Among Discourse and Reality; the EU’s Tentative Move beyond a Securitarian Approach in...

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Among Discourse and Reality; the EU’s

Tentative Move beyond a Securitarian

Approach in Managing Migration and the EU

Mobility Partnerships- the Moldovan Case

By Camille Maury

Student ID Number: 1084890

Masters thesis written under the supervision of

Dr. Dorota Dakowska

Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Université de Strasbourg

Dr hab. Marek Kucia

Centre for European Studies, Jagiellonian University

September 2013

Strasbourg, France

Kraków, Poland

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Acknowledgments

Writing this thesis has been a long journey with a great deal of good moments, but also

many doubts which I had to go through.

Foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Dorota

Dakowska and Dr. hab Marek Kucia, for their enthusiastic encouragements and insightful

comments in the duration of writing the thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Laure Delcour

for her constructive advice.

I wish also to thank the persons I had the chance to interview, who provided me with

precious information.

I would further say thank you to my parents and sisters for always believing in me

throughout my studies.

I am particularly grateful to Eri Tafa for his precious help and endless support.

A special ‘thank you’ goes to all my friends from the French-Polish Double Degree and

CES, for their contribution by proofreading my thesis and their encouragement.

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Abstract

Mobility Partnerships were presented, within the EU immigration policy discourse in 2007,

as a new tool aiming to overcome the securitarian approach in managing migration by

implementing a ‘comprehensive’ approach to migration. Materialised into Joint

Declarations between the EU Member States wishing to participate and the third countries,

Mobility Partnerships have been concluded so far with Moldova and Cape Verde (2008),

Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011) and lately Morocco (2013). Promoting circular migration

schemes to third countries, under a large number of conditions, Mobility Partnerships

appear to be, nowadays, a promising tool in managing the EU-third countries relationships.

Indeed, the conclusions of Mobility Partnerships are under discussions in the

Mediterranean region, in Tunisia and Egypt. Therefore, the present research aims to analyse

whether or not Mobility Partnerships permit to the EU to introduce a ‘comprehensive

approach’ to migration by implementing circular migration schemes as it is promoted

within the EU discourse.

The research is structured in two main parts. The first part aims to recontextualise the

genesis of the Mobility Partnerships within the global EU immigration policy discourse;

and to analyse the functioning of the EU-third countries Mobility Partnerships. It reveals

that the Mobility Partnerships found their roots and their modes of operation within a

security oriented approach on migration. The second part focuses on the implementation of

an EU Mobility Partnership from a third country’s perspectives. The snapshot on the

Moldovan History permits to picture the EU-Moldova relationships before the introduction

of the Mobility Partnerships as well as the possibilities for Moldova to implement this tool,

before focusing on the gains brought by the implementation of this tool for both Moldova

and the EU Member States.

Key words: Mobility Partnerships, Critical Discourse Analysis, European Neighborhood

Policy, Eastern Partnership, Schengen Area, Political Conditionality.

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List of Abbreviations

CDA- Critical Discourse Analysis

CPA- Cotonou Partnership Agreement

DA- Discourse Analysis

EaP- Eastern Partnership

EC- European Commission

EMP- Extended Migration Profile

ENP- European Neighborhood Policy

EU- European Union

FRONTEX- European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the

External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

GAM- Global Approach to Migration

MP- Mobility Partnership

NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO- Non Governmental Organisation

PCA- Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

SIS- Schengen Information System

TCN- Third Country National

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Table of Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 10

Development and presentation of the EU Mobility Partnerships ......................................... 10

Research question ................................................................................................................. 13

Research plan ........................................................................................................................ 14

The Choice of Moldova as a case study ............................................................................. 14

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY ......................... 16

Methodology for conducting the research ............................................................................ 18

Language matters .................................................................................................................. 19

The circular migration and its definition .............................................................................. 20

PART I: CONTEXTUALISING THE MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS IN EU

IMMIGRATION POLICY DISCOURSE. ........................................................ 21

Chapter 1: The Genesis of the EU Mobility Partnerships in the EU discourse on

immigration ......................................................................................................................... 22

1.1.The security impetus in the EU discourse on immigration ......................................... 23

1.1.1.The ‘Schengenisation’ of the EU discourse ......................................................... 23

1.1.2.Institutionalisation of the Security discourse ....................................................... 25

1.2.Toward more cooperation with third countries ........................................................... 27

1.2.1.The externalisation of ‘control’ .......................................................................... 28

1.2.2.The ‘comprehensive’ approach to migration: first step toward the de-

securitisation of the EU discourse on migration? ......................................................... 30

1. 3. EU Mobility Partnerships: On the way beyond Security? ........................................ 31

1.3.1. EU Mobility Partnerships: the ‘materialised’ EU willingness to go beyond a

security discourse on migration? .................................................................................. 31

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 32

Chapter 2: The functioning of the EU-Third Countries MPs ........................................ 34

2. 1. Conditionality for Third Countries ........................................................................... 34

2.1.1 ‘The price for mobility.’ ...................................................................................... 34

2.1.2. Perception of the use of conditionality by the third country ............................... 35

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2.1.3. Readmission agreements: the ‘unofficial goal’ of the MPs? .............................. 37

2.2. Political Significance of the Mobility Partnerships ................................................... 38

2.2.1. Mobility partnership: a new think tank? ............................................................. 38

2.2.2. The lack of motivation of the EU Member States .............................................. 39

2.2.3. A step towards visa liberalisation for Third Countries ....................................... 39

2.3. Mobility on the paper: View on the projects: comparison on the different projects

between the EU-Third Countries MPs. ............................................................................. 40

2.3.1. The Moldovan case ............................................................................................. 40

2.3.2. The Georgian case .............................................................................................. 42

2.3.3. The Armenian case ............................................................................................. 43

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 43

PART II: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP

FROM A THIRD COUNTRY’S PERSPECTIVES. THE MOLDOVAN CASE

............................................................................................................................... 45

Chapter 3: Analysis of the cooperation between the EU and Moldova before the

introduction of the MP ....................................................................................................... 45

3. 0. Moldova: a singular neighbor? ................................................................................. 45

3.1. Migration patterns ...................................................................................................... 47

3.1.1. Moldovan emigration toward Russia .................................................................. 49

3.1.2. Moldovan emigration toward the EU ................................................................. 50

3.2. Framework of cooperation on migration issues between Moldova and some EU

Member States. ..................................................................................................................... 51

3.2.1. Moldova – Italy relations .................................................................................... 51

3.2.2. Moldova- Romania relations .............................................................................. 52

3.2.3. Moldova- Bulgaria relations ............................................................................... 54

3.3. The EU- Moldova relations: From an insignificant to an important partner? ........... 56

3.3.1. The years 1990s to 2000s .................................................................................... 56

3.3.2. Conditionality for the Moldovan neighbor: the EU-Moldova Action Plan ........ 57

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 58

Chapter 4: Implementation of the EU-Moldova MP. What changes for Moldova? ... 59

4.1. From a pilot initiative to a Policy instrument ............................................................ 59

4.2. The EU-Moldova MP: ‘a success story?’ ‘But for whom?’ ...................................... 59

4.2.1. On the Moldovan Perspective ............................................................................. 61

A better comprehension and management of the Moldovan emigration .................. 61

A lack of Mobility for Moldovans ............................................................................ 61

4.2.2. On the EU perspective ........................................................................................ 63

A better management of the EU borders in the Neighborhood ................................ 63

A deeper cooperation with Moldova ........................................................................ 63

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Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 64

CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................ 68

APPENDICES ...................................................................................................... 73

Appendix 1: General information about the interviews .................................................... 73

Appendix 2: Critical Discourse Analysis .......................................................................... 74

Appendix 3: Development of the EU-Moldova relations ................................................ 75

Appendix 4: Questionnaire ............................................................................................... 76

Appendix 5: Transcription interview n°1 (French Version) ............................................. 77

Appendix 6: Transcription interview n°1 (English version) ............................................. 89

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« The boundary of your State is not the boundary of your moral concern. » 1

1Anthony Appiah, K. (2012), in Thought Leader Kwame Anthony Appiah on Cosmopolitanism, Carnegie

Council, documentary. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inyq_tfm8jc; see also Anthony

Appiah, K. (2010), in Examined Life, Astra Taylor, documentary, available at:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VjMnyP142b8.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inyq_tfm8jc

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VjMnyP142b8

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Introduction

Development and presentation of the EU Mobility Partnerships

EU Mobility Partnerships (MPs) were presented at the EU official level, in 2007, as a

‘novel approach’ to migration, aiming to “improve the management of legal movements of

people between the EU and third countries.”2 Introduced, on the European scene, as “the

most innovative and sophisticated tool to date”3 of the EU Global Approach to Migration

(GAM)4, which was propagated in 2005, MPs aim to promote, in theory, regular and to

fight irregular immigration in cooperation with third countries.5 They also aim to explore

the potential impacts of circular migration on development in order to respond to the needs

of countries of origin in terms of skills transfer and to mitigate the impact of the so-called

‘brain drain.’ At least, MPs were pictured this way within the EU discourse on migration.

Their implementation has to be understood in the context of “the increasing prominence of

the notion of ‘partnership’ in international relations.”6 So far MPs have been concluded

with Moldova, Cape Verde (2008), Georgia (2009), and Armenia (2011) and recently with

Morocco (2013). Negotiations with Senegal started in 2008 but stalled and have not

progressed further due to the lack of motivation of Senegal. Moreover, MPs are also

foreseen with Egypt and Tunisia in the light of the Arab Spring.

What is the ‘novelty’ introduced by the MPs, key tool of the Global Approach to

Migration? It seems to reside in the incentive, in the discourse, to overcome the EUs

restrictive measures in the area of migration management. For instance, the official

2European Commission (2007), On circular Migration and Mobility Partnership between the European

Union and Third Countries, document n°248, p.2. 3European Commission (2009), Mobility Partnerships as a Tool of the Global Approach to Migration,

Commission Staff Working Document, document n°1240, p.4. (Sections: Cooperation with third countries on

legal migration, fight against illegal migration, and migration and development). 4European Council (2005), Global Approach to migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the

Mediterranean, document n° 15744/05. 5Lavenex, S and Stucky, R. (2011), ‘‘Partnering’ for migration in EU external relations’ in: Multilayered

Migration Governance, The promise of partnership, Routledge Advances in International Relation and Global

Politics, p.116. 6 Ibid.

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discourse of EU Justice and Home Affairs, after the introduction of the Global Approach to

Migration, symbolises the willingness to change the EU political views, and practices,

about migration:

“We have to shift-even if not completely-our traditional way of thinking of

migration as a word of loss and sorrow. Let us be realistic in a visionary way. Let us

try to use a new expression: EU mobility. We have to look at immigration as

enrichment and as an inescapable phenomenon of today’s world, not as a threat.” 7

It is an ambitious plan to promote a shift in the EU discourse on migration, which was

focused for years on a restrictive securitarian approach to manage migration. Since the

opening of the internal borders, symbolised by the signature of the Schengen Agreements,

the management of external borders has become a priority for the EU Member States in

order to control migration flows. Security concerns of the EU Members States led to the

development of a negative image of the EU from outside symbolised by the so-called

‘Fortress Europe.’ This negative image still sticks to the core identity of the EU. Indeed, the

EU defines itself, mostly, by opposition to the ‘Others’; the non EU nationals. This idea

was led by a long process of institutionalisation within the EU discourse on migration. In

everyday life, this is the story of a large number of migrants trying to reach the EU, for

most of them by sea and when arrived on the EU land, usually on the Italian territory, they

are ‘welcomed’ by being directly bring to detention centres due to their ‘irregular’ status.

This idea has even reached its height with the story of the ‘left to die boat’, when 63

immigrants, fleeing Libya in 2012, were left to die in the sea after their distress calls were

ignored.8 Senator Tineke Strick, member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe, argues within her report that armed forces of the EU, FRONTEX; and NATO

should have rescued the migrants as they were present at the sea, at that time. Indeed, it was

the war in Libya and everyone was looking for Gaddafi, the sea was, therefore, full of

7Frattini, F. Former European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security (2007), ‘Enhanced

Mobility, Vigorous Integration Strategy and Zero Tolerance on Illegal Employment: A dynamic Approach to

European Immigration Policies’, Speech at the High Level Conference on Legal Migration, Lisbon, 13

September 2007. SPEECH 07/526. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-

526_en.htm 8The story was related in the news. See for example the documentary The left to die Boat: Survivors, BBC,

2012.

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-526_en.htm

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-526_en.htm

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armed forces.9 Abu Kurke, one of the survivors of this tragedy said that they met navy

boats and helicopters on their way but they “did not help…” 10

The question which is in

everyone’s mind is how nobody could rescue them? More than being unwelcomed in the

EU territory, migrants are being, now, pushed back home or even ‘left to die’ in the

Mediterranean Sea. We understand, therefore, that irregular migration represents a crucial

international issue. In order to reduce the irregular migration pressure, the EU Member

States started to cooperate, since the Asylum and Immigration Policy has been

communautaurised, with third countries. It is a question of concerns and directly related to

our topic, labour migration. Moreover, in the context of the current economic crisis and the

rise of populism within political system in the European Union, the question of labour

migration and rights for migrants appears to become a tough topic. How to manage to

promote legal migration schemes for TCNs within the high level of unemployment and the

rising level of xenophobia within European Union? This shift to a ‘comprehensive’

approach to migration, which aims to change the negative image of the EU in managing

migration, on the international scene, is far from being easy to reach, especially considering

the economic situation the EU is facing now.

Going back to MPs, it is important to precise the not legally binding nature of the Mobility

partnerships. Indeed, materialised in the form of Joint Declarations, they constitute a form

of so-called ‘soft law.’11

The MPs conclusions with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia

state that “the provisions of this joint declaration are not designed to create legal rights or

obligations under international law.”12

This is an important distinction with the trade

agreements, which also promote labour mobility but are legally binding and enforceable. 13

This point raises the question of the shared obligations for the EU Member States and the

third countries which concluded MPs. Moreover, different actors are involved in the

9Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report (2012), ‘“The left to die boat”: 15 days fatal journey’ in

Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible? pp. 7-24. Available at:

http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=18095 10

Talk with Abu Kurke at the Session of the Committee on Migration, Refugee and Displaced Persons, in

June 2013. 11

S. Carrera, R. Hernandez i Sagrera (2009), The Externalisation of the EU’s Labour Immigration Policy:

Towards Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships? CEPS Working Document N° 321, p. 1. 12

Ward, N. (2011), Multilayered Migration Governance, The promise of partnership, Routledge Advances in

International Relation and Global Politics, p.14. 13

Ibid

http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=18095

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process of the EU Mobility Partnerships’ institutionalisation and implementation. The

European Commission following the recommendations of the European Council, with

European Member States willing to participate, decides the content of the MPs. It is

important to underline that the partner countries are not involved in the decision of the

content of the partnership. This can put into doubts the notion of partnership itself and

show “an attempt to enhance the European Union’s ‘soft power’ in dealing with third

countries of origin and transit.”14

Furthermore, MPs are not isolated frameworks. Indeed,

third countries having concluded an EU MPs are also linked to the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern partnership (EaP) and the Cotonou Partnership

Agreement (CPA) frameworks. It is therefore important to consider the MPs in relation

with the actions, related to migration, taken under the framework of the ENP.

Research question

MPs can be considered as a trade-off between the EU Member States willing to participate

and a third country in order to promote circular migration schemes, development (to avoid

brain-drain in the third country) and to fight irregular migration in the EU Member States.

In a trade-off both partners have to give up something in order to get a little more of what

they want. By cooperating with third countries and promising to them the opening of legal

and circular migration schemes, under a large number of conditions, the EU attempts to

introduce a ‘new approach’ to migration. In the case of the EU MPs it is interesting to

analyse whether this tool constitutes, or not, a ‘new approach’ to manage migration within

the EU Member States as it is promoted in the EU discourse. Therefore we can ask

ourselves the following question:

Are Mobility Partnerships, in practice, a ‘new’ tool to permit to the EU to introduce a

‘comprehensive approach’ to migration by implementing circular migration schemes as it

is promoted within the EU discourse?

14

Lavenex, S and Stucky, R. (2011), ‘‘Partnering’ for migration in EU external relations’ in: Multilayered


Politics, p.132.

14

This research would aim to analyse the purpose of the Mobility partnerships as a key tool

of the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility by looking to the rhetoric and the

implementation of the Mobility Partnership with a focus on the EU- Moldova MP.

Research plan

The current research is divided in two main parts. The first one aims to recontextualise the

genesis of the EU-third countries MPs within the EU discourse on migration. The second

one will be a focus on the Moldovan case and EU-Moldova relations before and after the

introduction of the MP.

The Choice of Moldova as a case study

The choice of Moldova as a case study concerning the EU-third country MP’s discourse

and implementation was made depending on three main reasons.

Firstly, the fact that Moldova is a country of significant emigration facing important

economic and development issues due to the flows of persons going outside the country,

compared to Armenia or Georgia. Indeed, about 1 million out of 4 million of Moldovans

are living outside the country, in the EU or in Russia. Moldova was, therefore, a perfect

candidate to launch an EU Mobility Partnership aiming to promote circular migration

schemes in order to stop the ‘brain drain’.

Secondly, Moldova was the first country with Cape Verde to sign and implement a MP, in

2008. Moreover, the Moldovan Authorities were the first one to write a report, in 2012, on

the effects of the EU-Moldova MP.15

It permits, therefore, to investigate on what has been

done under the framework of the MP.

15

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, (2012).The

European Union-Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008-2011: Evaluation Report. 01/10/2012.

Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/eu-moldova-mobility-partnership-evaluation.pdf

http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/eu-moldova-mobility-partnership-evaluation.pdf

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Thirdly, the EU-Moldova relations represent an interesting field of investigation. Indeed,

EU-Moldova relations had significantly changed through time. First, Moldova was an

‘insignificant’ neighbor due to its little size and its close relations with Russia. After the

collapse of the Communism and the independence of the Republic of Moldova, in 1991, the

European Community did not want to intervene in the country assessing that Moldova was

still under the influence of Russia. The EU-Moldova relations changed with the 2004

Enlargement.16

Indeed, the EU had to engage a new kind of relations with its neighborhood

and created the European Neighborhood Policy in order to insure that the EU would be

surrounded by a “ring of friends.” 17

The ENP permitted, therefore, to the EU to cooperate

in a number of matters in the neighborhood like to operate changes within national

administrations, ministries of interior and to develop economical cooperation between third

countries and some EU member States. But the core idea of the ENP was to keep the EU

borders secure. Moldova started to strengthen its relations with the EU under the ENP

framework. The EaP institutionalised later, permitted to Moldova to become an important

partner of the EU.18

Nevertheless, Moldova is still in quest of its identity, divided between

the European Union and Russia. It is this complex situation, a country between two

different cultures which makes Moldova a fascinating case study.

16

Goujon, A. (2004). Les nouveaux voisins de l’Union européenne. Stratégies identitaires et politiques en

Ukraine, Biélorussie et Moldavie (‘The new neighbors of the European Union. Identity and political strategies

in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova’). Les Etudes du CERI, n° 109, pp.3-15. 17

Smith, K.E. (2005). ‘The outsiders: The European neighborhood policy’, in International Affairs, Volume

81, pp. 757-775. 18

The EaP was introduced in 2009. See The Council of the European Union (2009), Joint Declaration of the

Prague Eastern Partnership Summit. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declarati

on_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf

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Theoretical framework and Methodology

The theoretical framework adopted for the current research is based on Discourse Theory

and adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its methodological model.19

To

commence, it is necessary to define the meaning of CDA as well as the method it refers to.

