terms of delivering effective protection.What remains to be done is to outline clearly how to deal with lone-wolf or lone-wolves terrorism, as Boston marathon terrorism onceagain highlights the complexities of countering terrorism caused byinterconnectedness of the forces moving beyond borders. Last year theworld faced the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,otherwise known as ISIS. For Australia, last year also ended with aterrifying reality; that it is not free from lone-wolf terrorism; andit needs to review its counter-terrorism concepts and acquire betterunderstanding as to how to deal with extremely difficult cases likeMan Haron Monis and his siege of Martin Place café, held hostages,including killings, on 16 December 2014. ISIS and Monis remindAustralian leaders that the interconnectedness of terrorism motivesis not just a theory; it's real and troublesome and it requires in-depth understanding of what actually holds this web together, to sucha long time already and highly likely for even longer time ahead.Blaming the legal system alone is not the answer; blaming shortage of


financial resources is also not an answer. The answer lies preciselyin understanding what is it exactly that moves young men, whootherwise would be normal people striving for a carrier and happyexistence, to give everything up including their own lives.

Key terms: terrorism, coordination, networking, counter-terrorism, effectiveness, lone-wolf, ASIO and ASIS, terrorism and the West

Introduction

America’s most powerful ethos is ‘the American dream’,

leading to the historical and immortal speech of Martin

Luther King, Jr. highlighting the fact that he has a dream

too. He never lived to see the consequences of him having

a powerful dream; and many Americans today, since 9/11,

also failed to live to see their American dreams come

through. Likewise, many in the finish line of the Boston

marathon also did not live to see their dreams come

through. Like most major newspapers around the world, in

the small city of Darwin, Northern Territory of

Australia, where 250 US marines arrived to enhance

international security cooperation,1 as promised by

President Obama in 2011, NT News reflects upon the dream

that turns into nightmare because ‘Brothers’ Boston

violence hard to fathom’.2 Boston iconic marathon ending

in tragedy is bad enough; the type of tragedy that almost

revived the pain of 9/11 New York WTO twin towers being

destroyed by two airplanes and, in spite of endless

1 NT News, Sunday, April 21, 2013, p. 13, www.sundayterritorian.com.au2 L Scarr, ‘Dream turns nightmare – Brothers’ Boston violence hard to fathom’, NT News, Sunday, April 21, 2013, p. 13, www.sundayterritorian.com.au


investigation, there are still valid questions floating in

the air searching for the truth, makes the improvised

explosive devices (IED) of the finish line of Boston

marathon a powerful terrorist event which demands in-depth

reflection; if the goal of never-to-happen-again scenario

is to be ultimately the collective search for peace and

security. Hence, reflecting upon strategies of the best

possible counter-terrorism is of paramount importance. The

White Paper on Counter-Terrorism of Australia can be a

good start. It is hereby articulated that the counter

terrorism (CT) strategy outlined in the Australian White

Paper is an important tool. This dissertation is about

terrorism issues, part of a major research work with

emphasis on current and future impact of the (Australian)

Counter-Terrorism White Paper on domestic terrorism

issues. The elements and the structure of the counter

terrorism strategy, as well as its rationale and

objectives are analyzed, including threats assessments,

international dimension of this strategy and relevant

criticisms; and whether foreign affairs impact, directly

or indirectly, on the level of threats. This discussion

also highlights the threats and responses of counter-

terrorism, from an Australian perspective, as well as

provides arguments on the challenges contemporary

terrorism have imposed upon the Australian society and

politics; as Prime Minister Tony Abbott unveiled a “Review

of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery”,3 it is

3 B Keane, “Abbott targets Muslims and backflips on free speech in terrorism statement”, Crikey, 23.02.2015


worthwhile going back a bit and try to understand the

source of the structure of Australian counter-terrorism

strategy – its White Paper.

Contemporary terrorism: preparedness and challenges for Australia The crux of the strategy in the White Paper for counter-

terrorism is prevention. The Australian community so far

has been successful in pre-empting terrorism, because

‘numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted in

Australia’4, but threats are still real, including the

‘loan wolf’5 scenario - the disconnected terrorist that

can “emerge anytime’.6 To effectively prevent terrorism,

means to foresee possible attacks are paramount. This

requires effectively sharing intelligence, as envisaged in

the National Security Vision for 2020: “we need to make

sure that the right people can access the right

information quickly, securely and from the right

sources”7. Above all, ‘enduring commitment’, by all

stakeholders, as stated by National Security Advisor

Duncan Lewis,8 is a key strategic factor.

