ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

'I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the

thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's

design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.'

Signed

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Pakistani Cricket and Identity in Pakistan and Anglo-Pakistan

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Chris Valiotis

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of New South Wales 2006

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Abstract vii

Introduction 1

1 'A Nation Imperfectly Imagined': Muslim Nationalism and the Demand for Pakistan 19

2 Jinnah's Prize, An Impaired Vision: Power and Ideology in Pakistan 46

3 The Close of Play: Colonial Cricket and Partition 80

4 Pakistan Zindabad: Early Patrons and Players of an Orphaned Game 115

5 From Elite Sport to a Popular Culture: The Emergence of the 'Vernacular' Cricketer 146

6 The Political Umpire: Cricket Nationalism and Counter-Narratives 174

7 Runs in the Outfield: The Pakistani Diaspora and Cricket in England 211

Conclusion 265

Appendix 1 274

Appendix 2 289

Appendix 3 295

Bibliography 302

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this dissertation relied on the support and friendship of many people in Pakistan, England and Australia. I am considerably indebted to all of them for their compassion, and for the time they took to facilitate and broaden my understanding of cultures, customs and people I had previously only read about in books, magazines and travel guides. My PhD began almost unexpectedly in 1998 when I met with my then Honours supervisor at the University of New South Wales, Or Max Harcourt, to discuss the possibility of undertaking a more substantial historical project - one that would challenge me and allow for my development as a scholar. During our discussion it soon became apparent that I had little in the way of an outline, nor a particular historical enquiry in mind. In fact, all that was in my favour was a passion for South Asian history, and the desire to write on it. Over the period it took me to research, write and submit my PhD, these early tentative steps blossomed into a personal journey of immense intellectual and cultural development. In particular, the field trips abroad have left lasting memories of diverse human customs, socio-political arrangements, artistic expressions, and amazing vistas of topography and natural beauty. They also allowed for the viewing of numerous cricket matches, from the more formal version of the game played in Lords, Headingley and the Qaddafi Stadium, to the informal variants of street cricketers in Lahore and Karachi.

Many individuals contributed to make my stay in Pakistan a memorable one. Foremost of them was Or Am in U. Khan of Government College in Lahore. Dr. Khan, cousin to retired Pakistani cricketers lmran and Majid Khan, arranged my earliest accommodation and was always available for a discussion on numerous topics ranging from Pakistani cricket to indigenous Australian tropical plants and seeds that were best able to be propagated in Pakistani climatic conditions. Dr. Khan also arranged for several of my earliest interviews, and found work for me as an assistant coach for the Government College athletics team. The latter was a wonderful distraction from my daily routine as a researcher and led to the development of numerous friendships with students from the college. Despite my earliest protestations - "I am on holidays; I am not here to run!" - I warmed to the task, thrice a week, running with the team, until the timely intervention of the month of fasting (Ramadan).

I am also grateful to the staff of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Physics (CASP), Government College, particularly Syed Tahir Abbas and Asher Ahmad. Both became strong friends, and were always on call for lively

discussions on Pakistani history, politics, music and western mores. They were also companions on several trips to other parts of the Punjab where the pastimes and customs of diverse communities became increasingly apparent to me. I am grateful to their extended families for their hospitality and kindness. Without their acceptance of me as one of their own, I doubt I would have been exposed to so many fascinating cultural experiences, from weddings, Eid and Christmas celebrations to Lollywood productions, kite-flying and street cricket tournaments.

I shared similar experiences in Karachi, where families took the time to welcome me into their lives, particularly those of Abdul Raquib, Ather Viqar Azim and Munawar Ali Khan. Abdul Raquib, a former test cricketer of Pakistan and a prolific wicket-taker in Pakistani domestic cricket, was Head of the Habib Bank Sports Department. He, along with Ather Viqar Azim, the manager of the Pakistan Television (PTV) station in Karachi, was able to procure media accreditation for myself, where I was able to observe the Pakistan/England test series during Pakistan's 2000-2001 cricket season from within the hallowed confines of the press box. Within this perimeter I found myself standing alongside such cricket luminaries as Zaheer Abbas, Wasim Raja, lan Botham, David Gower and Geoffrey Boycott, amongst others. Abdul and Ather also allowed me the opportunity to use Habib Bank and PTV resources and archives to enhance my research.

Munawar Ali Khan, forever the quintessential product of colonial Indian cricket traditions and princely patronage, was an invaluable confidant. We shared many a lazy afternoon watching cricket at the Karachi Gymkhana eating malagatany soup and assorted pastries, and drinking tea and pomegranate juice. This was an ideal setting for me to tap into Munawar's vast knowledge of early club and college cricket in Pakistan and to be enthralled by precious anecdotes of the period. Furthermore, Munawar kept numerous artifacts and memorabilia from his playing days which he allowed me to observe and ask questions on. My afternoons at the gymkhana were reminiscent of my earliest days in Pakistan where I equally enjoyed the hospitality, support and friendship of staff and players at the Lahore Gymkhana, particularly the club manager Javed Zaman.

I am grateful for the use of facilities at the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB), Qaddafi Stadium, Lahore, and the DAWN newspaper office in Karachi. Staff at both these facilities were extremely cordial and helpful. I appreciate the efforts of both Col. Shujauddin Butt, a former test cricketer and the librarian of the PCB, and the librarian of the DAWN newspaper office, Ms Sabahad, for their

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tireless endeavours to keep me up to speed on archival material and photocopying needs.

There is a cast of hundreds of others that I should like to thank for my time in Pakistan, but I am afraid that what follows next is not as exhaustive a list as I would have liked to compile. Nevertheless, here is an arbitrary arrangement of many others in Pakistan who contributed to my growing knowledge of the people and customs in the region, and who offered support and encouragement along the way: Muneeb lbrahim and his family; Qamar Ahmed; lmran Ali; Professor Khalid Aftab of Government College; Majid Khan; Sultan Mahmud; Shahid Ajaz; A. Aziz Rehmatullah; Omar Kureishi; Gul Hameed Bhatti; Nauman Bader; Col. Rafi Nasim; Or Meesaq Rizvi; lmtiaz Ali Qureshi; Sarfraz Ahmad; lmtiaz Sipra; Stephen Lamb of cricinfo.com; Azhar Zaidi of Zaidi Sports and president of the P & T Cricket Club in Lahore; Abdur Razzaq; lmran Nazir; Aamir Sohail; Professor Asrar Ahmad; Afia Salam; Brigadier (Retd.) Salahuddin; Nauman Niaz; Mohammad Aamir Asad, Umair Aleem and Mohammad Khurram Asad; Mohammed Siddique; Sultan Rana; the late Pir of Pagaro; Wing Commander Salahuddin and Mrs Shaheen; Haider Ali; Haseeb Ahsan; Professor S. I. Bokhari; lskander lqbal and Jehangir Khan at PIA Sports headquarters in Karachi; Arif Ali Khan Abassi; Hanif Muhammed; Fazal Mahmood; lmtiaz Ahmed; Waqar Hassan; Andy Jalil, of Upper Ferntree Gully, Victoria, working at the Pakistan/England test match at the National Stadium in Karachi, December 2000; the staff of the Pakistan Olympic House in Lahore who put up with my late arrivals, every night for a whole week; the staff of the YMCA in Karachi who had to endure occasional visits from the constabulary forces because its facilities were directly opposite the Governor's House; Ahmed Mahmood, the son of Bahawalpur's chief Minister in the early 1950s, Makhdoomzada Syed Ahmed Mahmood; Yawar Saeed of the PCB; Kwajha Khawar, President of the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce; Zulfiqar Malik; Afzal Mufti, former colleague of the late Justice Cornelius; Shahzad Humayun; and Shahid Kardar, the Finance Minister of the Punjab Secretariat and the son of Abdul Hafeez Kardar.

My trip to England was far shorter than that to Pakistan, but here as well many provided the necessary friendship, assistance and direction to enable me to meet research commitments and to enjoy my stay. I am grateful for the hospitality and support shown to me, and the enthusiasm with which I was received at Bradford railway station on a cold summer's day in July 2004 by, Taj Butt. Taj is the most prominent organiser and authority of the British-Pakistani cricket scene, especially in Yorkshire. As a local authority officer for Bradford

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Council, and as Chairman of the Quaid-e-Azam League he is in a position to influence the direction of British-Pakistani cricket and its relations with the wider community. Taj was very approachable and assisted me in every imaginable way. He allowed me to access Bradford Council resources and facilities, took me to various British-Pakistani and Yorkshire cricket clubs and British-Pakistani youth clubs, introduced me to many prominent cricket figures in West Yorkshire, provided me with numerous resource material that I requested, served as my tour guide on visits to many historical sites in Bradford and the Yorkshire Dales, and was generally someone to discuss ideas and share a laugh with.

I am also indebted to Taj's extended family, his brothers, their wives and children, for the stories and adventures we shared and the various cricket matches we attended. I also wish to extend a special thanks to lkram Butt for his assistance. lkram has worked for many years developing an awareness of British-Pakistani issues in West Yorkshire. He is a former rugby league international, the first British-Pakistani player to represent Great Britain in an international fixture. In July 2004, he also worked for Bradford Council on initiatives aimed to curb racism in sport. lkram was always free with his time and with information and material pertaining to his initiatives, and those of others, in the field of race relations. One of his less novel ideas was his attempt to have me play rugby league for a British-Asian team he had organised and was taking to London for a tournament. In spite of the fact that I was not of South Asian heritage, nor had played the game competitively for some time, he persisted. What would Norman Tebbit have made of this?

Others in West Yorkshire who offered me assistance included British­Pakistani journalist and broadcaster, Masood Sadiq; sports shop owner and primary sponsor of the Quaid-e-Azam League, Solly Adam; cricket coach, Numan Shabbir Syed, West Bowling Youth Initiative Coordinator, Haqueq Siddique, and the players and staff of the Great Horton, Manningham and Girlington cricket clubs, particularly Ab id Shah of the latter.

In London I was well looked after by the staff of the British Newspaper Library in Colindale Avenue. On my few visits there I found them to be extremely helpful, and their resources and equipment were of the highest order. The staff and librarians at the School of Oriental and African Studies library, the University of London, in Russell Square, where I spent many a quiet moment reading and transcribing material, were kind enough to offer me as many day passes as I requested. My work also benefited from meetings with Dr Humayun Ansari of Royal Holloway, the University of London; Professor I an Talbot of the University of Coventry; Bobby Sayyid of the University of Leeds; Dr Stephen

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Wagg of Roehampton University, London; Shahid Sadullah, editor of the British­Pakistani daily The News; Haroun Khan, also from the offices of The News, who introduced me to a number of British-Pakistani youth publications and journalists; and Robin Richardson of lnsted educational consultancy and editor of two Runnymede Trust publications on lslamophobia. I would also like to thank Professor Roger Ballard of the University of Manchester for his time and assistance. Though I never met with him as I had hoped to during my visit to England, we have kept in touch through email where his suggestions, comments and articles - often sent as attachments - have kept me up to date with demographic developments among British-Pakistani communities.

My time in London was ably assisted by my friend and PhD graduate of the School of History at the University of New South Wales, Charles Little. He and his wife May provided lodgings for my first two weeks in London, and constantly inquired on the progress of my research. Charles offered invaluable advice and direction that kept me grounded and focussed on my research at a time when I, like many before me, was becoming increasingly drawn to the nightlife and theatrical charms of London's West End. There were numerous other friends, mostly expatriate Australians, who I was able to meet up with along the way. They made my time away from research enjoyable whether this was in London, Oxford, the Cotswolds, Bath, Salisbury, or Manchester.

There are various individuals in Australia without whose help my PhD would not have been attempted, let alone completed. Foremost, and of great importance, were my original team of supervisors, Or Max Harcourt and Associate Professor Richard Cashman. Max has been a constant source of inspiration, a veritable Rock of Gibraltar during tough periods and tougher ones, and a repository of vast knowledge, more than my infinitely more modest intellect could handle at any one time. He has been a mentor in the truest sense of the word, always encouraging me to believe and to trust my instincts, and never afraid to pull me up when I have invariably ventured off down some obscure intellectual path, or relied on some abstract piece of reasoning in place of accepted historical methodology and sound logic. Richard, an accomplished sports historian and lecturer, and a ruthless editor - he needed to be with some of my first drafts!- kept my dissertation from turning into the 'diary of a madman' due to its incongruous length and occasional proclivity to 'reinvent the wheel' in South Asian history. Richard, himself, was not short of motivation and encouragement, and offered critical feedback on argumentation and structure, as well as crucial insights on South Asian political, cultural and cricket history. I would also like to thank Richard for allowing me to develop as a scholar in other

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research and teaching capacities. Because of him I tutored for many years, gave papers at conferences and landed a much sought after position as an Australian researcher for NBC during their broadcast of the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.

The completion of this dissertation was seen to its end by Or Sean Brawley, who took the place of Richard Cashman upon the latter's retirement. Sean read tirelessly the many drafts I had left for him on his office desk in an effort to familiarise himself with my topic. This was done in what must have been record breaking time. Importantly, his critical feedback and meticulous organisation added polish to the overall presentation of my thesis. Or Kama Mclean, who contributed auxiliary supervision and support, was a pillar of strength and encouragement. I thank her for her confidence and belief.

Among others at the University of New South Wales whose contributions I would like to acknowledge are the funds committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, for their generous financial incentives that subsidised two field trips; librarian, Kaz M. Kazim, for his friendship, knowledge, support, humour and storytelling; and Anthony Hughes, Nick Ooumanis, Rae Frances, Mina Roces, Jean Taylor, John Gascoigne and the remaining staff and postgraduate students of the School of History.

The completion of this dissertation owes much to the staff of Cricket NSW, particularly its retired librarian, Bob Brenner. Much of the spade work was done in its library on various Tuesday afternoons in 1998 and 1999. I am grateful to Bob for taking the time to show me around and for sharing in discussions on my topic, and cricket in general.

Finally, I would like to close by mentioning that my family and friends were an integral part of the enjoyment and challenge that went into completing this dissertation. Without any of them I would be like an opening batsmen taking guard without protective gear to wear, nor a bat to hold. I would particularly like to thank my father who did not see the completion of many years of work. He passed away on 15 October, 2005. In many ways, the themes and arguments of this dissertation were very familiar to him.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation uses the game of cricket as a case study to examine the role of identity, and its construction, in Pakistan and among the Pakistani diaspora in England. lt makes a new and original contribution to the growing literature on nationalism and competing subaltern popular cultural discourses, and on the role of national sports in the study of cultural identities in global and commercial environments of disjuncture and rapid change. The dissertation is an original examination of cricket's importance in the overall narrative of the Pakistani nation, its ability to integrate disparate groups into a national framework in ways that political authoritarianism has been unable to, and its appeal to British­Pakistani communities who identify with the 'Pakistani' game to make sense of their political realities in England. Overall, the dissertation will argue that Pakistani cricket has engendered integration among disparate cultural groups in Pakistan and England. Its global cultural packaging has allowed for far greater levels of participation, contribution and representation from disenfranchised and disempowered political groups in both countries, a situation as yet not replicated by the political systems of either country.

The dissertation will discuss the origins of Pakistan as a concept (Chapter 1 ), and its continued use and manipulation by authoritarian politicians to justify their authority over numerous and distinct cultural groups (Chapter 2). lt will then evaluate the role of cricket, its history, and its impact on discourses of nationalism, resistance and integration in the region. Because of its origins in the colonial Indian cricket milieu, with its use of traditional systems of patronage and its distance from the nationalist agendas of indigenous politicians (Chapter 3), the game was devoid of political interference when Pakistan achieved independence. Its limited early appeal in Pakistan, restricted almost entirely to colleges and schools within Lahore and Karachi (Chapter 4), soon gave way to a growing popularity, albeit an exclusively urban phenomenon, brought about by an expanding industrial economy. Advances in technology and communications in this changing economic environment brought many poorer, rural, Pakistanis to the cities where, among other things, they began to engage in narratives of national belonging, including those perpetuated by its 'national' cricket team (Chapter 5). lt was at this moment that political authoritarianism and cricket nationalism clashed.

Politicians began to see the value of controlling a game that offered far greater scope for cultural integration to disenfranchised political groups than had the political system itself, and set about to appropriate it (Chapter 6). Their control of the game has not been successful in moulding a homogeneous

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political constituency. In fact, what has been more obvious is a multivocal and fluctuating use of identity and cultural bases by different groups in Pakistan. In relation to cricket, players and spectators have easily balanced various political positions, as all have played their part in the formation of personal and collective identities in Pakistan. Support of cricket at the national level does not mean a compromise to the dictates of power elites. On the contrary, this dissertation will argue that it adds to the richness and heterogeneity of Pakistan as a concept because it challenges political authoritarianism and its monopolisation of the Pakistani discourse.

The richness of the Pakistani discourse becomes more apparent when analysing its use by diaspora Pakistani groups in England {Chapter 7). The problematic of postcolonial realities in the contemporary world sees many in the diaspora readily identifying with Pakistani 'national' popular culture even as they disapprove of authoritarian regimes in Pakistan and the logic of their national discourse. Many of them also identify, to varying degrees, with the cultural products of the countries they have migrated to. This leads to the development of hybrid cultural identities that are complex, flexible and driven by multiple socio-economic and political imperatives and circumstances. The role of cricket in this context is useful to an understanding of diaspora constructions of identity, particularly when race relations in England have precluded any simple process of cultural and political integration.

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INTRODUCTION:

Salman Rushdie describes the fictitious country based on Pakistan in his novel, Shame, as "a nation imperfectly imagined".1 By implication Rushdie questions the rationale of the political proponents and supporters of the "two-nation" theory in India who sought, lobbied and eventually achieved the partition of the subcontinent on 14 August 1947. His fictionalised narrative of political events as they unfolded in Pakistan in its first 30 years after independence portrays the instability and inadequacy of a national political system characterised by any number of intractable structural conflicts and lethal factional rivalries. Rushdie's novel provides an example of fictional narrative used as an apologue.2 M. D. Fletcher writes that Rushdie is content to refer to the country in Shame as being "not quite Pakistan" because a real account of Pakistan would require a more thorough analysis of its corrupt and ineffective political framework and practices. 3 At the same time Rushdie uses parody and satire to challenge the legitimacy of "civilian and military Pakistani politics" along with its patriarchal architects, "Zia and Bhutto", throughout the novel.4

Shame provides a humorous historical account of, and offers a moral for, Pakistan's protracted political mismanagement. The novel brings into question, and ultimately undermines, the logic on which Pakistan as a nation came into being. As a contemporary novelist and critic of South Asian political and popular culture, Rushdie has often written of, and severely criticised, events which led to the formation of the independent nations of India and Pakistan. Moreover, much of his writing offers an evaluation of the impact of these events - and the subsequent partition of South Asia - on the political and cultural identities of the various ethnic, religious and social communities of the subcontinent. In Imaginary Homelands Rushdie asks poignant questions about the state of India as he saw it in August 1987:

Does India exist? If it doesn't, what's keeping Pakistan and Bangladesh apart? ... Nobody ever managed to rule the whole place, not the Mughals, not the British. And then, that midnight,

I S. Rushdie, Shame, Jonathan Cape, London, 1983. 2 Shelson Sack, Fiction and the Shape of Belief, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1964, pp.?-8, cited in M. D. Fletcher, "Rushdie's Shame as Apologue", in Journal of Commonwealth Literature, Vo1.21, No.1, 1986, p.120. Shelson Sack writes that an apologue is a work "organized as a fictional example of the truth of a formulable statement or closely related set of such statements". 3 Shame, p.29. 4 Fletcher, p.124.

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the thing that had never existed was suddenly "free". But what on earth was it? On what common ground (if any) did it, does it, stand?"5

it is questions like these that underlie the approach taken in this thesis to Pakistani cricket and its significance for Pakistani national identity.

i) The focus of the thesis The dysfunctional history of Pakistan as an institutional political entity

since 1947 is widely recognised, yet under the umbrella of that problematic political structure alternative popular cultural discourses that are representative of the multi-ethnic population have emerged. At least one of these, Pakistani cricket, has achieved remarkable success in the international arena. This thesis will focus on this paradox and will attempt to show such informal expressions of national identity that may in the long run contribute to the emergence of a more inclusive form of Pakistani nationalism than the "two-nation" theory that has been the official ideology for over 50 years.

In the process, the thesis will support the argument already developed by many scholars concerning the political and socio-economic circumstances as well as the ideological framework upon which Pakistan as a nation state was constructed. This argument asserts that Pakistan - like all nation states - is an t

imagined community of competing national and regional narratives. This approach offers a framework for understanding and interpreting the central proposition of this thesis: that the historical organisation and control of cricket in Pakistan, like the nation itself, is an invented tradition (in the sense used by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger).6 Since the 1970s it has come to be controlled by authoritarian politicians who define what is and what is not Pakistani cricket just as they define what is and what is not Pakistani nationalism. Power in Pakistan is held by a narrow military, bureaucratic and landholding elite, overwhelmingly drawn from the numerically and economically dominant Punjabi regional community. it is they who continue to define the national doctrine, political system, economic approach and cultural framework of the Pakistan nation state. Consequently, other cultural groups in Pakistan have been denied the opportunity to contribute to the structure and organisation of cricket and government in the country at the formal level, but not at an

5 S. Rushdie, "The Riddle of Midnight: India, August 1987" in Imaginary Homelands, Penguin, New York, 1991, p.27.

6 E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), Invented Traditions, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1983.

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informal, popular level where regional identities and cricket have become multi­layered idioms for cultural inclusion.

The thesis will look at two case studies of cricket development among 'Pakistanis' in Pakistan and England to highlight the flexible nature of national identities in a global context. In Pakistan an historical examination of the organisation, patronage and promotion of cricket will show active government involvement to have emerged at a late stage and not during the earliest years of nation-building. The game continued to function much as it had before partition, catering to an audience linked to western educational institutions established by the colonial state rather than to a broader national audience. Similarly, the financial patrons of the game continued to be the feudal magnates that had been the principal collaborators with the British Raj. Over time the changing demographic of cricket players and supporters and the increasing success of the national cricket team brought the game to the attention of politicians keen to use any means available to validate their authority. However, while government in Pakistan is inextricably involved in management of the game, this association is not unproblematic. Cricket, like the national discourse itself, has given rise to political rivalries and been exposed to conflicting interpretations of what, and whom, Pakistan was meant to represent. This can be traced back to the political imbroglio of the 1940s that directly led to the partition of India.

The globalisation of international economies and cultures in the late 20th century, and the presence of large numbers of migrants from South Asia in England, has led to further interpretations of Pakistani national identity that challenge the dominant discourse of Pakistan. The success of Pakistani cricket at an international level along with the development and consolidation of strong media and information networks has meant that diasporic Pakistani· communities in England have appropriated Pakistani symbols and popular culture - as well as their own regional histories - to make sense of their own political realities. They have imagined Pakistan for themselves in a foreign environment and away from the political yoke of authoritarian Pakistani politicians, and the construction of alternative cricket idioms has been crucial to this. In this way, the dominant construction and interpretation of Pakistani nationalism, and therefore that of Pakistani cricket, is challenged by a proliferation of viewpoints that originate outside of Pakistan.

The notion of what a Pakistani identity entails is a central focus of this thesis. The types of challenges Pakistanis have encountered in an era of greater economic, political and cultural globalisation has eaten away at the

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fabric of national identity woven by its political leaders. Though dominant, the official Pakistani national discourse is not the uncontested basis of identity amongst destitute, dispossessed and marginalised groups within Pakistan. Furthermore, its use by diasporic groups is specific to their experiences abroad and none have sought the political approval of lslamabad. The thesis will show that Pakistan, in particular, is a pertinent example of a nation state which from the moment of its independence found it very difficult to give expression to any coherent and universally accepted definition of national solidarity. Working against it were a variety of heterogeneous and often appositional foci of locality such as ethnicity, language and regional culture. Thus, the failure of the Pakistan movement to grapple with the significance of the disparities working against the monolithic definition of Pakistani identity paved the way for autocratic rule to be established and practised by its most dominant political groups, excluding the subaltern from the political process. However, political usurpation and increasing global flows and disjunctures have given rise to dissent and alternative Pakistani narratives that have inadvertently enriched concepts of Pakistaniness.

lt is within this environment that cricket has offered an opportunity to challenge the dominant discourse of Pakistani nationalism for those who have historically had little or no say in how the country is governed. This is the result of Pakistani cricket becoming international in scope, therefore, superseding the boundaries of the nation state. The international exposure given to the national cricket team of Pakistan has allowed suppressed elements within the country, as well as Pakistani migrant groups in various western industrialised countries, the opportunity to identify with the national team and, as a result, to redefine Pakistani nationalism on their own terms. lt should be pointed out however, that even accounting for the challenges that globalisation has brought to national governments world-wide, Pakistan's political leadership continues to suppress popular dissent as well as alternative constructions and interpretations of ethnic and national identity despite the pressure of globalisation and its ostensible democratic agenda. However, this does not prevent alternative accounts of identity and group solidarity from developing within and outside of Pakistan; nor, for that matter, does it prevent them from reaching a multitude of 'global' audiences who may in turn accept, be influenced by, or revise them.

The first chapter will cover the growth of Muslim political organisation in India from the mid 19th century to the time of partition. If the creation of Pakistan is to be considered as an example of an invented tradition then it is

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important to examine this period in an effort to interpret the events that led to the independence of Pakistan. This chapter will thus look at the politics and motivation behind prominent Muslim figures and movements in India responsible for the development of Muslim nationalism. The importance of this chapter is to demonstrate that, though Muslims were beginning to organise themselves politically, they did so in diverse ethnic and class communities. The assertion that they constituted a single, unified 'national' community was, in fact, the agenda of just one sub-section of the Muslim population.

In the process, the chapter will emphasise the diversity of the Muslim population of India that was dispersed all over the subcontinent. it will be shown that the Muslims of India were from different ethnic backgrounds, spoke distinct dialects and espoused cultural practices that varied from one region to the next - in fact, Muslims from particular regions shared languages and cultural practices with their non-Muslim eo-regionalists, and many of them had religious origins and practices that were palpably at odds with one another. The creation of Pakistan was the result of a political deadlock between the British, the Congress Party and the Muslim League. The members of these respective groups - and more particularly the leadership of the Congress and the Muslim League who resolutely clung to their political objectives - could not reach an agreement over the political configuration of independent India in the very restricted timeframe allocated to them by a British government determined to exit from a post-war Indian Empire that.was seen by Whitehall as a wasting asset. This power struggle is what eventually led to the partition of the subcontinent into the nation states of India and Pakistan. it is important to take into account this urgent timetable and the impact it had on the long-standing dispute between the leaderships of the Congress and the Muslim League over power sharing in an independent India. Arguably partition and the formation of Pakistan as a new nation state as the basis of the territorial division of 1947 was a 'second-best' solution that the Muslim League leadership desired as little as their Congress rivals. This was because the tnore prominent personalities of both parties accepted the desirability of a unified Indian state and were only in disagreement about the constitutional framework of that state.

Chapter 2 will examine the political and cultural landscape of Pakistan from 1947 to the present. This chapter will provide the necessary background material for an evaluation of the popular culture of Pakistani cricket, both in Pakistan and abroad. it will also support the main premise of the dissertation by depicting the primary force working against the concept and practice of Pakistan as a nation state. This will be shown to be ethnic tension between the

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subaltern regional-linguistic communities and the politically, culturally and economically dominant Punjabi region. In the first, economically precarious, decade, the League leadership - largely derived from regions outside of territorial Pakistan - failed to devise parliamentary institutions that could contain these tensions. The military coup of 1958 brought the Punjabi elite to power; . and they set about consolidating their authority through the instruments of their control: the arrned forces, bureaucracy and land ownership. This allowed them to impose definitions of Pakistani nationhood and national identity that were favourable to them but which were resisted by other segments of the country.

Chapter 3 will look at the introduction and growth of cricket in the Indian _ subcontinent priQJ:-to 1947. This will offer an insight on the extent to which the game was played by the British in India, as well as a discussion on the members of the indigenous population who took to playing and patronising the game. This chapter will emphasise that cricket remained a very small part of the ; overall political framework of the British even while it was maintained for two distinct reasons: it provided the British, resident in India, with ties to their homeland, culturally, physically and psychologically; and, it served as one aspect of the policy of anglicisation of segments of the Indian population needed as bureaucratic and economic collaborators in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The game of cricket in India remained small in scope throughout the period of British colonisation. it was situated in urban areas - with Bombay the most prominent of all - and mostly played by the students and alumni of colleges established by the British - or indigenous patrons influenced by, or convinced of, the importance of British education. Other areas of employment that allowed Indians to participate in the playing of cricket included the military and some commercial establishments like the Railways. So, at this early stage of cricket development in the subcontinent it is worth pointing out that the game was played at an official level by a very small number of urban Indians who mostly had an English language education. it is also worth acknowledging that in the areas that came to be allocated to Pakistan in 1947 cricket was not very strong. The game was played mostly in Karachi and Lahore but it was not very well organised or attended. Tournaments between communal teams and others between non-communal teams began in Karachi and Lahore by the end of the 1920s; these did not last longer than the two weeks of the competition itself. There was no permanent organisation of the sport.

Although cricket always remained a minority activity in India during the period of British colonisation, the game, nevertheless, acquired an indigenous

6

character in two different ways: some of its more ardent and colourful patrons and organisers were the Nawabs and Maharajahs - the princes of India - who became the most significant collaborators with British rule after the 1857 Rebellion. They participated in the elite western educational institutions and acquired a taste for western sports, especially cricket. Since the British categorised Indians primarily in terms of religious affiliation - rather than class, caste, region, etc. - and based access to their patronage on membership of a religious community, it is not surprising that early cricket teams were often communal in composition.

Chapter 4 will look at the formative years of Pakistani cricket from 1947 until the 1 970s. In this early period of nation-building cricket reflected the circumstances and scenarios prevalent in the game that was played in undivided India prior to 1947: it was very poorly organised and attended; and, it remained the pastime of college students and alumni in Karachi and Lahore. In the 1 950s and 1 960s the game could not be classified as a national sport. lt had few supporters and was bereft of infrastructure, organisation and money. Furthermore, government in Pakistan was preoccupied with the construction of political and economic institutions best suited to the growth and perpetuation of national identity and unity. They showed little interest in activities that sought to divert its attention away form the importance of building a nation on viable political and economic grounds; and, as a result, sports, like cricket, and other cultural and leisure pursuits were often neglected and denied funds by national politicians.

The chapter will also contradict the views of cricket journalists in Pakistan by arguing that the game was slow to organise offering no career opportunities and next to no financial incentive for players and administrators. Furthermore, the cricket board was often embroiled in controversy and intrigue based on factional and regional rivalries, and lacked experienced administrators and the representational basis of a truly national establishment.

The one notable exception to the early inadequacies of cricket organisation and management in Pakistan was Justice A. J. Cornelius. He is venerated in cricket circles as the Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, is at the national level. Cornelius is seen as the 'founding father' of cricket in Pakistan. His zest for cricket organisation and development in Pakistan, even in light of the problems caused by the administrative inefficiencies of those around him, paralleled his efforts to provide the country with a judicial system of national repute. He implemented strategies that sought to strengthen and entrench cricket in Pakistan. Because the game lacked funding as well as

7

national and international exposure he relied heavily on the support of the few experienced players who remained in Pakistan after partition - chiefly Abdul Hafeez Kardar and Fazal Mahmood - and on a strong youth policy - which led to the development of Hanif Mohammed. However, his efforts did not prove to be enough. While cricket began to develop and the national cricket team experienced several encouraging results, the game failed to reach - let alone interest- the majority of Pakistan's poorer and illiterate population.

Chapter 5 will examine the spread of the game to the masses and the rise of the 'vernacular' cricketer. lt will discuss the relevance of socio-economic change in Pakistan brought about by industrialisation and improved media technologies, and the impact this made on cricket. The political and economic reconstruction in Pakistan in the 1970s coincided with changes to international economic and cultural practices that made currency, information, culture and entertainment accessible to a larger number of people throughout the world. The growth of commercialisation, modernisation and, later, globalisation was beginning to be felt by nations as early as the 1970s. These global changes impacted on the economy and society of Pakistan. The urban areas of the country industrialised at the same time as technological machinery for farming made the agricultural sector less labour intensive. The growth of mechanised production for the market replaced renter systems and ensured that land fell more and more into the hands of big landowners. Much of the peasantry, poor, illiterate and evicted from land, made their way to the cities hoping to find work.

The economic and social transformation that Pakistan began to experience in this period resulted in a variety of changes to existing cultural and leisure practices. Cricket, itself, was transformed in a number of ways. First, the domestic competition took on a new appearance as many national companies formed cricket teams of their own. Second, many of the more established players increasingly were able to make careers out of playing the game -largely the result of company involvement and the growth of advertising and other methods of sponsorship that the national cricket administrators began to accrue. Third, the development of stronger national and international media networks, along with the increased exposure to the playing conditions and lifestyles of cricketers in other countries - the result of national team tours and an increased participation of Pakistani cricketers in the domestic competitions of other countries, particularly that of England - developed ethics of professionalism and camaraderie amongst Pakistani cricketers that often conflicted with the views of the national cricket board. Fourth, as cricket became more professional the educated classes took to managing the game

8

while the less educated were recruited to play it.7 Finally, with the growth of local and global media outlets, and international consumer and leisure cultures, cricket increasingly became more lucrative and commercial, both nationally and internationally, and this provided an opportunity to project to the world an image of Pakistani society and national identity.

Chapter 6 will discuss the role of government involvement in cricket and ~­

the reasons for its appropriation of the game. lt will primarily focus on the intervention of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Zia ui-Haq who used cricket to present a more 'human face' to their autocracies. The rise in status of cricket and its growing international exposure enabled them to use patronage of the game as a way to buy popularity and legitimacy.

Bhutto, democratically elected and a Sindi, was popularly perceived as working in opposition to the elite power structure of the Punjabi military, bureaucratic and landholding classes. His initial political decisions supported this commonly held belief: he implemented a series of policies that seemingly undermined the power base of his predecessors. Bhutto's government was also presiding over a country that was reduced to half the population of that ruled by the previous administration. Pakistan had numerically lost its largest, poorest and most illiterate ethnic group when the war in East Pakistan culminated with the independence of Bangladesh in December 1971.

The earliest phase of Bhutto's political leadership promised prosperity and social equality for the heterogeneous ethnic and regional communities in Pakistan. This political and economic climate was conducive to a number of changes in the organisation and popular support of cultural and leisure activities. Government became a stronger financial and administrative patron to sport. This was especially beneficial for the game of cricket. The early 1970s saw the establishment of a permanent national organising and representational body for cricket at the Qaddafi Stadium in Lahore; it also gave rise to a professional managerial environment that produced a greater level of national and international exposure for Pakistani cricket resulting in substantive efforts to promote and develop the game beyond its principal strongholds of Karachi and Lahore.

Suddenly the growing popularity of Pakistani cricket, which had previously been largely ignored by the nation's political leaders, turned the game into an instrument that could be used to validate the political elite's discourse of Pakistani nationalism. In the late 1970s Zia ended the Bhutto

7 Admittedly, many still came from the Punjab, often from small towns in close proximity to Lahore or, to a lesser extent, that of other cities; others began to slowly emerge from Peshawar.

9

experiment and its protagonist's life but continued his policy of 'appropriating' cricket to legitimate his autocratic authority, thus giving the game a military public image. This second era of military rule saw Zia presiding over any number of, often blackly comic, disputes, rivalries and resignations that led to the termination of captaincies, coaching staff and cricket boards. Much of this resulted from the ignorance of cricket rules and administration on the part of the military leaders. it was also the consequence of the Punjabi elite's determination to construct a cricket identity consistent with their national and political objectives.

There will be a brief discussion of indigenous Pakistani alternatives to the official cricket culture of Pakistan in Chapter 6, but I will argue that the most significant alternative Pakistani cricket culture emerged amongst the Pakistani diaspora in England. This thesis will be more fully developed in Chapter 7 which will examine the politics of identity and ethnicity amongst diverse Pakistani migrant groups who have interpreted the international success of the Pakistani national cricket team on their own terms. This chapter will serve two purposes: it will be a separate case study of Pakistani cricket identities developing outside of Pakistan; and, it will argue that collective and personal identities are constantly evolving and cannot be confined within the parameters of arbitrarily drawn political boundaries.

The first of these points will look at the construction of distinct Pakistani identities in the context of lslamophobia and institutional racism in England. The appropriation of the idea of Pakistan was undertaken by British-Pakistani communities who were denied opportunities and a 'voice' in English society. Their marginalisation led to separate imaginings of Pakistan, specific to the socio-political milieu of post war England, and to reconstructions of Pakistaniness on cricket pitches throughout the country. A particular emphasis will be given to the Quaid-e-Azam League in West Yorkshire that offers the most recognisable response to British-Pakistani socio-cultural marginalisation.

The second point will argue that in the last two decades of the 20th century nationalism, largely through the growth of global forces and disjunctures that have increased social contact the world-over, has evolved into a series of multinationalisms where the construction of political, cultural and economic identities are in continual flux. This process is evident in England where the dominant construction and interpretation of Pakistani cricket culture is challenged by migrant groups who identify with the national cricket team of Pakistan but oppose the autocratic leadership of its politicians and their definitions of Pakistani nationalism. Pakistani cricket is used by them to make

10

sense of their experiences in English society and not in that of Pakistan. These multiple identities are the product of the enormous and variegated proliferation of information that is so readily available in contemporary times. This chapter will assess the heterogeneity of Pakistani identities among the diaspora communities in England. lt will discuss the nature of their political and cultural disempowerment and their subsequent and various organised and informal responses, the extent to which they identify with and feed back into the popular culture of cricket emanating from Pakistan and England, and how this, in turn, challenges and somewhat undermines the official Pakistani national discourse.

ii) Scholarly influences on the thesis This thesis has covered a range of disciplines and theoretical positions in

the arts and social sciences. lt has looked at the development of popular culture, institutions and identities in Pakistan and among Pakistani diaspora groups in England. In formulating a personal conceptual and analytical framework for the topic, a wide array of primary source material and secondary literature was consulted. This included the use of interviews, newspaper and magazine articles, brochures and artifacts, and the historical, anthropological, sociological and theoretical arguments of various scholars from numerous academic disciplines. The fields of South Asian and Pakistani history, nationalism and the study of cultural and diaspora identities are large and cannot be fully exhausted in the writing of this introduction. What follows is a brief sample of some of the scholarly publications in each of these areas that are crucial to the overall objectives and arguments of this dissertation.

