Term Paper

An Ontological Proof of Human Rights within Immanuel Kant’s Philosophya redefinition of humanity and a much needed attempt at shifting moral consciousnesses

George SkandalidisHuman Rights ProseminarProfessor P. ChurchillDecember 16, 2013

Two things fill the heart with renewed and increasing awe and reverence the more often and the more steadily that theyare meditated on: the starry skies above me and the moral law inside me.

-Kant, Critique of Practical Reason

There has been an ongoing debate on the nature of human

rights. Most scholars, along with political leaders and

rights’ activists, have been focusing on clarifying which

rights are central, how should we implement or guarantee

those rights, where are rights relevant. However, only a

lesser part of the debate has been on the most fundamental

question, the one at the foundation of the entire discourse;

namely, are there Human Rights? That is, though human rights are

becoming all the more significant in moral reasoning, little

is being said about their ontological basis. Yet, in order

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for human rights to be properly conceived of and become

detrimental in the conduct of human life catholically they

should first be somehow justified. We are here, thus,

interested in providing an ontological basis for the

existence of Human Rights within Immanuel Kant’s philosophy,

namely, through his unique understanding of human beings.

That is, by defining –or, rather, redefining- human beings

through Kant’s propositions, according to their capacities

for moral agency, reason, freedom, autonomy and personhood,

human rights will be proved to exist synthetically and a priori.

This paper argues for a radical position; a (re)definition

of Human Beings that will allow for the existence, as such,

of Human Rights, and a subsequent attempt to solidify their

universal respect in this way shifting our moral

consciousness.

The central hypothesis here at work is that, if human

rights are to be somehow ontologically derived, they should

be so according to a definition of what it means to be

human. To explicate, the purpose is here to deconstruct the

concept of human rights in order to understand it best and

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thus yield its existential import. There are two things that

will here serve as points of inquiry, namely what are human

beings and what is a right. It is important, also, to note that

what this will mean for the scope of this essay is that the

proof provided is a conditional one. That is, the whole

project is here based on a certain conception –hopefully a

convincing one- of human beings that will allow for an

ontology of their rights as such, a point to which we shall

later return.

There are many ways of understanding the humanity of

man and there have been different theories of right. This

inquiry though is wholly inspired by the philosophy of

Immanuel Kant, and that is so for numerous reasons. Kant’s

contributions and legacy within philosophical and,

specifically, moral reasoning, provide us with a unique

standpoint from which to treat this project. As will be

shown along the progress of the text, his deontological

conception of ethics and duty, along with his propositions

of universalizability and disinterestedness, will become

central for any justification of human rights. Also, Kant’s

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groundbreaking understanding of the analytic and the

synthetic, as well as the a priori and the a posteriori, will

provide a fertile ground from which our proof can be

materialized. It is perhaps the case that only through a

strictly Kantian understanding of these notions could one

fruitfully arrive to an ontology of human rights as such.

Most importantly though, it is not merely the instrumental

value that his perspective gives to this project that

inspired its very beginning –rather the opposite, as it is

no walk in the park to disambiguate his philosophy. It was

his noble purpose. Kant’s entire philosophical project was

an attempt to understand man. His metaphysics, his morality,

his epistemology, his aesthetics, were all aiming towards

structuring “a geography of the human mind” out of a genuine

love for its greatness. Kant’s intrinsic respect for

humanity inspired this project and will hopefully inspire

its readers too.

Now, it is important to begin our inquiry by laying

down Kant’s epistemological position on metaphysical claims

and specifically his notion of the synthetic a priori judgment.

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Kant set out to answer whether metaphysical judgments, like

the one we will later make on what a right is, can be both

synthetic and a priori. He distinguishes between judgments

in his Prolegomena where

‘there is a distinction between judgments as to their content, by which they are either merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of knowledge, or ampliative, augmenting the given knowledge. The former can be called analytical, the latter synthetical judgments’.1

That is, analytical are those statements that are by

definition so, de facto, like “all bachelors are unmarried”

where synthetic those that produce extra-definitional

knowledge as in “the book is on the table”.2 Moreover, a

priori are those judgments that do not require experience

whereas a posteriori are those that do. Thus, Kant moved into

challenging the epistemological position widely held up to

his time, namely, that all synthetic judgments are a

posteriori; that all synthetic judgments require experience.

After reading Hume he was thus ‘interrupted [from his]

dogmatic slumber’ regarding metaphysical questions –1 Beck, p. 163 (Prolegomena 266-267).2 Since there is nothing in the definition of a book that provides us knowledge of its being on a table

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especially regarding the nature of causality.3 Kant showed

that synthetic a priori judgments are possible by first

dealing with mathematics, which were traditionally

considered analytic. Discussing the simple notion of 7+5=12

he found that there is nothing in the mere expression 7+5

that necessitated 12 and thus proved that, though a priori,

the expression itself ‘contains merely their union in a

single number, without its being at all thought what the

particular number which unites them is’.4 As a result, Kant

showed that it is possible to have synthetic a priori

judgments, a priori because they do not require experience,

synthetic in that they provide extra-definitional knowledge.