R. Wodak and M. Meyer compared CDA to Discourse Analysis (DA), noting that the

former is problem oriented and that “any social phenomena lends to critical investigation,

to be challenged and not taken for granted.”20

The research goal of CDA is not only, as the

name supposes, to analyse discourses related to a topic in a critical way by studying the

linguistic unit per se, it also refers to studying social phenomena through the construction

of the discourses within social and historical contexts; thus utilising a multidisciplinary and

multi-methodical approach.21

CDA is largely based on the use of common concepts such as

critique, discourse, power, and ideology. The critical impetus, emphasised in CDA, has its

roots in the Critical theory, in the sense of Frankfurt School, which stipulates that social

theory should be focused towards critique in order to change society in opposition to

traditional theory mostly focused on understanding and, or, explaining it. There is not a

unitary theoretical framework for CDA rather there are several types of CDA. Studies in

this field, indeed, are “multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds,

oriented towards different data and methodologies.”22

Discourse can belong from a multitude of supporting materials such as a policy, a political

strategy, text, talk, a video, a recorded interview, a speech or even a monument. CDA

considers “discourse- language use in speech and writing- as a form of social practice”23

19

The roots of CDA can be found in the Critical Linguistics that appeared in late 1970s (especially in the UK

and Australia) and within the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School before the WWII as T. A. van Dijck

explains it in ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in: D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H. E. Hamilton. The Handbook of

Discourse Analysis, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, UK, 2001, p. 352. Later, CDA was established as a network

of scholars by the launch of T. A. van Dijk’s journal Discourse and Society in 1990. Major actual scholars in

the CDA field are T. A. Van Dijk, N. Fairclough and R. Wodak. 20

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009), ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and

Methodology’, in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, SAGE, p.2. 21

Ibid 22


Methodology’, in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, SAGE, p. 5. 23

Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. 1997.

17

Discourse is more than ‘the mirror’ of the world; it is socially constitutive. In other words,

discourse plays a role in the construction of reality. R. Wodak argues that discourse is

socially constitutive and socially conditioned. Therefore, “it constitutes situations, objects

of knowledge and the social identities of and relationships between people and group of

people.”24

Discourse also contributes to the construction of shared social representations.

Indeed, our beliefs and perceptions of the world are transmitted by discourse. In this

context, discourse is not only about ‘what’ is said but includes an in depth relation to the

persons speaking, or authors of a discourse, namely the social actors, their authority, and

the external context. The social actors constitute the link between the discourse and reality.

The relation with the notion of power is here crucial; especially the social power of a group

or an institution on another group, due to the knowledge, information or even authority the

dominant group has got and can therefore enjoy. Social actors can exercise power by

threatening or suggesting to the dominated group particular event or outcome. On occasion,

the power of the dominant group can be exercised within laws, rules, norms and even

consensus. The discourse plays here a major role by confirming, legitimating, reproducing

or challenging relations of power in society. Ideology is another important concept linked

to CDA. Indeed, CDA researchers are display a marked interest in investigating in the

hidden ideology. Conducting a CDA research implies to understand that discourses are

historical. They always have to be re contextualized, in their historical and societal

contexts, in order to be understood.25

Mobility partnerships constitute an interesting topic in the frame of CDA. Indeed, their aim,

through EU immigration discourse, is to change the perception of immigration in

encouraging a type of mobility by persuading that migrants are not a threat anymore but

can constitute a possibility for the EU to answer to its labour needs. For decades, EU

immigration discourse was mostly focused on associating immigration to a threat. This

discourse has been constructed by important actors, mostly the Ministries of Interiors of the

EU Member States and the European Council. The official goal of the Mobility

Partnerships, through the discourse, was, therefore, to move from a security approach,

24


Methodology’, in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, SAGE, p. 5. 25

Wodak, Van dijk also argues for it. Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) constitutes one branch of CDA

and emphasizes the needs for the re contextualization of discourses within their context.

18

associating what could be called the added value of a new type of migration, the circular

mobility, for the EU Member States and the sending countries. Here it seems necessary to

relate CDA to our subject, by accepting the commitments the suggestion is to promote

mobility for TCNs, or even visa facilitation and visa liberalisation.

Methodology for conducting the research

The current research results from an analysis of different sources. Firstly, the CDA of the

EU immigration discourse is made possible by analysing a large number of documents

produced mostly by the European Commission (EC), the Council as well as reports and

speeches related to the EU asylum and immigration Policy and the introduction of the EU-

third countries Mobility Partnerships. Related to the Moldovan case study and the

implementation of the Mobility Partnership, different reports have been analysed.

Moreover, semi- directives interviews have been conducted with four different specialists,

from May to July 2013, in order to have access to some important information for

proceeding with the research. The interviews have a duration from 35 minutes to more than

1 hour according to the time availability of the interviewees. The choice of the interviewees

was made depending on the issues arising from the topic. An additional useful contribution

was given by two experts in migration management, from Moldova, by e-mails

correspondence. The detailed information about the interviewees and their contribution are

further furnished in the Appendices section.26

The main difficulty for conducting the research was to have a direct interaction with the

interviewees due to their status and availability.

26

Appendix 1: General Information about Interviewees.

19

Language matters

Attention should be paid to the language which is used regarding immigration. Within the

research the use of the term ‘irregular migrant’ is preferred rather than the term ‘illegal

migrant’. Indeed, this term is more neutral. It does not induce the stigmatisation of the

adjective ‘illegal’.27

This term is also increasingly promoted by international organisations

working on migrations issues like the Council of Europe and Non-Governmental

Organisations (NGOs), for example. Whereas Member States and EU Institutions still

employ the term ‘illegal migrant’, in their official documents, to describe a person in an

irregular situation within an EU Member State.28

François Crépeau, the Special Rapporteur

on the human rights of migrants, also argues the terminology ‘illegal migrant’. He deplores

the binding of irregular migration with crime and security concerns. The uses of

inappropriate terminology, describing a person as ‘illegal’, contribute to negative

discourses on migration and strengthen stereotypes about irregular migrants within our

societies.29

Moreover, the link between ‘illegal’ immigration and security is “‘self-evident’,

since the securitization of illegal immigration is incorporated in the concept of ‘illegal’

immigration itself.”30

27

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2006), Human rights of irregular migrants, Resolution

1509.Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=17456&lang=EN 28

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2010), Criminalisation of Migration in Europe:

Human Rights Implications, Issue Paper commissioned and published by Thomas Hammarberg. 29

United Nations Human Rights Council (2013), Regional study: management of the external borders of the

European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants, A/HRC/23/46, Report of the Special

Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, pp.9-10. 30

Van Dijck, D. (2006). Is the EU Policy on illegal immigration securitized? Yes of course! A study into the

dynamics of the institutionalized Securitization, Paper presented to the 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU

Politics, Istanbul, p. 2.

http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=17456&lang=EN

20

The circular migration and its definition

The promotion of temporary migration schemes, through the idea of circular migration, is

at the heart of the Mobility Partnerships. Circular migration can be defined as “a form of

migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth

between two countries.”31

Through the Communication ‘on circular migration and mobility

partnerships between the European Union and third countries’, the European Commission

is promoting the idea that migration has to be limited in time. 32

Migrants do not have to

settle but should return to their home countries, in order to prevent the brain drain, when

their term of stay has expired. Then, migration is made temporary and return is mandatory

for the functioning of circular migration schemes. In this case, we will rather talk, within

the research, about mobility than migration. TCNs are, therefore, considered as ‘mobiles’

not as migrants which would have to get integrated to the host country. An important fact

to underline is that mobility of TCNs depends on social traits. Indeed, circular migration

schemes are likely among young and unmarried persons.33

This raises the problems of

social integration of TCNs coming to work temporarily, within an EU Member State, as

well as the problem of family reunification. Carrera and Hernandez i Sagrera consider that

circular migration promoted by the MPs is based on a utilitarian logic of selecting TCNs

depending on the labour market needs of the participating EU Member States. “TCNs are

not treated as workers and human rights holders, but as economic units at the service of the

demand and supply of participating states”.34

This constitutes a ‘shopping list’ for EU

Member States. They argue that Mobility Partnerships rather constitute ‘insecurity

partnerships’ for the TCNs coming to work within an EU Member State.

31

COM (2007), 248 final, On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and

third countries, p.8. 32

Ibid 33

Vertovec, S. (2007), Circular Migration: the way forward in global policy? Working Paper, International

Migration Institute, James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford, p.5. 34


Towards Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships? CEPS Working Document N° 321, p. 2.

21

Part I: Contextualising the Mobility Partnerships in EU immigration

Policy Discourse.

Analysing the genesis of the Mobility Partnerships within the EU immigration discourse

allow us to go back and forth to the context in which the Mobility Partnerships arise; taking

into consideration the role of the actors within the process of construction and

institutionalisation of the MPs. For decades, the EU immigration discourse was focused

largely on associating immigration to a threat. The official goal of the Mobility

Partnerships, through the political discourse, was to move away from a security approach,

associating what could be called the added value of a different type of migration, the

circular mobility, for the EU Member States and the sending countries. Is this shift

materialised by the MPs? A diachronic approach will be adopted through the

argumentation. Indeed, the introduction of the Mobility Partnerships is an inscription within

a History, within a space in the EU immigration discourse. It is important to look, first, at

the EU security oriented discourse which shaped, for decades, the EU- third countries

relations and permitted the diffusion of the idea of ‘exclusion’ of the non EU nationals from

the EU space. Then, we will look at the functioning of the EU-third countries MPs. Does

the will to go beyond security constitute the main driving force of the Mobility

partnerships? Or is there an increase of security management through the development of

the EU-third countries Mobility Partnerships? What is hidden, therefore, behind the official

discourse? The aim of this first part is to look at the official and unofficial driving goals of

the MPs, in order to understand how the discourse was materialised and how the MPs were

put into practice.

S. Lavenex and R. Stucky consider that there are three different phases in the History of EU

immigration cooperation with sending countries35

. The first one called the

‘intergovernmental restrictionism’ lengthened from 1980s to the end of 1990s. During this

period, EU immigration was mainly intergovernmental, belonging from the duties of the

35

The use of the expression ‘sending countries’, referring to the third countries, will be used, within the

argumentation, in opposition to the expression ‘receiving countries’, referring to the EU Member States.

22

Member States, and focus on security. The second phase, called ‘comprehensive

intermezzo’, symbolises the transfer from the third pillar to the more supranational first

pillar with the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty36

, in 1999, with an increase of the role

of the European Commission. The third phase called ‘restrictive backlash and

conditionalities’, refers to the use of conditionality in cooperation with sending countries.37

The argumentation will go through these three phases in order to understand the changes

which occurred within the EU political discourse on migration.

Chapter 1: The Genesis of the EU Mobility Partnerships in the EU discourse on

immigration

Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam treaty, in 1999, the EU asylum and

immigration policy has been, step by step, ‘communautarised’. It became, indeed, less

intergovernmental. The shift from the third pillar to the first pillar led to shared

competences between the European Commission and the EU Member States.38

This

conducted to the development of the role of the European Commission, not just by

suggesting policy, but also in negotiating agreements with third countries on immigration

issues.39

This can be found within the Tampere conclusions which contained

recommendations for the EC to develop the external dimension of Justice and Home

Affairs.40

Then, the EU immigration policy moved to the ‘externalization of control’ to the

third countries. The etymology of the word immigration comes from Latin, migratio. It

means a passage from a place to another place. This definition can be applied, of course, to

the migrant itself as well as to the EU immigration policy in general. V. Guiraudon, indeed,

36

The Amsterdam Treaty was ratified on the 2 October 1997 and entered into force on the 1

May 1999. 37



Politics, pp.117-120. 38

Boswell, C. (2003), “The ‘external dimension’ of the EU immigration and asylum policy”, in International

Affairs, p.627. 39

Ibid 40


Affairs;Tampere conclusions.

23

uses the word ‘chewing gum policy’ to describe the EU immigration policy.41

The EU

immigration policy is moving “from a public action sector to another one and implying

DGs of the Commission and ministries of External services, development and international

trade, and going to the most of third countries to involve a number of actors in the control

of the flux.”42

It constitutes, therefore, a complicated object of research, which implies a

number of different actors from the public and private sectors. It is, therefore, necessary to

multiply the level of analysis and to move our attention from one point of view to another

one- in order to study the EU immigration policy. We will, therefore, go from the

institutionalisation of the Security discourse on EU immigration policy to the point of view

of a third country. To go through different points of view perspectives will help to

demonstrate the EU willingness to control; manage the migration. This means to study how

the discourse was constructed and also what it means for the third countries to conform to

the EU attempts.

1.1. The security impetus in the EU discourse on immigration

1.1.1. The ‘Schengenisation’ of the EU discourse

When the Schengen Agreement entered into force, abolishing border controls between the

EC/EU Member States43

, the struggle against irregular immigration was put on the top of

the EU agenda. The loss of national control over internal borders conducted to the

41

By using the expression ‘chewing gum policy’, the author makes reference to the Sociologist Erving

Goffman and his expression ‘candyfloss’ used within his book Stigma. Guiraudon, V. (2010), “Les effets de

l’européanisation des politiques d’immigration et d’asile” (‘The effects of the europeanisation of the

immigration and asylum policies’), in Politique européenne, L’Harmattan, 2010/2 n°31, p.9. 42

Guiraudon, V. (2010), ‘Les effets de l’européanisation des politiques d’immigration et d’asile’(‘The effects

of the europeanisation of the immigration and asylum policies’), in Politique européenne, L’Harmattan,

2010/2 n°31, p. 9. 43

The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985, at the time of the European Community, on the initiative of

Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It entered into force in 1995. Schengen

area includes, at the time of writing the thesis, all the EU countries at the exception of Ireland and the United

Kingdom due to their own will to not participate; and Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania. The Schengen area also

includes four non- EU Member States: Iceland, Norway, Lichtenstein and Switzerland.

24

introduction of measures, to balance the increased possibility of irregular entries to the EU,

limiting the mobility of third countries nationals into the EU.44

The Schengen area, also

called the ‘Schengenland’45

, became the common place of the EU nationals, protecting

themselves against a ‘new kind of enemies’: ‘the non EU-nationals’, also commonly called

‘illegal’ migrants. Therefore, as Haar and Walters explain the ‘Schengenland’ relinks the

concepts of security and territory by conceptualising security in terms of the defence of a

common space.46

Nevertheless this link has been broken during the 50s with the

development of the European Community; it was put back on the scene with the

development of the Schengen area. This phenomenon permits to the EU to show itself as a

“protector, a source of Justice and social defence.”47

This created a symbolic border

separating the ‘EU citizens’ from the - ‘Others’- the non EU citizens. Schengen, became,

therefore “a laboratory not to open borders, but to strengthen them” (« un laboratoire non

pas pour ouvrir les frontières mais pour les renforcer »). 48

The process of ‘Schengenisation’ 49

of the EU discourse on immigration, defined as the

inclusion of the ‘fight’ against irregular immigration within all the sectors of the public

action, was made possible by the securitisation50

of the EU discourse. The notion of

securitisation refers to the way people construct, or, securitise a ‘threat’. An issue “is

44


Affairs, p.622. 45

The expression ‘Schengenland’ is used by J.H. Haar and W. Walters, in the article ‘In/Secure Community:

Governing Schengenland’ in: Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration,

(2004) pp. 91-113. The notion is used to define the Schengen area; in opposition to the non- Schengen space.

The use of ‘land’ is referring to the notion of territory. 46

Ibid, p.107 47

Ibid, p.111 48

Guiraudon, V. (2010), “Les effets de l’européanisation des politiques d’immigration et d’asile” (‘The effects

of the europeanization of the immigration and asylum policies’), in Politique européenne, L’Harmattan,

2010/2 n°31, p.13. 49

Ibid, p.19; The author refers to the idea of ‘mainstreaming’, symbolising the fight against irregular

immigration as the main idea within the EU discourse and EU cooperation with third countries. The author

argues that this ‘Schengenisation’ was made possible by the takeover of the Ministers of Interior and Justice

on the discourse on EU immigration. 50

The concept of Securitisation was introduced by the Copenhagen School, which accords a particular

importance to the social aspects of security. The main scholars of the School are Barry Buzan, Ole Waever

and Jaap de Wilde. The first main publication of the Copenhagen School is Security: A New Framework for

Analysis, written by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde.

25

‘securitised’ when it gets constructed to a threat.”51

The role of the actors, their legitimacy,

is predominant in the process of construction of a ‘threat’. Indeed, a securitising actor, by

affirming that “a referent object is threatened in its existence, claims a right to

extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object survival.”52

In other words, in the

security speech act an issue is described as a crucial problem that needs to be solved by

extraordinary measures. Then, securitisation is a linguistic action led by a specific rhetoric,

usually associated to the emergency to react. An issue “is a security problem when the elite

declare to be so.”53

This happened with the Ministers of Interior of the EU Member States

and their willingness to create a Schengen area, which also led to a discourse characterised

by two antonymic ideas: the fight against the ‘criminal’, ‘unwanted’ irregular immigrants

and at the meantime the ‘freedom of mobility’ for the EU nationals. In the case of the EU

immigration discourse, the European Council and Ministers of Interiors of the EU Member

States were, at that time, the influent actors; they disposed of the legitimacy, competences

and information to influence the EU policy in this matter. As the will of the Ministers of

Interior of the EU Member States was to protect their respective country interests, the EU

immigration discourse was, therefore, mostly oriented toward the ‘impeachment’ of the

migration of TCNs into the EU.

1.1.2. Institutionalisation of the Security discourse

It is what occurred with the discourse on immigration, which was institutionalised54

, by the

Ministers of Interior and the European Council, as a threat for the host countries. For D.

Van Dijck, a discourse is institutionalised when it becomes recurrent, “embedded or

51

Stone, M. (2009), Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis, Security Discussion

Papers Series 1, Sciences Po – Paris, France; Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs

– New York, USA. Available at: http://geest.mshparis.fr/IMG/pdf/Security_for_Buzan.mp3.pdf 52

Ibid. 53

Ibid. 54

The author argues that security logic becomes institutionalised when it is incorporated in the day-to-day

practices of politicians as well as of bureaucratic officials. Van Dijck, D. (2006). Is the EU Policy on illegal

immigration securitized? Yes of course! A study into the dynamics of the institutionalized Securitization,

Paper presented to the 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Istanbul, p.4.

http://geest.mshparis.fr/IMG/pdf/Security_for_Buzan.mp3.pdf

26

routinised in institutions and institutional practices.”55

The risk is, therefore, that ideas

become taken-for-granted and ‘locked in’ the institutional discourse leading to a hegemonic

discourse, which can construct the perceptions of the world.56

Then, migration is not seen

as a threat anymore; but perceived as a managerial problem which needs to be controlled

quickly.57

The creation of the new policy systems like the SIS, which permits to write the

non-wanted foreigners within the Schengen area, SIS II and Galileo program, attests the

strong need to manage and control migrations toward the EU.58

Since the 1990s, indeed, migration has been perceived as a security threat to receiving

countries. Migration was linked in the EU official discourse to organised crime, terrorism

and even, sometimes, to Islamic fundamentalism.59

Therefore, migration became “an easy

target on which to focus a range of concerns about crime and internal security, welfare state

reform and job security, and the declining relevance of traditional collective identities in

postindustrial societies.”60

This political discourse raised, within the public debate in our

societies, many stereotypes about immigration. Migrants became the scapegoats of the EU

internal and external issues. The Security discourse of the EU reached its peak after the

attacks of the 9/11.61

The conclusions of the summits of the European Council in Laeken

and Seville attest, indeed, the strong link between immigration issues and security,

55

Van Dijck, D. (2006). Is the EU Policy on illegal immigration securitized? Yes of course! A study into the

dynamics of the institutionalized Securitization, Paper presented to the 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU

Politics, Istanbul, p.4. 56

Ibid, p.4 57

Ibid, p.5 58

The SIS system was instituted by the dispositions under the Title IV of the Convention of the Application of

the Schengen Agreement signed the 19th

June 1990. It is a tool for all the Member States of the Schengen

area, which permits to coordinate the judicial authorities of each Member State in order to exchange

information about the mobility of persons within the Schengen area to guarantee the public security. The SIS

II, a new tool, was instituted on the 9th of April 2013. The novelty resides in the use of biometric passports.

The Galileo program is a European project which consists of the creation of a global satellite navigation

system and would be available in 2014. 59

Boswell, C. (2003). ‘The ‘external dimension’ of the EU immigration and asylum policy’, in International

Affairs; Lepers, J.P. Qui a peur de l’Islam? (Who is afraid of Islam ?), documentary, France 4, 10 mars 2012,

Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p_VLMpH6dA 60


Affairs, p.624. 61

‘The Union’s action following the attacks in the USA on 11 September’, European Council, (2001),

Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, document SN

300/1/01, pp.4-5. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p_VLMpH6dA

http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf

27

especially in response to the 9/11 attacks.62

Moreover, V. Guiraudon defines the ‘fight’

against irregular immigration as an obsession, since the attacks of the 9/11, justifying the

trans-governmental and the community cooperation, completing the EU anti-terrorist

discourse and reaching other sectors of the EU public policy; especially the EU external

policy.63

Therefore, the EU immigration ‘freshly communautarised’ moved progressively to

an ‘externalised’ policy in order to maintain the EU secure.