The development of notions like communalism and concepts like the "two-nation" theory, crucial to the logic of the Pakistani separatist discourse, are critically examined in the scholarly appraisals of Ayesha Jalal and Gyanendra Pandey.8 Jalal's monograph on the "two-nation" theory and its use by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the decade leading to the partition of India is The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan.9 lt examines the reasons behind Jinnah's transformation from a secular nationalist espousing the independence of an undivided India to the staunchest political proponent for a Pakistani nation state. Pandey in The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India examines the orientalist desire of

8 G. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, OUP, Delhi, 1994.

9 A. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1985.

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imperialists to construct essentiaiist categories of separation and allegiance for indigenous groups as critical to the reification of communal identities in India.

Of the histories of South Asia and Pakistan, Jalal and Sugata Bose's Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, examines historical and contemporary competition, conflict and resolution in the region and their impact on political institutions and identities. The book looks at the British and their role in the construction of caste, communalism, class and gender in the lead up to partition, and at the separate developments of India and Pakistan after 1947, the political and economic successes and failures of both, and their ever increasing hostility to one another.1 O

Additionally, the work of lan Talbot is widely cited in Chapter 2, as are books by Christophe Jaffrelot and Ashok Kapur. Talbot's Pakistan: A Modern History illustrates the political rivalries and institutional power conflicts that have bedevilled the political system in Pakistan.11 His Inventing the Nation: India and Pakistan describes the inability of official national discourses in both India and Pakistan to speak for all 'national' groups.12 lt also highlights the myriad socio­cultural rivalries and conflicts that have emerged internally in both countries and globally among diaspora communities who originate from the region.

In Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation? Jaffrelot and other scholars trace the origins an~,~valuate the complexity of various Pakistani identities.13 Numerous chapters cover\he separatist tendencies of many in Pakistan who engage in conflict wi h-th·/government and other cultural groups over issues of ethnicity, 'Islamic ideology' and denominational dissidence, economic disparities and regional polarities. Kapur's Pakistan in Crisis reflects on the causes of constant destabilisation and turmoil within the Pakistani political system.14 He examines the rise and fall of all governments up to Zia's demise in 1988, and argues that political authoritarianism is the product of institutional imbalances that has made government captive to the demands and prerogatives of military rulers.

The theoretical perspectives of Benedict Anderson, Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, Arjun Appadurai and Zygmunt Bauman are integral to the arguments of this dissertation. Anderson's seminal study, Imagined Communities,15 looks at

I 0 M. Base & A. Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, Routledge, London, 1998. I! I. Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Vanguard, Lahore, 1999. 12 1. Talbot, Inventing the Nation: India and Pakistan, Arnold, London, 2000. 13 C. Jaffrelot (ed.}, Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, Zed Books, London, 2002. 14 A. Kapur, Pakistan in Crisis, Routledge, London, 1991. 15 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 2000 (Tenth Impression).

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the critical role of dominant 'national' languages and the use of print-capitalism in the rise of political elites to power, and the emergence of nation states in a world of international economic competition. Bhabha extends Anderson's premise in Nation and Narration16 to argue for the existence of alternative and multiple national narratives that challenge official discourses of power. Bhabha sees debates on nationalism promoting hybrid 'national' experiences and not homogeneous and authoritarian ones. Hall's oeuvre has focussed on the complexity of hybrid and multiple cultural identities that blur modernist conceptualisations of existence and belonging. In "The Question of Cultural ldentity"17 Hall describes identities as heterogeneous and multi-accented, and nation states as "cultural hybrids" subject to change. Appadurai's study on globalisation, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy", 18 provides a theoretical basis to evaluate the complex nature of global human realities and relations. Bauman's work on migrants and postmodernism is critical of modernist discourse and its endorsement of absolute order and structural homogeneity. He argues that the experiences of migrants and diaspora communities to synthesise numerous cultural idioms can bring change to rigid political structures, allowing for greater levels of socio-cultural spontaneity, tolerance and freedom.19

The literature on sport and national identity offers crucial historical and \ comparative case studies of various sports and their capacity to integrate vast and diverse communities and cultural groups. This field addresses the pivotal role played by 'national' sports in the formation of national identities, and the potential of these pastimes to unite disparate groups and marginalised sectors of society under the banner of the nation state. The theoretical and empirical arguments of several authors in this field provide an evaluative basis for understanding the complexities and subtleties of Pakistani cricket's appeal to peripheral and disenfranchised cultural groups in Pakistan and among the Pakistani diaspora in England.

16 H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, Routledge, London, 1990. 17 S. Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity", in S. Hall, D. Held, T. Mcgrew (eds.), Modernity and its Futures, Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers and Open University, 1999. 18 A. Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy", in Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minnesota UP, Minneapolis, 1996. 19 Z. Bauman, "The Re-enchantment of the World or, How Can One Narrate Postmodernity?" (1992), & "Making and Unmaking of Strangers" (1995), in P. Beilharz (ed.), The Bauman Reader, Blackwell, Oxford, 2001.

13

I

I

The seminal study on sport and national identity is C.L.R. James's Beyond a Boundary.20 In this book James threads the development of West Indian cricket to the political, socio-economic and cultural history of the region, and to his own personal development as a scholar, activist, and cricket player and enthusiast. He unveils a large tapestry of interlocking discourses that renders the scholarly viewing of sport and other popular cultures in isolation of politics and economic forces as tenuous and inefficacious. This is captured in his oft-quoted epigram: "What do they know of cricket who only cricket know?" His tying of sport to politics has made any analysis of the former critical to, and contingent on, developments in the latter, and vice versa. As a result, many scholars since have written on a plethora of sporting cultures, locating them intrinsically in the social, political, cultural and economic lives and experiences of individuals and communities around the world.

Boria Majumdar and J. A. Mangan's recently edited book, Sport in South Asian Society: Past and Present, 21 details the rise of various sports in the subcontinent and their impact on the lives and identities of different communities in the region. The book examines the significance of sport on constructions of socio-cultural identities, and in discussions on national consciousness and political marginalisation and inclusion, in South Asian society. it also highlights the historical origins and diverse traditions of numerous sports cultures throughout the region, and the various interweaving trajectories of sports development and participation amongst players, patrons, spectators and officials, both British and indigenous.

Jeremy MaCJancy's edited book, Sport, Identity and Ethnicity, is a critical study of various sports and their impact on notions of national identity.22 Authors in various chapters cover the diverse pastimes, ranging from wrestling, female bullfighting, angling, cricket and soccer, of select nations and particular cultural groups, like Turkey, Spain, British-Pakistanis and the Basques. MaCJancy's introductory chapter examines the role of theory in the study of sport and nationalism. He looks at the congruence of sport and the objectives of nation-builders in contemporary times, and argues that sport's strong international exposure through media networks and its conspicuous organisation and institutionalisation along national lines has made it an

20 C. L. R. James, Beyond a Boundary, Stanley Paul & Co., London, 1963.

21 B. Majumdar & J. A. Mangan (eds.), Sport in South Asian Society: Past and Present, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon (UK), 2005.

22 J. MaCiancy (ed.), Sport, Identity and Ethnicity, Berg, Oxford, 1996.

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invaluable source for harnessing national sentiment and emotional social consensus.

John Bale's books, The Global Sports Arena and Kenyan Running,23 both examine the impact that sport and sporting achievement and success have had on constructions of national identity and belonging. The first book looks at the critical role of sports migrants on notions of nationhood, and the obstacles that migration presents to them as individuals and to 'national' communities that are quite often the products of inflexible and rigid socio­political institutions. The second book charts the history of running in Kenya as a British colony and as an independent nation. lt looks at the evolution of indigenous cultures of running, their appropriation and alteration into British track and field contests, and the subsequent adoption of the latter by athletes whose international success has conveyed a strong and unequivocal endorsement of the Kenyan postcolonial state.

There are a growing number of books, biographies and articles written on cricket, its origins, development and spread to the Indian subcontinent and other locations around the world. Of the scholarly books that look at the game's emergence and spread worldwide, Keith Sandiford's Cricket and the Victorians24 and The Imperial Game,25 edited by Brian Stoddart and Sandiford, are valuable contributions to the topic. In the first, Sandiford evaluates changing socio-economic conditions in 19th Century Britain that led to the rise of public schools, muscular Christian ideals and the codification of cricket among many other sports. He also looks at the zeal with which cricket was then taken to imperial colonies by public school graduates. In the latter book, various scholars, including Stoddart on the West lndies and Richard Cashman on the subcontinent and Australia, examine the transformation that cricket underwent in the British dominions and colonies that the game was introduced to. Central to the arguments of all contributors to this book is an understanding of how crucial cricket was to concepts of national identity and nation building, and to struggles for independence and political freedom.

There is very little scholarly literature on cricket in Pakistan and among the Pakistani diaspora in England. However, the few books that have been published on the game's history in both these regions do offer varying insights

23 J. Bale, & Maguire (eds.) , J. The Global Sports Arena: Athletic Talent Migration in an Interdependent World, Frank Cass, London, 1994; & J. Bale & Sang, J. Kenyan Running, Frank Cass, London, 1996.

24 K. Sandiford, Cricket and the Victorians, Scalar Press, Aldershot, 1994.

25 B. Stoddart & K. Sandiford (eds.), The Imperial Game: Cricket, Culture and Society, Manchester UP, Manchester, 1998.

15

into popular cultures of cricket that are rich, vivacious and continually growing.

For the history of the game before partition there are numerous accounts of Indian cricket to turn to. Chapter 3 of this dissertation makes use of the arguments and histories of Ramachandra Guha,26 Cashman,27 Mihir Bose28

and Boria Majumdar.29 All provide an extensive overview of the game in the colonial period, its chief patrons, players and organisers, and numerous anecdotes that capture the spirit and colour of cricket as it was played at the time. In the more recent writing of Guha and Majumdar, analysis of Indian

cricket history has emphasised the growing importance of princely patronage, notions of egalitarianism, and the cricket cultures of regions other than Bombay on the development of the game in India. Majumdar, in particular, points to the existing and thriving cricket milieu of colonial Bengal as an example of the game's greater penetration into Indian society than has previously been

acknowledged.

However, studies of Indian cricket history currently lack any probing

evaluation of the game's development in areas partitioned to Pakistan, principally Lahore and Karachi. The former was a crucial player in the cricket of northern India; the latter was overwhelmed by the game's strong development in Bombay.30 Of course, one reason why such histories have not been written is that Lahore and Karachi were part of separate regional cricket structures. No one involved in the cricket played in these two cities could foresee the political impasse and subsequent dismemberment of these regions by nationalists from either side of the political spectrum.

For an insight on the development of a distinct Pakistani cricket tradition this dissertation relies on a single scholarly publication and several autobiographies. Omar Noman's Pride and Passion looks at the achievements

26 R. Guha, A Corner of a Cricket Field: The Indian History of a British Sport, Picador, London, 2002. 2 7 R. Cashman, Patrons, Players and the Crowd: The Phenomenon of Indian Cricket, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1980. 28 M. Base, A History of Indian Cricket, Andre Deutsch, London, 1990. 29 B. Majumdar, "Cricket: The Indian History of a British Sport" (Review Article), in The International Journal ofthe History of Sport, Volume 20, Number 1, March, 2003, pp.162-170; "Cricket in India: Representative Playing Field to Restrictive Preserve, in Sport in Society, Routledge, Volume 6, Numbers 2-3, October, 2003, pp.169-191; Twenty-Two Yards to Freedom: A Social History of Indian Cricket, Penguin, New Delhi, 2004; & "Maharajas and Cricket: Self, State, Province and Nation", in The International Journal of the History of Sport, Volume 22, Number 4, July 2005, p.639. 30 Ironically, it was cricketers from northern India that became the prominent patrons and players of cricket in Lahore and Karachi after partition. Lahore kept to its existing structure, while Karachi inherited the Muslim cricketers that migrated from other parts of northern India. For more on this refer to Chapters 3 and 4.

16

and failures of Pakistani cricket on the international stage by focussing on its first 5 decades as a cricket nation.31 The book describes in detail the contribution of players, and the importance of sporting success, to a young nation like Pakistan. Noman offers an overview of all the test series' played by Pakistan before the end of the 20th Century, and assesses their relevance to the Pakistani nation.

The autobiographies of lmran Khan,32 Wasim Akram,33 Hanif Mohammed34 and Fazal Mahmood,35 and a collection of published articles by Abdul Hafeez Kardar36 cover the length and breadth of Pakistani cricket history to date. The lack of serious writing on this topic makes each of these books undeniable resources for an understanding of the difficulties that players have encountered in the face of social upheavals and major political events in Pakistan's short history. Hanifs poignant description of his family's migration from Gujerat to Karachi at the time of partition is as compelling a read as that of Fazal's constant need to come to terms with his father's pious life and political agitations at a time when the domestic cricket milieu in Lahore endorsed secular British values· and traditions. Kardar's life as a cricket player and administrator encompassed both Pakistan's entrance into the test arena in the early 1950s and the disputes over player payments and other external influences that affected control of the game in Pakistan in the late 1970s. His writings discuss these and other issues that Pakistani cricket has had to deal with during his lifetime. They also capture the richness of his family's history and that of others who were crucial to the early development of the game, including that of the Nawab of Mamdot.

Both lmran and Wasim's autobiographies reveal personal histories that reflect two contrasting but accepted ways for cricketers in Pakistan to be chosen for the national team. lmran's cricket was nurtured on traditional lines, and this included domestic cricket appearances at a very young age and college cricket in Pakistan and England; Wasim, while not from a poor family, nor lacking formal education, did not play cricket until his late teenage years,

31 0. Noman, Pride and Passion: An Exhilarating Half Century of Cricket in Pakistan, Oxford UP, Karachi, 1998.

32 I. Khan, All Round View, Chatto & Windus, London, 1988.

33 W. Akram, Wasim: The Autobiography of Wasim Akram, Piatkus, London, 1998.

34 H. Mohammed, Playing for Pakistan: An Autobiography, with Q. Ahmed & A. Salam, Hamdard Press, Karachi, 1999.

35 F. Mahmood, From Dusk to Dawn: Autobiography of a Pakistani Cricket Legend, with A.Sohail, OUP, Oxford, 2003. 36 A. H. Kardar, Memoirs of an All-Rounder, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1987.

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and was plucked from relative obscurity for his first overseas tour in the mid-1980s. Their autobiographies also tell much about the state of the game in Pakistan from the early 1970s to the first years of the new century. This includes the appearance of large numbers of Pakistanis in English county and league cricket, the military appropriation of the domestic game, and the rise of less affluent and non-English speaking players, many from families previously with little or no knowledge of the game.

There is a small but important literature on the significance of cricket to British-Pakistanis. The writings of Pnina Werbner,37 Chris Searle,38 Mike Marqusee39 and Jack Williams40 reflect a concern with the politics of exclusion in England that has alienated Pakistani diaspora communities both on the cricket field and in mainstream society. Werbner's research differs from that of the other three. She sees Pakistani diaspora cricket as one part of British­Pakistani youth culture that seeks to empower itself against patriarchal parental authority as much as it does against the institutional racism and lslamophobia of English society. Searle, Marqusee and Williams denounce the rampant racist attitudes of cricket authorities throughout England for their defamatory remarks and prejudicial policies that are levelled at cricketers of minority communities. Their arguments are part of an overall cricket dialectic that includes other discriminated cultural groups as well as British-Pakistani ones. They list numerous instances of the racism prevalent in English cricket circles and on English cricket greens.

37 P. Werbner, "'Our Blood is Green': Cricket, Identity and Social Empowerment among British Pakistanis", in J. MaCiancy (ed.), Sport, Identity and Ethnicity, Berg, Oxford, UK, 1996; & P. Werbner, Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims: The Public Performance of Pakistani Traditional Identity Politics, James Currey, Oxford, 2002. 38 C. Searle, Pitch of Life: Writings on Cricket, The Parrs Wood Press, Manchester, 2001. 39 M. Marqusee, Anyone but England: Cricket, Race and Class, Two Heads Publishers, London, 1998. 40 J. Williams, Cricket and Race, Berg, Oxford, UK, 2001.

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CHAPTER 1 'A NATION IMPERFECTLY IMAGINED':

MUSLIM NATIONALISM AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistan came into existence on 14-15 August 1947. Its creation had more to do with the politics of opposition and distrust practised by rival class and regional elites located within the all-lndia Muslim League and the Indian National Congress than with any 'essentialist' division of the subcontinent into Hindu and Muslim 'nations'. Pakistan as a nation state was an improvised political solution devised by indigenous politicians and the post-war British government to meet the latter's unexpected but urgent timetable for bringing independence to India. This timetable was itself the product of Britain's precarious economic situation and the wartime transformation of lndo-British economic relations.

Before examining the disputes and failures at compromise of Congress and Muslim League politicians, a brief account of Muslim history on the subcontinent from the time of the arrival of the British East India Company is necessary. This is important because it undermines the basis of tile "two­nation" theory originally formulated by the Muslim elite politicians opposed to the Indian Nationalist Movement's objective of an independent democratic nation state, and much later, 'tweaked' to provide the legitimating rationale for the idea of a Muslim territorial state. At the heart of the "two-nation" theory is the assumption that the Muslims of the subcontinent constituted a unified, homogeneous community historically distinct from a similarly unified, homogeneous 'Hindu' community. What the following analysis will demonstrate is that India's Muslims were actually fragmented along multiple lines of division: religion, language, sect and class.

THE "TWO-NATION" THEORY AS THE LEGITIMATING IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN

In the immediate post-partition period Pakistani political writers developed the "two-nation" theory to justify the legitimacy of Pakistan's / independence. Their arguments found support amongst a small group of sympathetic western historians who began interpreting the significance of Pakistan's post war alliance with the United States as crucial to the Cold War

19

objectives of the west in South and Central Asia.1 In the process the latter began to endorse the "two-nation" theory.

The "two-nation" theory, as propounded by these writers, was a simplistic ideological construct that obfuscated the complex layers of social and / community modes of identification that had developed over time in various localities throughout India. Furthermore, it did not take account of the many / divisions that were discernible within the supposedly unified religious categories of Hinduism and Islam. Historians endorsing the "two-nation" theory logic have consistently overlooked or completely dismissed variations in the practice and adherence of ritual and custom by the members of these two faiths.

Other scholars have chosen to analyse more fully the significance of Muslim diversity in the history of the subcontinent. In The Muslims of British India, Peter Hardy stresses that until the arrival of the British the Muslims of India did not conceive of, let alone regard, themselves as a national group:

In reality, the British began, in the eighteenth century, to rule over a Muslim community unified at best by a few common rituals and by beliefs and aspirations of a majority - not the totality- of its scholars.2

One reason for this was that the Mughals, Afghans and Turks who conquered India from the north did not in any way promote communal solidarity and identity. These invading armies were proud of their ethnic lineage and exclusivity. While ruling over India they espoused and observed practices of segregation towards Muslims of different ethnic and social backgrounds. Hafeez Malik argues the caste structure of the Mughal period divided Muslims into three groups - royalty, nobility and workers/peasants - with next to no interaction between the lower and upper classes.3 Muslims whom the ruling Muslim dynasties of pre-colonial India considered to be of lower social status, different ethnic and/or tribal communities, working in unacceptable and unclean environments and living in poverty were socially ostracised and discouraged from attending mosque services, inter-marrying, or dining with their "respectable" co-religionists. 4 These neglected sections of Muslim India had more in common with non-Muslims of similar class and regional background.

1 F. Abbot!, Islam and Pakistan, Cornell UP, lthaca, NY, 1968; & R. Wheelkr, The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest, Cornell UP, lthaca, NY, 1970.

2 P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge UP, 1972, pp.1-2.

3 Hafeez Malik, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan, Columbia UP, New York, pp.26-27.

4 Hardy, pp.1-2.

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In the United Provinces most of the Muslims worked in agriculture, as artisans, and in a number of other professions. 5 The Punjab and Bengal told similar stories: out of every 1 000 Muslims in the Punjab 574 worked in agriculture, 274 as artisans, 36 as menials and 7 were listed as employed in some form of commerce6- i.e., nearly 90 per cent of the total population (thus, the 'military aristocracy'/ruling class/social elite formed only about 10 per cent of the Muslim population); in Bengal, including Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur, there were 628 out of every 1 000 Muslims in the region working as agriculturalists, 31 in textile production and 73 as labourers.?

The majority of Muslims in India had regional, social, economic and / cultural practices in common with the non-Muslim communities in their linguistic region. An example of this could be found in pre-independence Delhi: Muslim ceremonial occasions and funeral rites were heavily influenced by their Hindu equivalents8 This process of communal borrowing which led to a regional hybridisation of religious and cultural expression was reciprocated by the Hindu population of Delhi: many took to speaking in the Urdu vernacular; others visited the shrines of Muslim saints to pay homage and seek blessing; and, some adopted the practice of wearing distinct Muslim attire. 9

In Sind religious syncretism and mysticism historically flourished long before the arrival of the British. This led to the development of Islamic Sufism which blends aspects of Hindu ritual and practice with traditional Islamic mystical belief and teaching. This growth of Sufi mysticism was vehemently opposed by the u/ama who rejected its non-Muslim accretions as being antithetical and anathema to traditional Islamic doctrine and worship.10 They also opposed it because it had historically been more influential amongst the Muslim peasantry than had u/amic legalistic Islam.

Recent writing on the "two-nation" theory has stressed the importance of both Hindu and Muslim interaction in the subcontinent. Various writers have emphasised the cultural and religious borrowings and ties that the followers of

5 Hardy, p.6. Some worked as musicians, others as perfume-sellers, prostitutes and other occupations associated with courtly service and entertainment needs. 6 ibid, p.7. 7 ibid. 8 Dehlawi in Malik, p.25. Leaving Sayyid Ahmad Dehlawi (1846-1918) to comment that "All the customs of Muslim women, and because of them the customs of Muslim men, are almost all of Hindu origin". 9 Malik, ibid., p.26. 10 S. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843 - 1947, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1992, p.13.

21

both religions had forged over many years. They point to racial distinctions as misleading and deceptively used by some sections of both the Hindu and Muslim religious and political leaderships of India before 1947; and, that these were given prominence over historical examples of shared economic and socio­cultural affinities and practices that the people of both religious groups demonstrated.11

Mushirul Hasan highlights several religious borrowings from Hinduism that permeated the way Islam had been - and continues to be - practised and observed by many Muslim communities in the subcontinent. He writes of the "fusion of Hindu and Muslim 'folk' worship" that he and other scholars have examined, and concludes:

On the basis of existing studies, we can safely trace the strength of composite and syncretistic tendencies, though their growth and progress were neither unilinear nor unimpeded ... Islam gained a foothold (in Kashmir, Punjab, Bengal and South India) because of its capacity to forge links with the religions and peoples of the wider society, to offer a form of access to the divine which could be grasped and built upon through means already present within these societies. This interpenetration was neither 'degenerate' nor a product of superficial accretions from Hinduism. The sharing of belief and practice was, in fact, built up into a dynamic and expansive religious system.12

Numerous examples of religious, socio-economic and cultural interaction in times of peace and crisis emphasised the importance that regionalism and ethnicity - in contrast to religious affiliation and identity - played in the historical formation of communal tolerance, acceptance and, at times, assimilation.

(There is) the case of the Muslim weavers of Banaras (participating) in public ceremonials relating to particular Hindu figures. There are also instances... such as the one from Bahraich in eastern UP, where the outbreak of cholera in 1930 prompted Muslims to join in great force to worship the goddess Bhawani to induce her to remove the pestilence ... 13

11 These writers include: Mushirul Hasan ([ed.] India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization, OUP, Oxford, 1993; & Making Sense of History: Society, Culture and Politics, Manohar, London, 2003}, Susan Bayly (Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700-1900, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1989) and Barbara Metcalf, (Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan, OUP, Oxford, 2004). 12 Hasan, 1993, p.35. 13 ibid., p.34.

22

Furthermore, G. T. Garratt observes that the majority of Muslims in India "are in no sense foreigners" and "only a few generations removed from their Hindu kinsmen".14 He stresses that Muslims who claim foreign descent cannot completely disassociate themselves from Hindu ancestral ties and influences: "Six of the Mogul Emperors, including Jahangir and Shah Jehan, had Hindu mothers, and in the seventeenth century this form of intermarriage seems to have been common".15 Rather, he argues that economic reasons were responsible for the outbreak of communal antagonism and opposing political visions and objectives. These emanated from competition over colonial government appointments to bureaucratic positions. Thus, calls for equality in political employment and representation were voiced by communal politicians at the elite level and supported by some religious officials, politicians and communal newspaper publishers at the lower JeveJ.16

In this context the "two-nation" theory and its emphasis on the primacy of religion in providing the appropriate and logical parameters for distinguishing one group of people from another in India has no historical basis. The spuriousness of its historical logic links 17th and early 18th century Islamic revivalism with the political separatism of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan and his followers in the period 1880-1914 and the Pakistan movement of the period 1940-1947 all in a single line of dissent. The rest of this chapter will demonstrate the Jack of a unified Muslim 'voice' in the political landscape of India in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. Ultimately, it will argue that the Pakistan movement's objective of a separate nation state for the Muslims of the majority regions was not an outgrowth of earlier movements (those organised by Islamic revivalists in the 18th and 19th centuries, and those by early Muslim separatists) but a radically new conception with no precedent in Indian Islamic history.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 1857 U/amic revivalist movements in the period before 1857 envisaged the

restoration of a purified Islamic empire over the whole of India, not the establishment of a Muslim nation state in the Muslim majority areas. Indeed, the latter was anathema to the notion of Darullslam which recognised Muslims as a unified community of religious adherents and was not restricted to specific

14 G.T. Garratt, An Indian Commentary, (London, n.d.), pp.172-179. Reprinted by permission of Jonathan Cape Ltd. in Wallbank, T. W. (ed.), The Partition of India: Causes and Responsibilities, D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1966, p.1 0. 15 ibid. 16ibid., p.11.

23

territorial demands. Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind, Shah Wali-AIIah, Sayyid Ahmad and Dudu Miyan were not united in any nationalist sense; they remained isolated from one another and the source of their respective grievances pertained to regional alterations in the organisation and administration of socio­economic and political affairs. They had similarities in their call for Islam to be reformed; but they also appealed to the peasantry and other disenchanted religious groups who were also affected by the imposition of British law and economic practice.17

In the early 19th century these religious scholars preached their opposition to the decline of Mughal - and therefore Muslim - rule and the growing influence and subsequent establishment of British - and therefore non­Muslim - economic and political government in India. They were distressed at

the gradual introduction of British economic and legal reforms that undermined existing mercantilist and judicial practices. These reforms, along with changes to indigenous educational instruction, threatened to destabilise Muslim historical influence and tradition, and, of more particular concern to the u/ama, Islamic religious doctrine and practice.

Thus, the Muslims of India were not only increasingly advised to avoid British socio-economic customs and education, but, also to do away with Hindu religious accretions that had permeated and, in many instances, altered the practice of Islam in India. Of course, this meant the return to a traditional interpretation and practice of Islam; one that was not in conflict with the

teachings, sayings and example of the Prophet Muhammad. This proved to be a difficult exercise to accomplish in India where Islamic revivalism was tinged with aspects of mysticism. For example, Sheikh Ahmad and Wali-AIIah were members of both the Sufi sect of the Naqshbandi as well as traditionalists in the interpretation and practice of their religion.18

17 W. Cantweii-Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, Ashraf, Lahore, p.192. 18 Abbott, pp. 61 & 76-80. Sheikh Ahmad was an Islamic advocate and reformer whose religious legacy had been wholeheartedly embraced by the Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb. He was a religious traditionalist who influenced the spread and development of the Naqshbandi Sufi order in India. He advocated a return to the Islamic practice and way of life of Muhammad's 7th century Arabia. Shah Wali-AIIah lived in a period when Islamic leadership and influence in India was at its nadir. Throughout his life Wali-AIIah devoted himself to the study of the Quran and to the interpretation of Islamic doctrine and jurisprudence. He had passed the highest course then available on Islam, taught Hadith literature, went on a 14 month pilgrimage to Arabia to further consolidate his knowledge of Islam and spent the last 30 years of his life immersed in religious study. Wali-AIIah believed that Islam in India had lost its vigour and purity because the political leadership of the Mughal Emperors was prone to intrigue, luxury and leisure, and completely aloof from the Muslim population at large.

24

However, even allowing for this, the calls for religious change that both Sheikh Ahmad and Wali-AIIah made heralded the outbreak of Muslim religious uprisings in the early to mid-19th century. lt is important to stress that these religious movements of opposition were small in scope and had little or no contact with one another or with the Wahhabi movement of Arabia. Furthermore, they were characterised by socio-economic and political issues relevant to the particular regions from which they arose. The two most

prominent Muslim uprisings before the 1857 Rebellion were those of Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly and Dudu Miyan in Bengal.

Sayyid Ahmad was a student of Shah Abd ai-Aziz, the son of Shah Wali­AIIah. From this association he acquired knowledge of Wali-AIIah's and Abd ai­Aziz's Islamic teachings and reforms. In the characteristic approach to Islam that coloured the thinking of Wali-AIIah, Sayyid Ahmad believed in the complete removal from Islamic doctrine of Hindu practices and innovations without having to abolish the practice of Sufism; he too was a religious traditionalist who sought to confine Sufism within narrow limits.19 However, it was not against the

British or the Hindus that Sayyid Ahmad directed his hostilities. In 1826 he declared a jihad on the Sikhs of the Punjab and on their leader Ranjit Singh. When he defeated the Sikhs near Naushera he was proclaimed imam by neighbouring Pathan chiefs, and subsequently gained their support. This turned out to be his greatest achievement. Soon after, in May 1831 at Balakot, he and 600 of his followers were killed by the Sikhs.20

Dudu Miyan, the son of Hajji Shari at-AIIah, resorted to arms in an effort to address the poverty and exploitation experienced by the Muslim cultivators of Bengal. He violently opposed the British government's imposition of the Permanent Settlement act which promoted and upheld the rights of landlords to large tracts of land while discriminating against the cultivators, many of whom were reduced to "landless labourers".21 From 1838 until his death in 1862 he

organised the fara'izi faithful into military units to carry out violent attacks on

19 Hardy, pp.50-54. Like Wali-AIIah, Sayyid Ahmad was also motivated in restoring Islam to its 'pristine' 7th century Arabian model; more so, once the British had begun to impact on the socio-economic structure of early 19th century Indian society.

20 ibid., p.52. I! is interesting to note that once Sayyid Ahmad had gained the trust of several Pathan chiefs he set out to unite the Pathans under his leadership. This would have amounted to a proto­nationalist movement for Muslims in India. However, the Pathans, true to their historical practice of individual leadership based on kin and tribal structures of political organisation, repudiated him. Though Sayyid Ahmad appealed to the Pathans for Islamic unity and solidarity they still saw him as an outsider and rose in opposition to him forcing his eviction from Peshawar where he had set himself up after the defeat of Yar Muhammad Khan in 1830.

21 ibid, pp.55-56.

25

landholders and their property.22 These violent outbreaks and the equally violent methods adopted by landholders in repressing peasant, or potential peasant, revolutionaries acquired the appearance of communal antagonism. This was because the majority of the permanent settlement landlords were Hindus while the peasantry was almost exclusively comprised of Muslims. Nonetheless, Dudu Miyan's organised appositional tactics reflected the inequalities of the socio-economic and class structure of 19th century Bengal as well as addressing the concerns of those who sought the 'purification' of Islam -and Hindu peasants were also to be found in his movement.23

There were other examples of Muslim ulama responding to the gradual introduction and implementation of non-Muslim socio-economic and political approaches in India from the mid-18th century onwards. Many of the ulama who did so were reacting to the decline of Mughal leadership and the rise of British influences and practices that challenged the validity and structure of Islamic society and its historical traditions. All called for a return to a 'pristine' version of Islam; needless to say, the ulama saw themselves as the appropriate authorities to administer all the necessary adjustments required to 'purify' Islam. This ·approach led to two distinct outcomes: Muslims either withdrew from associating with non-Muslims - particularly the British - which left them falling behind other communities in India who acquired a knowledge and proficiency of British education, technology and socio-economic and political arrangements; or, they resorted to armed conflict in order to eliminate the twin threats of British authority and a growing mostly non-Muslim and British educated middle class.

These responses contrasted with the actions of a small secular Muslim elite - a substantial proportion of the old Mughal bureaucratic/landholding class - who did associate with the British just as they had with the Maratha government of Hindustan in the period 1770-1800. They did participate in the educational institutions set up by the British and were not hostile to new technologies. They were embarrassed by the ulamic denunciations of the British Raj but chose to ignore them and not to contest them. This strategy served them well until the Rebellion of 1857. The Rebellion had proven to be a terrible crisis for them insofar as it did, at one stage, seemingly threaten the very existence of British rule - which forced them to vacillate between support

22 ibid.

23 Dudu Miyan's militancy can be interpreted as a socio-economic and class struggle because of its indiscriminate choice of target - Muslim landholders were also attacked because they too exploited the peasantry, and also because they were identifiably a part of the status quo; and, Dudu Miyan can also be seen as a Muslim reformer because he espoused and, in some instances, further developed on, his father's religious beliefs.

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for the British or the ulama-led rebels. This left them in a delicate position when the British emerged victorious. Hence, the more dynamic of them, like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, decided, after 1857, that they had to contest the anglophobe strategy of the u/ama.

MAJOR RESPONSES TO BRITISH RULE

By 1857 both militancy and withdrawal had failed to arouse a common communal solidarity among the Muslims of India and this left them falling behind non-Muslim, particularly Hindu, communities in the acquisition of British education and economic and political systems of administration. After the British quashed the last of these militant revivalist insurgencies - an offshoot of the 1857 Rebellion - the Muslims were left with no choice but to look for other methods and to other individuals for solutions to their changing socio-economic and political fortunes in British India.

There were two distinct Muslim responses to the British political and economic presence in India after 1857. Both emanated from educational institutions that were at variance with one another on matters concerning the direction that Muslim socio-economic, religious and political organisation was to take under the authority of the British. The first of these was the u/ama

educational facility of Deoband which, not unlike the religious traditionalists and militants of the pre-1857 period, instructed the Muslims of India to disassociate themselves from contact with other religious communities - particularly the British and their educational institutions and cultural practices - in an effort to 'purify' Islam. The second was that of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan at Aligarh. Sir Sayyid's syllabus at Aligarh promoted British educational methods and various cultural values. He felt that the British were in India to stay and that withdrawal from any level of interaction with them would only be detrimental to the socio­economic and political uplift of Muslims in lndia.24

i) Deoband

The Deoband seminary was established to provide a traditional theological study of Islam to prospective u/ama.25 lt was also developed to protect the historical traditions and analyses of Islamic scholars in India -particularly that of Wali-AIIah - and as a bulwark against British education,

24 lt needs to be stressed that only a small minority of ulama and British educated, mostly United Provinces based, Muslim agitators actively participated in this dialogue of Muslim identity and political cooperation. Furthermore, the opposition shown by one group towards the other highlights the disunity, even among this small but strongly influential section of Muslims, of Muslim opinion and support for a united national ethos and identity in colonial India.

25 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964, Oxford UP, London, 1967, p.104.

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cultural values and, importantly, secular influences and practices.26 Initially the seminary was promoted as being "an institution complementary and preliminary to modern westernized schools and not as an antithesis".27 However, right from the outset, the teaching staff at Deoband rejected the teaching of the modern sciences and other western systems of thought that would have proven to be counter-productive to many of their theological beliefs.28

Deoband became the predominant institution perpetuating traditional Islamic scholarship and practice between the period of its inception and the creation of Pakistan.29 The seminary also produced the most notable as well as

the majority of u/ama in India in the early to middle period of the 20th century. As graduates, many of these religious scholars provided pastoral services to the mass of poorer Muslims which enabled them to disseminate Deobandi traditional Islamic values and anti-British attitudes very widely at this level of society.30

The u/ama and graduates of Deoband opposed the socio-economic and

political imposition of the British in India because of the threat that this presented to them. In a growing secular environment, brought on by greater levels of foreign intervention, they found it increasingly difficult to maintain their conservative traditions and religious authority and so they chose to withdraw from society at large. They interpreted the British presence in India as a period of foreign oppression devised by God to punish Muslims for deviating from the appropriate spiritual path. The restoration of Muslim power would only be conferred on the faithful once they accepted the error of their ways and endured a period of penitence whereupon they were expected to renounce all accretions deemed anathema to proper Islamic practice as decreed by the Quran, Hadith

and Sunna.

The religious admonitions emanating from Deoband were the product of an elite section of religious scholars in India who had little or no contact with the

masses and little understanding and appreciation of the richness and variety of ways Islam was practised by other ethnic, regional and lower class groups. Their call for the restoration of a traditional non-territorial religious community conflicted with the observances of variant Islamic groups like the Sufis, western

26 ibid.

27 ibid.

28 Abbot!, p.107. 29 Ahmad, p.109. In 1947, 50 of the 1 350 students in attendance at Deoband were from outside India including South Africa, Malaya, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran.

