An Anchor for a Dazzling Debate: Conceptualizing State Collapse

Daniel Lambach, Eva Johais, Markus Bayer

Affiliation and Postal Address:University of Duisburg-EssenFaculty of Social ScienceInstitute of Political Science Lotharstrasse 6547057 DuisburgGermany

Corresponding author:Daniel Lambach (LF 324)daniel.lambach@uni-due.de Phone: 0049 203 379 2021

Eva Johais (LF 320)eva.johais@uni-due.de Phone: 0049 203 379 3607

Markus Bayer (LF 320)markus.bayer@uni-due.de Phone: 0049 203 379 3607

AbstractThis paper proposes a theoretically grounded and methodologically rigorous conceptualization ofstate collapse. It seeks to overcome several key deficits of research into fragile, failed and collapsedstates which is often criticised as normatively problematic and methodologically deficient. Weargue that this is a worthwhile topic to study but that scholarly inquiry needs to become moresystematic and focus on extreme cases of state collapse. Following a Weberian institutionalisttradition, we disaggregate statehood into three dimensions: the state's capacity to make and enforcebinding rules, to monopolise the means of violence and to collect taxes. We then propose a set ofindicators as well as a mode of aggregation based on necessary and sufficient conditions. Ourframework identifies 17 cases of state collapse in the post-colonial era.

KeywordsState collapse, concept formation, fragile states

This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) under Grant LA 1847/8-1.

Word count (without title page, including endnotes): 9.135

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1. IntroductionThe state is back. After being out of fashion for decades, the institution of the state is now perceivedas a source of peace and well-being. Consequently, 'state fragility' and 'state collapse' are thought tobe a challenge to security and development in the Global South. However, more work needs to bedone to improve the analytical viability of these buzzwords.

This paper takes two recent critiques as points of departure. The first is that looking at state fragilityin the broadest sense makes the concept too difficult to operationalise and lumps together verydifferent phenomena underneath the same umbrella. Authors like Call1 and Ulfelder2 have thereforeadvocated a focus on more extreme and clear-cut cases, tightening the scope of inquiry from fragilestates to collapsed states. A second critique holds that current approaches are insufficientlytheorised. Indices of state fragility do not offer theoretically informed justifications for their choiceof sub-dimensions of fragility as well as the weighting of indicators. Eriksen has also pointed outthat there are two different conceptions of the state underlying the major contributions to theliterature.3

To rectify these problems, this paper proposes a conceptualisation of state collapse that istheoretically grounded and methodologically rigorous. We argue that 'state fragility' is a worthwhiletopic to study but that scholarly inquiry needs to become more systematic. To this end, we develop aconcept of state collapse that is anchored in a Weberian institutionalist understanding of statehood.We use Goertz' method of concept-building to derive a notion of state collapse that is disaggregatedinto three essential dimensions: the state's capacity to make and enforce binding rules, tomonopolise the means of violence and to collect taxes.4 We then employ this concept to identify 17cases of state collapse in the post-colonial era (1960-2007).

The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we give a brief survey of current debates in theresearch field. Thereafter, we present our concept of state collapse by first elaborating a Weberiantheory of the state and deriving a multidimensional operationalisation from it. Then, we use ourconcept of collapse and present results from an empirical survey of the postcolonial world. Theconcluding part summarises our argument about the merits and limitations of our approach and laysout some directions for future research.

2. Sorting the Field of Fragile States ResearchEver since the emergence of the research field, there have been attempts to define, delineate,measure and rank 'failed', 'fragile' or 'collapsed states'. With the development of the research field,the number of conceptual approaches multiplied and became an issue of intense debate. We do notprovide a detailed historiography but adopt the approach by Bueger and Bethke who identify fourstages in the development of the field:

Only loosely mentioned in academia of the late 1980s (phase one), the concept was extended to numerousdisciplines and foreign policy makers in 1990s (phase two), it was securitised and globalised in the early 2000s(phase three), and in a contemporary phase (phase four) there has been a double trend of homogenisationthrough quantification and heterogenisation through criticism.5

Although the development of the research field was always 'a story of struggle over homogenizingthe scope, aim and meaning of the concept', we focus on the fourth phase and discuss the 'doubletrend' highlighted by Bueger and Bethke.6 We first present attempts to quantify and measure statefragility and collapse. As for the heterogenisation dynamic, we present two strands of critique – oneanalytical, one normative.

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2.1 Quantification

There are several projects that strive to quantify state fragility. The best-known ones include theFailed States Index (FSI),7 the Index of State Fragility (ISF),8 the State Fragility Index (SFI),9 andthe Index of State Weakness (ISW).10 These indices typically employ aggregate data gathered byother researchers. All four indices take a very broad approach to state fragility, using indicators likeinfant mortality, the rate of deforestation and the GDP to assess the capacity of the state. Forinstance, the FSI uses twelve indicators (see Table 1) who are further disaggregated into 3 to 10sub-indicators.