1.2. Toward more cooperation with third countries

The idea is, since the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere conclusions, to include the

immigration ‘issue’ within all the agreements between the EU and the third countries, from

trade to development aid agreements, to stop the unwanted migrants to cross the borders.64

Moving from the Justice and Home Affairs domain, Immigration became central within the

EU Foreign Policy, organising the EU relations with third countries. Another aspect of this

policy is to force the third countries to prevent irregular immigration. This led to the

externalisation of the EU asylum and immigration policy to the third countries.65

What is

the core idea of this strategy; and how was it conducted?

The externalisation of the EU immigration policy consists in a two sided approach. Firstly,

the EU Member States cooperate with third countries to externalise the EU migration

control outside the EU borders, mostly in order to improve the border management and

conclusion of readmission agreements. Secondly, there is the preventive approach which

aims to stop emigration from the third countries. The recommendations for the

externalisation of the EU asylum and immigration policy can be found within the Tampere

conclusions. Indeed, the European Council stressed, within the Tampere Conclusions, the

62

European Council, (2001), Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15

December 2001, document SN 300/1/01, pp.4-5; European Council, (2002),Seville European Council 21 and

22 June 2002 Presidency Conclusions, document n° 13463/02. 63

Guiraudon, V. (2003), « Une obsession: la clandestinité » (An obsession: Clandestinity) in Plein droit,

2003/2 n°57, pp.22-25. Available at: http://www.cairn.info/revue-plein-droit-2003-2-page-22.htm 64

The term ‘unwanted migrants’ is here chosen to show the ‘closeness’ of the EU. 65

Graae Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (2006), Outsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External

Dimension of Asylum and immigration Policy, Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper no

2006/1,pp.1-15.

http://www.cairn.info/revue-plein-droit-2003-2-page-22.htm

28

need for a “more efficient management of migration flows” in cooperating with third

countries. 66

The idea of linking migration to third countries concerns and development is

also at the heart of the Communication from the EC on ‘integrating migration issues in the

EU’s relations with third countries.’67

The global behaviour of the EU is to call the third

countries to ‘fight’ against irregular immigration in exchange of a favorable attitude of the

EU in the Foreign Policy domain, such as commercial and development policies. The EU

shows, therefore, its soft power, by imposing the ‘rules’, in the game of migration control,

to the third countries.68

1.2.1. The externalisation of ‘control’ 69

The case of the readmission agreements

The externalisation of the EU immigration policy to the third countries has got a restrictive

control oriented approach. In a way it goes in pair with the concept of Europeanisation by

extending the EU standards, in terms of immigration management and border control,

outside the EU area. Third countries are, therefore, encouraged or in some cases obliged to

apply the EU standards of migration and border management, fight against irregular

immigration, and readmission agreements. For example, third countries are obliged to sign

the readmission agreements, now a priority for the EU, since the Amsterdam Treaty gave

powers to the EU concerning the field of readmission, in order to conclude a trade or

development aid agreements. Indeed, the Seville presidency conclusions stipulate the

importance of readmission in any kind of cooperation with third countries:

“The European Council urges that any future cooperation, association or equivalent

agreement which the EU or the European Community concludes with any country

66

Tampere Conclusions 67

The European Commission, (2002), Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with

third countries, document n° 713. 68



2006/1, pp.3-4. 69

Expression used by C. Boswell (2003), in ‘The ‘external dimension’ of the EU immigration and asylum

policy’, in International Affairs.

29

should include a clause of joint management of migration flows and on compulsory

readmission in the event of illegal immigration.”70

Moreover, the Seville presidency Conclusions stipulate that sanctions, like stopping the EU

financial support, could be imposed if third countries were ‘non- cooperative’ in terms of

readmitting irregular migrants. 71

The countries wishing to become EU Members are also obliged to apply the EU standards,

like to adapt the Schengen Acquis within their national administrations.72

Sometimes, they

also have to change their relations with their own neighbors in order to conform to the EUs

attempts. For example, when the negotiations for the accession of Romania to the EU

started, in 2000, the EU main preoccupation was about the Romania- Moldova relations.

The EU was afraid of the new EU neighbor; Moldova. The first question, asked by the EU

officials to the Romanian Government was: “When are you going to introduce visas for

Moldovans?” (« Quand est- ce que vous introduisez des visas pour les Moldaves? »)73

This

announcement was a shock for the Romanian political class, which “had not thought about

the Moldovan integration at that time.” (« Nous n’avions pas réfléchi à l’intégration

moldave en ce temps-là. »)74

The good Moldova-Romania relations became, therefore, a

problem for the Romanian integration into the EU. This ad also created an important

frustration in Chisinau, which made the experiment of the anti- Romanian speech led by the

Communists, enjoying sympathy, in Moldova, in the early 2000s: “They are in power and

they adopt legitimising discourse as “Romanians do nothing for you” or “you see; they tell

you they are your brothers and they introduce visas.”” («Ils sont au pouvoir et ils adoptent

des discours de légitimation comme: «Les Roumains ne font rien pour vous» ou «Ah les

70

European Council, (2002), Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002 Presidency Conclusions,

document n° 13463/02, p.10. Emphasis added by the author. 71



2006/1, p. 7. 72

Tomescu-Hatto, O. speaks about the difficult application of the Schengen acquis in the case of Romania and

its special relations with its neighbor: Moldova. Tomescu-Hatto, O. (2005), Comment conjuguer

l’élargissement de l’Union européenne et la Sécurité de ses frontières? Le Chapitre roumano-moldave. (‘How

to conjugate the EU enlargement and the Security of its borders? The Romano-Moldovan Chapter’), p.5. 73

Interview n°1, conducted in French. 74

Ibid.

30

Roumains, vous voyez, ils vous disent qu’ils sont vos frères et ils vous mettent des

visas»»).75

So during the years 2000 until 2003, the Romanian Government agreed with the

EU and did not deliver Romanian citizenship to the Moldovans anymore: “We will be

eligible; we will not give the Romanian citizenship to Moldovans.” («Nous allons être

éligibles, nous ne donnons plus la citoyenneté roumaine aux Moldaves»). 76

1.2.2. The ‘comprehensive’ approach to migration: first step toward the de-

securitisation of the EU discourse on migration?

At the meantime, the EU developed another approach to migration, the commonly called

‘comprehensive’ approach, which includes “measures designed to change the factors which

influence people’s decisions to move.”77

It is in the Tampere Conclusions, that the concept

of ‘comprehensive’ approach to migration is developed for the first time, within the EU

discourse on migration:

“The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing

political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin

and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job

opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring

respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children.”78

In other terms, the EU attempts to combat the root causes of immigration by linking

migration to development. This approach was developed through different tools like the

implementation of migration within the EU development and trade policies, implying,

therefore, other DGs to manage migration. The inclusion of human rights and development

issues within the framework of the EU migration policy permitted, therefore, a tentative to

move from a securitised toward a de-securitised EU discourse on migration.79

Nevertheless,

75

Ibid. 76

Ibid. 77


Affairs, p. 620. Emphasis added by the author. 78

Tampere conclusions, emphasis added by the author. 79

Babyan, D, (2010), Balancing Security and Development in Migration Policy: EU Mobility Partnerships,

Natolin Master Thesis, p.35.

31

the core idea of the ‘comprehensive’ approach to migration resides in keeping the

immigrants in their regions of origin, leading to a disguised control approach. Moreover, in

order to put into practice the ‘comprehensive’ approach to migration, the Tampere

conclusions stipulate that “partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key

element for the success of such policy, with a view to promoting co-development.”80

Therefore, the idea to co-operate with the third countries, by establishing partnerships and

promoting development, was born.

Nevertheless, the concept to link migration to development did not meet a high enthusiasm

at that time. Indeed, EU officials were afraid that it will have a negative impact on the EU-

third countries relations.81

Moreover, as it was noticed previously, the Laeken and Seville

Conclusions showed that the EU, still, linked migration to a security issue rather than to a

development perspective. The incentive was, therefore, to find a policy which would

reconcile and link the two opposite approaches in managing migration. Thus, in order to

develop and maintain good relations between the EU and third countries.

1. 3. EU Mobility Partnerships: On the way beyond Security?

1.3.1. EU Mobility Partnerships: the ‘materialised’ EU willingness to go beyond a

security discourse on migration?

The idea of partnerships and agreements with third countries, promoting legal channels for

mobility for TCNs, was within the EU discourse since the ‘Communautarisation’ of the

Asylum and Immigration Policy and found its roots within the Tampere Conclusions.82

Then, the Council of the European called, in 2005, “to work to make migration a shared

priority for political dialogue between the EU and the African Union”83

, showing therefore

partnership with third countries as the new tool of the EU to manage migration flows. Still,

80

Tampere conclusions 81


Affairs, p.620. 82

As it has been explained previously, the idea of promoting legal migration to third countries in exchange of

fighting against irregular migration is not new. 83

Council of the European Union,(2005). Global approach to migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa

and the Mediterranean, document n° 15744/05, p.5.

32

the idea to offer circular migration schemes to third countries, in order to reduce and

control irregular immigration within the EU, was highlighted for the first time by N.

Sarkozy and W. Schaüble (respectively Ministers of Interior of France and Germany, at that

time), within the document ‘New European Migration Policy’, presented to the G6 in 2006:

84

“We do not want uncontrolled immigration into our labour markets and our social

security systems. In order to promote circular migration, quotas should be set for

the migration of labour in certain occupations… in order for the concept of circular

migration to succeed, it is important that migrants return to their countries of origin

after they stay in an EU Member State.”85

Therefore, what will be called the Mobility Partnerships in 2007 found its roots in a

Security oriented approach to manage migration, following the introduction of the EU

discourse on Global Approach to migration in 2005.

Conclusion

Therefore, it has been shown that the principle of the Mobility Partnership (to promote a

comprehensive approach to migration by promising circular migration schemes to third

countries) found its roots within the ‘Communautarisation’ of the EU Asylum and

Immigration Policy. Since the Tampere Conclusions, which aimed to implement the

Amsterdam Treaty, the main idea of the EU Member States is, indeed, to cooperate with

third countries in order to keep the EU secure by fighting irregular migration. Therefore,

the incentive of the EU Member States by implementing the MPs is not to promote regular

migration by opening new legal avenues for mobility; but to strengthen its border by

cooperating with third countries in this domain. The willingness to move from a security

oriented to a comprehensive approach to migration can be, therefore, discussed. It will be

interesting, now, to look at the functioning of the MPs by analising the content of the Joint

84


Towards Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships? CEPS Working Document N° 321, p. 11. 85

Ibid, emphasizes added by the author.

33

Declarations, in order to see if the EU adopts, really, a new approach to migration or uses

the ‘old methods’ for persuading third countries to co-operate.

34

Chapter 2: The functioning of the EU-Third Countries MPs

2. 1. Conditionality for Third Countries

2.1.1 ‘The price for mobility.’

“The EU wants to have a better mobility in a secure environment.”86

The conditionality can be defined as the principle according to which the EU determines

certain conditions for the third countries before they enter into cooperation with the EU and

its Member States. “The promise of rewards” –and- or- “the threat of sanctions.”87

The use

of the conditionality is at the core of the Mobility Partnerships as it has been at the core of

the ENP. Indeed, the conclusion of an EU- third country MP is only made possible under

pre-conditions; “the level of commitments which the third country is ready to take in terms

of action against illegal migration and facilitating reintegration of returnees.”88

Therefore,

the opening of new avenues for legal migration and mobility is made conditional for the

third countries. Which price do they have to pay for obtaining the sesame: the regular

mobility? The return seems pale in comparison.

The commitments, defined within the Communication on ‘Circular migration and mobility

partnerships between the European Union and third countries’, are related to three main

points: the conclusion of readmission agreements of third country nationals which are in

irregular situation, initiative to fight irregular immigration, and the improvement of the

management of border controls by cooperating with the Member States or Frontex.

Commitments show, therefore, the will from the EU and its Member States to reinforce the

management of the border controls and fight against irregular immigration by cooperating

with third countries. The use of the conditionality can be found, already, within the

86

Interviewee n°2, emphasis added by the author. 87



Politics, p.133. 88

European Commission, (2007) ‘On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European

Union and third countries’ COM (2007) 248 final, p. 3. Emphasis added by the author.

35

Communication on ‘the Global Approach to Migration’: “mobility packages89

would be

made possible “once certain conditions have been met, such as cooperation on illegal

migration and effective mechanisms for readmission.”90

The use of the principle of conditionality symbolises the driving force of EU negotiations

with third countries. Conditionality has been, indeed, institutionalised within the EU third

countries relations and even taken for granted. From trade agreements to visa facilitation

dialogue, the use of conditionality shows the EU and its Member States- as the main actor-

deciding the rules of the mobility game. Indeed, “conditionality is also under the EaP

cooperation.”91

According to this fact, the MPs do not constitute a ‘new tool’ by changing

the approach to manage migration. The dominant use of conditionality shows, therefore,

that the EU did not change its approach to cooperate with third countries.

2.1.2. Perception of the use of conditionality by the third country

One important point, worthy to analyse, is the perception of the principle of conditionality

by the third countries. It can be understood and perceived as a step to go through in order to

obtain more from the EU, thinking that the benefit justifies the cost.92

Therefore, the use of

the principle of conditionality “can be understandable; it is the EU cooperating with third

countries. Of course in order to cooperate with third countries pre-conditions should be

fulfilled.”93

When the conditions are a part of a document and a third country signs it, “the

country expresses its will to undertake these obligations and should fulfill them. If you

agree it means that you wanted to agree.”94

But it can also be perceived as a ‘non legitimate condition’ regarding to the price, a non-

legally binding document in the case of the MP. As mentioned in the interviews, the

89

‘Mobility packages’ were the name used before the suggestion, by the European Commission in its

Communication ‘On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third

countries’, to call the “Mobility Partnerships”. 90

GAM 91

Interviewee 4 92

Interview n°3 93

Interview n°4 94

Ibid

36

principle of conditionality is applied on the same basis with the third countries, which can

raise a problem of coherency as each actor is not dealing with the same issues. Indeed, as

one of the interviewee emphasized: “It is difficult to believe that it is the same actor who

decides with Gaddafi how to block immigration coming from sub-Saharan Africa and talks

with Moldova, in Chisinau, about visa facilitation.” (« C’est difficile de croire que c’est le

même acteur qui décide avec Kadhafi de comment bloquer l’immigration qui vient de

l’Afrique subsaharienne et qui discute avec la Moldavie, à Chisinau, du dossier sur la

facilitation des visas. »)95

The real problem seems to belong to the definition of the EU

Neighbors.96

Moreover, as it is underlined by one of the interviewee the EU is much more

demanding to the closest neighbors than the further ones: “We are much more relaxed when

it comes to a more distant country. Perhaps the fear of immigration is the element which

explains this attitude. (« Nous sommes beaucoup plus détendus lorsqu’il s’agit d’un pays

plus éloigné. La peur de l’immigration est peut être un élément qui explique cette

attitude. ») 97

The EU MP: A benefic tool for the third countries?

As the interviewees emphasised, the conditions to fulfill for concluding a MP seem to be

less restrictive than the ones for visa facilitation: “there are commitments but compared to

the ones introduce by the visa dialogue, it is less restrictive.” (« Il y a des contraintes mais

par rapport au dialogue sur les visas, c’est moins contraignant »).98

There are a lot of

conditions for visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. Indeed, dialogue on visa issues

includes “travel documents, biometrical passports, high security features, integrated borders

management in cooperation with Frontex; and also internal reforms, fight against

corruption, and rules of law.”99

95

Interview n°1, translated from the French original version. 96

Interview n°1 97

Interview n°1 98

Interview n°3 99

Interview n°2

37

For the third country it seems even beneficial to conclude a MP because it does not need to

reform the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Justice.100

Moreover the third country

does not need financial resources, which is benefic in the case of a country like Moldova,

considered as the poorest country within Europe.101

2.1.3. Readmission agreements: the ‘unofficial goal’ of the MPs?

Why would EU Member States be interested in cooperating with a third country, in order to

develop mobility for TCNs, at the time of the economic crisis? What is the incentive for the

EU Member States? The readmission agreements symbolise this incentive. The new

‘carrot’ for the EU relations with third countries is the promise of visa liberalisation or ‘visa

free travel’ in exchange of the signature of readmission agreements.102

When MPs Joint

Declarations were signed by that time visa facilitation and readmission agreements were

not signed…but they were on the active process of preparation.103

A concrete example is

the one of Armenia; the negotiations about visa facilitation were introduced in 2012 and the

MP was signed in September 2011 (“la Commission européenne a eu deux tours de

négociations en 2012 sur un accord de facilitation des visas”).104

Even if there is no direct

link between the signature of an EU-third country MP and the visa facilitation dialogue, it

appears that the conclusion of an EU-third country MP is a step toward visa facilitation and

visa liberalization. Indeed, by implementing the reforms required under the EU-third

countries MPs (like the readmission agreements); third countries are getting closer to visa

liberalisation with the EU.

100

Interview n°3 101

Interviewee n°3, Emphasizes were made on the fact that the MPs were not costly to implement 102

Interview n°3 103

Interview n°4 104

Ministère de l’Intérieur, Immigration, integration et asile en France, Partenariat pour la mobilité:

l’Armenie (Mobility Partnership: Armenia), 10/09/2012. Available at :

http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Europe-International/L-approche-globale-des-migrations-et-les-

partenariats-pour-la-mobilite-PPM/Partenariat-pour-la-mobilite-l-Armenie

http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Europe-International/L-approche-globale-des-migrations-et-les-partenariats-pour-la-mobilite-PPM/Partenariat-pour-la-mobilite-l-Armenie

http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Europe-International/L-approche-globale-des-migrations-et-les-partenariats-pour-la-mobilite-PPM/Partenariat-pour-la-mobilite-l-Armenie

38

2.2. Political Significance of the Mobility Partnerships

2.2.1. Mobility partnership: a new think tank?

The MP symbolises a think tank (« un laboratoire d’idées »).105

It led, indeed, to the

establishment of a forum with meetings taking place in Brussels and in the third countries’

Capitals. It permits, therefore, to ‘stimulate’ the debate about immigration issues. The

meetings are held by experts and not by diplomats, which allow a new kind of debates

about the concrete needs of the EU Member States and the Third Countries in terms of

circular migration. It is, therefore, an important tool which “can provide the necessary

framework to discuss and work on issues that are often considered too political or too

technical” (« le partenariat pour la mobilité permet de donner le cadre nécessaire pour

discuter et travailler sur des sujets qui sont bien souvent considérés trop politiques ou trop

techniques »). 106

The MP is an important tool for boosting the cooperation in immigration matters.107

From

the meetings with the experts coming from the EU Member States participating and the

third countries, to the implementation of the projects exposed within the Joint Declarations.

It is not just a dialogue about immigration like the EU- Russia dialogue108

. The MP is a tool

which aims to go further in the cooperation between the EU Member States and the third

countries by developing the dialogue about immigration issues. It goes further, compared to

the bilateral agreements, by promoting a dialogue at the EU stage. It is important to

underline that it is the cooperation between the EU Member States which have signed the

MP and the third countries; and not between the European Commission and the third

countries. Indeed, the European Commission has the role of coordinator of the MP between

the EU Member States and the third countries. Moreover, the MP “is one of the tools for

promoting mobility, but it is not the ‘main tool.’”109

105

Interview n°3, translated from French

106

Ibid

107

Interview n°2

108

Interview n°3

109

Interview n°2

39

2.2.2. The lack of motivation of the EU Member States

The MP could be a useful tool; if there would be money and the necessary incentive from

the EU Member States, to implement the commitments decided by the conclusions of the

Joint Declarations. But “there is not so much enthusiasm from the EU side.”110

Maybe it is

due to the economic crisis and the rise of the populism within all the EU Member States. Or

probably, after signing the readmission agreements, the EU Member States lost interest in

implementing projects to enhance the mobility of the TCNs.111

Moreover, there is a lack of

participation of the EU Member States in giving ideas and participating in the debates.112

Or the future success of the MP depends on the good will and the participation of the EU

Member States to the projects.113

Indeed the European Commission is a coordinator but not

an actor within this process. The MP constitutes, therefore, a platform, which permits to

establish new projects concerning immigration matters; and to coordinate them.

