Aharoni, Sarai (2014). Internal Variation in Norm Localization: Implementing Security Council...

Internal Variation in Norm Localization:Implementing Security CouncilResolution 1325 in Israel

Sarai B. Aharoni1,*

The article explores the localization process of Security Council Resolution (SCR)

1325 (Women, Peace and Security) in Israel after the Second Intifada. An analysis of

four forms of interpretation developed in 2000–2010 by local and international

actors: protest, political dialog, legal reforms, and transformative actions, reveals a

selective localization pattern that goes far beyond conflict-related women’s rights.

This variation was linked to the nature of interactions between civil society organi-

zations and governmental agencies and could be explained by two national-level

factors: (i) despite the escalation of political violence the State of Israel continued to

develop national machineries promoting gender equality for women citizens, a

process that minimized state dependency on international mechanisms; (ii) by using

the universal language of SCR 1325 to construct, redefine, and reinforce domestic

identities and interests, governmental agencies and women’s groups were in fact

seeking new forms of political legitimacy. I argue that the normative language of

SCR 1325 proved to be especially beneficial on the civil society level, enabling

women’s organizations to survive the generally unfavorable domestic opportunity

structure during the Second Intifada. However, traditional state-centered policies

and perceptions of women’s political participation remain a determining factor in

explaining their effectiveness and success.

Introduction

Despite the somewhat static image of a global consensus around par-ticular norms regarding women’s rights, gender equality norms comprise aunique example of the dynamic picture of norm diffusion. The history of inter-national feminism reveals how normative assumptions concerning suffrage,welfare, peace, and development were constantly negotiated by a complicatedweb of parallel and independent institutions operating on the global and locallevel. Of these institutions the role of nation-states has been the most obvious

1Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel.*[email protected]

socpol: Social Politics, Spring 2014 pp. 1–25doi: 10.1093/sp/jxu003# The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press.All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]

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and the most controversial. States bear responsibility and have the institutionalcapacity to advance universal standards of gender equality. On the other hand,in many cases it is the centrality of governmental structures and nationalismthat produce discriminatory discourses, practices, and laws that perpetuatewomen’s marginalization. In the post-Cold War era, united under the 1995Beijing World conference slogan “Women’s Rights are Human Rights” trans-national feminist advocacy networks managed to effectively cooperate onissues that have been previously linked to state-sovereignty, includingsecurity-related issues. The adoption of five Security Council Resolutions(SCR) concerning women in armed conflict known as Resolution 1325 (2000),1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) celebrated “Genderand Peace and Security” as one of the peaks of the emerging consensus ongender and global governance, creating new institutional structures to stand-ardize, monitor, and regulate state behavior.

The five resolutions are classified as thematic resolutions, adopted underChapter VI and are considered as “soft law” of noncoercive nature (Tryggestad2009). Although Resolution 1325 (and 1889) take a somewhat differentapproach toward the issue of gender and armed conflict than Resolution 1820(and 1880), particularly with regards to rape as a “war tactic,” their normativeframework remains consistent. Interlinking three elements, women’s partici-pation, the gendered nature of conflict, and women’s post-conflict priorities,this normative framework sees the exclusion of women from official decision-making processes as part of a vicious circle that renders their voices,conflict-related experiences and concrete needs invisible.

Assuming that security-related norms are more difficult to localize thanother gender-equality norms, the primary goal of this study is to provide anempirically based analysis of state and nonstate actors’ interpretations of SCR1325 in the Israeli context during 2000–2010. Based upon a survey of variousdocuments including Parliament protocols, governmental reports, UN officialdocuments, media coverage, and independent publications by national andinternational NGOs in Hebrew and English, I present an analysis of competingactions and interpretations to the Resolution. By positioning the nation-state atthe center of norm diffusion efforts, I examine how various collective claims tosolve women’s human rights issues and gender inequality contest state author-ity, bargain with it and transform it.

Three key assumptions form the basis for my analysis. First, that nationalcontexts shape the way local women’s movements influence and are influencedby global women’s movements, the possibility for change in women’s rights, aswell as the choice of strategies, timing, and priorities in adopting internationalnorms (Tripp 2006). Second, that due to its declarative nature, SCR 1325 isonly partially a regulative norm (i.e., a norm that establishes recognized stand-ards and constrains behavior), but rather a constitutive norm that defines theidentity of actors, especially states and women’s groups on the civil society andtransnational level. Third, that the escalation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

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in October 2000, which corresponded with the adoption of SCR 1325, makesIsrael a good case study for a simultaneous analysis that focuses on the local(inward-looking) and on the global dynamics of norm diffusion as reciprocaland interconnected processes.

After a brief review of scholarship about the role of states and nonstateactors in the diffusion and localization of SCR 1325, I move to explain theparadox of women’s insecurity after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Thefollowing sections supply an overview of four types of activities initiated bymulti-level actors within Israel which represent a gradual and incrementaladaptation process of international norms. I conclude with asserting thatdespite the holistic approach of the Resolution which interconnected notionsof “participation,” “protection,” and “mainstreaming” (Gumru and Fritz 2009;Tryggestad 2009; Bell and O’Rourke 2010), Israeli discourses about Women,Peace, and Security (WPS) have adopted a much wider and instrumental inter-pretation that goes far beyond conflict-related women’s rights to includegender equality, diversity, and anti-sexual harassment campaigns.

Similar to other case studies on the implementation of SCR 1325, my inter-pretation of the tactical and ideological choices that women’s groups havemade while adapting the resolutions’ framework to the Israeli context revealsthe possible benefits of ambiguous language in promoting local ownership ofgender norms (McLeod 2011; Joachim and Schneiker 2012). However, thisstudy goes beyond identifying the already recognized complications of translat-ing global norms into local settings. Its standpoint diverges from the morecommon top-down approach that identifies SCR 1325 as a manifestation ofshared global feminist interests or as a “prescription” for actual policies andinstitutional reforms. Rather, it seeks to understand the role of difference inlocalization patterns and ask about the way new sets of feminist dilemmas andantagonisms are triggered through this process. Taking this claim one stepforward, I argue that since women’s rights are still “bound to the state” and assuch they intersect with national, ethnic, or religious identities, the currentstage in this norm’s life-cycle poses a complex dilemma for local women’srights advocates who are forced to navigate between global expectations andlocal practices concerning WPS.

