Against the background of the KRG’s ambition to declare

independence,

what is FedKom’s position with regard to the discourses on

Kurdish self-determination that are currently most

prevalent in the Kurdish diaspora?

Arad Javanmardi

10006249

International Public Management

The Hague University of Applied Science

Supervisors: I. Trigo de Sousa & R. Audenaerde

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Acronyms

Fedkom Federation of Kurdish Diaspora Organizations in the Netherlands

HRW Human Rights Watch

ISIL Islamic State

KDC-E European Federation of Kurdish organization, previously known as

KonKurd

KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party (in Iraq)

KDPI Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran

KNC Kurdish National Congress

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

Kurdistan Greater Kurdistan, including the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and

Syria

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

PKK Kurdistan Workers Party (in Turkey)

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (in Iraq)

U.S. United States

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACROYMS ...................................................................................................... 2

TABLE OF CONTENT ............................................................................................... 3

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 4

WHO ARE THE KURDS? ......................................................................... 4

EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM .......................................... 5

TURKEY ................................................................................................... 6

IRAQ ...................................................................................................... 7

IRAN ...................................................................................................... 9

SYRIA ...................................................................................................... 10

KURDISH DIASPORA ............................................................................. 11

KURDISH DIASPORA ORGANIZATION ................................................. 14

PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................... 14

OBJECTIVES & RELEVANCE ................................................................. 17

2. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 19

3. THEORIES & CONCEPTS .............................................................................. 21

DISCOURSES .......................................................................................... 21

DIASPORA ............................................................................................... 24

TRANSNATIONALISM ............................................................................. 28

4. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 32

INTRODUCTION TO FEDKOM ................................................................ 32

ACTIVITIES .............................................................................................. 37

FEDKOM’S POSITION TOWARDS KRG ................................................. 44

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 45

5. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................... 47

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 51

APPENDIX 1 ...................................................................................................... 54

APPENDIX 2 ...................................................................................................... 58

APPENDIX 3 ...................................................................................................... 64

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Introduction

Prelude

In order to fully comprehend the main thesis question and the reason for conducting this thesis,

the introduction will present the key actors and historical information relevant to the thesis.

Initially, this research will provide an overview of who the Kurds are and it will be followed by

what Kurdistan refers to as a concept. Hence, as this thesis is concerned with Kurdish self-

determination, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism will be presented. Furthermore, a reflection

of the Kurdish diaspora as well as their organizations will specifically be discussed pertinent to

their settlement in the Netherlands. Connecting the key actors and concepts to the main thesis

question will conclude the introduction.

Who are the Kurds?

The Kurdish people are one of the many ethnic groups in the Middle East region which form the

fourth-largest ethnic group in the region with an estimated population of thirty-five to forty million

Kurds. Being one of the world’s largest nations without a state, the Kurds predominantly inhabit

the areas of contemporary Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (The Time of the Kurds, n.d.). Map 2,

based on a map presented to the United Nations by Kurdish nationalists in 1948, shows the

regions where the majority of Kurds are situated (van Bruinessen, 1992). The area depicted in

the map is perceived as Kurdistan (‘the land of the Kurds), which will be used in this thesis to

refer to this region.

.

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In 2014, The CIA Factbook has roughly estimated the Kurds to have populations of 2 million in

Syria, 5 to 6 million in Iraq, 8 million in Iran and 15 million in Turkey (CIA Factbook, n.d.). The

diversity among the Kurds can be observed in national, linguistic, ideological and religious

differences.

Emergence of Kurdish nationalism

The following section will elaborate on the emergence of Kurdish nationalism, which will help to

inform the reader how it emerged and became one of the, if not most, important Kurdish issues.

Nationalism can be perceived as a desire by a large group of people (such as people who share

the same culture, history, language, etc.) to form a separate and independent nation of their own

(Merriam Webster Online, 2015).

Before the 20th century, the Kurds were organized in a tribal system, whereby the chiefs of the

tribes were subject to the Ottoman Empire and on the other hand the Persian Empire. The first

wave of Kurdish nationalism, which aimed specifically to establish an independent Kurdish state,

can be illustrated by the Kurdish revolt in 1880. At the time, Shaikh Ubeydullah was the most

respected Kurdish leader, who mobilized troops in pursuit of establishing an independent state.

The main reason was the neglect and oppression of the Kurds at the hands of the Ottomans and

Persians. The emergence and intensification of Kurdish nationalism became more evident in the

20th century (Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 250-251).

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War led to the partitioning of the

Ottoman Empire and consequently Kurdish regions. In 1916, the secret Sykes-Picot agreement

between the governments of the United Kingdom and France with assent from the Russians,

defined the territories of the former Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence and control in the

Middle East for the three parties (Sykes-Picot Agreement, n.d.)

The details of partitioning the Middle East region was addressed in the Sevres Treaty, signed in

1920. Section three of the Sevres Treaty, formally addressed the creation of an autonomous

Kurdish state (Treaty of Sevres, 1920).

However, due to the rejection of Sevres Treaty by the new leader of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal

Ataturk, the Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Sevres Treaty in 1923. The Lausanne Treaty

excluded all the phrases about the Kurdish state. Consequently, the nation became scattered

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across the newly set borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria where the Kurdish population

frequently rebelled against the respective authorities (Treaty of Lausanne, 1923).

Evidently, the reconfiguration of the Middle East and emergence of nation states in the region

led to a transition in the traditional governance structure of the Kurds as they became subject to

the nation states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In addition to the general emergence of Kurdish

nationalism, the following sections will give attention to Kurdish nationalism in the newly formed

nation states.

Turkey

Following the Lausanne Treaty, the Kurds fought together with the Turks against the Greeks and

Armenians who claimed parts of the Turkish state.

After their independence was realized, the Kemalist government, which gained its fame from the

Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, installed a policy of assimilation of minority groups

including the Kurds. (Bruinessen, 1991, p.191)

The intensification of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey was largely triggered by the ideology of

Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ata Turk that emphasized a single Turkish national identity and

denying the existence of the other minorities. The ideology, also known as Kemalism, thus did

not acknowledge the existence of Kurdish people or other minority groups as the Turkish leader

considered the Kurds to be Turks as well. Kendal (1993, p 49) argues that the long- term aim of

Kemalism was to eliminate the Armenians and assimilate the Kurds. Kendal’s statement is in

conformity with the policies that the Turkish government had implemented to realize their desired

model of a Turkish state.

Following Kurdish revolts against the regime of the new state, between 1925 and 1930, the

policy pursued a more violent way of enforcement. Many tribesman and other types of

representatives of the Kurdish people were sent into exile, deported to other areas of the state or

even executed. Law enforcement and schools taught the Kurds that they are Turkish natives and

all forms of expressions related to other identities were prohibited. This had consequences for

the Kurdish people as they were prohibited to use their language, dress in their traditional

clothes and even tribes were abolished. The Turkish government persecuted Kurds who had

some degree of political roles and all forms of indirect rule of tribal chiefs were eliminated.

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Consequently, it resulted in a growth of conflicts between the Kurds and the Turkish regime in

many areas. (Bruinessen, 1991, p.185)

The ideology of discriminating Kurdish identity and prohibiting associations that recalled the

Kurdish identity has grown roots in contemporary Turkey. This policy led to more critique and

resistance among Kurds across Turkey so that those that addressed the Kurdish issue in public

faced persecutions and jail-sentences. As this thesis is concerned with the most prevalent

discourses of the Kurds regarding self-rule, the following section will present the prominent

Kurdish organization in Turkey.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, better known as the PKK, was founded in 1978 under the rule of

Abdullah Ocalan. The party was initiated as a Marxist organization aiming for an independent

Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. Following the fleeing of the PKK leaders to Syria in 1984, the

organization started militant uprisings and attacks against the Turkish state, coordinated in Syria.

The conflict resulted in estimated forty thousand deaths where the majority of them were

Kurdish. In 1997, the United States labeled the party as a terrorist organization. (The Time of the

Kurds, n.d.)

The abovementioned discourse among the Kurds in Turkey and the ideology of PKK will be

discussed in the chapter of theories and concepts, which will elaborate more on PKK’s discourse

with regards to Kurdish self-determination.

Iraq

In pursuit of independence, the Kurds challenged the nation-state of Iraq under the rule of

Sheikh Mahmud who led two revolts against the government and the influential British rule, from

1919 to 1924. This was largely triggered by the government, which failed to provide the Kurds

with equal cultural and political rights. (McDowell, 2004, pp. 155-156)

The emergence of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq started taking organizational forms by the 1930’s

when some Kurdish middle-class students formed an informal Komala-I Liwan, Young Men’s

Club, which was concerned with cultural and literary aspects of the Kurds (McDowell, 2004, p.

288). The first notable organization that aimed to change political affairs to benefit the Kurds is

the Kurdish political organization Kurdistan Democratic Party, also known as the KDP. Mustafa

Barzani established the party while he was on exile in Mahabad in 1946, in the Kurdish region of

Iran, after he rebelled against the Iraqi’s and British rulers during the Second World War. The

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party’s aim was to establish a system of democratic values and social justice, which advocated

equality and freedom of expression. (McDowell, 2004, pp. 296-297). Following the military coup

in 1958, the military leader Qasim invited Mustafa Barzani to return (Kurdistan Business Law

Handbook, 2014, p. 11)

Mustafa Barzani rejected the Autonomy Law in 1974, which was published by Baghdad.

Autonomy is what the Kurds strived for, however, the amendments Baghdad made to the

original agreement allowed the central government to retain powers that could strip down the

autonomous region of any self-control through judicial exercise (McDowell, 2004, pp. 335-337).

As the uprisings crumpled in Iraq in 1975, disagreements became visible among the Kurds in

Iraq. Jalal Talabani splits from the KDP and established a new party called the PUK (Patriotic

Union of Kurdistan) (McDowell, 2004, p. 334).

Following the Iraq-Iran war between 1980-1988, Hussain wanted to crush the remaining Kurdish

and Iranian forces in Iraqi Kurdistan who fought against the Iraqi regime (McDowell, 2004, p.

357). The Kurdish genocide in Iraq, also known as the al-Anfal campaign, started in 1988. This

was directed by Saddam Hussain’s Ba’athist regime in their retaliation against the Kurds. The

campaign comprised the use of chemical weapons, the demolition of thousands of villages,

displacement and genocide. Approximately one hundred and eighty thousand Kurds were killed

(Council on Foreign Relations, n.d). The indiscriminate campaign led to the displacement of

hundred of thousands of people, forced dispersal to neighboring countries (McDowell, 2004, p.

373). The humanitarian catastrophe led to a United States initiated coalition operation in

response, during which a no fly zone was enforced over Iraqi Kurdistan and humanitarian aid

was supplied to the population. The no-fly zone, as well as the crackdown of Iraqi forces in the

Kurdish region, allowed the Kurds to return and acquire de facto autonomy. In 1992, the

constituencies elected the first Kurdistan Regional Government and National Assembly (About

the Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.).

More than two thousand Kurds were killed during a civil war, in the mid-1990, due to the conflict

between the two dominate political parties, namely, the KDP and PUK. This conflict ended with

the Washington Peace Agreement in 1998, while during the conflict the KDP received support

from the Iraqi regime and the PUK, on the other hand, received support from Iran (The Time of

the Kurds, n.d.).

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The Kurds played a vital role in drafting the Iraqi constitution in 2003, as the United States forces

invaded Iraq and Saddam Hussain was ousted. The new constitution acknowledged the

autonomous region of the Kurdistan Regional Government within the federal system of Iraq. The

Kurdish Regional Government bypassed the Iraqi central government by directly exporting

energy in 2013; it raised concerns amongst Baghdad and Washington that the oil revenue may

allow the KRG to establish independence (Oil and gas dispute between KRG and Iraq, n.d). The

Iraqi central government responded by blocking the seventeen percent share of federal

earnings, which led to a financial crisis in the Kurdish region. An agreement signed by the KRG

and Baghdad restored the initial process of selling oil through Iraq’s national oil-company (KRG

Reviews Baghdad/Erbil Agreement, May 15, 2015).

In the year 2014, a Sunni Muslim jihadi group, Islamic State (ISIL), initiated to establish a

caliphate in the regions of Syria and Iraq. After taking power in large areas of Iraq and territory of

the KRG, the Iraqi and Kurdish forces started a war to stop the advances of the Islamic State.