2.2.3. A step towards visa liberalisation for Third Countries

Moreover, the MP is a document which permits to enhance cooperation in the view of visa

liberalisation dialogue. The aim of the MP, from a third country point of view, is to end to

the visa liberalisation process. 114

After the conclusion of an MP, which includes admitting

the readmission agreements in exchange of visa facilitation, the next step would be, indeed,

the visa liberalisation. If all the conditions are fulfilled by a country then it will contribute

to the process of visa liberalisation. For example, visa liberalisation was always a priority

for the Republic of Moldova in its dialogue with the EU. In this context, an important

number of steps have been made115

:

110

Ibid

111

Ibid

112

Interview n°3

113

Ibid

114

Interview n°4

115

Information provided by the Moldovan experts

40

EU-Moldova Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Negotiations launched in

2006, entered into force in 2008.

Amendments to the EU-Moldova Visa Facilitation Agreement: negotiations launched

2010, signed in 2012, entered into force the 1 July 2013.

EU-Moldova Visa dialogue: launched in June 2010, EU-Moldova Liberalisation Action

Plan presented in January 2011. Officially under the phase II of the VLAP in December

2013.

“Being the priority of the Government, the Visa Dialogue has been the driving force for the

complex and profound reform process launched in the areas of Justice and Home

Affairs.”116

2.3. Mobility on the paper: View on the projects: comparison on the different projects

between the EU-Third Countries MPs.

Borders management impetus: a lack of projects developing mobility for TCNs?

A detailed analysis of the nature of the projects and initiatives written within the three Joint

Declarations, concluded by the interested EU Member States with Moldova, Georgia and

Armenia, let us establish the finding that the projects are more oriented towards border

management and security aspects rather than the development of circular mobility schemes.

Whether or not regular labor mobility is permitted, it is provided through bilateral

agreements between the wished EU Member States and the third countries under the MPs

framework.

2.3.1. The Moldovan case

Concerning Moldova out of 64 initiatives established within the Joint Declaration on

Mobility Partnership between the EU and Moldova117

only four projects are written under

116

Ibid

41

the context of ‘Labour migration schemes’118

, which has got for objective “to offer better

access to Member States Labour markets.”119

But no one of the projects opens up –directly-

new opportunities for circular migration. Other projects are related to local border traffic or

dissemination of information in Moldova on EU labor market regulation. Indeed, the two

projects related to promote mobility circular schemes, proposed by the Czech Republic and

the Republic of Cyprus, concern support for the reintegration of returning migrants; and no

word is said about promoting circular migration. Another project proposed bilateral

agreements. Bulgaria offers an ‘Agreement on the Regulation of Labour Migration with the

Republic of Moldova in 2008’; and Romania a conclusion of a convention on local border

traffic. ‘The access to the labour market’ is supported by a proposal from Italy to provide

assistance to potential entrants to the Italian labour market. There is also an offer by

Sweden to establish a pilot project to disseminate information within Moldova about the

Swedish labour migration reform “as regards recruitment of workers from third countries in

certain sectors.”120

There is also written an offer from Romania and the Veneto Region to

introduce an initiative to support labour migration and development ‘for the benefit of

Moldova.’ The last proposal, from Poland, aims to propose admission, to the Polish labour

market, for temporary work without the need to have a work permit.

It is the same concerning the development; there is no project related to the development of

the third country. The focus seems to be, exclusively, on improving remittances in

Moldova. N. Ward argues that there is “very little additional access provided in the EU MP

as compared to the bilateral migration agreements offered by individual EU Member States

(such as France).”121

Moreover, “in the Moldovan MP, the issue of access to the labour

market appears to be less advanced than in the Cape Verde MP.”122

In comparison, the MP

117

Council of the European Union (2008), doc. 9460/08, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnerships

between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, pp. 8-17. 118

See the Appendix section of the Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnerships between the European Union

and the Republic of Moldova, p.11. 119

Ibid, p. 11 120

Ibid, p.12 121

Ward, N. (2011), ‘Facilitating the temporary movement of natural persons, Economic partnership

agreements versus bilateral migration agreements and Mobility Partnerships’, in: Multilayered Migration

Governance, The promise of partnership, Routledge Advances in International Relation and Global Politics,

p.158 122

Ibid, p.159

42

with Cape Verde is more oriented to mobility. Indeed, on 31 projects123

, 10 are related to

the facilitation of labor migration. “The MPs do not generally offer any additional labour

access openings, but simply place the different offerings by individual EU MS under a

single framework.”124

In theory it should have provided concrete gains to the third country

with respect to its obligations and agenda, but in practice which was the benefit?

2.3.2. The Georgian case

Concerning Georgia, on 17 projects125

signed between the EU Member States and the third

country, projects are mostly related to migration and border control. Indeed, there are only

two projects, under the context of ‘Facilitation of Labour migration’, which aims to

promote circular mobility for Georgian citizens. There is a proposal by France to enhance

circular mobility for students and young professionals; and another project promoted by

France and Poland, which aims to facilitate, an access to the national labour markets, under

certain conditions126

. Concerning the support for circular migration, two projects exist. The

first one, proposed by Germany, aims to allow extended absences without loss of rights of

residence. The second, proposed by the Netherlands, aims to support the temporary return

of qualified nationals in the private sector.

The priority seems to be on ‘Strengthening Georgia's capacity to manage labour and return

migration’. Other projects are mostly related to disseminate information about the

promotion of regular migration schemes for Georgia and the EU Member States interests;

and on borders managements. Indeed, there is one important project involving Bulgaria, the

Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden,

123

Council of the European Union (2008), doc. 9460/08, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership

between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, pp. 8-14. 124

Ward, N. (2011), ‘Facilitating the temporary movement of natural persons, Economic partnership

agreements versus bilateral migration agreements and Mobility Partnerships’, in: Multilayered Migration

Governance, The promise of partnership, Routledge Advances in International Relation and Global Politics,

p.159. 125

Council of the European Union (2009), doc. 16396/09, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership

between the European Union and Georgia, pp. 8-12.

http://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/28794/PB1.pdf 126

Joint declaration, conditions are not mentioned.

http://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/28794/PB1.pdf

43

which aims to cooperate in disseminating information “on routes for legal migration to the

EU, legal employment in the EU Member States, dangers and negative effects of illegal

migration as well as return to and reintegration in Georgia.”127

There is also written an

important project to create a Joint Steering Committee to enhance the coordination and to

program activities in the field related to border management. It is a proposal from

FRONTEX, which is supported by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the United Kingdom. “It will be composed from the experts

of FRONTEX and EU Member States, as well as experts from the competent Georgian

institutions.” 128

2.3.3. The Armenian case

Concerning Armenia, out of 20 projects129

, only one concerns directly the promotion of

circular mobility schemes. This proposal comes from France and consists in promoting

circular mobility schemes for young professionals and students. Other projects, indirectly,

related to circular mobility schemes concern the dissemination of information about regular

and irregular migration; and training programs. Indeed there is one proposal from Italy,

Poland and Sweden to share information about the possibilities of migration through ‘legal’

channels; and another project which aims to implement ‘pre-departure’ training programs

in order to “joint study programs based on Bologna system to facilitate the recognition of

studies and diploma in Romania and Armenia.”130

Conclusion

Analysing the core of the EU-third countries Joint Declarations permitted to establish the

funding that the principle of conditionality is at the heart of the Mobility Partnerships.

‘Mobility’ for TCNs is made conditional under a large number of conditions. But the

127

The Council of the European Union, (2009), doc. 16396/09, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership

between the European Union and Georgia, p. 8. 128

Ibid, p.11 129

The Council of the European Union (2011), doc. 14963/11, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership

between the European Union and Armenia, pp. 10-13. 130

The Council of the European Union, (2011), Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the

European Union and Armenia, p.3. Available at:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/125698.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/125698.pdf

44

opening of legal avenues for TCNs seems to be missing. Indeed, the analysis shows that the

priority of the MPs is to introduce projects related to border management and to conclude

readmission agreements with third countries. Therefore, mobility appeared to be ‘a

promise’ rather than a reality for TCNs. The analysis of the EU-third countries MPs show

the unofficial goal of the EU: to keep its borders under control.

45

Part II: The implementation of the EU Mobility Partnership from a third

country’s perspectives. The Moldovan Case

Analysing the implementation of the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership allow us to go back

to the EU-Moldova relations before the introduction of the EU-Moldova MP. The aim of

this part is, therefore, to show the complexity of the EU-Moldova relations as well as the

changes brought by the implementation of the MP for both Moldova and the EU Member

States.

Chapter 3: Analysis of the cooperation between the EU and Moldova before the

introduction of the MP

3. 0. Moldova: a singular neighbor?

“The Republic of Moldova has always been a country in search of identity looking to

conjugate at the mean time its appurtenance to Europe and to the ancient Soviet area.”131

Located between Romania in the South- West and Ukraine in the North- East, Moldova is

composed of a significant ethnic diversity: 76.1 % of Moldovans, 5.8% of Russians, 8.4%

of Ukrainians, 4.4% of Gagauz and 1.9 % of Bulgarians.132

Moldova became an

independent State after the fall of the Communism, in 1991.133

Before, it was under the

authority of the Ottomans, Russians and Romanians. Indeed, declared Principality of

Moldova in the IV century, it became a territory under the Ottoman authority in the XV

century. Then Moldova started to be under the Russian authority in 1812 until the

reintegration to Romania in 1918. The signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the 23 of

131

Translated from the French: « La République de Moldavie a toujours été un pays en quête d’identité

cherchant à conjuguer à la fois son appartenance à l’Europe et à l’ancien espace soviétique », Tomescu-Hatto,

O. (2005) Comment conjuguer l’élargissement de l’Union européenne et la sécurité de ses frontières? Le

chapitre roumano-moldave, (“How to conjugate the EU enlargement and its border Security? The Romanian-

Moldovan Chapter”). Les Etudes du CERI, p.5. 132

Ibid, p.5 133

The declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova was declared by the Parliament the 27 August

1991

46

August 1939, made Moldova a Russian territory. The Moldovan history led to different

approaches dividing the present society concerning the identity and the future of the

country. There is, therefore, a permanent struggle within the Moldovan society to choose

between to be integrated to the East- Russia- or to go on the way of the European

integration?

Moldova constitutes a unique case study concerning the relations between the EU and its

Neighborhood.134

Approaches differ concerning the integration of Moldova, mobility and

visa dialogue depending on each EU Member State interests, and perceptions of the

country.135

There is not such relation between the EU and another country in the

Neighborhood: complexity, hips and downs due to the actual political crisis, the struggle

between the Russian and the pro-European influences within the country characterised the

EU-Moldova relations. Moreover, the relations between Romania and Moldova are

singulars compared to the other EU Member States and their neighbors. Ambiguity seems,

therefore, to be the best word defining EU- Moldova relations, especially in terms of

integration and migration issues. This ambiguity can be illustrated by the current political

crisis in Moldova. “Moldovan case is primarily a political problem.” (« Le cas Moldave est

avant tout un problème politique»).136

It is the domination of a Communist party as it does

not exist anymore within the EU Member States. The EU has supported the creation of a

pro-European government in Moldova but the Union is also powerless concerning the

political crisis in the country. A significant example is the fact that the Communists did not

want to meet Mr. Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European

Neighborhood Policy, in May 2013 during his visit to Chisinau.137

It is showing the stage of

the current crisis concerning the relations between the actual Moldovan Government and

the EU. At the meantime Moldova has been considered as the best student of the Eap.138

Compared to Ukraine, Moldova is well more advanced on the way to the democratisation

and institutionalisation of the EU prerogatives, in particular concerning visa dialogue and

134

Interview n°1, translated from French 135

Ibid 136

Ibid 137

Ibid 138

Interview n°1; Interview n°3

47

migration management.139

Even if Moldova is a small country compared to its neighbors,

like Ukraine, it is an interesting country for some EU Member States. Romania is

interested; Italy, Germany and Poland are interested as well. 140

3.1. Migration patterns

Moldova is a country of significant emigration; the number of emigrants largely surpassing

the number of immigrants.141

According to the last European University Institute’s Report

on EU Neighborhood Migration (2013), around 615.171 Moldovans reside officially

abroad, out of a population of four million. This constitutes about 17.3% of the total of the

population living in Moldova.142

The Moldovan emigration is difficult to measure,

especially due to the lack of control at the Transnistrian border with Ukraine. Academics

estimate that 800.000 to 1 Million Moldovans are living outside the country.143

While, there

are around 17.846 foreign citizens residing in Moldova.144

Characterised as being

depopulated, with about ¼ of the Moldovans living abroad, Moldova suffers from the leak

of its population.145

This wave of emigration started with the dissolution of the Soviet

Union in 1991 and increased due to the military conflict in Transnistria, in 1992. At that

time the emigration flows were mainly toward Russia and Ukraine.146

From 1999 until

nowadays, the emigration flows are mostly oriented toward Russia and the EU, depending

139

Interview n°1 140

Ibid 141

Buracec, E. (2012), Mobility Partnerships in a Third Country perspective: The case of EU-Moldova

cooperation, Working Paper FIERI, p. 5. 142

European University Institute, ‘Moldova’, in: EU Neighborhood Migration Report 2013, p.157.Available

at:

http://issuu.com/euipublications/docs/mpc_eu_neighbourhood_migration_repo?mode=embed&layout=http%

3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true 143

Ratzmann, N. Moldova and the EU: Liberalizing or Securitising Migration? , Research Paper, Centre on

Migration, Policy and Society, p. 3. 144

The number of Foreigners citizens residing in Moldova was registered for the year 2004. European

University Institute, ‘Moldova’, in: EU Neighborhood Migration Report 2013, p.157. 145

Interview n°1 146

European University Institute, ‘Moldova’, in: EU Neighborhood Migration Report 2013, p.157.

http://issuu.com/euipublications/docs/mpc_eu_neighbourhood_migration_repo?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true

http://issuu.com/euipublications/docs/mpc_eu_neighbourhood_migration_repo?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true

48

on different trends of emigration.147

In both cases, the Moldovan emigration is

economically and socially driven; the reasons for leaving are poverty and the lack of

jobs.148

Indeed, Moldova is considered as the poorest country in Europe in term of GDP

and GDP per capita. The average monthly income, which is very low, is around 180 Euros.

149 The country has also the “highest share of GDP supported by remittances for the year

2011.”150

The high emigration flows led to a negative effect on the development of the

country, the emigration population being very young. Indeed, 38% of Moldovan migrants

are between 20-29 years old and 23% are between 30-39 years old.151

One direct

consequence of it is the high percentage of old population within the country.152

Moldovan

emigration also has a crucial impact on families. As most of the Moldovan migrants have a

family staying in Moldova, many are forsaken due to the stay of one or both of their parents

abroad.153

Moreover, 22% of the Moldovan migrants have got a higher education degree.154

Therefore, the brain drain is one of the direct consequences of the high Moldovan

emigration. The number of elite workers leaving Moldova is a crucial problem for the

economic and social development of the country.155

The EU-Moldova MP, by promoting

circular migration schemes, could be, therefore, a good opportunity for managing the

Moldovan migration flows.

147

Stemmer, A. (2011), The Republic of Moldova and the Migration: Migration and its risks and opportunities

for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, p. 42. 148

Statement by H. E. Victor Moraru Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova

at the 101th Session of the IOM Council, Republic of Moldova, 30 November 2012 in

Geneva, p.1. 149

This number was for the year 2011. Stemmer, A. (2011), The Republic of Moldova and the Migration:

Migration and its risks and opportunities for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, p.

43. 150

European University Institute, ‘Moldova’, in: EU Neighborhood Migration Report 2013, p.157. 151

Ibid 152

Stemmer, A. (2011), The Republic of Moldova and the Migration: Migration and its risks and

opportunities for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, p.55. 153

Ibid 154


cooperation, Working Paper FIERI, p.6. 155

Stemmer, A. (2011), The Republic of Moldova and the Migration: Migration and its risks and

opportunities for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, p.45.

49

3.1.1. Moldovan emigration toward Russia

The majority of Moldovans migrate to Russia. Indeed there are more departures from

Moldova to Russia than to the EU.156

In term of official numbers, they are around 277.

527Moldovans living in Russia.157

The high number of Moldovans residing in Russia can

be explained by the past relations between the two countries. Indeed, after the collapse of

the Soviet Union, an important number of Moldovans with Russian descent decided to

move for living in Russia.158

The Transnistria conflict led to another wave of Moldovan

emigration toward Russia.

Nowadays, a consequent number of Moldovans decide, to go to live in Russia, rather than

in the EU, for administrative and financial reasons.159

Firstly, Moldovan migrants are going

to live in Russia because it is easier for them to work there rather than within an EU

Member States due to the free access to visas.160

Secondly, Russia is an attractive

destination due to its significant labour market, the socio economical closeness and the

geographical situation; even if the salaries are lower than within the EU Member States.161

Moreover, the living costs and the risks to work in an irregular situation are lower than in

the EU Member States.162

The Moldovan migrants in Russia are mostly men, who are

employed within the construction sector.163

Usually, their stays are short and can lead to

circular migration schemes. Indeed, due to the visa free regime between Moldova and

156

Interview n°1 157


Chin, J and Roper, S. D. (1995), ‘Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case of Moldova’,

in: Nationalities Papers, Vol.23, No.2, pp.304-305. 159

Interview n°3 160

Indeed, there is a visa-free regime for the Moldovan Citizens wishing to go to Russia. 161

Ratzmann, N. Moldova and the EU: Liberalizing or Securitising Migration? , Research Paper, Centre on

Migration, Policy and Society, p.3. 162


for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, p.52.

163


cooperation, Working Paper FIERI, p.6.

50

Russia, it is easier for Moldovans to go to work temporarily in Russia than in an EU

Member States.164

3.1.2. Moldovan emigration toward the EU

Officially there are 276.642 Moldovan citizens living in the EU Member States.165

The

main countries destinations for Moldovans are Italy, Romania, Poland, Portugal, France,

Spain and Greece. This is mainly due to the language facility, the higher salaries, the

important business networks and relatives residing within those EU Member States.166

Italy

is the second country, after Russia, attracting the most of the Moldovan migrants. Indeed,

around 132.000 Moldovan migrants, in a regular situation, live in Italy.167

We can add, to

this number, the migrants in an irregular situation and the Moldovan citizens which have

got Romanian passports. Then the number would, probably, be around 200.000.168

While more than 75 percent of Moldovan migrants in Russia are male, the converse is true

in the EU where the migrants are mostly women.169

Usually, they are employed within the

domestic care sector. Their stays are longer and can lead to permanent stays, in comparison

with the Moldovan migrants in Russia. This can be explained by the difficult access to the

EU due to the need of visas. Moldovan migrants usually reach the EU with a visa and stay

over the time permitted, being therefore in an irregular situation. They are supporting the

black market by accepting low non declared jobs. This is a significant way of doing so

within the EU Member States and especially in Italy.170

It is common that Moldovan

migrants, who arrived within the EU Member States, with qualifications let them in order

164

Interview n°3 165



for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS; Interview n°1. 167


for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, p.56. 168

Ibid 169


for the European Union, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS. 170

Ibid, p.27

51

to find a job due to the fact that qualifications are not recognised or that they do not have a

work permit.

3.2. Framework of cooperation on migration issues between Moldova and some

EU Member States.

Bilateral agreements signed by the Republic of Moldova and the EU Member States

represent the legal framework for the EU-Moldova relations in term of migration issues.

3.2.1. Moldova – Italy relations

Italy is the first EU Member State which has signed labour migration agreements with

Moldova in 2003 and later in 2011.171

The bilateral agreement between Moldova and Italy

permits to Moldovan workers to benefit from preferential quotas of entry for work

demands. 172

Italy opened its labour market to Moldovan migrants because there is a

structural demand for foreign labour in some sectors of the Italian economy such as

domestic care services, and Moldovan migrants fill in this work sector.173

Moreover,

Moldovans integrate easily the host society due to the language and cultural similarities

between the two countries.174

The Italian society has also a positive image about Moldovan

migrants, which helps for their integration into the host society.175

According to E. Buracec,

Moldovan migrants attracted the attention of the Italian policy-makers due to the fast

growth of the Moldovan immigrants group in Italy. Indeed, during the year 2010, the

number of Moldovans living in Italy, in a regular situation, increased by 24%.176

The Italian

government decided, therefore, to strengthen the relations with Moldova concerning

migration issues.