4 Counter-Terrorism White Paper – securing Australia, Protecting Our Community, p.115 Ibid, p.86 Ibid7 National Security Information Environment Roadmap: 2020 Vision, Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper – securing Australia, Protecting Our Community, p.11 Ibid, p.8 Ibid Ibid, p.4 Ibid, Forward, p.28 Ibid, Forward, p.2


The central elements of counter-terrorism The White Paper presents four key strategic elements to

enhance the capacity of the Australian community to

counter terrorism. Since prevention is the main objective,

analysis becomes the critical stage. It is argued that

Australia’s counter-terrorism is intelligence-led,

focusing on prevention.9 Information gathering, processing

and analysis are crucial to transform intelligence into

products which decision-makers can act upon to effectively

provide conditions to counter terrorism. Perhaps

reflecting lessons learned, the paper stresses the

paramount importance of effective connectedness, effective

information sharing and effective engagement at the

international level.10 It is recognised that ‘a

comprehensive and layered approach’ is required and the

measures taken to counter terrorism must be informed by

the nature of the threat and Australia’s vulnerability to

it.11 Protection, another key element, is defined as the

need to take all the necessary and practical action to

protect Australia and Australians at home and abroad.12 For

protection to be effective it is argued for stronger land,

sea and air border control, as well as impeding those in

Australia, suspected of involvement with terrorism, from

leaving the country. Emphasis is again on partnership, not

only with international partners but, also at domestic

level, with the business community, to protect critical9 White paper, p.1910 Ibid11 Ibid, p.2112 Ibid, p.20


infrastructures such as information and communications

technology. Perhaps more strategic then all the other

elements is the need for the Australian community to

become resilient to prevent “the development of any form

of violent extremism and terrorism on the home front.”13

This reflects what was reiterated in the National Security

Statement (NSS), presented to the Parliament on December

2008: “terrorism is likely to endure as a serious ongoing

threat for the foreseeable future. Extremism leading to

violence or terrorism continues to pose a direct threat to

Australia and Australian security interests”14

In the Prime Minister’s NSS of 4th December 2008, five

national security interests were highlighted. Protecting

the political and territorial sovereignty of the country,

protecting the cohesion and resilience of the Australian

society, protecting Australian’s and Australia’s interest

at home and abroad, promoting a stable, peaceful and

prosperous international environment, particularly in the

Asia-Pacific region, and combining these with “a global

rules-based order which enhances Australia’s national

interests.”15 Cohesion is an important element because, as

Bill Calcutt posits, the ‘war on terror’ approach has led

to “the alienation of particular religious and ethnic

minorities within Australian community, and the emergence

13 Ibid, p.2014 The First National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament,by the Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd, 4 December 2008, p.1815 NSS, 2008, p.6


of latent xenophobia’.16 In this regards, one needs to also

counter possible ‘political pyrotechnics’, the

manipulation of terrorism issues for political purpose, as

in the recent cases of Swiss referendum on minarets and

France’s banning of the niqab in public schools.17

Resilience relates to community cohesion. The sense of

unity is vital to counter- terrorism to ensure that sheer

commitment and effective sharing of information is not

compromised. Australia’s national interest means not

only to interact, but to lead on regional priorities.

Hence, the Counter-Terrorism White Paper reaffirms the

need to pursue ‘a range of counter-terrorism measures

internationally to counter the threat to our interests

both overseas and domestically’.18 Furthermore, Australia’s

interests must include pursuing the goals of

globalisation, demonstrating its capacity in enhancing

international security19 and providing effective assistance

to the developing countries to mitigate the risks of

terrorism emerging due to extreme poverty.