Localizing SCR 1325: The Role of State and Non-stateActors

The process by which norms are framed as shared global standards, carriedby different actors and become institutionalized through domestic laws andenforcement mechanisms, has been at the center of International Relationsscholarship. The complex picture of global norm diffusion produced variousexplanations to the ways norms migrate across borders and diffused withinnational governing institutions. From “norm life-cycle” theories, that stress

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three main stages: Emergence, institutionalization, and internalization(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998); through spiral models about domestic changeand resistance (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999); to discursive approaches thatview norms as performative and repetitive actions, anchored in language thatlead to similar forms of institutionalization (Krook and True 2012). Withinthis literature, the aspect of “norm localization,” which is the most advancedphase of norm translation, is probably the hardest to explain. According toAcharya (2004) “localization is the active construction (through discourse,framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, whichresults in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs andpractices” (245). Since diffusion involves local ownership, i.e., the making offoreign ideas consistent with local value systems, it may involve considerablereframing of global normative frameworks.

Three important patterns of diffusion should be noted. First, Finnemoreand Sikkink (1998) observed that domestic “norm entrepreneurs” who advo-cate a minority position can use international norms to strengthen their stancein domestic debates. This “two-level norm game” in which domestic and inter-national norm systems are increasingly linked, they argue, is apparent espe-cially at the early stage of a norm’s life cycle. Second, two national-level factorsprovide explanations for cross-national variations in norm diffusion: (i) thedomestic salience of a norm and (ii) the structural context within which thedomestic policy debate occurs (Risse et al. 1999; Cortell and Davis 2000).Third, that broad and ambiguous normative assertions spread more success-fully than specific demands and prescriptions, or as explained by Krook andTrue (2012) “norms that spread across the international system tend to bevague, enabling their content to be filled in many ways and thereby to beappropriated for a variety of different purposes”. Adding to the notion thatnorms themselves are dynamic, constructivist IR scholars have pointed to thedistinction between regulative and constitutive dimensions of norms, and theirpossible effects on norm localization patterns. While regulative norms establishrecognized standards and constrain behavior (restricting violence, stabilizingpossession, maintaining global order), constitutive norms define the identity ofactors and can also establish new actors, interests, and practices. These aspectsexplain why norms establish expectations about the relevancy of certain actorsin a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave(Katzenstein 1996). For example, the regulative aspects of SCR 1325 are to befound in concrete practices, standards, and institutional mechanisms recentlyadopted by international bodies within the UN, the World Bank, NATO, andthe EU, meant to address women’s protection during war, their participationin conflict resolution and ensuring adequate response to their needs in post-conflict reconstruction.

Advocating this approach since 2001, UNIFEM (now part of the new Entityfor Gender Equality-UN Women) has “led the way in the integration of genderanalysis into conflict programming” by compiling gender-disaggregated data

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in UN early warning systems, promoting measures for women’s participationin peace-making and supporting women in civil-society (Winslow 2009).Almost a decade later, UN Women has completed the task of identifying a listof almost thirty indicators for use at the global level to track implementation ofResolution 1325 accompanied by coherent standards of reporting and effectivesanction mechanisms (UNSCR 1889/Par. 17).

However, the constitutive aspects of SCR 1325 seem to have been evenmore successful. On the international level, the Resolution has changed theSecurity Council’s (SC) rhetoric concerning women and war, includingconflict-related sexual violence, and enabled transnational women’s groups tobecome acceptable and valuable participants in UN policy-shaping processes(Cohn 2008). Also, since 2000 there is a significant rise in specific references towomen in written peace agreement, especially in processes which the UN wasinvolved as third-party mediator (Bell and O’Rourke 2010). In this institu-tional context, it has been noted that the actual production of Resolutions,reports, guidelines, indicators, and standards are acts of authority and power(Shepherd 2008) constituting both the SC and trans-national women’s net-works as primary actors responsible for the protection of women in war-zones.

Nonetheless, a UN Secretary-General’s report from October 2004, whichinvited member states to prepare National Action Plans, indicated a develop-ment in the role that states were expected to play in the implementationprocess of SCR 1325. NAPs are designed as country-specific documents, oftenenacted with the cooperation of civil society, which provide timelines, identi-fied action and financial allocation, serving as guidelines for national govern-ments (Gumru and Fritz 2009). Although NAPs were endorsed rapidly during2005–2012 by at least forty states, little is known about the national andregional dynamics that have led to their formation or the causes of variety intheir content and scope. A recent comparative study of the implementation ofSCR 1325 in Great Britain, Sweden, and Germany has shown that SCR 1325 isbeing implemented in different ways on the national level even within the EUregional context (Joachim and Schneiker 2012). These cases indicate that mul-tiple interpretations are possible because the norm is vague, but the actual var-iation depends on the nature of the political processes leading to the adoptionof NAPs and the type of consultation with civil society organizations thatoccurred in each country. A similar study conducted in Serbia (McLoed 2011)of three WPS-related initiatives that preceded the adoption of a local NAP in2010 also links the emergence of competing interpretations to SCR 1325 withnational politics. In particular, these interpretations were shaped by the waydifferent actors perceived Serbia’s role during the wars, the issue of justice, andthe way they imagined the “post-conflict” period. In addition, this micro-levelstudy reveals how women’s groups’ cooperation with the Serbian Ministry ofDefense resulted in a growing antagonism toward the government which pre-ferred numerical representation or “quantitative equality rather than a newdefinition of security” (McLoed 2011, 605).



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Consequently, the gradual formation of international bureaucratic struc-tures and entities that professionalize expertise in gender and armed conflictalongside the proliferation of NAPs indicate a twofold development whichappears significant when analyzing micro-level and comparative case studies.First, regulatory processes concerning WPS have moved far beyond an earlyagenda setting phase to a more institutionalized phase in which standardiza-tion and monitoring are gaining importance as a global system of implementa-tion. Second, despite international efforts to consolidate a unified approach,member states that adopt NAPs are producing diverse local implementationmechanisms. As such, NAPs not only operate as a means for accountability,transparency, and standardization, but also represent state ownership, manifestsovereignty, and reinforce the problematic notion that women’s rights arebound to the state.