The Kurds took control of the disputed oil-region in the city of Kirkuk in June 2014. The rule of

Iraq’s central government became weakened and caused disputes with the KRG due to the

absence of financial payments by the Iraqi government to the Kurdish Regional Government.

Consequently, the KRG reviewed the idea of bypassing the central government to secure and

protect their region, and they will be better off if they establish an independent state due to the

disputes and weakening of Iraq’s rule of law (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). The political

stability in Iraq has been damaged due to the war between Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish forces

against ISIS. In August 2015, Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, the head of the Pentagon’s

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated in an interview that Iraq may indeed be irreparably

fractured and may not come back as an intact state (Foreign Policy, July 31, 2015).

Iran

After the Second World War, the Kurdish Movement created a Kurdish state with support from

the Soviet Union in the city of Mahabad in 1946. This Kurdish organization was known as the

Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran or KDPI, under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad

(McDowell, 2004, pp. 240-241). The withdrawal of the Soviet forces at the end of the war led to

the so-called Republic of Mahabad that lasted only eleven months and Qazi Muhammed as well

as his associates were publicly executed (McDowell, 2004, p. 254).

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In 1979 the Iranian Revolution took place, in which the Kurds also participated. The Kurds

considered the revolution as an opportunity to gain partial-autonomy. Dr. Ghassemlou, the main

Kurdish representative went to Tehran to meet the supreme leader for achieving peace as well

as addressing ethnic minority-, economic- and political issues (McDowell, 2004, p. 261, p.277).

Despite this meeting, on a speech which was broadcasted on national TV and radio, the

supreme leader of Iran “Khomeini” proclaimed;” I declare the Holy war and therefore the army

and militia forces are obligated to settle the Kurdish issue severely and suppress them

immediately.” (Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, p.390).

During this period two major parties were leading the resistance, namely Komala and the

Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran. The uprising, which lasted a few years, was violently defeated

by the Islamic regime of Iran, therefore the Kurdish militia forces and their leaders fled from the

country. Thousands of Kurds were executed and were prosecuted by the new Iranian regime

inside and even outside the Iranian borders. In 1989, the Iranian regime terrorized and brutally

assassinated the dissidents outside of its borders. The Iranian government, in a frame-up

attempt, approached Ghassemlou to start a peace process between the Iranian regime and the

Kurds; however, it finally resulted in a bloodbath in which Ghassemlou and his accompanies

were assassinated (Mc. Dowell, 2004, p.277).

Syria  In a 1962 Kurds in Syria were denied citizenship. Those who could not prove their residence in

Syria prior to 1945 were stripped of their citizenship. This caused some Kurds to become

stateless and not being able to travel legally. Hence, they were neither able to own properties or

businesses, nor able to vote or any other action that required citizenship (The Time of the Kurds,

n.d.). In 1970’s Hafez Assad seized power in a coup after his Ba’ath Party came into power

years before. In May 1986, thousands of Kurds gathered in the Kurdish area of Damascus to

celebrate Kurdish New Year. Police fired in the crowd because they prohibited people to wear

Kurdish clothing, which resulted in one person dying. Afrin, a city in the Kurdish region of Syria

also witnessed government oppression during the New Years demonstration in which three

Kurds were killed (Vanly, 1992, pp.163-164).

According to a Human Rights Watch report “Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights

in Syria” (2009), in March 2004, Syrian Kurds held large-scale protests throughout northern

Syria, as an immediate response to the shooting by security forces against Kurdish football fans

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who were engaged in a fight with Arab supporters of a rival team. The protests were also driven

by the grievances of Kurds concerning the years of discrimination against their people and

oppression of their cultural and political rights. At least 36 people, mostly Kurds, were killed, and

over 160 people were injured while there were widespread reports of torture and ill treatment of

Kurdish detainees. This was followed by years of increased repression of the Kurds, laboring

under assumption that Kurds were fighting for autonomy in pursuit of securing their human

rights. The violent repression of Kurds was condemned by the Human Rights Watch and noted

that the Syrian government detained and even opened fire at protesters and students during

their pro-Kurdish organized events.

According to the BBC, the popular uprisings, which swept the Arab world, paved peacefully the

streets of some cities in Syria in March 2011. The peaceful uprising demanded freedom and the

resignation of President Assad evolved into a lasting violent and sectarian armed conflict. The

opposition’s supporters began to use arms to defend themselves and then to oust the regime’s

forces from their areas (Arab uprising, 16 September, 2013). The Kurds and other ethnic groups

in northern Syria declared de facto autonomy in March 2013 based on principles of direct

democracy, gender equality, and sustainability. The autonomous region, also known as Rojava,

consists of the three cantons of Jazira, Kobani and Afrin (The Constitution of Rojava Cantons,

n.d.).

According to Human Rights Watch (2015), militant groups opposing the Syrian regime, such as

ISIS, have been carrying out ongoing, deliberate and systematic violations on Kurdish and

Syrian civilians, in their report concerning the situation in Syria.

Kurdish diaspora The abovementioned history of the Kurds in the 19th and 20th century illustrates how the

emergence of nation states triggered tension, revolts and the formation of Kurdish organizations,

which have been aiming for autonomy, independence or just equal rights. However, it is

important to note that there is diversity among Kurds. The diversity among the Kurds can be

categorized in national, linguistic, ideological and religious differences as mentioned in the

history section. Therefore, it is important to note that the Kurds are not homogeneous by nature.

The oppressors and their indiscriminate persecution of those who tried to create equal

livelihoods for their fellow Kurds, as well as the reluctance by the oppressors to acknowledge the

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Kurdish identity were the main reasons why Kurds initiated and some forcibly moved to Western

countries. This continuous exodus of the Kurds and their ensuing contributions such as

economic, cultural, social and political to their original regions which ultimately serve their focal

and final goals- namely their autonomy as the first stage and their independence as the last

stage- can be evaluated through two major interrelated contexts (or perhaps concepts in this

case) such as transnationalism and diaspora that form the main views of this research.

The discourse of the concept of diaspora according to Brubaker, which will be further elaborated

in the theories and concepts chapter, concludes that diaspora is constitutive of the three

following core elements: dispersion in space, orientation to a “homeland” and boundary-

maintenance (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5).

The Kurdish diaspora, estimated to be two million, primarily reside in Europe (Council on Foreign

Relations, 2014). As for the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, the majority, which is from the

Turkish region, have predominately immigrated to the Netherlands as labor workers in the sixties

of the twentieth century (Koerden in Nederland, May 23, 2007). On the other hand, the Kurds in

the Netherlands who immigrated or forcefully fled Iran, Iraq and Syria are generally political

refugees. According to Fedkom, the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands are largely concluded

by Kurds from Turkey, approximately eighty thousand of the total estimated 120.000 (Over

Fedkom, n.d.). More data and exact numbers of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands are

unavailable due to the fact that the Kurdish identity is not recognized by their nation-state of

origin.

Generalization should be avoided when talking about a diaspora community. As an example,

Smith has analyzed diaspora groups and their role in international conflict. According to him,

“diaspora groups are internally heterogeneous... and different parts of the same diaspora can

and do have different interests, defined among other things by class, gender, generation,

occupation and religion...” (Smith, 2007, p. 5)

On the other hand, Baser in her article about stateless-diaspora and their long-distance

nationalism activism in host countries, states that diaspora groups show a general sense of

belonging to their countries of origins. It becomes evident through their activities that show their

involvement in homeland politics. This can be observed in their efforts regarding affecting policy

and decision-making through their host countries, or directly in their countries of origin. She also

concludes that some transnational activities of diaspora groups that aim to improve things in

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their home countries are also executed while they may never return tot their homelands. (Baser,

2010, pp. 41-42)

Martin van Bruinessen, who is an anthropologist and author of numerous publications on Kurds,

has raised an important point, concerning the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. According to

Bruinessen, it is crucial to take into account that the Kurdish diaspora has made considerable

contributions to their homeland, for example through financial aid to rebel groups. It has raised

large amounts of financial support in Europe to aid in aggressive activities in Turkey.

(Bruinessen, 2000, p. 7)

Bruinessen in one of his publications concerning the transnational aspects of the Kurdish

question has also stated that the second generation of Kurds who have grown up in Europe

have the tendency to be more interested in the Kurdish politics and identity than their former

generations were. According to Bruinessen, the Kurdish diaspora’s practices in transnationalism

can be observed among the Kurds in Europe (Bruinessen, 2010, para. 4). Therefore it is relevant

to research what position the current Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands has with regards to

KRG’s ambition for independence by reflecting on their transnational practices. The concept of

transnationalism will be presented in the chapter of theories and concepts, which will be followed

by the organizational analysis.

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Kurdish diaspora organization

This thesis will analyze Fedkom (Federation of Kurdish organizations in the Netherlands), which

is an overarching diaspora organization of seven Kurdish organizations, with regards to their

position towards KRG’s ambition for independence. Besides Fedkom, this research will also

include some other key actors, which Fedkom cooperates with to realize their objectives.

Fedkom represents the Kurdish Diaspora in the Netherlands, which is according to Fedkom

estimated to be hundred to hundred-and-twenty thousand (Over Fedkom, n.d.).

The signaled organization was established in 1991 and has been one of a few organizations,

which have been able to sustain. It has been advancing into the biggest Kurdish Diaspora

organization of the Netherlands, and it is linked with a large number of supporters and member

organizations. The organizational analysis chapter will provide a thorough detail about the

organization such as the number of members and the amount of people it can reach. Another

objective of the organization is also to form a bridge between the Kurdish diaspora in the

Netherlands and their homeland as well as representing the Kurdish population of Kurdistan

within the Netherlands and Europe. Fedkom identifies itself as an organizer of a range of

activities that are focused on preserving the Kurdish identity, as well as supporting their

members and member organizations in matters related to the Kurdish diaspora.

Problem definition

In 2005 Kurdish Regional Government’s President, Masoud Barzani, expressed in a press

release (2005) that if a civil war breaks out in Iraq, the Kurds will aim to establish an independent

state. This statement manifested itself in an independent referendum, along with the Iraqi and

Kurdish parliamentary elections. The Kurdish constituencies voted with an overwhelming

majority of 63% in favor of state independence in Iraq. However, important key actors active in

reforming of an Iraqi state, such as the United States and the Iraqi central government, were in

favor of a unified Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government Press Release, October 25, 2005).

In a interview with BBC on June 2014, president Barzani announced for the second time that he

was planning another referendum for Kurdish independence (Iraq Kurdistan independence

referendum planned, July 1, 2014). At the time of this referendum, the insurgence of ISIL in Iraq

had already been intensified since January that year; however, the Kurds were not involved in

  15  

this conflict until the 29th of June when ISIL took over Mosul. Shortly after this, the Kurdish

Peshmerga forces started to protect the area around Mosul due to the fact that the inhabitants of

this region are mostly Kurds. The Kurdish Peshmerga forces’ aim was to stop ISIL from further

expansion in territories where Kurds enjoy regional autonomy.

The Iraqi government officials and its security forces fled the region due to the threat of closing

ISIL militias. The army left behind various military weaponry and transportation vehicles, which

eventually fell into the hands of an organization that proclaimed the Islamic State.

Simultaneously, the central government did not adequately support the Kurdistan Regional

Government with financial and military support to combat the insurgency of ISIL. This caused the

KRG to bypass the Iraqi government in selling their oil independently in order to acquire financial

resources.

The war in the region of Iraq and Syria has triggered a lot of international attention and

participation, particularly the United States as the key actor in restructuring the state after their

intervention, and Iraq’s neighboring country Turkey. Although the United States’ forces, in

combating ISIS, work closely with Kurdish forces, Turkey, after a terrorist attack conducted by

ISIS in a Turkish city Suruc, has recently responded with airstrikes against PKK, ISIS and other

Kurdish forces in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.

Subsequently, in retaliation, PKK assassinated two Turkish police officers for assisting ISIS in

conducting the terrorist attack in Suruc where 32 Kurdish people were killed. Turkey stated that

the assassination of two Turkish police officers by PKK was the main reason for not only

combating ISIS for Suruc but also fighting the PKK forces located in the Kurdish region of Iraq

(Turkey-Kurdish Conflct, August 8, 2015).

As mentioned before, there are concerns that Iraq may irreparably be fractured and the unitary

state may not return. Even though the contemporary policy of the U.S. is to treat Iraq as a

unitary state and avoid formal diplomatic recognition of de facto states such as the KRG in

northern Iraq, this policy will undergo drastic changes if Iraq is to be eventually fractured

(Foreign Policy, July 31, 2015).