<<Table 1 here>>

With this broad range of indicators, the FSI is representative of the major indices. The problemswith such a 'kitchen sink' approach towards fragility are twofold: First, it overstretches the notion offragility by lumping a diffuse set of crisis indicators into the same conceptual basket. Second, it cur-tails opportunities for causal analysis since most potential explanatory variables are already part ofthe definition. Furthermore, none of the four projects explicitly deal with issues of weighting. Someare also biased towards democracies.11

In spite of these methodological deficiencies, these indices – particularly the FSI – have receivedpolitical and public attention and have also been employed in other research.12

All attempts to quantify state fragility thus far have suffered from methodological shortcomings.This is particularly evident with respect to their validity: By subsuming several different sub-indic-ators within the concept of state fragility, these approaches measure a random amalgamation of con-flict potential, level of development and good governance. Fearon's observation that 'good directmeasures of a state’s administrative capability and integrity are lacking' is as true today as it was in2005.13

2.2 Critique

In a separate development, the entire research field has been subject to two major strands ofcritique. The first one comes from a critical, normative perspective that challenges the discourse assuch. The second one is more analytical and strives for a re-conceptualisation of state fragility andstate collapse.

Critical IR literature problematises effects of the ‘statebuilding’ paradigm in international interven-tions in non-Western states. Some contributions discuss how dynamics of statehood are globalisedby international interventions in non-Western states.14 For instance, international donors assumefunctions ascribed to the state or disrupt the formal institutional decision-making process. There-with, the state’s potential to generate legitimacy is curtailed. Wilén condenses the paradox of con-temporary international interventions: They aim at ‘statebuilding’, but encroach on state sover-eignty.15 With regard to its ontological implications, the ‘failed states’ discourse is thought to depol-iticise the non-Western state16 by picturing it as a pathological case,17 by the 'creolization of theAfrican world'18 or by considering societies beyond the modern liberal state as 'a homogenous anddisorderly Other'.19 The effect of this depoliticisation is the legitimisation of intervention, either byinternational agencies or Western states.A more radical position highlights the normative conception that underlies the research domain offragile statehood: States are measured with reference to a Weberian, liberal idea of modernstatehood. However, this ideal was developed in a very particular political setting in Late MiddleAge to Early Modern Europe whereas power relations in contemporary non-Western states are

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conditioned by different endogenous and exogenous structures. On the global level the state is thedominant political idea, but has to compete with other modes of governance on the level ofsocieties.20 The argument is brought up in particular by postcolonial studies, area studies on non-Western regions and 'functionalist approaches'21 that try to grasp the alternatives to ‘modernstatehood’ with concepts, such as ‘neopatrimonialism’, ‘clientelism’, ‘para-statehood’,22 ‘twilightinstitutions’23 or ‘social orders’.24 The notion of hybrid political orders catches the simultaneity ofthe formal – modern state institutions – and the informal - traditional, customary, socialinstitutions.25 Schlichte goes so far as to claim that 'state failure' is no more than a discursiveproduct without a corresponding empirical phenomenon.26

Recently, sociological and anthropological views on the state have also joined the debate.Sociological notions point to the embeddedness of ongoing statebuilding projects in long-termstruggles over the institutionalisation of power relations.27 The anthropology of the state adds anideational level to the institutionalist and functionalist dimensions of statehood: Which imagesinform individuals’ expectations on the state? How relevant is the global dominant norm in relationto other socio-political orders?28

These critiques highlight important shortcomings in our understanding of fragile states, e.g.regarding the relation between ideals and institutions of the formal state with social orders, informalinstitutions and societal norms. However, we believe that state fragility and state collapse are stillworthwhile subjects of study, as politically loaded as these terms may be. The cases we identifybelow are periods of political, social and economic crises that are characterised by excessive intra-societal violence. Similar to Putzel and Di John's notion of 'crisis states',29 we believe that thereasons for resilience and catastrophe can be located in the institution of the state. Furthermore,while an institutionalist understanding of the state can be criticised on many grounds, it representsthe dominant global ideal of political organisation. Citizens and political elites around the worldsubscribe to it. Approaching the issue in these widely understood terms has merit for comparativeresearch in particular.

2.3 Re-Conceptualisation

As second strand of critique does not seek to overturn the entire academic discourse about fragilestates, but rather to improve it. Partly motivated by the failure to develop a good index measure ofstate fragility, several authors have started to rethink the conceptual foundations of the field. Mostresponses follow two different approaches: the first argues for a significant tightening of theconcept to focus on extreme cases of state collapse, the second argues in favour of disaggregatingfragility into more specific subtypes. We shall discuss these arguments in turn.

As for the first approach, Call30 and Ulfelder31 argue that concepts of state failure and state fragilityshould be abandoned entirely, arguing that these are too broad and too vague. This conceptualoverstretch is said to produce two problems: first, that the line between failed/fragile and non-failed/non-fragile states is impossible to define, and second, that cases within the group offailed/fragile states are too different, making comparison almost impossible. Hence, they argue,scientists should focus on the extreme instances of failure which they call state collapse.32

For Call, state collapse refers to the all-encompassing failure of state institutions to provide anymeaningful output:

(I)t refers to countries whose state apparatus ceases to exist for a period of several months. The concept heredoes not refer to the inability of some ministries to provide services, or to a state under siege in warfare, nor toan absence of the state in some regions, but to a complete collapse of a national state. Here citizens do notknow where to go to obtain a recognised passport, and all services normally provided by the state are providedby sub-state or non-state actors.33