The Second Intifada (2000–2005) and the Paradoxof Women’s (In)security

The Israeli-Arab conflict is described as a complex intractable conflict.Intractable conflicts are defined as long and enduring conflicts which unlikeshort violent outbreaks sustain a comprehensive social and cultural structure,encompassing all walks of life, and are transmitted through generations(Bar-Tal 2007). Israel, a militarized democracy, appears on top of the list of themost intense international rivalries and has been involved in militarized inter-state disputes every year, fighting an interstate war every several years.1

With regards to gender, it should be noted that of all states involved inarmed conflict in recent years, Israel ranks as one of the highest in terms ofgender equality. As such, it serves as an exception to two recent empirical find-ings from cross-national research on gender and conflict: that states withhigher levels of social, economic, and political gender equality are less likely torely on military force to settle disputes (Caprioli 2000); and that states exhibit-ing high levels of gender equality also exhibit lower levels of violence in interna-tional crises (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). There are two other unique aspects tothe Israeli case which make it difficult to reconcile with mainstream interna-tional WPS discourses. First, despite the length and scale of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and although gender has played a symbolic role in definingnational identities in the region and consolidating Israeli militarized masculin-ity, sexual violence has been rarely documented by official bodies or humanrights organizations (Wood 2009). Second, Israel is the only state to enforcemandatory conscription for women and for more than six decades Jewishwomen serve as soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces, comprising about34 percent of the regular army and 3 percent of combat-related units.

Women’s military service is only one manifestation of the State of Israel’sformal commitment to liberal ideas about women’s equality, as expressed in

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the Declaration of Independence (1948) and the Women’s Equal Rights Law(1951). Prior to the 1990s Israeli domestic political institutions adopted thecause of women’s equal rights mainly when it corresponded with largernational projects such as Jewish nationalism, state religion, and the quest forWesternized modernization. Consequently, women’s equal rights wereendorsed by political elites as a way to promote particularistic values and inter-ests, granting Jewish women with more access to civil and political rights thannon-Jewish citizens, mainly Israeli–Palestinians; and maintaining all legalaspects of personal status in the hands of religious courts that rule accordingto Jewish religious law. These patterns have been largely connected with twotraditional “gendering forces” shaping Israeli society and politics within theframe of nationalism: a strong Jewish-familial tradition and a militaristicculture that places national security concerns in the center of public andprivate life (Berkovitch 1997; Herzog 1998).

However, the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and the escalation of theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict during the Second Intifada (2000–2005) creatednew forms of securitization and vulnerabilities that brought forth a set of com-peting and contradicting ideas about societal practices and norms relating towomen’s roles. Due to the intensity of political violence during this timeperiod and the overall disillusionment from peace, the Intifada is considered asone of the most dramatic events in the recent history of the Israeli–Palestinianconflict. Despite its local context, the cycle of violence in the region in 2000–2005 is also consistent with broader changes in patterns of global warfare,known as the “new wars.” Since “new wars” are associated with the weakeningof the state in the context of a unipolar hegemony, neoliberal economic forcesand globalization, the normative and strategic challenges that emerged duringthis period resonate larger tensions between global governance and state sover-eignty. In particular, this escalation manifested a breakdown of longstandingdichotomies between “home” and “front,” blurring the distinction betweencombatants and civilian. An analysis of Israeli causalities in this time periodthat stand on approximately 1178 deaths, 516 of them (43.8 percent) caused bymulti-casualty suicide attacks in Israeli cities (INSS 2010), reveals a new“death-hierarchy” (Levy 2012) in which military casualties account only forone-fourth of deaths, the rest being civilians. In this hierarchy, women andgirls not only consist of approximately one-third of Israeli civilian deaths after2000, but the combination of gender, ethnicity/nationality, and social classwere documented as having the most adverse affect upon their overall well-being (Sachs, Sa’ar, and Aharoni 2007). Nonetheless, despite the growing expo-sure of civilian women to political violence in this time period, publicacknowledgment of the issue was minimal. A possible explanation for this maybe the widespread belief among local policy-makers, military elites and thewider public that Israeli society continues to exhibit high levels of social resil-ience in coping with the armed-conflict; and that the psychological effects of



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political violence could be contained by already established socio-culturalstructures (Waxman 2011).

Another reason for the minimal attention to the growing vulnerability ofwomen was related to the changes in the political opportunity structure thatemerged at the early stages of the Second Intifada. Despite the substantial socialand political influence of women’s groups in the 1990s, Jewish women’s organ-izations in particular were trapped between the increasing securitization ofnational politics, an ongoing economic crisis, the privatization of state servicesand their longstanding commitment to address local women’s needs. It is pos-sible that in order to avoid internal political disagreements and external socialand political marginalization, many organizations became increasinglyinvolved with issues they identified as non-conflict-related human rights.These included domestic and sexual violence against women, LGBT rights,anti-trafficking campaigns, migrant workers rights, economic security, per-sonal status law, and wider social inclusion issues that were accompanied byservice-oriented activities (Herzog 2008).

Similar tendencies shaped the response of legislators and governmentalagencies, especially after the conservative turn in the 2003 national electionswhen for the first time in Israel’s history, the majority of women legislatorsrepresented the center-right political bloc. Paradoxically, despite an overallgrowing awareness to women’s rights the “peace and security” normativeframework was almost absent from official policy making. For example,according to a survey done by the Authority for the Advancement of the Statusof Women (2011), sixty-eight new laws addressing gender equality were passedsince 2000, focusing on three main issues: (i) women’s equal representation indecision making; (ii) minimizing the wage-gap between men and women byexpanding protections to pregnant women and working parents; (iii) eliminat-ing various forms of gender-based violence. Another analysis, of 334 officialpress-releases relating to women’s status issued by the Israeli Knesset fromOctober 2000 to December 2005, reveals a parallel pattern. The topics to gainmost publicity included: domestic violence (fifty-six), labor and welfare (fifty-six), reproductive rights (forty-one), and trafficking in women (thirty-two)(figure 1).

It is beyond the scope of the current study to explain the protectionistpublic policy that this pattern exposes or the fact that state institutions self-identified with defending women from gender-based violence in both thedomestic and public spheres at that time period. Yet this brief description pro-vides background information about the connection between gender andarmed-conflict in the Israeli case prior and during the development of the“external norm life” cycle of SCR 1325. It suggests three system-level character-istics that should be taken into account when explaining internal variation inlocalization choices. First, despite the escalation of political violence in theyears following October 2000, the State of Israel continued to develop nationalmachineries and pass laws promoting gender equality for women citizens.