7+5=12 is such a synthetic a priori judgment. In other

words, ‘a priori because a necessary truth not learnt from

experience, and synthetic because its necessity is not logical

necessity’.5 6

3 Beck, p. 157 (Prolegomena 261).4 Beck, p. 164 (prolegomena 269)5 Beck, p. 88.6 For more on Kant’s epistemology see Critique of Pure Reason B1-105 and Prolegomena IV255-289

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It is through this that Kant came up with what he

considered his greatest contribution to philosophy, his

Copernican Revolution as he calls it, namely, the synthetic

a priori nature of the faculties of the human mind. In his

Critique of Pure Reason Kant identified that in order to make

sense of the world, to have a unified and intelligible

experience, man has specific faculties that conform the

sensible world into his understanding. That is, asserting

that the object in-itself is not known –it is noumenon- he

found that the subject has certain traits that make it

possible to form appearances of the object and thus

experience it. The Copernican turn subsists in a shift of

perspective, in that it is the object that conforms to the

subject, the noumenal to the phenomenal, and not the

opposite. As an example of such faculties Kant discussed

Space and Time. Space and Time do not belong to the ‘world’,

are not qualities of objects, they are rather faculties of

the mind. Thus he says, ‘space is not something objective

and real, […]it is subjective and ideal, and originates from

the mind's nature […]as it were, for coordinating everything

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sensed externally’.7 It is impossible to imagine any object

outside space for Kant, but that does not necessitate that

all objects are in space; space is a human intuition. Space

and Time, -along with causality, plurality, negation etc-

are in this way synthetic a priori; they do not require

experience but are not logically –analytically- necessary.

More importantly they are ‘sources of knowledge from which

various a priori synthetical cognitions can be derived’.8 And

we say more importantly, as for our purposes what really

matters is that through Kant’s analysis two fundamental

points follow: one, that all human beings are in essence

similar and unique in terms of their faculties of

understanding the world as phenomenon; two, that these very

faculties, as sources of knowledge, are what gives rise to

man’s capacity to reason, what Kant called cognitions above.

Having briefly gone over Kant’s epistemology and view

on metaphysical claims, we have thus provided for the tools

with which an understanding of what it means to be human and

what is a right will be achieved. Subsequently, Kant’s analytic 7 Kant, inaugural dissertation (Ak 2: 403).8 Beck, p. 107 (critique of pure reason 55).

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will be used for a definition of humanity, whereas his

synthetic a priori for the ontology of human rights. Let us

now move to Kant’s conception of the humanity of man,

namely, through his propositions on personhood, reason,

freedom autonomy and moral agency respectively. One should

here note that all the above are intricately connected in

contributing to his understanding of what is means to be

human.

To begin, personhood is for Kant closely related to

self-consciousness. Being self-conscious is a central

characteristic of man for Kant and he defines a person as

‘that which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself

at different times’.9 By “numerical identity over time” he

alludes to the unified view of oneself that a person

possesses. In this way Kant wants to put forth that the

first and most central attribute of man is his consciousness

of himself, it is what separates him from other beings, what

defines his personhood. Elsewhere Kant says that ‘the fact

that the human being can have the “I” in his representations

9 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 341 (A136).

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raises him infinitely above all other beings on earth.

Because of that he is a person’.10 Moreover, on a more

radical note, Kant proposes that the very having of a self-

consciousness is a condition for having experiences at all –

a quite controversial claim. Self-consciousness serves for

‘all the objects of experience’ as a ‘ground without which

it would be impossible to think any object for our

intuitions’.11 A couple of things that are here important to

maintain are that, first, Kant supposes the unifying ground

of self-consciousness as necessary for having experience,

second, that human beings are because of their self-

consciousness unique and, third, that self-consciousness

itself is related to thought. Which brings us to another

definitional trait of human beings, that of reason.

As has been above mentioned our cognitions are resulting

from the geography of the human mind, our faculties and

intuitions. Reason is one of the most important notions

within Kant’s philosophy –on which exclusively he has

written two critiques. His treatment of human beings’ 10 Kant, Anthropology (A127).11 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 135-136 (A106).

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capacity to reason was, for its biggest part,

methodological. That is, Kant was interested in how we

reason, which led him to distinguish between two types of

reasoning, pure and practical. The former is ‘that in which

reason determines its object entirely a priori’, the latter, a

posteriori.12 Kant, found that there are two distinct ways in

which we think about things, where the pure refers to

abstract, conceptual, thinking and the practical to questions

that involve decision-making as well as empirical and moral

judgments. He writes, following what has been hinted towards

in our discussion of personhood, that

‘The spontaneity of thought requires that that which is manifold in pure intuition should be first gone through, received, and connected, in order to produce from it a cognition. This act I call synthesis’.13

The synthesis he alludes to, be that within pure or

practical reasoning, is another way of characterizing the

process of thought and is, of course, echoing the discussion

on the role of self-consciousness as providing unity. Reason

is for Kant what separates human beings from animals ‘which 12 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 96 (Bxi).13 Beck, p. 110 (Critique of Pure Reason A103).