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By contrast, Ulfelder focuses on one particular issue as an indicator of collapse:

A state collapse occurs when a sovereign state fails to provide public order in at least one-half of its territory orin its capital city for at least 30 consecutive days. A sovereign state is regarded as failing to provide publicorder in a particular area when a) an organised challenger, usually a rebel group or regional government,effectively controls that area; b) lawlessness pervades in that area; or c) both.34

The second approach starts from the same observation as the first approach: '(C)ountries as diverseas Haiti and North Korea may end up in close neighbourhood to each other […] although it isobvious that the respective challenges they face are rather different in nature. '

35Instead of trying toredraw conceptual boundaries, contributions to this approach argue that we should stop theorizingabout fragile states as a group and instead try to identify the groups of states that make up thisamorphous totality. Call, in a later contribution, argues that this empirical diversity should bepreserved instead of being reduced to a one-dimensional judgment.36

Such an approach can draw on many different attempts to disentangle the constituent parts of(fragile) statehood. Patrick made a fundamental distinction between the inability and theunwillingness of a state to fulfil its functions.37 Ghani et al. stress the need for effectiveness andlegitimacy in state-building.38 Still others, like the Commission for Weak States and US NationalSecurity, identify gaps in the 'three functions that effective governments must be able to perform:ensuring security, meeting the basic needs of citizens, and maintaining legitimacy'.39 Call furtheredthis approach by disaggregating state failure into a capacity gap, a legitimacy gap and a securitygap.40 Building upon these earlier contributions, Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum disaggregatefunctional statehood into the components of authority, capacity and legitimacy and develop anempirical typology that identifies seven major clusters of states.41

In practice, the differences between the first and the second approach should not be overstated. It iseasily possible to use the more fine-grained methodologies of the second approach to identify casesof state collapse, as advocated by the first one. Many contributions to the second approach do this,explicitly or implicitly. The Commission for Weak States and US National Security defines acontinuum of how many functional 'gaps' a country exhibits, allowing for the classification of failedstates.42 Carment and Samy mention that countries with gaps in all three dimensions, like 'Somalia,Afghanistan, Yemen, DRC and Chad might all be characterised as either failed or collapsed'.43

Similarly, Call describes Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, the DRC and Iraq as failed states due to theirweak performance in all three state functions.44

The conceptual debate has infused the research field with a new vitality. However, we see a seriousweakness in that key contributions seem to have no underlying theory of the state. Of course, theyall provide definitions of state fragility or collapse, and many duly refer to the work of Max Weber,but the theoretical foundation from which these definitions are derived is usually not articulated indepth. For instance, Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum do not discuss why differentiating statehoodinto the dimensions of authority, legitimacy and capacity is the best and most logical choice.45 Thesame goes for other contributions: why should the essential functions of the state be 'ensuringsecurity, meeting the basic needs of citizens, and maintaining legitimacy?'46 Why are the problemsof state ineffectiveness best expressed as gaps of capacity, legitimacy and security, as Calladvocates?47 Without a theory of the state, these choices are arbitrary.We draw two conclusions from this debate: a) Statehood needs to be understood as amultidimensional, multi-causal concept. b) Drawing a distinction between fragile and non-fragilestates is a core challenge. Focusing on extreme cases would reduce the uncertainty somewhat eventhough we still need some sort of threshold-based definition. A clear theory of the state is necessaryto provide guideposts that help us derive and justify such a threshold.

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3. Conceptualizing State CollapseIf we understand stateness to be a variable, it must be anchored to a fixed reference point. In theliterature on fragile states, the predominant reference points are ideal-type definitions. Eriksen hasidentified two different ideal-types, which he calls 'Weberian' and 'Lockean'.48

Weber defined the state by its instruments. The Weberian state has a legitimate monopoly over themeans of physical coercion which it employs to implement policies of its political leadership andthe bureaucracy within a given territory. Weber strongly objects to a definition that uses aims todistinguish states from other forms of polities:

It is not possible to define a political organisation, including the state, in terms of the end to which its action isdevoted. All the way from provision for subsistence to the patronage of art, there is no conceivable end whichsome political association has not at some point of time pursued.49

By contrast, a liberal approach in the tradition of John Locke defines a state according to its output.In this perspective, a state's primary purpose is to provide public goods like security, the protectionof property rights, justice or public health. Depending on the exact definition, welfare issues likeaccess to education, basic social services, opportunities for participation and the rule of law can alsobe considered part of the state's core functions.

Eriksen rightly points out that the Lockean approach has several drawbacks. First, this approachtakes a normative position about which tasks a state should engage in. As a result, the definition of astate is very closely tied to the 'OECD model' of statehood. Second, such a definition of statehood iseven more remote from realities in the Global South than a Weberian conception. Third, states thatdo not provide certain public goods due to a conscious political choice will be classified as weak orfailing. Conversely, states that outsource the production of public goods to non-state actors (e.g. byletting NGOs run schools and hospitals) look more capable than they really are. And finally, mostLockean approaches exhibit a strong democracy bias by including the rule of law or participationamong the definitional elements of statehood. For these reasons, we prefer to follow the Weberiantradition and focus on the institutional capacity of the state.50

3.1 An Institutionalist Theory of the State

Weber famously defined the state as follows: 'A compulsory political organisation with continuousoperations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staffsuccessfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in theenforcement of its order'.51 The crucial element that distinguishes a state from other kinds of politiesis its ability to monopolise the means of violence, claim legitimacy for this move and to assert anddefend its sovereignty within a given territory. Additionally, it shares several characteristics withother forms of political organisation, like a hierarchical governance structure, an administrativeapparatus and social relations based on domination and rule (Herrschaft).