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Second, when examining the exact scope of both state-centered policies andwomen’s groups’ activities, it appears that the adverse effects of political vio-lence on Israeli and Palestinian women’s lives were not thought of in thecontext of gender equality. Rather, gender equality was perceived particularlyrelevant to three areas of governance that do not intersect with national secur-ity: equal representation, motherhood/labor rights, and gender-based vio-lence. Third, women’s peace politics became marginal and the historic linkbetween feminism and the political left in Israel has been uncoupled.

Redefining SCR 1325: Between State-feminism,Securitization, and International Expectations

It is in this context that multi-level actors were engaged in localizing SCR1325 through multiple initiatives on the international, national, and civilsociety level. Like previous attempts to explain the unique patterns of imple-mentation in the Israeli–Palestinian case (Naraghi Anderlini and Tirman2010; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2010; Farr 2011), the current analysis identifiedlocal and transnational women’s groups as the most important actors to intro-duce, interpret, and operationalize the Resolution. However, the following nar-rative attempts to show how localization, in this case, was a dynamic,multilayered, and accumulated process of learning. In this process, four mainsets of activities were initiated by local and international actors (see table 1)identified as: protest, political dialog, legal reforms, and transformative actions.These actions mirror some of the external changes in the norm life-cycle atthis time period, but they also manifest a clear continuity with local practicesthat had developed prior to the escalation of violence in 2000. In order to

Figure 1 Knesset press-releases on women’s status 2000–2005.



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Table 1 Diffusion of SCR 1325 in Israel: women’s conflict-related activities 2002–2010

Actors Conflict stage

Stage in external norm

life-cycle Main goal Relation to state

Resistance and

protest

Women’s peace groups Conflict escalation Emergence Stop violence, end

conflict

Minimal ties; “enemies

of state”

Political dialog Women’s peace groups

and women leaders

Conflict escalation/

Continuation of

previous contacts

Emergence Alternative paths of

conflict resolution

International

sponsorship; no clear

effect on

policymaking

Legal reform Women’s organizations,

Knesset Members,

women from public

service

Conflict

de-escalation

Institutionalization Promoting women’s

equal & diverse

representation in

conflict resolution

Negotiation with state;

monitoring state

policies

Awareness

raising and

public

campaigns

Women’s rights

organizations,

women’s peace

groups, women

leaders

Post-2005 Institutionalization

and Internalization

Redefining security to

include women’s

perspectives

Challenge state-centric

definition of national

security to include

women’s security

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better understand how women’s groups, peace activists, and state representa-tive’s different understandings of SCR 1325 shaped the internal variation ininterpretation, the following sections offer a general analysis of these fourphases.

Feminist Resistance and Protest: From LocalMarginalization to Global Support

In November 2000, a month after the breaking of the Second Intifada, ina [. . .] sense of emergency, a group of women met at Heinrich BollFoundation offices in Tel Aviv. [They] were looking for ways to expresstheir protest against the violence used by Israeli occupation in the occu-pied territories and the wrath of the Zionist left-wing movements thataccepted the ‘no partner’ version promoted by the government, from afeminist perspective (CWP 2010).

Immediately after October 2000, Jewish and Palestinian Israeli women utilizedexisting feminist networks to form new protest groups: the Coalition ofWomen for Peace (CWP) founded in late November 2000 (Benski 2008);Checkpoint Watch founded in January 2001 (Kotef and Amir 2007); and BlackLaundry founded in the Spring of 2001 (Baum 2006). Operating in a contextof escalating political violence and a massive pro-national popular mobiliza-tion within Israel, women peace activists who had minimal ties with govern-mental institutions and officials were mostly invisible and marginalized. Likeprevious Israeli women’s peace organizations, many of the feminist peace acti-vists identified the escalation of violence and continuing occupation with mili-tarization, male domination, and heterosexism. These sentiments wereexpressed in public events such as anti-government protests and vigils, human-itarian aid, feminist conferences, and petitions through which they sought toexpress solidarity with the Palestinian struggle for recognition and self-determination. Early public reactions to feminist resistance resembled the well-documented hostility toward Women in Black in the First Intifada (Sharoni1995; Helman and Rapoport 1997). However, as political violence escalated,what was previously a popular sentiment of resentment started to appear inofficial state policies. In spring 2002 during Operation Defense Shield (thelargest Second Intifada military operation in the West-Bank), a demonstrationof three thousand peace activists headed by the CWP escorted a convoy of foodand medicine on its way to Ramallah. In an unprecedented manner, the acti-vists were received at A-Ram Checkpoint by tear-gas grenades resulting intwenty-one wounded. Similar events that followed were interpreted by thesegroups as a clear change in the military’s attitude toward Jewish women politi-cal activists. At that time feminist peace activists started to develop a growingsense of dissatisfaction, dissidence, and alienation toward the state and its



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institutions, diverging from the more traditional “resistance and compliance”approach which characterized earlier women’s peace efforts. In summer 2002,after the peak of Palestinian suicide-bombing attacks and in the wake of theglobal War on Terror, the editors of the local Noga feminist journal openlyaccused the State of Israel of conducting a “policy of terror”:

Our sense of helplessness is growing from day to day. Instinctively, wejust want to say: we refuse to cooperate with the Israeli Government thatis conducting an irresponsible policy, that has politically, socially andeconomically abandoned the lives of citizens and residents; and that isconducting a cruel, criminal policy of terror against the Palestinianpeople.

Such an open language of resistance was rarely heard in the post-Oslo Processdays when the Israeli peace camp has lost public and political support. TamarHermann’s (2009) comparative assessment of the Israeli peace movementduring the Second Intifada suggests that women’s peace organizations, despitetheir meager resources, diverse composition, nonhierarchical structures andradical feminist politics “proved quite immune to the fatal political opportu-nity structure created by the Intifada, and highly capable of crossing the stormyseas in which many other peace initiatives sank” (199). Her explanation for therelative strength of women’s protest activities during the peak of political vio-lence in 2000–2003 is that their decision to adopt a double-faced politicalagenda, linking peace activism with concerns over women’s rights enabled adevelopment of multiple strategies, activities, and alliances.