30 Ahmad, ibid.; &Abbot!, p.107.

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educated Muslims and the British. On the other hand they were less intolerant of non-Muslim communities. They accepted that there would be a substantial (perhaps even majority) non-Muslim dhimmi31 population coexisting with the Muslims in their restored traditional Islamic state. 32

The ulama of Deoband also spent much time opposing the secular theoretical approaches to Muslim political organisation and representation that began appearing at Aligarh from 1875 onwards. The ulama saw the educationalists and students of Aligarh, particularly Sir Sayyid, as examples of Muslims who had strayed from the correct religious path by adopting western values and neglecting traditional religious ritual and education. The u/ama of Deoband primarily opposed the scholars of Aligarh because they espoused an alternative solution that was secular, British influenced and offered a proactive response to the predicament faced by Muslims in late 19th century lndia.33 They did not waver in their opposition to the political thinking of Aligarh's earliest educationalists and students and those subsequently influenced by them. This remained the situation unti11947.

ii) Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Aligarh lt was from the secular environs of Aligarh that theories of political

organisation for Muslims began to surface. After the 1857 Rebellion Sir Sayyid began to emphasise the need for Muslims to come to terms with British authority in lndia.34 He dedicated himself assiduously to providing Muslims with educational qualifications and the political initiative and organisation needed for their active participation, upkeep and socio-economic survival under foreign rule. Hafeez Malik describes Sir Sayyid's ambitions as being:

31 This term literally translates to "the people of the book" and refers to Christians and Jews whose religious exegeses precede that of Islam. In India its frame of reference had been extended to include Hindus and Jains.

32 A corollary was that it was quite legitimate to seek non-Muslim allies amongst the wider Indian population for the jihad against the British. 33 Cantweli-Smith, p.23. The ulama, who relied exclusively on the preservation of the Persian language for their authority, were opposed to English language tuition for Muslims because it threatened their position in society "both ideologically and economically". As a result, "Sir Sayyid was excommunicated, slandered, persecuted" and on more than one occasion had his life threatened.

34 Hafeez Malik, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan, Columbia UP, New York, 1980, pp.24 & 71-73. Sir Sayyid was born on 17 October 1817 in Delhi. His family had ancestral ties with the Mughal court and foreign lineage. His education, though never fully completed nor comprehensive, was a traditional one. He learnt to recite the Quran, studied Persian texts and Arabic syntax, grammar and logic, gained some knowledge of mathematics, algebra and geometry, and spend several months as a medical student. However, by the age of 18 Sir Sayyid gave up formal education altogether; though at age 29 he did resume his study of Arabic and traditional Islamic texts for a short period.

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(1) rationalism in Islam, which established a new orientation -that religion existed as an aid to man's progress, and man did not exist just for religion; (2) social reforms patterned after western culture; (3) modern education through English; and (4) Muslim nationalism.35

Before 1857 Sir Sayyid had received a traditional Muslim education, but

this did not necessarily mean commitment to naqshbandi radicalism and its anti-British ethos. lt was possible to be both an educational traditionalist and

well disposed to the British regime. For example, in the North West Province

(the precursor to the United Provinces) the language of government service continued to be Persian and Urdu; so, a traditional education was perfectly

adequate for employment in the British service as Sir Sayyid's own career

demonstrated. The majority of the Muslim bureaucratic elite were products of

both traditional Muslim education and British custom and culture; whereas,

'Wahhabi' hostility to British rule was essentially confined to the ulama and the

lower orders of the Muslim community: artisans and peasants who suffered

from the economic impact of British rule.36

Sir Sayyid did not support the Rebellion of 1857 but its failure to make an

impact on the British and to provide a constructive and logical basis for Muslim

progress in India proved to him that religious isolation and antagonism were futile methods of organising Muslims politically and dealing with the reality of

British supremacy in the subcontinent. He was left with little choice but to adopt

a secular approach to Muslim political and socio-economic progress and a

more cooperative relationship with the British. He was particularly concerned to

impress on the British that Muslims were not hostile and opposed to foreign

rule. He opined that had the British Crown directly ruled India instead of the

35 ibid., pp.8-9.

36 Hardy, pp.53-54. The Muslim population of Delhi responded in numerous ways to the implementation of British education in 1803. As in other parts of India, many of them chose to ignore it altogether which, when it came time for the British to employ local civil servants, made them unsuitable for recruitment into the bureaucracy. An example of this was evident in the Mughal Court during this period. The Emperor maintained traditional education and courtly tuition for his progeny. However, other Muslims did allow their sons to attend English classes at Delhi College: 2 1 02 Muslims graduated from Delhi College between 1835 and 1857. These Muslim participants were individuals dissatisfied with traditional Islamic education on general intellectual grounds. They had no need to embrace English education for employment in the civil service: a traditional Islamic qualification could do that just as well as an English one. These graduates provided a basis for Muslim awareness, knowledge and partial acceptance of British ideas, customs and practices before 1857. Nevertheless, the Rebellion of 1857 imposed an enormous strain on the Muslim elite in the British service. Hence, Sir Sayyid's dramatic change to a modernist political culture after 1857, seeing it as necessary for the survival of his community.

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British East India Company there would have been no cause for rebellion. Sir

Sayyid disapproved of the latter's commercial exploitation of native resources and labour and emphasised that this, along with the East India Company's

complete ignorance of Indian traditions and the disorganised state of its Indian

army, was the paramount cause of disturbances in 185?.37 He was to spend

the rest of his life providing elite Muslims with the opportunity to obtain

knowledge and proficiency of British political, socio-economic, legal, linguistic

and cultural traditions. He felt that this would provide them with the necessary

skills to actively participate in the political and economic milieu of British lndia.38

The pinnacle of Sir Sayyid's achievements was the educational

institution he founded in 1875. The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO)

College at Aligarh was not restricted to Muslims alone; Hindus and students of

other religions also attended. However, a special emphasis was placed on

Muslims acquiring the necessary type of education for their socio-economic

progress. According to David Lelyveld, Sir Sayyid disapproved of the

educational facilities that were then available for the few Muslims who were

fortunate enough to acquire an education. These included: "British-Indian

schools ... as well as ... Islamic madrassahs, which were supposedly giving the

wrong kind of education to the wrong kind of people". 39

The MAO College was built on the subscriptions of Indian middle

classes and indigenous politicians. lt emulated British educational institutions in

every way except for one: the college included the study of Islam as part of its

educational curriculum. Sir Sayyid was aware of ulamic Muslim objections to

Christian schools so he developed a compromise variant of Islam that

37 Ahmad, pp.29-30. 38 Sir Sayyid was not a proponent of the "two-nation" theory that led to the partition of India. Rather he espoused a different model. His version called for the coexistence of Hindus and Muslims within a single territory. lt was inconceivable, he argued, that either could establish a separate territorial polity. Political independence was a fantasy because in reality one group would dominate and oppress the other. In this context he felt it necessary that the British continue to rule over India because under their 'benign' authority permanent religious civil war would be avoided. 39 D. Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India, Princeton UP, New Jersey, 1978, pp.85-102. Sir Sayyid was also greatly disturbed by the lack of education that Muslims in general had. In 1865-66 out of a total student collegiate enrolment of 1 578 only 57 were Muslims. By 1882 the number of Muslims in colleges had risen to 197 out of 5 399 with the percentage remaining steady at around 3.5 per cent. In secondary schools Muslims comprised 11 per cent of the student body with 5 433 enrolments out of a total of 62 938. These statistics were clearly reflected in both the Bengal Presidency (including Bihar and Orissa), where Muslims were one­third of the population, and the Punjab where they were in the majority. In Bengal they comprised 5 per cent of college student enrolments and less than 10 per cent of secondary school students. In the Punjab they formed 13 per cent of the college student body and one-fifth of secondary school enrolments.

31

repudiated the ulamas hostility to western scientific education.40 This doctrine,

Islamic Modernism, attempted to harmonise Islamic theology and western

science and political liberalism and became the ideological basis of Aligarh which was consciously modelled on British academies of excellence like

Cambridge and Oxford. Furthermore, a British teaching staff was employed to teach in English and from a European perspective41

The stop-start piecemeal imposition of British authority over India was

the primary reason why Sir Sayyid's post-1857 ideals and beliefs made little or no impact outside of the Muslim middle class of the United Provinces.42 The

British acquired the United Provinces considerably later than they did other

parts of India: principally Bengal, Bombay and Madras; "the three port areas, the centres from which British commerce and culture radiated".43 This had

meant that the indigenous people of Bengal, Bombay and Madras had been

exposed to British custom, language and administrative authority in the political,

legal and socio-economic realms of their respective regions long before their

counterparts in the United Provinces. The outcome of this historical

development had many middle class Muslims from other regions of India,

notably Bombay (Jinnah's hometown), interpreting Sir Sayyid's message as being regionally parochial with overtones of communalism.44

By the time the British had acquired the United Provinces, Bengal, ,

Bombay and Madras had developed strong middle classes who were fluent in

English and well adjusted to British power, custom and law. As a result, these

middle classes were earliest to organise themselves politically. In 1885 they

helped found the Indian National Congress Party and for the next few decades

leading up to the time of partition they controlled its political fortunes. Because

40 However, If aspects of Islam contravened with British political, social and educational theory and practice Sir Sayyid saw to it that the offending articles of faith be revised or completely removed from the religious doctrine that he was putting together for his students. This antagonised the Islamic religious clerics who, over time, became increasingly hostile towards him.

41 Cantweii-Smith, pp.12-14; & Lelyveld, p.125. Some of the classes at Aligarh were also taught in Urdu but students were instructed from the outset that graduates seeking government employment needed to be fluent in English. 42 Lelyveld, p.213. 43 Cantweii-Smith, p.25. 44 Lelyveld, p.213. Opposition to Sir Sayyid and MAO College was also shown by "the higher levels of the old society" who were descendants and loyal beneficiaries of the Mughal rulers. Though representatives of different political and socio-economic constituencies than the u/ama, these traditional elites were also concerned at the potential for disruption that British education and culture threatened to cause. Much of the resentment shown by the higher levels of the old society to British education and culture resulted from British administrative measures that stripped many of them of their estates and pensions.

32

they were predominantly Hindu and well versed in the ways of the British this created a problem for the strong and substantial middle class of Muslims in the United Provinces of which Sir Sayyid was one. Sir Sayyid saw the Congress Party as a vehicle for the predominantly coastal urban elite Hindu nationalism and was deeply suspicious of its nationalist agenda. At the same time, he urged all Muslims to distrust and ignore Congress politicians and to abstain from joining the political rank and file of the Congress Party.45

Sir Sayyid believed that the Congress Party's push for civil service examinations to be held in English was part of an overall strategy to Hinduise indigenous politics. He was afraid that people from different ethnic communities and regions of India would wrest prized political and status-enhancing jobs away from the local bureaucrats of the United Provinces. Because the majority of outside groups likely to be employed in the United Provinces' bureaucratic service were mostly Hindu and those they would replace mostly Muslim if a resolution for civil service examinations to be taken in English was passed, Sir Sayyid began to misinterpret and consequently oppose the nationalist political aspirations of the Congress Party. He opposed the Congress Party because he felt that its predominant Hindu administrative control did not make it a truly nationalist political organisation. In the process, Sir Sayyid invented the "two­nation" theory as a refutation to the Indian nationalism of the Congress. He could not oppose the idea of the nation because he accepted the modernist discourse but he could discredit Congress nationalism as representing only one of two nations present in India. However, Sir Sayyid's claim that the Congress Party catered only for the interests of India's Hindus has been challenged by historians of India who point out that some of its most ardent and outspoken members, political organisers and prominent identities in the lead up to partition were Muslims - but Bombay, Madras and Calcutta Muslims, not United Province ones, who were just as much rivals for bureaucratic jobs.

THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS Hardy writes that Muslim participation at the first Indian National

Congress, held in Bombay on 28 December 1885, was encouraged but short notice and travel constraints made it difficult for many Muslims outside of

45 Sir Sayyid's opposition intensified when the executive of the Congress Party demanded that the all-lndia civil service examinations be held in English. He vehemently protested against this demand because he was well aware that it would be to the detriment of Muslim bureaucrats in the United Provinces who were, up until then, mostly educated on traditional Muslim lines and recruited by government eo-option rather than competitive examinations.

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Bombay to attend, particularly those from northern lndia.46 At the second National Congress, held in Calcutta in the ensuing year, 33 Muslims participated.47 By early December 1887 Badr al-din Tyabji, the Sulaimani Bohra Muslim leader in Bombay, was being summoned to preside over the third National Congress to be held in Madras.48 Tyabji had no qualms about Hindu/Muslim unity and political organisation at the national level. He censured Muslim criticism of the National Congress and disapproved of separate political representational arrangements sought by other Muslims. In his presidential address at the third National Congress in Madras, Tyabji said:

I, for one, am utterly at a loss to understand why Musalmans should not work shoulder to shoulder with their fellow countrymen... for the common benefit of all... Gentlemen, this is the principle on which we in the Bombay Presidency have always acted.49

Tyabji's presidential speech alludes to the limits of Sir Sayyid's educational reach and political vision. Sir Sayyid wanted to change traditional Muslim education which had been introspective in outlook by introducing new vistas of historical, political, cultural and scientific modes of methodological and analytical investigation and interpretation. These new approaches to education were designed to familiarise Muslims with British administrative, legal and socio-economic power so that they could eventually come to terms with, and benefit from, the English presence in India. However, Sir Sayyid's educational experiment and political vision in the post-1857 period was limited because of alternative Muslim political experiences elsewhere in India.

Muslims in urban centres outside of the United Provinces did not subscribe to Sir Sayyid's vision. Those from Bombay particularly joined the ranks of the Congress Party in defiance of Sir Sayyid's political opinions. While they were small in number when compared to their Hindu eo-regionalists they, nonetheless, shared common class interests and a history of harmonious coexistence both professionally and socially with each other. so Tyabji was a member of the Bombay Muslim elite. He was influenced by much of what Sir Sayyid propounded - particularly calls for Muslims to acquire an English

46 ibid., p.127. 47 ibid., & Cantweii-Smith, p.25.

48 Hardy, ibid.

49 Tyabji in Cantweii-Smith, p.25.

50 Cantweii-Smith, p.25.

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education- but he did not share his anti-nationalist rationale. 51 Ironically, it was from this affluent and educated class of nationalist Muslims in Bombay that the principal architect for Pakistan emerged.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, like Tyabji and the educated class of Muslims from Bombay, believed that Muslims and Hindus could coalesce and work together for the political and socio-economic betterment of India's masses. 52

Jinnah had no qualms about associating with Hindu politicians and bureaucrats. He became a member of the Congress Party in 1906 - the very same year that the Muslim League was formed- and later, in 1916, joined the Muslim League. Many of the Muslim elite of Bombay saw no inconsistency in holding membership of both political parties. Up until the early 1920s relations between the Congress Party and the Muslim League were cordial owing to a political accord between the two - the Lucknow Pact - and the fact that many of the members of the latter were also politically active in the former. 53

The Muslim elite of Bombay, though a minority group, were well entrenched in the professions and industries of the city. Many had set themselves up as merchants, industrialists and in other professional capacities holding key positions and readily mixing with Hindus of comparable socio­economic standing. There was no vestige of communal conflict and opposition shown by either; rather, both formed a strong and mostly like-minded collective that adhered to British constitutional, cultural and socio-economic custom, and paid scant regard to religion and other forms of indigenous social and cultural

51 Tyabji & Sir Sayyid cited in Hardy, p.129. One way of comparing Tyabji's nationalist aspirations with that of Sir Sayyid is to look at a section of the correspondence he entered into with Sir Sayyid early in 1888. Tyabji believed that Hindus and Muslims were capable of forming a united nation that safeguarded the religious practices and beliefs of both:

I would say to all Mussulmans 'act with your Hindu fellow-subjects in all matters in which you are agreed but oppose them as strongly as you can if they bring forward any proposition that you may deem prejudicial to yourselves'. We should thus advance the general progress of India, and at the same time safeguard our own interests.

To which Sir Sayyid replied: There could not be a National Congress of equal benefit to all the peoples of India. Is it supposed ... that the different castes and creeds living in India belong to one nation or can become one nation, and their aims and aspirations be one and the same? I think it is quite impossible and when it is impossible there can be no such thing as a National Congress.

52 Most of the Bombay Muslim educated class were, like Jinnah and Tyabji, Shiite lsmailis, whereas the Muslims of the United Provinces were either Sunnis or 'Twelver' Shias. 53 Hardy, p.187. The Lucknow Pact promised to increase the representation of Muslims "in any expanded provincial legislative council" through the introduction of separate electorates. lt was attended by members of both the Congress Party and the Muslim League including some 400 Muslims from Lucknow.

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methods of organisation. Muslims like Jinnah, who were secular in outlook and beneficiaries of a British education, joined the Congress Party because they believed that independence for India could be attained through constitutional means. By the same token, they were also interested in the role to be designated to Muslims of their educational class in an independent India so they also became members of the Muslim League.

it is important to focus on Jinnah and the crucial role he played in the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah came from a class of Muslims in undivided India who at no time prior to the 1937 elections envisaged the political division of India along religious lines. The scholarly debate on how, when and why Jinnah gave his unqualified approval to the Pakistan demand is weighty and well known to scholars of South Asia. One established fact that all scholarship points to is that Jinnah, at some point between 1937 and 1945, changed his political position from a nationalist advocating the independence of an undivided India to the foremost proponent and political representative for a Muslim nation in South Asia. What remains unresolved and the source of constant conjecture between scholars is the precise moment of, and motivation for, Jinnah's political transformation. 54

The Pakistan demand that Jinnah propounded was ambiguous from the outset. The decision to support the creation of a new nation on religious grounds was more the result of the political impasse reached by the Congress Party and the Muslim League in their negotiations with the British than of any inevitable historical trend. The call for a Pakistan to be carved out of parts of the Indian subcontinent had a very brief conceptual history. The initial suggestion was made by Muhammad lqbal in 1930, but was largely ignored even in his home province of Punjab. This was followed by the scenario proposed in 1933 by Chaudri Rahmat Ali, a student from India who was attending Cambridge University. Both proposals were vague and unsubstantial representations of the socio-economic and political circumstances prevalent in India at the time. This undefined conception of Pakistan was carried over by Jinnah into the conception of the Pakistani state in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League in 1940.

In the first instance Muhammad lqbal felt that growing communal violence was proof enough that Muslims and Hindus were increasingly at odds with one another and that the only practical solution to this problem was to separate one group from the other. His proposition, speculative and ill-defined,

54 A. Ray, "The High Politics of Indian Partition: The Revisionist Perspective", in Hasan, (1993) pp.1 02-1 03; & R.J. Moore, "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand", in Hasan (1993), pp.160-197.

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offered more problems than it did solutions. Other than suggesting that north­western India be left to the Muslims he avoided any clarification of what type of political framework the Muslim section of India was to function under - a federal set-up with the remainder of India, or as a separate nation. Furthermore, he ignored issues both crucial and pertinent like population transfer, the division of assets, and any number of sociological and historical factors - ethnicity, language, culture, regional affiliation, urban/rural differences - that worked against his theory. Chaudri Rahmat Ali is remembered for little else other than having constructed the word 'Pakistan' as the term by which to refer to a Muslim state in South Asia. Interestingly enough, his acronym left out any reference to Bengal.

Pakistani nationalists describe Jinnah as the Quaid-i-Azam ('the Great Leader'; 'Father of the Nation') of Pakistan. He is portrayed in a heroic light as the defender of Muslim minority rights, overcoming "insurmountable barriers put in his path by the Congress and the British", in his efforts to create "a separate Muslim 'nation"'.55 However, scholarly analyses that portray Jinnah's eventual acceptance of the Pakistan demand as motivated by the realisation that the Muslims of India somehow comprised the necessary qualities to be categorised as a national group are misleading and without historical foundation. Furthermore, they simplify and largely undervalue the importance of political developments as they unfolded in India in the decade prior to 1947. These drastically altered Jinnah's thinking and overall assessment on matters pertaining to the frankness of British demands to withdraw from India and the outcome of Indian independence.

Prior to 1937 Jinnah advocated the independence of India by constitutional means and through a system of negotiation with the British. He set himself up as the "sole spokesman" for Muslims and propounded the notion of a decentralised Federal polity that bequeathed greater levels of administrative authority to regional governments. 56 At no time did he believe in, or work towards the development of, a separate nation state for India's Muslims. His claim to represent India's Muslims was an ingenious stratagem on

55 Tai Yong Tan & Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, Routledge, London, 2000, p.13.

56 A. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1985. Jalal argues his claim to speak on behalf of all India's Muslims was a ploy to manufacture a constituency for himself that would assure him of long-term political support. This was his approach before he left for London and this continued to be his approach when he was called back to lead the Muslim League in the elections guaranteed by the Government of India act of 1935.

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his part to protect himself, and the minority Muslim elite of which he belonged to, from political obscurity. Jinnah, like the Muslims in the United Provinces, was in a precarious political position. As such, he and the Muslim elites of Bombay and the United Provinces manufactured themselves a political constituency, where previously there had been none, by designating themselves as representatives of the Muslims of India at the national level.

In the first two decades of the 20th century Jinnah, on behalf of himself and other Muslim nationalists, was able to extract political concessions from both the British and the Hindu members of the Congress Party that were favourable to him and his political cause. The 1909 Morley-Minto reforms allowed for the distribution of separate electorates to Muslims "which extended links between the higher and lower councils" - with the British steadfast and resolute in their control of the higher council and with no intention of relinquishing their political power in India at the time or in the forseeable future. By 1919 these had been extended "despite the expressed reservations of its authors". 57 Furthermore, Jinnah and Motilal Nehru had agreed to the Lucknow Pact in 1916.

The ability of Hindu and Muslim nationalists, in this early period, to work in cooperation with one another towards Indian independence was shortlived. The return of Mahatma Gandhi to Indian politics in 1917 had repercussions on Jinnah's immediate political career in India, and on the understandings and agreements - of which he had been an important part - that had to date been reached by the Hindu and Muslim political elite. Jinnah's constitutional approach to Indian independence was in opposition to Gandhi's policy of Civil Disobedience. This left them at loggerheads. Furthermore, the veneration shown to Gandhi by the executive of the Congress and his reconstruction of the party as a mass organisation, cut the political ground from under Jinnah's feet. Gandhi refused to negotiate with Jinnah who, as the representative of a · 'minority of a minority', he saw as a politician of little importance. Within 5 years of Gandhi's return to Indian politics Jinnah's political standing and influence were reduced to that of a peripheral player in Indian public life. Gandhi sought the support of Hindu and Muslim individuals and groups who possessed a tangible political supporter base that the likes of Jinnah did not have. In this political milieu Jinnah became redundant and withdrew from the Indian political scene altogether to take up a legal position in London. Subsequently, the 1928 Motilal Nehru Report ended Congress Party support of Muslim separate

57 s. Base & A. Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, Routledge, London, 1998, p.168.

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electorates and led to the withdrawal of Muslim Leaguers from the Congress Party. From this moment on the Muslim League began to function in opposition to the Congress Party.

Jinnah began to identify with the concept of a Pakistan after the elections of 1937.58 His public announcement during the Lahore Resolution of 1940 that north-western and north-eastern India - including all of the Punjab and Bengal -be given to the Muslims was a clear political challenge and affront to the Congress Party who emerged triumphant from the 1937 elections. The Muslim League, badly defeated at the polls, took up the rhetoric of communal defiance in a last bid to save themselves politically. This was their response to the Government of India act of 1935 which guaranteed gradual independence for India. However, all references to Pakistan that Jinnah and the Muslim League made from 1940 onwards were vague and open to interpretation.

Both Jalal and David Gilmartin have extensively analysed the vagaries of the Lahore Resolution and the demand for Pakistan drawn up and advocated by Jinnah and the Muslim League. Their research leads them to conclude that at no time did Jinnah and the politicians of the Muslim League clearly articulate the parameters, both politically and geographically, that their vision of Pakistan entailed. According to Jalal, the Lahore Resolution and the Pakistan demand that Jinnah propounded in the 1940s was purposely full of contradictions and ambiguities.

The resolution stated that constitutional arrangements be "'reconsidered de novo' since Indian Muslims were a 'nation' and not a minority, as had been presumed in the past". 59 Furthermore, it called for Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west and north-east to be "'grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units ... [would] be autonomous and sovereign"60 without the slightest reference to partition or Pakistan. This intimated a greater level of provincial autonomy that would appease the distrust and opposition shown to the Muslim League at this time by the political leaders of the Muslim­majority provinces of Punjab, Bengal and NWFP. The resolution also avoided any clarification of the type of central authority that would administer an independent India; while its mere mention of separate statehood for Muslims -with no mention of where and how this was to be achieved - was to be left to some later date - again, no indication of when this was likely to occur - after a

58 Jinnah had returned to India to assume the leadership of the Muslim League in the lead up to the 1937 elections.

59 Jalal & Bose, p.175.

60 ibid.

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period of extensive negotiations on the type of "sovereignty and autonomy to be conferred".61

Jinnah and the Muslim League's 1940 resolution and demand for Pakistan was expressed in vague terms to not antagonise Muslims in positions of political power - whom Jinnah cajoled for his own political survival and not their own- and "to not foreclose alternative outcomes".62 Throughout the 1940s Jinnah continued to support the independence of a united India that would provide him, and the Muslim elite from Muslim-minority provinces, with the opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes of the political executive of postcolonial India. When the British made it clear that they would withdraw from, and grant independence to, India Jinnah welcomed the invitation by the executive of the Muslim League to be a part of this historic opportunity. When the Muslim League was routed in the 1937 elections that subsequently left it powerless and no match for the Congress Party - who at this time began to ignore the Muslim League and refused to negotiate with its leadership because they considered it to be politically irrelevant and finished - Jinnah adopted and perpetuated a political position and message steeped in the rhetoric of communalism.

His communal political approach allowed him to negotiate with the British and the leadership of a defiant Congress Party on the outcome of Indian independence. The Congress Party's continued opposition to, and reluctance to accept, Jinnah politically - not to mention his daring and tenacious claim that he was the sole spokesman for India's Muslims which saw negotiations at the all­lndia level reduced to communal concerns that were without historical precedent- played into Jinnah's hands. The British, in their haste to depart from India - particularly at the conclusion of the Second World War - and in their efforts to provide a counter-balance to the Congress Party's growing representational strength and arrogance, elevated the importance of Jinnah's political influence and standing. This, once a date for withdrawal had been reached by the Labour Government in London, set into motion events, disagreements and decisions that led to the unprecedented task of partitioning India into two nation states, ostensibly on religious grounds.

The events and decisions that led to partition resulted from irreconcilable differences on the part of the principal negotiators of Indian independence from 1945 to 1947 - the British, the Congress Party and the Muslim League - and had nothing whatsoever to do with the historical necessity - real or imagined -

61 ibid.

62 "b"d I I .

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for a separate Muslim nation. Jinnah's political gamble - or bluff - when played out to its limit produced the outcome that none of the principal negotiators had foreseen or believed could happen. So unexpected was this outcome that Jinnah, a constitutionalist, found himself with the unenviable task of defining his new nation politically and ideologically after it was presented to him; for no thought was given to it beforehand.

The Muslim League did not seriously consider the option of a Pakistan until it was thrust upon them by the British and the unyielding leadership of the Congress Party that, to the death, refused to share political parity with its most formidable of adversaries, Jinnah. When negotiations reached a stalemate and partition became a fait accompli, Jinnah and the Muslim League were left to pick up the pieces of an unsuccessful political strategy and bargain as best they could for as much Indian territory as was possible for them to receive.

Jinnah's predominant political supporter base lay in regions where Muslims were a minority and not in the Punjab, Bengal and NWFP:

... the Pakistan movement received widespread support among Muslims in areas that had little conceivable prospect of being incorporated into a territorially bounded Muslim state, while Muslims in the Punjab and N.W.F.P., subsequent heartlands of Pakistan, were among the last to register widespread support for the concept. Such patterns are explicable only if we assume that for most Muslims the meaning of Pakistan did not hinge primarily on its association with a specific territory. 63

There was no consistent and universal Muslim support for Jinnah at the all­lndia level because he was perceived as being ethnically different, culturally British and politically aloof and ignorant of the concerns of Muslims in north­western and north-eastern India. This was another reason why Jinnah avoided any specific and concrete references to a Muslim nation state. He did not want to alienate and risk losing the support of those he worked assiduously to win over; he needed their support more than they needed his. Jalal depicts Jinnah's political dilemmas and tactical response in this way:

... support could not be won by too precise a political programme since the interests of Muslims in one part of India were different from those of Muslims in others. A socio-economic programme aimed at rousing the Muslim populace was bound to be resisted

63 D. Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative", in The Journal of South Asian Studies, pp. 1068- 1095, 57, no.4, November 1998, p.1083.

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by landed oligarchs who dominated local politics and, given the limitations of the franchise, prove utterly impracticable. With no organizational machinery in the Muslim provinces, Jinnah and the League could not afford to incur the wrath of the landed notables in control of local politics. The best tactic was to build bridges with as many local bigwigs as possible and reserve energies for negotiations at the all-lndia level.64

The leaders of the Punjab, Bengal and NWFP had historically forged their own political ties and arrangements that were in stark contrast to Jinnah's political vision. The "two-nation" theory does not stand to reason when analysed against the backdrop of Jinnah's communal politics and the opposition and disregard shown to it by Muslim leaders exercising provincial authority. In both the Punjab and Bengal supra-communal parties were in power: The Unionist Party - first under the leadership of Mian Fazl-i Husain and later that of Sikander Hayat Khan - in the Punjab supported the agrarian interests of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh landholders, and guarded its provincial autonomy and ethno-cultural customs determinedly from the incursions of outside groups; similarly, in Bengal the Krishak Proja Samiti - under the leadership of Fazl-al Haq - implemented agrarian and welfare programs beneficial to both Muslims and Hindus. 65 Both these parties were products of their respective socio­economic and ethnic environments whose focus was exclusively on provincial matters. Furthermore, in NWFP, where an overwhelming majority of the population was Muslim, the Congress Party presided over the provincial legislature. These were historical trends that worked against the logic of Muslim homogeneity and the "two-nation" theory at the elite and legislative levels of Muslim politics in India.

lt was the abstract nature of Jinnah's political vision in the 1940s and the absence of an existing and reliable political constituency for the Muslim League - not to mention the obvious class, ethnic and linguistic differences that existed between Jinnah and the Muslim League on the one hand and the disparate and fragmented Muslim communities of India on the other - that influenced the Congress Party's decision to work in opposition to him. Gandhi had already sidelined Jinnah politically in the 1920s when he chose to work with Muslims whom he perceived to have had strong political support. This is why he backed the Ali brothers in their protest and rioting at the Caliphate's downfall in Turkey. As a shrewd political strategist himself, Gandhi knew the value of supporting a

64 Jalal & Bose, p.177.

65 ibid., pp.170-173; & Hardy, p.223.

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cause so crucial to the lives of India's large Muslim rural and urban lower classes. Jinnah, not withstanding his later appropriation and use of Islam for his own political benefit, could never pull off a political stunt of this kind. He was much too class conscious to associate with the underprivileged and lower classes, irrespective of their religious background. In any case, as an lsmaili Shia he had little sympathy with the Caliphate concept and even less for the idea that the Sunni Turkish Sultan was the universal Islamic ruler.

In the 1940s the Congress Party refused to acknowledge the strategies and arguments of the Muslim League. Gandhi and Jawarlal Nehru continued to challenge the political credentials and policies of the Muslim League, in particular Jinnah. The Congress Party's intransigence and outright arrogance towards the Muslim League contributed to the end game of partition. Had they been more conciliatory in their negotiations with the Muslim League, and willing to reach some level of compromise, it is very likely that the partition of India would have been avoided: after all, Jinnah did favour a united India that offered him and his political colleagues the opportunity to contribute to the policy­making of its central government.

However, in light of the circumstances that prevailed in the 1940s and the improvised and makeshift manner in which they unfolded, it is easy to be critical of Congress intransigence and imprudence in dismissing Jinnah and the Muslim League as potential allies and viable political aspirants. In hindsight it would probably have been more adroit for the Congress to offer the Muslim League a more generous share of ministerial posts than its electoral performance in 1937 warranted, but it did not necessarily appear so at the time: Pakistan was hardly a significant issue in 1937. The demand for Pakistan became central in negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League once the restructure of lndo-British fiscal relations in World War 11 and the Labour Party's electoral success in Britain in 1945 had come about. These completely altered events in India and meant that from that point onwards the British were prepared to concede - even hurry along - real independence. 66

On the eve of withdrawal Jinnah's political bluff was returned in kind by the Congress Party who, in the political impasse created by the failure to reach an adequate resolution within the deadline put forward by Mountbatten,67 opted

66 Until 1945 the British were still trying to retain a position of power in India. They wanted to devolve power in such a way that Congress would not be able to rule in their own right, but would have to share power with the League and the princely states with themselves as mediator. Congress rejected this scenario.

67 Part of the problem was that they did not realise how serious this deadline was - not surprising in view of the fact that the British had resisted nationalist demands for 70 years.

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for the partition plan that gave them autonomy over western Bengal - including Calcutta - and eastern Punjab. In reaching this decision the leadership of the Congress Party was influenced by three objectives: first, the appointment of Mountbatten as the last Governor-General of India, and his intention to hasten the outcome of Indian independence, left no one in doubt that the British were ready to depart; second, with negotiations at a standstill and with no conceivable way of acquiring the whole of India in the time allocated by Mountbatten, the Congress Party chose the partition plan that was favourable to them; and third, it was always expected by the Congress Party that Pakistan, in its own right, would not succeed as a political nation and, as a result, its leaders would eventually seek unification with India- this point was stressed by the Congress Party and endorsed by Mountbatten at the final meeting which saw the resolution to partition India passed.

There were two important factors behind the increased stature of the Muslim League from 1937 to 1947:68 the British, who brought them to the negotiating table as a counter to the Congress Party; and Jinnah, whose political acumen, persistence and tenacity allowed him to take advantage of the opportunities that came his way. However, even allowing for this, the nature of Indian independence would no doubt have been different had the British not given such weighted advantage to the Muslim League in the negotiating process. In so doing, they ignored important elements of Indian society with strong historical traditions that were left to lament their absence and lack of consultation in the epochal-making decisions that led to the events of August 1947. Two groups in particular were the strong contingent of Sikhs in the Punjab and a multitude of princes - admittedly, some more important than others - who were completely ignored by the colonial authorities. 69 Both groups had formed strong associations for their political representation, had charismatic leaders with an easily identifiable following and had legitimate historical, cultural, socio-economic and territorial links with certain sections of

68 I! Is important to distinguish between British strategies in the period 1937-45 and 1945-47. In the earlier period the British did not envisage a full transfer of power but only an extension of self-government with the themselves occupying the highest level of political control. Hence, their patronage of the Muslim League and their genuflection to the 'Pakistan' concept were not a prelude to a territorial partition. The post-war Atlee government, with Britain's catastrophic economic situation to sort out, abandoned all compromise and settlement schemes and moved at full speed towards a transfer of power. Thus a bargaining counter became a political reality. 69 L. Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., New York, 1961, pp.55-65. The British did not abandon the princes until 1945. In all their bargaining with Jinnah, they insisted the Muslim League leave the princely states alone even where an unpopular Hindu ruler governed a Muslim majority. Jinnah accepted this restriction which in some ways contributed to the Kashmir problem of today.

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India. In the end, British disapproval of them and preference for the Muslim League only allowed events to transpire in the way that they did giving Jinnah the opportunity to propound his political vision on an equal footing with that of the Congress Party. This allowed the "two-nation" theory to be aired publicly as a verifiable alternative to that offered by the politicians of the Congress Party. And, in a climate of uncertainty and fear of millennia! proportions Jinnah and the Muslim League's rhetoric was accepted by sections of the Muslim population who were beginning to interpret the changes they were undergoing along communal lines.

CONCLUSION Pakistan at its birth was a peculiar and artificial nation borne out of

political dispute and hasty compromise, and without historical precedent. it was imagined at a very late stage in its inception and when the state was created the notion of what it would become was vague and ambiguous. This chapter has explored the social and political status of Muslims in British India in the century before partition to show why this was so and to refute claims of a Muslim national consciousness before 1947. it has emphasised the lack of cultural and socio-economic homogeneity and political unity among Muslims who were scattered over vast areas of India. Additionally, it has examined various Muslim responses to British rule including those of Islamic schools and revivalist movements, their western alternatives, and the rallying. cries of nationalists to stress the isolated and contested nature of Muslim political and cultural organisation in British India.

The next chapter will consider the enormous task the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah, and the politicians who followed him, had to forge an identity for this new nation. There will also be an analysis of the problem of setting up the apparatus for the new state given how it was so ill-prepared for nationhood. Importantly, it will support the conclusions of this chapter that the idea of Pakistan was ill-conceived and offered little in the way of concession and solace to the majority of Muslims it claimed to represent. Ultimately, such a nation, lacking historical justification at its inception, falls prey to the auguries and political cunning of communal architects and their uncompromising authority for its political legitimacy and survival.

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CHAPTER2 JINNAH'S PRIZE, AN IMPAIRED VISION: POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN PAKISTAN

Despite political attempts to articulate and implement a stable, consensual nation state, Pakistan has never achieved that goal. The reinterpretation of the "two-nation" theory in the context of post-1947 Pakistan shows that public debate in Pakistan has centred around the opinions and actions of a small politically and economically entrenched section of the population who have sought to perpetuate and impose their authority to the exclusion of the masses. This said, a multivocal 'small tradition•1 of opposition and defiance to political elitism has existed from the very beginning of Pakistan. This appositional element comprises the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis, both within and outside of the country, who represent a broad section of regional, economic and cultural interests, and who do not fall within the narrow confines of the dominant political culture. Their opposition is crucial in the articulation of national imperatives and issues of identity that seek to redress the partial and monopolistic interpretations of those in power. The dichotomy between the few who autocratically govern and the many who oppose and seek to reform the political system will be evident in subsequent chapters. An analysis of existing discourses of nationalism will be undertaken in this chapter to highlight the problems that have inhibited the construction of Pakistani nation-statehood and national identity from 1947 onwards.

The relevance of this chapter is crucial to an overall analysis of Pakistani cricket history and the development of cricket nationalism and identities among different cultural groups in Pakistan and England. The problematic birth of Pakistan as a nation and the insurmountable difficulties of constructing a national discourse for all Pakistanis at the political level, the principal theme of this chapter, will contribute to an understanding of why its cricket variant/s have been comparatively more successful in projecting notions of national cohesion and unity than official proclamations of government have been.