Weber's approach lends itself to an understanding that looks at statehood as a variable: 'Even incases of such social organisation as a state [...] the social relationship consists exclusively in the factthat there has existed, exists, or will exist a probability of action in some definite way appropriate tothis meaning'.52 This means that within Weber's framework, all institutions and all forms of socialrelations exist only to the degree that people act in accordance with their orders. The corollary isthat if the state only exists as a particular likelihood of certain forms of social action, then theremust logically be different degrees of statehood. Weber himself asserts:

The fact that, in the same social group, a plurality of contradictory systems of order may all be recognised asvalid, is not a source of difficulty for the sociological approach. Indeed, it is even possible for the sameindividual to orient his action to contradictory systems of order. [...] Thus for sociological purposes there does

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not exist [...] a rigid alternative between the validity and lack of validity of a given order. On the contrary, thereis a gradual transition between the two extremes; and also possible, as it has been pointed out, for contradictorysystems of order to exist at the same time. In that case each is 'valid' precisely to the extent that there is aprobability that action will in fact be oriented to it.53

However, the role of legitimacy in Weber's concept of the state needs to be critically examined.Weber has an empirical understanding of legitimacy that focuses on the impact of legitimacy beliefson actors' behaviour. In his view, legitimacy consists of two components: 1) obedience towards anorder given by some authority, and 2) the intellectual or emotional affirmation of this authority andits orders as rightful and justified.54 This second component is crucial so that conformist behaviourresulting from coercion or out of pure self-interest is not mistaken for an act of legitimation.

We prefer to exclude legitimacy from our definition of the state. First of all, legitimacy is verydifficult to measure, making any assessment vulnerable to post-hoc rationalisation. By excluding itfrom the definition, we are freed from the burden of having to operationalised and measure it as acomponent of statehood. Second, Weber's understanding of legitimacy sets a very high bar for astate to be considered legitimate. If we take his two components of legitimacy seriously, a majorityof what is generally considered 'states' in the contemporary world would be hard pressed to meet thesecond criterion in particular. This is greatly at odds with the everyday use of the word 'state' – thereare many instances of states with little to no popular legitimacy that nonetheless persist. The latteryears of the Mobutu regime in Zaire (1965-1997) illustrate this very well. By the late 1980s, aftertwo decades of 'kleptocracy' and in the wake of severe economic crisis, the regime and the entire'Mobutist' state had lost all popular legitimacy. However, accelerating economic decline, a stalleddemocratisation and frequent mutinies by disgruntled soldiers were not enough to dislodge Mobutu.By 1992, the state operated without a formal budget, the territorial reach of the government waslimited to the capital and taxes were collected in the manner of armed raids.55 This farce continueduntil 1996-97 when Mobutu was finally unseated after rebels from the Alliance des ForcesDemocratiques pour la Libération du Congo conquered the country within less than eight months,sweeping away of the facade of statehood that the old regime had continued to uphold.

Therefore, we define the ideal type of the state as an institution that is characterized by monopoliesof rule-making, violence and taxation within a defined territory and the population living therein.This institution finds its organisational expression in an administrative apparatus, political organsand bodies for collective decision-making. It is represented by symbols and social practices thatremind citizens of the existence of the political order.

The monopoly of rule-making is inherent in the concept of the state as that institution which makesbinding decisions about the allocation of values, to borrow a phrase from Easton.56 This monopolyis the core element of state sovereignty. A state's claim to the monopoly of rule-making includes thecorollary that no one else is entitled to make binding decisions for another citizen unless he or shehas been specifically delegated this authority by the state.

The monopoly of violence follows logically from the monopoly of rule-making and is inextricablytied to it. To make its binding decisions stick, a state has to be able to implement them even in theface of resistance. The state might need to employ violence to get its way, but more importantly, itcan never tolerate means of violence in the hands of those who would defy it. Nevertheless, someprivate means of violence are still acceptable but only insofar the state explicitly authorises this.

The monopoly of taxation derives from historical experience rather than theory: To finance themeans of violence centralised under its control, the state in Early Modern Europe started tomonopolise the collection of taxes and duties. Elias has noted that the resources that becameavailable to the state supported the monopoly of violence, and that the means of violence supportedthe monopoly of taxation.57 As with the other two, private collection of binding taxes are outlawedexcept with the assent of the state.

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As discussed above, the state's ability to achieve, enforce and defend this 'holy trinity' ofmonopolies can vary. This means that states can be fragile in different ways, e.g. with little capacityto collect taxes but effective security forces that guarantee internal and external stability. We canrepresent variation in statehood as a three-dimensional space (see Fig. 1). Theoretically, a state caninhabit any point within this space, although some of the extremes are very unlikely to exist. Wewould hypothesise that deficiencies in one dimension strongly correlate with deficiencies in theother two – but that is ultimately an empirical question.