171


cooperation, Working Paper FIERI, p. 8; Ciumas, T. (2012), Legal Aspects of Labour Migration Governance

in the Republic of Moldova, CARIM-East Research Report 2012/22, p.8 172

Ciumas, T. (2012), Legal Aspects of Labour Migration Governance in the Republic of Moldova, CARIM-

East Research Report 2012/22, p.8 173


cooperation, Working Paper FIERI. 174

Interview n°1, Interview n°3 175


cooperation, Working Paper FIERI, p.9.

176

Ibid, p. 9

52

The Agreement on labour and on Implementation Protocol thereof with the Government of

Italy, signed by Moldova on the 5th

of July 2011, stipulates that the Italian Government

would grant special entry quota for Moldovans.177

The agreement stipulates that circular

migration schemes for Moldovan workers will be promoted as well as joint projects for

technical assistance in managing migration. Moreover, trainings and Italian languages

courses, financed by the Italian authorities in Moldova, will be developed. The Agreement

also underlines the role of the Moldovan Diaspora for integrating the newcomers. The aim

is to increase the relations between Moldovans and the Moldovan citizens living abroad.178

3.2.2. Moldova- Romania relations

“Currently, Romania is the country where there is the biggest number of Moldovan

entries.” 179

Romania and Moldova are linked by a unique history. For almost all Romanians,

Moldovans are brothers living in another country but sharing the same culture, language,

history and even sometimes family ties.180

Tomescu- Hatto argues that Moldova and

Romania present similar characteristics which make them being significant special

neighbors: “The relations between Romania and Moldova present some specificity which

differentiate them from the other relations between neighbors of the region” («Les relations

entre la Roumanie et la Moldavie présentent certaines spécificités qui les différencient des

autres relations entre voisins de la région»).181

Being so closed to each other always led to

177

Ciumas, T. (2012), Legal Aspects of Labour Migration Governance in the Republic of Moldova, CARIM-

East Research Report 2012/22, p.8 178

Ibid. 179

Interview n°1, the interviewee insisted on the fact that he was talking about Moldovans without Romanian

Passports. 180

Interview n°1 181

Tomescu-Hatto, O. (2005) Comment conjuguer l’élargissement de l’Union européenne et la sécurité de ses

frontières? Le chapitre roumano-moldave (How to conjugate the EU enlargement and the EU borders

Security? The Romanian- Moldovan Chapter). Les Etudes du CERI, n°116, p. 4.

53

the problem of the Moldovan identity.182

The identical problem came back on the scene

when the Republic of Moldova became independent, in 1991. After being under the yoke of

the Russians, an important number of Moldovans was, therefore, afraid of a possible

reunification with Romania. It was especially the case with the Moldovans and the Russian

minority living in Transnistria, who saw the ‘romanisation’ of the Moldovan society as a

motif of separation with Moldova. Thus, Moldovans did not want “to follow neither

Romanian nor Russian ways”183

, but were looking for an independent Moldovan identity.

The construction of the Moldovan identity was, therefore, made possible by a total

opposition to the Romanian identity and Romania as a State.184

The political relations between the two countries have also seen different phases, mostly

depending on the international context. It is important to notice that there is an important

number of Moldovans which have Romanian passports and, therefore, travel to Romania,

and to the EU: “There are very important flows of Moldovans who come to Romania with

Romanian passports because they are Romanian citizens.”185

The policy to give the

Romanian citizenship to Moldovans, due to the family and historical ties, has not always

been the same. Indeed, there have been some moments of political rupture between the two

countries. As it has been explained within the first chapter, the Romanian Government

stopped to deliver the Romanian citizenship and started to impose visas to Moldovans,

during the process of negotiations for the entrance of Romania within the EU.186

The

Communist party started, therefore, to raise an anti-Romanian discourse within the

Moldovan society. Even if, the Romanian President claimed, at that time, that Romanians

182

Cazacu, M and Trifon, N. (2010). ‘Guerre et paix des langues sur fond de débat identitaire’ (‘War and

Peace languages amid identity debate’), in Un Etat en quête de nation : la République de Moldavie (‘A State

in quest of nation: the Republic of Moldova’), Editions Non Lieu, pp. 170-209. 183

Heintz, M. (2005), Republic of Moldova versus Romania: The Cold War of National identities, Journal of

Political Science and International Relations, 1, Vol. II, p.1. Available at:

http://monica.heintz.free.fr/Republic%20of%20Moldova%20versus%20Romania-

%20the%20cold%20war%20of%20national%20identities.pdf 184

Ibid 185

Interview n°1 186

See the first Chapter.

http://monica.heintz.free.fr/Republic%20of%20Moldova%20versus%20Romania-%20the%20cold%20war%20of%20national%20identities.pdf


54

would find their Moldovans brothers in the Union, the relationships, between the two

countries, were difficult.187

After 2005, the Romanian attitude toward Moldovans changed and Bucharest introduced a

new Policy. It is the creation of the policy for the Romanian citizenship for Moldovans.188

This policy permitted, therefore, to a large number of Moldovans who had family origins

from Romania to have access to the Romanian citizenship. Indeed, “there are Moldovan

citizens who have family in Romania and had to wait ten years for Romanian

citizenship.”189

(« Il y a des citoyens Moldaves qui ont de la famille en Roumanie et qui ont

dû attendre dix ans pour avoir la citoyenneté roumaine. ») This contributed to reestablish

the good relations between the two countries, and permitted to Moldovans to get a legal

access to the EU. Moreover, during the years 2005 to 2007, Romanian market needs labour.

Therefore, “there is the idea, in official positions, to facilitate the acquisition of Romanian

citizenship to allow the arrival of Moldovans on the Romanian labour market.”190

(« Il y a,

dans les positions officielles, l’idée qu’il faut faciliter l’acquisition de la citoyenneté

roumaine afin de permettre l’arrivée des Moldaves sur le marché du travail roumain. ») At

that time, Romania has got a little economic boom, just before the economic crisis in 2009.

191 This economic situation permitted to develop the idea that Moldovan immigration

“makes sense for the Romanian labour market, especially due to the fact that a lot of

Romanian citizens are leaving the country to work abroad.”192

(‘L’immigration Moldave a

un sens pour le marché du travail roumain. D’autant plus que beaucoup de citoyens

roumains quittent le pays pour travailler à l’étranger’).

3.2.3. Moldova- Bulgaria relations

Relations between the two countries have always been intensive, belonging from historical

ties. As Nicolai Tveatcov explains, the Bulgarian Diaspora settled in the region of the

187

Interview n°1 188

Ibid 189

Interview n°1, translated from French. 190

Ibid, translated from French 191

Ibid 192

Ibid, translated from French

55

Southern Moldova, anciently called Bessarabia 193

, around the end of the 18th

, beginning of

the 19th

.194

In the 1980, the Bulgarians from Moldova started to improve their relations with

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian minority, became, therefore the purpose of the bilateral

cooperation between Moldova and Bulgaria.195

It is, indeed, the Bulgarian Diaspora in

Moldova, which constructed the basis of, and permitted to keep cordial and even friendly,

Bulgaria-Moldova relations.196

It is important to underline that after 1991, the Moldovan

Government adopted a tolerant policy toward minorities residing within the country.

Indeed, the Moldovan Government accorded the “full cultural autonomy to all the

minorities” residing in Moldova.197

Citizenship was also granted to all and education was

taught in different languages. Then, Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Turkish appeared to be

taught at School; it was, therefore, an important contrast with the Soviet period, which

allowed, only, two languages: Moldovan and Russian. Thus, the development of the

Bulgarian culture in Moldova was promoted during the years 1992-1995, with the openings

of Bulgarian Schools in some districts. The most famous Bulgarian district in Moldova is

called Taraclia center. Located in the South of Moldova, it is mostly populated by

Bulgarians, constituting a culturally autonomous region of the Bulgarians minority.198

Moldova and Bulgaria have got good relations. A significant example is the fact that during

the negotiations process for Romania and Bulgaria entering into the EU, there were more

Moldovans who acquired Bulgarian citizenship rather than Romanian citizenship.199

In the

view of the European integration, the good Moldova- Bulgaria relations are capital.

Moldova has got everything to continue a good cooperation with Bulgaria.

193

Bessarabia is a historical region located in Eastern Europe. It is bounded on the East by the Dniester River

and on the West by the Prut River. Actually, the main core of Bessarabia region is part of Moldova, excluded

the northern and southern areas which are part of Ukraine. 194

Tveatcov, N. (2012), ‘Bulgaria: Relations with Moldova under the Influence of the Bulgarian Diaspora’, in:

Moldova: Arena of international Influences, published by Kosienkowski, M and Schreiber, W, Lexington

Books. 195

Ibid 196

The author argues that the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Moldova and Bulgaria as well

as the opening of the Bulgarian Embassy in Chisinau are mainly due to the Bulgarian Diaspora. Ibid 197

Ibid 198

28.000 Bulgarians out of a total population of 45. 000 live in the Taraclia district. Ibid. 199

Interview n°1

56

3.3. The EU- Moldova relations: From an insignificant to an important partner?

3.3.1. The years 1990s to 2000s

The EU-Moldova relations took a long time to develop. Indeed, Moldova was not on the

“EU Foreign Policy priority list”200

during the 1990s. Neither Moldova was on the road to

the EU integration process as were some countries of the Balkans. During the 1990s, the

EU did not have a lot of influence in the country. It was, probably, due to the fact that

Moldova, after its independence, was still under the Russian sphere of influence. The EU

did not want, therefore, to intervene within the country. Moreover, “in the eyes of the EU,

Moldova was insignificant compare to Russia or even to Ukraine”.201

The country size and

the lack of economic interests did not make Moldova, at that time, an interesting partner for

the EU. The Partnership and Cooperation agreement (PCA) was agreed in 1994 and ratified

in 1998; it instituted the first framework of cooperation between the EU and Moldova.202

The PCA permitted to open a political dialogue between Moldova and the EU by helping

the country to succeed in the transition to democracy and labour market economy. Thus,

this first agreement institutionalised the EU- Moldova relations. Even though, it did not

give any perspectives for the Moldovan integration like the Association Agreement.

During the 2000s, the EU started to change its perspectives regarding its relations with

Moldova. The 2004 enlargement, seen as a shift of borders by bringing the EU closer to its

Eastern Neighbors, appeared to be the trigger. At the meantime, the Moldovan Government

started to be more in favor of the EU integration. Indeed, to get closer to the EU was a way

for Moldova to go further from the Russian influence, especially in Transnistria.

200

Sapovalova, N. and Boonstra, J. (2012), ‘The European Union: From Ignorance to a Priviledge Partnership

with Moldova’, in: The Moldovan Arena, published by Kosienkowski, M, Schreiber, W, Lexington Books. 201

Ibid 202

Table development of the EU-Moldova relations, appendix 3.

57

3.3.2. Conditionality for the Moldovan neighbor: the EU-Moldova Action Plan

The EU concerns toward Moldova grew when Romania started the negotiations to become

a member of the Union.203

The 2007 enlargement perspective, which concerned Bulgaria

and Romania, was seen as a ‘new challenge’ for the EU border Security.204

Indeed, the EU

was afraid to make the experience of a new wave of immigrants coming from the ‘Eastern’

Neighborhood; Moldova being a special Romanian neighbor, the question of strengthening

the Romanian-Moldovan border was, therefore, crucial for the Romanian adhesion to the

EU. In 2004, the EU developed a new Policy in order to deal with the new neighbors; the

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was a way to extend the EU values and

rules of law outside the EU borders as the EU had to deal with the enlargement fatigue and

its new neighbors.205

The problem was, therefore, how the EU could have an influence by

extending its values, and l’acquis communautaire in a country which did not have a

membership prospective? The ENP Policy applies the same ‘tools’ as the Enlargement

Policy: socialisation and conditionality but in a less binding way.206

Indeed, the principle of

conditionality could not be applied on the same basis as for the countries on the way to

become EU Member States. The vertical relationship that the EU, usually, had with the

future Member States under the Enlargement Policy, by directly imposing the rules, could

not suit in this context of sharing everything “excepting the institutions.”207

The EU-

Moldova Action Plan, signed in 2005, which strengthen the EU- Moldova cooperation

under a three years program, stipulates that “the level of ambition of the relationship will

depend on the degree of Moldova’s commitment to common values as well as its capacity

203

Interview n°1 204

Tomescu-Hatto, O. (2005) Comment conjuguer l’élargissement de l’Union européenne et la sécurité de ses

frontières? Le chapitre roumano-moldave, (‘How to conjugate the EU enlargement and the EU border

Security? The Romanian- Moldovan Chapter’). Les Etudes du CERI, n°116, p.3; Kelley, J. (2006), New Wine

in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighborhood Policy, JCMS

2006, Volume 44, p. 31. 205

Kelley, J. (2006), New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European

Neighborhood Policy, JCMS 2006, Volume 44, p. 31. 206

Ibid, p.35 207

Expression from Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, A Wider Europe-A

Proximity Policy as the key to stability “Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of

the EU” at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, SPEECH/02/619.

58

to implement jointly agreed priorities.”208

Therefore, here applies the principle of

reciprocity: “I will scratch your back if your will scratch mine.” The EU could not get from

the third countries to implement an important number of reforms if it was not giving

something in return. Therefore, the implementation of the political, economic and security-

oriented reforms within Moldova was made possible by the promise of a counter part from

the EU: to enhance the dialogue on visa facilitation and to settle the Transnistria conflict.

Conclusion

The snapshot on the Moldovan history permitted to demonstrate that the country has got

special relations with some EU Member States like Romania, Bulgaria and Italy. The

relations between the EU and Moldova have been mostly institutionalised by bilateral

agreements between Moldova and some EU Member States. Before being the best ‘student’

of the EaP, Moldova has been for a long time considered as an insignificant neighbor.

Attention started to rise from the EU side when Moldova moved closer to the EU after the

2004 Enlargement. Then, the cooperation between Moldova and the EU started. Under the

ENP, Moldova started to make the experiment of the securitarian approach to migration of

the EU. It has been shown that Moldova is a large emigrant country; facing economic and

development issues. Therefore, an attention should be paid to what changes have been

produced by the implementation of the EU-Moldova MP.

208

European Commission. (2005). EU-Moldova Action Plan, p. Available at :

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf


59

Chapter 4: Implementation of the EU-Moldova MP. What changes for Moldova?

4.1. From a pilot initiative to a Policy instrument

The Republic of Moldova presented its candidacy by means of a non-paper written to the

European Commission.

To date two main documents related to the evaluation of the EU-Moldova MPs are

available. The first evaluation was conducted in 2009 and aimed to analyse the outcomes of

the EU-third countries MPs implemented at that time; it concerns, therefore, mainly

Moldova and Cape Verde.209

The second document is the first detailed evaluation of the

EU-Moldova MP, conducted in 2012 by the Moldovan Authorities.210

It is important to

notice that the Moldovan Authorities are the first to publish an evaluation of the EU-third

countries MPs, showing, therefore, the Moldovan active participation within the EU-

Moldova cooperation under the framework of the MP. Another evaluation report, directed

by the European Commission, on the Global Approach to Migration and the EU-Third

Countries Mobility Partnerships outcomes, will be published in October 2013. 211

4.2. The EU-Moldova MP: ‘a success story?’ ‘But for whom?’

“In the case of Moldova they have got some success stories… it is not our case, we have

just started.”212

209

European Commission,(2009).Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration,

Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2009) 1240 final. 210


European Union-Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008-2011: Evaluation Report. 01/10/2012.

Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/eu-moldova-mobility-partnership-evaluation.pdf 211

Interview n° 3 212

Interview n°2, the interviewee was talking about the EU-Moldova MP in comparison with the EU-Armenia

MP.


60

In the line of its success within the EaP, Moldova is perceived as the best student of the

Eastern Neighbors concerning the implementation and the outcomes of the EU-third

country MP.213

Indeed, the EU-Moldova MP is described as a ‘success story’ among the

other countries which implemented a MP later, like Armenia and Georgia.214

The EU

officials describe the EU-Moldova MP as a new political strategy to get Moldova closer to

the EU; presenting, therefore, the evolutions in the country as an example of the successful

implementation of the EU new policy tool to enhance the cooperation with its

neighborhood: “without Mobility Partnerships, Moldova would not be as politically close

to us as it is now.”215

Therefore, the EU Commission is using this ‘success story’ to

implement its ‘new tool’ to the Southern Neighbors as in Tunisia and Egypt. We should

keep in mind that the relative success of the EU- Moldova MP is probably due to the EU

Member States’ interests in developing numbers of projects with Moldova (actually the

EU-Moldova MP includes 64 targeted initiatives) in comparison with the other EU-third

countries MPs.216

Moreover, Moldova was one of the first countries to implement a MP,

this can, therefore, explain the relative success compared with Armenia, which is looking

back now to the effects of the MP.

Nevertheless, from perception to reality as depending on the actor’s goals there can exists a

gap. Therefore, did the outcomes of the EU- Moldova MP implementation meet the official

goals depicted through the launch of the EU-Moldova MP, for both, the EU and Moldova?

213

Boonstra, J. (2011), Moldova: an EU Success Story? Policy Brief n° 92, FRIDE, pp.1-2 214

Interviews n°2, 3 and 4 stressed the success of the EU-Moldova MP compared to the implementation of the

EU-Third Country MP in other countries. In the Armenian case it was underlined that the Mobility

Partnership was a ‘too young tool’ to be evaluated now. In the Georgian case, the lack of motivation of the

EU Member States has been stressed. 215

Jasiński, F. (2012), Declaration during a dialogue on ‘the Mobility Partnerships: an effective tool for EU

external migration policy?’ Policy Dialogue, (12 June 2012). Event Report, European Policy Centre, p. 2.

Available at: http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedfiles/2012-kbs-

frb/05)_pictures,_documents_and_external_sites/12)_report/epc_mobilitypartnerships.pdf 216

Indeed, interviewees agreed on the fact that the EU-Moldova MP is an effective cooperation due to the

good will of the EU Member States to participate, which is not the for the Armenian case for example.

http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedfiles/2012-kbs-frb/05)_pictures,_documents_and_external_sites/12)_report/epc_mobilitypartnerships.pdf

http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedfiles/2012-kbs-frb/05)_pictures,_documents_and_external_sites/12)_report/epc_mobilitypartnerships.pdf

61

4.2.1. On the Moldovan Perspective

A better comprehension and management of the Moldovan emigration

“The Extended Emigration Profile (EMP) reflects the changes in the management of

Moldovan emigration after the implementation of the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership.”

(« L’EMP témoigne des changements dans la gestion de l’émigration Moldave grâce à la

mise en œuvre du Partenariat pour la Mobilité. »)217

As it has been explained in the third Chapter, Moldova is suffering from the lack of its

population. The implementation of the EU-Moldova MP permitted to the experts in the

country to understand and manage in a better way this emigration.218

The Extended

Migration Profile (EMP) of the Republic of Moldova has been produced within the

framework of the MP. According to the interviewees, the EMP constitutes the ‘Bible’ for a

good management of the Moldovan emigration.219

Moreover, with the implementation of

the MP, border security in Moldova has been improved as well as border management due

to the projects which develop the cooperation between the EU Member States and

Moldova, by making possible the meetings of experts from EU Member States and

Moldova in order to exchange the best practices in border management. 220

A lack of Mobility for Moldovans

The Moldovan expectations in concluding and implementing a MP were based on the

deployment of projects enhancing development and circular migration schemes in order to

permit the effective return of migrants.221

The Moldovan consideration on developing

circular migration schemes was at the core of the second non paper written by Moldovan

217

Interview n°3 218

Interview n°3; Moldovan experts 219

Ibid 220

Ibid 221


Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2009) 1240, p. 3; Babayan, D. (2010). Balancing Security and

Development in Migration Policy: the EU Mobility Partnerships, Master Thesis College of Europe Natolin, p.

41.