Criticisms: Australia’s Counter-Terrorism and foreign

policy

16 B Cacutt, The Role of Intelligence in Shaping Public Perceptions ofTerrorism, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Vol. 3, No.1, April 2008, p.77 17 T Raihanah & E Frécon, ‘Islamophobia’ or ‘Europhobia’?: Deconstructing the Contemporary Debates, RSIS Commentaries, S. Rajaratham School of International Studies, Singapore, 23 February 2010, p.118 p.2119 NSS, p.16


It is often argued that one of the main causes of

terrorism is the Western foreign policy. Australia’s close

partnership with the US and its role in the ‘war on

terror’ are said to be part of the problem. Khan believes

that the CT White Paper has missed one fundamental point –

Australia’s foreign policy and its relationship to

emerging “terror” threats”, because the origin of

Australia’s current terror threats are part of recent

phenomenon which became much clearly since its involvement

in the “war on terror”. A view supported by Ungerer who

notes that ‘prior to the events of September 11, 2001,

counter-terrorism was not considered a vital national

security priority in Australia’.20 Khan further contends

that ‘Australia’s counter-terrorism measure completely

ignores the political context21 of the “terror” and rely on

the commonly if not naively held notion that “terrorism”,

especially the so-called “Islamic terrorism” is but a

“hateful, insane scourge that spins on its own axis, in

its own orbit and has nothing to do with the world around

it, nothing to do with history, geography or economics.

Such lateral thinking is not only unfortunate but

ominously counterproductive.”22 Jenny Hocking also sees the

‘war on terror’ as a rejection of complexity, a denial of

reason, a type of adult-American ‘baby talk’.23 Ernie20 C Ungerer, “Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism”, Presentation to the Safeguarding Australia Summit, 3-4 October 2007, p.9 21 M Khan, ‘Australia’s head-in-the-sand counter-terrorism strategy’, ABC The Drum Unleashed, 22 June 2010, pp.2-322 Ibid23 J Hocking, ‘Terror laws: ASIO, Counter-terrorism and the threat to democracy’, UNSW Press, Sydney, Australia, 2004, p.7


Davitt, in spite of endorsing the CT White Paper, is

concerned about funding commitment, pointing out that it

lacks detail and an idea of intended future levels of

spending.24

Blaming Western foreign policy may also miss one

fundamental point. The question is what, in the context of

terrorism beyond borders, should be conceived as the West.

President Obama when he reflected upon the Boston bombing;

he asked about the real motives for two young men, living

in the US where they call home and benefiting from what

the country has to offer, can turn to such a hideous

killing of innocent people in American soil. This is

certainly a central theme for academic in-depth research.

Is it foreign policy of the West – meaning the USA and UK

– gone ashtray?

A study asserts that ‘although British foreign policy

played a significant role in British Moslem alienation, it

was by no means critical’.25 It cites a revealing interview

with the jailed terrorist Hassan Butt who said: ‘I

remember how we used to laugh in celebration whenever

people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic

acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and the 7

24 E Davitt, Counter-Terrorism White Paper: No surprises in new paper,ASM – Australia’s Security Magazine, 07/06/2010, p.3, http://securitymanagement.com.au/article.php?action=view&article_id=14825 A Bergin, D Jones & C Ungerer, Beyond belief: Islamism, radicalisation and counter-terrorism response, Insights, ASPI – Australian Strategic Policy Study, September 2007, p.140


July 2005 London bombings, also known as 7/7, was Western

foreign policy. By blaming the government for our actions,

those who pushed the Blair’s bombs line did our propaganda

work for us. More important, they also helped to draw away

any critical examination from the real engine of our

violence: Islamic theology’.26 This raises the question of

whether making Western foreign policy a terrorist issue

effectively feeds terrorist propaganda, confusing the

public and minimising the role of Islamic theology in

fomenting Islamic radicalisation.

Within the legal domestic spectrum, the Australian Human

Rights Commission is concerned that Counter-Terrorism

measures infringe upon the right to a fair trial, the

right to freedom from arbitrary detention and arrest and

the right not to be subject to torture.27 These concerns

focus on the principle of innocent before proving guilty.28

Australian academic Carl Ungerer further contends that

although ‘our counter-terrorism efforts are improving, it

continues to lack sufficient flexibility in order to

prevent further terrorist attacks on home soil’29 because

inflexibility may lead to misdiagnosis of the emerging and

future threats. Recognising that since the new laws,

26 Ibid27 A Human Rights Guide to Counter-Terrorism Laws, Australian Human Rights Commission, 2008, p.228 R White & S Perrone, Crime Control and Social Control – An Introduction, Oxford University Press, UK, 1997, p.12029 C Ungerer, ‘Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism’, presentation to the Safeguardian Australia Summit, 3-4 October 2007, Canberra, Australia, p.11


namely the Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005, citing Peter Clark,30