<<Figure 1 here>>

3.2 Operationalising State Collapse

We now derive a concept of state collapse from our definition of the ideal state given in theprevious section. We focus on state collapse instead of broader notions of state fragility for the sametwo reasons mentioned earlier: First, setting a threshold is easier when focusing on extreme cases.In the space depicted in Fig. 1, we focus on the (0, 0, 0) corner of the diagram and its immediatesurroundings. Second, even though cases of state collapse differ from each other, they stillrecognizably belong to the same class of object. We thus avoid the problem of grouping wildlydifferent phenomena under a single, broadly-defined header.

The collapse of a state is defined as the situation where the state has no meaningful capacities in itsthree core dimensions of rule-making, violence control and taxation. In the dimension of rule-making, this may mean that the state no longer passes any laws, that these laws are not implementedor that rival sets of rules (religious or traditional law) dominate. In the violence dimension, the statecan no longer exert physical control over large parts of the country while non-state actors establishthemselves as local para-sovereigns. With respect to taxation, the state can no longer collect taxessystematically and its fiscal administration is in disarray.

We use Goertz' three-level method of concept formation for the operationalisation of statecollapse.58 The basic level contains the phenomenon itself, e.g. 'democracy'. This concept needs adefinition and it has to be distinguishable from its opposite ('non-democracy'). The second levelcontains the dimensions that make up the basic phenomenon. For instance, democracy can –depending on its definition – include second-level dimensions like 'competitive elections','participation', 'civil rights' and others. These dimensions represent the core aspects of theunderlying concept. On the third level, dimensions are operationalised through indicators. Theseprovide criteria that answer the question: How do we recognise a certain dimension when we see it?

This multidimensional approach to concept formation is a very useful way of breaking downcomplex concepts. However, to answer the fundamental question 'is object A a member of set Y?'(e.g., 'is Russia a democracy?'), we need a way to aggregate the information from the lower levels.Here, Goertz proposes two prototypical logics: The essentialist two-valued logic of sufficient andnecessary conditions and the family resemblance logic.59 The first one assumes that all instances ofa particular concept are alike in their fundamental aspects. In our example, an essentialistunderstanding of democracy would mean that certain dimensions of democracy (like competitiveelections) are considered to be so crucial that political systems without these features would not beclassified as democratic. This requires a clear specification which dimension, or combination ofdimensions, are necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a particular concept to be present. Thesecond logic assumes a continuum of cases that are closely related but do not necessarily share acore set of characteristics. To use a medical analogy: Diseases have certain symptoms that arefrequently displayed by infected persons, but not all patients display the exact same set of

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symptoms in the exact same manner. A common way of formalizing family resemblance is bysetting a threshold how many dimensions of the basic phenomenon have to be present for an objectto be an instance of this concept (e.g. 'a political system is democratic if it meets any three of thefollowing four criteria...').

For our purposes, the basic level phenomenon is 'state collapse' as the polar opposite of the ideal-type of the state (see 3.1). We then follow an essentialist two-valued logic and define sufficient andnecessary conditions of state collapse. This means that we have to establish a threshold betweencollapsed and non-collapsed states. While this dichotomy might seem to be in conflict with ourcontinuum of statehood (see Fig. 1), this is actually not a problem since our objective is merely totheorise about collapsed states, not about statehood in a more general sense.

Drawing on the three core dimensions of statehood, we define the second-level dimensions of statecollapse as:

1. No meaningful capacity to make rules

2. No meaningful control over the means of violence

3. No meaningful capacity to extract taxes

Jointly, these three dimensions create the necessary and sufficient conditions for state collapse, ifthey occur continuously over a time span of at least six months.60

At the indicator level we use a combination of both logics (see Table 2). Every dimension of statecollapse, 'rule-making', 'means of violence' and 'taxation', has primary and secondary indicators.Primary indicators are unambiguous signs of state collapse, e.g. when the government leaves thecapital or when security forces cannot even control the entire capital. These indicators wereformulated to be as specific as possible to maximise their objectivity and reliability. The presence ofany primary indicator was sufficient for a particular dimension to be coded as collapsed.

Because these events only occur infrequently, even during state collapse, we added a group ofsecondary indicators which by themselves were not particularly indicative of collapse but which welooked at jointly. Here we use a family resemblance logic: if more than half of the secondaryindicators are present, the dimension is also coded as collapsed. For example, in the 'means ofviolence' dimension, if non-state actors command large parts of the country AND if the state'ssecurity forces are de facto private militias, this is sufficient to diagnose a lack of meaningfulcontrol over the means of violence.

<<Table 2 here>>

4. Instances of State CollapseTo demonstrate its implications for empirical research, we used the framework elaborated above toidentify cases of state collapse in the international system. Since there has been no prior systematiccollection of data for most of our indicators, we had to assess potential cases through qualitativecase studies. To limit the number of case studies, we culled the number of 'candidate cases' in aseries of steps.