62

Authorities with the help of the IOM.222

Nevertheless, the final projects implemented under

the EU-Moldova MP framework did not meet the Moldovan expectations, reflecting rather

the supremacy of a security oriented approach.223

The first evaluation of the MP made by

the European Commission in 2009, attested, in its Communication on ‘Mobility

partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration’, the lack of projects oriented

toward development, and underlined the requirement to plan activities in this matter in

order to maintain the good relations between the EU and the third countries.224

The same

observation was made three years later by the Moldovan Authorities, who expressed the

need to launch new agreements and projects related to circular migration.225

According to

the evaluation report made under the supervision of the Moldovan Authorities in 2013, the

lack of projects promoting circular migration schemes is due to the legal framework of the

MP, which promotes bilateral agreements between an EU Member State and Moldova

rather than a multilayered cooperation between all EU Member States and Moldova.226

The

Moldovan Authorities would appreciate, therefore, to introduce more projects which would

permit the recognition of qualifications of the Moldovan migrants as well as an effective

mobility.227

To implement circular migration schemes requires the will from both sides: the

EU Member States and Moldova. For the moment Moldova is the only actor asking for

it.228

“Now, Moldovans should convince the EU Member States.” (« C’est désormais aux

Moldaves de convaincre les Etats Membres.»)229

Indeed, as Moldova as already

222

Hernández i Sagrera, R. (2011). Assessing the Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Moldova and

Georgia, Article, Eastern Partnership Community. 223

Babayan, D. (2010). Balancing Security and Development in Migration Policy: the EU Mobility

Partnerships, Master Thesis College of Europe Natolin, p. 41. 224


Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2009) 1240, p. 5. 225


European Union-Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008-2011: Evaluation Report, p.12. 226

Ibid. 227


European Union-Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008-2011: Evaluation Report; interview 3;

Moldovan experts. 228

Interview n°3 229

Ibid

63

implemented the ‘capacity building phase’, the country could now ask for enhancing the

circular mobility schemes.230

4.2.2. On the EU perspective

A better management of the EU borders in the Neighborhood

The EU succeeded, with the introduction of the EU-third country MPs, to reinforce the

management of its borders by making the third countries full participants of these efforts.

The strategy to promote the circular migration schemes and development as a ‘gift’ to third

countries231

, under a number of conditions, permitted to the EU to be more than successful

in cooperating with third countries on combating irregular migration, on returns of

irregular migrants and on concluding readmission agreements. The EU-third countries

MPs implementations have reached the first unofficial goal of the EU: to keep migrants in

their countries of origin. Moreover, the institutionalisation of MPs shows that migration

and visa liberalisation dialogue are now a full part of the EU Foreign Policy.

A deeper cooperation with Moldova

“If we use Mobility Partnerships well, they can have a great impact in boosting our

relations and allowing us to engage with partners. Without them, we probably would not

have moved at all with countries like Moldova. ”232

The implementation of the EU-Moldova MP also permitted to enhance the EU-Moldova

relations. As we have seen previously, the EU-Moldova relations have been slow to

implement. Moldova is, now, considered as one of the best partner of the EU within the

EaP and ENP. Under the MP framework, Moldovans, now “come to us with suggestions

230

Ibid 231

Interview n°4 232

BrewkaPino, M. (2012), Declaration during a dialogue on ‘the Mobility Partnerships: an effective tool for

EU external migration policy?’ Policy Dialogue, (12 June 2012). Event Report, European Policy Centre, p. 3.

64

too. It is more than just a political declaration – it’s a platform for good cooperation” 233

Finally, the MPs represented an opportunity for Moldova to reform its administration in

term of migration management and to move, therefore, closer to the EU.

Conclusion

Four years after the implementation of the EU-Moldova MP, outcomes have been provided.

Depicted as a ‘success story’, the EU-Moldova MP has, indeed, permitted to the EU to

strengthen the management of its borders with Moldova as well as its relations with the

country. If the MP implementation did not permit to open new circular migration schemes

for Moldovan citizens as promised; it nevertheless contributed to a better comprehension of

the migration phenomenon for the Moldovan Authorities. The time may have come for

Moldovan Authorities to ask more to the EU Member States in order to co-operate in the

openings of circular migration schemes.

233

Jasiński, F. (2012), Declaration during a dialogue on ‘the Mobility Partnerships: an effective tool for EU

external migration policy?’ Policy Dialogue, (12 June 2012). Event Report, European Policy Centre, p. 2.

Emphasis added by the author.

65

Conclusions

Driven by the aim to uncover whether the Mobility Partnerships actually represent a ‘new

tool’ in the EU-third countries relationships by introducing a ‘comprehensive’ approach to

migration as promised within the EU discourse, the current research focused on three

specific elements: recontextualising the genesis of the MPs within the EU discourse on

immigration, in order to understand if the willingness to move beyond a security oriented

approach was the main driving goal of the EU; explaining the functioning of the MPs as a

‘new tool’ for EU-third countries co-operation; analysing the EU-Moldova relations before

and after the implementation of the EU-Moldova MP.

The first chapter adopted a diachronic approach in order to explain the main changes,

within the EU discourse on immigration, throughout time. Therefore, it has been shown

that for years the EU discourse was mostly focused on a security oriented approach on

migration, which has been institutionalised by two main actors: the Ministries of Interiors

and the European Council. The shift toward a ‘comprehensive’ approach on migration

appeared for the first time, within the EU discourse, in the Tampere conclusions. Since the

Amsterdam Treaty, the main idea of the EU Member States is, indeed, to cooperate with

third countries by linking development to security in order to keep the EU secure.

Therefore, the conclusion of the readmission agreements became the obsession of the EU

relations with third countries. Trade agreements, development aid agreements, were under

the condition, for third countries, to sign the readmission agreements. The MPs found their

roots within this securitarian approach. The aim of developing circular migration schemes

was, indeed, to promote ‘mobility’ rather than migration in order to stop the immigration

flows at the doors of the EU. TCNs were, therefore, considered as ‘mobiles’; they had to go

and come back to their countries in order to reduce irregular migration into the EU.

The second chapter aimed to show that the MPs did not represent a ‘new’ tool in their

functioning. Indeed, the analysis of the Joint Declarations revealed that the principle of

conditionality is at the heart of the EU-third countries MPs. The analysis also showed that

even if all the conditions are fulfilled by the third countries, mobility for TCNs remains not

permitted. Indeed, projects proposals are more oriented toward border management than to

66

promote circular migration schemes for TCNs. Therefore, the incentive of implementing

the MPs is not to promote the openings of new avenues for regular migration as it has been

promised; but to strengthen EU borders by cooperating with third countries in this domain.

Nevertheless, the novelty introduced by the MPs is the attempt to create a ‘think tank’ in

immigration matters. Indeed, the MPs allow to the experts of the third countries to meet

with EU experts in order to exchange the best practices in migration management.

The historical approach adopted through the third chapter pointed out that Moldova

represents a unique neighbor for the EU. Indeed, the country has got special relations with

some EU Member States, such as Romania and Italy. Considered as an ‘insignificant’

partner, Moldova had to wait to be geographically closer to the EU borders to become a

significant EU partner.

The study of the outcomes of the EU-Moldova MP shows that the implementation of the

MP permitted many changes for the Moldovan Authorities to adapt their national

administration to the EU attempts. Therefore, it allows Moldova to get closer to the EU.

Coming back to the main question of the dissertation: Are Mobility Partnerships, in

practice, a ‘new’ tool to permit to the EU to introduce a ‘comprehensive approach’ to

migration by implementing circular migration schemes as it is promoted within the EU

discourse? The answer looks now more evident. We would, first, be tempted to answer

‘no’; according to the outcomes of the research the introduction of the MPs was, indeed,

based on a securitarian approach. Moreover the analysis of the projects showed how much

the MPs suffer from a strong security frame. The analysis of the Moldovan case attested it.

This shows, therefore, the EU’s soft power in dealing with third countries. Nevertheless, the

analysis of the Moldovan case as well as the interviews revealed how much the MPs

changed the EU-third countries relations in their approach in understanding the migration

phenomenon. We understand, therefore, that MPs introduce the basement for a ‘new’

cooperation between the EU and third countries. But this shift to a ‘comprehensive

approach’ to migration remains difficult to reach. This is mostly due to the lack of interest

coming from the EU Member States in considering all the possibilities this tool could offer

to them in term of labour needs (i.e. Chapter two).

67

We should keep in mind that MPs are intended to be developed, in a near future, in

Mediterranean countries. Indeed, Morocco just signed, in June 2013, an EU Mobility

Partnership.234

Extended to the Southern Neighborhood, Mobility Partnerships are intended

to be the ‘new’ tool of the EU in dealing with third countries. This will bring new

challenges for the EU as the Mediterranean region is subject of larger emigration flows than

Moldova, Georgia or Armenia. In some years, attention will be on looking at the outcomes

of this tool in the Mediterranean region.

234

Council of the European Union, (2013) Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the

Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States, document n° 6139/13.

68

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Appendices

Appendix 1: General information about the interviews

Date Status Main

contribution of

the interview

Interview

location

Language Length

Interview 1 21/05/13 Romanian MEP Information about

the Moldovan

case and the

Romanian-

Moldovan

Relations

European

Parliament

(Strasbourg)

French 1hour 10

min

Interview 2 20/06/13 Armenian

Diplomat

In charge of the

implementation of

the EU-Armenia

MP during the 6

first months

Information about

the Armenian

case

Council of

Europe

English 45 min

Interview 3 1/07/13 Expert at the

European

Commission in

the field of the

MP, visa

facilitation and

visa liberalization

dialogue

Information about

the Moldovan

case and the role

of the European

Commission in

the EU-Third

Countries MPs

By phone call

from Brussels

French 35 min

Interview 4 3/07/13 Georgian

Diplomat

Information about

the EU-Georgia

relations

concerning

immigration

Council of

Europe

English 35 min

74

Appendix 2: Critical Discourse Analysis

Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) summarize the main tenets of CDA as

follows:235

1. CDA addresses social problems

2. Power relations are discursive

3. Discourse constitutes society and culture

4. Discourse does ideological work

5. Discourse is historical

6. The link between text and society is mediated

7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory

8. Discourse is a form of social action.

235

Van Dijk, T.A. (2001), ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in: Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen and Heidi E.

Hamilton. The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Blackwel Publishers Ltd, UK, p. 353. T. A. van Dijk

established these main tenets of CDA according to the work of N. Fairclough and R. Wodak in ‘Critical

discourse analysis.’ In T.A. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol. 2,

Discourse as Social Interaction, Sage Publications, London, 1997, pp. 258- 284.

75

Appendix 3: Development of the EU-Moldova relations236

1994: Signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

1998: PCA comes into force

2001: Conclusion of the stability pact. Moldova is the only country from the ex-Soviet

countries which have signed it.

2005: Approval of the EU- Moldova Action Plan, establishment of EU Representative for

Moldova (post abolished with creation of EEAS in 2010), and opening of EU Delegation in

Chisinau, establishment of EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

(EUBAM), EU becomes observer in official talks for the settlement of the Transnistria

conflict

2007: Opening of Common Visa Application Centre, Chisinau

2008: Visa Facilitation and Readmission agreement come into force, pilot Mobility

Partnership, autonomous Trade Preferences granted to Moldova

2010: Autonomous Trade Preferences granted to Moldova, negotiation launched for EU-

Moldovan Association Agreement (to replace PCA), launch of visa dialogue

2011: Presentation of EU Visa Liberalisation Action Plan to Moldovan government,

preparations for launch of negotiations on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement

236

Table from: N. Ratzmann, Moldova and the EU: Liberalizing or Securitising Migration? , Research Paper,

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, p. 2.

76

Appendix 4: Questionnaire

I) EU- Moldova relations

What would be your opinion of the EU and Moldova relations concerning

immigration?

Which policy is the EU adopting concerning the liberalisation of the visas

for Moldovan citizens? How has this liberalization come to pass?

II) EU Mobility Partnerships

Could you share your interpretation on the Mobility Partnerships?

What advantages might Moldova gain after signing the mobility

partnership?

In your opinion, what position occupies the conditionality principle within

the conclusion of the mobility partnerships?

*

Do you notice any improvement concerning the mobility of persons from

Moldova to the EU since the conclusion of the EU-Moldova Mobility

Partnership?

What do you think about the future of this tool in managing migration

flows within the EU?

77

Appendix 5: Transcription interview n°1 (French Version)

Remarques générales:

L’entretien a eu lieu le 21 Mai, au sein du bureau de Monsieur le député au Parlement

européen à Strasbourg, lors de la session parlementaire. L’entretien a duré 1 heure et 10

minutes.

1) Quelle serait votre opinion concernant les relations politiques, notamment en

matière de visas, entre l’UE et la Moldavie ?

Tout d’abord le cadre de la Moldavie est particulier. Les approches sont différentes au sein

de l’Union au sujet de l’intégration, de la mobilité et des visas. Vous avez un peu de tout.

Vous avez la position la plus radicale: c’est la position de Bucarest, qui veut associer la

Moldavie aux Balkans de l’Ouest. Et certains Etats membres qui disent: « la Moldavie c’est

quoi ça ? Ça se trouve où ? » Bien sûr qu’on a mis la Moldavie au sein de la Politique

européenne de voisinage. Et désormais, nous sommes en train de faire des programmes de

l’UE avec les Etats membres qui sont notamment intéressés par la mobilité. Je ne sais pas

s’il y a un seul mot pour définir les relations avec la Moldavie. Ou bien s’il y a un mot c’est

l’ambiguïté.

Je viens de discuter avec Monsieur Füle, Commissaire européen à l’élargissement et à la

politique de voisinage, ce matin, à propos de sa visite à Chisinau. La crise politique actuelle

illustre très bien cette ambiguïté. D’un côté l’UE a soutenu l’idée de créer un gouvernement

pro-européen en Moldavie. La constitution d’un tel gouvernement, c’est assez fort

politiquement. Et l’UE a appuyé ce gouvernement. L’Union l’a aidé à faire des progrès,

etc… La Moldavie est devenue le meilleur élève du Partenariat Oriental... aussi dans le

contexte de la crise actuelle des pays Sud. D’un autre côté, on voit que l’UE est

impuissante devant cette crise politique en Moldavie. On le voit avec la déclaration de

Monsieur Watson, membre des Libéraux Démocrates européens, qui s’occupe de la

Moldavie. Selon lui, la perspective européenne pour la Moldavie n’est pas pour demain.

78

Pourtant c’est quelqu’un qui s’intéresse à la Moldavie. Il connait bien ce pays. C’est

quelqu’un qui pourrait être plus optimiste car il connait ce dossier.

Je ne sais pas si le mot ambiguïté est finalement le meilleur mot. Il y a des hauts et des

bas…ainsi que des hésitations. Le fait est que le cas moldave est avant tout un problème

politique. C’est la domination d’un parti communiste comme il n’en existe plus dans les

pays européens…à l’exception de Chypre. Mais, à Chypre, il existe tout de même un

système présidentiel. Alors qu’en Moldavie, il s’agit d’un système parlementaire avec une

élection du président qui pousse au blocage.

C’est pour vous montrer que ce n’est pas facile pour l’UE d’appuyer la démocratisation de

la Moldavie. Il est difficile de trouver un mot… mais ces éléments sont importants pour

situer le contexte et caractériser les relations entre l’UE et la Moldavie. Je suis aussi

influencé par le fait que Bucarest est la Capitale la plus intéressée par les affaires moldaves.

La position de Bucarest est un peu spéciale. Mais j’essaie de prendre de la distance…

Oui mais où se situe la Moldavie par rapport à d’autre pays du voisinage comme

l’Ukraine par exemple ?

L’Ukraine c’est très différent car c’est un pays énorme. La Moldavie c’est très petit. Et la

Moldavie est en train de se dépeupler. Les gens partent. La fuite est le phénomène le plus

important en Moldavie. Cela existe aussi en Roumanie sauf que la Roumanie est membre

de l’Union. Nous nous mettons donc à l’abri, derrière l’idée que nous pouvons circuler

parce que nous sommes au sein de l’Union. Mais c’est un mouvement qui est très clair… Il

s’agit de départs massifs en Roumanie comme en Moldavie. Et dans le cas Moldave c’est

encore plus important. L’Ukraine n’est pas la Moldavie. C’est beaucoup plus grand. C’est

également plus difficile politiquement car il y a un clivage politique avec une forte

dimension territoriale. En Moldavie le problème de la séparation de la Transnistrie est plus

facile à gérer, paradoxalement, que le clivage politique entre l’Est et l’Ouest en Ukraine.

Bien sûr qu’en Moldavie il y a un conflit gelé avec le problème de la Transnistrie.

Aujourd’hui, il y a notamment un obstacle dans le développement des programmes

européens. Mais c’est beaucoup plus clair du point de vue politique, par rapport à

l’Ukraine, car il s’agit d’une séparation. Et avec toute l’histoire des procès politiques.

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L’Ukraine s’est égarée après l’affaire Timochenko. Cette affaire est assez symbolique de

l’incapacité de l’Ukraine à comprendre les valeurs de l’Etat de droit. En Moldavie, hormis

le fait que vous avez la plus grande famille politique, qui sont les communistes, il y a eu

des progrès ces dernières années. Il n’y a pas eu, comme en Ukraine, des procès politico-

communistes. Bien sûr, au sein de l’Union, certains Etats sont intéressés par l’Ukraine en

termes de ressources.

La Moldavie est intéressante pour quelques- uns des membres de l’Union, à l’exception de

la Roumanie, les polonais et les allemands sont intéressés. Il y a aussi un intérêt français ou

plutôt il y avait un certain intérêt à un certain moment. On le voit d’ailleurs dans le cas du

partenariat pour la mobilité. Il y a 15 Etats membres qui participent à ce partenariat avec la

Moldavie.

La Moldavie est également intéressante pour la Russie. C’est important de le souligner. Il y

a plus de départs pour la Russie que pour l’Union européenne. C’est une mobilité différente

mais d’un point de vue quantitatif c’est important.

A l’heure actuelle, c’est en Roumanie qu’il y a le nombre le plus important d’entrées

moldaves, et cela pour plusieurs raisons. Je parle des Moldaves sans passeports roumains.

Parce qu’il faut distinguer cela. Il y a les Moldaves qui ont un passeport roumain parce

qu’ils ont suivi le parcours de la citoyenneté roumaine. Et il y a les Moldaves avec le

passeport moldave. Il y a des flux très importants de Moldaves qui entrent en Roumanie

avec des passeports roumains parce qu’ils sont également citoyens roumains. Je trouve que

c’est l’aspect le plus intéressant concernant le cas moldave. C’est ce qui fait la différence

entre la Moldavie et tout autre voisin de l’Union. Parce que vous n’avez pas un cas pareil.

Pourquoi ? Parce qu’il y a un moment de rupture. C’est en 2000, lorsque les négociations

commencent avec la Roumanie. A ce même moment, on introduit des visas pour les

Moldaves. Je me souviens très bien des premiers contacts que nous avons eus avec l’UE,

juste avant les négociations. La première question politique posée par l’UE à la Roumanie a

été: « qu’est-ce que vous faites des Moldaves ? Quand est-ce que vous introduisez des visas

pour les Moldaves ? » Cette question a été un choc pour la classe politique roumaine. Car

nous n’avions pas réfléchi à l’intégration moldave en ce temps-là. Tout de même, vous

savez, il y a des liens historiques entre la Moldavie et la Roumanie. Et l’idée de la libre

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circulation des deux côtés était l’un des points les plus importants pour Chisinau et

Bucarest après la chute du communisme. Donc cette annonce a vraiment été un choc. Pour

Bucarest ce n’était pas facile… mais en même temps, en Roumanie, ils se sont finalement

alignés. Les négociations pour la Roumanie commencent en février 2000, et je me souviens

très bien des discussions politiques que nous avons eues avant le début des négociations

officielles. C’est-à-dire fin 1999- début 2000. Je vois encore la surprise des politiques

roumains lorsqu’on leur dit : « il faut introduire des visas pour les Moldaves. » Cela a

également crée une énorme frustration pour Chisinau. Ce qui explique d’ailleurs, en bonne

partie, le succès des communistes dans leur discours anti-roumain : « Ah les Roumains,

vous voyez, ils vous disent qu’ils sont vos frères et ils vous mettent des visas. » Cela

explique, pour une grande partie, la sympathie dont bénéficient les communistes en

Moldavie au début des années 2000. Ils sont au pouvoir et ils adoptent des discours de

légitimation comme: « Les Roumains ne font rien pour vous ».