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have no conception of themselves as identical over time’ and

thus don’t think in the way we do.14 The “I” of man allows

him to think in relation to himself, his past and future,

and his experiences –to synthesize in this way. He elsewhere

defines reason as ‘the faculty of principles’ in that it

unites, all those faculties –hence being a faculty itself-

of the human mind, and in this way a characteristic trait of

every human being.15 That is, where

‘Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles’.16

Therefore, if understanding refers to what had above been

alluded to through the faculties of the mind –like space and

time- that make experience possible, reason, along with

self-consciousness, is what unifies and makes it intelligible.

And it is through our capacity to reason that we are free

for Kant.

14 Altman, Kant and Applied Ethics, p. 249. 15 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 301 (A299).16 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 303 (B359).

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He begins in the Critique by merely proving freedom’s

possibility through reason. In his widely discussed Third

Antinomy Kant proposes that it is both possible to

reasonably assert that there has been at some point ‘an

absolute spontaneity of causes, by which a series of

appearances, moving forward according to natural laws,

begins of itself’, as well as that ‘nothing takes place

without a cause sufficiently determined’.17 That is, Kant

takes up the notion of causality –and thus the determinist

thesis against that of freedom-, and provides an assertion

of two seemingly contradictory claims. Ingeniously, he does

so utilizing the epistemological differences between object

and subject, the noumenal and phenomenal. That is, there is

evidently nothing contradictory in asserting that in the

phenomenal, subjective, realm every event is preceded by a

cause. This is, after all, how we understand causality. But,

there is also nothing contradictory for Kant in reasoning

that in the noumenal, the realm of the de facto unknown, an

uncaused event can take place as such –as causality is a

17 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 129 (A472-476).

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faculty of the mind, not a thing in-itself. Thus both

‘apparently contradictory assertions can be true of the same

phenomenon from different points of view’.18 Though this is

not a proof of a noumenal freedom per se, it is a proof of

its possibility, through a shift of perspective.

The proof of a noumenal spontaneity of causes, Kant

finds within man himself. The very faculties of

understanding and reason that each human being possesses are

not phenomenal appearances in relation to himself but,

rather, “pure intelligible objects”. Kant finds that man

‘knows himself through pure apperception […]in acts of inner

determination which he cannot regard as impressions of the

senses’.19 That is, man is for himself a noumeally

intelligible object –while being a subject in relation to

the noumenal world- in that his faculties are completely

intelligible and available to him as things in-themselves.

In this way it is our capacity to reason, as a faculty, that

makes us noumenally free. Through reasoning we can create a

spontaneous –free- event in the outside world and in this 18 Ward, the Development of Kant’s Ethics, p. 75.19 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 472 (A546).

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way begin a series of causally determined effects. Simply

put, through his faculty of reason, which ‘seeks absolute

spontaneity, unity and totality’, man is a creator of causal

events.20 As a result, ‘the activities of thinking and

reflection enable one to justify the attribution of noumenal

freedom to the agent’; and such capacities can ‘cause events

in the sensible world [without being] objects of sensible

intuition’.21

In addition, Kant finds that freedom, being derived

from our faculty of reason, is thus ‘a concept that man must

supposes to be instantiated, in order to regulate his

actions in accordance with the demands of morality’.22 Since

morality will also be founded upon reason, freedom takes

another, more purposive, dimension; namely, that, in any

case, we should consider ourselves free as moral agents since

‘freedom is internal determination’.23 But before looking

into how morality is related to freedom and reason, it is

vital to explore Kant’s understanding of autonomy. 20 Ward, the Development of Kant’s Ethics, p. 75.21 Ward, the Development of Kant’s Ethics, p. 76.22 Ward, the Development of Kant’s Ethics, p. 76.23 Ward, the Development of Kant’s Ethics, p. 9.

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As we have already seen man is free through his

capacity to reason. Kant elaborates on this idea by

declaring man a completely autonomous agent –in this sense-

through having a will of his own. He finds that though

‘everything in nature acts in accordance with laws. Only a

rational being can act in accordance with the representation of laws,

that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will’.24

Thus, our capacity to reason, as well as our subjective

perspective of the world, allow human beings to have a will.

Acting “in accordance with principles” is crucial for Kant’s

declaring the autonomy of man, for his conception of

autonomy is one that involves constraints. Strange as it may

at first appear, Kant firmly believed that complete autonomy

or freedom is one that is restricted by reason, as ‘reason is

required for the derivation of actions from laws’ and the

‘the will is nothing other than practical reason’.25 He

proposed such an understanding of autonomy to show that

‘acting freely does not mean acting capriciously’.26

24 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 193 (MM 392).25 Beck, p. 262 (Groundwork G:4 412).26 Altman, Kant and Applied Ethics, p. 109.