Our first aim was to identify all cases where the state had potentially collapsed. We cast a very widenet so as not to miss any 'false negatives' – of course this came at the price of increasing the numberof 'false positive' cases in the initial sample. To come up with this first sample, we identified allcountry-years from 1946 onwards that fulfilled one or more of the following conditions:

• Polity IV

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◦ Indicator 1.7 (Polity Fragmentation) = 3 ('serious fragmentation')

◦ Standardised Authority Code = -66 (Interruption) or -77 (Interregnum), or -88(Transition) for three concurrent years

◦ Indicator 4.10 (Total Change in POLITY value) = 96 ('state disintegration')

◦ Indicator 4.12 (State Failure) = 1• Index of State Weakness 2008 score < 2• Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2008): Indicator Q1.1 (Territorial Extent of State

Monopoly of Violence) ≤ 3• State Failure Task Force: 'Near-Total Failures of State Authority'• Categorisation as 'failed' or 'collapsed state' by Rotberg• Personal assessment by researchers.61

This resulted in a list of 87 countries that had potentially experienced state collapse at some pointafter 1946. Many countries fulfilled multiple of the above criteria, often for overlapping timeperiods. These were then consolidated into continuous periods.

This initial list still contained a lot of cases that were obviously not cases of state collapse in ourunderstanding. These included the dissolution of states under international law (e.g. East Germany1989), foreign invasion (e.g. Kuwait 1990) or regime change (Greece 1974, Portugal 1974-75,Spain 1975-77). Most cases from the immediate post-World War II period were qualitativelydifferent from our understanding of state collapse (e.g. Czechoslovakia 1947, West Germany 1946-48, East Germany 1946-48, Hungary 1946-47, Japan 1946-51, and Romania 1946-47). Due to theirlimited comparability with later cases, we decided to shorten our period of observation to 1960-2007.

This narrowed our list to 48 potential country-periods of state collapse. We then conducted deskstudies of these candidates and identified 17 cases of state collapse (see Table 3). Five cases met allcriteria but only for a period of less than six months (Albania 1997, Central African Republic 2001,Ethiopia 1991, Iran 1978, Rwanda 1994). Another five cases had collapsed in two of the threedimensions (Burundi 1993, Cambodia 1975, Côte d'Ivoire 2004, Nicaragua 1979, Solomon Islands2000). And another four cases exhibited symptoms of collapse in one of the three dimensions(Colombia 2000, El Salvador 1979, Ghana 1979, Nigeria 1966).62

<<Table 3 here>>

It is plainly visible that these instances of state collapse all coincide with civil wars and other formsof widespread intrastate violence (and in cases like Iraq and Afghanistan interstate conflict as well).In some ways, this is inevitable given our coding scheme where territorial control by governmentforces plays an important role. However, we wish to stress that our concept of state collapse is morethan a fancy name for situations of pervasive violence. Our concept asks whether the state iscapable of functioning as a provider of governance but also as an actor in conflict. State capacity isa crucial precondition for counterinsurgency as a multitude of cases, e.g. in Latin America, readilyshows. By contrast, conflicts in the countries from Table 2 were characterised by a predominance ofnon-state actors of violence. It is no coincidence that many of the more recent cases, likeAfghanistan, Liberia and Somalia have been discussed in terms of 'warlordism'.

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To borrow a distinction from research into civil wars, all of our cases are instances of a particularkind of 'governmental conflict', i.e. an incompatibility concerning the type of political system or thecomposition of government. In contrast, 'territorial conflicts' about secession or regional autonomy(as in the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan or Senegal) are not found in our final list of cases. This isconsistent with Buhaug who found that rebellion in institutionally capable states will morefrequently occur as secessionist conflict where weaker states were more likely to experiencegovernmental conflicts.63

5. ConclusionIn this paper, we have demonstrated an approach to the conceptualisation and operationalisation ofstate collapse. We have asserted that current attempts to measure state collapse (as well as thebroader concept of state fragility) suffer from key weaknesses that limit their analytical value.Therefore, we sought to develop a concept that represents an improvement in two crucial aspects.First, our approach has a firm theoretical grounding. It is based on a view of the state derived from amodification of Weberian institutionalism. This theoretical background provides the reference pointfor our choices during concept formation. Second, our approach is methodologically rigorous. Weemployed Goertz' method of concept formation and provided a multidimensional disaggregation ofthe concept of state collapse, as well as the logic for the aggregation of the data. This represents aparticular advance in terms of content validity since our measurement instrument is closely fitted tothe dimensions of our concept. Using this framework, we identified 17 cases of state collapse in thepostcolonial era.

This concept is designed to be employed in comparative research. Classifying states as 'collapsed' or'not collapsed' would be little more than l'art pour l'art, especially as we reject normative andteleological claims about the sort of politics that take place in collapsed states. Where our approachworks much better is in providing a common reference point to compare disparate countries,especially in cross-regional research. In other, small-N research designs, sociological approachesare more appropriate as they paint a richer picture of individual cases. Furthermore, our approachfollows global ideals of statehood that are shared by elites and citizens alike.

Our conceptualisation of state collapse opens up several avenues of research. In our own research,we use it to analyze the causes of collapse.64 In particular, we are interested in whether there arestructural differences between collapsed states and those that are fragile but that did not collapse, orwhether this due to particular political dynamics. Another possibility would to use it in research onhuman security: What are the dynamics of violence and deprivation in collapsed states? And howcan human security concerns be alleviated by humanitarian aid in these contexts? Our concept canalso be used to improve early warning systems.