Additionally, the Kurdistan Regional Government, the key actor in this research, has formally

expressed that the federal system has not proven to be effective and that it is gathering support

for an independent state (President Barzani: Iraq, July 7, 2015). Besides, since it has bypassed

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the central government several times, the KRG indicates that it has acted as an independent

state in terms of decision-making processes.

As a natural reaction to the war between ISIL and the Kurds as well as the political instability in

Iraq, Diaspora organizations in the Netherlands such as Fedkom were motivated to constantly

provide help in overcoming humanitarian, social, political, and economic issues. This problem

has even caused several new Kurdish diaspora organizations to be established for the

abovementioned issues. Taking into account the possible role of the Kurdish diaspora and its

organizations in aiding KRG’s ambitions through transnational practices, this research will

analyze Fedkom’s position with regards to the issues of self-rule in Iraqi Kurdistan.

In conclusion, the main focus of this research is to answer the following thesis question: against

the background of the KRG’s ambition to declare independence, what is Fedkom’s position with

regard to the discourses on Kurdish self-determination that are currently most prevalent in the

Kurdish diaspora?

Sub-questions that will help to answer the main thesis question are:

1. What is Fedkom’s discourse with regard to Kurdish self-determination?

2. Which discourses on Kurdish self-determination are currently most prevalent in the

Kurdish diaspora?

3. How does Fedkom’s discourse relate to these prevalent discourses?

4. How do Fedkom’s transnational activities reflect their position with regard to the current

discourses on Kurdish self-determination?

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Objectives & Relevance The main objective of this research is to fill the gap of Public Management studies with regards

to the Kurds’ issues and in particular, the position and efforts of Fedkom, in the context of

transnationalism and diaspora, concerning the main discourses of self-rule, specifically in the

Kurdish regions of Iraq. Additionally, due to the absence of studies about the functions of

Kurdish diaspora organizations in the Netherlands, this research will particularly be interesting to

conclude whether Fedkom, the largest Kurdish diaspora organization in the Netherlands, has

been able to realize their desire in participating in the reform and empowerment of the Kurdish

Region through the possibilities they have in their host countries according to their objectives.

The reason for choosing Fedkom as the organization to research with regards to the thesis

subject is that it has proven to be the most sustainable Kurdish diaspora organizations since it

was established in 1991. The organization has visibly rooted and empowered itself in the

Netherlands. Fedkom has established a broad network and it has a wide range of activities in

pursuit of fulfilling the needs of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands as well as their nation in

general. The explanatory reason why Fedkom is reliable, as a case, in concluding this research

is that it meets the necessary characteristics as an organization. The organization objectives

have an international dimension and the organizational nature makes it possible to play a role in

KRG’s ambition for independence looking at their broad network and resources, which will be

addressed in the organizational analysis chapter.

The generalizability and reliability of this thesis has its geographic limitations, since Kurdish

diaspora in other European countries differ from each other. It implies that the proportion of

Kurdish people from Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey living in different European countries may not

have a similar distribution. These discrepancies cause Kurdish diaspora to show different

attitudes or ideologies towards KRG’s ambitions for self-rule. For instance, in the Netherlands,

the overwhelming majority of Kurds are originally from Turkey.

However, the general conclusion can be regarded representative when it comes to the Kurdish

Diaspora organizations in the Netherlands.

Additionally, the research and recommendation will help to improve the functioning of Fedkom

and other Kurdish diaspora organizations along with diaspora organizations of other stateless

nations, regardless of where the diaspora organization is established. A recommendation will be

  18  

given in terms of how diaspora organizations and stateless nations can develop fruitful

relationships by minimizing possible challenges. Besides, this thesis can help to improve

diaspora policy of the Kurdish Regional Government and other state actors, particularly in

relation with the Netherlands or host country where the diaspora resides, which can foster

opportunities in social, political and economic developments.

Hence, this research and recommendations can be used as an example showing how to prevent

and overcome tensions between the diaspora organizations and institutions in their homelands.

This can help to build a more fruitful relationship between the two actors by focusing on the

mutual interests.

Finally, this thesis will be concluded with recommendations concerning what measures Fedkom

and the Kurdistan Regional Government should take to improve their current position in order to

realize a significant increase of influence concerning the developments in the KRG and its

population, which are the key stakeholders within the Fedkom organization.

  19  

Methodology

Primary sources: As there is lack of research concerning this topic, this thesis will use a

qualitative method including semi-structured interviews with important delegates of the Kurdish

Diaspora organization as well as the Kurdish Regional Government.

The interviews with Egin Kaynak, board member of Fedkom, and Zana Kurda, EU representative

of the Kurdistan Regional Government, has aided in collecting the necessary information, with

respect to both organizations, to conclude this research with reliable sources. These interviews

are included in the Appendix and relevant information is used in the organizational analysis

chapter.

Hence, this research will also include the participation observation method. The observations

made during Fedkom’s events and paying occasional visits to the organization will serve as

additional data in the analysis of the organization.

Using qualitative research method will aid in understanding the attitude and experiences of the

concerning actors which is pivotal in order to gather the necessary information needed to

conclude this specific research.

Peripheral sources/literature review: In order to have a better understanding and know what

has already been done with regards to this topic, this research will include a literature review

analyzing prior researches done by scholars and other theories. Concepts such as the (Kurdish)

diaspora and transnationalism will be further analyzed.

This will also help to find missing elements and views that need to be further analyzed when

taking discourses of self-rule, the Kurdish Diaspora Organization, transnationalism and the

Kurdish Regional Government into consideration

Additionally, studies and books concerning the history of the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism

have contributed in providing the necessary historical background of the thesis subject. Finally,

articles, such as news and press releases, aided as information with regards to the background

and analysis of this thesis. All sources are included in-text, as well as in the bibliography.

  20  

Demarcation/limitations: As this thesis will aim to analyze what Fedkom’s position is with

regard to the discourses on Kurdish self-determination that are currently most prevalent in the

Kurdish diaspora, analyzing only one Kurdish diaspora organization will limit the scope of all

Kurdish Diaspora organizations in the Netherlands, and their position regarding Kurdish self-rule

in the Iraqi region.

Narrowing the research to the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands is also limiting the Kurdish

diaspora in general as it may have different proportion across the European borders. This

proportion can be categorized in national, linguistic, ideological and religious differences.

Besides, the research focuses on the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and will therefore

limit the scope of research concerning the activities of Fedkom in the Netherlands with respect to

The KRG. Other Kurdish regions are excluded from the analysis.

Finally, unfortunately Fedkom does not publish any formal reports concerning their activities or

their internal meetings, in which strategies are formulated, to the public or up on request. These

types of reports could have been used to have a more detailed overview of the organization.

  21  

Theories & Concepts

Discourses

As this thesis aims to analyze what Fedkom’s position is with regard to the discourses on

Kurdish self-determination that are currently most prevalent in the Kurdish diaspora, it is

important to discuss the discourses related to forms of self-determination. The discourses that

will be provided are derived from desk-research concerning the ruling Kurdish parties within the

KRG as well as generally researching popular ideologies among the Kurds. In conclusion, there

are four main discourses among the Kurds: single state independence, confederalism, autonomy

and a pan-Kurdish state.

The first two ideologies, independence and confederalism, are the most relevant to this thesis

due to the fact that these discourses can strongly be linked to the two key actors in this thesis,

Fedkom and the Kurdish Regional Government. Explanatory reasons for focusing on those two

discourses will be provided in addition to the definitions. Nevertheless, due to the fact that

autonomy and a pan-Kurdish state are also relevant ideologies amongst the Kurds, the

relevance of those two discourses will briefly be discussed as well. This will help the reader to

understand the reasons why an independent state, consisting of the four Kurdish provinces in

Iraq, and confederalism on the other hand are of more significant to the main research question.

Independent single state: It is important to discuss what the explanatory arguments are to use

the concept of independence, particularly looking at the Kurdish Regions of Iraq, within this

research. The following section will present the arguments why, in this specific region, an

independent state is the relevant discourse.

In 2005 Kurdish Regional Government’s President, Masoud Barzani, expressed in an interview

that if a civil war breaks out in Iraq, the Kurds will aim to establish an independent state. As

mentioned before the referendum resulted in a 63 percent vote for independence. Besides,

given the fact of the second call for a referendum in 2014, the instability in the country due to the

war accompanied with the political disputes between KRG and Baghdad as well of the

bypassing indications, the KRG has shown that it has acted as an independent state as the

country is getting fractured.

  22  

The central government did not adequately support the Kurdistan Regional Government with

financial and military support to combat the insurgency, of ISIL, with the KRG’s own military

forces.

In conclusion, the Kurdistan Regional Government, key actor in this research, has formally

expressed that the autonomous system has not proven to be effective as well as gathering

support for an independent state. Besides, as it has bypassed the central government numerous

times, indicates that it has acted as an independent state in terms of decision-making processes.

Confederalism Democracy: The discourse of confederalism democracy is popular amongst

Kurds. It has become a political ideology promoted by the dominant Kurdish political party in

Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers Party also known as the PKK.

The PKK was established by de jure leader Abdullah Ocalan, with the objective of empowering

political and cultural right for the Kurds in Turkey. According to 2014 estimates of the CIA, 15

million Kurds are populated in Turkey, which is eighteen percent of the Turkish population and

roughly fifty percent of the total Kurdish population (CIA Factbook, n.d.).

The main principles of this particular system with respect to PKK can be found in Abdullah

Ocalan’s publications (Ocalan, 2011). Democratic confederalism is a non-state social paradigm

based on grassroots participation and collective consensus. However, the state or higher levels,

in this respect, solely function as a coordinative actor and it will implement the will of the

communities that send their representatives to the general assembly. Furthermore, the

publication emphasizes that its goal is not to establish a Kurdish nation-state; it rather aims to

install federal structures in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria that are accessible for all Kurds. The

system emphasizes the importance of diversity in the participation model, whereas ecology and

feminism are key pillars. Hence, it forms an umbrella confederation for all four parts of Kurdistan.

According to Ocalan, the need for to change the system of rule are to be found in the

developments and events in the Middle East. He observed that the capitalism modernity in the

society has had negative consequences for the majority of people. While the bourgeoisie went

hand in hand with the Industrial revolution, the elite gained more influence in the political

decision-making and state structures. Accordingly, he states that confedederalism democracy

will benefit the majority of people as it is designed to be accessible for all groups that live within

  23  

those territories in which the system will be installed. In conclusion, taking the abovementioned

points into account, democratic confederalism, can be considered as a project of liberating the

society, democratizing it, based on open participation models.

As approximately eighty percent of the total 120.000 Kurds in the Netherlands are from

contemporary Turkey, as well as a significant number of Fedkom’s members have a political

preference for the biggest Kurdish organization in Turkey, the discourse can be considered to be

important in this research. Fedkom plays key role in analyzing the efforts of the organization in

relation to the KRG regarding independence. A further assessment of this discourse in relation

to Fedkom concerning the Kurdish Region in Iraq will be provided in the organizational analysis.

Kurdistan, a pan-Kurdish state: A pan-Kurdish nation-state, Kurdistan, combines the Kurdish

regions in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria as one greater sovereign Kurdistan nation-state. The

establishment of a new Kurdish state will consequently lead to redefining the borders of not only

Iraq but also the additional three mentioned states.

However, this is not a feasible option at the moment compared to a single state democracy or

confederalism system due to the fact that four countries will have to give up their territories. This

has never been an option to these states; otherwise it would already have legitimate bases and

support to actually form a new pan-Kurdish state. The Turkish and Iranian governments have

formally expressed that minority groups, such as the Kurds, are considered to be equal, having

the same rights and privileges as other fellow citizens within their nation-states, and therefore

there is no reason to secession. Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan has even mentioned that it

will not even allow a Kurdish state to be established within the Syrian borders (Erdogan will

'never allow' Kurdish state, June 27, 2015).