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Autonomy expressed through the will of human beings is to be

located within practical reasoning –as the possibility of

freedom is in pure reasoning- in that ‘the will is a faculty

of choosing only that which reason, independently of

inclination, recognizes as practically necessary’.27 In the

words of Onora O’Neill ‘Kantian autonomy is not something

that individuals possess in relation to other individuals,

but is rather a property of principles that are shareable by

all other agents’; whereas, freedom is indeed others-

regarding.28 So, for Kant autonomy is a central part of who

we are as individual agents with individual wills. This led

Kant to characterize men as “end-setters”, autonomous in

setting their own ends according to their practical

reasoning. Autonomy ultimately can be characterized as the

capacity to set ends according to one’s will, only

restricted by her reason. This, then, leads him into

understanding human beings as moral agents too.

Moral agency has thus far appeared in our discussion

on reason as well as freedom. Now, in as far as man is 27 Beck, p. 262 (Groundwork G:4 412).28 O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, p. 83-95.

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autonomous and free, an internally determined end-setter, he

can potentially be worthy of intrinsic moral worth for the

thinker. Kant characterized ‘the autonomy of will as the

supreme principle of morality’.29 That is, Kant moves from

an attribute of individual agency into justifying a

communal, moral, one; something that will appear again in

our paper. Thus, in discussing the very nature of “ends”

having treated individual end-setting, Kant wondered which

end is the highest –or, better, if there is any intrinsic

end. He writes

‘If there is to be a supreme principle and a categorical imperative for the human will, it mustbe one that forms an objective principle of the will from the conception of what is necessarily anend for everyone because it is an end in itself’.30

The notion of an imperative will be shortly illuminated.

What is here important is keeping that Kant begins a

discussion of morality as a whole, and therefore individual

moral agency, according to intrinsic and universal –for

everyone- ends. He arrives at his understanding of moral

29 Beck, p. 281 (Groundwork G:4 440).30 Beck, p. 273 (Groundwork G:4 428).

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agency through a division and decomposition of human ends in

a passage that is here worth quoting in toto:

‘In the realm of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price and therefor admits of no equivalent, has dignity. That which is related to human inclinations and needs has a market price. That which, without presupposing any need, accords with a certain taste (i.e. with pleasure in the purposeless play of our faculties) has a fancy price. But that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have a mere relative worth (price) but an intrinsic worth(dignity). Morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, because only through it is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the realm of ends. Thus morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity’.31

By dividing ends through price and dignity, Kant arrives at

the conclusion that it is morality alone that has dignity

and thus intrinsic value. Morality is the only end-in-

itself. Individuals, in addition, are ends-in-themselves so

far as they are capable of morality. It is in this way that moral

agency becomes a central trait in defining the humanity of

an individual, elevating him to being intrinsically valuable31 Beck, p. 277 (Groundwork G:4 435).

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as a “lawmaker in the realm of ends”. This is the only

realm, after all, where one can be free for Kant, according

to one’s practical reasoning as shown earlier. It is through

moral agency that all the definitional characteristics of

humanity and human beings come together, integrally

interrelated, thus completing the unique portrait of man

that Kant wants to paint.

It is here worth pausing and reevaluating what has thus

far been asserted, as the first composite term within the

notion of human rights has been assessed. Human beings, or

humanity, have been shown, according to Kant’s approach, to

be defined through their personhood (being self-conscious),

faculty of reason (pure and practical), freedom (in

spontaneous creation and morality), autonomy (through

individual will) and moral agency (becoming ends in-

themselves). Now, let us move into treating the notion of

Right within his thought through wholly evaluating his

deontological ethics.

To begin with, it is pivotal for our purposes to assess

the “becoming” intrinsic ends for individual agents. That

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is, the humanity of a being is not a necessary but, rather,

a contingent term for Immanuel Kant. Only via being capable

of morality does an individual participate in humanity and

can be a human being –properly so called. Though this claim

may be at first appearing as highly controversial, through

elaborating on Kant’s ethics it will be more illuminated as

it will play a significant role in the subsequent treatment

of human rights. How does one, then “become” a human being

for Kant?

As has been already hinted towards, morality is an

ultimately rational endeavor for Kant. Relating morality

with moral agency and reason, he asserts that ‘just because

moral laws are to hold for every rational being as such, one

must derive them from the universal concept of a rational

being as such’.32 What he here calls “moral laws” are in

essence what he elsewhere refers to as duties, where ‘duty

is the necessity of an action done from the respect for law’

–hence deeming his approach deontological. 33 His duty will

be centered on ‘the conception of an objective principle, so32 Beck, p. 261 (Groundwork G:4 412).33 Beck, p. 253 (Groundwork G:4 400).

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far as it constrains the will, is a command (of reason), and

the formula of this command is called an imperative’.34 The

role of reason in constraining the will is what gives birth

to moral agency for individuals, what elevates them to

humanity, according to such an imperative. It is in this way

that reason relates to morality and moral agency. The

imperative as such, his overarching moral principle, moral

law or duty, in Kant can be summed up as: “always act such

that you will your maxim of action be universalized”.35

What this means is that the moral imperative that each human

being has is essentially to always act as if his maxim –his

reasoning behind each action- is adopted by every other

human being, every other moral agent. The imperative itself

is a categorical one in that is a necessary “command of

reason”. As Kant writes, ‘the categorical imperative would

be one which presented an action as of itself objectively

necessary, without regard to any other end’.36 That is, the

34 Beck, p. 262 (Groundwork G:4 413).35 Beck, p. 275-276 (Groundwork G:4 431-434).36 Beck, p. 263 (Groundwork G:4 415).

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moral duty should be objective and intrinsic, an end in-

itself, never as a means for some other, secondary end.