Ungerer reiterates that the legal provisions in the law

‘renders modern counter-terrorism increasingly political’

and this ‘becomes more problematic when the use of

violence and subversion serves an ideology that feeds off

global and local perceptions of ethnic and religious

grievance, the alienation of minorities and the escalation

of identity’31 politics. Correct diagnosis of terror

threats is vital part of effective strategies, but ethnic

and religious profiling and overemphasis on Islamic

radicalism may divert attention from real threats. For

Sauter and Carafano not all terrorists are from Islamic

extremist groups, giving that many of the most dangerous

extremists in the United States are members of domestic

groups.32

Organisational structure of Counter-Terrorism strategy

The new structure is designed to enhance effective

intelligence capability as well as providing space to

evolve to overcome what Ungerer calls insufficient

flexibility.33 Hence, the new expectation is that the

agencies are well coordinated, effectively sharing

30 P Clark, ‘Learning from Experience – Counter terrorism in the UK since 9/11’, inaugural Colin Cramphorn lecture, London, UK, 2007, cited in C Ungerer, ‘Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism’,presentation to the Safeguardian Australia Summit, 3-4 October 2007, Canberra, Australia, p.1131 C Ungerer, p.1132 M Sauter & J Carafano, Homeland Security – a complete guide to understanding, preventing and surviving terrorism, McGraw-Hill, NY, USA, 2005, p.27433 Ungerer, op. cit., p.11


information and able to adapt to emerging demands. The AIC

is, thus expected to provide immediate and targeted CT

responses. A Counter-Terrorism Control Centre (CTCC) is

created under the umbrella of ASIO. The main task for this

CTCC is to harmonise across the spectrum of the Australian

Intelligence Community (AIC) the sharing of information to

pre-empt terrorist attacks. It is also charged with the

responsibility of ‘evaluating and integrating counter-

terrorism intelligence…to improve the ability of agencies

to operate against terrorism and to prevent terrorist

threats to Australian and Australia’s interest’.34 To

overcome fragmentary pieces of information, the National

Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) is created,

headed by the National Security Advisor. This Committee

encompasses all the national security agencies of the

Australian Intelligence Community (AIC), namely the Office

of National Assessments (ONA), the Australian Secret

Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Australian Security

Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Defence Imagery and

Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), the Defence Intelligence

Organisation (DIO), the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),

the AFP, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), and

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The departments of

Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Immigration and

Citizenship, and Attorney-General’s, are also represented

at the Deputy Secretary Level.35 To ensure effective flow

of information throughout the full spectrum of the AIC,

34 CT White Paper, p.2835 Ibid


emphasis is given to the need for a strong relationship

with the public. This relationship is expected to enhance

surveillance and contribute towards successful

investigation. However, one must call for caution because

the provision for public involvement or greater community

participation in intelligence matters can be misunderstood

as “a euphemism for communist type community based mutual

spying”.36 Insurmountable information and no time for

proper analysis may become an issue, but this may be

overcome by having ASIO and ASIS working, together, under

one overall national coordinating body.

Complementing the structure are the National Threat

Assessment Centre (NTAC) and Financial Intelligence (FI).

NTAC is a multi-agency also under the umbrella of ASIO. It

prepares threat assessments ‘in relation to specific

people, places, and events’ to ‘inform the risk management

decisions made by operational agencies, the implementation

of protective security measures and travel advisories

regarding potential threats’37 overseas. Financial

Intelligence includes the Australian Transaction Reports

and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) to track down illegal or

terrorist-related financial transactions. The agency is

tasked with the responsibility to provide relevant

intelligence to 34 Australian agencies in the realms of

law enforcement, national security, revenue and social

36 M Khan, p.237 Ibid


justice agencies.38 Armed with this integrated structure,

AIC can work effectively with a broad network of

international partners, making it easier to join the dots

of crucial pieces of information to pre-empt terrorists’

plans. This network, well coordinated, can help disrupt

planned attacks of terrorists against Australia and

Australians’ interests, both domestically and abroad.39

Financial Intelligence has a daunting task because

terrorist groups also adapt themselves to avoid detection.