Autonomy: The Oxford dictionary defines autonomy as when state or province within a country

has the freedom to govern its self or control its own affairs (Oxford Dictionary, 2015). The

concept of autonomy is more relevant to present in this thesis, as the Kurdistan Regional

Government is formally a federal autonomous region and this thesis is specifically focused on

this region. The Kurdistan Region is part of the federal system of Iraq that recognizes the KRG

as the legitimate government body of the predominately Kurdish inhabited regions in Iraq. The

KRG has official bodies such as the Parliament, Presidency, more than twenty ministries and

departments that can propose, vote and implement policies and laws with respect to a wide

range of governmental issues that may not contradict the Iraqi constitution (Kurdistan Regional

  24  

Government, August 18, 2015). The central government oversees the KRG in an administrative

role whereas the central government collects all revenues and taxes and distributing

approximately seventeen percent of the national budget to the Kurdistan Regional Government

(Iraqi Government approves federal budget, April 20, 2015).

Nonetheless, this system is according to the KRG flawed as the central government has failed to

meet budgetary agreements. Consequently, the Kurdistan Regional Government did not have

the available resources to adequately respond to terrorist attacks against Kurds. Furthermore,

the KRG has formally taken action to gather internal support from their constituencies as well as

external support to position itself as a legitimate state to the international community. The

bypassing of the central government in trading oil and visits to lobby with other state-

representatives in legitimizing a Kurdish state, can be strengthen arguments in favor of the

transitions in the power structure of Iraq and Kurdish region (PM Barzani: Baghdad 'not

committed' to budget deal, May 14, 2015).

Diaspora  In this section the terminology of diaspora will be explained, as well as a clarification of the

different views and perceptions of the concept of diaspora found in literature. This will be

followed with how this thesis will utilize of the concept diaspora in the following chapters.

Introduction to “diaspora”

The way of using diaspora as well as the meaning has experienced several changes, which

essentially is an old concept. “Diaspora”, the term, has its roots from the Greek words “dia”

(over) and speiro (to sow) (Anteby-Yemini & Berthomière 2005). Initially, this term was referring

to the Jewish population that have suffered dispersal, separation in their region, having a

collective identity and an ongoing support for their homeland. (Safran 1991; Shuval 2000).

However, nowadays the concept of diaspora became a term to be used not only for the Jewish

people but also other ethnic groups whose diasporic sufferings were neglected before diaspora

studies became more developed through the interest of academics and authors.

The interpretation of the concept of diaspora can be explained in different forms.

For example, “diaspora” can be described as ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing

  25  

and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their

countries of origin-their homelands (Sheffer, 1986).

The following section will elaborate more detailed on one of the main views of how the concept

of diaspora, its narrative, can be perceived and distinguished, derived from academic literature.

  26  

Brubaker’s constitutive elements of diaspora

As mentioned before, the concept of diaspora is very complex. The use of the word as well as

the numerous ways to distinguish specific diasporas has constructed itself as an ongoing study

with different discourses and theories. Similarly, Roger Brubaker noted that the concept of

diaspora is widening. The discourse of the concept of diaspora according to Brubaker concludes

that diaspora is constitutive of the three following core elements: dispersion in space, orientation

to a “homeland” and boundary-maintenance (Brubaker, 2005, p.5). These three core elements

that are constitutive of diaspora will be illuminated briefly in order to get a better understanding

of this diaspora discourse and how it relates to the Kurdish diaspora.

Dispersion in space

According to Safran, taking diaspora into consideration, dispersion occurs when group moves

from an original homeland to at least two “peripheral” places. (Safran, 1991)

Roger Brukaker states that dispersion is the most general criterion and clarifies this analytical

assessment by elaborating on what the motivation is for such dispersion, either being forced,

voluntary, traumatic, dispersion can emerged more broadly as such that dispersion within state-

borders may suffice (Brubaker, 2005, p.5). As mentioned before the dispersion of Kurds to the

Netherlands emerged through voluntary labor and non-voluntarily due to dangers threatening

their livelihoods, which Brubaker recognizes as dispersion in space.

Homeland orientation

Brubaker’s second constitutive criterion is defined as “the homeland orientation to a real or

imagined ‘homeland’ as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty.” (Brubaker, 2005,

p.5)

Similarly, Safran states that, “being in diaspora implies a tension between being in one place

physically- and thinking regularly of another place far away” (Safran, 2004, p.12)

Despite this explanation of homeland orientation; the notion has been scrutinized in academic

discussion. Accordingly, some diasporas are not so much oriented to a particular area as around

their desire to recreate a culture in different places.

Using the concept of diaspora should also place the discourse of ‘home and ‘dispersion’ in a

creative sense, emphasizing a homing desire while at the same time criticizing discourses of

specific origins (Brah, 1996). As mentioned in the Kurdish diaspora section following the history

of the Kurds, the Kurdish diaspora maintains a homeland orientation when taking into account

  27  

the historical and present activities the Kurdish diaspora has conducted. Organizations and

platforms have been established specifically for the Kurdish diaspora to fulfill their desires, which

can be social, political or economically related. The following chapter concerning the

organizational analysis will provide more arguments and examples why homeland orientation is

one of the core elements linked to the Kurdish diaspora.

Boundary-maintenance

The third constitutive criterion, stated by Brubaker, is called boundary-maintenance, which

includes the protection of a distinctive identity vis-a`-vis the host societies.

This notion of boundary-maintenance can be explained as diaspora preserving their identity

through deliberate refusal to accept assimilation. An example of this deliberate refusal can be

considered as marrying only within the limits of the community or other forms of segregation.

Consequently, this confirms that diaspora is a distinctive group, which through preserving their

social relationships within their own community, as well as solidarity that crosses state-

boundaries connect diaspora in various areas into a singular transnational community (Brubaker,

2005, p. 6).

As mentioned before, the concept of transnationalism, including transnational communities, is

one of the discourses or concepts this thesis will apply in illuminating the Kurdish Diaspora in the

Netherlands concerning their position and towards more self-rule in the Kurdistan Regional

Government.

It is this that enables one to speak of a diaspora as a distinctive ‘community’, held together by a

distinctive, active solidarity, as well as by relatively dense social relationships, that cut across

state boundaries and link members of the diaspora in different states into a single ‘transnational

community’ (Brubaker, 2005, p.6).

  28  

Transnationalism As this thesis’ objective is to analyze what Fedkom’s position is concerning the ambition of the

KRG of realizing Kurdish self-determination, the concept and the explanatory reasons of

particularly using the theory of transnationalism, with respect to the research question, will be

explained in the following sections.

Defining transnationalism

According to sociologist Thomas Faist, transnationalism can be explained as a threefold linkage

between groups and organizations which is sustained in the state where the two actors reside,

the state where the activities are designated for and the minority group migrants, implying a

notion of links and positions in which political, economic and cultural processes foster the

increase of human, social and economic capital (Faist 1994, p.41),

Hence, transnationalism can be regarded as an example of global governance. Diaspora groups

can build civil society structures that function as a mean to integrate in their hosting countries, on

the one hand, and as a way to influence the governance of their original homeland, particularly

the form of democracy, encouragement of human rights and peace, through the process of

globalization (Khayati, 2012). The process of transnationalism and its activities, taking Fedkom

into account, will be used as indicators to analyze the diaspora organization’s position towards

with their original homelands in the following chapter.

According to Vertovec, transnationalism can also be defined in a simpler way as it regards the

concept as “multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of

nation states.” (Vertovec, 1999)

The main research question of this thesis can therefore be linked with transnationalism, taking

into account that the Kurdish diaspora and their diaspora organization in the Netherlands aims to

empower the Kurdish region through their activities including the various institutions that are

involved in the process of realizing change across borders.

The next paragraphs will provide the research findings with respect to previous studies and

publications concerning the concept of transnationalism.

  29  

What drives transnationalism?

Alvaro Lima, directing a research institution, has published a relevant article regarding the

transnationalism and immigrant integration. The researcher states that the development of

technology can be considered as the main drive of transnationalism. The relationship between

human beings and locations has changed due to the evolution of technology; it has made

transportation and communication more attainable and affordable. The possibilities to have

continual and direct contact between immigrants and their homelands have never been so

accessible.

Lima also states that the global transitions concerning the weakening of political and legal

frameworks of states has enabled persons from other states to become sources of influence

through economic, political and socio-cultural activities across borders.

• Economic activities, being trade investments and remittances in the country of origin can

be considered as examples of economic transnational activities.

• On the other hand social and cultural activities or transactions are compromised by ideas

and meanings, which are transferred across borders. This socio-cultural transnational

activities occur through visits to family and friends in the countries of origin or vice versa,

as well as the various ways of exchanging communication through emailing, chatting

online, phone calls.

• Lastly, political transnational activities can occur in wide range of areas. Voting in

elections in the home country or less formal activities such as the exchange of political

ideas through blogging, lobbying or raising political awareness through publications on

social media are a few examples concerning political transnationalism. (Lima, 2010, pp.

3-5)

On the other hand, Vertovec states (1991), in his review of transnationalism, that the meaning of

transnationalism can be examined in six distinct conceptual clusters. The clusters are

considered interrelated. According to Vertovec, the meaning of transnationalism can be

categorized as, a social morphology, a mode of cultural reproduction, a type of consciousness,

an avenue of capital, a site of political engagement and a reconstruction of place. Each migrant

can be considered to be an instrument as well as a subject concerning transnational activities

and practices. Four clusters relevant to the Kurdish diaspora and its organizations will briefly be

presented in the next section.

  30  

1. Social morphology

This cluster indicates the attention among scholars concerning the social formation of

spanning the borders in understanding the concept.

Ethnic diaspora groups explained in the previous chapter are considered to be a

paradigm regarding the concept of transnationalism. According to Manuel Castells

(Castells, 1996), new technologies and its networks are at the heart of contemporary

transnational activities.

2. Mode of cultural reproduction

The mode of cultural reproduction can be perceived as the new types of cultures that

arise from transnationalism. Among transnational teenagers, whose socialization has

occurred crossing different countries and a variety of cultural fields, the reproduction of

culture through transnationalism can perceived more striking compared to older

generations. The younger generations seem to self-consciously select and reconcile

aspects of identity from more than one specific culture, for example through global media

and communications.

3. Site of political engagement

Transnationalism as a site of political engagement refers to the debate of global and

national issues, which cannot be debated and solved solely through national politics. The

more evident and original examples of political engagement in transnationalism can be

found in international (non)-governmental organizations such as the International Red

Cross and the United Nations. On the other hand, awareness among diaspora groups

concerning the issues in their countries of origin propel the diaspora to actively

participate in the promotion of human rights and social issues. This indicates that political

engagement can also be conducted on a smaller scale as well. The dynamic relations

between diaspora, country of origins politics and politician have caused political

organizations to establishment of organizations abroad to mobilize diaspora. On the

other hand, diasporas establish organizations and organize events to lobby the host and

home government to become influential actors with respect to policy and decision-

making processes.

4. Construction of “place” or locality

According to Castells and other scholars, people’s bond to space has changed through

  31  

transnational activities and its “social fields”. Transnationalism has connected and

repositioned people and institutions in multiple states. The developments in mobility,

instruments of communication and the Internet have significantly contributed to the fact

that people’s sense of belonging to one place has eroded causing the reconstruction of

“place” or locality (Vertovec, 1991, pp. 2-13).

In conclusion, the concept of transnationalism can be perceived and defined in various ways

when we take the abovementioned theories of Lima and Vertovec into account. The wide range

of categories of practices linked to transnationalism in addition to the four clusters defining the

meaning of the concept can be used to analyze the practices of the Kurdish diaspora

organization. The main research question can evidently use the political and social-cultural

aspects of transnationalism as transnational practices indicators of Fedkom. This will help to

confirm what the organization’s transnational practices are and how they position as an

organization with regards to the long-term goal of the KRG realizing state independence. The

following chapter will give an organizational analysis of Fedkom, which will provide the

necessary data to conclude the organization’s position and ideology with regards to situation in

the Kurdish Regions in Iraq and the KRG’s desire for a single independent statehood.

  32  

Organizational Analysis

In order to get a better understanding of what Fedkom is about, an overview of how the

organization operates as well as what their activities are will be provided.

Despite the fact that the organization has not published any reports or detailed publications of its

activities, as well as what the organization’s mission, vision or goals are, or statutes, the

information provided in the following sections are collected through information on their website,

Facebook page, interviews with board member(s) as well as contact with member organizations.

In addition, my personal participatory observations will be included as it can serve as additional

data. The abovementioned sources will complement to a more representative conclusion of the

organization’s nature.

Introduction to Fedkom

Fedkom, Federation of Kurdish organizations in the Netherlands, is an overarching organization

of several Kurdish organizations. Internationally, the organization is part of Kon Kurd, which is a

European confederation of Kurdish organizations located in Brussels, including 170

organizations (Over Fedkom, n.d.).