This approach can also lay the foundation for research that looks at the roots of political and socialorder: How is political order constructed in the absence of any meaningful statehood? Who dopeople turn to for security, justice and basic public goods? There is substantial research ongovernance in areas of limited statehood which could be enriched on a focus on those cases wherethe state completely ceases to be a meaningful institution.65 Its usability for comparative researchalso makes our conception of state collapse a potential tool for bringing together disparate fields ofenquiry.

Finally, our approach can also be used to improve attempts at quantification. While data collectionfor our indicators was labour-intensive, this process could be automated for most primary indicatorsby using machine coding of event data. This would make it possible to extend the scope of researchby also looking at non-collapsed states where collapse has occurred in one or two, or even none of

11

the dimensions of collapse. An expansion of the dataset in this manner would facilitate a morethorough comparison of collapsed states and those that are merely fragile or temporarily unstable.

AcknowledgementsThis research was made possible by the generous funding of the German Research Foundation(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). The paper was presented at the 8th Pan-European Conferenceon International Relations, Warsaw, 18-21 September 2013. Achim Görres and Jörg Faust haveprovided helpful comments and suggestions. We would like to thank Christian Tischmeyer, LauraBlomenkemper and Simon von Dahlen for their research assistance.

Notes on ContributorsDaniel Lambach is a Visiting Professor in International Relations and principal investigator of theproject “Why do states collapse?” at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany). He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Cologne (Germany).His current research interests are state fragility and collapse, territoriality in the internationalsystem, nonviolent resistance and agency in the global South.

Eva Johais works as research fellow in the project “Why do states collapse?” at the Institute ofPolitical Science of the University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany). She holds a diploma in politicalscience from the Philipps-University in Marburg. Her current research focuses on politics ofinterventions, dynamics of statehood and electoral governance in Guinea.

Markus Bayer is research fellow in the project on "Why do states collapse?" at the Institute ofPolitical Science of the University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany). He holds an M.A. in PoliticalScience, Sociology and Peace and Conflict Studies. His research interests are the causes of statecollapse and strategic choices of non-state actors in (non)violent struggles against authoritarianregimes.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Failed States Index Indicators

Dimension Indicators

Social Indicators 1. Mounting Demographic Pressures

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons

3. Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators 5. Uneven Economic Development

6. Poverty, Sharp or Severe Economic Decline

Political Indicators 7. Legitimacy of the State

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

9. Violation of Human Rights and the Rule of Law

10. Security Apparatus acts as 'State Within the State'

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites

12. Intervention of External Actors

Source: Based on HYPERLINK"http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators"http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators (as of 24 February 2014).

17

Table 2: The Concept of State Collapse

Rule-Making Means of Violence Taxation

First Level Indicators• Cessation of the work of

the High court

• No formal legislation

• Government or parlia-ment leaves the capital

• De jure dissolution of thesecurity forces

• Security forces do not control the whole capital

• No official government budget is declared

• Central Bank ceases work

Secondary Indicators

• Massive corruption

• Laws are only rarely en-forced

• Widespread legal pluralism

• Security forces become de facto private militias

• Security forces control onlysmall parts of the country

• Private non-state actors control large portions of thecountry

• No organized fiscal adminis-tration

• Taxation by non-state actors

• Tax ratio below 8%

18

Table 3: Cases of State Collapse

Cases of State CollapseAfghanistan 1979 Iraq 2003Afghanistan 2001 Laos 1960Angola 1992 Lebanon 1975Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 Liberia 1990Chad 1979 Sierra Leone 1998Congo-Kinshasa 1960 Somalia 1991Congo-Kinshasa 1996 Tajikistan 1992Georgia 1991 Uganda 1985Guinea-Bissau 1998

19

Figure 1: Dimensions of Statehood (see separate File)

20

1

Call, "Fallacy of ‘Failed State’."2 Ulfelder, “'State Failure' has Failed."3 Eriksen, "‘State failure’ in theory and practice."4 Goertz, Social Science Concepts Guide.5 Bueger and Bethke, "Actor-networking ‘failed state’." Alternative accounts are provided by

Lambach, "IR Scholars Study Fragile States"; and Paris, "Ordering the World" who focus onthe intersection of academic interest and politics in the emergence of state fragility as a topicof research.

6 Bueger and Bethke, "Actor-networking ‘failed state’", 60.7 Baker, Conflict Assessment System Tool; and Fund for Peace, "The Failed State Index."8 Carment et al., "Country Indicators Foreign Policy"; and Carment, Samy and Prest, "State

Fragility and Aid Allocation."9 Marshall and Cole, "Report on State Fragility 2008"; Marshall and Goldstone, "Report on

State Fragility 2007."10 Rice and Patrick, "Index of State Weakness." In addition to these frequently updated indices,

there are several country lists and classificatory heuristics from development agencies, seee.g. World Bank, Low-Income Countries Under Stress; Weinstein, Porter and Eizenstat"Weak States and US National Security"; or DFID, Work Effectively in Fragile States.