However, it is almost impossible to understand these groups’ resiliencewithout taking into account the international aspects and changes in globalattitudes at this exact period. In particular, the case of the CWP whose valuesand expressions of protest were based upon postmaterialist ideas stressinghuman rights, peace, cooperation, justice, and equality illustrates the compli-cated relationship between nationalism and feminism in an increasingly inter-connected global polity (Benski 2008). Unlike earlier constructions of Israeliwomen’s peace groups that redefined citizenship within a discriminatorynational context, the emergence of global women’s networks inspired by thenewly introduced WPS agenda and the growing quest for norm diffusionreduced the pressure on Israeli women to conform to traditional nationalroles. In addition, internet technology facilitated access to new skills and formsof knowledge-sharing about feminist protest and resulted in an increased par-ticipation of Israeli women in transnational movements such as the WorldSocial Forum and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.Finally, women’s peace groups were among the first to benefit from new sourcesof funding that became available due to SCR 1325, such as the EU-sponsoredPartnership for Peace Program and the European Neighborhood Policy.

The CWP continued to protest against Israel’s security policies during theSecond Lebanon War (2008), the Siege of Gaza (since 2007), and Operation

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Cast Lead (2009) maintaining a strong ideological commitment to work“against the occupation of Palestine and for a just peace [. . .] while enhancingwomen’s inclusion and participation in the public discourse.” Caught betweena hostile state and a more supportive global community, this specific groupbecame more professionalized in its appeal, advocating for international pres-sure on the State of Israel by endorsing the Palestinian call for Boycott,Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) and “exposing companies and corporationsthat profit from the Israeli occupation of West Bank, Gaza and the GolanHeights” (CWP 2010). The decision to adopt a naming and shaming strategysymbolizes the most critical action undertaken by Israeli women peace activists,who have come to view issues of justice and accountability as central to femi-nist resistance in the Israeli–Palestinian context. Resulting in an even moreconfrontational dynamic, these actions had led the Israeli government, Knessetand far right-wing movements to portray the CWP as “a strategic threat” to thestate. Since 2009, various attempts have been made to minimize the groups’access to external funding and impose legal restrictions upon its core activities(CWP 2010).

Although women’s peace activists in Israel did not engage directly withimplementing SCR 1325 on the national level, their activities reveal how thegrowing global consensus around the WPS agenda created new opportunitiesto overcome deep hostilities toward feminists on the national level. As seen inthe example of the CWP, this form of diffusion had very limited success inchanging state policies and public discourses, especially, since Israeli govern-ments continued to identify women’s peace groups as illegitimate threats tonational security throughout the decade and had no incentive or political willto engage in any form of joint political dialogue.

Challenging State-Feminism From Outside: Women’s Political Dialogue

On December 2004, when the Swiss Foreign Minister, MichelineCalmy-Rey came to the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea to speak in front ofIsraeli and Palestinian women leaders, she lay out very clearly the growingexpectations that international women leaders had entrusted in the hands oflocal women. “We need to be able to show the positive contribution that womencan make to peace processes in order to overcome the continued denial of thespecial role of women in defending peace,” she said, “Participation is essentialfor demonstrating how successful women can be in developing gender-sensitivestructures and institutions in post-conflict societies” (Calmy-Rey 2004, 6).

The conference, organized by an international women’s network establishedin Oslo a year before, the Women’s Partnership for Peace in the Middle East,was one of many networks that sought to connect Israeli, Palestinian, andinternational women under a shared political call to return to peace negotia-tions. As such, the second set of activities initiated in Israel/Palestine duringthe early stages of the emerging normative framework of SCR 1325 should be



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understood as more explicit attempts by external actors to support politicaldialogue between Israeli and Palestinian women from the oPt.

Unlike the spontaneous nature of grassroots protest activities, these projectswere a more professional form of conflict resolution incorporating experiencedelite women leaders. The earliest and most comprehensive of these attemptswas the International Women’s Commission (IWC), directly sponsored in2005–2011 by UNIFEM. As mentioned earlier, the Independent ExpertsAssessment’ submitted in late 2002 signified a new stage in consolidating UNtypology and strategy. Israel and the oPt were among the fourteen conflictareas visited by the experts that year, yet, the final report revealed minimalinformation about this specific conflict. It mentioned the severe restrictionsand violations of Palestinian’s basic human rights but when referring to Israeliwomen it only cited the work of one joint Israeli-Palestinian women’s initia-tive, the Jerusalem Link (established in 1994). Terri Greenblatt of Bat-Shalom(the Israeli partner) explained that the Jerusalem Link provided an alternativevoice, allowing women on each side to publicly challenge the notion that polit-ical partnerships across the lines are impossible and to claim “mutual recogni-tion and respect for each other’s individual and collective rights” (Rehn andJohnson Sirleaf 2002, 120).

In spring 2002, members of the Jerusalem Link agreed to speak before theSC in New York. Their personal experience was used to convey a radicalmessage, that “Resolution 1325 cannot imply a simple ‘add women and stir’approach to peace building [. . .], seating more women at negotiating tables orwithin the ranks of the military will not necessarily lighten the path to coexis-tence and understanding” (Bahdi 2003, 47). In an attempt to bypass themonopoly of state-level officials in designing negotiation frameworks, theJerusalem Link presented a proposal to establish an international women’scommission to act as an independent advisory body in peace negotiations.

Officially established in July 2005, the IWC presented a clear political visionthat went far beyond simple requirements for gender parity: “to end the Israelioccupation and bring about a just peace based on international law, humanrights, and equality.” Its activities included informal negotiations about theconflict’s core issues in order to promote “direct negotiations for a permanentsettlement which will lead to a sovereign, sustainable Palestinian state alongsideof the State of Israel in its 4 June 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as capital ofboth states” (Saragusti 2011). The innovative structure of the IWC was meantto address the asymmetrical power relations between Israeli and Palestinianwomen and was shaped by two assumptions. First, women can create a sharedpolitical vision that could be translated into a concrete negotiated solution tothe conflict. Second, the conflict is not local or regional but international,which is why the commission, co-chaired by Liberian President Ellen JohnsonSirleaf and Finnish President Tarja Halonen, consisted of three equal groups:prominent international leaders, Israelis, and Palestinians who met on aregular basis (Smith Polfus 2008).