For example, it is argued that ‘al-Qaeda’s current

financial backing is no longer predominantly from the

personal funds of bin Laden. Instead, this backing comes

from wealthy supporters who donate funds to Islamic

charities and relief organisations, which are then passed

through to the terrorists’.40

Will it work?

In May 2009, the Australian Government announced funding

of around $100 million dollars to strengthen national

security framework. This fund, to be used over four years,

was said to be part of$685 million investment in national

security. Out of this overall funding, $82 million

attributed to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) “to

enhance cooperation with law enforcement counterparts in

South and Southeast Asia and to combat the threat of

38 Ibid39 Ibid, p.3140 J McGulloch & S Pickering, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism – Proliferating State Crime, Eroding Censure and Extending Neo-colonialism, British Journal of Criminology, 45, 470-486, 2005, p.473


terrorism” in the region, including threats to Australians

and Australian interests. This funding is to enable AFP

“to effectively address and respond to offshore security

incidents in cooperation with local police”.41 This is

indication of political will to combat terrorism, ensuring

that relevant agencies can deliver. However, funding and

political will alone cannot provide this assurance.

Coordination, intelligence gathering and analysis, will

determine whether the new structure works or whether

Australia has created a messy bureaucracy. Coordination

requires resources and clear distribution of tasks for

each of the agencies within the AIC. It is imperative that

each unit understands its assigned tasks and how to

succeed. Clear chain of command is also vital because no

matter how good the intelligence gathering and analysis

are, ultimately someone has to make final decisions.

Preparedness does not come from resolve alone. It needs

being sensitive to emerging threats and every possible

source of terrorism. This may mean that intelligence

effort to counter terrorism does not drastically pull out

resources away from traditional targets and tasks.42

Effectiveness also depends on regional integration. The

complexities of the region need to be tackled if a CT

41 “Strengthening our National Security”, Media Release, Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government, 12 May 2010

42 M Wesley, ‘Between Probity and Proficiency: Challenge and Change within the Australian Intelligence Community’, Commentary No.88, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, April 2006, p.2


strategy is to work.43 Australia’s counter-terrorism

strategy recognises this and has created the post of the

Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism to work on negotiations

with other countries as well as building international

linkages and ensuring consistency in the various counter

terrorism efforts abroad.44 But regional integration

requires that countries in the region develop similar

perception of the threats. One problem is the war on

terror is perceived as using excessive force and, as

Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak posits,

“terrorism cannot be bombed into submission…the underlying

legitimate grievances that allow for such extremists to

gain support” must be addressed.45 Australia needs to

address these discrepancies, including, bearing in mind

that Indonesian public disagrees with the USA keeping

troops in Afghanistan whilst supporting the USA-led anti-

terrorism effort.46

Other regional tensions, which the West may frame as

‘terrorism-related issues’, also requires hard work from

Australia. Democratic India with Islamic problems also

faces “more poor people in 8 of its states than in 26

43 C Rice, ‘Opening Remarks to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 8, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2004, p.444 CT White Paper, p.4845 B Vaughn, E Chanlett-Avery, M Manyin & L Nicksch, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 11, 2007, p.2746 Key Indicators Database, ‘U.S. Anti-Terrorism Efforts’, Updated with polling data from 2010 Spring Survey, 2010