11 Bethke, "Zuverlässig invalide Indizes." The State Failure Task Force (renamed as the Polit-ical Instability Task Force in 2003) was an important precursor of these projects. Establishedin 1994, its original aim had been to identify the root causes of state failure. However, afterpreliminary research produced only 18 cases of state failure, it broadened its definition ofstate failure to include contentious regime transitions, genocides, revolutions and ethnic con-flict. By including these different phenomena into the same category, the State Failure TaskForce suffered from the same methodological shortcomings as its predecessors. For a moredetailed critique see Lambach and Gamberger, "Temporal Analysis of Political Instability."

12 E.g. Tikuisis, “Weak States and Terrorism”; and van Veen, "Global Developments in StateFailure."

13 Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War", 502.14 See e.g. Hill, "Challenging Failed State Thesis"; Wulf, "Challenging the Weberian Concept";

and Veit, "Direct International Rule."15 Wilén, Justifying Intervention in Africa.16 Hameiri, "Failed states or failed paradigm?"17 Hill, "Beyond the Other?"; Manjikian, "Diagnosis, Intervention, and Cure."18 Sidaway, "Portraying postcolonial sovereignty scapes", 172.19 Richmond, "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism."20 Migdal, Strong societies weak states; Migdal, State in Society.21 DiJohn “Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States."22 Trotha, "Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit."23 Lund (ed.) Twilight Institutions in Africa.24 Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions of Social Order."25 Boege, Brown and Clements, "Hybrid Political Orders"; Clements, "Internal Dynamics Ex-

ternal Interventions."26 Schlichte, "Gibt es überhaupt 'Staatszerfall'?"27 Cf. Bilgin and Morton, "'Rogue' to 'Failed' States?"; Schlichte, Staat in der Weltgesellschaft;

Hagmann and Péclard, "Negotiating Statehood Dynamics"; and Wai, "Neo-patrimonialismand state failure."

28 Cf. Bourne, "Geopolitics: Security, Failed States"; Hansen and Stepputat (eds.) States ofImagination; and Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre, "Practical Norms of Real Governance."

29 Putzel and DiJohn, "Challenges of Crisis States."30 See note 1 above.

31 See note 2 above.32 Borrowing the term from Zartman (ed.) Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Au-

thority.33 Call, "Fallacy of ‘Failed State’", 1501.34 See note 2 above.35 Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, "State Fragility: Multi-Dimensional", 3.36 Call, "Beyond the 'failed state'."37 Patrick, "Weak states and global threats"; also see Torres and Anderson, "Defining Difficult

Poverty Reduction", 15.38 Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, "Agenda for State-Building."39 Weinstein, Porter and Eizenstat "Weak States and US National Security", 13.40 See note 36 above.41 Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, "State Fragility: Multi-Dimensional."42 Weinstein, Porter and Eizenstat "Weak States and US National Security", 13f.43Carment and Samy, "State Fragility Country Indicator", 107.44 Call, "Beyond the 'failed state'", 310.45 See note 41 above.46 Weinstein, Porter and Eizenstat "Weak States and US National Security", 13.47 See note 36 above.48 See note 3 above.49 Weber, Economy and society, 55.50 Recently, Putzel and DiJohn, "Challenges of Crisis States", 1 have pointed out the relevance

of political settlements and elite bargains for the stability of the state. While we do not sharetheir actor-centered perspective, we nonetheless follow their point that institutions are notusually the product of conscious design but a reflection of power relationships.

51 Weber, Economy and society, 54.52 Weber, Economy and society, 27.53 Weber, Economy and society, 32.54 Weber, Economy and society, 31.55 Young, "Zaïre: Shattered Illusion"; Weiss, "Zaire."56 Easton, Framework for political analysis, 21.57 Elias, Prozess der Zivilisation, 142; also Tilly, Coercion, Capital, European States.58 See note 4 above.59 Goertz, Social Science Concepts Guide, 35.60 We used six months as a threshold to distinguish short-term political instability, e.g. during

regime or the final months of civil war, to distinguish the complete failure of state institu-tions from other forms of disorder.

61 Sources are Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, "Polity IV User's Manual"; Rice and Patrick, "Indexof State Weakness"; and BTI Project, "Bertelsmann Transformation Index". The assessmentby the State Failure Task Force are published in Esty et al., "The State Failure Project", 38;whereas Rotberg's data can be found in Rotberg, "Failure and Collapse of Nation-States", 46-49.

62 The remaining cases, which had not collapsed in at least one dimension, were Argentina1976, Bangladesh 1975, Cambodia 1988-92, Comoros 1997-98, Cuba 1958, Cyprus 1963,Czechoslovakia 1968, Dominican Republic 1965, Ethiopia 1974, Haiti 1985, Haiti 1994,Lesotho 1998, Nigeria 1993, Pakistan 1969, Yugoslavia 1991, USSR 1991, Sudan 2003

63 Buhaug, "Capability and Rebel Objective."64 Lambach and Bethke, "Forschungsstand Staatskollaps"; Lambach, Bayer and Johais, "State

Collapse Causes QCA."65 E.g. Risse, "Areas of Limited Statehood"; and Baker, "Policing in Sierra Leone."