This is what has led Kant into characterizing the

formulation of his categorical imperative in a second way,

namely, “to always treat others as ends in themselves, never

as mere means to other ends”. As we have already asserted,

in participating in morality, individuals gain intrinsic

value, they become ends in-themselves for Kant. Thus, the

categorical imperative’s requirement for universalization of

maxim entails such a duty towards other moral agents;

namely, recognition and respect for their intrinsic worth,

their dignity. Kant stresses that it is this kind of reasoned

respect that both forbids the treatment of other moral agents

as means, as well as allows for recognizing oneself as

having dignity.

How is this justified? For one, we have seen that since

‘freedom consist only in this, that the agent utilizes his

powers at his own choice, in accordance with a principle of

reason’, and since the principle of reason is the

categorical imperative, it is only in this way that freedom

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can be materialized in society.37 More importantly perhaps,

we need to disambiguate how the notion of universalizability is

understood by the thinker. Kant shows the moral imperative

towards telling the truth by proposing what would result

from lying. According to the categorical imperative, if I

tell a lie, then I will that my maxim of action is

universalized, and thus institute lies universally, for all

moral agents. That would nevertheless mean the collapse of

the institution of language itself and is thus

impermissible.38 In this way we see why Kant’s conception of

a deontological ethics and, in turn, individual moral agency

is very strict, and thus, why it is based on a universalizable

imperative. Moreover, within Kant’s ethics,

disinterestedness and impartiality play a crucial role. In

his Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, a work mainly on aesthetics,

Kant argues for ‘beauty as a symbol for morality’ in that it

too necessitates ‘impartiality’ from the subject.39 That is,

in acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, in

37 Kant, Lectures on Ethics (LE 594).38 Ward, the Development of Kant’s Ethics, p. 113-114.39 Beck, p. 385-386 (Critique of the Faculty of Judgment CJ 352-354).

24

doing one’s duty, one has to be completely disinterested –as

has been shown with never treating others as mere means-, as

well as impartial, in that one should never discriminate

between other human beings –in the disinterested and

impartial way of treating objects of beauty. Therefore,

universalizability, as such, connotes the utter and

unqualified adoption of one’s moral duties. Let us now move

into treating Kant’s ethics in relation to the notion of

Right and, subsequently, into an ontological proof of human

rights as such.

Briefly, for clarity’s sake let us first illustrate how

the proof will be structured, what our methodology here is:

1) Analytic a priori Definition of Human Beings 2) Synthetic a priori Universalizability through

Others’ DutiesTherefore_______________

3) Derivation of Human Right’s Ontological Basis

That is, we will first show how there is an analytic and

necessary a priori notion of Right within Kant’s definition

of humanity (and radically so), then propose that a

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synthetic ethical duty, as correlative external obligation,

on the part of other human beings exists a priori, in order

to arrive at the existence of human rights.

First, we must understand the nature of the vey

concept of right within Kant’s thought. In the Metaphysics of

Morals Kant says that a non-statutory Right is ‘simply right

that can be known a priori by everyone’s reason’.40 The

first thing to be kept here thus is that a right is an a

priori notion, one that is determined and available through

reason alone. Moreover, for Kant, a right is analytic. It is

not a thing in-itself, rather, an a priori concept that is

by definition only reasoned towards. As a result, a right is an

analytic a priori notion. Keeping this in mind let us move

to Kant’s principle of right, which will pose the central

question to this entire treatise.

In talking about a principle of right, Kant extends the

concept of right into his treatment of ethics in general.

And immediately one sees that there is an epistemological

question raised in relation to his previous account of right

40 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 113-114 (MM 297).

26

as analytic a priori. The central concern here is that,

given that right is conceptually a priori, that means that

its extension to morality will necessitate that morality is

also a priori for Kant

To better explain explain, in the words of scholar

Leslie Mulholland who disagrees with Kant claiming that

‘the main problem in Kant’s argument for the principle of rights, however, is Kant’s claim thathe derives the principle of rights from analysis of the concept of right alone. […]The difficulty with this claim is that Kant insists that the capacity to obligate others to a duty, i.e. the concept of a right, is derived from the moral imperative. However, the moral imperative is the categorical imperative, and this is a synthetic proposition. How can an analytic proposition be derived from a synthetic proposition?’41

This is not the case. Mulholland correctly identifies that

the “obligating others to a duty” is a synthetic proposition

from which one cannot derive any analytic ones. However,

Kant’s notion of right in relation to morality should not be

taken in regards to others’ duties. That is, there is no

evidence that what Kant identifies as right is something

41 Mulholland, Kant’s System of Rights, p. 168.

27

that is external in obligating others –and we should here

apply this to morality too.