poorest African nations”.47 China’s autonomous region of

Uighur (XUAR) faces Moslem radicalism connected with the

Al Qaeda network of East Turkistan Islamic Movement.48 The

Philippines confronts demands for regional control from

the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, Southern

Philippines. The success of these two Islamic

organisations, in establishing an autonomous Islamic

region in the Southern Philippines, may fuel hope for al

Qaeda and JI network for a “khilafah (world Islamic

State)”,49 similar to ISIS. Malaysia faces the threat of

seaborn terrorism in the Straits of Malacca,50 and the

Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has a resilient network

spreading beyond borders.51 In the case of Indonesia, one

may need to delve deep into history.52

Back to President Obama’s question as to the motives of

the two brothers in arms, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,

a reasonable question is whether circumstances of broken

family, growing up alone and lonely, in environment

dominated by harsh war and uncertainties, filled with long

path of pain and suffering, can accumulate ill fillings as

47 R Velloor, Indians found wanting in poverty index, The Straits Times, Saturday July 17 2010, Singapore, p.Part C48 W Pengxin, ‘China Under Threat: Ethnic Tensions and Terrorism’, CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, August 2010, p.149 K Ramakrishna, p.1850 Ibid, pp.14-2551 K Ramakrishna, “Constructing” the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, October 2004, p.252 M Bessa, Seeds of Terror – An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia, Free Press, NY, USA, 2003, p.130,


fuel which can spark actions that are often characterised

as terrorism. As McBeth wrote, “after Indonesian brothers

Amrozi Nurhasyim and Ali Ghufron were executed for the

2002 Bali bombing, one investigator told me he believed

the two could not have turned out any other way, given

their father’s life-long support for the decades-old Darul

Islam movement”.53 All these may not be real regional

concerns if it is true that terrorism is only ‘fantasy and

myopia’.54

Healthy scepticism aside, current reality dictates that

the work of the Australian Intelligence Community is very

complex, but the difficulties intrinsic in the nature of

contemporary terrorism can be overcome through effective

use of the new structure, as well as coordination with

counter-terrorism agencies in the immediate region and

beyond. If one cannot contain lone-wolf terrorism or lone-

wolves terrorism, the decisive factor is to ensure that

law enforcement agencies are capable of responding

decisively and with visible results, if and when terrorism

attacks are taken place within Australia, as the case of

Boston terrorism has proven for the law enforcement

agencies in the USA, particularly in Boston,

Massachusetts. This is vital because in an era where power

to destroy is amply available within non-state actors,

ensuring that the citizens trust the State must become the53 J McBeth, Militant minds are hard to change, The Straits Times, July 10 2010, Singapore, p.A3254 Hamilton-Hart, N, The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2005, p.232


ultimate concern of all the State institutions. In doing

so, the same agencies ought to also uncompromisingly

safeguard universal values for all, so to avoid alienation

of sectors of the society to curb the possibility of being

recruited by non-state actors to mount terror attacks

within or beyond national boundaries.

Conclusion

Albeit criticisms, Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy

is conceived and structured to meet the demands of

Australian’s own reality. Being multicultural and liberal

democracy, in a country as big as the entire Western

Europe, in a region with diverse problems which can feed

terrorism’s motives and means; and among one of the major

terrorism country-level hot spots in the first decade of

the twentieth-first century,55 the urgency to have a well

planned counter-terrorism strategy is justified. Australia

is also a country with high international prestige and

this brings about higher expectations from the

international community. This requires that countering

the threat of terrorism, must be equated with safeguarding

universal values. Hence, the challenges faced by the

Australian Intelligence Community are complex. To protect

the interests of Australia and Australians within the

country and overseas, AIC must not violate human rights,

including freedom of speech and a transparent legal55 G LaFree, N Morris & L Dugan, Cross-National Patterns of Terrorism – Comparing Trajectories for Total, Attributed and Fatal Attacks, 1970 – 2006, British Journalof Criminology, 50, 622-649, UK, p. 641


system, the sensitive cohesion of its multicultural

society and regional priorities. The counter-terrorism

strategy outlined in the white paper is sensitive to all

these challenges. Whether it will work towards effectively

meeting the expectations without hindering Australia’s

values, remain to be seen. The flexibility to evolve and

adapt envisaged in the strategy may well provide

sufficient room to ensure desired outcomes. In May 1986,

leaders of seven major industrial countries, preoccupied

with protecting the world order, met in Tokyo and declared

that ‘terrorism must be fought relentlessly and without

compromise.’56 Australia is trying to do just that. If

intelligence analysis and coordination work effectively,

Australia may even lead the world on strategic approach to

counter terrorism, without hindering human rights and

social cohesion. Nevertheless, as the Martin Place siege

has highlighted the answer to the lone-wolf threat remains

unclear.

56 L Freedman, C Hill, A Roberts, R Vincent, P Wilkinson & P Windsor, Terrorism and International Order, Gratham House Special Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1986,p.8


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