Après 2005, il y a une nouvelle politique de Bucarest. La politique de création de la

citoyenneté roumaine pour les Moldaves. Il y a un point important à souligner: lors des

négociations pour la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, en 2002/2003, il y a plus de citoyens

Moldaves qui acquièrent la citoyenneté bulgare que la citoyenneté roumaine. C’est très

intéressant. A ce moment-là, en effet, les socialistes qui sont au pouvoir en Roumanie

disent: « vous savez nous allons être éligibles, nous ne donnons plus la citoyenneté

roumaine aux Moldaves. » Après 2005, le président roumain adopte un autre discours et

l’attitude envers les Moldaves change. Il y a des raisons historiques et des liens familiaux.

Il y a des citoyens Moldaves qui ont de la famille en Roumanie et qui ont dû attendre 10

ans pour avoir la citoyenneté roumaine. Maintenant, cela a été beaucoup facilité du côté

roumain. Il y a, aujourd’hui, une forte création de citoyens européens roumains. Tous ces

gens rentrent en Roumanie facilement. Il y a tout d’abord les raisons historiques ainsi que

les liens familiaux. Ensuite, il y a dans les années 2007/2008, l’idée que le marché roumain

a besoin de main d’œuvre. Cela est exprimé à quelques reprises dans les positions

politiques officielles roumaines. C’était juste avant la crise. A ce moment-là, on venait de

découvrir l’immigration asiatique parce qu’il y avait une forme de petit boom économique

dans notre pays. Il y a dans les positions officielles l’idée qu’il faut faciliter l’acquisition de

la citoyenneté roumaine afin de permettre l’arrivée des Moldaves sur le marché du travail

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roumain. Cela se passe dans les années 2005 à 2007. Avant la crise, qui vient en 2009. Cela

a développé l’idée que l’immigration moldave a un sens pour le marché du travail roumain.

D’autant plus que beaucoup de citoyens roumains quittent le pays pour travailler à

l’étranger. Donc l’idée c’était de faire venir des citoyens moldaves en Roumanie. De ce

point de vue, nous avons vraiment un cas à part. Vous n’avez pas un autre pays, voisin de

l’UE, qui soit dans cette situation. Je ne vois pas d’équivalent. Il y a bien sur des liens entre

des pays de l’UE et des voisins de l’UE mais le cas moldave est vraiment particulier.

Tous les Etats membres connaissent cette position roumaine. Et ils savent qu’il s’agit d’une

position qui a des raisons très particulières à la Roumanie. Le fait que pour la quasi-totalité

des Roumains, la Moldavie c’est un pays avec la même culture et la même langue. Il n’y a

pas un projet de réunification mais en même temps cette conscience est très claire du côté

roumain. Cela complique le dossier moldave car pour les autres Etats membres de l’UE

c’est différent.

Lors de mes recherches, j’ai pu constater qu’il y a une forte émigration moldave

vers l’Italie…

C’est une forte immigration roumaine et moldave en Italie. La langue en est l’une des

raisons. L’apprentissage de l’italien est facile pour un Moldave ou un Roumain. Le

rapprochement des langues facilite la constitution des réseaux de migrations. Par exemple,

il est plus facile pour les Roumains, à cause de la langue, d’aller en Italie plutôt qu’en

Islande. Je suis rapporteur pour l’Islande et je sais qu’il y a des Roumains qui travaillent en

Islande mais l’islandais c’est plus compliqué que l’italien.

Pour la Roumanie il y a eu des études réalisées, par les sociologues roumains, sur les points

de départs de la Roumanie vers les pays européens. C’était également sur la différence des

réseaux qui font venir les citoyens roumains. Il y avait des réseaux religieux qui faisaient

venir les citoyens roumains au sein de l’UE. Au niveau du territoire, il y avait des zones de

départ privilégiées…et des liens particuliers avec différentes régions en Italie, en France,

etc. Il y avait également une distinction de la constitution des réseaux. Par exemple, on a

découvert que des Roumains d’origine allemande, qui avaient quitté la Roumanie pour des

raisons de réunification des familles après la chute du communisme, ont facilité le départ de

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Roumains sans racines allemandes qui sont allés travailler en Allemagne. Puis il y a les

réseaux religieux. La raison pour laquelle on fait le parcours de migration pour le travail est

généralement pendulaire. C’est très saisonnier pour beaucoup de métiers. Le contenu de ce

lien était donné par l’appartenance religieuse. C’était notamment clair pour les néo-

protestants. Je ne sais pas s’il y a des points de départs différents pour les Moldaves qui

partent à l’étranger pour travailler. Et si les réseaux sont tellement différents. Je sais qu’il y

a des études sur les réseaux mafieux ainsi que sur le trafic des femmes. Car il s’agit d’un

problème très important pour la Moldavie. Je sais que, déjà sous le communisme, des

actions pour limiter le trafic des femmes ont été mises en place. Dans les années 2000,

j’étais à Chisinau, et je me souviens de grands panneaux qui disaient « faites de votre

mieux pour stopper le départ des femmes pour la prostitution ». A l’époque d’ailleurs il n’y

avait pas beaucoup de publicités dans la rue. C’était un peu surprenant pour l’époque…

2) Dans ma recherche, je m’intéresse également au discours entre l’UE et les pays

tiers, notamment lorsque la mobilité est mise en avant. Pourriez-vous me dire

s’il y a des valeurs transmises par l’UE dans ce type de discours ?

Oui ça c’est un peu l’hypocrisie européenne… Il y a d’un côté l’idée de rendre possible

l’accès, et on est obligé de définir cela négativement. Et d’un autre côté, il y a l’idée du

contrôle. L’idée de la migration circulaire par exemple, qui est une idée désormais mise en

œuvre, symbolise vraiment l’idée de contrôle. Cette idée est le résultat d’une pression qui

vient des différents Etats membres. D’autre part, nous pouvons observer des attitudes plus

ouvertes. La Roumanie est plus ouverte à cause de ce dossier moldave. D’après ce que je

sais la République Tchèque est plus ouverte. La Pologne a également ouvert son marché du

travail. Il y a quelques pays ex communistes qui sont plus ouverts à l’immigration. Je

comprends qu’il s’agit d’un dossier difficile, notamment à cause de la montée des

populismes dans le contexte actuel. Il y a un clivage assez fort. D’ailleurs, on peut suivre ce

clivage au sein des pays qui sont très marqués maintenant par la montée des populismes

(référence à l’ouvrage de Dominique Reynié sur le Populisme patrimonial.) Si vous

regardez la question de la mobilité et si vous l’appliquez à la Moldavie, il y a un clivage

entre les pays plus ouverts et les pays moins ouverts sur la base de l’existence ou non des

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populismes qui sont basés sur des attitudes anti-immigrations. En Roumanie vous n’avez

pas une attitude anti-immigration. Il y a un parti d’extrême droite en Roumanie comme en

Pologne ou en République Tchèque, mais il n’y a pas de partis formés sur une attitude anti-

immigration. Or cela explique une attitude plus ou moins ouverte par rapport aux voisins

qui, comme la Moldavie, veulent avoir cette possibilité de venir travailler au sein de l’UE,

notamment pour le travail saisonnier, etc. Je comprends que certains Etats membres, sous la

pression de ces populismes, soient plus intimidés lorsqu’il s’agit de gérer des questions

liées à la mobilité des étrangers, issus des pays du voisinage de l’Est et du Sud. D’autre

part, il est évident que la solution que l’on propose actuellement a des limites. Je ne sais pas

si la migration circulaire est une réussite. Est-ce que cela donne les résultats escomptés ?

Est-ce qu’on a vraiment fait des progrès dans ce sens-là ? D’autre part il faut voir que les

pays comme la Pologne ou la Roumanie sont des pays qui ont fait l’expérience des départs.

Ce thème-là est important. On comprend et on accepte les arrivées parce qu’il y a une

expérience des départs. Il existe également une autre dimension de cette attitude

européenne: l’idée, exprimée dans un langage politiquement correct, de faire le tri parmi les

migrants. Les migrants qualifiés contre les migrants moins qualifiés. Je trouve qu’il s’agit

d’une caractéristique actuelle. Je ne veux pas porter de jugement de valeur sur cette

attitude… mais il est clair qu’il n’y a pas une attitude commune à l’échelle de l’Union

européenne. Les Etats membres sont assez influents dans ce domaine. Je trouve également

que le facteur déterminant, aujourd’hui, est la montée de ces populismes, qui sont vraiment

perçu comme un danger par les partis traditionnels, de droite et de gauche. Les partis

traditionnels sont désormais intimidés. On peut observer notamment, des tentatives de

récupération du langage populiste. Il y a ce blocage des partis établis dans beaucoup d’Etats

membres par rapport au thème de l’immigration et cela influence directement la Politique.

Si vous voulez, il est difficile de réunir tout cela au sein d’un seul concept. Car il y a bien

évidemment l’idée du contrôle et en même temps il y a l’idée de l’accès, qui n’est pas

complétement exclu. Il y a aussi l’idée du tri. A tout cela s’ajoute la peur liée aux tendances

démographiques. C’est notamment le cas pour l’Allemagne. Maintenant, nous voulons

également faire des accords avec les pays du Sud… Le Maroc, la Tunisie, etc… Je me

souviens très bien des discussions avant le départ de Kadhafi ou de Ben Ali et la surprise

générale survenue à la suite du printemps arabe. Je n’ai pas oublié le fait que quelques jours

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avant le départ de Ben Ali, mon groupe politique a refusé un débat sur la Tunisie en disant:

« ah non rien ne se passe en Tunisie. » C’était quelques jours avant… Je suis aussi dans la

Sous- Commission Droits. Je m’intéressais beaucoup à la question des Droits de l’Homme

en Tunisie. J’ai essayé de placer ce sujet-là… mais à l’époque on m’a dit « rien ne se passe

en Tunisie », et quelque jours après ce fut la grande révolution. Ils ont commencé à

comparer les printemps arabes avec les révolutions anti-communistes. Je vous dis cela pour

vous montrer le fait qu’il y a un effet de surprise terrible. Et qu’il y a peut-être un effet

d’improvisation lorsque l’on parle de ces programmes-là. On est à mi-chemin. Je crois

qu’on est en train de voir quels sont les effets de ces politiques… J’espère que dans les

années à venir cela sera plus clair, plus cohérent.

Par exemple on parle beaucoup de la conditionnalité. Regardons l’attitude que nous

avons eue avec Kadhafi et la manière dont on applique la conditionnalité dans les rapports

avec la Moldavie. Vous vous dites on ne discute pas du même acteur. De nouveau c’est

l’influence de certains Etats membres… Parce que l’attitude par rapport à Kadhafi, c’était

le résultat d’une pression de certains Etats membres. C’est difficile de croire que c’est le

même acteur qui décide avec Kadhafi de comment bloquer l’immigration qui vient de

l’Afrique subsaharienne et qui discute avec la Moldavie, à Chisinau, du dossier sur la

facilitation des visas.

Ce principe de conditionnalité devrait être adapté en fonction du pays ? Ce

principe devrait-il être plus adaptable ?

Pour moi le vrai problème est un problème politique. C’est la carte politique de l’Europe.

C’est-à-dire que tant que nous ne savons pas quelles sont les limites de l’Union européenne,

nous ne savons pas quels sont nos voisins. Prenons le cas de la Moldavie… s’agit-il d’un

voisin ou bien d’un futur Etat membre ?

Il y a d’ailleurs des attitudes contradictoires…Parfois nous sommes beaucoup plus

exigeants par rapport à des voisins plus proches que par rapport à ceux qui sont plus

éloignés. J’étais récemment en Jordanie, où nous faisions de l’observation électorale.

Techniquement les élections se sont très bien déroulées. Il y avait des facilités techniques.

Je suis sûr qu’il y a beaucoup d’Etats membres qui n’ont pas les facilités technologiques

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dont dispose la Jordanie. Les gens étaient très bien préparés pour faire de la mobilisation de

vote. En Jordanie, ils étaient largement au-dessus de la moyenne européenne. Ils

connaissaient toute la procédure, etc… A la fin, nous avons salué tous les progrès…sauf

que nous avions oublié une chose importante: il s’agit d’une démocratie sans partis. Il s’agit

d’une démocratie basée sur des relations très anciennes, très archaïques, des clans. Et

lorsque l’on a discuté entre nous, parlementaires, à propos du compte rendu que nous

allions adresser publiquement… quelqu’un a dit: « nous sommes en train de dire de la

Jordanie des choses beaucoup plus positives que ce que l’on dit habituellement des pays

limitrophes de l’UE. » Bien sûr ces pays connaissent des difficultés, notamment

économiques, mais ils sont tout de même plus proches de l’Union européenne car ils

possèdent un système de partis. Il y a des confrontations, des cultures politiques qui sont

proches de celles de l’UE… La Jordanie ce n’est pas le cas. Je vous donne cet exemple

pour vous dire que, parfois, nous sommes extrêmement exigeants par rapport à ces voisins

ou aux pays candidats, les Balkans de l’Ouest par exemple, et nous sommes beaucoup plus

relaxés par rapport à la Jordanie. Je crois d’ailleurs que la Jordanie est un exemple parfait.

Nous sommes beaucoup plus détendus lorsqu’ il s’agit d’un pays plus éloigné. La peur de

l’immigration est peut-être l’élément qui explique cette attitude. Cette peur de l’autre, c’est

un élément à prendre en compte. Cela en dit beaucoup sur l’attitude européenne, qui est

difficile à caractérisée à cause de tous ces points-là. Au fond le point de départ de tout ça,

c’est ce regard politique sur les limites de l’Union. Qui pourrait dire quelque chose de clair

et net sur les frontières de l’Europe ? On est plutôt dans une époque d’hésitations, de

confusion, de travail. On essaie de travailler dans plus de cohérence. Mais on ne voit pas

très clair. Cela explique les attitudes envers la mobilité. Car dernièrement, nous sommes

très hésitants.

Dernièrement, c’est-à-dire en mars dernier, le Parlement européen a facilité

l’octroi de visas de courte durée (90 jours) pour la Moldavie. Est-ce que cette action

c’est une façon de récompenser le bon élève moldave ?

Si je me souviens bien, il s’agissait essentiellement d’augmenter le nombre d’octroi de

visas pour des catégories qui bénéficient déjà d’une certaine facilité, comme pour les

journalistes par exemple.

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Oui, ils ont également octroyé ce type de visas aux femmes, aux conjoints…

Oui effectivement. L’un des problèmes, pour les Moldaves hautement qualifiés, qui

viennent pour travailler et s’installent dans les Etats membres, est avant tout le fait que leur

proches ne puissent pas venir…

Ce qui est frappant c’est que quelque chose de si banal soit présenté comme une grande

victoire. C’est un peu pénible tout de même. (J’ai connu le régime des visas. Sortir d’un

pays je sais ce que ça veut dire.) Je suis très sensible personnellement à la question des

visas… Et lorsque l’on m’explique qu’il y a la facilitation des visas pour les journalistes

parce qu’ils doivent se rendre plus facilement dans certains Etats membres pour ne pas

écrire de mauvais articles dans la presse… Je banalise mais essentiellement c’est ça. Bien

sûr que si vous voulez être plus rationnel, vous ne devez pas faire de blocage absurde,

notamment pour les étudiants. Il existe une chasse aux cerveaux, très claire, engagée par

certaines universités européennes dans les pays comme la Bulgarie, la Roumanie, la

Hongrie et la Pologne. Il y a également le fait que, ces facilitations c’est d’un côté très

rationnel, et de l’autre c’est la reconnaissance du fait que le gouvernement moldave a été

cohérent.

La facilitation et la libéralisation des visas est un processus engagé. Ce n’est pas

révolutionnaire. Il s’agit tout de même de la liberté de circulation… Il ne faut pas présenter

cela comme quelque chose de formidable.

J’ai un autre problème: je suis rapporteur pour l’Islande. Il s’agit d’un excellent candidat.

Mais à la différence de beaucoup de pays dont on parle, ils ont une opinion publique très

défavorable à l’intégration européenne. Ils viennent d’organiser des élections et ils sont en

train de constituer un gouvernement anti intégration européenne. Le problème va être celui-

ci: comment allons-nous justifier le fait qu’un excellent candidat comme l’Islande ne

rentrera pas, et qu’en même temps, nous voulons faire entrer des pays qui ont de gros

problèmes, entre autre, la corruption ? Cela va être difficile. Et dans ce climat de peur et de

monté des populismes…ça va énormément compliquer le dossier dont on parle…les

partenariats avec les pays tiers ainsi que toutes les questions liées à la mobilité. Vous allez

me dire : « qui pense à l’Islande ? C’est tout petit. »

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Politiquement c’est comme ça… nous avons un excellent candidat, dont la société ne veut

pas de l’UE. Et nous avons des candidats plus modestes, dont les élites et la population

veulent rentrer au sein de l’UE. Et celle-ci se montre réticente concernant leur intégration.

Cette situation ne va pas jouer en faveur de l’Union car cela risque de donner l’idée d’un

ensemble plutôt hésitant. Cela risque également d’influencer le regard de nos voisins vis-à-

vis de l’UE. Dans le cas de la Moldavie, les Russes, qui se montrent peu exigeants, risquent

d’attirer les Moldaves. Pour les Russes il s’agit d’un contrôle politique. Ils veulent avoir

une influence politique en Moldavie.

3) Quelle évolution voyez-vous pour cette mobilité moldave ? Ainsi que pour le

partenariat pour la mobilité ?

Je suis pessimiste sur le court et le moyen terme. Le problème est finalement un problème

politique. A l’heure actuelle, je vois que d’un côté le parti communiste, en Moldavie, reste

le plus puissant. Et il n’y a pas une évolution de ce parti dans le sens d’une ouverture vers

l’Europe. Je simplifie mais vous avez un parti important, le parti communiste, qui ne voit

pas d’ouverture. Et vous avez des opposants qui sont très divisés. Vous avez les trois

grandes familles européennes qui divisent l’opposition.

Ce qu’on a essayé de faire c’est d’oublier, en quelques sortes, les clivages et de faire

ensemble un gouvernement qui réussisse contre les communistes, pour l’intégration… sauf

que les communistes restent toujours le parti le plus important. Ces dernières semaines, les

communistes ont su travailler avec les différentes composantes de cette alliance pro-

européenne, pour bloquer les belles perspectives que nous avions dessinées pour le Sommet

de Vilnius. Tant qu’il n’y a pas une ouverture des communistes vers l’Europe ou une

diminution de l’influence des communistes en Moldavie, politiquement cela va être un gros

blocage. Parce que le tableau est celui-ci: vous avez les clivages européens qui divise

l’opposition et en même temps une radicalisation des communistes. Les communistes ont

refusé de rencontrer Monsieur Füle lors de sa visite à Chisinau. Ils ne le lui ont pas

annoncé, il l’a appris cela devant le siège des communistes. C’est assez suggestif du

problème politique moldave. Il y a donc deux voies possibles: soit une diminution de

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l’influence communiste en Moldavie, c’est-à-dire un affaiblissement du parti, soit une

ouverture de ce parti vers l’UE. Mais pour l’instant les deux possibilités sont exclues. Et

cela va fragiliser la position moldave dans ses rapports avec l’UE. Lorsque Monsieur Füle

était en Moldavie, la semaine dernière, les communistes ont invoqué, pour ne pas

rencontrer le Commissaire Füle, le fait que la délégation de la Commission Européenne

ainsi que Monsieur Füle appuient la manifestation des homosexuels à Chisinau. Hors il

s’agit tout de même du Commissaire à l’élargissement, cela concerne directement le pays…

Ils sont très intolérants les communistes et ils savent qu’une partie de la population est

intolérante. Donc ils jouent avec cela afin d’associer l’UE à un certain libéralisme. Ils

associent l’UE à un facteur de déchirement de la société moldave.

Comment faire des progrès dans ce paysage qui est tellement difficile politiquement ? Ça

ne va pas être facile. Le résultat sera, probablement, que certains pays comme la Roumanie

vont profiter un peu plus de ces rapports vu leur ouverture envers les Moldaves.

Il y a aussi la question de la Transnistrie que nous n’avons pas abordé. Cela reste, en

quelques sortes, le dossier politique le plus lourd. De nouveau ce sujet n’intéresse pas

beaucoup de monde en Europe. Dernièrement il y a certains petits progrès car ils ont réussi

à réanimer les négociations qui étaient bloquées pendant de nombreuses années. Je sais

qu’il y a des tentatives de faire des progrès en Transnistrie en ce qui concerne les

documents, notamment les passeports. Mais cela sera difficile avec les autorités, qui sont de

plus en plus radicales. Le problème est qu’il n’y a pas de consensus sur la question de la

Transnistrie au sein de la société moldave.