To explicate, as we have thus far seen, moral agency is

acting according to the categorical imperative individually, as

an agent. It is what characterizes the humanity of the

individual, what elevates him to being an end in-himself, what

provides dignity. But this is not, at least on a first

level, obligating others towards him. It is, to this extend

a characteristic of an individual human being not of men in

general. It is, thus, here fitting to illuminate the radical

claim on the definition of human beings that has been so far

presented. According to what we have seen from Kant, the

humanity of man is defined by an intricately related whole

of personhood, reason, freedom, autonomy and moral agency.

The humanity of man is, therefore, contingent upon each of

these traits. What this means is that not all individuals are human

beings for Immanuel Kant. Recall that what characterizes moral

agency is participating in morality through acting in

accordance with the categorical imperative. An individual

that does not do so, is not a human being per se, though he

28

may be an individual. That is, the radical distinction

proposed, is that there is, after all, a difference between

being a human being –in the Kantian sense of the term- and

that of merely belonging to the genome –being a homo

sapiens-sapiens. The same goes for all the above, as they,

by virtue of being the definitional traits of humanity,

also, necessarily, serve as criteria towards it too.

Now, this is presently quite relevant as it shows the

fallacy in which Mulholland succumbs to. The scholar finds

that Kant ‘goes too far’ in asserting that since ‘the claim

that man is free is synthetic, hence, the claim that humans

have rights is synthetic’.42 However, the claim that man is

free is not a synthetic claim for Kant, it is an analytic, a

priori one. That is, since de facto human beings are free –as well

as autonomous, rational, moral, self-conscious persons- they

are analytically free. Recall that Kant found an a priori

freedom in the noumenal conception of man as a creator of

uncaused causes in the phenomenal world through his capacity

to reason. Thus, morality too –in terms of moral agency- is an

42 Mulholland, Kant’s System of Rights, p. 171.

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analytic statement for Kant, one that as has been shown is

derived from human beings’ capacity to reason, and from

which he can derive a certain principle of right –in the

individual level at least. This was after all Kant’s entire

transcendental idealist project, to provide for an a priori

ethics through reasoning alone.

However, that ‘the supreme principle of Rights is

therefore an analytic proposition’ for Kant does not suffice

for ontologically proving human beings’ rights.43 All it

shows is merely their possibility [as was the case with

Kant’s original treatment of freedom in the Critique]. The

human being’s right in principle does not necessitate human

beings’ rights. Yet, without the logical possibility for an

a priori principle of right, Kant could not move forward

with discovering the conditions for any such rights’

existence. The existence of human rights is indeed one that is

going to be synthetically so derived, ironically perhaps,

from what Mulholland identified as obligating others. Having

provided for a radical understanding of human beings, as

43 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 199 (MM 396).

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analytically defined through the aforementioned

characteristics, let us turn to the second premise of our

proof, namely, the universalizability of duties.

It is, of course, here that Kant’s strict deontology

will come into play and where the notion of duty will serve

in proving that of right. As he writes, ‘Right is that free

action whose maxim can coexist with the freedom of everyone

according to universal law’.44 Remembering that human beings

are “free as moral agents”, thus materializing their freedom

only through acting morally, that is, according to the duty

imposed by the categorical imperative, right itself becomes

synonymous to moral duty for Kant. In other words, if right

is freedom –in the human being and every other - and freedom

is acting according to duty, then right is acting according

to duty.

It is perhaps here appropriate to answer the question

“what are human beings’ rights?” under Kant’s schema.45 As the

notion of duty, the very notion of right is directly derived

44 Kant, Theory of Right (HN 262).45 What kind of rights, which should be prioritized, put forth or sacrificed, are exceeding the purposes of this paper; we are merely interested in ontologically proving the existence of human rights, as such, according to our definition of human beings.

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from what it essentially means to be human for Kant. Human

beings’ rights, thus, human rights, can be simply said to

refer to those that guarantee one’s humanity. That is, human

rights are those obligations that one moral agent has in

relation to another, his moral duties. In this way, the

whole debate of human rights can be summed up as a moral

agent’s duty towards the categorical imperative, to the

maxim of “universalizability of maxim of action” –along with

the disinterestedness and impartiality that Kantian

deontology supposes. Human rights are duties to others’ –

that are participating in humanity- personhood, reason,

freedom, autonomy and moral agency. Kant, after all,

elsewhere writes that the ‘only one innate right’ human

beings have is ‘independence from being constrained by

another’s choice’.46 The independence proposed is thus the

inalienable right of each moral agent to be treated as an

end in-himself, never as mere means to other ends, to have

dignity.

46 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 63 (MM 237).