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The IWC project was based upon a specific interpretation of SCR 1325 thatsaw its potential in fostering independent peace negotiations between womenacross the lines under the auspices of an international mechanism. Maintainedby UNIFEM as part of a larger strategy to consolidate an independent voice forIsraeli and Palestinian women leaders, it was broadly structured as a top-downinitiative that bypassed state officials and enabled women to criticize Israeligovernmental policies, military occupation, and violation of human rights. Itmight be possible that UNIFEM’s official mandate, to promote women’s rightsonly in developing countries affected the decision not to work within Israel butto design an international structure for mediation. However, the main conse-quence of bypassing the state was that the IWC operated de-facto as a politicaldialog group and not as a third-party mediator. Although the group managedto produce shared political statements and engaged in international diplomacy,it did not have enough leverage and resources to influence official policymak-ing. This finding resonates with recent empirical work about tracks of negotia-tions and the role of third-party mediators. Bohmelt (2010), for example,shows that Track I diplomacy led by official actors is the most effective form ofconflict resolution due to greater resources and political investment by partici-pating states. Consequently, he argues that independent tracks are most effec-tive when linked to official tracks. Since the majority of agreements signedbetween Israel and the PA after 1994 were negotiated by state officials, the factthat the IWC did not have sufficient links to policymakers may explain why ithad so little impact. The IWC continued to operate until mid-2011 under theauspices of the new UN Women, when ‘unfortunately, the tensions generatedby the ongoing conflict, particularly after the Israeli attack on Gaza, ended thejoint activity’ (Saragusti 2011).

Bargaining with the State: SCR 1325 and Israeli Law

On July 20, 2005, the Knesset passed an amendment to the Women’s EqualRights Act of 1951 mandating the representation of women on public commit-tees and “national policymaking teams,” including, “In any group appointedto peace-building negotiations.” The amendment was drafted in 2004–2005 asan attempt “to create public awareness to women’s roles in peace processes asdefined in SCR 1325” (Committee for the Advancement of the Status ofWomen 2004) and remains the first documented case of implementationthrough state legislation. According to Knesset members Yuli Tamir (Labor)and Eti Livni (Shinui) who sponsored the amendment, its purpose was: “Toenable women to participate in any negotiating team and decision makingforum from which they are currently excluded [. . .] such as peace negotiationswith the Palestinians” (Divrei HaKnesset 2005); hoping that it will eventually“enable the expression of a gendered perspective, sensitive to the special needsof women” (Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women 2005).

This legal reform was in fact the culmination of a third set of initiatives bywomen’s organizations that were not involved in protest or political dialog



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during 2003–2005. Corresponding with the decline of political violence, itdemonstrated a more active stage of norm localization on the domestic level,linked to the overall increase in the external impetus to implement SCR 1325.Supported by European funding, one of the first women’s groups to translatethe resolution into Hebrew and use it for advocacy and educational purposeswas Isha l’Isha-Haifa Feminist Center. In a shadow report submitted to thereview of the 49th session of the UN Committee on the Status of Women(2005) in New York, the organization attempted to connect gender equalitywith human rights violations in Israel and the oPt, stating that “we seek to cata-lyze both the drafting and enforcement of new and of existing laws in Israel”(Myrtenbaum 2005, 6).

Their decision to implement SCR 1325 by a binding law was drawn fromearlier practices of localizing international norms of gender equality into state-feminism and implied a bargaining process among local actors, women MKs,and state institutions (Halperin-Kaddari 2004). During the preliminaryprocess of discussions within an ad hoc coalition led by Isha l’Isha andItach-Maaki (Women Lawyers for Social Justice), it became clear that anyattempt to identify a consensus-based legal reform would have to demonstratecontinuity with preexisting legal interpretations of gender equality referring to“equal representation”; and keep away from overt political controversies con-cerning the roots of the armed conflict and its possible resolution.

Taking into account the minor role that Israeli Jewish women had played informal peace negotiations during the Oslo Process, the lack of formal mecha-nisms to promote and ensure their full participation and reluctance to engagewith women’s exposure to political violence, the legal reform’s main focalpoint was to secure women’s equal and diverse representation in future officialpeace negotiations. Nonetheless, of special interest is clause 6C1(b) of theamendment, known as the “diversity affirmation” clause which states that:

In a public committee or a team appointed by: the government, theprime minister, a minister, a deputy minister or an executive director ofa ministry, appropriate expression will be given to the representation of avariety [migvan] of women, permitted by the circumstances.

The significance of the diversity clause is twofold. First, it is the earliest diver-sity legislation ever enacted in Israel, which offers an expansion of existing legalconcepts of affirmative action established by law in 1993 known as “appropri-ate representation” for women (Izraeli 2003). By inserting identity-politics intothe book of laws, Israeli women’s groups used SCR 1325 to challenge theimage of a unified Jewish national state in which “all woman” solidarity isfounded, implying that structural differences between women may affect theirpolitical positions and life experiences. In a Knesset discussion held on July 12,2005, MK Yuli Tamir explained that the diversity clause was to encourage the“Appointment of an Arab woman, a Mizrachi woman, or a woman from theperiphery,” and clarified that “we came to an agreement with all women’s

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organizations to stress the diversity component. It was very important for them”(Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women 2005).

Second, by linking diversity norms to the developing international debateover implementation of SCR 1325, this strategy demonstrates how its universal,yet vague, language was cut and altered to resonate with existing state-feminismand local projects of the women’s movement. Unlike the two previous sets ofactivities, feminist resistance and women’s political dialog, the 2005 amend-ment manifested shared interests of both the Israeli government and localwomen’s groups. As such, local feminist groups’ role as domestic norms entre-preneurs exhibited from an early stage a clear “two-level norm game.”In this game women’s groups were using the newly introduced normativeframework to gain support, legitimacy, and resources; while the state was usingthe work done by women’s NGO’s as a means to foster a more positive imagein the international arena.