Pour vous dire ma pensée, je ne m’attends pas à ce que ce soit une grande réussite avec la

Moldavie. Sauf pour des pays comme la Roumanie ou la Pologne, qui vont trouver des

raisons différentes d’être satisfaits.

Le dossier moldave n’est pas vu en Roumanie comme une partie de notre engagement

européen. Vous voyez ce n’est pas vu comme ça. Le président roumain a toujours dit : «

vous savez nous pourrons retrouver nos frères moldaves au sein de l’Union… » Le projet

de l’intégration de la Moldavie au sein de l’Union est encore très lointain. Il n’y a pas cette

lecture, sauf à quelques exceptions, que la Moldavie nous concerne en tant qu’européens.

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Cela nous concerne en tant que Roumains tout simplement. C’est d’ailleurs très intéressant

comme lecture.

Appendix 6: Transcription interview n°1 (English version)

General information:

The interview took place on 21st May in the office of a member of the European

Parliament in Strasbourg, during the parliamentary session. The interview lasted 1 hour and

10 minutes.

1) Which would be your opinion about EU- Moldova relations, politically and

concerning visa dialogue?

Firstly, Moldova is a special case. The approaches are different within the Union

concerning the integration, mobility and visa dialogue. You have a bit of everything. The

most radical position is the one of Bucharest, which wants to associate Moldova to the

Western Balkans. And some Member States who say: “What is Moldova? Where is it?” Of

course Moldova is within the European Neighborhood Policy. And now we are doing

programs with EU Member States that are particularly interested in mobility. I do not know

if there is one word to define relations with Moldova. If there is a word it is ambiguity.

I just talked to Mr. Füle- European Commissioner for Enlargement and European

Neighbourhood Policy- this morning about his visit to Chisinau. The current political crisis

illustrates very well this ambiguity. On the one hand the EU has supported the idea of

creating a pro-European government in Moldova. The formation of such a government is

politically strong enough. And the EU supported this government. The Union helped to

make progress, etc. Moldova became the ‘best student’ of the Eastern Partnership ... also in

the context of the current crisis in the South. On the other hand, we see that the EU is

powerless concerning the political crisis in Moldova. This can be seen with the statement of

Mr. Watson, a member of the European Liberal Democrats, who is in charge of Moldova.

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According to him, the European perspective for Moldova is not for tomorrow. He is

someone who is interested in Moldova. He knows the country well. He could be more

optimistic because he knows the country and the topic.

I do not know if the word ambiguity is ultimately the best word. There are ups and downs

... and hesitations. The fact is that the Moldovan case is primarily a political problem. This

is the domination of a communist party as it does not exist anymore in European

countries…with the exception of Cyprus. But in Cyprus, there is still a presidential system.

While in Moldova, it is a parliamentary system with an elected president who pushes the

blockage.

This is to show you that it is not easy for the EU to support the democratization of

Moldova. It is difficult to find a word ... but these are important elements to provide context

and describe EU-Moldova relations. I am also influenced by the fact that Bucharest is the

most interested in the Moldovan case. The position of Bucharest is a bit special. But I try to

distance myself a little.

Yes but at which point is Moldova if we make a comparison with other

neighboring countries such as Ukraine, for example?

Ukraine is a very different case because it is a huge country. Moldova is very small.

And Moldova is being depopulated. People leave. The leak237

is the most important

phenomenon in Moldova. It also exists in Romania but Romania is a member of the

European Union. We put ourselves behind the idea that we can move because we are in the

Union, but it is a movement that is very clear. There are massive departures from Romania

as well as from Moldova. It is even more important for the Moldovan case. Ukraine is not

like Moldova. It is much bigger. It is also more difficult politically because there is a

political division with a strong territorial dimension. In Moldova the problem of separation

of Transnistria is easier to manage, paradoxically, than the political divide between East

and West Ukraine. Of course in Moldova there is a problem with the frozen Transnistria

conflict. Today, there is a particular obstacle in the development of European programs due

to the conflict. But it is a much more clear political point of view, compared to Ukraine,

237

Expression directly translated from the French, also meaning the departure of people, or the flow or drip of

people out the country. The use of the word to drip, or flow could also be appropriated here.

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because it is a separation. There are also all stories of political trials. Ukraine has lost itself

after the Timoshenko case. This case is quite symbolic of the failure of Ukraine to

understand the values of the rule of law. Moldova, except that you have the greatest

political family, who are the Communists, there have been advances in recent years. There

were not politico-communist trials as in Ukraine. Of course some states are interested in

Ukraine in terms of resources.

Moldova is interesting for some members of the UE. Of course Romania is interested.

Germany and Poland are interested as well. There is also a French interest or rather there

was some interest at some point. You can also see it in the case of the mobility partnership

(MP). There are 15 Member States participating in the Moldovan MP.

Moldova is also interesting for Russia. It is important to underline it. There are more

departures from Moldova to Russia than to the European Union. It is a different mobility

but it is important from a quantitative point of view.

Currently, Romania is the country where there is the biggest number of Moldovan Entries.

This is due to several reasons. I am speaking about Moldovans without Romanian

passports. It is necessary to make the distinction. There are Moldovans who have Romanian

passports because they followed the path of the Romanian citizenship. And there are

Moldovans with Moldovan passports. There are very important flows of Moldovans who

come to Romania with Romanian passports because they are Romanian citizens. I think this

is the most interesting aspect about the Moldovan case. This is what makes the difference

between Moldova and other neighbors of the EU. You do not have another similar case.

Why? There is a moment of rupture. The negotiations began with Romania in 2000. At the

same time, we introduced visas for Moldovans. I remember very well the first contact we

had with the EU. It was just before the negotiations. The first policy question asked by the

EU to Romania was: “how are you going to deal with the Moldovans? When are you going

to introduce visas for Moldovans?” This has been a shock to the Romanian political class.

We had not thought about the Moldovan integration at that time. There are historical ties

between Moldova and Romania. And the idea of the free movement of both sides was one

of the most important points for Chisinau and Bucharest after the fall of communism. This

announcement was really a shock. In Bucharest it was not easy ... but at the same time,

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Romania, finally aligned. Negotiations for Romania began in February 2000 and I

remember very well the political discussions that we had before the start of formal

negotiations. That was during the end of 1999, early 2000. I still remember the shock of the

Romanian political class when they said: “it is necessary to introduce visas for

Moldovans.” It also created a huge frustration for Chisinau. This also explains, in large

part, the success of their anti-communist Romanian speech: “You see Romanians; they tell

you they are your brothers and they introduce visas.” This explains, to a large extent,

sympathy enjoyed by the Communists in Moldova in the early 2000s. They are in power

and they adopt legitimizing discourse as “Romanians do nothing for you.”

After 2005, there is a new policy of Bucharest. This is the creation of the policy for the

Romanian citizenship for Moldovans. It is important to underline that during the

negotiations for Romania and Bulgaria, in 2002/2003, there were more Moldovans who

acquired Bulgarian citizenship rather than Romanian citizenship. This is very interesting.

At that time, socialists in power in Romania said: “We will be eligible; we will not give the

Romanian citizenship to Moldovans.” After 2005, the Romanian president adopts another

speech and the attitude changes towards Moldovans. There are historical reasons and

family ties. There are Moldovan citizens who have family in Romania and had to wait 10

years for Romanian citizenship. Now it was much easier on the Romanian side. There is

now a strong foundation of Romanian citizens. All these people come easily into Romania.

First of all there are historical and family ties reasons. Then there is the idea that the

Romanian market needs labor in the years 2007/2008. This is expressed on several

occasions in the Romanian public policy positions. It was just before the crisis. At that

time, we had discovered Asian immigration because there was a form of small economic

boom in our country. There is the idea, in official positions, that we facilitate the

acquisition of Romanian citizenship to allow the arrival of Moldovans on the Romanian

labor market. This happens in the years 2005 to 2007. Before the crisis which came in

2009. It has developed the idea that the Moldovan immigration makes sense for the

Romanian labor market. Especially due to the fact that a lot of Romanian citizens are

leaving the country in order to work abroad. The idea was to bring Moldovan citizens to

Romania. From this point of view, we really have a special case study. You do not have

another country neighbor of the EU which is in this situation. I do not see any equivalent.

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Of course there are links between EU countries and neighbor countries of the EU but the

Moldovan case is very special.

All Member States know this Romanian position. They know that this position has got very

specific reasons for Romania. For almost all Romanians, Moldova is a country with the

same culture and language. There is not a reunification project but at the same time that

consciousness is very clear on the Romanian side. This complicates the Moldovan case.

Indeed for the other EU Member States the relationship with Moldova is different.

During my research, I saw that there is a strong Moldovan emigration to

Italy…

There is a strong Romanian and Moldovan immigration to Italy. The language is one of the

reasons. Learning Italian is easy for a Moldovan or a Romanian. The combination of

languages facilitates the creation of networks of migration. For example, it is easier for the

Romanians to go to Italy rather than Iceland because of the language. I am rapporteur for

Iceland and I know there are Romanians who work in Iceland but Icelandic is more

complicated than Italian.

In Romania there have been studies conducted, by the Romanian sociologists, on the

starting points of Romanian flows to the European countries. The different networks that

bring the Romanian citizens were shown. There were religious networks that helped bring

Romanian citizens within the EU. In terms of territory, there were some preferred areas of

departures... and a special relationship with some regions in Italy, France, etc… There was

also a distinction between the creations of networks. For example, it was discovered that

the Romanians of German origin, who left Romania for reasons of family reunification

after the fall of communism, have facilitated the departure of Romanians without German

roots who went to work in Germany. Then, there are the religious networks. The reason is

that the path of labor migration is generally pendulum. It is very seasonal for many

businesses. The content of this link was given by religious affiliation. It was clear for the

neo-Protestants. I do not know if there are different starting points for Moldovans who go

abroad to work. Are there different networks? I know there are several studies on criminal

networks and trafficking of women. It is a very important issue for Moldova. I know that,

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even under communism, actions to limit the trafficking of women were put into place. In

the 2000s, I was in Chisinau, and I remember advertisements saying: “do your best to stop

the departure of women for prostitution.” At that time, there were not a lot of

advertisements in the street. It was a bit surprising.

2) In my research, I am also interested in the discourse between the EU and

third countries, particularly when mobility is highlighted. Could you tell me whether

there are values within those EU speeches?

Yes it is a little European hypocrisy... There is the idea of making access possible and this

access has to define negatively. On the other hand, there is the idea of control. The idea of

circular migration, for example, which is an idea now set to work, really symbolizes the

idea of control. This idea is the result of pressure that comes from different Member States.

On the other hand, we can observe more open attitudes. For example, Romania is more

open due to the Moldovan case. As far as I know the Czech Republic is more open. Poland

has also opened its labor market. There are some ex-communist countries that are more

open to immigration. I understand that this is a difficult issue, especially because of the rise

of populism in the current context. There is a strong cleavage. Moreover, we can follow

this divide within countries which are now marked by the rise of populism (reference to the

publication of Dominique Reynié on Le Populisme patrimonial.) If you look at the issue of

mobility applied to Moldova, there is a gap between the most open and least open countries

on the basis of the presence or absence of populism that are based on anti-immigration

attitudes. In Romania, there is not an anti-immigration stance. There is a far-right party in

Romania, Poland and Czech Republic, but there are no parties formed on an anti-

immigration stance. This explains a more or less open attitude for neighbors like Moldova,

which wants to have the opportunity to come and work within the EU, especially for

seasonal work, etc. I understand that some Member States, under pressure of those

populisms, are more intimidated when it comes to managing issues related to the mobility

of foreigners from the neighboring countries of the East and South. It is also obvious that

the solution currently proposed has got limits. I do not know if circular migration is a

success. Does it produce the desired results? Did we really make progress in this direction?

Moreover, we must see that countries like Poland and Romania are countries that have

95

experienced departures. This theme is relevant. We understand and accept the arrivals

because there is experience of departures. There is also another dimension of this European

attitude. It is the idea expressed in a politically correct language, to rank among migrants.

The highly skilled Migrants versus the less skilled Migrants. I think it is a current feature. I

do not want to make a common shared judgment on this attitude ... but it is clear that there

is no common attitude across the European Union.

It is difficult to put it all in a single concept. Of course there is the idea of control. There is

also the idea of access, which is not completely excluded and as well the idea of sorting. To

all of this is can be added the idea of fear related to demographic trends. This is particularly

the case in Germany. Now we also want to make agreements with the countries from the

South... like Morocco, Tunisia, etc... I remember many discussions before the departure of

Ben Ali and Gaddafi; and the surprise occurred in the wake of the Arab Spring. I have not

forgotten the fact that few days before the departure of Ben Ali, my group refused a debate

on Tunisia, saying: “Oh no nothing happens in Tunisia.” It was few days before ... I am

also within the Sub-Commission on Rights. I was very interested in the issue of human

rights in Tunisia. I tried to point out the importance of this situation... but at the time I was

told “nothing is happening in Tunisia”. A few days later, there was a big revolution. They

began to compare the Arab Spring with the anti-communist revolutions. I tell you this story

to show you that we have, indeed, an effect of surprise. There may be an effect of

improvisation when it comes to those programs. We are halfway. I think we are seeing

what is the impact of these policies ... I hope that in the future this will be more clear and

consistent.

For example, there is much talk about conditionality. Having a look at the attitude

that we had with Gaddafi and how conditionality is applied in relations with Moldova, we

are not discussing the same actor. Again it is the influence of some Member States ...

Because the attitude to Gaddafi was the result of pressure from some Member States. It is

difficult to believe that it is the same actor who decides with Gaddafi how to block

immigration coming from sub-Saharan Africa and talks with Moldova, in Chisinau, about

visa facilitation.

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This principle of conditionality should be tailored to the country? This

principle should be more adaptable?

The real problem is a political one. This is about the political map of Europe. As we do not

know which the limits of the European Union are, we do not know who our neighbors are.

Look at the Moldovan case… Is Moldova a neighbor or a future Member State?

There are also conflicting attitudes. Sometimes we have much higher expectations from the

nearest neighbor than from those who are more distant. Recently, I was in Jordan. We were

there in order to observe the elections. The elections went technically very well. There were

technical facilities. I am sure there are many Member States which do not have the

technological facilities that Jordan has got. The people were very well prepared for the

mobilization of the vote. In Jordan, there were well above the European average. They

knew the whole procedure, etc… At the end we welcomed all the progress… except that we

forgot one important thing: Jordan is a non-party democracy. It is based on very old and

archaic relationships. When we discussed between us, parliamentarians, about the debate

that we would go public… someone said: “we are saying much more positive things about

Jordan than what is said usually about neighborhood countries of the EU.” Of course these

countries are experiencing difficulties, mainly economic ones, but they are still closer to the

European Union because they have a party system. There are confrontations and political

cultures which are close to those of the EU. It is not the case in Jordan. This example is to

explain to you that sometimes we are extremely demanding in relation to our neighbors or

the candidate countries, for example, the Western Balkans compared to Jordan. I believe

that Jordan is a perfect example. We are much more relaxed when it comes to a more

distant country. Perhaps the fear of immigration is the element which explains this attitude.

The fear of the other is something to consider. It shows a lot of aspects of the European

attitude, which is difficult to characterize due to all these points. Who could say something

loud and clear about the borders of Europe? It is rather a time of hesitation, confusion and

work. We try to work in more consistency. But we do not see very clearly. This explains

attitudes towards mobility. Lately we are very hesitant.

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Recently, in March, the European Parliament facilitated the provision of short-

term visas (90 days) for Moldova. Is this action a way to reward the good student

Moldovan?

If I remember well, it was mainly to increase the number of visas for the categories that

already benefit from some facilities, such as for journalists.

Yes, they also granted such visas to women and spouses…

Indeed. One problem, for highly skilled Moldovans, who come to work and settle in the EU

Member States, is primarily the fact that their loved ones cannot come...

What is striking is that something so trivial is presented as a great victory. It is a bit

annoying. (I know the visas procedure. I know what it means to exit a country). I am

personally very sensitive to the visa issue ... And when you said to me there is visa

facilitation for journalists because they have to make it easier for them in some Member

States in order to not write bad articles in the press ... I make this seem banal but essentially

it is like that. Of course, if you want to be rational, you do not have to close, especially for

students. There is a clear hunt for brains, committed by some European universities in

countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland. The facilitation is a very

rational side as well, and the other is the recognition of the fact that the Moldovan

government has been consistent.

Facilitation and visa liberalization is a process involved. This is not revolutionary. It is

freedom of movement... it should not be presented as something great.

I have another problem. I am the rapporteur for Iceland. It is an excellent candidate. But

unlike many countries we talked about, they have a very unfavorable public opinion

regarding European integration. They come to hold elections and they are introducing a

government anti-European integration. The problem could be the following: how do we

justify that an excellent candidate as Iceland will not join the EU, when at the same time,

other countries that have a big problem, especially related to corruption, want to join the

EU? It will be difficult. And in this climate of fear and rise of populism ... it will greatly

98

complicate the issues of partnerships with third countries as well as all issues related to

mobility. You will say: “who thinks about Iceland? It is very small.”

Politically it is like that ... we have an excellent candidate and its population does not want

to join the EU. And we have more modest candidates where the elite and the population

want to join the EU. It is reluctant for their integration. This will not play in favor of the

Union. It may give the idea that the Union hesitates. This may also affect our neighbor’s

point of view vis-à-vis the EU. In the case of Moldova, Russia, which shows little

demanding, may attract Moldovans. The Russians wants a political control. They want to

have a political influence in Moldova.

3) What do you see for the evolution of Moldovan mobility? How do you see

the evolution of MP?

I am pessimistic about the short and medium term. The problem is ultimately a political

one. On one side the Communist Party in Moldova remains the most powerful. There is not

a change of the party in the direction of an opening towards Europe. I am oversimplifying

but you have an important party, the Communist Party, which sees no opening to the

European direction. On another side, there are opponents who are much divided. You have

the three major European families that divide the opposition.

We tried to go beyond the divisions and to create together a government that succeeds

against the Communists. For the integration…but the Communists still constitute the

largest party. In recent weeks, the Communists were able to work with the various

components of the pro-European alliance to block the bright prospects that we had drawn

for the Summit in Vilnius. Until there is not an opening from the Communists to Europe or

a decrease of the influence of Communists in Moldova, the situation will be blocked

politically. The main issue is that the European cleavages divide the opposition and at the

same time they are more radical communists. The Communists refused to meet Mr. Füle

during his visit to Chisinau. They do not announce it to him. He learned the news before the

siege of the Communists. It is quite suggestive of the Moldovan political problem. There

are two possible ways: a decrease of communist influence in Moldova, that is to say a

weaker party, or an opening of the party to the EU. But for now the two possibilities are

99

excluded. And this will weaken the Moldovan position in its relations with the EU. When

Mr. Füle was in Moldova last week, the Communists invoked for not meeting him, that the

Delegation of the European Commission and Mr. Füle support the gay event in Chisinau.

He is the European Commissioner for Enlargement; it directly concerns the country. The

Communists are very intolerant and they know that a part of the population is intolerant.

They use it and they describe the EU, to the population, as a liberalist Union. They accuse

the EU for tearing the Moldovan society.

How to make progress in this politically difficult situation? It will not be easy. Probably,

the result will be that some countries such as Romania will experience more of these

relationships because of their openness to the Moldovans.

There is also the issue of Transnistria that we have not talked about yet. This is, in some

ways, the heaviest political issue. Again this topic does not interest many people in Europe.

Lately, there are some small steps because they were able to revive the negotiations which

stalled for many years. I know there are attempts to make progress in Transnistria regarding

documents, including passports. But it will be difficult with the authorities, who are

increasingly radical. The problem is that there is no consensus on the issue of Transnistria

within the Moldovan society.

To tell you my thoughts, I do not expect that it would be a great success with Moldova.

Except countries like Romania or Poland who will find various reasons to be satisfied.

The Moldovan case is not seen in Romania as a part of our commitment to Europe. You

can realize that it is not seen like that. The Romanian President has always said: “we will

find our Moldovan brothers in the Union.” The proposed integration of Moldova in the EU

is still very far away. We do not consider that Moldova concerns us as Europeans. The

Moldovan topic concerns us as Romanians.

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