NATIONALISM: THEORY AND DEBATE The intellectual debate over nationalism and the formation of nation

states is a large and well documented one. The current debate is largely between the perennialists and the modernists because the primordialists

I I. Talbot, Inventing the Nation: India and Pakistan, Arnold, London, 2000; & C. Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, Zed Books, London, 2002.

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approach was largely discredited by racist holocausts of the 20th century.2Perennialists like John Armstrong,3 John Hutchinson4 and Anthony Smith5 see themselves as holding the middle ground between primordialists and modernists. They argue that nation states are modern phenomena that have their origins in pre-modernist times: they see the link between "ethnic pasts" and the "national present" as "crucial".6 Smith writes that nation states are created when nationalists, like Jinnah in the case of Pakistan, "rediscover, authenticate, and appropriate aspects of what they assume is 'their' ethnic past" .7 Thus, as far as the perennialists are concerned, this selective approach of, what amounts to, immutable historical and cultural links with the past forms the basis for nationalist ideology in the present and "enables nationalists to give a convincing account and representation of the nation to their designated compatriots, as well as to outsiders".8

The arguments of the perennialists do not reflect the epoch-specific relevance of Enlightenment ideas on nationalism and nation building. The nation state is a modernist project and its significance can only be gauged within the political and economic context of the last three centuries. On this matter Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny write that:

A modern nationality, with all its familiar qualities and political claims - popular sovereignty, ethnicity as a basis for political independence, and a claim on a particular piece of real estate - is only possible within the modern (roughly post-American Revolution) discourse of nationalism. Whatever Greeks in the classical period or Armenians in the fifth century were, they could not be nations in the same sense as they would be in the Age of

2 V. Pecora, Nations and Identities: Classic Readings, Blackwell, Massachusetts, 2001, p.22. Pecora describes primordialists as those who see "the nation ... (as) an inherent , natural, eternal, and necessary part of human development, both as a particular entity unto itself and as a component in a larger, universal teleology ... "

3 J. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism, University of California Press, Chapel Hill, 1982.

4 J. Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State, Alien & Unwin, London, 1987.

5 A. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and Nationalism, University Press of New England, Hanover, 2000.

6 ibid., p.63.

7 ibid.' p.64.

8 ibid. Smith's argument that nationalists somehow "rediscover" and "authenticate" an "ethnic past" is teleological and flawed in at least two ways: first, it presumes that all historical notions and categorisations of individual and group identity naturally evolve into, and are supplanted by, an overarching concern with, and longing for, national group solidarity; and, second, it attributes to the nationalist leader a messianic capacity to articulate the teleological narrative of the nation in history from its pre-nationalist beginnings to its nationalist consummation and beyond.

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Revolution. The discourses of politics of earlier times must be understood and respected in their own particularity and not submerged in understandings yet to be formed. 9

Nation states are not the logical outcome of pre-determined historical narratives of human identity; they are modern phenomena whose origins can be traced to the Enlightenment period of the late 18th century. Scientific and social thinking introduced during the Enlightenment questioned the validity of existing institutional beliefs and practices, both religious and political, and called for their removal. Enlightenment ideas that emphasised the importance of human reason in practical terms led to increased technological, socio-economic and political changes and advancements and ushered in an unprecedented period of European nation state formation in the 19th century. The nation state in Europe, which became the accepted method for managing European continental and colonial economies by the end of the 19th century, was modelled on the American nation established in 1783 and invoked the spirit of the French Revolution (1789) by imparting sovereignty "to the will of the people".10 Both American Independence and the French Revolution were by­products of Enlightenment thinking and provide modernists with a crucial historical starting point for an analysis on nation state formation.

The acceptance of the nation state by large numbers of people within the context of 19th century European economic competition was facilitated by the development of previously unavailable networks of communication that Benedict Anderson refers to as print-capitalism.11 In his book, Imagined Communities, Anderson describes the historical conjunction of capitalism and print media as decisive in the popularisation of the nation state. Industrialisation and improved health standards led to the development of numerous urban localities which became the foci of political and economic management in the modern world, and thus provided the basis for the growth of a collective national identity. "Print-as-commodity", evident in an increasing number of book publications and newspaper sales, allowed the political and economic managers of the urban localities to articulate their authority and the role of the new urban working classes in nationalist terms. Thus, print-capitalism, in the hands of the urban political and economic elite, was the catalyst for a rapidly increasing number of people in Europe to imagine themselves as a political

9 G. Eley & G. Suny, "Introduction" in Becoming National: A Reader, OUP, New York, p.10. 10 D. McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors, Routledge, London, 1998, p.10. 11 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 2000 (Tenth Impression).

48

collective within certain geographical limits even if they knew little or nothing about each other.12

In light .of the above discussion modernist discourses of nationalism describe nations as products of modernity constructed by political and economic elites who imagine and invent their historical lineages and mythical narratives through the use of print-media and social 'ritual.13 Or, as is historically discernible in the case of the partition of India and the subsequent emergence of Pakistan as a political entity, nationalism for Jinnah and the Muslim League was "an anticipatory strategy adopted by (them when as a dominant group they were) threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally­imagined community"- that imagined by the Congress Party.14

IMAGINING THE PAKISTANI NATION lt is the modernist discourse of nationalism that can best analyse

Pakistani nationalism and national identity from 1947 onwards. As a case study Pakistan shows all the hallmarks of a nation belatedly imagined as a veritable community by its post-1947 political leaders. The construction of Pakistani nation-statehood and national identity did not begin even at the level of the imaginary until 3 June 1947 when the British officially sanctioned, and the Congress and Muslim League accepted, the partition of India. Once independence was achieved Muhammad Ali Jinnah took it upon himself to define the political and ideological raison d'etre of Pakistani nation-statehood and national identity. In this way he imagined himself as the "sole spokesman" of an independent Pakistan in much the same way as he had imagined himself as the sole spokesman for the Muslims of India within the Indian nationalist imaginary before 1947.15

12 ibid., pp.36-47. The nationalist undertaking by Europe's urban elite was expedited by the development of lingua francas or dominant national languages. The plethora of languages in the European continent were reduced to a smaller number of "related vernaculars ... mechanically reproduced (and) ... capable of dissemination through the market". Anderson describes that these "print-languages laid the bases for national consciousnesses in three distinct ways". First, they extended the range of communication amongst large sections of European society by providing an essential link "below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars". Second, print-languages provided a necessary linguistic constancy crucial to the imagining of primordial national lineages. And, finally, they became alternative "languages-of-power" with a wider popular base than had previously been the case because of their similarity to an existing range of regional dialects. 13 ibid., pp.37-47; Smith, 2000, p.52; & E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1983.

14 Anderson, p.1 01.

15 A. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1985.

49

Jinnah's efforts to establish a sizeable Pakistan were unsuccessful.

Instead he had to invent a Pakistan whose territoriality was not of his own

making. it was comprised of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP),

Baluchistan, Sind, West Punjab and East Bengal, regions that had been

lukewarm to his Muslim League party until the last years of the British Raj.16

Not surprisingly his attempts to implement a Pakistani state were beset with

fundamental problems. Historically, the regions comprising the new nation were

part of a wider political sphere of influence that emanated from Delhi. No

governmental infrastructure and political figures covering the areas designated

to Pakistan in 1947 as a single unit had ever existed. Nor did the region

historically form a single electoral unit; the pre-1947 parliaments represented

the old British Indian provinces.17

At the time of independence Pakistan found itself desperately short of

funds and bereft of industry and skilled workers.18 it also had to deal with a

severe refugee problem. The "flood of refugees was totally unexpected and had

Chapter 1 argued that Jinnah propounded the "two-nation" theory to give himself and other middle-class British educated Muslims of the minority provinces political legitimacy by manufacturing a 'Muslim' constituency at the all-lndia level. However, when Jinnah secured Pakistan as an independent political unit he exhibited an autocratic and uncompromising leadership because he believed it was necessary to act in such a way to deal with the problems of this new nation.

16 At the time of independence regional concerns threatened to destabilise Jinnah and the Muslim League's political authority. Pakistan's 5 major regions had traditionally harmonised relations between their various religious communities and this had allowed them to develop distinct regional and ethnic group identities and social practices that ran contrary to the "two­nation" theory of Jinnah and the Muslim League. * For the NWFP refer to A.S. Ahmed, Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia, OUP, Delhi, 1988, p.202; & D.M. Hart, "The Afridi of the Khaiber Tribal Agency and the Kohat Frontier Region" in A.S. Ahmed (ed.}, Pakistan the Social Sciences Perspective, OUP, Karachi, 1990, pp.1-16. * For Baluchistan refer toY. Gankowsky, "The Social Structure of the Brahui and the Baluch", in Ahmed, 1990, p.260. * For Sind refer to H. Alavi, "Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan", in Alavi & J. Harriss (eds.), Sociology of "Developing Societies": South Asia, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1989, p.239; & Ahmed, 1988, p.208. * For the Punjab refer to A. Ahmed, "Social Structure and Flows", in W.E. James & S. Ray (eds.}, Foundations of Pakistan's Political Economy, Sage, New Delhi, 1992, pp.71-72. * For East Bengal refer to C. Baxter, Y. Malik, C. Kennedy, & R. Oberst, Government and Politics in South Asia, (4th Edition}, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1998. 17 F. Robinson, "Origins", in James & Ray (eds.), pp.33-34. 18 Two months before partition Hindu and Sikh entrepreneurs had withdrawn some three billion rupees from the Punjab and NWFP in their haste to depart from areas that would fall to Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan received only 17.5 per cent of the total assets of undivided India. Much of this was not handed over by the government of India until January 1948 because of confiict in Kashmir. (Talbot, 2000, p.198.) Francis Robinson argues that raw materials from West Pakistan were traditionally sent to Bombay and Ahmedabad to be manufactured, while those of East Pakistan supplied the commercial houses of Calcutta. These traditional markets and sources of revenue were lost to Pakistan. (Robinson, p.33)

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never been an intended consequence of the Pakistan demand. Indeed, the so­

called 'hostage' theory saw the advantage of the existence of large minority

populations in both India and Pakistan".19 As such, Jinnah, like other nation­

building figures, had to come to terms with a lack of ethnic, cultural and

linguistic homogeneity in Pakistan which threatened to derail his nationalist

project. The proclaimed legitimacy of the "two-nation" theory did not lessen the

need to reorder and redefine people along nationalist lines. Jinnah's solution

was to impose authoritarian rule over Pakistan in an effort to minimise

opposition and apathy to the Muslim League party which he expected from

regional groups with long-established ethnic and political bases that undercut

the quasi-religious justification of the Pakistan demand.20 The Muslim League

leadership believed that they could ill-afford a Federal polity because the power

of regional subnationalists, particularly in Punjab and East Bengal, was strong

enough to undermine the central level of government altogether. The League's

authoritarian approach on the matter reflected the short period of gestation that

Pakistan as a concept had undergone. Unlike its Congress rivals who had

accommodated regional subnationalists into their electoral party political

organisation by the 1920s, the League did not have to grapple with such

considerations until the 1940s.

THE "TWO-NATION" THEORY AND OPPOSITION TO INDIA POST-1947

Opposition to India was the fundamental principle of Jinnah's Pakistan.

Authoritarian rule and the politics of personal charisma that emphasised "'law

19 Talbot, 2000, pp.198-199. The infiux of some 8 million people from Indian territory was largely unforeseen; Jinnah, himself, had not anticipated such an outcome. Nevertheless, in-migration into Pakistan put enormous demographic and socio-political strains on the economy of the new country. The majority of the refugees were displaced rural migrants from adjacent border regions who were poor and illiterate: 4.6 million of them made the journey from East to West Punjab in a three-and-a-half month period after independence. Migrants from India with wealth at their disposal migrated into Pakistan's urban areas, particularly Karachi. Many of them were from the professional and commercial classes of the United Provinces. They were the core supporter group of Jinnah and the Muslim League and, once Pakistan received its independence, they saw themselves as the rightful heirs of the new nation. In essence, they formed Jinnah's only recognisable constituency, and their initial political, economic and linguistic infiuence was much resented by the original inhabitants of pre-partitioned Pakistan. 20 * For the Pathans see D.B. Edwards, "Frontiers, Boundaries and Frames: The Marginal Identity of Afghan Refugees", in Ahmed, 1990, pp.90-91. * For Baluchis see Gankowsky, pp.260-261. * For Sindis see S. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1992, p.13. * For Punjabis see I. Talbot's argument later in this chapter. *For Bengalis see C. Baxter et. al., pp.236-237.

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and order' (issues) rather than political development" were considered necessary for its achievement.21 Jinnah's narrative of Pakistan was constructed along the lines of Edward Said's theory of binary opposites. Although Said's analysis is concerned to show that Occidentalisrn and Orientalism do not function in isolation but rather inform one another to the point where they are constructed as opposites of each other, 22 it also offers a useful insight into Jinnah's discourse of opposition to India post-1947. Said writes that " ... culture comes to be associated, often aggressively, with the nation and the state; this differentiates "us" from "them", almost always with the same degree of xenophobia".23 Jinnah's use of the "two-nation" theory after 1947 served to create a political culture that would provide scope for "national cohesiveness" and solidarity between the government and the masses in Pakistan.24 Whereas before 1947, the "two-nation" theory was used to attack the credibility of the Congress Party, after 1947 it was recycled to identify India and its 'Hindu' Congress as the 'other'. Jinnah thus attempted to divert attention away from potential domestic disturbances that threatened to subvert his political 1

leadership and undermine the logic of a Muslim homeland in South Asia. The "two-nation" theory proved a useful tactic in sustaining Jinnah's

political legitimacy and historical legacy, but during his short tenure as Governor-General of Pakistan25 it also generated a good deal of controversy and ambivalence. As a secular man with a British education and an adherent of British legal and political traditions Jinnah found himself at variance with traditional Islamic political thought. During the time of his leadership he made vague references to Islam but his premature death left little guidance on the type of role that Islam was to play in an independent Pakistan. However, his secular outlook and political cunning in persisting with the "two-nation" theory as a means of manufacturing a political constituency made it unavoidable for him to include some reference to Islam in his national framework. Thus, Islam was used as a nominal badge to underpin Jinnah's opposition to India in a manner consistent with the founding of Pakistan, and ultimately his political authority.26

21 A. Kapur, Pakistan in Crisis, Routledge, London, 1991, p.28.

22 E. Said, Orienta/ism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1995. 23 Said cited in McCrone, p.116.

24 Kapur, p.20.

25 He died on 11 September, 1948.

26 Kapur, p.30. Ashok Kapur writes that the legacy of Jinnah's authoritarianism has been four-fold. First, it gave rise to an executive-dominated presidential system of government in Pakistan that paved the way for the outright usurpation of democratic politics by autocratic political figures. Second, it allowed elite-centred intrigue and political struggles for power to develop that disregarded the

52

When Jinnah died there was no individual possessing his aura and indelible association with Pakistani independence to take his place. This created immediate political problems. In Jinnah's absence it was not certain if th.e Constituent Assembly could legislate without the approval of the Governor­General; nor was it clear if the latter could disband the former.27 Ghulam Muhammad's seizure of the executive in 1954 opened the door for the army to enter the political legislative machinery of government. He appointed Major­Generallskander Mirza as Interior Minister and General Muhammad Ayub Khan as Defence Minister of a small "Cabinet of Talents" selected to help with legislation after the dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly. Mirza subsequently became Governor-General after Ghulam's death in 1955; while Ayub Khan officially ended Pakistan's troublesome experiment with democracy when he became Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) in October 1958.28

NARRATING THE PAKISTANI NATION

i) National inclusion and exclusion: theories and debate Homi Bhabha's29 assessment of nationalist discourse and its

construction and contestation by various groups is crucial to an understanding of these processes in Pakistan. Bhabha writes that "Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizon's in the mind's eye". 30 In other words, nations are ideological constructs, imperfectly imagined, prone to periodical oversights and destined to remain incomplete in their practical application. Bhabha calls the process of narrating the nation a "Janus-faced discourse" because the language used in constructing and articulating the national narrative is open to the interpretation of others within

masses, and, over time, created a widening socio-economic, political, and cultural chasm between an authoritarian political elite and the rest of Pakistani society. Third, it made foreign relations with western powers essential to the political survival of Pakistan. And, finally, it put policies in place that emphasised the symbolic importance of Kashmir as a national issue justifying the historical necessity for an independent Pakistan. 27 Baxter, et. al., p.176. On 24 October 1954 existing political arrangements in Pakistan were dismantled by the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad, who sacked the Constituent Assembly for its lack of productivity. His actions were supported by the Supreme Court in 1955 when it affirmed that the Governor-General had acted according to the law. Moreover, as an adjunct to this decision, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the Governor-General had every right to prevent the passing of legislation by the Constituent Assembly. Subsequently, the successor to the first Constituent Assembly was accountable to the demands and wishes of the Governor-General. The decision passed by the Supreme Court set the precedent for autocratic legislative control of the executive in Pakistan.

28 Kapur, p.40.

29 H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, Routledge, London, 1990. 30 'b'd 1 I I 'I p . .

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the geographical and socio-ideological framework of the nation. This creates the prospect of a double-meaning or, for that matter, multiple-meanings. In light of this, "cultural authority" in the "composition" of the national narrative and in the construction of national identity will with the passing of time be scrutinised, contested and rewritten/interpreted by, or because of, competing ethno-cultural groups from the margins of mainstream society. A national narrative can only ever be a syncretic product because of the constraints placed on it by changing historical and linguistic traditions, associations and interpretations. 31 Thus, in Nation and Narration, Bhabha relates that:

The boundary (of the national narrative) is Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of hybridity, incorporating new "people" in relation to the body politic, generating other sites of meaning and, inevitably, in the political process, producing unmanned sites of political antagonism and unpredictable forces for political representation. 32

In his work on cultural identities Stuart Hall describes national cultures as "constituting a discursive device which represents difference as unity or identity. They are cross-cut by deep internal divisions and differences, and 'unified' only through the exercise of different forms of cultural power".33 Hall writes that nations have never been unified and homogeneous in "Western Europe" or elsewhere. In his view nations are "cultural hybrids"34 whose narratives are "subject to processes of translation and change".35

Central to an understanding of Hall's analysis is the concept of identity. Hall describes identity as a human characteristic that is multi-accented and plural at both an individual and collective level. 36 The fact that identities are

31 ibid., pp.1-4.

32 ibid., p.4. Bhabha's analysis also intimates the prospect of a reasonably successful integration of disparate ethno-cultural groups within the narrative of the nation state. That is, while the nation state is a product of modernity, it need not have a short life-span as a structure for the classification of collective human identities at a geopolitical level. For this to happen the nationalist narrative needs to become a project that incorporates and represents in some shape or form the views and demands of all its ethno-cultural components. lt also needs to be flexible and inclusive in its composition and interpretation in order to accommodate changing expectations and representations of nationalness over time. 33 S. Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity'', in S. Hall, D. Held, & T. Mcgrew (eds.), Modernity and its Futures, Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishers and Open University, Cambridge, 1999, p.297. 34 ibid.

35 S. Hall in McCrone, 1998, p.30.

36 ibid.; & Hall, et. al., (1999), pp.275-280.

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constantly changing and laden with a variety of socio-cultural and political attributes allows for them to be compared to a production line:

Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, with the new cultural practices they represent, we should think instead of identity as 'production', which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation. 37

Hall's conceptualisation of identity as 'production' offers an insight into the historical evolution of human identities from smaller kin group structures to larger ethnic, regional, national and transnational variations. The chronological leap from small and tightly knit groups to broader and all-encompassing ones takes place over a considerable period of time. National cultures are a recent construction of this historical phenomena of human identity formation and they are intrinsically tied to the development of the modern nation state. Moreover, they have as their basis a plethora of historical and cultural representations of human identity that have been strategically, selectively and gradually added to the national narrative by means of coercion and negotiation.

National cultures that successfully integrate existing regional and ethnic systems of cultural representation are able to construct a whole new level of cultural meanings for a diverse range of people within the boundaries of the nation state. 38 These new cultural identities "subsume" previous socio-cultural modes of individual and group identification and allow regional and ethnic variations and distinctions to be gradually incorporated or assimilated into the

' national narrative reducing the potential for opposition.39 This, however, requires time and is not without its constraints. In its short history as a nation state Pakistan has been unsuccessful at integrating its various regional and cultural identities into a national community. The primary reason for this is that its political leadership has sought to coerce alternative cultural identities into incontrovertibly accepting its nationalist vision. The failure of disparate regional and cultural groups to comply with demands to abandon traditional modes of

37 Hall in McCrone, p.29; & S. Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora", in J. Rutherford (ed.), Identity: Community, Culture and Difference, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1990, p.222. 38 Hall in McCrone, p.30. 39 Hall, et. al., (1999), p.292.

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identity for a nationalist discourse, novel and dogmatic in its composition, has created opposition and, in some instances, conflict in Pakistan.40

Pakistan's national discourse has continually perpetuated and sustained an anti-lndia orientation in place of genuine efforts to provide greater political accountability. The early introduction of the military into the political system signalled the indefinite postponement of democratic government. In its absence autocratic political control was entrenched through coercion and a concomitant strategy to establish an unrepresentative political culture. The prelude to military rule was the incompatibility of the Muhajir leadership of the Muslim League and the peoples actually inhabiting the Pakistani territory at the time of independence. The former were ill-equipped to construct a consensual 'national' culture out of the diverse currents of ethnic, linguistic and sectarian culture that characterised the nation state territory. This was likely to have contributed to the drift into authoritarian politics and the attempt to impose the "two-nation" theory as the national ideology,41 with its built-in demonisation of India.

ii) Military leadership and the rise of Punjabis to power The, military assumed leadership of the country in October 1958. This

made formal what had existed de facto since Ghulam Muhammad's constitutional coup. The military dismantled the short-lived democratic system that had endured difficulties from its inception. Democratic government in Pakistan prior to the military coup of 1958 was hindered by polarities in the distribution and representation of power at the federal and regional levels. lt was also hampered by the insincerity and distrust shown by the political elite of West Pakistan.42

The military leaders of Pakistan have been preoccupied with the procurement of munitions and the development of a steadfast and sustainable military culture. Ayesha Jalal writes that during 1949-1950 approximately 68 per cent of national expenditure was used on arms purchases.43 Much of this was extracted from sterling balances owed to Pakistan by Britain estimated to

40 The use of force to advance postcolonial nation-building had historical precedents. European nations in the 19th century were constructed through carefully implemented programs of cultural and ethnic cleansing and homogenisation of minority groups at a time when the internationalisation of human rights issues was non-existent. Postcolonial nations that emerged in the mid to late 20th century period of increasing global interaction risked condemnation by the international community if, and when, they adopted repressive methods of national integration and assimilation analogous to those practised by their 19th century European predecessors.

41 The "two-nation" theory never had much traction in Punjab, Sind, East Bengal, Baluchistan and NWFP because Muslims there had never been threatened by a Hindu electoral majority.

42 Baxter et a/, 1998, p.176.

43 A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origin's of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1990, p.94.

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amount to 35 million pounds for the period in question.44 This preoccupation with a "political economy of defence" diverted large amounts of revenue from the crucial task of "building a political party system that would reflect Pakistan's linguistic and cultural diversities".45 lt also inadvertently smoothed the path for the military and bureaucracy to wrest the political leadership from the Muhajirs, the nation's earliest leaders.46

In light of Stuart Hall's theory of "identity in production" the Pakistan army can be viewed as an institution with its own identity indelibly associated with political control and a supra-ethnic national vision that, although overwhelmingly Punjabi in its orientation, does not prevent the inclusion of other internal ethnic groups from entering its ranks. This does not mean that the Punjabi military elite, once ascendant in the political realm of Pakistan, become something other than ethnic Punjabis; on the contrary, they remain staunch proponents of their ethnic identity, but within the "Janus-faced" discourse of modern identity studies they also identify themselves in other - non-ethnic - ways. In the context of the post-1947 political environment of Pakistan, the Punjabi military elite began to identify themselves along occupational lines and sought either to subsume or supersede ethnic and other socio-cultural identities - particularly non-Punjabi

44 ibid., pp.94-95.

45 A. Jalal, "The State and Political Privilege in Pakistan" in M. Weiner & A. Banuazizi (eds.), The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse UP, New York, 1994, p.155.

46 I. Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947, Princeton UP, New Jersey, 1988, pp.4-6 & 110-123. Ali's historical research is crucial in its description of military links to power in the Punjab. He describes that the outcome of British efforts to secure their political authority in India after 1857 was an increased awareness and acceptance by Punjabis of the importance of military service to provincial power and socio-economic prosperity. This provided the impetus for the establishment of an entrenched military culture of power in the province. The British, aware of Punjabi associations of "land with status", began, sometime in the early 1890s, to reward soldiers for their support of the Crown Raj. At first this was done in a tentative and somewhat sporadic manner; but, within a short period of time land acquisition for retired servicemen became an accepted practice of British policy so much so that "men from the Punjab came to expect, and obtain, colony land as their rightful due for service in the military".

The importance of the military to the British was clearly evident from the manner in which the distribution of land was carried out. Land could only be obtained by ex-soldiers who had given 21 years of service. This encouraged soldiers to maintain a long association with the military and provided levels of uniformity and stability that greatly strengthened the bond of loyalty between the British and the Punjabi elite. This not only helped to entrench military culture and power in the Punjab that had immediate and enduring consequences of political significance in the newly established nation of Pakistan, but it also led to the development of a new category of group identification amongst military personnel - particularly from the upper echelons of the army- that was exclusively based on an association with military service and a culture of imperial and paternalistic authority. lt was from within the ranks of this legacy of British imperialism that individuals emerged to challenge and overthrow the political legitimacy of the Muhajirs; and, in the latter's place the leaders of the army began to imagine themselves as the rightful benefactors of political control in Pakistan.

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and minority Punjabi ethnic identities - in the process of narrating their national discourse. Punjabi military identity included small numbers of non-Punjabis who, in some instances, did rise to important positions within the army and government of Pakistan.47 Just as importantly, it also excluded many poorer Punjabis who lacked the socio-economic influence and political power of the landowning castes and who failed to benefit from British policies of land distribution and military entrenchment in the Punjab. Thus, this Punjabi landed/military elite who supported the 'Federalist' approach to nationalism of the Unionist Party during the inter-war years found themselves with no other option after 1947 but to 'reinvent' their political identity in the Pakistan discourse.

lan Talbot's research on the socio-cultural, political, economic and linguistic variations to be found in the Punjab of post-1947 Pakistan is crucial in depicting the rise and entrenchment of a distinct cultural identity of power in the province that is associated with military service and expansive agricultural holdings.48 The nature of partition which amalgamated the economically poorest and traditionally diverse socio-cultural regions of undivided India into a national collective facilitated the need for an immediate and overarching political leadership that could reconcile historical differences and mould them into a workable national platform. Unfortunately, the Muhajirs and their successors, the army, were not characterised by a need to share power with other socio­cultural groups. The army's numerical and logistical strength allowed them to impart their power and political vision over all the other regions of Pakistan through policies of coercion and exclusion that sought to inhibit the growth and participation of alternative cultural identities - including that of other Punjabis.

47 Talbot, 1999, p.393. Muhammad Ayub Khan is a good example of this. He "came from a middle-income Pushtun family from the Hazara district of' the NWFP.

48 I. Talbot, "The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality?", in C. Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, Zed Books, London, 2002. He argues that the Punjab continues to be characterised by internal class differences and can be divided into four distinct geographical zones with noticeable political, economic and linguistic variations. The northern sector which encompasses the Rawalpindi Division and the nation's capital, lslamabad, is home to the Pakistan army; the central area contains the majority of the province's population that as a unit comprises almost half the national electorate, "the industrialized region around Faisalabad" and "the fertile agricultural districts" surrounding Lahore and Gujranwala; and the south-west and western districts, much poorer in comparison and both feudal in their social and economic organisation. Hindko and Pothwari are languages other than Punjabi spoken by people to "the north of the Salt Range". However, it is in the south-west Punjab that a discernible linguistic counter-narrative in opposition to Punjabi has developed. Saraiki, "closely related to Sindhi", is the predominant language of a sizeable section of the population of south-west Punjab. Many of them are situated in areas bordering India and the Pakistani province of Sind. This has presented problems for a series of Pakistani governments, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.

58

The exclusion of alternative cultural identities from contributing to the outcome of the national narrative has been detrimental to national integration and led to the widespread belief that government in Pakistan is only concerned with promoting and maintaining the interests of its Punjabi constituency. This purported Punjabisation of Pakistan has created opposition to the military and bureaucratic elite from internal and external ethnic, regional, religious and socio-political groups interested in redressing the imbalances of political authority in the country. Both the army and the bureaucracy are viewed by their opponents as repressive institutions interested only in prolonging their power and ethnic bases.49

THE INCREASING USE OF JINNAH AND ISLAM AS NATIONAL SYMBOLS

The political leaders of Pakistan, irrespective of their agendas, intrigues, and power struggles, have all had to deal with and interpret the legacy of Jinnah and the position of Islam in their respective attempts at nation building. In other words, Pakistan's political leaders, whether civilian or military, have recognised and made use of the practical and symbolic importance of Jinnah and Islam to the national narrative. From the very beginning they have used Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam and founding figure of Pakistan, and Islam, the alleged rationale for Muslim solidarity and national consciousness in South Asia, as instruments for the political mobilisation and legitimation of a national identity that articulates the importance of a strong and authoritative leadership in response to the imagined opposition and hostility of neighbouring India. lt is this imagined threat from India that has given the military rulers of Pakistan the opportunity to appropriate and redefine the legacy of Jinnah's political vision and appeal, as well as monitor and decree the type of political role that Islam was to play in Pakistan.

The cult of personality associated with Jinnah the man and Jinnah the political leader of the Muslims of India began before partition. Sharif AI Mujahid writes that Jinnah was bestowed with the title Quaid-i-Azam soon after the 1937 election in India. 50 To date, no precise explanation for the conferment of this title on Jinnah exists. 51 However, what remains important about the appellation

49 For a description of the "two-nation" theory as practised by the military and civilian leaders of Pakistan refer to Appendix 1.

50 S. AI Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation, published under the auspices of the Committee on Quaid-i-Azam Biography, Quaid-i-AzamAcademy, Karachi,1981, p.424. 51 ibid., pp.424-430.

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given to Jinnah is that from the outset it was used to support the "two-nation" theory. Jinnah was imagined as a great Muslim leader in the tradition of the great historical imperial rulers of Mug ha! India. 52 To the apologists of the "two­nation" theory and the need for Pakistan he was given the mythical qualities of a millennia! figure53 and depicted as a political emancipator that stood in opposition to the Satanic Hindu Congress before 1947 and to India after partition, and as a political symbol of Muslim national assertiveness after his death in 1948. Jinnah himself, personally averse to having any honours bestowed on him, 54 was fully cognisant of the appellation's symbolic value in the decade leading to partition. He was aware of the importance of portraying to the British and the Congress a unified Muslim constituency which recognised and revered him as its leader at a time when crucial decisions on the outcome of Indian independence began to be made. Thus, Jinnah warmed to the appellation with all his political guile despite the opposition of Congress and others who disputed its validity. AI Mujahid sums up Jinnah's acceptance in this manner:

Hence, why the title got permanently reserved for Jinnah must be attributed in part to the "race" ("two-nation") theory, in part to the Muslims' paramount psychic need to invest themselves with all the essential attributes of nationhood, which called in the first place for a supreme leader to head the movement, and in part to the sort of inspiring leadership Jinnah had provided them, which made them a "third force" for the first time in a real sense. 55

AI Mujahid writes that both the Congress Party and the Muslim League believe that each was responsible for ascribing the appellation Quaid-i-Azam to Jinnah. The writer warns that both accounts are speculative with little to support their veracity other than the words of prominent officials from both parties.

52 A.S. Ahmad, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity. The Search for Saladin, OUP, London, 1997. In the recent scholarship of Akbar Ahmad Jinnah has been imagined as a modern day Saladin. 53 A.R. Willner, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership, Yale UP, New Haven, 1984, p.4. Willner quotes from Max Weber to describe the concept of 'charismatic authority': "it rests on "the devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him" ( M. Weber, Economy and Society, in G. Roth & C. Wittich (eds.), 3 vols., Bedminster Press, New York, 1968, Vol. 1, p.213.) 54 AI Mujahid, p.433. AI Mujahid writes that "throughout his long public career, he (Jinnah) was averse to accepting "any post or position or title from the Government", or even an honorary degree from the Aligarh Muslim University which he held so dear''. 55 ibid., p.435.

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Looked at it from this perspective, Jinnah's acceptance of the appellation is consistent with the national discourse of Pakistan which has been narrated to accentuate the antagonism between India and Pakistan as being historically fixed, immutable and internecine. The need for Pakistani nationalists to construct a national identity and consciousness in contrast to that of India can be traced to the period prior to partition when the Muslim League changed its political position to accord with the logic of the "two-nation" theory, and Jinnah welcomed the growing support and popularity that came from this with open arms. lt was also the result of the weakness of the League's party organisation compared to that of the Congress. These have certainly been given prominence by historians of South Asia who reflect the views of Ambedkar:

If the Hindus have the Benares University, the Musalmans must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi movement, the Muslims must launch the Tablig movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must meet it by Tanjim [Tanzim]. If the Hindus have the R.S.S., the Muslims must reply by organizing the Khaksars. 56

By extension then, and the point is made by AI Mujahid, the need from 1937 onwards for Jinnah and the Muslim League to construct a politically charged and unified Muslim identity in India that contrasted in every detail with the rhetoric that emanated from the ranks of the Congress necessitated and prompted the recognition of an identifiable, unequivocal and strong Muslim leader to oppose Gandhi. Furthermore, this Muslim leader needed to be portrayed in a grandiose and eminent manner to match the esteem and veneration given to Gandhi. Thus, as a title Quaid-i-Azam represented Jinnah and the Muslim League's desire to construct a charismatic political leader of mythical proportions to compete with the Congress's Mahatma Gandhi. 57

The cult of personality associated with Jinnah quickly developed in a fledgling nation seeking to define itself internationally. If anything, Jinnah's premature death intensified the need for Pakistan's earliest politicians to establish the messianic status of its founder. lt made it easier for private and public figures to eulogise and mythologise him and his political legacy to justify their positions and the validity of Pakistan as a nation. The demise of the leader before he had time to implement any measures that adversely affected any of the new nation's citizens also facilitated his posthumous apotheosis. In these

56 Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India, (p.236), cited in ibid.

57 AI Mujahid, p.435.

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circumstances, the earliest benefactors of political and economic power in Pakistan set out to consolidate and entrench their authority by increasingly using Jinnah's name to rubber-stamp their policies.

In the immediate aftermath to partition a rush took place to name a wide variety of private and public organisations and institutions in Pakistan after the Quaid-i-Azam. These included educational and other research-based institutions, commercial ventures, sports competitions and events like the inaugural domestic cricket tournament, and infrastructural facilities in cities and towns like roads, buildings and parks. Images of Jinnah were visible in schools, government offices, courts of law, hospitals, homes and public hoardings throughout Pakistan. Jinnah was also commemorated annually on his birthday, 25 December, on the day of his passing, 11 September, and as the founder of Pakistan during independence celebrations. These occasions have been recognised as national holidays and marked with festivities and solemn processions that have indelibly etch.ed Jinnah into the national consciousness. They have also been extensively supported by the media who have provided ample newspaper space, as well as radio and television coverage. Over the years the newspaper Dawn has devoted large sections of its press coverage with additional supplements to each of these occasions. Throughout Pakistan's history the tributes and homage paid to Jinnah have remained as deliberately hyperbolic as the one made by prime minister Khwaja Nazimuddin in a public meeting at Jehangir Park, Karachi, on 25 December 1952 in front of 10 000 people who had assembled to commemorate what would have been Jinnah's 76th birthday. On the day in question Nazimuddin publicly announced:

The history of the world will hardly furnish an example of a leader who led his followers to victory in the face of two opposing forces without any equipment and any arms and won them freedom and made them possessors of such a big state.58

The narrative of Jinnah's cult of personality was transformed by General Zia ui-Haq. During the latter's leadership Jinnah the secular political leader who founded a state for Muslim nationality rather than a Muslim religious state became Jinnah "the upholder of lslam".59 In his determination to elevate and entrench the position of Islam in the national narrative Zia fabricated the past to bridge the ideological divide that had existed between Jinnah and the u/ama

58 Dawn, Saturday 27 December 1952.

59 Talbot, India and Pakistan, p.201.

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before and after partition. Zia's "official discourse swept to one side the ambiguities of the freedom struggle, as the goal of an Islamic state was deemed to be its main basis".60 The u/ama who had formerly struggled to win over the electorate, or impress upon previous regimes the need for a greater, if not comprehensive, political role for Islam in Pakistan were in one fell swoop catapulted to prominence as the guardians of the national narrative by Zia.

The ideological conflation of Jinnah and the ulama concocted by Zia to increase the influence of Islam on Pakistani society was consistent with the political outlook of the new military rulers who fused traditional authoritarian leadership with an austere and firm observance of Islamic doctrine and practice. Zia's actions paved the way for Islamic parties to become more competitive and influential political alternatives after 1988. However, during his time as leader of Pakistan Islamic parties and prominent members of the u/ama refrained from challenging his authority. This was because Zia had introduced a traditional Islamic political system in Pakistan that recognised the importance of political and religious institutions working together as an understood compact even though they both had different and specific societal duties to fulfil. Thus, political rulers governed on a consultative basis with the ulama. For their part, the latter were awarded patronage by political rulers for staying out of politics. These awards included the appointment of u/ama as political advisors, judges under Shariat law, inspectors of markets and school teachers at various madrassahs -the full patronage regime of past traditional Islamic empires like the Delhi Sultanate and Mughals61

This was a complete reversal of fortune for the u/ama of Pakistan who had struggled to assert themselves politically since the imposition of Crown Rule in India. The British had destroyed much of their economic and authoritative basis by bypassing Shariat law and traditional Islamic educational practices. British legal practices and educational curricula became the means for government employment and fostered the secular politicians that ushered in the nationalist period and the partition of India. The ulama fared no better once Pakistan came into existence. The new state saw itself as heir to the secular system of the later Raj and was not inclined to offer the mullahs any role in the nation's political institutions. The ulama, for its part, remained fundamentally at odds with the concept of a liberal, secular nation state.