The degree to which the State of Israel used this legal reform to gain legiti-macy could be deduced from official statements by Israeli diplomats in the2006–2009 SC thematic reviews of SCR 1325. These statements manifest arhetorical commitment to gender equality, affirming that “Israel believeswomen must play an equal role in all aspects of state and civil society”(Eilon-Shahar 2006); “Israel is determined for women to play an increasinglyactive role in peace negations” (Gillerman 2007); “Israel is proud that ForeignMinister Tzipi Livni is leading our peace negotiations with the Palestinians”(Shalev 2008); and in 2009, the Israeli Ambassador reaffirmed that the amend-ment was indeed the official mechanism for implementing SCR 1325:

Israel remains committed to the principles of the landmark SecurityCouncil Resolution 1325 that calls for an increase in the participation ofwomen at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace proc-esses. Israel amended its Women’s Equal Rights Law in the spirit of thisresolution, mandating that the Israeli government include women in anygroup appointed to peace-building negotiations (Shalev 2009).

Moreover, despite the lack of direct peace negotiations and the overbearingdominance of men within Israeli political elites, the legal reform was seen as asuccess also from the norm entrepreneurs’ point of view, and as “a uniqueimprovement of the original formulation of the UN resolution” (Saragusti2011). The reason for this assessment was that the law had given local women’sgroups another tool to demand accountability from the state, encouraging apublic debate over women’s representation in all “national committees”,including on issues of national security and foreign policy. During 2008–2011at least five different joint petitions against violations of the law were submittedto the Israeli Supreme Court by Itach-Maaki and other women’s groups,demanding the creation of clear mechanisms of implementation.2 Of these,the petition for the inclusion of women in the investigating committee on theGaza flotilla incident in May 2010 (The Turkel Committee) was especially



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challenging. Accepting the petition, the court severely criticized the govern-ment for failing to appoint women and for not establishing clear proceduresfor their nomination and inclusion. Subsequently, in mid-2011 the Israel StateAttorney announced the creation of specific governmental guidelines instruct-ing the inclusion of women from diverse groups in public committees and thenumbers of women appointed is on the rise (Thon-Ashkenazy 2011).

Although the 2005 amendment of the Women’s Equal Rights Act wasinspired by SCR 1325, it presents a selective version of the international nor-mative framework focusing mainly on women’s equal representation withoutreferences to the overall negative effects of the armed conflict and militarismon their status and well-being. Furthermore, this norm-translation processwhich involved newly created coalitions of women’s rights advocates andwomen MKs was only remotely linked to international actors that mainly sup-plied financial resources and moral support. Nonetheless, the Israeli legalreform introduces two novel contributions to understanding the relevance ofSCR 1325 for women in conflict zones. First, by expanding the demand to“national policymaking teams,” the law not only calls for women’s representa-tion in decision-making mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of con-flict, but could also be used in an array of cases. Second, by inserting the“diversity clause” local women have aimed to minimize the possibility thatonly privileged women would be appointed to governmental committees, con-fronting essentialist notions about women’s peacefulness and/or victimhoodin situations of armed-conflict.

Redefining Security

After the successful amendment in 2005, a fourth type of action associatedwith SCR 1325 emerged in Israel, signifying the most complex and maturestage of localization in which feminist organizations cooperated with womenpeace activists and women leaders to challenge state-centric security dis-courses. By flashing instances of deep-rooted gender discrimination fosteredby the state against its own citizens and within official governmental institu-tions, like sexual harassment, privatization, and ethnic/national discrimina-tion, women’s groups attempted to challenge official security narratives andredefine the term “Security” [Bitachon] from a feminist standpoint.

This shift emerged from the sense of antagonism and disappointment offeminist groups at the prospect of change by official legal reforms and mecha-nisms. Two events in particular triggered a feminist dilemma concerning theeffectiveness of women’s participation as mediators in official decision-makingforums. The first was the Second Lebanon War (2006) in which Israeli civiliansexperienced massive missile-attacks for more than a month which exposed,once again, the state’s limited capacity to protect its own civilians. The secondwas the participation of Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and US Secretaryof State Condoleezza Rice in the failed 2007 Annapolis peace talks. In addition,Palestinian women’s critical view of SCR 1325 as a reification of “normative

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patriarchal practices of peace-making” and state-building (Farr 2011) hadgained wider recognition among Israeli activists that were increasingly search-ing for ways to show solidarity and overcome the inherent conflict between dif-ferentiated identities, citizenship, nationality, and access to rights (ShalhoubKevorkian 2010).

Identified as transformative actions, the main activities associated with thisform of localization were public campaigns, media events, educational proj-ects, surveys, and conferences. Their main goal was to reframe dominant secur-ity discourses that usually treated Jewish women as loyal, strong, functioningcaregivers who support and nurture their families by asking how these narra-tives reinforce hegemonic masculinity. For example, Isha l’Isha and the CWPorganized counterpart events to the annual Herzliya Conference, considered asIsrael’s primary global policy annual gathering in which Israeli and interna-tional participants, mostly men, from the government, business, and academiaaddress “strategic issues.” The 2007 event, titled “Security for whom?” aimedto “change the meanings implicit in the male, militant, and military under-standing of Security through a debate of the concept in a civil context andthrough a feminist lens” (Dayif, Abramovitch, and Eyal 2007). The conferencethemes did not refer at all to the recent legal reform or to the issue of womenas mediators in peace-negotiations. Instead, it focused on everyday experiencesof insecurity in the public sphere, the workplace, the home, and highlightedproblems of racism and institutional discrimination, police violence, interper-sonal violence, pollution, and even nuclear arms.

Another example, the public campaign for the “Removal of Sex Offendersfrom Government” is probably the most striking manifestation of how pro-moting local ownership of norms may lead to a comprehensive interpretativeshift. Launched in March 2007 by a short-term coalition of nine feministorganizations headed by the Association of Rape Crisis Centers, the campaignwas a spontaneous response to simultaneous allegations of sexual assaults byChaim Ramon, Minister of Law and the State’s President, Moshe Katsav.Unlike the legal reform that meant to change procedural aspects of women’sinclusion in decision-making processes, this campaign targeted one of themost powerful informal mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization ofwomen in Israeli political and military culture—sexual harassment and rape.