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The only constraint Kant proposes is an internal one,

it is the constraint of reason. It is only thus that one can

ontologically conceive of human rights, where they become an

a priori synthetic judgment. That is, only through

participating in Kant’s humanity, acting thus according to

duty as constrained by reason, that we can have the

existence of human rights, as such, materialized. We have

seen that in the individual level, the principle of right

can be analytically conceived of, but that does not

necessitate an existence of human rights. In an imaginary

world, with only one human being –even defined in the

Kantian sense- that human being’s rights would not exist, as

there would be no one to act according to them. Better, they

would only be conceived of in principle, but not take any

material manifestation through moral action. There exists no

duty, right or moral obligation in vacuo. However, we can

have the existence of human rights both synthetically and a priori

the moment we enter one more human being as such in that

world. That is, the second human being will be synthetically

materializing the practice of human rights by recognizing

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the moral obligation involved in treating the first human

being as an end in-himself, and will be doing so a priori

according only to the constraints and duties imposed on

himself by his capacity to reason. In other words, the

synthetic has to do with the extra-definitional information

that a Kantian human being imposes on the very definition of

humanity. That is, it is synthetic in imposing a duty on

action, an intrinsic respect for human beings’ rights as

such. The a priori, clearly, in that it is reason alone that

leads him to act according to a categorical imperative. It

is thus that we have derived an ontological proof of human

rights, flowing from an analytic a priori definition of

human beings and a subsequent synthetic a priori judgment on

humanity as imposing the correlative and external

obligations that are human rights.

That is, we have proven, why and how Human Rights (can only)

exist within the Kantian schema.

========

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As the thesis is itself radical, it should be

instrumental for our purposes to face two key objections

that arise from what has thus far been asserted.

I. What has been asserted is too strict.

It is clearly the case that the radical distinction

between mere individuals and human beings merits further

discussion. By asserting that in order to have dignity, to

participate in humanity, one has to be a moral agent for

Kant, immediately one sees that there are questions in

regard to human rights in relation to aborting fetuses,

individuals in desert (Crusoe), a severely disabled

individual etc. Are they worthy of human rights? According

to what has thus far been proposed, Kant would strictly say

no. Commenting on a Kantian view on the question of

abortion, Kantian scholar Matthew C. Altman writes

‘For Kant, determining the ethics of abortion requires first that we determine the personhood ofthe fetus, yet an analysis of Kant’s approach to personhood shows that the class of morally considerable agents is very limited. Kant’s moral theory excludes not only fetuses but also young children’.47

47 Altman, Kant and Applied Ethics, p. 242.

35

Since the fetus is in no way a person defined via self-

consciousness, or a moral agent, it is not worthy of being

classified as a human being. Even more illustrative of the

radical position of Kant’s distinction is Altman’s exclusion

of young children too from belonging to humanity. Similarly,

this should also be the case for severely disabled

individuals, where one has but to again allude to the fact

that it depends on whether they “fulfill” the criteria of

humanity as presented above. On the contrary, in the case of

Robinson Crusoe, though while left deserted in the island by

himself where there is no one who can express moral duties

towards him, Crusoe can still be considered a human being,

with personhood, reason, freedom, autonomy and moral agency.

48 As was shown above, he is worthy of human rights in

principle but they do not exist per se as there is no other

to act upon them in his isolation. With the arrival of

Friday, granted that they both act in accordance with the

categorical imperative, human rights exist.

48 Similar to Churchill’s conception of moral agency, p. 3-4.

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A more interesting case, would be that of the

protagonist of the Jungle Book, Mowgli. Mowgli is fully

grown when ‘retrieved’ from nature and in entering society

the moral consideration enters a greyer area. That is –as

perhaps with different elements form previously considered

cases, but this example is more direct both in relation to

time and possibility- Mowgli is at first not a Kantian human

being due to lack of moral agency and autonomy. He is self-

conscious according to his a priori faculty of understanding

and rational –at least in terms of pure reason in as much as

it is organizing his understanding (practical reason is

related to end-setting). Mowgli, we can imagine, is also

noumenaly free. As the story goes Mowgli in time, comes to

terms with his humanity, and develops into a proper human

being, acquiring both autonomy through end-setting abilities

and moral agency in terms of duty by virtue of reason, thus

becoming a human being with dignity. What does this entail

for Mowgli’s human rights? Can his “human potential” be

deemed enough for granting him human rights?

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Kant proposes no arguments on potentiality or teleology

in relation to prima facie moral duties. That is, for Kant

Mowgli was at some point merely an individual, at another

point a human being, at one point unworthy, at another

worthy of human rights. And that is another reason why one

can have trouble with the radical criteria Kant puts forth

in relation to humanity.

In any case, one can characterize Kant’s ethics as

morally degenerate, exclusive, arrogant and highly

discriminative. Nonetheless, what is here most significant

is that we are providing for an ontological and a priori

proof of human rights, not a an argument on morality in

general. And such a project can only be achieved in the

strictest way possible within Kant’s thought. That is, we

have been arguing for a conceptual basis through which we

can materialize the existence of human rights through Kant’s

philosophy and if in his ethics animals, children, even some

grown individuals, are not worthy of a firm deontological

moral consideration, it is so because his entire focus is on

human beings in the manner he defines them. Whether one buys

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Kant’s thesis –including yours truly- is another story.