60 ibid. 61 G. E. Von Grunebaum, Classical/slam: A History, 600-1258, Alien & Unwin, London, 1963. (Translation by K. Watson, 1970.); & P. Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, Thames and Hudson, London, 1968, pp.33-76.

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Sayyid Abu'I-A'Ia (Maulana) Maududi fell into the latter category. He believed that a real Islamic state in Pakistan - i.e. one in which the 'political institution' deferred to the 'religious institution' - was inevitable and worked towards its achievement. His overt disapproval of the government on ideological grounds was backed up by strategies he felt would undermine the validity of secularism in Pakistan. Maududi felt that a proper religious education would bring to the attention of Pakistani's "the hollowness of the Muslim League's agenda", and train them to be "an Islamic vanguard who would oversee the revival of Islam at the national level".62 Furthermore, he frequently denounced Pakistan's earliest politicians for their secular habits, advised Pakistani's against taking "an oath of allegiance to the state until it became Islamic", 63 harangued and embarrassed the government over its policy in Kashmir in 194864 and its failure to repudiate the Islamic legitimacy of the 'heretical' Ahmadis,65 and worked tirelessly for the inclusion of the word Islam in the title of the first constitution. Nevertheless, Maududi and the u/ama were too divided and mutually hostile to be of any political significance in this early period; the best they could do was to harass, in the name of Islam, national governments including those of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.66

The promotion of a dogmatic national narrative by the political leaders of Pakistan resulted in the denial and suppression of alternative discourses. These leaders imposed stringent censorship laws on publications and electronic communication networks to prevent information detrimental to their interests

62 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, Oxford UP, New York, 1996, p.41.

63 ibid., p.42.

64 ibid. When the government of Pakistan described its authorisation of paramilitary units to enter Kashmir in 1948 as being a jihad Maududi took them to task. Vali Reza Nasr writes that "Mawdudi undermined these efforts by arguing that vigilante groups organized by the government... could not be fighting a jihad, nor could the government surreptitiously support a jihad while outwardly professing to observe a cease-fire... Mawdudi claimed that the government should either declare war with India over Kashmir or abide by the terms of the cease-fire to which it had agreed; covert war and diplomatic sleights of hand were not acceptable in Islam".

65 ibid., p.43. The ulama organised demonstrations in 1953 and 1954 to oust the finance minister, Zafaru'llah Khan, from his position because he was an Ahmadi. At the same time, the demonstrations were used to pressure the government into putting forward a declaration that recognised the "Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority''. The government's decision to do neither led to the outbreak of violence and the arrest of many of the agitators including Maududi and members of his political party, the Jama'at-i-lslami. (For a definition of the Ahmadiyya movement see footnote 102 of this chapter.)

66 Ayub Khan, the Sandhurst-trained and English-educated General, was particularly ruthless with them refusing to countenance any ulamic political input to his 'basic democracy' system.

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from circulating to a wider audience. 67 Civil and military politicians have

consistently disparaged and dismissed political views that have conflicted with

those of their own. The desire to hold on to power at any cost has necessitated

the use of multiple Machiavellian intrigues and plots to do away with dissidents

and material deemed objectionable and anathema to authoritarian politics.

Zia's fabrication of the past bears similarities to Stalin's reinterpretation of

Soviet intellectual history. 68 Like Stalin, Zia selectively used history to justify

authoritarianism in Pakistan, his political legitimacy and the inclusion of Islam in

the national narrative. During the Zia period the suppression and alteration of

fact and history became firmly embedded in the high school curriculum. The

lslamicisation of history and the introduction of Pakistan Studies69 were

designed for the purpose of indoctrinating future generations of Pakistani's into

67 z. Niazi, "Censorship: blackest of the black laws", in Dawn, Vol. XLX, No. 202, Karachi, Tuesday, July 29, 1997, p.11 of the Dawn at Fifty supplement. Niazi writes that: After the promulgation of the blackest of the black laws, the Press & Publications Ordinance of 1963, the Press was granted "freedom to agree". Pre-censorship during the Zia era, gave another "freedom" - "freedom to chop and change" ... The entire Press was forced to trim its sails to one wind, to tow along in a single file and to sing in symphony with one voice, in an effort to formulate public opinion into a single mould". 68 R.C. Tucker, "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult", in The American Historical Review, Vo1.84, No.2, April1979, p.352. Robert C. Tucker writes that Stalin destroyed the philosophical credentials of the Russian Marxist and political theorist Georgi Plekhanov in order to justify and entrench his own political and intellectual authority. Stalin suppressed the Marxist contributions of the Bolshevik opponent Plekhanov and credited Lenin as the "supreme" intellectual and revolutionary individual responsible for the introduction and popularisation of Marxist doctrine in Russia. This was similar to Stalin's ejection from official Soviet history of Lean Trotsky's crucial contribution to the Russian revolution both as a revolutionary and writer. Thus, Stalin validated the Bolshevik revolution by suppressing its counter-narrative, and elevated his own status within it and Soviet history per se by erasing the achievements of Trotsky. In Stalin's version of history he placed himself fourth in a line behind Marx, Engels and Lenin as the quartet responsible for the advent and perpetuation of communism in the Soviet Union. He also employed a team of "Stalin­surrogates" to popularise and disseminate his name and reputation among the masses, and to ward off prospective challengers.

69 K.K. Aziz, The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan, Vanguard, Lahore, 1993. Aziz offers an in-depth analysis of the negative impact that Pakistan Studies has had on the nation's youth. He points out the misleading logic that is past for fact by a number of textbooks that are in circulation throughout Pakistan, and criticises their attempt to construct a history that aims to validate Zia's political and religious objectives. A case in point is Aziz's summary of "General Zia as Ruler of Pakistan":

Textbooks aimed at students from class 9 to B.A. give their verdict on General Zia's military rule in five glowing testimonials: (1) his repeated postponement of elections was the right decision taken for unavoidable reasons; (2) he honestly tried to enforce the Islamic system of government as had been promised by the Quaid-i-Azam to the nation; (3) his Islamic ordinances at last achieved the real objective of the creation of Pakistan; (4) he was chosen by destiny to be the person who achieved the distinction of implementing Islamic law; and (5) naturally, he deserves our thanks and congratulations (p.158).

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believing that Jinnah was the founder of an Islamic state in South Asia.?O In this way he made certain that the re-imagining of Jinnah as a religious leader would ultimately permeate all sections of Pakistani society once the graduates of the new high school syllabus began to assume positions of power. Furthermore, Zia's death has done little to dislodge the long term repercussions of his educational policy; Pakistani youths continue to be weaned on Zia's reading of history.71

Zia's educational legacy has encumbered those who have succeeded him since 1988 and forced their reluctant adherence to his political structure. Talbot cites examples that indicate the compliance of both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto to the lslamicisation policies implemented by Zia. The former remarked on the occasion of the National Assembly's passing of the Shariat Act in May 1991: "historic ... the objective of the creation of Pakistan had been realised";72 the latter adopted the wearing of the dupatta (scarf) in public, and during her time in office she was unable to overturn Sharia-based legislation that discriminated against women like "the Law of Evidence or the Hudood ordinances". 73

COUNTER-NARRA TJVES AND OPPOSITION TO THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

Since 1947 the logic of the "two-nation" theory and its post-partition transformation into a political doctrine justifying opposition to India has carried little weight outside of official circles. Its continuous articulation by the elite classes within Pakistan has not overcome the genuine need to construct a cooperative and equitable nation state inclusive of its various and disparate ethno-cultural groups. Instead, the excluded, and disenfranchised, segments of society have quite often organised themselves politically to oppose the culture of authoritarian politics and the dogmatic constructions of national identity imposed on them by those in power. Rather than blindly and passively adhering to the vagaries of a national discourse that leaves little or no room for the input of groups outside of the official branches of power, the excluded have articulated their own counter-narratives and ethno-cultural objectives in defiance of the ruling authorities, or, as Will Kymlica puts it, the counter-narratives of

70 Talbot, India and Pakistan, p.201. 71 ibid. 72 ibid., p.212. 73 ibid.

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minorities in Pakistan are "a response to majority nation-building, using the same tools of nation-building".74

Kymlica's research is crucial in understanding the discernible need for minorities to organise themselves into distinct political groups that actively seek to disengage from the national narratives of majorities, and, in the process, it highlights the failure of the Pakistan enterprise to date. Minorities who have over a considerable period of time acquired distinct cultural identities begin to feel threatened when nation-building majority groups set out to assimilate them into a nationalist discourse that by its proclamation is condescendingly inimical to their traditional socio-political organisation and ethno-cultural practices. In turn, these excluded groups, in an effort to preserve their traditions and identities, organise themselves politically to the point where in a competitive nationalist environment they increasingly imagine themselves to be national groups distinct from those imagined by nation-building majorities. Although Kymlica's research is directed at western democracies and the need for greater political representation and understanding of minority rights within their governmental institutions, it nevertheless offers an obvious relevance to the nation-building agenda of elites in Pakistan. Kymlica writes that:

In both scholarly analysis and everyday public debate, minority rights are often described as forms of 'special status' or 'privilege', and people wonder why all of these pushy and aggressive minorities are demanding concessions and advantages from the state. In reality, however, while minorities do make claims against the state, these must be understood as a response to the claims that the state makes against minorities. People talk about 'troublesome minorities', but behind every minority that is causing trouble for the state, we are likely to find a state that is putting pressure on minorities.75

In Pakistan the demands and claims that the nation-builders have made against other ethnic groups has led to the latter defining themselves in ethno­political terms through the articulation of counter-national narratives. That is, the demands and claims of ethnic minorities within Pakistan to maintain their own cultural and ideological customs and practices in light of the limitations and constraints of an official discourse that sets out to nullify or destroy them has posed irremediable problems of social unrest and political disunity that has historically worked against national consensus. The reluctance of elites to invite

74 W. Kymlica, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multicu/turalism and Citizenship, Oxford UP, Oxford, 2001, p.29.

75 'b'd 2 I I ., p ..

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minorities into debates centring on national identity, and their failure to provide greater equity and representation for them in education, language, military and public service, and media employment and depiction has amounted to a limited nationalist vision that has threatened to derail Pakistan's political integrity on numerous occasions.

In the absence of genuine political and socio-economic reform throughout its short history, Pakistan has experienced numerous centrifugal agitations that have defied the rhetorical basis of its creation. Regional and ethnic assertiveness and secessionist demands in conjunction with sectarian conflict, difficulties in the management of refugees and the growth of trafficking in arms and narcotics are all examples of a collapsed socio-political system that shows little sign of improving if efforts to redress its weaknesses and inequalities continue to be ignored. These exclusionist practices have beset the construction of a national narrative that resonates with all ethno-cultural identities, and highlights the redundancy of the "two-nation" theory as a verifiable tool for the formation of a national culture in Pakistan. The secession of East Pakistan provides an obvious example of the failure of the "two-nation" theory to appeal to large numbers of Muslims in South Asia, and also points to the ramifications of a political leadership that is unwavering in its determination to thrash resistance and antagonism out of its citizenry.

i) Secession of East Pakistan By 1971 the political representatives of East Pakistan had long grown

disenchanted with the national policies that emanated from West Pakistan. On numerous occasions they had voiced their annoyance at the neglect and discrimination that they were made to endure and rallied for political, cultural, and socio-economic rights to put them on an equal footing with their compatriots in the west. Three issues that had particularly irked them were the exclusion of Bengali in preference to Urdu as the national language of Pakistan, the lack of substantial political representation commensurate with their numerical advantage and the continued economic exploitation of their raw materials with little in the way of a return.76 The political organisation of the Awami League to redress these institutional imbalances was greeted with suspicion in West Pakistan. Many there thought that this was a seditious plot on the part of the Bengalis who were regarded "as latter-day Muslim converts still corrupted by Hindu practices ... (and) in league with their "co-culturists" in lndia".77 In

76 R. Sisson & LE. Rose, War and Secession:Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, California UP, Berkeley, 1990, pp.B-34. 77 "b"d 9 [ [ 'I p, •

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addition, its leaders, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy its founder in 1950 and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from 1963, were known political agitators who both frequently organised demonstrations against unpopular national legislation; and both had been arrested for this. This dismissive attitude towards Bengali subnationalist political parties and the failure of the West Pakistani elite to appreciate the grievances of the beleaguered Bengalis climaxed in the political events of 1971. The Awami League which had captured 160 out of 162 National Assembly seats allocated to East Pakistan, 78 and who had a clear overall majority in the national election of 1972, were refused the opportunity to form a government by Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The election proved that the "two-nation" theory was not capable of overriding Bengali identity, and the leaders of West Pakistan knew it. The subsequent civil war to quell the disturbances that had arisen in East Pakistan was confirmation of continued opposition to authoritarianism. By this stage the Bengalis had no more desire to follow the dictates of West Pakistan's nation-builders, and as hostilities escalated and Indian forces joined the affray on the side of the East Pakistani's - making a mockery of the "two-nation" theory - the latter gained its independence and subsequently undertook the task of constructing a nation all on its own.

Pakistan's other provinces have also produced counter-narratives that have demanded greater regional autonomy. In some instances, regional organisations with nationalist aspirations have emerged and often engaged in violent demonstrations against the central government. Sindis, Baluchis and Pathans have opposed the discriminative policies of Pakistan's political leaders. These groups were directly effected by the One Unit plan, the adoption of Urdu as the official national language, and the politics of authoritarianism that monopolised resources and power in the hands of established institutions like the army and bureaucracy.

ii) Sindi Desh

The imposition of the national narrative on minority groups in Pakistan has continuously been resented by the Sindis. Initially they directed their anger and hostility at the Muhajirs. This was because the political vision and power of the Muhajirs was strongest in the urban areas of Sind where many of them had settled after 1947. As the initial architects of the Pakistani nation, the Muhajir leadership disregarded the demands and grievances of ethnic Sindis who were increasingly becoming alienated in their own region at Muhajir dominance and the omission of their cultural identity from the national narrative. Once the army

78 Talbot, Pakistan, (1999), p.405.

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took power ethnic Sindis redirected their hostility at Punjabis. The army encroached on the traditional rural strongholds of ethnic Sindis by issuing large tracts of land to retired military personnel. In light of this and the influx of Punjabis, Pathans, Biharis, Afghan refugees and others into the urban economies of Karachi and the other cities of Sind - that reduced the Sindi population in the province to less than 50 per cent - ethnic Sindis began to articulate their own vision of themselves to the ruling authorities of Pakistan.

The Sindi counter-narrative reached its political zenith during Zia's leadership and demanded the recognition of Sindi as an official language, a confederal political structure with wider regional autonomy, a larger slice of government expenditure, equality in the selection of recruits for the army and bureaucracy and greater initiative and recognition given to Sindi politicians and entrepreneurs.79 it was reminiscent of the Awami League's proposals in East Pakistan and came at the end of a more prosperous political period for ethnic Sindis in Pakistan.80 The gains made by ethnic Sindis during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's leadership were overturned by Zia. 81 This led to the development of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and its articulation of the above demands for ethnic Sindis. Zia's staunch repression of them led to MRD calls for a 'Sindi Desh' -the popular appellation amongst the members of the MRD for a Sindi nation. In response to this, Zia deployed 45 000 troops in Sind in 1983 for a 6 month campaign that only ended after the deaths of 300 separatists. 82

iii) Baluchi dissidence In Baluchistan secessionist demands took some time to crystallise. it was

not until 1955 and the One Unit plan that the province officially became an integral component of the Pakistani nation-building enterprise. Before this the nature of colonial policy and partition had left the tribal chiefs of Baluchistan free to administer over the affairs of much of the region. However, fears of irredentism and the growing need to centralise the construction of a Pakistani nation state meant that independent Baluchi authority needed to be reined in.

79 Baxter et. al., p.204. & F. Ahmed, "Pakistan's Problems of National Integration", pp.229-246, in Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics, and the State: The Pakistan Experience, Zed Books, London, 1985. 80 Jaffrelot, pp.23-24. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto granted rural Sindis an 11.4 per cent administrative quota in Sind, and passed the Teaching Promotion and Use of Sindi Language Bill in July 1972. This was resented by the Muhajirs who organised demonstrations that turned violent. 81 ibid., p.24. Zia sacked many Sindis that found work in important institutional and commercial professions during the Bhutto period. This included 1 746 from the civil service in February 1978. 82 ibid.

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Thus, clandestine agreements between the central government and the tribal chiefs led to the purchase of Baluchi territory that extended the former's political and jurisdictional limits of West Pakistan under the One Unit plan. 83

The subsequent politicisation of Baluchistan led to the development of a rnore inclusive and widespread regional identity for previously scattered tribal groups. The representatives of this nascent regional identity demanded from the central authorities political and socio-economic reforms to better facilitate regional development. The 1970 election saw two Baluchi nationalists elected to the positions of governor and chief minister of the province, Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal respectively. Both became vocal opponents of central government policies and nationalist objectives, and both demanded a larger share of the spoils and wider provincial autonomy for Baluchistan. 84 Furthermore, the newly elected provincial government sought to "indigenize" the local administration "by replacing non-Baluchi bureaucrats" with ethnic Baluchis, and couched much of its resentment in an anti-Punjab dialectic. 85

Baluchi politicisation and growing opposition to centralisation provoked Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto into dismissing the Baluchistan government in February 1973. Bhutto accused the ousted government of treason for allegedly conspiring with an Iraqi diplomat, who was arrested for the possession of a cache of arms, and Baluchi separatists against his government. 86 The dismissal led to the outbreak of violence that continued throughout Bhutto's time in office. The Baluch People's Liberation Front and the Baluch Students' Organisation rallied some 10 000 supporters to oppose central government intervention and to secede from Pakistan. Between 1973 and Bhutto's political demise in 1977 80 000 troops were deployed to suppress the dissidents, 3 300 of them were killed in action.87 The Baluchis lost 5 300 lives88 causing a great deal of embarrassment for Bhutto and further diminishing the credibility of the official national discourse in the eyes of many Pakistani's. After all, the dust had barely settled on the events of 1971 when war between the central government and Baluchi separatists broke out. lt was Zia's timely gesture of goodwill to release thousands of Baluchi prisoners of war from captivity that led to the

83 Baxter et. at., p.208. 84 ibid.

85 Jaffrelot, p.29. 86 ibid.

87 ibid.

88 ibid.

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disengagement of troops and brought an end to hostilities. However, demands for Baluchi regional autonomy did not disappear during the Zia period. The Baluchis were just as steadfast and resolute in defending their regional identity and culture during his leadership as they were during that of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. As a result, political recognition and acceptance of them as a distinct ethnic group within the national narrative remains unfulfilled; a combination of central government obduracy and regional political disunity and factionalism that became more evident from 1988 onwards. 89

iv) Pathans: separatism and support The Pathans of the NWFP have oscillated between a pressing need to

articulate their ethnic identity in nationalist terms and a periodic eagerness to work with the Pakistan government when Pathan interests in neighbouring Afghanistan have been perceived as in danger. The latter of the two options has always been on the condition that the Pathans be given some access to socio­economic and political power. 90 Generally, the Pathans have benefited more favourably from military governments than they have from civilian ones. British colonial policy saw bonds of loyalty and affiliation develop between a select core of Punjabis and Pathans who served in the British India Army and civil service. These bonds remained intact after partition and many Pathans were able to rise to positions of prominence in Pakistani society. The NWFP, commensurate with its population base, has fared better in socio-economic and political terms than have Sind, Baluchistan and East Pakistan prior to the latter's secession. In the 1960s the Pathans were well represented in the national government: Ayub Khan and 19 out of 48 of the highest ranked officers in the military were Pathans. 91

When political authoritarianism has reverted to civilian politics in Pakistan the Pathans have renounced any association with the national government. Instead, they have propounded their ethnic distinctiveness along nationalist lines. In the aftermath of partition Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the Red Shirts movement in the NWFP, opposed the national integration of Pathans into Pakistan citing irreconcilable cultural and political divisions between Pathans and the rest of the country. According to Ghaffar Khan a more practical solution was for the NWFP and southern Afghanistan to pool their resources and form their own nation state. 92 The 'Pakhtunistan' demand was nipped in the

89 ibid.

90 ibid., p.28.

91 ibid., p.25.

92 ibid.

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bud by Jinnah who arrested both Ghaffar Khan and his brother, Khan Sahib, "the then Chief Minister of the NWFP". 93

In the 1970s Ghaffar Khan's son, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, articulated separatist demands against the Bhutto government. Wali Khan was the leader of the National Awami Party of the NWFP. The party had been formed in 1957 to promote the nationalist aspirations of its leadership at a time when representational politics at the national level had completely disintegrated. With the rise to power of Ayub Khan soon after, Wali Khan and the National Awami Party were quite content to follow the official political line.94 However, Bhutto's determination to define Pakistan within the parameters of his own nationalist vision left little room for parties and politicians with a history of separatist agitation - particularly one's like the National Awami Party who had links with, and similar political principles to, the nationalists that brought Bangladesh its independence. After Bhutto's dismissal of the National Awami Party of Baluchistan in 1973 Wali Khan and his party resigned from office in protest. 95 This set the two on a collision course that culminated with Bhutto's arrest of Wali Khan in 1975 for his alleged role in the assassination of H. M. Sherpao, a minister of the NWFP government who was also a member of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).96 The hearing remained unresolved by the time of Bhutto's own political dismissal, and the charges were subsequently withdrawn by Zia leaving Wali Khan to resume his political career.97

After the Zia period Wali Khan entered into a coalition arrangement with Nawaz Sharif that lasted for 10 years. This allowed Wali Khan to maintain the traditional strong links of the Punjab is and Pathans that dated back to the period of British rule in India. At the same time, this pitched him in direct opposition with the daughter of his old political adversary. In the mid to late 1990s Pathan identity within the national narrative of Pakistan once again became an issue of importance in the NWFP. Calls were made to change the name of the province to 'Pakhtunkhwa' on the basis that this provided a more fitting label for a region whose population was overwhelmingly Pathan, and, it was consistent with the situation pertaining in other parts of the country where provinces were named

93 ibid. 94 ibid. Jaffrelot writes that in the run in to the 1969 election Wali Khan had curbed his nationalist aspirations "to the point of forgetting his promises about the renaming of the province", and accepting "the official borders between the NWFP and Baluchistan, a province of which the NAP (National Awami Party) claimed a part till then". 95 ibid., p.26. 96 Baxter, et. al., p.207. 97 ibid.

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after predominant ethnic groups. Jaffrelot writes that the rise of greater ethnic awareness in the NWFP during this period resulted from the Kalabagh Dam project "whose royalties were bound to go into Punjabi pockets" instead of the NWFP that was more at risk of flooding.9B In other words, Pathan identity was politicised by an economic decision that was perceived to be ethnically motivated.

v) Muhajir opposition The rise of an independent Muhajir political identity in response to the

official discourse is not without its irony. By the early 1980s political authoritarianism had come full circle to such an extent that the descendants of those who brought Pakistan into fruition as a nation state found themselves increasingly left out of the national narrative. Their subsequent need to organise along ethno-politicallines and identify as a distinct community with other Muslim people of South Asia who made, or sought to make, the trek into Pakistan signalled the limits of nation-building in the country. The Muhajir response is an example not only of the difficulties that the authoritarian rulers of Pakistan have had in assimilating other ethno-political and cultural identities into the national narrative, but also how their policies of political exclusion have led to the construction of other and newer forms of ethno-political and cultural demands. Thus, the Muhajirs, who as a group of distinct ethnicities at the time of partition, initially formed a political identity on the basis of their origins outside of Pakistan to articulate their vision for the new nation from a position of authority, were by the 1980s organising themselves in opposition to the national narrative because of their exclusion from it.

The political mouthpiece of Muhajir demands and nationalist aspirations was the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM). Founded in 1984 the MQM and its outspoken leadership, particularly its leader Altaf Hussain, articulated an "ethnic mohajir political identity amongst the Urdu-speaking voters of Karachi and Hyderabad".99 The MQM sought greater political and socio-economic reforms for its constituents and found electoral success in 1988 winning 13 National Assembly seats and forming a coalition government with the PPP. However, relations between the two deteriorated bringing about the downfall of the Bhutto government and ushering in a period of political upheaval and violence, particularly in Karachi and Hyderabad.

These hostilities arose from ideological differences that divided the MQM into two factional rivals. Altaf Hussein's group the MQM(A) were the more

98 ibid., p.27.

99 Talbot, India and Pakistan, p.259.

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radical of the two pursuing a path of political intimidation and violence; Afaq Ahmed's 'Haqiqi faction', the MQM(H), were moderates and sought reform through the political process. Subsequent army intervention uncovered arms caches and torture chambers belonging to the former, and this was interpreted by the ruling authorities as evidence of political separatism on the part of Altaf Hussein's group.100 Further violence was to follow in Karachi once the army had withdrawn. This time the MQM(A) were fighting against ethnic Sindis and Afghan refugees, and, along with increased sectarian conflicts, Karachi in the mid 1990s had been turned into a war zone. Military intervention was once again required to bring the violence to an end.101

vi) Political sectarianism The growth of political sectarianism has further inhibited the national

narrative and nation-building in Pakistan. The heterogeneous practice and interpretation of Islam has historically undermined the logic of the "two-nation" theory. Prior to the Iranian Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 disputes centring on Islamic doctrine and practice in Pakistan were few. The Ahmadiyya issue was the only dispute of significance. In 1953 the u/ama had insisted that the Ahmadiyya be given the status of a non-Muslim minority on doctrinal grounds and that this be written into the constitution. This subsequently led to large-scale u/amic demonstrations that turned violent and culminated in the arrest of many of the ulama. Opposition to the Ahmadiyya continued unabated until 1973 when u/amic pressure on the Bhutto government succeeded in legislation that reclassified the Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim group. This has alienated the Ahmadiyya community from the rest of Pakistani society and has led to continued discrimination, persecution and ostracisation of many of its followers.102

Sectarian differences and conflict, especially between the Sunnite and Shiite communities of Pakistan, ossified after 1979 for two major reasons: first, the Iranian Revolution provided the spiritual stimulus for Shiites in Pakistan to

100 ibid., pp.260-263. 101 ibid., pp.263-265. 102 Baxter, et. al., p.209. Baxter et. al. write that the "Ahmadiyya are members of a religious sect who follow the teachings of the late nineteenth-century religious leader and self-proclaimed "prophef' Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (c. 1840-1908). Ahmad was a prolific polemicist, the author of hundreds of pamphlets and religious tracts. The targets of his writing were primarily Christian missionaries, but he often ran afoul of orthodox Islamic groups as well. Between 1892 and 1906 Ghulam Ahmad had made a confusing and contradictory set of claims that were considered heretical by orthodox Islamic groups but were interpreted by his followers as constituting proof of Ahmad's prophethood. Such claims, contended orthodox Muslims, violated a central tenet of Islam that Muhammad was the final prophet".

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become more politically vocal and organised, and was interpreted by the Zia government as a religious threat that had the potential to incite sedition from within Pakistan; and, second, Zia's lslamicisation program was one rooted in Sunnite theological practice and tradition, and this was anathema to the Shiite community. The outcome of this impasse has been the crystallisation of sectarian politics and conflict "that combines Islamist and ethnic discourses of power".103 In other words, Islamic differences in Pakistan have been ethnicised to the point where Sunnite and Shiite communities consider themselves as distinct cultural groups with no overlap, religious or otherwise.

This has had a detrimental effect on internal nation-building and external political recognition. Internally, political representation has become more and more ethno-communal based. Within this arrangement Islamic politics easily divides into two groups: one representing Sunnite Islam, and the other representing Shiite Islam. Externally, a complex web of associations between the Pakistan government, Shiite Pakistani representatives and third parties which includes other countries and private organisations exists and diminishes the credibility of Islamic unity in Pakistan. From 1979 Pakistani Shiites have received support from the Iranian government; in return, Pakistani Sunnite groups have been assisted by the governments of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, particularly during the Iran/Iraq war.104 Furthermore, the Pakistan government openly supported the Taliban in Afghanistan until the 11 September, 2001 ai-Qaeda attack on the United States which irritated the political leadership of lran.105

vii) External ties and funding The national narrative of Pakistan has also come under fire from

diasporic Pakistani communities. Aggrieved minorities in Pakistan have acquired support and funding from local expatriates residing in Europe and North America. Talbot estimates that almost two-thirds of Britain's South Asian communities originated from Indian Punjab and Azad Kashmir.106 The latter have helped internationalise the Kashmir dispute by organising overseas political agencies to highlight human rights issues and the nationalist aspirations of the Azad Kashmiris. The more recent call by Kashmiris for an independent nation state separate from both India and Pakistan is a huge symbolic blow to

103 S.V.R. Nasr, "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan", in Jaffrelot, pp.85-114. 104 M .A. Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Confiicts in Pakistan", in Jaffrelot, pp.115-128. 105 ibid.

106 Talbot, India and Pakistan, p.248.

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the nationalist vision of the authoritarian leaders of the latter. Pakistani governments have always pointed to Kashmir as confirmation of Indian aggression and intransigence in the region, thereby justifying their official opposition to India, and, in the process, legitimising the need for a Pakistan. The separatist aspirations of Kashmiri activists not only questions the validity of the official nationalist rhetoric of opposition emanating from lslamabad, it also discredits and undermines the logic of the "two-nation" theory as a verifiable discourse explaining the history of partition and its political aftermath in South Asia.

Both ethnic Sindis and Muhajirs have also found support from Pakistani communities abroad. Organisations demanding ethnic Sindi and Muhajir rights' have formed in Britain and the United States.1 07 Both are hostile to political authoritarianism in Pakistan and openly fund campaigns and conferences, like the World Sindi Congress, that bring to the attention of an international audience the hardships and inequalities experienced by many in Pakistan.108 The Muhajir communities of both Britain and the United States rallied behind the MQM in its bid to redress the decreasing socio-economic and political fortunes of Muhajirs in Pakistan. These communities, now domiciled overseas and attuned to the political and economic trends and expectations of their adopted countries, still identify with the political landscape and issues of ethno-cultural identity in South Asia. Many of them are affluent and well educated and in an increasing global environment where information and correspondence is so readily available they have no desire to diminish their political and cultural associations with the 'homeland'. Talbot cites the establishment of "overseas branches of political parties", the observance of the rules and "activities of socio-religious organisations" formed in Pakistan, and the construction of mosques and schools from the donations accumulated on behalf of visiting religious dignitaries as examples of the Pakistani diaspora maintaining its ties with the 'homeland'.109

viii) Afghan refugees The repercussions of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan has

generated instability in Pakistan that has been detrimental to national

107 ibid.

I 08 ibid., pp.245-246. Talbot writes that "Satellite television, the interne! and a burgeoning South Asian press in North America and Europe, epitomised by such publications as Jang and Des Pardes, supplements the information about 'home' arising from personal family communications and frequent visits for marriages and to see ageing parents."

I 09 ibid., p.246.

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integration. An influx of 3.2 million Afghan refugees by 1990 has strained the resources of the country.110 The Library of Congress website points to the rise of "inflation, a dearth of low-paying jobs because these were taken by refugees, and a proliferation of weapons, especially in urban areas" as reasons for growing disapproval of refugees by Pakistanis and the introduction of government restrictions on their numbers and movement within the country.111 In fact, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) revealed that the Pakistan government had placed the majority of these refugees in 345 villages with room for some 10 ODD inhabitants each.112 These were scattered throughout the country, but 68.5 per cent of them were in the NWFP.113

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also cleared the path for an illicit trade in narcotics and weapons. The Pakistan drug trade received the clandestine support of sections of the military and political establishment. A report in 1993 had "listed 164 former legislators as active in the drug trade" .114 it was collectively condemned by governments in Europe and North America where most of the narcotics were distributed. Significantly, Pakistan itself "possessed 1.5 million heroin addicts by the mid-1 990s, three-quarters of whom were under the age of 30".115 The illegal narcotics and weapons economies were entwined following the same routes in and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The mujahiddin of Afghanistan financed much of its guerrilla warfare from the sale of drugs; while drug barons in Pakistan used their profits to acquire munitions and territorial security and patronage.116 Weapons also found their way into the hands of separatist groups like the MQM and ethnic Sindis who used them on each other and against the government. Much of the hostility and violence evident in Karachi in the 1 990s resulted from the procurement of weapons from the Pakistani black economy. The illicit trade in narcotics and guns accentuated ethno-cultural and political divisions and elevated the need to resolve them through the use of violence.

CONCLUSION

I I 0 Library of Congress I Federal Research Division I Country Studies I Area Handbook Series I Pakistan, Pakistan- A Country Study, http:l!lcweb2./oc.govlfrdlcs/pktoc.html#pk0177, Monday, March 26, 2001. ]]]ibid.

I 12 ibid.

I 13 ibid.

I 14 Moin Qureshi in Talbot, India and Pakistan, p.231. I 15 Talbot, ibid., p.232. 116 ibid., p.231.

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This chapter has argued that Pakistan was a nation that struggled to create institutions for governance that would be effective given a range of political, economic, socio-cultural, regional and other problems. Because Pakistan was such a problematic nation, a national narrative and symbols became important ingredients of the new nation. The representation of India as the 'enemy other' and the veneration of Jinnah, were attempts by authoritarian politicians, civilian and military, to paper over the problems in Pakistan.

Throughout its short history Pakistan has been politically unstable and in turmoil. The interests and political objectives of its leaders have been unpopular with the masses. The latter, often disenfranchised and disempowered, have refused to countenance or identify with the former's political authority and this has led to conflict, violence and alienation. Pakistan has never acquired the approval of its citizens. lt is a nation that remains fractured and vulnerable. The lack of homogeneity and unity at its independence continues to grow and this has undermined the logic of the "two-nation" theory in its post-1947 phase.

The next chapter will give an overview of cricket's development in India during British colonisation. lt will provide the background for an evaluation of cricket in the problematic context of post-1947 Pakistan to show how an obscure game has been more successful at forging a national consciousness and transnational attachments among Pakistanis both in Pakistan and England.

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CHAPTER3: THE CLOSE OF PLAY:

COLONIAL CRICKET AND PARTITION /

The governmental appropriation of cricket in Pakistan by authoritarian politicians, especially military rulers, is the contemporary outcome of a political culture that has been propagated from its inception to assert Muslim homogeneity and the demonisation of India. The recognition and success given to Pakistan on the international stage by its cricket players from the 1970s onwards has attracted the government's active involvement in, and its over­riding concern with the control of, the cricket affairs of the country. Authoritarian and unpopular national politicians have made it their civic duty to manage a cultural pursuit of growing national significance like cricket which in the late 20th century has generated the impetus for a confined but growing national identity aside from, and in contrast to, that of the official national discourse. Their attempt to fulfil the role of patrons and managers is both a symbolic gesture acknowledging cricket's internal mass appeal and a political strategy to procure domestic approval of their authority by associating themselves with the game. Additionally, it provides the basis for the perpetuation of the official national discourse and the validation of their established political power at the domestic level to a larger world audience. The projection of a separate cricket tradition in support of the "two-nation" theory that validates the need for the Pakistan project runs contrary to the historical origins and development of the game in South Asia. An analysis of cricket's early history in India will clarify why the political leaders of Pakistan chose to appropriate the game once it began to generate its own cultural momentum. This chapter will outline the introduction and spread of cricket in pre-partition India, the necessary historical foundation for its subsequent growth and dissemination in Pakistan.

THE ORIGINS OF CRICKET IN INDIA: THEMES AND HISTORY From the time the British completed their conquest of the two-thirds of

the subcontinent that became the mature British Indian empire by the middle of the 19th century until 1947 the inhabitants of pre-partitioned Pakistan and the other Muslims of South Asia played cricket as participants in colonial Indian cricket culture. Teams within that culture were sometimes designated as communal teams but · they were not associated with the aspirations of nationalist politicians. By the time of the 1935 elections cricketers of all faiths mingled freely with each other on the playing field and during social occasions.

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In this context Muslim cricketers did not see themselves as the representatives of a 'Muslim nation' and did not envisage the 1947 partition. The haste with which the British departed from India and the improvised and historically unconventional outcome of discussions for independence left many on either side of the border unprepared and exposed to communal violence and reprisals. The uncertainty brought on by competing nationalist visions at the political level was not a reflection of the way the patrons and players of the small but nascent cricket scene in India went about their business.

While debate lingered on the nature of India's independence, cricket had long found resonance among a section of the indigenous population. The game had set out on its own trajectory developing indigenous traditions and regional peculiarities removed from the nationalist ideals of both the Congress Party and the Muslim League.1 Arjun Appadurai writes:

Rather than being a spin-off of the imagined community of nationalist politicians in India, nationally organized cricket was an internal demand of the colonial enterprise and thus required cognate national or protonational enterprises in the colonies.2

Cricket authorities and players of India were independently forging their own national sports culture that was inclusive of ail ethnic and communal groups that had taken up the game in the colonial period. This was consistent with the logic of Indian historical tradition that offers numerous examples of communal coexistence. Thus, cricket, like other popular cultural enterprises in India, conformed to the Indian mohalla tradition that provided for the participation of diverse communities - each characterised by multiple foci of identity - in the wider economy and society. This is crucial for an understanding of the difficulties that have plagued the organisation of domestic cricket in Pakistan. Having been embedded in the framework of Indian cricket which relied heavily on a thriving domestic competition in Bombay, and those of Lahore, Northern India and Calcutta, and on numerous imperial and indigenous patrons and officials in these regions and eisewhere in India, Muslim cricketers from the regions that became Pakistan found themselves orphaned at partition. This was because cricket in the colonial era had not itself been consciously partitioned. Instead, its administrative and cultural links with the rest of India were severed because of political events that it did not control and left it bereft of funds,

1 A. Appadurai, "Playing with Modernity: The Decolonization of India Cricket", in Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minnesota UP, Minneapolis, 1996, p.99. 2 ibid.

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patrons and an organisational structure. Hence, Pakistani cricket history cannot be understood without reference to the historical growth and development of the game in the pre-partition period. lt is not an sui generis outgrowth of Pakistani independence, but a variant of India's cricket history that found itself stranded in a new, separate, imagined community.