Kon Kurd’s members are mostly Kurds of Turkey, noting that most Kurds in Europe are from

Turkey (World Heritage Encyclopedia, n.d).

Fedkom identifies itself as an organizer of diverse range of activities as well as an organization

that supports their members and member organizations in matters related to Kurdish diaspora.

Such activities include contacting and maintaining relationships with various organizations and

representing the Kurdish community in the Netherlands through lobbying with Dutch decision-

making bodies (Over Fedkom, n.d.).

According to their website, the organization also helps students with their essays and theses as

well as contributing to expositions and cultural activities. Hence, Fedkom states that it puts effort

in preserving and cultivating the Kurdish identity, these efforts are made through the provision of

Kurdish language-, folklore dance- and music classes. Furthermore, its objective is to form a

bridge between the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands and their homeland as well as

representing the Kurdish population of Kurdistan in the Netherlands and Europe (Over Fedkom,

n.d.).

  33  

According to board member Egin Kaynak, Fedkom has 12 board members and including their

member organizations their workforce consists approximately 300 committed volunteers. The

number of active members is estimated between 10.000 and 20.000, while their reach is

estimated to be 60.000 to 80.000 (E. Kaynak, personal communication, May 24, 2015)

Purpose

According to Egin Kaynak, Fedkom is an umbrella organization established for the purpose of

serving the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. The organization's’ main purposes are to

promote and cultivate the Kurdish identity in the Netherlands, developing and participating in

activities that are demanded by the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, building a bridge

between the Kurdish population in Kurdistan and the Netherlands as well as promoting the will of

all people of Kurdistan, regardless of nationality, dialect or religion, within the Netherlands. (E.

Kaynak, personal communication, May 24, 2015)

Resources

In order to get a better understanding with regards to Fedkom’s resources, the following section

will present how the organization attains its resources. This information is derived from my first

interview with Fedkom’s board member Egin Kaynak, which can be found in the Appendix of this

thesis(E. Kaynak, personal communication, May 24, 2015).

Fedkom, is a non-profit organization and the members work on voluntary bases. The

organization has changed its attitude towards fundraising and funding from foundations or

subsidies from the government. In 2008, Fedkom decided to withdraw from government funds,

as they were under the impression that it was a negative force concerning the level of freedom

of organizing and the way they conduct their activities. According to the board member, disputes

between the funders and the organization triggered Fedkom to withdraw from external funding.

Reason for this was that some members expressed their sympathy with political parties during

Fedkom’s activities, which was condemned by the external funders.

According to Fedkom’s board member, despite that Fedkom has stated that they are non-

politically-affiliated organization, naturally, most members have political preferences that can be

observed in some of the organization’s activities and offices. Furthermore, he stated that it’s

obvious that most of our members are supporters of the PKK. However, Kaynak emphasized

that Fedkom is open to cooperate with all parties, regardless of the ideological differences, as

long as it is beneficial to the Kurdish population (E. Kaynak, personal communication, May 24,

2015).

  34  

During some of their organized protests, members of Fedkom and other protesters raised flags

of Kurdish political parties such as the PKK, which is as an terrorist organization as mentioned

before.

Kaynak explained (Appendix 1) that the government officials concerned with organizational

subsidies notified that if the organization does not hinder and exclude political flags, they will be

forced to pay back the subsidies in the future. Therefore, Fedkom decided that they would

renounce the subsidies as the demand was considered to threaten the level of freedom of

expression to the organization as well as their supporters, which Fedkom considers important

stakeholder of the organization.

Kaynak further explained that the organization’s budget is acquired from member’s contributions,

as well as members that pay for subscriptions to magazines and newspapers Fedkom publishes.

Fedkom’s budget serves as a resource to finance their activities and also financial contributions

to their member organizations. Kurdish organizations are required to be transparent and

democratically operated, as well as having the same objectives as the umbrella organization if

they want to become a member organization of Fedkom (E. Kaynak, personal communication,

May 24, 2015)..

On the other hand, rejecting and definitely stopping efforts to acquire external funding implies

that the organization has lost a market or instrument to have access to more financial resources.

According to Kaynak, limited resources and members on voluntary bases, besides their paid

jobs, do not imply that their work is less productive compared to paid jobs (E. Kaynak, personal

communication, May 24, 2015). However, from a public management perspective, one can

argue that if the organization had the favorable resources to offer paid jobs; it would empower

the organization in terms of capacity and productivity.

Unlike other organizations with paid jobs, most of Fedkom’s volunteers have their own paid jobs

and sometimes use their own resources required in their operations, such as financing a

meeting or lunch with representatives for lobbying purposes. In example, my interview

conducted with the Kaynak was during his own paid job in Amsterdam.

Acquiring more resources, such as government subsidies, could be beneficial to Fedkom as it

will have more budgets available to finance their activities or their volunteers that will become

less financially dependable on their private financial resources. It is arguable that the

organization with more financial resources would lead to empowerment in terms of capacity and

  35  

productivity. However, as mentioned before, Kaynak explained that Fedkom’s board stated that

it is satiated with the decision not to adhere to the requirements imposed by the government and

other institutions for subsidies and other financial contributions.

Member organizations

The website of Fedkom mentions that it is an overarching organization linked with 7 Kurdish

member organizations, in the Netherlands. However, none of the organizations is mentioned on

their official website. The following information with respect to the member organizations is

derived from an interview conducted with my contact within Fedkom’s board, Egin Kaynak.

(Appendix 1)

The member organizations, or associations are:

Kurdish Association in Arnhem

Kurdish Association in Eindhoven

Kurdish Association in Middelburg

Kurdish Association in Den Haag

Kurdish Association in Rotterdam

Kurdish Association in Amsterdam

Kurdish Association in Zaandam

All the member associations have the objectives to represent the Kurdish community and to

promote Kurdish identity. Some associations have established a separate women’s and/or youth

organization that is indirectly linked with Fedkom.

There are specific requirements for becoming a Fedkom member organization. Firstly, the

organization is required to be democratic. A new board must yearly be re-elected by its

members, as well as the mandatory duo-chair of a male and female.

Secondly, similar to Fedkom, each association should put efforts in preserving and cultivating

the Kurdish identity, these efforts are activities such as providing Kurdish language-, folklore

dance- and music classes. The heads of all the associations are required to attend the bi-

monthly group meetings with Fedkom to elaborate on coming plans and reports of recent

activities. The heads of the member organizations are able to influence Fedkom’s decision

making processes as they have opportunities to become candidates and voting procedures for

Fedkom’s board, beside their function within the member organization (E. Kaynak, personal

communication, June 10 2015).

  36  

  37  

Activities

The activities of Fedkom are pivotal to this research as it can be used as indicators to analyze

how the organization positions itself concerning KRG’s ambition for state independence.

Fedkoms main goals are to preserve and to cultivate the Kurdish identity and building a bridge

between the Kurds in the Netherlands and Kurdish Regions. These objectives are realized

through their daily operations in addition to their member organizations’ activities. The next

paragraphs will give a report of Fedkom’s activities.

Taking into account the main research question, it is important to include all activities that are

relevant to the organizational discourse regarding self-rule in the Kurdish Region of Iraq and

particularly transnational activities relevant to KRG’s ambitions mentioned before.

The analysis of Fedkom’s operations aided by the theories and concepts discussed in the

previous chapter will help to diagnose the transnational activities in order to conclude the

organization’s position with respect to the main thesis question.

The following section will present the organization's activities categorized as:

transnational/international relations, lobbying, media, and events or other activities

  38  

Transnational/international relations

Relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government

Referring to my interview with board member Egin Kaynak, Fedkom has established a broad

network including, NGO’s, government representatives, politicians and other organizations and

individuals as well as contacts within the Kurdish Regional Government (E. Kaynak, personal

communication, May 24, 2015).

Taking into account that transnationalism creates “multiple ties and interactions linking people

and institutions across the borders of nation states.” (Vertovec, 1999), a partnership between

Fedkom and the Kurdistan Regional Government can benefit both actors in realizing efforts in

reaping social, political and economic benefits for the Kurdish population.

For example, in the interview with Fedkom, the board member mentioned that in May 2013,

Fedkom organized and financed a Kurdish New Year’s reception and invited various

representatives of Dutch ministries, political parties and NGO’s. Besides celebrating Kurdish

New Year, it became a platform for opportunities to lobby with the before mentioned parties in

pursuit of establishing fruitful relationships, which can benefit the Kurdish diaspora and the

Kurdish population in general. The representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government and

Kurdish political parties were invited to create opportunities for partnerships between Kurdish

and non-Kurdish organizations (E. Kaynak, personal communication, June 10 2015).

In 2014, Fedkom requested a financial contribution from the KRG to organize a similar New

Year’s reception in May 2014, as the previous event was benefited the KRG in terms of

networking and lobbying. After a long process of communication between the two parties

regarding the finances of the event, the Kurdish Regional Government formally stated that it

couldn’t fund the event due to budgetary issues. The lack of financial resources led to cancelling

the 2014 New Years reception (E. Kaynak, personal communication, June 10 2015). In my

interview with Zana Kurda (Appendix 3), KRG representative in the European Union, he

acknowledged that the KRG was coping with budgetary issues due to the fact that the Iraqi

central government failed to adhere to the financial agreements between the government and

the federal state (Z. Kurda, personal communication, April 7, 2015).

Additionally, Kaynak explained that in 2015, Fedkom was able to organize a reception with

various delegates from Dutch and Kurdish political and social organizations; however, it

  39  

excluded the Kurdish Regional Government, due to the difficulties in organizing the previous

reception (E. Kaynak, personal communication, June 10 2015).

The abovementioned example of partnership between the two actors indicates that their

relationship was damaged due to the dispute over the event. Fedkom’s board member

expressed that the difficult relationship with the KRG is due to the differences in the political

agendas. Fedkom’s ideology is strongly linked with PKK and differs compared to the Kurdish

Regional Government, which is compromised by the KDP and PUK. The sympathy for the PKK

within Fedkom’s organization became evident to me when I visited their center in The Hague,

Netherlands. The Fedkom center is a meeting center for the Kurdish diaspora and members of

Fedkom where meetings, social-, cultural and educational activities take place. There are many

PKK flags and posters of de facto leader Abdullah Ocalan. Besides, the names and pictures of

PKK martyrs can be found within some of its rooms. A member of the organization, whose name

is confidential, told me about her visits to Kurdistan and joining PKK in their battle against

Kurdish enemies, during my visit to the center.

International Organization(s)

Fedkom states that it does not have direct relations with international organizations such as the

European Union and the United Nations. The organization has prioritized its focus on a national

level, as their prime stakeholder is the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. However, it does

have relations with other Kurdish organizations, on an international level. The following sections

will elaborate more on the international relations and perspective concerning Fedkom’s activities

on an institutional level (E. Kaynak, personal communication, May 24, 2015).

KCD-E

Fedkom is a member of a European umbrella organization of Kurdish associations, in Brussels,

located in various European countries, with also some associations from Canada and Australia

included in the federation (Over Fedkom, n.d.)

The KCD-E, which is an abbreviation for the Kurdish democratic congress in Europe, is one of

the biggest organizations of Kurds in Europe. According to Kaynak, KCD-E works with various

Kurdish organizations in Europe, such as the Kurdish Institute in Paris and Kurdish National

Congress. Its members are largely Kurds from the Turkish region (E. Kaynak, personal

communication, May 24, 2015).

  40  

In order to know how the cooperation looks like, the following paragraph will give an example of

a joint operation between the two parties. One of the main activities of the KCD-E is to invite the

member associations to meet in Brussels and discuss important issues concerning Kurds.

Hence, the results of these meetings are formally expressed in published statements.

Fedkom has published these statements, in accordance with KCD-E and all partners, regarding

the situation of the Kurds. In the following joint statement published on September 14th 2014,

derived from Fedkom’s website, the signatories addressed the Kurdish community, public

opinion, European Union, United Nations, NGO’s, and all other key political actors in the world to

condemn the attack and persecution of Kurds by the Turkish and Iranian regimes. Hence, the

statement also includes a call for all Kurds in Europa and all the abovementioned entities to

protest for more action, concerning the adherence to international peace and human rights laws

(KonKurd Verklaring, Septermber 12, 2014).