The campaign, which lasted for 4 years, sought to broaden and changepublic discourses concerning sexual assault by “promoting real social change,raising awareness among varied populations and positioning the feminist turfas a catalyst for change in the public sphere” (Abramovitch 2008, 64). Indeed,vigils, protests, petitions to the Supreme Court and countless press releasesfueled a large public debate. A spontaneous demonstration held in Tel-Aviv onJune 2007 mobilized the largest number of women demonstrators in a decade,with approximately twenty thousand participants. Interestingly, despite thefact that the allegations which sparked the campaign were not directly con-nected in any way to conflict-related politics, the ad hoc coalition was



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sponsored by the CWP as part of the “Security for Whom?” project, a 2-yearproject predominantly funded by EU civil society partnerships SCR 1325component.

Interpreting “Security” to include freedom from sexual harassment mani-fests not only the agency and creativity needed in order to promote a broadconsensus on local ownership of the global WPS agenda; it also signifies theboundaries of legitimate/illegitimate feminist discourses in contemporaryIsrael/Palestine. Since sexual harassment, rape, and domestic violence werealready framed as legitimate concerns in the eyes of both women’s groups andstate institutions, it is not surprising that more mainstream women’s organiza-tions such as the Rape Crisis Centers were willing to cooperate with the moreradical and ostracized CWP. As such, the effectiveness and success of thesecampaigns manifest a gradual learning process in which civil society groupswere not only engaged in an act of generating genuine meaning to abstract orambiguous universal claims, but were able to create practical alliances topursue gender equality based upon feminist re-conceptualizations of security.Overall, this strategy, which did not involve any direct cooperation with gov-ernmental agencies, provides an example of how contemporary feminists avoidthe silencing of dissent during conflict without complying with nationalist andmilitarized gendered expectations by using the ambiguous WPS frameworkand the many meanings of insecurity it had introduced.

Conclusion

The complex and multi-faceted localization process of SCR 1325 in Israelafter the Second Intifada reinforces previous findings that broad and ambigu-ous normative assertions spread more successfully than specific demands andprescriptions and suggests three main patterns which could serve as a basis forfurther comparisons. First, competing interpretations of the relevance of theWPS framework to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were more salient at theearly stages of the norm’s external life cycle, i.e., prior to 2005. This may possi-bly indicate that despite the limited capacity of international organizations tointervene in this conflict, external influences and especially the “push forimplementation” of gender security norms did affect local responses.

Second, that the Israeli domestic political opportunity structure, includingprevious encounters with similar norms and the existence of a long traditionof state-feminism, has largely determined localization patterns and preferences.Especially, the state’s ability to continue developing national mechanisms forgender equality during the Second Intifada may explain why internationalattempts to promote the official participation of Israeli and Palestinian womenin attempts to resolve the conflict gained so little success and public attention.

Third, that Israeli state and non-state actors engaged with SCR 1325 (femi-nist resistance, women’s dialog, legal reforms, and public campaigns) were

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utilizing a selective localization process in order to construct, redefine, or rein-force existing domestic identities, interests, and political institutions. In thisprocess, women’s peace groups that were marginalized within the domesticcontext of conflict escalation used the new international opportunity system tomaintain activism and feminist resistance. Simultaneously, feminist groupsthat continued to bargain with the state managed to link the idea of women’srepresentation with the principle of diversity and later on used a similar tacticto reinterpret the protection components of SCR 1325 as a way to expand localdiscourses about national security.

This case study shows how the ambiguous language of SCR 1325, which hasbeen criticized in international circles as hampering accountability, has actuallybenefitted many local actors which used it to redefine identities, interests, andprojects in new ways. Yet, the main contribution of these findings to thegrowing understanding of general localization patterns of gender securitynorms is that variation in interpretation seemed to have appeared to a largerpart as a result of lower-level interactions between civil society organizationsand governmental agencies. Furthermore, what seems to have partly shapedthis interaction is a conscious attempt to bridge the gap between internationalassumptions about WPS and state-centered, national constructions of genderand armed conflict. In this process, local women’s groups did not act as blindcarriers of norms, but were faced with a series of imminent dilemmas aboutthe meaning of representation, the idea of protection, practices of solidarityand how to avoid co-optation. In fact, local women’s groups who negotiatedwith state legislators and official policy-makers were de facto forced to choosebetween universal conceptualizations of WPS norms and national, historicallyembedded notions about state feminism. This was particularly the case duringthe escalation of violence in 2000–2005, when the very few feminist groupsthat maintained a dissident and critical view of Israeli military occupation weremarginalized, disempowered, and legally prosecuted. Whether or not thesedilemmas are inevitable, this case tells us something important about microlevel feminist struggles in the current phase of localization and implementationof the WPS framework today, their possibilities and limitations.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by a grant from the Leonard Davis Institute forInternational Relations at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

NotesSarai Aharoni, b. 1973, PhD in Gender Studies (Bar-Ilan University, 2009);

Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies, the University of Michigan (2010–2012);Research Fellow, Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University (2012–); research



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interests include the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, women in Israeli politicsand feminist security studies. Her work on gender, peace, and conflict in Israel hasbeen published in Sex Roles, International Sociology and Politics & Gender.

1. This article refers only to women who are citizens of the State of Israel. Itshould be noted that Israel which ratified CEDAW in 1991 has historically refusedto report its implementation in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) which areseen as “beyond its own territory.” However, this division serves as a partial reflec-tion of the reality on ground where the legal and political boundaries betweenJewish and Palestinian communities in Israel/Palestine are constantly shifting. Forrecent discussions on the reception of SCR 1325 by Palestinian women in the oPt,see Farr (2011) and by Palestinian women in Israel see Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2010).

2. These include petitions: H.C. 3974/08 Itach v. The Government of Israel(2008) for inclusion of a Bedouin woman in the Goldberg Committee for regula-tion of Bedouin settlements in the Negev; H.C. 2475/09 Itach v. The Minister ofInterior (2010) for inclusion of an Arab woman in the Committee on Ramleh-Lodcity unification; H.C. 5660/10 Itach v. The Government of Israel (2010) for inclu-sion of a woman in the Turkel Investigating Committee for the Gaza flotilla events;H.C. 5980/11 Itach v. The Government of Israel (2011) for inclusion of an Arabwoman in the Trajtenberg Committee on socio-economic reforms.

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Aharoni, Sarai (2014). Internal Variation in Norm Localization: Implementing Security Council...

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Transcript of Aharoni, Sarai (2014). Internal Variation in Norm Localization: Implementing Security Council...