The game was first introduced to India by individual traders, sailors and soldiers associated with the British Empire. 3 These individuals participated in matches against each other on an ad hoc basis to "maintain morale", "relieve boredom" and demonstrate "Englishness" in an "alien environmenf'.4 lt is believed that the game was first played by them as far back as 1721 in Calcutta. Thus, for well over a century cricket remained the sole preserve of the British in India; there was no desire on their part to teach the fundamentals of the game to the indigenous population. The period immediately before the Rebellion of 1857 saw the development of a strict and austere public school code in both Britain and India in which both sport and game-playing were symbolic of British policies of political and cultural segregation that emphasised "the privileged and exclusive character of British colonial culture". 5

This being the case, cricket in this period can be examined using Johann Huizinga's notion of sport as an instrument that can be used to create and maintain order:

Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it (sport and game-playing like cricket) brings a temporary, a limited perfection. Play demands order absolute and supreme. The least deviation from it "spoils the game", robs it of its character and makes it worthless.6

As a result, cricket arguably served to perpetuate the existing hierarchy of British supremacy and indigenous subservience through the reluctance of the colonial rulers to teach the game to, and play it with, the Indian population. The policy of colonial segregation on the sports field was indicative of that practised in the world at large: order was maintained solely by the British without the interaction and input of the indigenous peoples. The introduction of cricket into the subcontinent provided a sense of normalcy and a link to British society for

3 R. Cashman, "The Subcontinent", in B. Stoddart & K. Sandiford (eds.), The Imperial Game: Cricket, Culture and Society, Manchester UP, Manchester, 1998, p.118. 4 ibid.

5 ibid.

6 J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, Beacon Press, Boston, 1950, p.10.

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the colonial inhabitants of Company Raj.? They felt no need to change the existing order on the cricket field just as they felt no need to question their political and economic power in world affairs.

However, this period is worth examining to better appreciate the relationships, social and otherwise, forged by early British merchants, traders, soldiers and fortune-seekers with the local population. A recent appraisal of the British in pre-1857 India makes some crucial observations that highlight the spontaneous and unorganised nature of social relations between the two. E. M. Collingham8 examines associations between the British and sections of the native population that facilitated a cross-cultural exchange of ideas, social customs and mannerisms. He describes the transformation of the Anglo-lndian from a nabob in the period before 1857 to a sahib thereafter. The British servants of the East-lndia Company were flexible in their dealings with the local people and their customs in ways that their political successors could not be. As a small, essentially mercantile, presence in India they saw it as necessary to include "aspects of Indian practice" in the projection of themselves as "the new Indian ruling aristocracy".9 Company officials had no reservations about fraternising with local people, nor did they object to the adoption of certain local customs, particularly when both helped to ease frequent and protracted periods of loneliness. Moreover, the absence of any early imperial political presence in India placed less constraints on their personal behaviour which allowed them, as it did fortune-seekers, who were there of their own accord and for their own personal gain, to be more broad-minded and eclectic in their outlook and etiquette.1 o

In this context colonial cricket in ln~H~Lflrior to the imR.,osi}ion of direct ;-------------- ·- -----··---------- ~-------._______ ·~--···

political rule from London needs to be revised. First, the game in this period la~!ure and a recognised ruling body of its_ own. lt also lacked any " ------- --·---·---~---------- ------ ----...._____. formallink-tb--tl1el\li1irleyl5one Crrcket Club (MCC) to bring it under the latter's

7 Cashman, p.118. 8 E. M. Collingham, Imperial Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj, c.tB00-1947, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001. 9 ibid., p.7. Collingham writes that in this period "the British were open to Indian influences, and aspects of Indian practice were incorporated into the display of British power and authority as the Company servants set about projecting an image of themselves as the new Indian ruling aristocracy. Traces of India can be found in Anglo-lndian ceremonial display, in their personal habits of eating, clothing, hookah-smoking and cleanliness, and in the Anglo-lndian household, which incorporated large numbers of Indian servants and frequently an Indian mistress". I 0 The term "fortune-seekers" is an ambiguous one. Arguably East-lndia Company officials themselves were fortune-seekers who also worked for the Company. When their personal interests clashed with those of the Company it was often the latter that lost out.

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aegis as part of an expanded international network of cricket control. Matches had no formal arrangements. They were played at sporadic intervals and were improvised and spontaneous affairs that reflected the lifestyles and motives of its earliest participants.11 Until the 1850s the game not only lacked centralisation and broad recognition, it was essentially restricted to the presidencies, developing in North India and other parts of the subcontinent comparatively later as more and more of India came under British control.12 The gap between parts of India that were exposed to the game before the 1850s and those that were not led to different cultural patterns of cricket patronage emerging in Bombay than elsewhere in India (see below). Because of the spontaneous and improvised nature of cricket in the pre-1850s there is reason to believe that ad hoc cricket matches would occasionally, at least, have included Indian players even before the first native teams appeared.

The type of cricket that was first introduced to India contained only the rudiments of its modern counterpart. In the early to middle 18th century cricket was still developing as a game and lacked the recognisable criteria that it needed to have for it to be deemed a modern sport. That is, it lacked an official governing and law-making body, and a specialist approach to the playing of the game that transformed a spectacle that was more carnivalesque in appearance and provided high levels of escapism from the realities of everyday life into a contest that was firmly rooted to the logic of a capitalist system.13 Alien Guttmann writes that bureaucratisation, centralisation, specialisation, rationalisation, quantification and obsession with records are the benchmarks that separate modern sports from pre-modern traditional games.14 Modern sports are rigid in their structure, organisation and rules, encourage conformism

I I An assortment of British officials, merchants, traders, soldiers and sailors whose time in India varied according to Company and personal obligations, funds and capabilities. I 2 The Presidency capitals dominated early colonial cricket because they had 'a critical mass' of British inhabitants. In the interior British personnel were much thinner on the ground and team sports a low priority. The nucleic cells of cricket in the interior were probably the cantonment towns where British garrisons provided the 'critical mass'. 13 M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1984. Games that pre-date the advent of codification and organisation of modern sports have similarities with the carnivalesque world of Rabelais in that they offer an escape from the drudgery of day-to-day living. They provide participants with the opportunity to enact make­believe scenarios that highlight the play-element in folk games and pastimes, and bear no association whatsoever with modern sports that are result-driven and geared to the fundamental logic of market forces. I 4 A. Guttmann, Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism, Columbia UP, New York, 1994, p.2.

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and competition as desirable objectives and place primary value and prestige on results and achievements.15

THE BIRTH OF THE MCC The creation of the MCC as the official governing authority of the game

in 1787 provided the impetus for the formalisation of cricket and its transformation into a modern sport. From that moment onwards laws were gradually implemented and traditions steadily forged that were to provide the basis for the modern game. Laws pertaining to round-arm and over-arm bowling, 'hit-wicket', 'no-ball', 'short-runs', and specification of bat, ball, stump and bail weight and size, not to mention the length and width of the batting crease, pitch and playing field and the fixed number of participants that each team was allowed to have, were all systematised and gradually accepted by the close of the 19th century.16 Changes in the rules occurred gradually over time, and with the introduction of a nation-wide regional competition, initial resistance to formalised cricket and the MCCs status as a law-making body was overcome.17

Much of the 19th century was taken up trying to convince many in Britain . of the merits of a unified national game. The crowning achievement of MCC authority and the acceptance of cricket as a sport of unifying character was the establishment of a domestic competition that brought together existing regional teams to play against one another.18 This formalised version of cricket with its national championships, national ruling bodies and prescribed laws and practices made its appearance in India after the 1857 Rebellion when the British deemed it necessary to provide a small section of the indigenous population with a western education. lt is this version of the game that Indians began to play - some, of their own accord, like the Parsees; and others encouraged to do so through the public school system introduced by the British and, to a lesser extent, the fieldsports culture of the Indian army.

After 183519 the British began to take more interest in the socio-political and cultural affairs of the indigenous inhabitants of the subcontinent. They felt it

15 ibid. 16 C. Brookes, English Cricket: The Game and its Players Through the Ages, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1978, pp.43, 92-96. 17 ibid. 18 ibid., pp.120-137. The County Championship began in 1873, experienced some initial problems, but gradually overcame them to become the premier national competition for cricket in Britain. 19 The year of the Macauley minute on education.

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necessary to anglicise a minority of Indians by persuading them to adopt and internalise British values as a way of undermining the continuing resistance of elements of traditional society. The major beneficiaries of this revised British policy that was now given official status by the government in London were the Indian landed-bureaucratic elite. They were taught the language, customs and manners of imperial Britain, and, by virtue of their education, they were expected to develop an appreciation and loyalty to the Crown that would serve as a model for less fortunate Indians or, at any rate, make them allies of the British in the event of popular insurgence. Sport, and more particularly cricket, was not an official · part of this imperial program of anglicisation, but it nevertheless emerged as an important, if less formal, component of imperial acculturation and indoctrination. This was brought on by a changing socio­economic and cultural milieu in Britain itself during the middle to late 19th century.

Before an analysis of 19th century British export of sport to its colonies is given there is a need to clarify why Britain itself took to organised sport in the first place. This will help explain the attitude of numerous British educators in 19th century India who felt it their duty to extol the merits of playing sport to their indigenous students.

SPORT AND THE BRITISH An initial formalisation of certain sports - though not all - was undertaken

by the British upper classes in the 18th century. The need to do so coincided with a growing concern among these classes to curb the escalating violence amongst the lower social orders in the commercialised rural sector and the new industrial cities that threatened to get out of hand and destroy the prestige of their political and economic control in a modernising world. Restraints on violence were a central component of the mercantilist capitalism which gradually gained the ascendancy over the feudal order in the early modern period. The Enlightenment-thinking of the 18th century influenced the eradication of traditional extra-economic methods of social and political control that encouraged manly combat values. The new order vested a monopoly of force in the central state and suppressed the 'private' seigneurial armies of the Middle Ages that had required a culture of sanctified violence.

In 18th century Britain conflict resolution between the upper classes began to be handled along more amicable lines. Norbert Elias describes this as

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the outcome of the 'civilising' process adopted by these classes.20 The legacy

of this was the introduction of a parliamentary system both as a forum for

debate and as an instrument for the passing of legislation in the interest of the

political elite as a whole. The success of the new parliament hinged on the

widespread approval of its members and their acceptance of it as an

appropriate governing body. The fact that the landowning classes held the

majority in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons facilitated the

acceptance of the new parliament as they provided a counterpoise between the

Puritan dissenters and the Stuart kings.21 However, the landowning classes

were not a united group with unilateral concerns. There existed an uneasy

divide with clear political, economic and lifestyle differences between the Whigs and the Tories that sometimes made a mockery of the new and more 'civilised'

form of government. In its more formative stages parliamentary authority was used by members of either side "to impeach the former office holders, harass

and use threats against them, force them into exile, or imprison or kill them".22

What is instructive of this new political approach is the gradual

willingness shown by the upper classes to institutionalise non-violent methods

of political and social control. Furthermore, Elias describes how this became a

normative for the institutionalisation and formalisation of other upper class

social and cultural pursuits including sport. He does this by comparing the

parliamentary process with that of sport:

... the ancient estate assemblies, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, representing small, privileged sections of society, formed the principal battle-ground where it was determined who should form the government. Among the chief requirements of a parliamentary regime as it emerged in

20 N. Elias, "The Genesis of Sport as a Sociological Problem", in N. Elias & E. Dunning (eds.), The Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp.21-26. Elias traces the etymological root of the word civilisation to the term 'civility' coined by Erasmus of Rotterdam. This "later gave rise to the verb 'to civilize'. From this point the "refinement of manners" became something that could be taught. This provided a basis for power to those that did the teaching (upper classes to lower classes in Britain; British to indigenous populations throughout the world) which was discriminative and self-righteous and denigrated the cultural, social and political systems of those who were taught. 21 ibid., p.29. 22 ibid., p.28. The specific historical impetus for the implementation of this system of negotiation and political debate was the political violence of the 17th century that began in 1641 when King Charles 1 sacked members of parliament who opposed his dictates. This caused the outbreak of uncontrollable violence that led to Oliver Cromwell's usurpation of power, his subsequent removal from power and the restoration of the executed Charles's son to the throne. (Eiias, p.27)

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England in the course of the eighteenth century was the readiness of a faction or party in government to hand over office to its opponents without the use of violence if the rules of the parliamentary game required it.23

Thus, both the political system and sport were products of a readiness among British upper classes to redress the chaotic and tumultuous nature of traditional political conflict and dispute with more orderly and humane alternatives. This offered them political and economic security in a world progressing at the formative stage of Enlightenment influence. The institutionalisation of sports culture, like that of political power, provided them with a constructed political legitimacy in their relations with one another and with those of humbler background. Cricket offers a pertinent example of the latter.

i) The Formation of Cricket Cricket was one of only a few traditional games that was formalised in

the period before the middle class appropriation of sports development, codification and organisation took off from the middle of the 19th century.24 Various forms of cricket, like many other traditional games in Britain, had been played by the masses over a long but unsubstantiated period of time. By the 18th century the upper classes in Britain had become prominent advocates and patrons of a standardised version of the game. This did not lead to the disappearance of regionally diverse variants of folk cricket. The masses, who for centuries defied officially sanctioned laws to abolish their popular pastimes, continued to participate in their own distinct versions of the game. However, upper class patronage came with its rewards, both financially and socially; alid, over time, this contributed to an increased involvement from the lower classes that eventually led to the demise of folk cricket.

The formalisation of cricket by the upper classes provided the game with two characteristics that distinguished it from other sports that, through the initiative and enthusiasm shown by public school alumni, were to become popular in Britain and its colonies in the 19th century. First, with its own governing body, rules and etiquette the game had already acquired the status of a sport before it reached the public schools; and second, because of the strong patronage given to the game by the landowning classes cricket became associated with bucolic images and symbolism.25 Both these points help to

23 ibid., p.28.

24 ibid. The others were "hunting, boxing, racing, and some ball games".

25 This association has continued into the 21st century even though the game, especially at the first-class level, is well and truly an urban one.

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reinforce the notion of cricket as an upper class game when throughout its history, including the 18th century when cricket was first standardised and controlled by the nobility, its players were drawn mostly from the middle and lower classes.26

The growth of industrialisation and the mercantile trades during the 18th century led to the gradual rise to power of the middle classes. By the 19th century traditional authority and influence began to waver as the middle classes began to wield enormous political and economic control on issues of national and imperial significance. Best able to manipulate the forces of change that were brought about by a growing awareness of scientific principles and laws, they facilitated mass production on a scale never before imagined. This increase of economic output entailed the need for more efficient methods of political management and social organisation. This meant regulated and severe practices of economic control in the workplace with its emphasis on collective output and a gradual reduction of work hours that led to an increase in private time. The growth of domestic wealth and leisure time and the need for both to be used constructively and in accordance with the capitalist logic of the period provided the impetus for the middle classes to participate in organised sport.

In the 19th century Britain was developing into the world's first sports haven. Many of its citizens formed numerous sport and recreational societies and poured a substantial amount of their time, income and energy into their various sporting lives and interests. The British believed participation in sport led to the development and perpetuation of an exemplary physical and moral disposition. Many public figures and heads of respected institutions ranging from the Church, Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, educators, parliamentarians, writers and imperial administrators extolled the virtues of a muscular Christianity.27

26 K. A. P. Sandiford, Cricket and the Victorians, Scalar Press, Aldershot, 1994, p.25. Sandiford writes: "I! was the landed squires and aristocrats who led the rest of the society in politics, fashion, leisure and agricultural improvements. They were an active rather than an ornamental elite. In cricket they played the game and encouraged others to do likewise. They also paid commoners rather handsomely to play it much better than they themselves were capable of doing. Thus the majority of Georgian cricketers were not aristocrats at all. Many of them were not even gentlemen. Some of the best players in the eighteenth century were carpenters and wheelwrights (not to mention bakers, barbers, and clockmakers) ... the hired hand ... in the service of the great patron".

27 ibid., pp.34-36. & R. Halt, Sport and the British: A Modem History, Clarendon, Oxford, 1993, p.206. Sandiford defines muscular Christianity as "the cult of athleticism" (p.35) that is best represented by a fusion of "Godliness and manliness (which he defines as "robust power and raw courage"), spiritual perfection and physical power. .. (the notion that) a feeble body could (not) support a powerful brain" (pp.35-36).

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Educationalists and writers propounded and disseminated notions of physical manliness and strength of character that endorsed the modern capitalist policies and imperialist strategies of the west. In the international milieu of 19th century nation-building and economic competition, public school principals and their teaching staff instructed their students to extol the supremacy of the British way of life to others less fortunate than them. These students graduated to become the active agents of imperial Britain's quest for political and economic hegemony at home and abroad. Those of them who complained against the repercussions of British domestic and foreign policies and their market-driven logic were reminded of the higher purpose of the national enterprise and their expected obedience to it.

ii) Muscular Christianity and Britain's Imperial Imperative Public schools upheld the muscular Christian ethos throughout 19th

century Britain and were pivotal in the continuation of sports traditions for graduates in the dominions.28 They were also crucial in the development of British sports traditions amongst the indigenous populations of their colonial possessions. Richard Holt describes the extent to which J. E. C. Welldon, the headmaster of Harrow from 1881 to 1895, associated the significance of sport to the imperial imperatives of Britain:

The pluck, the energy, the perseverance, the goodtemper, the self-control, the discipline, the co-operation, the esprit de corps, which merit success in cricket or football, are the very qualities which win the day in peace or war. In the history of the British Empire ... it is written that England has owed her sovereignty to her sports.29

In the spirit of Thomas Hughes's Tom Brown's Schoo/days, which advocated the merits of athleticism and imperial conquest, the alumni of public schools carried their beliefs with them to the far off dominions of Britain. 30 Keith

28 Sandiford, p.36. Foremost in bringing sport to the masses were graduates who became affiliated with the church. Keith Sandiford writes that as the 19th century was coming to a close: "all the Victorian churches accepted play as an 'adjunct to work'. Even the Nonconformists, who had earlier tried to check the expansion of sport, revised their strategy and attempted to control it".

29 Welldon in Holt, p.205.

30 J. A. Mangan, "Social Darwinism and upper-class education in late Victorian and Edwardian England", in J. A. Mangan, & J. Walvin (eds.), Manliness and Morality: Middle-class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800- 1940, Manchester UP, Manchester, 1987.p.137. Mangan writes that one reviewer of Tom Brown's Schooldays, T. C. Sanders, remarked that the title character was a "strenuous paragon who feared God and could walk a thousand miles in a thousand hours, breathed God's free air on God's rich earth and at the same time could hit a woodcock, doctor a horse and twist a poker round his finger".

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Sandiford describes how public school graduates combined their belief in

athleticism, which heightened after the Crimean War, the Anglo/Chinese Wars and the Indian Rebellion, with social Darwinism: they believed that their role as

colonial administrators, educators, or entrepreneurs was to preserve Britain's

imperial glory and aid in the mission to 'civilise' native populations.31

In this context, social Darwinism implied a "struggle for existence"

through competition and conflict that determined political, economic and cultural

ascendancy in world affairs during the 19th century. 32 In an effort to legitimate

their own political and economic exploitation of much of the world that came

under its control during this period, the British established a preferential

theoretical basis that equated evolution and natural selection with "reproductive

fitness" and a moral system that justified the competitive ethos of western

capitalism. 33 However, the reality of life in Britain itself evinced socio-economic

disparities and class differences that challenged the social Darwinist opinions of

its upper and educated classes who believed that the British way of life was

superior to that of others. The popular press and literati may have described the

Victorian male as being energetic, sports-minded and on a mission to

disseminate the values of British life to others considered to be from inferior

cultural backgrounds, but this was only the view of a minority of its educated

classes who, cocooned within the walls of public schools and given positions of

authority - including the organisation and supervision of many student activities

like sport, were prone to messages that eulogised them as men of action and

initiative, sturdy and resilient in times of crisis and possessing the right

temperament and ability to become leaders and nation-builders. 34

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN CRICKET

The public school graduates that made the long trip to India and found work in the colonial civil service were expected to have a "... 'modest'

31 Sandiford, p.48. 32 R. C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1979. 33 T. Honderich (ed.)The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1995, p.829. 34 Richards in Mangan & Walvin, pp.106-108; Mangan in Mangan & Walvin, pp.142-143. Much of this popular imperial rhetoric came at a price for many public school students. Life in these institutions was often brutal and unforgiving. A rigid and inhumane hierarchy operated by a select posse of senior students who were referred to as the 'athletic 'bloods' - the heroes of the system" - made life miserable and unbearable for those not within its ranks. These student leaders were callous in their treatment of fellow students. Their superiority in the schoolyard and the culture of fear that this generated went largely unchallenged because headmasters willingly endorsed them and approved of their methods. They often forced their authority on the student body and acquired its subservient compliance through exhaustive feats of athleticism, humiliation, privation and hunger that were clearly meant to reify the muscular Christian ideal.

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intellectual achievement, athletic prowess, a taste for outdoor life and, implicitly, (an) unquestioned acceptance of the 'aristocratic' ethos of the rules and ideals of imperialism".35 The implication being that they were not valued as much for their acumen as they were for their ability to politically manage India and its vast economic resources and population in harsh, stifling and extreme geographical and climatic conditions. India was where the discipline and character of public school life was expected to be put to the test. Those that made the journey brought with them their sport and recreational activities and eagerly pursued them with other compatriots and, over time, newly found adherents amongst the indigenous population. These public school alumni, employed in influential colonial positions, provided the initial impetus for the growth of cricket in the subcontinent.

The development of an Indian cricket tradition emerged from both British and indigenous sources. Both varied in their approach to promote a competitive domestic culture for cricket in India, and both were motivated by different reasons for doing so. The British in their various colonial positions may have brought the game of cricket to the subcontinent but it was the Indians themselves who shaped meaning from the game. Various Indian communities and political figures used cricket as a vehicle to promote their socio-economic and cultural objectives within the framework of an indigenous setting. For some it provided scope for power and prestige, for others it was viewed as a way out of the lower levels of the Indian caste structure. Some of these objectives were to prove more successful and long-lasting than others. The principal British and indigenous coordinators and patrons of cricket were the public school educators, provincial governors and native princes of India.

A small fraction of India's population developed the knowledge and skill to play cricket directly from the British from numerous local public schools modelled on those of Britain. Subsequently, graduates of these schools found opportunities as players from both British and indigenous patrons who varied from one another in their organisation of cricket. The construction of a cricketing tradition in India was a contested cultural terrain between the official representatives of Britain who sought to reinforce the communal framework that they were then forging in the political sphere and the native princes who approached the task of managing players from various ethnic and religious backgrounds in a manner consistent with indigenous tradition.

35 J. Bale & J. Sang, Kenyan Running: Movement Culture, Geography and Global Change, Frank Cass, 1996, p. 76.

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The British impressed the ideology of muscular Christianity upon the small number of Indian students who had the means to acquire an education. During the Victorian period headmasters and various teachers encouraged their students to play cricket and other sports in an aggressive and competitive manner, and within designated rules and regulations that befitted the ideals of Victorian gentlemanly behaviour. While muscular Christianity was not an official part of colonial government and educational policy, many headmasters and teachers used sport, particularly cricket, within the framework of native acculturation. Chester Macnaghten, the Principal of Rajkumar College in Saurashtra, became his schools' cricket coach and in the process financed the purchase of cricket equipment from his own pocket. He also coached and spotted the talent of a young Ranjitsinghji whom he took to England where he was to excel at all levels of cricket including international test matches for his adopted country.36 Cecil Earle Tyndale-Briscoe, the dogmatic headmaster in Srinigar, Kashmir, in an effort to 'discipline' his charges put them through rigorous drills of exhausting physical exercises and sports contests. 37

At the MAO College in Aligarh further examples abounded of British educators determined to instil the 'cult of athleticism' into indigenous students. In the last two decades of the 19th century sport became a veritable measurement of manhood for the students of Aligarh. David Lelyveld writes that the sports fields of Aligarh became "charged with (the) symbolism" of gentlemanly behaviour, social interaction with the British and military preparedness.38 At the initiative of Theodore Beck, Thomas Arnold and Theodore Morison students were familiarised with, and came to adopt, the sporting ethos, and the concomitant cultural rhetoric, of the British public school system. Sport at Aligarh was the litmus test that turned boys into men. lt was promoted as an important aspect of native education because it stressed individual and collective strength, solidarity and team cohesiveness, fortitude under duress and victory in combat. 39 These then were the virtues and principles stressed and upheld in the public schools of India between the 1870s and 1947.

/ By the end of the 19th century public schools throughout India had developed inter-college associations and social group formations, as well as a

36 R. Cashman, Patrons, Players and the Crowd: The Phenomenon of Indian Cricket, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1981, p.19. 37 Sandiford, p.149; & Guttmann, p.35. 38 D. Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India, Princeton UP, New Jersey, 1978, p.257. 39 ibid.

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strong basis for the forging of social ties between college students and alumni with prominent and influential members of the British community of lndia.40 These ties between the products of British influenced educational institutions and British educators, administrators and officialdom allowed for the development of a series of domestic cricket competitions - none greater and more prestigious than the one in Bombay. These competitions helped further

?'­solidify the working relationship that indigenous educated elites and the British began to have by the turn of the century.

Bombay became the most recognisable playing region for cricket and the principal centre of the British organised domestic game.41 Before describing the

reasons behind Bombay's ascendancy, so crucial to an analysis of colonial Indian cricket, there are two matters relating to the game in this period that need some consideration. First, because of the success and early commercial appeal of cricket in Bombay, and its crucial role in the development of Indian cricket traditions, most scholarly attention has focussed on it and not on the cricket cultures that were simultaneously developing, albeit with far less intensity, in other parts of India. Second, there has been a recent attempt to

redress this imbalance. When critiquing Ramachandra Guha's A Corner of A Foreign Field for its failure to grasp the significance of Bengal to the development of the colonial game, Boria Majumdar writes: "Bengal, it needs to be stated, had an equally rich cricketing tradition as Bombay, one that remains confined to the dusty shelves of archives".42 Majumdar refers to Bengali cricketers, Saradaranjan Ray and Bidhu Mukherjee,43 and international fixtures against a Sri Lankan team and between the Presidency College of Calcutta and

the Australians, both in 1884, as evidence of the vibrant state of cricket in Bengal at the time.44 He also points to an administrative rivalry between the cricket regions of Bombay and Bengal in the 1930s. This rivalry centred around

40 B. Majumdar, "Cricket: The Indian History of a British Sport" (Review Article), in The International Journal of the History of Sport, Volume 20, Number 1, March, 2003, p.168. Majumdar writes of frequent college cricket matches between teams from west and east Bengal that took place from the mid-1880s, including that between Dacca College and Presidency College (Calcutta) at the Eden Gardens in 1890. He also points out that inter-school cricket tournaments in India first began in Calcutta in 1887 (the Harrison Shield), and not in Bombay (with the Harris Shield of 1893) as is widely believed by many scholars and cricket aficionados. 41 Indeed, the city continues to dominate the cultural landscape of cricket in South Asia. 42 Majumdar, (March 2003}, p.168. 43 "b"d I I .,

Ray introduced the game to Aligarh College and is referred to as "the father of Bengali cricket"; Mukherjee, "one of the best batsmen" of the period, was selected for the 1911 all-lndia tour to England, but did not go. 44 ibid.

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the omission of Bengali cricketers from India's national team. The princely ruler of Santosh and journalists from Bengal rejected Bombay's dominance and protested vehemently against selection policies deemed inimical to cricketers from Bengal and other minority provinces.45

Majumdar argues that vernacular sources from Bengal attest to the development of the game in the region. The Bengali bhadralok (urban educated classes) were keen to promote cricket and other sports in Bengal and Tamil Nadu.46 Their efforts did not go astray. They set up numerous sports clubs and competitions with cricket at the forefront of these developments. The primary motivation for Bengal's cricket growth - and that of other sports - in the second half of the 19th century lay in pejorative and prejudicial European assessments of the Bengali character. Adjudged to be effeminate by the British, prominent Bengali educators and public figures called for the introduction of European sport to inculcate a "sense of pride and purpose" in "young Bengali boys". 47 Bengalis were even instructed that they would "be nearer to God through football than through the Bhagwad Gita", by "the religious and social reformer", Swami Vivekananda.48 All this, writes Majumdar, "was geared towards the fashioning of a new identity and individuality for the Bengali male".49

The growth and subsequent prominence of cricket in Bombay can be attributed to two factors. First, the relatively close social relations between the Indian collaborating elites and British officialdom in the Bombay Presidency made the development of close sports ties more suitable there than it did in North India where the influence of social Darwinist racism and the recent traumatic experience of the 1857 Rebellion kept the westernised Indian elite and British officialdom at a greater social distance. Moreover, North India lacked a bridging community like the Parsees who were accepted as part of Indian society but were sufficiently detached from either Hindus or Muslims to be able to embrace British culture unreservedly. Second, Lord Harris, the assiduous cultural imperialist and muscular Christian, launched the Presidency matches between the European and Parsee communities during his term as Governor of Bombay (1890-1895). Harris felt that close cultural and sporting

45 B. Majumdar, Twenty- Two Yards to Freedom: A Social History of Indian Cricket, Penguin, New Delhi, 2004, pp.133-170. This book further develops Majumdar's earlier research on Bengali cricket's significance to the development of the colonial game in India.

46 ibid., p.142.

47 ibid., p.149.

48 ibid.

49 ibid., p.151.

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ties between the British and indigenous educated elites would benefit Indian society, as a whole, immensely. Throughout his term in office as Governor of Bombay he openly endorsed Victorian prejudices by referring to Indians as 'lazy', 'supine' and 'effete', and advocating "that participation in the game (of cricket) would educate Indian players to a new set of colonial values which would help to create a sense of unity and purpose in a country where such ideas are weak".50 Moreover, Harris, despite his shortcomings, did allocate sections of the maidan, a large open playing space in Bombay, to the Parsee, Hindu and Muslim communities to develop communal cricket gymkhanas.

For a better understanding and appreciation of the origins of cricket in India and its adoption by local communities both these points need to be further clarified. From the outset, the city of Bombay in contrast to the Presidency as a whole and the rest of India became the principal domestic cricket centre of India because of propitious economic developments and a wider and more representative local political structure that allowed for the continuation and intensification of British and indigenous socio-cultural relations. In 19th century India Bombay city was a place of commerce not government. it had its own distinctive commercial and mercantile culture that distinguished it from the rest of the Presidency. The dominant British group in the city-island were merchants and they interacted more socially with the local population in a manner befitting British/Indian social relations of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Thus, the British of post 1850s Bombay city were similar in behaviour and outlook to their fortune-seeking predecessors. They were less restricted by a centralised political authority and more open to cross-cultural exchanges with the local population. This had a profound impact on the organisation and patronisation of cricket and explains why the city of Bombay emerged as the most successful cricket playing centre during the second half of the 19th century.

During this period the economy of Bombay city shifted from an agricultural base to an industrial one. British anxieties over the reduction of cotton manufacturing in North America saw them encourage sections of the local population to take up production in the city. This resulted in the development of a cotton textiles industry in India that by 1900 was one of the largest in the world.51 The industrial growth of Bombay city was almost entirely managed by Hindu, Parsee and Muslim entrepreneurs. The most successful of these were the Bania castes who emigrated into the city from Gujerat at the

50 Cashman, 1981, p.12. 51 M. D. Morris, Indian Economy in the Nineteenth Century: A Symposium, Indian Economic and Social History Association, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi-7, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1969, p.1 0.

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behest of the British, the Parsee community also from Gujerat and "Hindu trading castes which had been converted to Islam - the Bohras, Khojas, and Memons".52 While these groups maintained a "commercial monopoly" of trade and industry in the city, the Marathi-speaking peoples of the Bombay Presidency formed the majority of the industrial workforce.

The industrial and trading classes of Bombay city were more inclined to take to cricket than the Marathi-speaking factory workers. However, this resulted from circumstances that were at variance with traditional methods of imperial acculturation. The collaborating elite of Bombay city were its commercial and industrial groups, and not its predominant British-educated ones. The city's affluent upper classes were keen to learn the English language, adopt British culture - including cricket, and socialise with their colonisers for administrative and "commercial purposes", but they were not prepared to "embrace" British "intellectual" traditions and, thus, strongly resisted "attempts to turn them into 'cultivated Indian gentlemen"'.53 On the other hand, the city's Marathi-speaking Chitpavin Brahmins, Saraswat Brahmins and Pathare Prabhus, castes who had a "tradition of learning and government service", were prepared to acquire a British education to become clerks and lower civil servants of British Jndia.54 This added greater intricacy and complexity to the city's existing higher class associations and political arrangements.

Bombay city had its own municipal council which the British enacted to protect their own economic interests and those of the local collaborating elite. Its elected members were predominantly British and Indian businessmen who worked closely to marginalise the small but vocal presence of the indigenous intelligentsia. This typified the close interaction of the British and Indian merchants in Bombay city - an arrangement which had continued unabated since the 18th century. The Parsee and Gujerati members showed the same nonchalant indifference to council politics as they did to British education. They rarely appeared at meetings and were little bothered by the concerns of the local intelligentsia and the indigenous electorate. 55 The British authorities in Bombay city approved of them and continually validated their political legitimacy because as businessmen and traders themselves they had little inclination to

52 C. Dobbin, "Competing Elites in Bombay City Politics in the Mid-Nineteenth Century", in E. Leach & S. N. Mukherjee (eds.),Eiites in South Asia, Cambridge UP, London, 1970, p.79. 53 ibid., p.BO.

54 ibid.

55 ibid., pp.84-85.

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redress the socio-political and economic imbalances of a system that benefited both parties. Thus, in Bombay city cultural adaptation to British' customs and pastimes was better" managed by its collaborating and affluent elites than it was by its locally British-educated castes, and this is evident in the city's cricket history.56

As a result of the previous discussion. two discernible arguments can be drawn relating to the origins of cricket in India. First, the game develOped in Bombay because socio-economic and political arrangements were more advanced, progressive and better suited to the implantation of cricket there than. they were elsewhere in India. The game encouraged competition and this was suited_ t.o, the economic rationale of both British and Indian merchants. / "· \ Furtb~I:rn3· the Indian elite who took to the game did so not because of some enforced and carefully worked plan on the part of the British to indoctrinate and acculturate them to British ways, but from their own initiative because it allowed .. them to compete against the British - much the same way as the indigenous cotton-textile industrialists successfully competed in the world economy for markets. In other words, Bombay city elites procured and developed their interest in cricket as a way of maintaining and further enhancing their economically induced competitive orientation. The British in Bombay city aided in this process because they were not an overarching political authority but a commercial and mercantile class who encouraged a similar outlook amongst a certain section of the local population.

Second, because of the manner in which the game developed in Bombay-city, India, from the outset, acquired two distinct cricket tradition$. There was the industrial and commercial culture of mass appeal in Bombay city; and an agrarian and aristocratic culture in North India and other parts of· the subcontinent. The first could only develop in Bombay because of the continuous historical interaction of British and indigenous traditions of trade and commerce which were further intensified and solidified once certain sectors of the local population became industrial entrepreneurs; the second was more susceptible to the influence of public school educators and their muscular Christian ideals in much the same way public schools in Britain had been. As a result, the Bombay city game very early on became associated with the city's large commercial houses and this facilitated its rapid commercialisation and

56 S. M. Edwardes, The Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Volume 1, The Times Press, Bombay, 1909, p.172. Edwards's is an account of the late 18th and early 19th centuries' social, political and cultural arrangements and practices in Bombay city. I! also mentions the early association with cricket that some of its indigenous population had.

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popularisation - this was something that the Pakistani political leadership attempted to achieve in the mid-1970s with its reform of the game in that country; on the other hand, its agrarian and aristocratic counterpart which operated in the closed environment of the public school system resembled the traditional approach to cricket organisation and play which had its benchmark in Britain.

i) The Bombay Presidency Matches it was the Parsee community of Bombay city that first took to playing

cricket. As a marginal community they had less to Jose than did others of the collaborating elite. The Parsees were more enthusiastic and flexible in their dealings with the British than were Hindu and Muslim businessmen who were more socially conservative and interacted at a more secure distance. So, in many areas of South Asian popular culture it was the Parsee community that became the vehicle for the implantation of western forms of popular culture in India. More importantly, they were able to adapt western popular culture into the Indian environment in a way the British could not do. Aside from sport, the Parsees borrowed and emulated British literature, poetry, theatre and film giving to them a specific indigenous relevance and frame of reference that allowed other communities in India to subsequently take them up for themselves. 57

The Parsees had emigrated from Persia to India some 1500 years before the middle of the 19th century and had remained a distinct ethnic community during that time. Over the centuries they had set themselves up economically and were in an advantageous position to benefit financially, culturally and socially from British imperialism. 58 The British saw the Parsees

57 E. Kulke, The Parsees in India: A Minority as Agent of Social Change, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1978, pp.106-108. In sport: "The Englishman's enthusiasm for sports was fervently imitated by the Parsees ... (Aside from cricket) Every new kind of sport that took root in India (swimming, cycling, motor sports, flying) was eagerly taken up". In literature and poetry: "The nonexistence of their own literary tradition - apart from the religious literature - made the preference for and the acceptance of European literature easier, a knowledge of which was cultivated in literary circles and expected of one at parties. The intensive use of the English language and the thorough study of European literature led to Parsees' writing and publishing English poems and tragedies.' In theatre: "Around 1850, Parsees at Elphinstone College had already formed a !heater group (Parsee Elphinstone Dramatic Society) for the performance of English plays ... The response was so encouraging that this ensemble was able to venture tours to Singapore (1862) and England (1885). On the other side, the Gujarati Theater was founded at about the same time by various Parsee Gujarati ensembles".

58 R. Guha, A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport, Picador, London, 2002, pp. 11-12.

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as "ideal middle-men" to advance the imperial and cultural imperatives of the Raj because of their enthusiasm in "adopting British language, dress, furniture, literature and music, and taking on its customs and culture including cricket". 59 The Parsees saw in cricket a means for further political, cultural and social advancement within India. This symbiotic relationship which began when Parsees first made their way into Bombay from the adjoining province of Gujerat to take advantage of the city's burgeoning economic, administrative and cultural sectors,60 was further reinforced through the development of strong cricket relations between the two.