Kurdish National Congress

Fedkom has a representative in the Kurdish National Congress, which is an international

organization intended to establish a higher forming body of the Kurdish people to protect the

interest and unity of the nation of Kurdistan. Representatives of parties, social, cultural and

political and patriotic individuals, who have approved the KNC declaration, are the key actors

within the organization. The organization emphasizes its take on international human rights law,

the principle of self-determination and Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the foundation

of the organization. The KNC is open to all Kurdish organizations and individuals and it aims to

reinforce cooperation and the struggle among the different parts of Kurdistan. Hence, it works on

the principles of unification and interests of the Kurdish people.

The cooperation with the KNC, as well as the before mentioned KNK, are examples of political

practices in transnationalism, taking into account that the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands,

Fedkom, links with other institutions and organization across borders on matters related to Kurds

in Kurdistan (KNC Charter, n.d.).

In conclusion, the transnational relations and activities of Fedkom can strongly be linked with

transnational political engagement practices, as mentioned in the theories and concepts chapter.

It cooperates with a wide range of Kurdish organizations in order to improve the socio-cultural,

political and economic aspects of the Kurdish population in Kurdistan.

  41  

Media

First, the importance of the Internet and social media networks with respect to the transnational

activity opportunities of diasporas will be presented.

The International Organization for Migration has released a report, concerning diaspora

development in building bridges with states. The report emphasizes the importance of Internet

and social media networks in developing an environment that enables organizations even more

to play a role in empowerment within the region of origins.

Furthermore, the report states, “social networks are not limited but extend to the global scale

through members of the same diaspora who are scattered in several countries”, “social media

are increasingly playing a major role in sustaining and extending these networks (Diasporas and

development, 2013). The media and Internet are crucial as it creates opportunities to facilitate

the engagement of diasporas in development of social networks.

Fedkom puts effort in utilizing their media channels to generate more awareness regarding the

Kurdish issue, and gathering support for their organization in order to have more resources to

realize their organizational purposes and goals.

In the following section a detailed analysis will be provided regarding the organization media

channels such as social networks and other media activities. This will give a better overview of

the way the organization utilizes their instrument to empower the organization and what

transnational practices can be observed.

The Internet

As one of the prime objectives of the organization is to build a bridge between the Kurdish

people in the Kurdish Regions and the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, it is important to

include their Social Media activities.

Social media

The organization has multiple social media accounts, namely: accounts on Facebook, Twitter

and LinkedIn. Taking the intensity of activity and followers into consideration, we can conclude

that Facebook is their most developed social media instrument. With a little over 4.000

Facebook-accounts following their page in which the organization updates these accounts.

These updates can be distinguished in the following categories; cartoons, events-posts, news-

posts, informative posts concerning; elections, commemorations, awareness for Kurdish political

affiliated prisoners in he Kurdish Region (Facebook Fedkom Page, n.d.).

  42  

Some examples of transnational dimensions within their activities are the posts regarding

elections in the Kurdish regions, noting that i.e. Kurds from Turkey can vote for Turkish elections

in the Netherlands, as well as what Dutch political parties or members of parliament can benefit

the Kurds in political terms. Hence, some news and cartoon posts can suggest the political

ideology the organization supports towards the key political actors relevant to the Kurdish

Regions. The political preference or ideology of the organization is evident when Fedkom posts

some articles in favor of the PKK, such as statements of the PKK that condemn the Turkish

strikes against the PKK. Furthermore, Fedkom informs their followers about protests to support

Kurdish political prisoners facing disproportionate sentences.

Website

The website is occasionally updated with news articles with regards to the Kurdish community

while some of the website’s pages, such as their agenda and projects, have no content. As

mentioned before, there are no references to the member organizations. This may implicate that

the organization does not have the capacity or willingness to publish more information

concerning their activities or their organizational nature (www.fedkom.nl).

Events

The penultimate category of activities is the organization’s events. In order to form a better view

of what the organization does to realize their objectives, an overview will be provided of what

types of events Fedkom organizes that can linked to the organizational discourse with regards to

Kurdish self-rule and efforts in influencing the Kurdish issue.

The organization has organized many and various types of events. These events range from

educational activities for the younger Kurdish diaspora to protests. With regards to transnational

activities that involve a site of political engagement, Fedkom organized a sit-in protest in the

Dutch Second chamber when ISIS was attacking and killing Kurds in Kobani. The organization

has also organized a few lectures inviting Kurdish political party-leaders from various Kurdish

Regions to present their ideas about the Kurdish issue, as well as inviting four different party

members of the Dutch Parliament and Cabinet to discuss Kurdish matters during the

organization’s New Year’s reception.

Some of the abovementioned events have confirmed that it can lead to a visible change. For

example, the sit-in protest in the Dutch Parliament resulted in a seldom seen during the protest

  43  

between Dutch members of the Parliament and the Kurdish Diaspora representatives.

Consequently, it resulted in a national political issue to support the Kurds in combating ISIS,

which eventually led to transnational military support from the Dutch government to train and

equip the Kurdish forces (Koerdische betogers dringen Tweede Kamer binnen, October 6,

2014).

Besides events with political dimensions, the organization also organizes educational and

cultural events for their members. These events include Kurdish language, Kurdish folklore,

music classes but also informative events in which they aim to educate the Kurdish diaspora

about the history and the future of the Kurds (Over Fedkom, n.d.).

The organization’s goal, mentioned before in the introduction to the organization, namely,

promoting and cultivating the Kurdish identity is realized by these efforts in educational activities.

Consequently, this can also be seen as a way to attract the Kurdish Diaspora to empower the

organization by uniting the diaspora in pursuit of creating more opportunities to exercise more

influence, as a minority group.

Lobbying

Lobbying is another transnational activity, particularly to create a site of political engagement,

that can be linked to direct or indirect changes in Kurdish matters, whether it being through

Dutch politics or directly in the Kurdish region as well as through European or International

organizations. As mentioned in the category of event activities, Fedkom’s board member Kaynak

acknowledged that the organization has interactions with Dutch politicians but also party

members of political organizations in the various Kurdish Regions, such as the PKK, KDP and

PUK. Despite the fact that there are no reports from Fedkom concerning these informal talks, the

interactions with political actors implies that the organization recognizes that lobbying is an

effective instrument in influencing professionals in policy making processes concerning Kurdish

matters. This statement can be backed with previously mentioned organized protest leading to a

meeting with members of parliament which consequently led to the Dutch government

intensifying their support to the Kurdish troops.

  44  

Fedkom’s position towards KRG  As stated earlier, the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands’ ideology towards self-rule can be

categorized in two major discourses regarding the political structure of the Kurdish regions.

Confederalism and independence are the two most relevant discourses as argued in the

previous chapter of discourses.

The analysis of Fedkom’s organization through semi-structured interviews with its board member

and participatory observations have confirmed that although the organization formally states that

it is non-party affiliated, its members and supporters have political and ideological preferences

when it comes to Kurdish self-ruling. Hence, these preferences affect the formation of the

strategies of Fedkom. The analysis has proven that the affiliation with PKK and influence of its

ideology has an overall effect on Fedkom. Egin Kaynak, board member of Fedkom,

acknowledged that many members favor the PKK. The PKK flags and pictures of PKK leaders

and martyrs in their center in The Hague also indicate that the organization leans more towards

PKK’s ideology, which is Confederalism, when it comes to political aspects of the Kurdish nation.

Although it is hard to prove that the political agenda’s of the two discourses has caused division

between Fedkom and the KRG, interviewing the two parties has confirmed that both actors want

more neutrality and transparency in their activities to obtain more fruitful results from their

partnership. Board member Egin Kaynak admitted that Fedkom has not formulated a strategy to

cooperate with the KRG in empowering the region in terms of self-determination. As mentioned

before, it happened because of the disputes they have had in the past which lead to an

unworkable partnership.

However, Fedkom’s board member expressed in the interview that when the war in Iraq and the

KRG will end, it will support the Kurds in Iraq once they formally start to make efforts in realizing

a confederalism system or even an independent state if the first option appears to be ineffective

(E. Kaynak, personal communication, May 24, 2015).

In fact, the Kurdish Region of Iraq, due to the suppressing policies during the reign of Saddam’s

regime, did not have the opportunity to develop both political and civil infrastructure. Therefore

the self-governing region needs a significant amount of investment in terms of lobbying,

investments, expertise, management and young professionals from different parts of the world,

  45  

including the Netherlands. The recent developments in KRG’s relation with the central

government and the fracturing of the state requires to take into account what possible scenarios

may follow in order to realize peace and stability in the region. Fedkom and its resources can

play a key role in facilitating a partnership to empower the Kurdish region in Iraq. The

recommendations part of this research will help to improve the partnership in pursuit of mutual

goals to empower the Kurdish Regions and contributing to their desires concerning self-rule.

Conclusion

Taking into account the analysis of the organization’s nature and its activities in relation to its

position of self-rule in the KRG, some conclusions can be drawn concerning the history of the

organization with regards to the research question.

According to Fedkom, the organization sets objectives and changes its activities-focus when

something happens in the Kurdish Regions that can be addressed or tackled through their

activities in the Netherlands. The referendum in 2005 that favored an independent state is one of

the examples that Fedkom, according to their objectives, should have taken into consideration in

their meetings and activities. Therefore principally it should be clear what position the

organization has with regards to KRG’s ambition for independence.

Ten years have passed since the first indication of Kurdish independence in the region of Iraq,

referring to the 2005 referendum, and taking into account the recent developments in Iraq and

KRG, it is relevant to know how Fedkom deals with situation. Through the reassessment of

Fedkom’s activities and transnational practices are illuminated in the organizational analysis

chapter, it is reasonable to state that Fedkom leans more towards the Confederlism Democracy

accordingly to the PKK.

As signaled before, the history and present cooperation between Fedkom and the Kurdistan

Regional Government indicates that tensions in the past has damaged the trust as both parties

stated in the interviews that they need more transparency and neutrality in order to have a more

fruitful relationship. Egin Kaynak, board member of Fedkom, stated that the organization does

not make efforts in aiding in independence as the KRG and the Kurdish Region of Syria is

enmeshed in a war. Fedkom prioritizes activities that can benefit the Kurdish population

concerning humanitarian aid and lobbying the Dutch government to aid the Kurds against ISIS

(E. Kaynak, personal communication, May 24, 2015).

  46  

Besides, disputes between the ruling parties in the KRG with Kurdish organizations abroad

concerning a common political agenda benefiting all Kurds have occurred numerous times

throughout history. The partnership between the two actors requires concessions and

transparency, like any other democratic government or partnerships, in order to become more

united and neutral towards matters related to Kurds.

However, due to the fact that most Kurds in the Netherlands are from the Turkish region and

their ideology and political preference are significantly influenced by their geopolitical origins,

there are indications that Fedkom would like to pursue the Confederalism discourse instead of

making efforts in supporting an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. As mentioned in the

organizational analysis chapter, Fedkom’s affiliation with the PKK is evident despite labeling

itself as a non-party-affiliated organization.

None of Fedkom’s transnational practices or public statements and media posts has

acknowledged the ambition of the Kurdistan Regional Government for independence. This

implies that Fedkom prioritizes its organizational ideology or even negligence of KRG’s political

issues due to ideological differences. In accordance with Fedkom’s objective with regards to

Kurdistan, it would be more probably that the organization would have incorporated what the

majority of the KRG’s constituencies’ desires with regards to self-determination within its daily

operations.

It is important to note that Fedkom has visibly contributed to the Kurdish diaspora and the Kurds

in Kurdistan, since it puts loads of effort in their daily operations in pursuit of realizing their

objectives, given the fact that the organization is operated on voluntary-bases. However, the

organization’s position and efforts with regards to KRG’s ambitions and cooperation indicates

that it does not put much effort with regards to self-determination issues in the KRG due to

ideological differences. Taking the abovementioned conclusions into consideration, if Fedkom

wants to be genuine non-party affiliated organization; it should take necessary measures to

minimize the political influences within the organization to become a more neutral organization

serving all Kurds around the world according to their objectives.

  47  

Recommendations

The following section will elaborate on proposed recommendations to improve the role of

Fedkom, as well as other similar Kurdish diaspora organizations in the Netherlands, and the

Kurdish Regional Government in pursuit of benefiting and empowering the Kurdish region in

Iraq, through transnationalism.