Kant’s ethics are in many ways radical, most importantly

perhaps, according to Altman, in grounding ‘ethical theory

neither in a principle to be obeyed nor in an end to be

pursued, but in a value to be esteemed, honoured or

respected’.49

II. This is all conditioned on accepting Kant’s terms.

We have but to return to an early assertion made about

our project, namely, its conditionality. As has been shown

since our introductory remarks, this entire thesis on human

rights’ existence is a conditional one, an if P then Q

statement. Our proof is based on a certain conception of

what it means to be human without which, its dialectic

collapses. The fact that the ontological basis was to be a

priori derived, necessitated such a conditionality, in

relation to Kant’s rational, a priori, definition of human

beings and morality.

49 Altman, Kant and Applied Ethics, p. 244.

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As a result, it is very easy for the reader not to

ascribe to the thesis proposed on what constitutes humanity.

Merely declaring a determinist philosophical position, that

space belongs to the world not the mind, that we are not

really self-conscious etc. suffice in invalidating this

enitre proof. Of course, this does not invalidate the very

process of argumentation and justification within the proof.

That is, rejecting the soundness of the antecedent deems the

whole proof unsound, though the conditional itself is valid.

Rejecting the premises does not invalidate the logical

reasoning towards the ontology proposed.

Moreover, one could argue against the consequences of

what has been asserted, as many individuals are not supposed

to be worth of equal moral consideration from the Kantian

human being. That is, even declaring the soundness of the

proof, would not necessitate the adoption of its conclusion

due to pragmatic concerns. After all, the conception of

human beings proposed is very radical and controversial, as

was just discussed above. Little more can be said here on

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the conditionality, as such, as it is a conditional that one

either adheres or not –on a first level.

Nonetheless, on another note, there is something more that

can be derived from the very conditionality of the project,

when understood normatively.

The very weakness of conditional proofs like this one,

is what sometimes gives them normative value, what makes

them especially intriguing. The fact is that having read

this entire paper, one can safely conclude –without agreeing

with its theses- that in order for Human Rights to exist, there needs

to be a redefinition, an elevation, a change of some sort.

That is, what this project ultimately can show to those that

are not wiling to buy the arguments strictly put forth by

Kant, is that for Human Rights to exist there is a necessary

shift of moral consciousness involved.

This is what the subtitle of the paper eventually

alludes to. By claiming a redefinition of humanity and a much needed

attempt at shifting moral consciousnesses, this project does not

purely aim at convincing its readers that the redefinition

proposed is the only one possible. It indeed strives to

41

convince its readers that the ontological materialization of

Human Rights requires the acceptance of a new original

premise by everyone and for everyone. It strives to show,

through the Kantian lens, the intrinsic worth and value

human beings possess. It indeed strives towards a morality

that is stricter and obligatory in relation to each other’s

humanity at the very least. But, most importantly, it aims

at an overall shift of consciousness on the individual level in

relation to the other –to the human being next to you.

This is, after all, the intended placement of the paper

in relation to the entire human rights discourse. To show

the dire need of shifting perspectives in terms of how we

define humanity, in how we define ourselves, in order to

make human rights work, in order to bring them into

existence in our world. The conditionality and contingency

of any possible human rights’ ontology is the one message

the reader should keep in mind.

Having gone through Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, we have

seen certain aspects of what it universally means to be human.

Freedom, autonomy, personhood, reason and moral agency can

42

be –and have been- defined in many different ways. What we

need to maintain studying Kant is that they are indeed part

of a broader picture that is man –and, I think, this is what

Kant himself ultimately aimed for. He famously said “I had

to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” in the

preface of his Critique.50 This “faith” echoes the kind of shift

in moral consciousness that is here proposed. A faith in

humanity.

-----------------To conclude with a quote from a thinker that truly

influenced Immanuel Kant in his understanding of man:

‘Change human nature, to transform each individual(who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole) into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being; to alter man’s constitution in order to strengthen it; to substitute a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature. In a word, he must deny man his own forces in order to give him forces that are alien to him and that he cannot make use of without the help of others’.51

-Jean Jacques Rousseau

-----------------50 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 29 (CPR Bxxx).51 Rousseau, On the Social Contract, p. 181.

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Beck Lewis White (editor), Kant Selections, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1988.

Caygill Howard, a Kant Dictionary, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford,1996.

Churchill Robert Paul, Human Rights and Global Diversity, Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2006.

Cohen Alix, Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History, Palgrave McMillan, New York, 2009.

Hill E. Thomas, Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002.

Kant Immanuel (trans. N. H. Smith), Critique of Pure Reason, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1965.

Kant Immanuel (trans. M. Gregor), the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

Mullholand A Leslie, Kant’s System of Rights, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989.

O’Neill Onora, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

O’Neill Onora, Acting on Principle: an Essay in Kantian Ethics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1975.

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Reath Andrews (edit.), Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: selected essays, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006.

Rousseau Jean-Jacques (trans. D. Cress), Basic Political Writings, Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2011.

Saner Hans, Kant’s Political Thought: its Origins and Development, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967.

Sussman David G., the Idea of Humanity: Anthropology and Anthroponomy in Kant’s Ethics, Routledge, New York, 2001.

Ward Keith, the Development of Kant’s View of Ethics, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1972.

& Webliography

Kant’s Theory of Right found here (pdf):http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/germanphilosophy/files/2011/11/kant-doctrine-of-right-1-10-and-44.pdf

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