The Parsees, out of their own initiative, first established a cricket club in 1848. By 1877 they had challenged the British to a game at the Bombay gymkhana and won. Thus, they had organised themselves into a cricket team before the high period of Victorian public school sports traditions and muscular Christian notions had fully blossomed. In 1886 and 1888 they organised, financed and undertook their own cricket tours to Britain. The Parsees were active in Indian cricket long before Lord Harris began to see them as an instrument in the promotion of the imperial message to the rest of India's , communities. By 1892 Parsee/European matches, known as the Presidency matches, were an important part of the social calender. By the time these matches expanded to include a Hindu team in a triangular tournament in 1907 the Parsees and the Europeans had met on 26 occasions; the Parsees had won 11 to the Europeans' 10 matches while the remainder were drawn.61

Parsee success against the Europeans in the last quarter of the 19th century helped challenge notions of British superiority that had been built on the concepts of muscular Christianity and social Darwinism. This motivated other indigenous communities familiar with cricket to emulate the achievements of the Parsees. In addition, Parsee success at cricket helped enhance their status and wealth amongst the· British and gave them scope for greater prestige and standing in India. This provided an initial basis for resentment, but was soon overcome when educated non-Parsees began improving their playing skills and forging their own cricket traditions.

The Parsee position in India as a 'comprador' community that was amenable to British custom and culture facilitated their attraction for the game

Guha writes that the Parsees "took easily to trade and commerce, professions viewed with disdain by the high-born Hindu ... Commerce and culture brought them closer to the rulers than any other Indian community".

59 Cashman, The Subcontinent, p.121.

60 E. Kulke, p.36.

61 M. Base, A History of Indian Cricket, Andre Deutsch, London, 1990, pp.20-27.

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when it was still undergoing a period of gestation in the colony. Emulating the British at play they had at first been arrogantly rejected as able opponents, but gradually through initiative and persistence the colonial authorities grew convinced of Parsee competence and desire for cricket and abandoned their inflexible and intolerant disapproval of them. Subsequent cricket matches between Parsee and European teams helped initiate a domestic cricket structure that received the participation and support of indigenous players and patrons.

The cricket patronage that Harris extended to indigenous communities was continued by subsequent Bombay Governors like Lord Willingdon (1913-1918), Sir Leslie Wilson (1923-1927) and Lord Brabourne (1934-1937). They presided over an expanding competition that evolved into the Triangular Tournament in 1907 (with the addition of a Hindu team); the Quadrangular Tournament in 1912 (when a Muslim team entered); and the Pentangular Tournament in 1936 (the year the Rest - Christians, Jews, etc., joined the competition). In the period before 1947 they helped transform the communal cricket tournament of Bombay into a catalyst for the growth and spread of Indian cricket. Bombay's premier cricket and economic status in India attracted indigenous cricketers from all parts of the subcontinent. In time this was to lead to the ascendancy of Hindu and Muslim cricket teams and the demise of the Parsee team in the Bombay competition. Both the Hindu and Muslim teams benefited from strategies of recruitment that tapped into the large numbers of Hindu and Muslim people in India, predominantly enrolled students and graduates of Anglo-lndian colleges throughout the subcontinent.

it was the viewing and reporting of the Bombay tournament that facilitated some level of popularisation for cricket amongst urban labourers and poorer classes of artisans. Guha writes how an observer in 1929 described the extent to which the tournament captivated the imaginations of the city's inhabitants:

(the city was) swept by a furious epidemic. For nothing moves the placidity of Bombay as the premier sporting event of India. In London you have Poppy Day, New Year's Eve, the Varsity Boat Race, Epsom, the Test Matches. But in Bombay you go on working and clogging and grubbing the whole year round -except in this week.62

62 Unknown source in R. Guha, "Cricket and Politics in Colonial India", Past and Present, No. 161, (November, 1998), p.175.

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Cricket was played on the maidan the whole year round but the "veritable carnival" that was the Bombay tournament disrupted the city's commerce almost every year on the last week of the cricket season:

activity (was not only) confined to those who played or watched cricket... (T)ailors were 'busy with the necessary apparel for their clients; clerks, businessmen, odd-jobbers pounce upon every opportunity of making a little money either by betting (on the cricket) or having a finger in the pie; (carriage-drivers) and schoolboys shout themselves hoarse; grandmothers die; offices are empty on account of illness; college rolls are never taken; briefless barristers rush up and down Waudby Road.63

( ~{""/' t,.--Y.~

w 1/' ~ ,, (/!/ ~JN'? /' /'' (~v /f'/,

On the one occasion that the tournament was played in Poona instead of Bombay in 1926 a journalist observed that "'perhaps the offices will have cause to be satisfied as illness will not be as prevalent as usual in the period embracing this feast, and grandmothers will not require burial'".64 These examples serve to elicit a growing awareness of, and association with, cricket for Indians within restricted, though predominantly urban, geographical and social parameters.

ii) Replica Tournaments

The success of the Bombay tournament encouraged the development of replica, though substantially subordinate and ancillary, competitions in other parts of India. By 1930 Karachi and Lahore, amongst others, had communal tournaments of their own. Colonial officials outside of Bombay believed, like Lord Harris had, that competitive sport would enhance indigenous morale and character and promote a sturdy and reliable satellite class of native collaborators fit to serve British interests and power. Thus, college graduates from other parts of India were given the opportunity to play a limited form of competitive cricket and took that opportunity with an eagerness akin to that of their Bombay counterparts. News of the Bombay tournament had reached many other Indians by bush telegraph and from the accounts of cricket teams and recruits, bureaucrats, business personnel and others from Bombay, or not, who were constantly on the move.65 By the early 1930s radio provided a further means of disseminating cricket news and scores.66

63 ibid., pp.175-176.

64 ibid., p.176.

65 ibid.

66 ibid.

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Communal cricket in Karachi and Lahore did not begin until the second decade of the 20th century. Karachi was the first of the two cities to organise a communal tournament because of its proximity to Bombay. The Sind Quadrangular Tournament began there in 1916 when the Parsees beat the Hindus in the final. Other teams included the Muslims and the Europeans. This tournament later became a Pentangular with the addition of the 'Rest' who comprised of Christians and Jews. Colonel C. B. Rubie, who served in the British Army in Mesopotamia during World War I, was instrumental in the establishment of the Sind communal cricket tournament. He and other war veterans figured prominently in the cricket matches and administration of Karachi.67 The Karachi Cricket Association followed the lead of its Bombay predecessor in its recruitment of players and coaches to facilitate the development of its regional tournament and the growth of the game in clubs and schools.

The Northern Indian Quadrangular Tournament in Lahore began in 1923 after a series of articles and letters, for almost two years, appeared in the local press appealing for a communal cricket competition to begin. The competition comprised of teams representing the city's Muslim, European, Hindu and Sikh population. The official championship trophy was presented by the Maharajah of Patiala to the tournament organisers during the inaugural season.

These tournaments in Karachi and Lahore, though small in size and of limited cultural significance for a vast and scattered indigenous population, did provide a platform for the development of the game in India. However, neither was able to match the success and prestige of the Bombay tournament which tapped into the city's highly established cricket culture, and attracted the finances of local industrialists and the cream of the playing talent.

iii) British Communal Structure I Indigenous Cross-cultural Interaction

The structure of communal tournaments reflected the official British disposition to classify local populations along religious lines irrespective of numerous historical traditions that ran counter to imperial logic. The British developed a system they thought best conceptualised the "basic feature of Indian society- its religious bigotry and its fundamentally irrational character".68 Gyanendra Pandey compares communalism to tribalism and factionalism in that they are terms that are constructed by an outside group - in most instances

67 Cashman, 1981, p.19.

68 G. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, OUP, Delhi, 1994 (second impression), p.1 0.

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a technologically and economically more advanced one - and applied without any empirical justification on another group - often perceived as backward and dysfunctional, or as Pandey himself puts it: "communalism is given, endemic inborn". 69 In other words, "it denies consciousness and agency to the subjected peoples of the colonized world. 'History' happens to these people; it can hardly be a process in which they play a conscious and significant part".70

Central to the construction of communalism in India is an orientalist desire to dichotomise the socio-cultural realities of the colonial authority and its subject people in terms that are pejorative and prejudicial to the latter. This allows those constructing the communal narrative to define their 'mission' as part of a civilising process on a barbaric and unenlightened people. Pandey defines this as a "form of colonialist knowledge". That is, the term 'communalism' "stands for the puerile and the primitive - all that colonialism, in its own reckoning, was not".71 Colonialist knowledge in India was informed and reinforced by any number of 19th century imperial officials, "observers and writers" who were engaged in constructing a popular discourse of "quotidian existence" amongst the native population in India that endorsed the objectives of the colonial enterprise.72

In his research Nicholas B. Dirks points to the role played by Sir Herbert Risley in determining and constructing an elaborate framework for the classification of modern caste identities in lndia.73 Risley, steeped in the tradition of late 19th century eugenicists, argued against "territorial representation and parliamentary government for India", thereby justifying the imperial project.74 Dirks believes that Risley's racial theories provided the imperial authorities with the rationale to keep India divided through such policies as the 1905 partition of Bengal and the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 that called for separate electorates. As a consequence, Risley's legacy was integral in the formation of alternative trajectories of nationalist thought in 20th century India that, in the long run, destroyed any prospect for national unity and led to the "bloody" and "deadly" 1947 partition. Dirks refers to this outcome and

69 ibid.

70 ibid.

71 "b"d 6 I I ., p ..

72 ibid., p.10. 73 N. B. Dirks, Castes of Mind:Colonialism and the Making of Modem India, Princeton UP, New Jersey, 2001, pp.225-227. 74 ibid., p.226.

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the misinformed dialectic that produced it as "one of imperial Britain's most venal legacies to Jndia".75

While the British implemented a domestic cricket structure steeped in the rhetoric and policies of their communal beliefs, many Indian players and administrators still behaved in a manner befitting traditional practices of cross- · cultural tolerance and interaction. Limited by the imposition of a restricted and codified communal structure, native cricketers defined for themselves how and in what way their cricket affairs were to be organised and promoted. The earliest patrons and organisers of Muslim cricket in Bombay were wealthy Gujerati merchants. Members of the Lukmani and Tyabji families, who were' responsible for running the Muslim gymkhana, provided the impetus for the city's Hindu merchants to do likewise and acquire their own section of the officially approved playing turf in the city_76 Thus, the organisation and management of Hindu and Muslim cricket in Bombay city was in the hands of its indigenous collaborating elite, thereby further perpetuating and sustaining the dominance of a distinct local and cross-cultural tradition of commercial supremacy. Furthermore, the communal gymkhanas were located alongside one another facilitating convivial relations between the players and administrators of each, with membership not restricted to individuals from designated religious groups.?? This was because cricket was another means for affluent merchants and industrialists to gain recognition and prestige in the hotbed of Bombay city's competitive economic milieu. The communal teams they set up and managed were only done so because the British had deemed communal cricket an appropriate socio-cultural structure under the circumstances and realities of colonisation. The indigenous elites worked with this structure not because of any inherent belief in it, but because it was just one more path for success and acceptance in a closely-knit community of Bombay businessmen. But, by doing so, they inadvertently developed the precedent for similar competitions to be played in other parts of lndia.78

The communal tournaments that were played outside of Bombay, including those in areas that were to be partitioned to Pakistan like Karachi and

75 ibid.

76 Guha, 2002, pp.60-61.

77 ibid.

78 Majumdar, (March 2003) p.164. Despite the communal interaction and cooperation the Pentangular Tournament fostered, it was not without its indigenous critics. Majumdar has recently argued that its commercial viability made other cricket organisers and sporting bodies envious of its success. These included "the Board of control for Cricket in India ... (and) Princely figures ... who wielded great power in the cricketing circles of the country but who had no place in the Bombay tournament".

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Lahore, can only be viewed in the context of pre-1947 Indian cricket and not as events formed out of their own independent traditions and historical origins. As already mentioned, it was news of the Bombay tournament that reached other parts of India through returning players and contemporary communication and transportation networks that facilitated the means for other such competitions to emerge. The organisation of communal teams varied from one region to the next depending on the type and size of religious communities in different parts of colonial India. For instance, the Karachi tournament mirrored that of Bombay with teams representing the British, Hindu, Muslim and Parsee communities; while in Lahore, the absence of Parsees and the presence of a sizable Sikh community saw the latter's inclusion in its city competition.

THE "TWO-NATION" PROBLEMATIC IN RELATION TO CRICKET lt is a problematical and deceptive task for scholars who treat the cricket \

I cultures of areas that were to be partitioned to Pakistan as teleological narratives working towards the formation of an independent national cricket tradition separate from that of India's. First, the patrons and players of the communal tournaments in both Karachi and Lahore changed dramatically as a result of partition. Before 1947 Karachi did not have a strong Muslim representation in that city's cricket scene. Research on the significance to Indian cricket history of this city's tournament is sadly lacking at the moment. For example, while it is known that the Muslims fielded a team in the communal tournament, it is not known where the players were recruited from. The lack of any substantial interest in the game shown by ethnic, mostly rural, Sindis and the small number of Muslims in Karachi in comparison to that of Hindus would suggest that players may have been invited to play in the city's competition from other parts of India, thereby following the pattern established in Bombay. The closeness in proximity of Karachi to Bombay may have seen Muslim cricketers of the latter invited to participate in the communal game in Karachi. Perhaps this points to a large network of domestic cricket tournaments that were sometime after 1930 played at different times of the year, so as to not clash with one another, and run on an invitational basis for the country's best cricketers, both British and local.

In Karachi, both Hindus and Parsees were the most important local cricketers. Guha writes of the fierce rivalry generated by the cricket teams of these two communities: "the two communities were rivals in business, in the professions, in politics - and on the cricket field".79 Furthermore, he describes

79 Guha, 2002, p.41.

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the travails of a local Hindu player, G. A. Ganser, in becoming the "first non­Parsi in his school eleven", and in being denied the coveted best batsman prize by the 'underhanded' tactics of the Parsee school headmaster who feared the awarding of such a distinguished honour to a Hindu student would have enormous repercussions for his community.80 More importantly, at the time of partition, the city's majority Hindu population left their homes to take up residence in post-1947 India. In other words, those primarily responsible for the development of the game in Karachi were no longer a part of the local scene after 1947. Furthermore, the Muslims who replaced them were from Northern India having learned their cricket and honed their playing skills in Aligarh College and the local competition of that region. They were ignorant of the cultural traditions of Sind simply because they had no recourse to them until 1947 when they emigrated into the region to set themselves up as Pakistan's political leaders.

What was true of Karachi was, to a certain extent, similar for Lahore. In the latter the Muslims made a very strong and crucial contribution to pre-1947 cricket in India. Lahore had a vigorous collegiate system modelled on the educational institutions of Britain. Three of these colleges, Aitchison, Government and lslamia, had a significant intake of Muslim students and promoted the disciplinarian approach to cricket and other sports that they inherited from British muscular Christian educators. Two examples of Muslim/Punjab81 competence and ability at cricket in this early period include the significant proportion of Indian representative players that came from the region once test match status had been bestowed on India in 1932, and the frequency of university titles that went the way of Punjab in the national intervarsity championships: most of the test teams in the 1930s "had four Muslim players and in the Third Test of 1936 there were six"; and the University of Punjab won the first three national Rohinton Baria Trophy inter-university finals in succession from 1935 to 1937.82 However, Lahore had a strong Hindu and Sikh organisational and participational presence in its cricket structure as it did in so many other areas. Both communities were lost to it after partition.

THE GROWTH OF A 'NATIONAL' CHAMPIONSHIP IN BRITISH INDIA

80 ibid.

81 The former including Muslims predominantly from Northern India which included Lahore, but also from Bombay and to a lesser extent from other regions; the latter including non-Muslim Punjabi communities as well as that of Muslims. 82 Cashman, 1981, p.85.

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By the 1940s communal tensions at the political level began to penetrate \ into other historically shared traditions; cricket itself was not immune from these developments. Thus, a game which had never prefigured or played a part inJhe~Ji demands of local nationalists suddenly began to be noticed by them.83(<3a~~~ aghast at the repercussions of a growing pastime openly canvassing a framework for communal segregation, denounced the domestic cricket milieu for accentuating religious rivalries and socio~political divisions that threatened to destabilise his vision for national unity.

(The) 'sporting public of Bombay (needs) to revise their sporting code and to erase from it communal matches'. 'I can understand matches between Colleges and Institutions ... but I have never understood the reason for having Hindu, Parsee, Muslim and other communal Elevens. I should have thought that such unsportsmanlike divisions would be considered taboos in sporting language and sporting manners'.84

it was for this reason that communal cricket tournaments were opposed by nationalist politicians like Gandhi and the Congress, and by 1944 they were officially brought to an end. 85 Congress opposition to communal cricket had been simmering for some time and was not simply an outcome of the heightened nationalist struggles of the 1940s. In 1935 Syed Abdullah Brelvi, the Muslim Federalist editor of the Bombay Chronicle, criticised the Bombay tournament for: "insidiously keeping alive (the) undesirable communal spirit which it should be the endeavour of every patriotic Indian to eradicate from every field of public activity, especially sports". 86 Thus, communal cricket, which had taken an independent path to that of political nationalism, was usurped and

83 Appadurai, p.99. Appadurai writes: "The idea of Indian talent, an Indian team, and Indian competition in international cricket emerged relatively independently, under nonofficial stimulation by its patrons and publicists... Nevertheless, as cricket became more popular in the first three decades of this century, and as the nationalist movement, particularly with Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress gathered momentum in the same period, cricket nationalism and explicitly nationalist politics as such came into contact in the ordinary lives of young Indians".

84 Gandhi in Guha, 1998, p.182. ·

85 A. de Mello, Portrait of Indian Sports, P. R. Macmillan Ltd., London, 1959, p.135. De Mello describes the difficulties that communal cricket in Bombay was experiencing in the 1940s as the national struggle at the Federal level grew increasingly more hostile. In 1940 the Hindu team withdrew from competition, but returned again the following season. In 1942 the tournament was cancelled due to the Quit India movement; it was reinstated again in 1943. All this points to a precedent of growing bitterness, resentment and opposition in the domestic cricket scene, courtesy of contested nationalist visions in the political sphere that led to the eventual abrogation of communal cricket not long before the onset of partition. 86 Brelvi in Guha, 1998, p.181.

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purged of its segregational elements by the representatives of the latter in the decade leading to partition. Prior to this, politicians showed little inclination to reform Indian cricket even while many of them disapproved of its structure. lt is only in the last stage of the nationalist struggle when the communal vote was openly sought by Jinnah and the Muslim League that Gandhi and the Congress deemed it necessary to eradicate communal cricket in favour of a domestic variant that emphasised diverse regional traditions working towards a national objective.

In place of communal cricket, nationalists like Gandhi began to extol the ) merits of the Ranji Trophy, the National Cricket Championship of India, as an appropriate and suitable domestic competition for a population on the cusp of nationhood. This competition was inaugurated in 1934 with little publicity and interest shown to it by politicians. From humble beginnings it gradually became more popular acquiring a greater following and, by the mid-1940s, the eventual endorsement of nationalists. Former colonial Indian cricketer Mushtaq Ali writes that the initial impetus for a national competition was to popularise the game for it to survive and flourish in India. 87 The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), which was formed in 1928, acquired recognition from the ICC, and supervised the successful organisation of a national cricket tour to England in 1932, saw the development of a national domestic cricket competition as the final and most decisive step in legitimising its authority as a governing body and ensuring that the game was given every opportunity to become national in its focus. Mushtaq Ali describes the optimistic vision of the BCCI during the early 1930s:

Until the inauguration of the National Championship, only about 50 Indians had the scope and opportunity to play big cricket in the Bombay Pentangular, which included one team for the Europeans. But the Ranji Trophy tournament, even in the year of its inception, had 15 playing units, thus opening the door of first class cricket to at least 200 youngmen.88

The organisation of the Ranji Trophy as a national championship was the.\. work of indigenous patrons and administrators who sought to turn a game . essentially structured along communal lines and limited to particular 1

1

geographical zones into one representative of all communities in India. Using I the County Championships in England as their model the BCCI developed a

87 M. Ali, Cricket Delightful: MushtaqA!i's Own Story, Rupa & eo., Calcutta, 1967, p.151. 88 ibid., p.152.

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domestic structure that underpinned its centralised authority. In a period of increasing national consciousness the introduction of regional cricket became a crucial way of taking the game to the masses and incorporating them into a national framework. Whereas communal cricket was exclusive and divisive; the Ranji Trophy was inclusive and sought to promote a sense of national and cultural unity. All this was in keeping with the rich and variegated layers of traditional Indian social and cultural practice. Its usage in the milieu of Indian cricket, however, derived initially from princely patronage.

PRINCELY PATRONAGE

The Maharajas and Nawabs of India provided an alternative domestic approach to cricket organisation and popularisation. Their patronage of the game gave to Indian cricket the spectacle and panache of an indigenous princely pageant, while, at the same time, it emphasised traditional patterns of socio-cultural interaction and inter-community involvement that the British neglected. The princes themselves were not a homogeneous group. They shared certain characteristics and justified their positions through grandiose courtly customs and historical narratives that were more fantastic than real. !an Cop land describes them as having:

affiuence; privileges that put them above the common law of the land; the status of khashatriyas (members of the warrior caste), autocratic power; bloodlines which connected them to gods and mythical heroes and which set them totally apart from ordinary folk. 89

Furthermore, many of them related to one another as 'bhai' (brother) which allowed for the development of a "class-consciousness" reinforced by the "close kinship connections" that several of them shared. 90 However, this was offset by the fact that variations and disparities in size and power existed between principalities which ultimately affected the level of influence, prestige and authority that some princes had more than others. 91 For example, policies and strategies concerning the princely order were made by a small and exclusive coterie of the wealthier and more prominent princes who had larger

89 I. Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947, Cambridge UP, 1997, p.12.

90 ibid.

91 "b"d 8 I I ., p ..

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~ I I

' ! I i

constituencies and greater and more prosperous estates. 92 These princes were able to dominate the princely institutions that were organised to address their concerns on an all-lndia basis - "the Chamber of Princes (COP) and the Committee of Ministers (COM)".93 By doing so, they developed the necessary political skills and accumulated high levels of political prestige and recognition that reinforced their standing within the community of princes. it was these more powerful princes that involved themselves in the cricket affairs of colonial India, as organisers, sponsors and players.

Ashis Nandy argues that cricket was adopted by the princes because as khashatriyas they found the game "attractive for (its) defiance of fate, emphasis on style and sense of honour". 94 This is in accordance with the overall premise of his book which sees cricket as containing a deep and meaningful socio­cultural dialectic that informs Indians of who they are, particularly in a rapidly modernising postcolonial world. In other words, cricket's origins may lay elsewhere but its principles and spirit of play are inextricably linked with Indian spiritual asceticism and self-restraint, as well as warrior honour, defiance and courage in moments of adversity and tragedy. Thus, not only does cricket appeal to khashatriya castes, it also finds adherents amongst a host of brahmins (members of the priestly caste) who can relate to "the posture of moral superiority and self-control of the gentleman cricketer" .95 While Nandy's argument offers an insight on why cricket may have appealed to a certain sector of Indian society - Hindu upper castes - it leaves little room for an analysis of the input and interest shown for the game by some of India's other communities and lower socio-economic classes.

As far as the princes were concerned Nandy points to their assiduous involvement in developing the game and to their sycophancy for all things British.96 In regard to the latter point, the princes after the 1857 Rebellion were

92 ibid., p.11. Copland writes that the princes who carried most weight were: " ... the larger, wealthier ones, who spoke from positions of inherent strength; the ones ruled over by lineages of especially exalted status, such as the Sisodias of Udaipur, highest in the rank of the Rajput clans; and ones whose voices carried weight by virtue of their ability to speak for a wider community, such as Patiala for the Sikhs; altogether, perhaps a score of states". 93 ibid.

94 A. Nandy, The Tao of Cricket: On Games of Destiny and the Destiny of Games, OUP, New Delhi, 2002 (2nd impression), originally published in 1989 by Viking, p.7 95 ibid.

96 ibid., p.54. "They themselves played the game, introduced it to their courts and palace staff, provided a livelihood to semi-professional cricketers, and gave at least a fragmented organizational base to the game in the country".

Ill

more concerned with maintaining cordial relations with the colonial authorities for matters of prestige and socio-political expediency than they .were with advancing the interests and concerns of the Indian population at large. Thus, cricket was a vehicle for their own political uplift and ascendancy and not for the general betterment of others.

Princely patronage of cricket was facilitated by the forging of close ties with the British after the conclusion of the 1857-58 disturbances. The princes were allowed to keep their status, land and wealth and were bestowed with British aristocratic titles in exchange for their loyalty: they were anglicised in custom, manners and education in British 'princely' public schools and in turn they provided security against insurgency.97 The improved prestige and status in colonial affairs that this gave to the princes allowed them to strongly influence the shape of cricket development in India.

In spite of the loyalty shown to the British by the princes their patronage of cricket differed from that of colonial educators and other muscular Christians. The princes developed an indigenous cricket milieu whose organisation reflected traditional patterns of coexistence. Their own organised teams comprised of Europeans in India and indigenous players from all religious communities;98 they hired numerous cricket professionals to help develop the skills of indigenous players and provide assistance and knowledge on matters pertaining to cricket facilities, equipment and playing surfaces; they used their own finances to administer the game, its facilities, coaching staff, equipment and tours; and, they were instrumental in the development of an Indian Cricket Board, the achievement of Indian test cricket status and the organisation of MCC tours to India and Indian tours to Britain. Thus, by the early 20th century India's princely patrons were organising the game along proto-nationalist lines and not in the communally divided manner of the British; and they were doing this for all sports. 99

Major princely patrons were the Sikh rulers of Patiala, the Maharajkumar of Vizianagram, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Porbander and the

97 Holt, pp.212-213.

98 B. Majumdar, "Maharajas and Cricket: Self, State, Province and Nation", in The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol.22, No.4, July 2005, p.639. In this article Majumdar discusses the nature of princely patronage in the colonial period and its potential to recognise the abilities of players of low-caste and from underprivileged economic environments. He also alludes to the paradox of the modern, post-1947, 'corporate' cricket culture of India that has been unable to do the same for its impoverished and discriminated cultural groups.

99 B. Majumdar, "Cricket in India: Representative Playing Field to Restrictive Preserve", in Sport in Society, Routledge, Volume 6, Numbers 2-3, October, 2003, pp.169-191.

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Nawab of Bhopal and his nephew, the Nawab of Pataudi. All of them sought cricket expertise and playing talent in a bid to improve the local game and to outdo one another. While at times their contributions and rivalries seemed extravagant and humorous their patronage and commitment to the game could not be questioned. A brief description will sufficiently illustrate the importance given to cricket by India's princely elite.

The Sikh rulers of Patiala were the first princely patrons of cricket. Rajendra (1872-1900) and his son Bhupinder Singh (1891-1938) recruited cricket coaches and players from various locales, both from within India and abroad. Rajendra acquired the services of Ranjitsinghji, a number of professional county players and numerous Hindu, Muslim and Parsee cricketers.1 oo Bhupinder also recruited high profile foreign professionals like Wilfred Rhodes, George Hirst, Maurice Leyland, Harold Larwood and Frank Tarrant, and some of the best players in India in Nazir and Wazir Ali, Lall Singh, Mohammed Nissar and Lala Amarnath.101 Furthermore, he organised and financed the 1911 all-lndia tour of Britain, the first official selection trials and test series tour of India to Britain in 1932 and actively participated in the establishment of the BCCI and the Cricket Club of lndia.1 02 In light of this, it can be summarised that the princely contribution to cricket in colonial India was a substantial one and reflected traditional patterns of communal inclusiveness that the British themselves had neglected.

CONCLUSION Neil Brimnes describes the outcome of the colonial encounter on right

and left hand castes in early colonial south India as "a dialogic process, in which the colonialists and indigenous people sought to incorporate each other into their own social structure and conceptual universe. Inevitably, the colonial realities that emerged from this process were hybrids containing elements of both European and South Indian origin."103 This was precisely the nature of cricket relations between the British and indigenous patrons and players in colonial India as a whole. The game, though British in origin and introduced to India by the colonialists, was not an instrument of imperial politics. This would be an over-simplification of the colonial encounter; one that overlooks the

I 00 Cashman, 1981, p.27. 101 ibid., pp.30-31. 102 "b"d 32 I I ., p. .

I 03 N. Brimnes, Constructing the Colonial Encounter: Right and Left Hand Castes in Early Colonial South India, Curzon Press, Guildford, GB, 1999, p.1.

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contributions made by those colonised on colonial exchanges and relations that took place between the British and vast numbers of Indians. Authoritarian colonialism as a paradigm of intellectual reasoning has been dispelled in recent decades by any number of subaltern studies and postmodern theorists. Brimnes himself acknowledges the immense scholarly input that Said's Orientalism has had on academic departments throughout the world this past 25 years, even as he embraces the recent intellectual position of 'hybrid' colonial exchanges between coloniser and colonised that has superseded Said's original argument.1D4 In relation to the cultural landscape of cricket in colonial India both the British and sections of the indigenous population made distinct but crucial decisions that allowed for the game to develop amongst various local communities. The British organised cricket along communal lines and then bestowed on each individual religious community the freedom to manage their own cricket affairs - this differed somewhat in 'British' public schools, the mercantilist and entrepreneurial cricket culture of Bombay, and the cricket settings of Calcutta and Madras. On the other hand, indigenous patrons and players valued communal integration: the princes, despite their loyalty to the British and their use of cricket as an instrument to further enhance their self interests, forged a vigorous and independent cricket milieu that was inclusive of all cultural groups who had taken to the game; and the players, for the most part, exhibited no hostility to one another and mixed freely with each other even while taking part in British induced communal tournaments.

104 "b"d 1 2 I I ., pp. - .

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CHAPTER4: PAKISTAN ZINDABAD: EARLY PATRONS AND PLAYERS

OF AN ORPHANED GAME

The development of cricket iiJ Pakistan was __ !;loJIV_.to_begin.-As an insignificant and rarefied pastime of the urban western elite, inherited from pre-partition India, the game did not become a successful commercial and national sport until the last guarter of the-2o-fh_<:;e_11tl.lry. The-focus of thls-ch;pt~r ~iiip~i~a-rily ·­be on the difficulties of organising a game like cricket as a national sport in the immediate post-partition period when distinctively Pakistani cultural and political traditions had yet to be fully conceptualised. lt will argue that the game relied exclusively on colonial Indian institutions of patronage and organisation for its survival. Subsequent chapters will analyse how and why Pakistani cricket. became commercially successful and the preeminent sport of the masses.

Cricket in Pakistan emerged from civil society and not from the political realm. Its earliest organisers and players were products of the colonial Indian game. Unlike the political advocates of the "two-nation" theory, they upheld colonial traditions of patronage and status that took for granted the existence of ethnic, class and sectarian divisions in the social fabric. In this early period cricket and politics were on separate lines of development despite attempts by cricket officials to bring the two lines together. The game lacked funds and international recognition, and it was felt that a formal link with government would aid in its development. However, there was no particular interest shown to cricket by the latter and the game continued to be nourished by its traditional-~ colonial patrons.

THE FOUNDATION OF A CRICKET BOARD FOR PAKISTAN Two years elapsed before the preliminary steps were taken to develop a

new Pakistani 'national' cricket infrastructure. The Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan (BCCP) was established on 1 May 1949 after organisers had met the previous year to discuss the development of a domestic cricket structure geared towards international acceptance. Fazal Mahmood, the Pakistani seam bowler of the 1950s and early 60s, recalls that the initial meeting in 1948 in the WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) building of Lahore was the brainchild of Khan lftikhar Hussain (the Nawab of Mamdot), Justice A. R. Cornelius and Keki Collector- all early cricket board officials. Significantly two of these three midwives of Pakistani cricket were not even members of the religious community Pakistan was intended to represent - Cornelius being a

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r/

Christian and Collector a Parsee. The three together with Fazal and some other cricketers were discussing the likelihood of organising an unofficial test match between Pakistan and the West lndies, who were then on their way to play in India. This was viewed as a way to impress the ICC1 of Pakistan's cricket credentials.2

The vital early leadership of the BCCP came from Justice Alwin Robert Cornelius. He was born on 1 May 1903 and educated at Muir Central College, Allahabad, Allahabad University, and Selwyn College, Cambridge.3 He had a

' highly distinguished legal career in both the Punjab before partition and Pakistan afterwards, culminating in his appointment to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1956 where he achieved the position of Chief Justice in 1960.4 He is fondly remembered by his peers as a prominent advocate and authority of jurisprudence in Pakistan, and helped to devise a legal system that reflected the concerns of an independent and modernising Muslim state. Cornelius was not a Muslim himself, but he was active in the propagation of Muslim history and tradition in the new state: "He translated into English the Commentary of the Holy Quran by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani."5

Cornelius was a cricket enthusiast who had a genuine desire to see the game develop in Pakistan.6 As the inaugural Vice-President of the BCCP7 he was responsible for attracting private funds and official patronage. In essence Cornelius went about balancing the existence of traditional patterns of patronage with the gradual introduction of newer and more sophisticated methods of sports management and development. This entailed that the early cricket milieu of Pakistan would make use of the traditional feudal patronage of princes and pirs (Sufi saints) while endeavouring to develop a regional domestic structure with links to government and the commercial sector. In the long run, the latter structure, once self-sufficient, would completely supplant the need for the former.

1 Then the Imperial Cricket Conference but soon to become the International Cricket Conference. 21nterviewwith Fazal Mahmood, Lahore, 31/10/2000. 3 H. Khan, The Judicial Organ, Fisco Press, Lahore, n.d., p.30; & R. Braibanti, Chief Justice Come/ius of Pakistan: An Analysis with Letters and Speeches, OUP, Oxford, 1999, pp.1-5. 4 H. Khan, p.30. 5 ibid., p.36. 6 Interview with Qamar Ahmed & Chisty Mujahid, the GAB BA, Brisbane, 5 January 2000. 7 He had appointed a government minister, Hassan Shah, as President as well as making the Head of State the Chief Patron.

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Cornelius's resourcefulness was to prove effective in securing support from both government, particularly in the distribution of land for building stadiums in the 1960s, and industry. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) began its association with cricket in the country during Cornelius's ad hoc leadership of the BCCP in the early 1960s.8 He also devised schemes like the Pakistan Eaglets program to strengthen grass-roots cricket at a time when the game was little played outside of the metropolises of Lahore and Karachi (see below). His achievements were crucial to the development of cricket in Pakistan and they are recognised, acknowledged and celebrated by many Pakistanis: "in 1995 a seminar was held at Lahore to commemorate his achievements. lt was organized by current senior civil servants and former test players."9

The inaugural members of the BCCP were Justice Cornelius, the Nawab of Mamdot {the Chief Minister of the Punjab), Syed Fida Hussain (the chief secretary of the Punjabi government), Mian Muhammad Saeed (the first unofficial captain of Pakistan and a magistrate in Lahore), Dr. Jehangir Khan (a Punjabi cricketer who represented the all-lndia team before partition), Muhammad Nissar (another Punjabi all-lndia test cricketer), Dr. Dilawar Hussain (yet another all-lndia player who at the time was Principal of MAO College in Lahore), Mr. Qamaruddin Butt (a Punjabi who had played for northern India in the pre-partition period and would also become a Pakistani cricket correspondent during the 1950s and early 60s) and Keki Collector (a Parsee businessman from Karachi who was made the first Treasurer of the board because he was in a position to provide some much needed funding).10

The initial board members of the BCCP were thus predominantly professionals from Lahore, the Punjab capital. The only member not from Lahore was the Parsee, Collector, from Karachi who was wealthy and willing to invest in the game's development in Pakistan. This suggests several conclusions. First, the BCCP grew out of the cricket tradition of the pre-partition North Indian Cricket Association (NI CA) which was run by the cricket officials of Lahore; thus, Punjabi domination of cricket predated Punjabi domination of the national legislature. Second, the game was exclusively organised and, initially, almost entirely played by members of the professional classes who were graduates of private schools and colleges in the region. lt did not take long for a cadre of lower class cricketers to emerge -just as in the colonial India cricket

8 0. Noman, Pride and Passion: An Exhilarating Half Century of Cricket in Pakistan, OUP, Karachi, 1998, pp.51-52. 9 ibid.' p.52. 10 S. Mahmud, Cricket After Mid Night: 1947-1998, Azad Publishers, Lahore, 1999, pp.1-2.

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milieu prior to 1947 - but they had to accept the hegemony of the players and administrators from the professional elite. Early cricket patrons of Pakistan, like those of the pre-partition period, saw themselves as political and cultural leaders: they used cricket to generate support and recognition for themselves within a still ill-defined Pakistani nation state. Third, because of its cultural and. administrative association with NICA and elite ecfucational institutions, cricket in its formative years could not immediately sever its links with the traditional feudal patronage base of the colonial period. Initially these links were maintained because they pro(ided a structural continuity that enabled the BCCP to develop its game. ~inally, the game was firmly anchored in an elite anglophone culture; English ~s its lingua franca and indeed still largely remains so though, in more recent times, vernacular languages have started to make some inroads.

From its inception the national governing body for cricket encountered numerous difficulties in developing and promoting the game in Pakistan. Foremost was the ICCs rejection of its submission for membership in 1948 and 1950 on the grounds that there were "insurmountable difficulties" for the new nation to overcome.11 The BCCP Vice-President, Cornelius, complained to the ICC that: "We get the impression that we are not wanted in the world family of crickef'.12 Sections of the English press including those of The Times of London and the Manchester Evening News were also dismayed with this decision. A letter to the editor of the latter newspaper commented that:

(The) procedural and legislative objections (to Pakistani admission into the ICC were) ... unnecessarily insensitive to the feelings of a new dominion... (Furthermore, Pakistan is a) legitimate member of the ICC (as she) represented an integral part of the territory previously under the jurisdiction of the board of undivided India which has now gained full membership of the Conference.13

In July 1952 the ICC on the recommendation of Anthony de Mello, the president of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), recognised the BCCPs right as a national organising body and awarded it full membership.14 However, this decision did not make the task of managing cricket in Pakistan any easier. From its earliest meetings the BCCP had not been the most efficient

11 Dawn, 13 June 1950. 12 Cornelius in ibid.

13 Letter to the editor of the Manchester Evening News, 18 August 1950. 14 A. de Mello, Portraits of Indian Sport, P.R. Macmillan Ltd., London, 1959.