KRG Agency in the Netherlands

Since the outcomes of this research depicts the idea that Kurdish diaspora organizations in the

Netherlands have indirectly been playing a role in promoting independence for Kurdistan, it can

be recommended that the KRG should consider this potential leverage of power as one of the

influential factors in the function of independence. Therefore, the KRG can establish an agency

in the Netherlands through which opportunities can be created for the Kurdish diaspora to

cooperate directly with the Kurdistan Regional Government in enhancing this potential tool for

any future progress regarding political issues. This can serve several goals such as:

● Filling the gaps of time and space in communication and interaction between the Kurdish

diaspora and Kurdistan Regional Government;

● Creating the opportunities for the Kurdish diaspora to address their demands and/or

ideas directly to Kurdish representatives;

● Increasing cooperation with Kurdish diaspora group which in turn can simultaneously

maximize the unity between the two parties and minimize the ideological differences;

● Sharing their networks to facilitate the uniformity in addressing Kurdish issues.

● Enhancing the possibilities to strengthen the interaction between the Dutch

government and the Kurdistan Regional Government;

● Stimulating the Kurds in the Netherlands to help in informing the public concerning the

difficulties in the Kurdish Regions.

Neutrality

Given that, there are discrepancies among various Kurdish groups and their interests, the board

of Fedkom needs to undergo a strategic change in taking a more neutral position towards its

concerning community to further maintain the homogeneity among the Kurdish diaspora and

having monophony in realizing their mutual objectives.

  48  

It should also facilitate more space for cooperation with other organizations and government

institutions for the same purpose. Despite the fact that Fedkom has stated that it is a non-party

affiliated organization, political preferences can easily be recognized. The political parties’ flags

and posters of their political leaders are very striking while organizing protests or other socio-

political activities, which in turn shows a breach in their neutrality.

  49  

Developing records of the Kurdish diaspora

Fedkom can develop a web-based databank on their website to gather ideas, demands and

information about competencies and skills of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands to match

them with vacancies and job opportunities in the Kurdish Regions which can augment the

channels between the host and main regions in the context of transnationalism and diaspora.

Diaspora policy of the KRG

Strategically speaking, the Kurdistan Regional Government does not have a clear vision on how

the Kurdish diaspora (organizations) can contribute to the region. Therefore, establishing an

agency in the KRG handling diaspora issues can be used as a tool in further development of a

diaspora policy. On the one hand, this will enable the Kurdish diaspora to contribute through

channels for exchanging knowledge, expertise, students-exchange programs, economic

opportunities and political contributions. On the other hand, it will create an opportunity for the

representatives of the KRG to participate in conferences, seminars and similar events,

elaborating on ideas and projects, with people in the diaspora.

Fedkom funding programs

Since Fedkom has discontinued fundraising from external sources, the organization does not

possess sufficient resources for its activities, thus it will not be capable of extending its activities.

If Fedkom includes fundraising in its activities, through informing the public and their members

regarding their activities and projects, it will strengthen their economic viability to organize

different socio-political events for increasing awareness, extending the network for lobbying and

maintaining the unity among Kurds.

Dialogue

The abovementioned recommendations can facilitate a platform where the Kurdish diaspora and

the Kurdistan Regional Government conduct more interaction with each other. However, it is

also important to note that dialogue between the two actors is of great importance if it wants to

establish a more sustainable relationship. Without dialogue and regular interaction between the

two parties a partnership will become ineffective when disputes or differences are not solved

through reconciliation. Therefore, the recommendation to build a strong relationship where

dialogue is regarded as a priority will help to a better partnership with meaningful results

benefiting Kurds in general.

  50  

Conclusion

The abovementioned recommendations can facilitate an improved infrastructure for both of the

key actors with regards to influencing and gathering support for the issue of self-rule. The KRG

agency in the Netherlands and the Kurdistan Regional Government can create more interaction

with the diaspora through a diaspora policy. An environment can be established that offers more

opportunities for diaspora transnationalism. Hence, it will lead to more awareness through the

improvement of infrastructure for Kurds in the Netherlands; more opportunities will arise to

mobilize the necessary stakeholders as well as resources to influence and participate in the

KRG’s ambitions for independence through diaspora transnationalism between Fedkom and the

Kurdistan Regional Government.

  51  

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38. Vertovec, S. (1999), Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism: University of Oxford

39. Wereldjournalisten (2007, May), Koerden in Nederland. Retrieved August 8, 2015 from

http://www.wereldjournalisten.nl/factsheet/2007/05/23/factsheet_koerden_in_nederland/

40. World Heritage Encyclopedia (n.d), KON-KURD. Retrieved August 1, 2015 from

http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/kon-kurd#cite_note-1

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APPENDIX 1

Interview a board member of Fedkom and head of Media Commission, May 22, 2015

1. What is Fedkom and why was it established?

Fedkom was established in 1999. Federation of Kurdish Organizations members’ are Kurdish

Organizations in the Netherlands with the purpose to promote Kurdish identity and culture in and

outside the Netherlands as well as raising awareness and building a bridge in contributing to

solve issues Kurds face in the Kurdish Region.

Fedkom operates within the Netherlands and they are represented on a European level through

the KON-KURD in Brussels. KON-KURD compromises 13 Kurdish Federations

which includes 230 Kurdish organizations in Europe.

2. Does Fedkom have any reports available on the abovementioned matters?

There are reports concerning Fedkom’s activities but these are not public, these reports are

used for communication purposes between the Fedkom and its organizations as well as for

presentations at the meetings at the end of the year. However, most of the public activities can

be found through their social media channels?

3. How does Fedkom attain resources (everything that empowers the organization; funds,

seminars etc) to make the activities of their organizations possible?

Fedkom is a non-profit organization and the members are working on voluntary bases. Fedkom

changed their attitude towards fundraising and receiving funds from foundations or subsidies

from the government as they were under the impression that it was a negative force concerning

the level of freedom of organizing and the way they conduct their activities. In example, the

organization was faced with requirements issued by the Dutch government to forbid PKK flags

during their events and protests, if not the funding of the organization will be executed.

According to Fedkom, this is a direct threat to the freedom of the organization to act as it wants

to. Therefore, Fedkom concluded that they should step away from government subsidies due to

their desire to be able to protect their members freedom in their activities.

The organization collects their funding through members contributions who can decide how

much they are willing to donate to Fedkom, as well as members that pay for subscriptions to

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magazines and newspapers Fedkom offers. A portion of the money they collect goes to the

affiliated organizations.

This makes it very difficult to create a more professional environment in which employees get

paid for their services in order to be more effective in their activities, unlike other NGO’s having

various res/gid, have their own pay-jobs during the week and have to make use of their own time

and money for Fedkom’s activities. However, Fedkom is happy that they do not have to trade

their ideology of how to run the organization any more as it has appeared that funding from the

government and other institutions also brings along some requirements or rules that they need

to adhere to.

4. Does Fedkom have any form of strategic management in order to be more organized and

effective towards long- and short term goals?

There is some sort of strategy included within the organization, as they do conduct meetings in

which short- and long term goals are discussed and plans are made to satisfy these goals. The

board member says that the strategy Fedkom follows stems from the situation of the Kurds in

Kurdistan. Each board of the member organizations that apply to be part of Fedkom needs to be

transparent and democratic, as such that it has; 6 assembly meetings a year, both a man and a

woman as chairman and a new chosen board each year.

Each affiliated organization has to include the following concepts in their activities; Kurdish

culture, women's-rights, youths as well as rights and duties.

5. Does Fedkom have any ties to political parties/does it work independently?

Fedkom is a non-political organization. However, it is possible for all political parties to contact

Fedkom to create or realize programs to empower Kurds in the Netherlands. Despite the fact

that Fedkom is non-party affiliated, the members of the organization have their political

preferences and some of them sympathize their political affiliation for example during protests it

is obvious that most of their members support the PKK.

6. Does Fedkom make efforts to aid in realizing an independent state or has it in the

past?

Fedkom acknowledges the fact that more autonomy for all major ethnic groups in the region of

Kurds will benefit and empower those areas; this is also Fedkom’s ideology. Reason for this is

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that a more decentralized governance will aid in empowering those regions as their locals and

governors have a better understanding of what can empower their canton or province.

This implies for Kurdish autonomy in the Turkish region. As for the Syrian region this would be a

division of cantons, meaning a subdivision of a country established for political or administrative

purposes. The Kurdish region of Iraq is already autonomous and looking at the contemporary

situation this may lead to an independent state. As long as the population is in favor of

independence in the KRG, Fedkom will support and aim to aid in realizing their efforts in creating

an independent state. However, at the moment it is obvious that the Kurds are in war, it is

therefore important to prioritize the safety of the people rather than political discussions

regarding independence.

Fedkom says that it spreads information concerning autonomy for Kurds through their events

and affiliated organizations. This information is derived from the Kurdish region's; political

parties, media, locals. In conclusion, Fedkom tells stories derived from the Kurdish Region’s.

7. How does Fedkom cooperate with other Kurdish Diaspora organizations?

Fedkom is willing to cooperate with other Kurdish organizations because it can create more

unity. The umbrella organization is also a member of KON-KURD, almost all Kurdish

organizations participate during this congress, including the other member Federations of

Kurdish organizations in European countries. It should be noted that KON-KURD’s members are

generally from the Kurdish region in Turkey. The organization also participates in the KNC,

Kurdish National Congress, which is congress concluded with all Kurdish (political)

organizations, regardless of their geographical location or political ideology.

8. Does Fedkom cooperate, diplomatic relations, with other organizations in realizing their

goals? (in example Dutch government, EU, UN) (Petition, application international organizations)

The organization has a broad network of Dutch politicians and members of parliament. Lobbying

is an important tool to cooperate with the Dutch government as they can address issues related

to Kurds to the Dutch cabinet. Despite the fact it does not have a direct link with international

institutions such as the UN or the EU, it is possible to influence the Dutch cabinet that can

consequently address those issues to higher governmental organs.

9. What has Fedkom done related to the last two years looking at the ISIS conflict?

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Besides, lobbying with politicians to address the sense of urgency regarding the conflict in Iraq

and Syria, it has also contacted NGO’s such as HIVOS and Steun Kobani to find as much

support to raise support, and funds, for the Kurdish region.

Fedkom has organized many protest and participated in the occupation of the Dutch cabinet.

The occupation had fruitful results as the Dutch cabinet proposed to meet immediately with

representatives of the Kurds in the Netherlands. Consequently, the Dutch Cabinet agreed to

support the Kurds in terms of equipping- and military training the Kurdish forces.

10. How is Fedkom’s media department organized looking at the possibilities media can

offer?

Fedkom has a website and various social media accounts where it tries to utilize the

opportunities the media can offer. They have created accounts on Facebook, LinkedIn and

Twitter. These media channels are a very important tool to reach their members as well as non-

members. Publishing news concerning the Kurds, informing posts about their upcoming events

and informing what political parties are beneficial to the Kurds in elections are a few examples of

how they use their media channels.

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APPENDIX 2

Second interview with Egin Kaynak, board member of Fedkom, June 10, 2015

1) What are the member organizations of Fedkom?

Kurdish Association in Arnhem

Kurdish Association in Eindhoven

Kurdish Association in Middelburg

Kurdish Association in Den Haag

Kurdish Association in Rotterdam

Kurdish Association in Amsterdam

Kurdish Association in Zaandam

These are all Fedkom’s member Kurdish associations. All the member associations have the

objectives to represent the Kurdish community and to promote Kurdish identity.

Some associations establish a separate woman’s and/or youth organization, which are indirectly

linked with Fedkom.

There are specific requirements for being a Fedkom member organization. Firstly, the

organization is required to be democratic. Each year a new board must be elected by their

members, and the appointment of a male and female as the heads of the board.

Secondly, similar to Fedkom, each association should put efforts in preserving and cultivating

the Kurdish identity, these efforts are made by providing Kurdish language-, folklore dance- and

music classes. The heads of all the associations are required to attend the bi-monthly group

meetings with Fedkom to elaborate on coming plans and giving feedback on recent activities.

These heads of member organizations have influential powers concerning the umbrella

organization Fedkom, power to influence activities as they have the opportunity to attend the bi-

monthly meetings, having opportunities to become candidates for Fedkom’s board besides being

a board member of the association, as well as having the power to vote for Fedkom’s yearly

chosen board.

2) What is the structure of the organization? Organogram

Fedkom operates nationally, with 7 local member associations, in cooperation and accordance

to Kon-Kurd’s guidelines. Kon-Kurd, also known as KCD-E, is a confederation organization.

Fedkom has 12 board members and including their member organizations their workforce

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consists approximately 300 committed volunteers. The number of active members is estimated

between 10.000 and 20.000, while their reach is estimated to be 60.000 to 80.000. Its members

are Kurdish federations, such as Fedkom, concluding 220 organizations. Kon-Kurd sets

guidelines for the federations’ organizations concerning what activities are appropriate for

promoting Kurdish identity, but also wide-range informing i.e. what opportunities there are with

regards to lobbying in specific countries. The federations of Kon-Kurd meet up each quarter of a

year to discuss the abovementioned matters.

Kon-Kurd is a member of KNC (Kurdish National Congress) which concludes almost every

Kurdish organization in the world, including Kurdish political parties.

3) What has changed in the organization taking the emergence of ISIS into consideration?

The nature of the organization has stayed the same, no different strategy concerning how to

realize the objectives or change in objectives. However, due to the war and interest from various

stakeholders, such as the Dutch political figures and media, the activities and work of Fedkom

have gotten more attention. More people volunteer to be part of Fedkom’s work, such as

organizing protests, interviews with media or creating opportunities to lobby with Dutch political

parties. The member organizations have also become more active, working even harder, due to

the demand of organizing more protest to raise awareness about the Kurdish issues.

The lobbying activities have increased significantly, when taking the emergence of ISIS into

account. Fedkom’s explanation for this change is that due to political interests of the Dutch

government the organizations is taken more seriously for the work they have been doing for

many years now.

4) What is the strategy of Fedkom in achieving these objectives?

The strategy of Fedkom and its activities are derived from making plans and meetings and these

plans are usually triggered by news and issues coming from the Kurdish regions, or an increase

of demand for action by the Kurdish diaspora. The media is an important source to Fedkom to

organize specific lectures or other events. For example, if there are many Kurds sentenced to

death, Fedkom will inform their network by spreading information, lobbying, organizing a protest

or other types of activities that can raise awareness and influence the issue.

5) How can the process of decision-making and agenda setting be illustrated?

As mentioned before, there are bimonthly meetings with all representatives of the associations.

The associations report, which is mandatory to all associations, their past and future plannings

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and activities, these reports are archived in order to have an overview of for example how many

people attended a protest or language classes. During these meetings, associations are enabled

to propose ideas for the future and request funds for their projects.

6) How does it contribute to the KRG?

Fedkom has a broad network of connections, including political, governmental and NGO entities,

that are beneficial to the KRG. The KRG can use Fedkom’s network in the Netherlands to

promote and lobby their interests directly and indirectly, via Fedkom. In 2013, Fedkom organized

a Kurdish New Year’s reception and invited various representatives of Dutch ministries, political

parties and NGO’s in order to lobby with these groups in pursuit of establishing fruitful

relationships that benefit the Kurds. Of course, Kurdish representatives of political parties,

including the KRG, were invited to create opportunities for Kurdish and non-Kurdish

organizations to connect.

However, this reception was financed by Fedkom and as for the following reception in 2014,

Fedkom requested the KRG to make a financial contribution because it is also in the interest of

the KRG to have an opportunity to broaden their network and lobby with Dutch delegations.

Eventually, after a long process of aiming to have the KRG make a direct financial contribution

for the reception, the KRG backed out after saying they will support the event. Formally,

budgetary issues did not allow the KRG to financially contribute the New Roz reception. Due to

the lack of funding the 2014 New Years reception was canceled from Fedkom’s agenda. In

2015, Fedkom again organized a reception with various delegates from Dutch and Kurdish

political and social organizations, excluding the KRG from this event due to the previous

difficulties in organizing the previous reception.

On the other hand, informing and exposing issues related to Kurds in the KRG through protests,

social networks and events are also ways Fedkom says it contributes to the Kurdish issue in the

KRG.

7) What is the nature of relationship with KRG or organizations in the KRG?

As mentioned before, the relationship between Fedkom and the KRG is far from perfect. He

explains that the differences of ideology, Fedkom vs KRG, are the main reason why the

relationship has been difficult. An example of this difficult relationship is, according to Fedkom,

the Iraqi embassy representative, appointed by the KRG, was not even willing to have contact

with Fedkom in order to realize bridge between Iraqi/Kurdish officials in the Netherlands and the

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Kurdish organization Fedkom and its broad network in the Netherlands. This does not enable the

KRG or Fedkom to build a bridge between the Kurds in Iraq and the Kurdish community in the

Netherlands, as well as the political relationship between the KRG and connections of Fedkom

in the Dutch political arena. Another example is the commemoration of the chemical genocide of

Halabja, the board member expresses his discomfort about the steps taken by the KRG to

compensate and assist the victims of the genocide.

Fedkom is unable to make direct contributions to the KRG or in the region of the KRG due to the

difference in ideology, however it says it is open for projects or ideas that can build a stronger

connection with the KRG.

8) What does it need to realize these contributions?

In Fedkom’s view, the lack of unity between the Kurds in the KRG and organizations abroad

should be tackled. KRG needs to make efforts to be open, and not solely focus on their political

ideology, for more cooperation between the government and Fedkom. Different views regarding

ideology are still a block to a fruitful relationship whereas KRG can make use of Fedkoms broad

network and vice versa.

9) What are the organizational network and resources?

Concerning networking, depending on the goal, the organization is open to applications from

people that want to get involved and on the other hand it looks for useful partnerships with other

organizations or people that can help in realizing the goal. For example, Fedkom worked with

the Kon-Kurd, also known as the KCD-E, who sent people to follow whether the recent elections

in Turkey didn’t breach international voting standards.

With regards to resources, in terms of funding, Fedkom’s views funding as something that might

become a problem. Fedkom stepped away from receiving government funds since 2008, this

was formally decided during their meetings, as it was perceived that it had more negative than

positive consequences. The following section will explain why decided to turn away from

external fundraising.

As fundraising can be very complex, the organization feels it could lose its focus on their goals if

funding becomes too important. Besides, receiving funds from the government or other

organizations can also include specific requirements. In the past, Fedkom received funding from

the government and at times they did not know what to do with the funds. Also, reports became

a bureaucratic issue as they were not able to direct the total sum of funds to their activities, as

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well as the political and ideological requirements these funds bring along. Hence, the

bureaucratic issue is due to the fact that some volunteers are sometimes abroad for a few

months, while the reports are not being dealt with because the volunteers are not there or are

unable to do so. According to Fedkom, during their events, such as protests and lectures,

political ideology can not be separated from their members and Fedkom does not want to forbid

their members to raise flags or posters of martyrs who were killed for defending their people.

Besides, having fewer funds seems to be a trigger to be more involved and work harder

according to Fedkom. The views of Fedkom regarding funding can be scrutinized as funding can

be beneficial to the organization due to the fact that they can broaden or intensify their activities,

attract more members, hire more skilled workers and other factors that can empower the

organization and its cause.

10) How was the relationship between KRG and Fedkom before the recent war in Iraq and

how is it now?

Fedkom states that it forms the biggest Kurdish diaspora organization in the Netherlands, and

their fellow federation is the most developed organizations in Germany, Belgium and other fellow

European countries. However, the KRG does not involve the federations in their political agenda,

as mentioned before due to ideological preferences. This division in political ideas does not

enable the two parties to create a meaningful relationship that could empower the KRG as a

political entity in Europe, nor does it lead to a unified Kurdish diaspora with the support of a

regional Kurdish government. According to Fedkom, the KRG excludes Fedkom as well their

fellow federation, most of the times, from their activities in Europe and rather partner up with

organizations linked with the PUK and KDP, which are the ruling political parties in the Kurdistan

Regional Government. According to someone within Fedkom, the organization proposed, in

2009, to the KRG to have a big New Roz (Kurdish New Year) outdoor celebration in The Hague,

co-financed by the KRG. There were many reasons for this idea. Namely, besides the fact that

many Kurds live in The Hague, the Dutch Government, embassies, international organizations

and political organizations are located in the Hague. This would benefit the Kurds worldwide as it

raises awareness amongst lots of people, through the media coverage and public opinion, for

causes related to the Kurds. However, after being strung along by the KRG, the Kurdish

Regional Government formally acknowledged it does not have the necessary budget available in

order to financially support this new National The Hague New Roz Day, as Fedkom would name

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it. According to Fedkom, this financial contribution was proportional taking into account the large

budget the KRG had in 2009, which was estimated to be 20,000 euros. It would have not only be

beneficial to the Kurds regarding their identity and exposure but the KRG would also have

benefited from the exposure, accompanied by the many prosperous networking opportunities it

would have as a co-financer.

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APPENDIX 3

Interview Zana Kurda, KRG representative in the EU, April 7, 2015

1. How can the relationship between Fedkom and the KRG be defined?

There is hardly a meaningful relationship between the KRG and Fedkom. One of KRG’s

representatives was present during the establishment of the organization. However, the KRG

noticed that due to the fact that the organization is influenced by the PKK, it became difficult to

establish a partnership between the two parties. According to the KRG, Fedkom is more focused

on pursuing PKK’s agenda rather than taking a non-party affiliated stance in realizing benefits to

the Kurdish Diaspora and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Taken into account that the KRG is political entity and the influence of the PKK in Fedkom’s

activities, it became clear that is not a clear mutual understanding of how both can partner up to

mobilize the Kurdish diaspora in pursuit of empowering the Kurdistan Regional Government.

2. Does the KRG make efforts in realizing independence, and how?

According to the KRG, the current federal system in Iraq is not working correctly looking at the

numerous issues the federal state has with the central government. Therefore, the Iraqi and the

Kurdish Regional Government should review the structure of the government to enable the KRG

to be more independent of the central government so it can try to solve issues themselves

without consent of the Iraqi government.

Zana Kurda continued saying that even a Confederalism system is even more beneficial, if

practiced correctly, and Confederalism is an option before going for a fully independent nation-

state.

Currently, the KRG president Barzani is meeting representatives from various countries in order

to realize more support for the establishment of a Kurdish state. This is accompanied by the

work of many KRG representatives and ambassadors around the world, and in international

organizations such as the EU.

However, when we take the efforts made in the Netherlands into account, no significant support

from the Dutch government has been gained, similar to many other European countries. The

KRG representative explained that if the USA will publicly support the Kurds regarding their

statehood, many European countries would also support Kurdish statehood.

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According to the KRG, establishing a Kurdish state is also a matter of timing. If the opportunity

will become significant, holding another referendum in the Kurdish provinces can legitimize the

Kurdish statehood, as it can create legitimate bases for the claim.

Zana Kurda, representative of the KRG in the EU, also said that confederalism is also beneficial

to the Kurdish Region in Iraq as he explained that the KRG could operate in a more

decentralized power structure whereas the Kurdish Region will become an independent non-

state power. This entails that the Kurdish Government will also be able to decide independently

on matters such as foreign affairs and their own finances.

In conclusion, an independent Kurdistan is the most desirable solution however a confederalism

system will also be very beneficial to the Kurds due to freedom of the opportunities in decision-

and policy making processes.

3. If so, how can the Kurdish diaspora, Fedkom, contribute in this respect?

The KRG is prepared to cooperate with any organization that can contribute in realizing more

independence in decision- and policy making. However, in the case of Fedkom it is difficult to

cooperate, as mentioned before, due to the gap of having a mutual agenda’s to realize

confederalism or an independent state. The KDP does not engage in the activities of Fedkom

due to the influence the PKK has in Fedkom’s position. The KDP prioritizes independence whilst

PKK formally addressed that they desire a confederalism system.

4. What advices do you have concerned with mobilizing the power of KRG in the

Netherlands, political and diaspora organizations?

The establishment of a KRG agency or embassy in the Netherlands will be the first step as there

are no KRG representatives appointed to handle issues related to the KRG in the Netherlands.

This will benefit the relation as the KRG and Fedkom will both have a stake in Dutch affairs to

address issues related to Kurds, rather than hampering each other due to minor disagreements.

If Fedkom, as it is a federation of all Kurds, as well as other Kurdish organizations linked with

political parties, would integrate the desires of Kurds from all Kurdish, it would become a more

unified diaspora organization. This would make it easier to approach the KRG as well as the

Dutch institutions, establishing a neutral unified voice of Kurdish diaspora organizations, rather

than following one particular political ideology.

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The KRG has financial problems; budget, if there are more budgets’ available more things can

be realized.