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and amicable of associations: intrigue, disputes, power conflicts and divisions afflicted its organisational capacities and have continued to do so ever since. An early example of conflict within the ranks of the BCCP occurred at a board meeting held on 15 May 1953. During its proceedings the members of the Lahore branch, representing both their constituency and that of the NWFP, elected themselves on the board in the absence of the members for Karachi and Bahawalpur. The latter had moments before stormed out of the meeting because they opposed Lahore's overarching numerical strength: an agreement had previously been reached by the delegates of Lahore and the NWFP for the former to be spokespersons and representatives of the latter. In actual fact, all Lahori delegates at that time came from the one club, Mamdot. This further irked the delegates of Karachi and Bahawalpur because it demonstrated that the power to run cricket in the country was thus monopolised by a closely integrated coterie of Punjabi players and patrons.15

PUNJABI DOMINANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE TEST CAPTAIN AS NATIONAL LEADER

Cornelius worked closely with the existing organisational arrangements for cricket that had survived partition in the Punjab. He sought the services of cricket organisers and promoters in Lahore because of their established status and connections. Few, if any, senior cricket administrators were to be found outside Lahore. Karachi which had a substantial cricket culture prior to partition was hamstrung by its large socio-economic losses and demographic fluctuations brought on by the large population exchanges that the port city had to endure in the aftermath to partition. To a much greater extent than in Lahore, Karachi cricket had been dominated by the Hindu community and it was weakened proportionately by their exodus. In this context, the relatively stable cricket milieu of Lahore was able to assume the leadership of the game, heavily influencing its direction and organisation. The extant patrons of colonial cricket in the region found themselves in a position to stamp their own cultural imprint on the game in the absence of competition from elsewhere. In time the Muhajirs - immigrants from India - who settled in large numbers in Karachi would fill the vacuum left by the departing Hindus and provide some competition to the Punjabis. However, at this early stage they were too preoccupied with the problems of relocation to re-imagine the role of cricket in their lives.

The early Punjabi dominance of the BCCP set the platform for the region's continued authoritative position in matters pertaining to cricket

15 M. Akhtar in Dawn, 24 May 1953.

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organisation and administration. Essentially, they did not object to players from other regions appearing in test matches because this endorsed the national discourse: of a Pakistan for all Pakistani's. What they did take objection to was the possibility that their authority would have to be shared with, or even relinquished to, others they did not see as equals. That they would have to be accountable to anyone but themselves was not something that they were willing to countenance. The fear of losing power to perceived outsiders disrupted the administrative efficiency of cricket in the country, particularly as more and more non-Punjabis became members of the BCCP. These divisions soon found their way into the board of national selectors that appointed the captain and players for the national team. Until the appointment of Hanif Mohammed as captain in 1969 the role had always been assumed by Punjabi cricketers. In fact, the cricket association, press and supporters of Karachi saw Hanifs appointment as long overdue. Throughout the 1960s they had pushed for his selection and voiced their disappointment whenever he was overlooked in favour of less experienced and capable cricketers from Lahore. This reached its crescendo prior to Hanifs eventual appointment as captain when two acrimonious and parochial factions, one from Lahore and the other from Karachi, were noticeable within the ranks of the BCCP and the national press.16

Cornelius endorsed Kardar as the first official test captain and gave him absolute authority over the team. By doing so he allowed him to take on the role of an authoritarian and charismatic leader of men, subsequently leaving the door ajar for others, mostly senior players and prominent public and military figures, to do likewise. At various periods in Pakistan's short cricket history these authoritarian and charismatic leaders have been given a free reign by the BCCP to develop and promote the structure, culture and symbolism of the game for themselves. This has corresponded with traditional South Asian patterns of political authoritarianism that invest absolute authority in the hands of a few individuals who, for one reason or another, have been able to win the -sometimes tenuous - support and recognition of constituencies at the local, regional, or national levels. This type of leadership is sustained by patriarchal socio-cultural norms of loyalty. In this context, cricket leaders expect nothing less than personal success and recognition at the national and domestic levels. The likes of Kardar, I m ran Khan and, to a lesser extent, Wasim Akram, have all, at one time or another, found themselves in positions where they have exercised complete control over many issues pertaining to cricket selection and

16 A. Licudi with W. Raja, Cornered Tigers: A History of Pakistan's Test Cricket, Hansib Caribbean, St John's, Antigua, Wl, 1997, pp.62-63.

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strategy. Each one of them has shown their hand at identifying and selecting players for the national team - many with little formal experience of the game at the international level. The meteoric rise of such players from relative obscurity to international cricket stardom, a peculiar feature of Pakistani international cricket, owed much to this tradition of authoritarian, all-powerful captaincy.

The position of Pakistan captain has sometimes been filled by celebrated tacticians like Kardar, lmran and Wasim whose authority was unquestioned. But more often captains have been subjected to humiliating manipulation by the great patrons of the sport. Successful cricket captains in Pakistan are the exception to the rule; and, the position, though coveted by almost every cricketer in the country, has often been a poisoned chalice. Even the much vaunted achievements of Kardar, lmran and Wasim have been marred with controversy, opposition and dispute, while the captaincies of Mushtaq Mohammed, Javed Miandad and Salim Malik were subject to extreme manipulation by patrons from the President downward. Kardar, fresh from his stay in England where he played for Oxford University and Warwickshire in the County Championships, refused to play under the captaincy of the then unofficial captain of Pakistan, Mian Mohammed Saeed. Later, his dictatorial approach to cricket etiquette and strategy antagonised several of his players. lmran's captaincy was initially challenged by the likes of Mianded and Zaheer Abbas and was bedevilled by the regional rivalries of administrators from Lahore and Karachi; later, with his leadership indubitable and secure, he upset many teammates when he dedicated the 1992 World Cup victory to his mother in memory of her loss to cancer. Wasim, like Salim, became entangled in the match-fixing scandals that dogged international cricket in the mid to late 1990s (see Chapter 5).

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION Once cricket acquired a recognised governing body in Pakistan with the

development of the BCCP it became imperative to nurture sustainable cultural and symbolic traditions for the game's survival. This is why the BCCP was determined to gain the approval of the ICC at any cost even before it had developed a recognisable and accepted domestic game of its own. International ratification of the domestic game was crucial for the legitimation of Pakistani cricket on the world stage at a time when it was difficult to predict just how successful the game would become in the country. The recognition of other cricket playing nations and the opportunity to compete with them was felt to be the most appropriate path for the game's development in the absence of strong

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cultural, infrastructural and organisational traditions. it would lead to government assistance and the growth of local community support for the national team. However, until the election of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as Prime Minister in 1972 government assistance was at best lukewarm, and the wait was equally as long if not longer for the rise of a significant mass following for cricket.

In the meantime, the board, in its wisdom, was determined to silence all criticism levelled at it or its domestic game. This hypersensitivity stemmed from its fear that other cricket playing nations were working to undermine its legitimacy as a representative body when they rejected its first two JCC applications. In fact, the BCCP felt that it was being cast as a pariah state amongst the international community of cricket nations and objected with vitriolic displeasure at any suggestion of alternative approaches to establishing a Pakistani cricket culture. One such suggestion which had been made at the end of 1948 proposed that India, Pakistan and Ceylon combine as a single test playing entity similar to that of the West lndies. The newly formed BCCP unequivocally rejected this request on the grounds that Pakistan was an independent state and could accept nothing less than the international recognition of its cricket team. With the prospect of test cricket for Pakistan seemingly at a standstill at the time, and the BCCP defiant in its opposition to a combined regional test team, the Indian cricket authorities set out to poach some of Pakistan's players. By doing so the BCCI hoped to strengthen its own domestic competition which had also suffered losses as a result of partition. Thus, it made plans to incorporate the Pakistan regions into its own competition despite the opposition shown to it by the BCCP. it may be argued that this was an attempt to usurp the independent authority of the BCCP, but at the time the decision was more likely to reflect the concern shown to players on the Pakistan side of the border who as products of colonial Indian cricket found their cricketing prospects stranded with little incentive for further development after partition. The latter of the two arguments is more convincing when one considers that the BCCI supported the BCCP and Pakistan's admission at all ICC sessions including that of 1952 which ultimately approved Pakistan's membership.

The BCCP, then a fledgling organisation, interpreted the BCCis actions as threatening and it, along with the press in Pakistan, adopted a defiant nationalistic stance that was critical of the motives of the BCCI. According to Dawn, Mr. Hassan Shah, the Chairman of the Organising Committee of the

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BCCP, released a statement praising the actions of a group of cricketers in Sind who turned down an offer from the BCCI to field a team in the Ranji Trophy:

Some of the players who were invited for trial matches have written to the Organising Committee of the Cricket Board of Control in Pakistan disassociating themselves from the Ranji Trophy Tournament on the plea that with the partition of India and the establishment of two independent dominions all cricket matches and tournaments between India and Pakistan have to be played on (a) dominion and international basis.17

To this statement Keki Collector, the Secretary of the BCCP, added:

The two boards (the BCCP and the BCCI) now are distinct and we have nothing whatsoever to do with the Cricket Board of Control in India in so far as cricket in Pakistan is concerned. All that we have to do with them now is to seek division of assets ... proportionately on the basis of (the) partition formula obtaining in other spheres between the two dominions.18

From its inception the BCCP represented itself as the sole authority and mouthpiece for cricket and promoted its own brand of Pakistani nationalism in an effort to do so. lt not only appealed to cricket's international authorities for recognition as an independent national body in its own right, but it began to narrate and develop its own historical rationale and traditions to legitimise its national position and authority within Pakistan itself. The BCCP adopted a number of strategies in its attempt to construct an identifiable national culture for the game, subsequently influencing the direction cricket was to take in Pakistan. lt relied on an existing culture of feudal patronage and the gradual foundation of modern commercial-centred patronage and strong leadership by a small number of individuals respected for their knowledge of cricket and/or authoritarian demeanour.

CRICKET PATRONAGE IN PAKISTAN The earliest members of the BCCP, particularly Justice Cornelius, sought

to 'nationalise' the game in Pakistan and associate it with the foremost politicians of the national legislature in an effort to obtain resources and the much needed support of the government. The colonial cricket organisation model, like other colonial organisations, had seen the Raj as the supreme

17 Hassan Shah in Dawn, 2 December 1948. 18 Keki Collector in ibid.

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patron and arbiter of the game in any case. An examination of the decisions taken by the board from the time of its first meeting until Muhammad Ayub Khan's military coup in 1958 show this to have been the case. The BCCP along with other political, economic and cultural bodies lacked traditional legitimacy within the context of Pakistani nationalism. Because the latter was so recent in its conceptualisation and construction the organisations and associations that fell under its authority had to either be rearticulated if they existed prior to '. partition or newly articulated if they did not. Often most organisations and ·~. associations needed to be rearticulated and newly articulated at the same time. ·!

For instance, Pakistan's earliest politicians had already been active in the i political system of colonial India before 1947. Afterwards they restructured their \ political lives to accord with the realities of the actual territorial state of Pakistan j­and the rationale for its continued survival in the post-partition period. So too did other institutions, professional and commercial; foremost of which were the army and civil service. In this context the game of cricket had to adjust to the demands and expectations of the new nation as well. As has already been discussed, cricket was played in areas partitioned to Pakistan before 1947 but never as the national game of Pakistan, imagined or otherwise.

At the same time Cornelius persisted with the existing feudal patrons of the game to offset crickefs limited appeal for many Pakistanis in the early to mid 1950s. In this study feudalism, as a term, does not imply any close parallel to its use in Medieval Europe.1 9 Rather, it refers to the class of large landlords and princely rulers that played a major collaborative part in India after the rebellion of 1857. They controlled much of the power over rural society and had very diverse origins. Some inherited large tracts of land as scions of ancient indigenous political chiefdoms, like the Rajput zaminders; others were Mughal officials who had been successful in converting their revenue estates into hereditary landed property; And still, others were religious leaders who acquired landed property through the patronage of traditional governments whether

19 G.Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, Chicago UP, Chicago, 1980; & G. Duby, The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warrior:s and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century, Cornell UP, lthaca, NY, 1974, pp.164-168. The more formal political and economic aspects of feudalism which Georges Duby argues began in Europe not long after 1 OOOCE, gave rise to a three-tiered socio-political hierarchy that sanctioned "social inequalities and all forms of economic exploitation". In the second of the two publications cited, Duby refers to the three-tiered socio-political hierarchy as "the theory of the three orders that was being slowly nurtured by a narrow circle of intellectuals ... (They argued:) since the Creation, God had assigned specific tasks among men; some were commissioned to pray for the salvation of all, others were pledged to fight to protect the mass of the people; it was up to members of the third order, by far the most numerous, to provide for the men of religion and men of war by their labour." (p.164)

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Hindu or Muslim.20 After the rebellion of 1857, the British government came to rely on these landlords as crucial collaborators to offset further indigenous disturbances (see Chapter 1 ).

In an effort to promote this collaboration, the British made strenuous efforts to involve traditional rulers in an English education which acculturated them to English sports like cricket. However, their authority had largely been usurped. What remained during the colonial period and in the years immediately following partition was the lavish depiction of regal pomp and tradition minus its political and economic potency. The open invitation of Cornelius and the BCCP to traditional leaders to help organise and develop the new national cricket culture of Pakistan allowed these vestiges of feudal society and patronage to flourish well beyond the support given by the last of the recognised princely patrons in the region.

The extent of feudal patronage in Pakistan was rather limited; few princely states were located in the territory that became Pakistan at partition. One state that was so located was Bahawalpur, and it along with the domain of the Sufi Pir of Pagaro were two crucial sources of traditional patronage open to the BCCP. The Nawab of Bahawalpur had developed his interest in cricket during the colonial period when many of India's princes adopted British customs and pastimes. After partition he was keen to continue his association with the game and offered his services and resources to its development in Pakistan. The organiser of cricket in Bahawalpur was its Chief Minister, Makhdoomzada Syed Hasan Mahmood. He was a graduate of Aitchison College where he acquired an understanding and appreciation of the game, and the ability to play it. This was evident when he captained Bahawalpur to win the inaugural Quaid­i-Azam Trophy in 1954. Behind this early success was a large amount of princely sponsorship and patronage that made Bahawalpur an attractive location for many cricketers. In his capacity as Chief Minister and cricket patron Makhdoomzada recruited many of the best cricketers and gave them "land grants, which some put to good use for agricultural purposes."21 One humorous anecdote of Bahawalpur's inaugural triumph tells of a group of graduates from the University of Punjab who had been invited to play cricket for the princely state. They were given work in a cotton ginning factory and unlimited use of cricket facilities for practice. However, during the course of the cricket season they neglected their work in order to practise "in the nets morning and evening,

20 P. Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh: A Study of their Relations Until ZamindariAbolition, OUP, Bombay, 1991. 21 A. H. Kardar, Memoirs of an All-Rounder, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1987, p.191.

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until they decided to leave." As a result the factory worked at a loss while its workers were busy winning for Bahawalpur the first Quaid-i-Azam Trophy.22

Bahawalpur's foray into cricket provided some much needed resources and facilities for the BCCP at a time when funding was not readily available. The princely state had acquired a recognised international cricket stadium; the first in Pakistan. By 1955 this venue hosted its inaugural test match during the Pakistan versus India home series. The Bahawalpur stadium was also used "for a three-day match against the MCC in 1951" and as the official venue for selection trials for Pakistan's 1954 tour to England.23 Most importantly, Bahawalpur provided much needed incentives for players to continue with their cricket careers, even if this was restricted to a small number of Pakistan's best and most promising cricketers.

The Pir of Pagaro's involvement in Pakistani cricket would not have occurred but not for his father's intransigence towards the British. After deposing the pro-nationalist Pir Sibghatullah Shah the British were initially determined to break the spiritual and temporal authority the Pir's of Pagaro had over their followers by terminating the Pir gadi (throne). Eventually, they opted against this and decided instead to send his two sons to England to be "educated and 'hopefully' turned into 'little Agha Khans."'24 Prior to their departure the British invested the Pir's eldest son with the title of Pir of Pagaro knowing full well that the late Pir had intended his youngest son to be the heir of his gadi. So it was then that the eldest son, Pir Shah Mardan Shah 11, the new Pir of Pagaro, returned from England in the early 1950s to reclaim his father's wealth, prestige and influence, thanks largely to the efforts of the Governor of Sind who successfully petitioned the Government of India to return to the Pir of Pagaro his belongings. Furthermore, the leaders of Pakistan in the immediate post-partition period felt that Shah Mardan showed them enough support to warrant him the return of his gadi and his followers:25

Following the restoration of the gadi in 1952, the pir (of Pagaro) aligned himself with the Muslim League. By 1955, he was said to control twenty members of the Sind Assembly and his backing for Sind's Chief Minister, M. A. Khuhro, was instrumental in enabling the Centre via Khuhro to achieve the

22 S. Berry, A Cricket Odyssey: England on Tour, 1987-88, Pavilion Books, London, p.93. 23 Kardar, p.1 91.

24 S. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1992, p.148.

25 ibid.

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appearance of full support of One Unit in a province where the move was bitterly resented.26

While in England the Pir of Pagaro was the recipient of a western education that stressed the importance of manliness and physical athleticism. There, he encountered a wide array of British sports and pastimes developing a particular interest in, and liking for, cricket. Upon his return to the newly established nation of Pakistan, the Pir was eager to continue his association with the game; he thus became one of Pakistan's earliest and influential patrons providing funds and facilities that helped to promote and develop Pakistani cricket in its infancy.

The Pir had "a net-practice pitch installed in his garden" and paid cricketers like Wallis Matthias, lkram Elahi, Khan Mohammed, Mohammad Munaf and Hanif Mohammed "two or three hundred rupees a month, good money, for the period" to practise all they liked.27 On 1 September 1953 it was announced in Dawn that the Pir was to form a Pir of Pagaro's XI to give cricketers the opportunity to develop as players while gaining experience through matches and earning money in the process. He was quoted as saying:

The members of the team ... would be paid "TALENT MONEY" to pay their fees and other expenses .. . (He hoped to) encourage the young talent in the country in the field of sports which was a healthy outlet for the energies of youngmen ... (He) regretted that sports was being neglected ... (and he had) taken this practical step to provide an incentive to young men to take to sports. 28

On 4 September 1953 the Pir of Pagaro's XI, with the Pir himself as captain, began a 5 week tour of Sind with a win over the Karachi Gymkhana team in a friendly one day match. Subsequently, the Pir's Xi returned to Karachi on 13 October after having been feted and "well received" everywhere they went. They were even invited to a lunch in honour of the then prime minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, by Mir Ghulam Ali Khan Tal pur of Hyderabad.29 The Pir then reestablished the Sind Cricket Association and entered a team from Karachi into the inaugural Pakistani domestic cricket competition. 30

26 ibid., pp.152-53.

27 Berry, p.92.

28 Pirof Pagaro in Dawn, 1 September 1953.

29 Dawn, 13 October 1953.

30 Berry, p.92.

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Hanif Mohammed in his autobiography, Playing for Pakistan31, writes of two separate but humorous anecdotes involving the Pir as cricket patron and participant. In his first account he tells of the time when Muhammad Munaf at a net practice session bowled a vicious delivery to the Pir hitting and flooring him in the process. The disciples of the Pir, the Hurs, seeing their spiritual leader on the floor and hurt, made their way to the players seeking retribution. Fortunately for Hanif and the rest of the team, they were rescued from the wrath of the Pir's disciples by the intervention of the spiritual leader's secretary who had seen the whole episode.

On another occasion, the Pir had become annoyed at the frequency with which young boys invaded the pitch of a match he was participating in at Hyderabad's Rani Bagh, lost his temper, and, in a moment of rage, removed a cricket stump from the ground and hit one of the offenders. As a result of this unexpected reaction by the Pir to the disturbances in the middle, the young boy who was hit became an "instant celebrity"; he was envied by others for having been blessed by the spiritual hand of the Pir of Pagaro.

THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A DOMESTIC CRICKET COMPETITION

The domestic cricket scene Cornelius and the BCCP organised in Pakistan had inauspicious beginnings. The game encountered many organisational and structural problems, the outcome of board indecision and conflict, a lack of any substantial funding and few facilities of first-class standard. Pakistan found itself in the unusual position of playing in official test matches in 1952 before it had developed a recognised domestic structure. All this frustrated early attempts to develop the playing talent of local cricketers and inhibited the growth of the game nationally.

Conflict of opinion over the direction the game would take and its leadership led to many aborted attempts to develop a sustainable domestic competition. In 1951 an unsuccessful attempt was made to adapt the Pentangular Tournament model of colonial India, with teams representing the Muslims of Lahore and those of Karachi, and other teams representing the Europeans, Parsees and the other minority ethnic and religious groups. This competition failed to arouse the interest of patrons and the public and folded after two years. it did not appeal to Pakistanis because it was a strong reminder for many of the recent communal divisions of the pre-partition period that cricket

31 H. Mohammed, Playing for Pakistan: An Autobiography, with Q. Ahmed & A. Salam, Hamdard Press, Pakistan, 1999, pp.28-31.

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itself had condoned. Also, the size of the European and Parsee communities after partition was much too small for them to field competitive teams - unlike the situation in colonial times. Similarly, the flight of the Hindus and Sikhs made a pentangular style competition a non starter. Nor could an Australian style competition be adopted -as eventually occurred in India- because the adoption of a unitary state model ruled out a simple construction of federal territorial teams.

In the 1953-54 cricket season the BCCP organised the Quaid-i-Azam Trophy - a regional competition that was modelled on the English county championship. lt was named after the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to legitimise the BCCPs right to call itself a national body. This was done at a time when the cult of personality associated with Jinnah was widely used by individuals with leadership aspirations in professional and institutional positions to validate their organisations as national enterprises. 32 The BCCP sought to further justify its national image by making the head of state for Pakistan its Chief Patron, thereby associating its position with the official nationalist discourse. 33

The Quaid-i-Azam Trophy failed to emulate the success of the English county championship or the Australian Sheffield Shield. From its very inception it lacked funds, suitable playing facilities and strong regional and grass-roots foundations. This was the outcome of partition that left the under-developed cricket regions of Pakistan to fend for themselves without the organisational participation and direction of its pre-partition Hindu population and the financial support and overarching leadership of its then national governing body, the BCCI. 34 This reflected the wider fiscal crisis of Pakistan. Not only had partition kept the main banking and business centres in India, it had also led to the flight of the predominantly Hindu business classes of Punjab and especially Sind to India. Until United States political aid became an important factor, this meant that only essential state fu"nctions could be adequately capitalised.

I

The Quaid-i-Azam Trophy was also short in duration and the players • were poorly paid. Qamar Ahmed, a domestic player in the 1950s and now ari acclaimed international journalist for Pakistani cricket, describes cricket in 1950s Pakistan as organisationally and financially in disarray; there were few

32 See section on Jinnah's cult of personality in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

33 The struggle to associate the game with the nation's foremost politicians and the initial disinterest shown by the latter will be clarified in Chapter 6 of this thesis. In the period covered by this chapter, politicians and other nation-builders were approached by the BCCP but generally they took little or no part in the day to day decision-making of the crtcket board. 34 See section on cricket in pre-partition Lahore and Karachi in chapter 3.

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games played, and few incentives for people to play. As he testified, he himself

played on average only three first class games a season earning the equivalent

of "two dollars a day". In one 7 year period from 1956-57 to 1963 he played only 17 first class matches. 35

Abdul Hafeez Kardar writes of the financial difficulties faced by the BCCP

at the time of his appointment as captain of the national team in 1951. The BCCP had little more than Rs. 4,00,000 in its coffers and paid its players a daily

allowance of 12 rupees. 36 Indeed it was not able to afford a permanent

headquarters until 1972. Furthermore, in an attempt to cut its costs, along with

the desire to project itself as a hospitable and viable organisation to the I CC, the

BCCP treated visiting cricketers more favourably than it did its own: Kardar

writes that "While the visitors travelled first class by Pak Railway, our team was

booked in second class compartments."37 Inadequate funding led to some

compromises in the way cricket officials went about their business;38 ultimately,

this alienated the players, officials and journalists of other cricket playing

nations from the BCCP and led to international questioning of its efficiency as

an organising body and Pakistan's suitability as a cricket hosting nation. 39

As a result of these numerous obstacles the BCCP have struggled to find

an appropriate structure for the Quaid-i-Azam Trophy, adding, removing and

amalgamating sides, even while experimenting with its playing format to include

zonal, group and round robin matches at different times and in different years.

For 25 years none of this challenged the dominance of Karachi and Lahore. If

anything, the playing and administrative strength of these two cities was further

reinforced in 1975 when private corporations were formally invited to develop

35 Interview with Qamar Ahmed & Chisty Mujahid at the GABBA, Brisbane, 5 January 2000. 36 A. H. Kardar, pp.186-87. 37 ibid., p.186. 38 ibid. With meagre resources at its disposal the BCCP improvised in unexpected ways when greeting visiting teams from abroad. Kardar describes in some detail the manner in which luggage belonging to the MCC team was transported to their hotel in Lahore on the eve of the second unofficial test match in 1951: "I! was quite a sight to see luggage (dozens of suitcases and kit bags) piled up on donkey carts! But they did the job in carrying the load to the hotel." 39 ibid., p.187. Unable to make arrangements for its own official headquarters until Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's timely intervention in 1972, the BCCP was an organisation constantly on the move: general meetings were held in varying locations, particularly Lahore, Rawalpindi and Karachi, or they took place over the phone between members who were stationed in these three cities.

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their own domestic teams by the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government to financially underwrite the game.40

COLLEGE AND CLUB CRICKET Despite the efforts of the BCCP to establish a national game at the

domestic level, cricket's earliest phase in Pakistan survived on the traditional college and club rivalries of the colonial period. In Lahore an intense rivalry had developed in the 1930s between students and graduates of Muslim and secular government colleges that continued for almost two decades after partition. Two annual matches in particular typified this rivalry: lslamia College versus Government College, and Crescent versus Mamdot. lslamia College followed a similar foundational trajectory to that of Aligarh College: it was founded by Muslim educationalists who wanted to advance the study and practice of Islam in response to western educational and secular challenges. Government College was founded by the British and "was opened on January 1st, 1864, under the sanction given by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, to the establishment provided for it in the budget of 1863."41 Its purpose was to educate the sons of the indigenous nobility.

Large crowds gathered to watch the two colleges play against each other. Quite frequently they provided a festive backdrop to the action taking place in the middle of the college cricket ground; at other times, they would actively participate in the outcome of matches by baiting and openly deriding players of the opposing team. That there was a rivalry between the two is unquestionable. Fazal Mahmood describes how at one stage in his life there was enormous pressure on him to not defect to Government College. His father, Professor Ghulam Hussain, had been a Principal of lslamia College and a one time Muslim agitator opposed to British rule:

He took part in the Reshami Roomal movement, and during the Khilafat Movement, migrated to Afghanistan with Ubaidullah Sindhi. He also served time in prison for his involvement in the movement. After his release from jail, he brought out his own newspaper, lnqilab, but soon had to close it down as the British government confiscated his press. He

40 Private teams like Pakistan Railways and Pakistan International Airlines had long fielded teams in local championships, but this was not at the request of government nor a systematic policy to include company teams. *Chapter 6 of this thesis will evaluate the significance of government policy that authorised the largest financial and commercial houses in Pakistan to underwrite the game. 41 H. L. 0. Garret! and A. Hamid, A History of Government College 1864-1964, Ripon Printing Press, Lahore, 1964, p.1.

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was arrested again and got news of my (Fazal's) birth while in jail.42

From this background Fazal was encouraged to follow in his father's footsteps by actively pursuing a life of Islamic study. Indeed his time at lslamia College spanned the period from the 'Lahore Resolution' to the eve of partition when the college itself was actively behind the Muslim League43 Fazal wanted to join Government College but was persuaded from doing so by Professor Colonel Aslam, his college mentor at lslamia44

Fazal's own autobiography relates the importance of lslamia and Government College matches to Pakistani cricket in its formative years. Players selected for Pakistani test teams in the 1950s were predominantly graduates of these two colleges. For example, students of lslamia College in the 1940s who went on to appear for Pakistan in test matches included Fazal, Gul Muhammad, Nazar Muhammad, Abdul Hafeez Kardar, Maqsood Ahmad, lmtiaz Ahmad, Shujauddin and Zulfiqar Ahmad.45 All were prominent contributors to Pakistan's early success as a test nation.

These players graduated from college cricket to play for the leading club teams of Lahore. The most important annual club game on the cricket calendar was that of Crescent versus Mamdot. Essentially, lslamia College was a recruiting agency for Crescent, while graduates of government colleges like Government and Aitchison made their way into the Mamdot club. Many of Pakistan's earliest test players participated in these matches. Often the competitiveness of both teams, and the fact that they both had numerous test players to call upon, made for entertaining fixtures that many regarded as genuine selection trials for the national team. Some of the earliest personalities associated with these matches included Fazal, Kardar and lmtiaz Ahmed of Crescent and the Nawab of Mamdot and Munawar Ali Khan of Mamdot.

Club cricket in Lahore, particularly the contests between Crescent and Mamdot, typified traditional feudal links between patron and client. The patronage given to cricketers by the Nawab of Mamdot is but one example. The Nawab had been the "largest Muslim landowner in pre-Partition East Punjab" and President of the Punjab Muslim League by 1943.46 After partition he

42 F. Mahmood with A. Sohail, From Dusk to Dawn: Autobiography of a Pakistani Cricket Legend, OUP, Oxford, 2003, pp.3-4. 43 "b"d 5 I I ., p .. 44 "b"d 7 I I 'I p .. 45 "b"d 6 I I ., p ..

46 I. Talbot, Pakistan: A Modem History, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1999, p.396.

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became the chief minister of the Punjab and, not long after, prime minister of Pakistan.47 In his role as cricket patron he offered financial support to many players in need of assistance irrespective of whether they played for his club or not.48 This type of cricket patronage has not to date been displaced by BCCP remuneration. The proliferation and ad hoc nature of club tournaments in Pakistan has offered political prestige for 'feudal'-type landholders and their descendants as well as more recent commercial and industrial entrepreneurs. lt is one way for them to enhance their prestige and authority in a country whose political economy has been slowly modernising, thereby relying less on traditional modes of leadership.

In Karachi the domestic scene was almost a replica of that in Lahore. Hanif Mohammed describes a great rivalry between Sind Madrassah, a 'Muslim' school, and St Patrick's, a government one. Matches between these two teams are also remembered for their carnivalesque atmosphere and intense rivalry.49 However, partition had disrupted the domestic cricket of Karachi more than that of Lahore. The loss of its strongest community, the Hindus, and the entry of Muslim refugees predominantly from northern India changed entirely the structure and culture of the local game. The new clubs and patrons that emerged in Karachi after partition adopted the cricket traditions and symbolism of north India that bore no resemblance to the city's historical cricket culture. lt was clubs with names like Pak Moghul that all 5 Muhammad brothers played for, including the three who played test cricket for Pakistan, Hanif, Mushtaq and Sadiq. 50 Although these clubs were constructed around a culture of Hindustani Muslim identity they were open to cricketers from various backgrounds, including the Mu hammed brothers whose family had migrated from Gujerat.

COMMEMORATIVE MATCHES Despite its meagre resources and the game's lack of popularity the

BCCP devised other ways to consolidate its cultural position and the livelihood of its players. Soon after the completion of Pakistan's first official test series, played against India in 1952-53, the BCCP staged two cricket matches to commemorate the achievements of 'Pakistani' cricketers so early in the history . of that country. The staging of these matches, 7 months apart from one another, served to validate Pakistan as an international cricket nation and the BCCP as a· ·> _

47ibid.

48 Interview with Sultan Mahmud, Lahore, 2 November 2000.

49 H. Mohammed, p.21.

50 ibid., p.22

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justifiable national ruling body. Both the Amir El a hi Benefit Match and the Wazir Ali Commemoration Match exhibited the symbolism and conventions historically associated with nation-building narratives: both matches glorified the achievements of the two players concerned by constructing a genealogy for Pakistani cricket culture that could be traced back to the earliest emergence of Muslim cricketers in colonial India. The organisation of these matches and the press coverage dedicated to them by Dawn, the official English language newspaper of the Muhajir establishment, was intended to provide a teleological historical basis for the game in Pakistan that was sympathetic to the logic of the "two-nation" theory. While the biographical details of both players remained authentic their histories were misleadingly portrayed as being always directed towards the emergence of Pakistani cricket. In other words, their participation in Muslim teams before 1947 was interpreted as commitment to the concept of a national Muslim cricketing culture. By linking the pre-partition cricketing careers of Amir Elahi and Wazir Ali with the cricket milieu of early 1950s Pakistan both . the BCCP and Dawn were inventing history to justify an historical narrative of~­Pakistan that extended beyond its accepted origins.

On the morning of the Amir Elahi match Dawn reported that: Forty-five-year-old Amir Elahi, one of the greatest "googly" bowlers born in the sub-continent of Pakistan and India, announced his retirement from first class cricket while touring India with the Pakistan team last year. The benefit match being played today is to present him with a purse as a token of appreciation of his services to the game during his 20 years cricketing career. 51

Abdul Hafeez Kardar, the first official Pakistani cricket captain, put it more succinctly:

... it is customary to reward first class cricketers during their cricketing career or at the time of their retirement with a benefit match in token of recognition of meritorious services rendered in the field of cricket. 52

Amir Elahi was given a tribute by the BCCP because upon him fell the honour of being Pakistan's first cricket retiree. He had played 20 years of first class cricket with some 250 wickets to his name. His cricket for Pakistan covered one

51 Dawn, 6 March 1953.

52 Kardar in Dawn, 5 March 1 953.

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test series - Pakistan's first- and one unofficial test series where he took 14 of his overall career wickets. 53 Amir Elahi's cricketing annals read rather modestly; he was not a prominent player in anyone's estimations. However, he had a likable personality and had figured in cricket environs - including two test match appearances for India - for two decades. Thus, his retirement at the completion of Pakistan's first test series provided the BCCP with the opportune moment to promote its leadership credentials and the significance of its nationalist enterprise.

In October the BCCP decided to commemorate the passing of Major Syed Wazir Ali who had died in 1950. A match in his memory gave the BCCP more scope for publicity than had the Amir Elahi match because Wazir Ali was one of the most dominant indigenous cricket players in colonial India. He left behind a young family to whom the BCCP bestowed the proceeds of his commemoration match. This was a generous gesture by the BCCP that signified its willingness to look after not only the players it represented but their families as well. However, Wazir Ali's history presented obstacles to both the BCCP and Dawn who were keen to portray him as a Pakistani player and a significant contributor to the national game.

Wazir Ali was born in Jullundur- now in East Punjab- on 16 July 1903. In 1921 he became a student of Aligarh University where his cricket development was so rapid that he was invited to play for the Muslim team in the Bombay Quadrangular of 1 923; and so began his illustrious first-class career. As a batsman and captain of the Muslim team in Bombay he helped orchestrate victories over what many considered to be more powerful Hindu teams in 1934, . 1935, 1938 and 1941. He also had a distinguished career in international cricket where he scored two centuries against the first MCC tourists to India in 1926-27, one more against them on their 1934 tour, and two more on India's 1936 tour of England. Undoubtedly, he produced his best international form during India's inaugural tour to England in 1932 where he scored 1725 runs including 6 centuries. 54

In 1948 Wazir Ali decided to leave his state service job in Bhopal and migrate to Pakistan. Like many others at the time, he felt that the hostile and uncertain political and religious climate propagated by nationalists from either side of the political divide left him with little choice but to migrate to Pakistan. His ill health saw him play a minor role in the early cricket milieu of his newly adopted country. His death in 1950 came not long after participating in a match

53 Dawn, 6 March 1953. 54 Dawn, 18 June 1950.

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played on his behalf. Thus, he was lost to Pakistani cricket almost immediately upon his arrival. However, this did not prevent the BCCP and other prominent cricket personalities from associating him with the 'imagined' national cricket history of Pakistan.

In the Dawn issue of 2 October 1953 Wazir Ali, his cricket achievements and his legacy to cricket in Pakistan were commemorated in much detail on a four-page broadsheet layout. To mark the occasion journalists contributed additional articles on Muslim cricket in Karachi before partition, the development of cricket in Pakistan, the need for professionalism in the new nation's cricket, and an abstract on the participants of the Wazir Ali Commemoration Match. While this helped to contextualise the event within the Pakistani cricket setting of the early 1950s for Dawn's reading public, it also conveyed to them the importance of Wazir Ali's achievements for Pakistani cricket as upheld by the BCCP. Furthermore, to justify BCCP accounts of Wazir Ali's significance to Pakistani cricket folklore quotes from prominent individuals paying tribute to him were printed by Dawn. General Cannon commented:

... Major Wazir Ali ... was one of the finest cricketers of the lndo-Pakistan sub-continent. 55

while a former cricket contemporary, Mushtaq Ali, said:

A tournament making Wazir immortal, will I am sure, give to lovers of this wonderful game ... its highest traditions (my italics). I wish this tournament all success and hope that it will serve its purpose by finding future Test stars for Pakistan. 56

Thus, the BCCP and Dawn used both matches to invent a tradition of Pakistani cricket nationalism before partition. In their efforts to nationalise the game they used historical license to reinterpret the history of communal cricket in colonial India to accentuate the presence of a distinct Pakistani cricket narrative at a time when many Muslim players had yet to imagine themselves as Pakistani cricketers. The fact that the history of both players was linked by Dawn to provide a "continuity with the pasf' is a further example of the importance in symbolism of both matches. On the morning of the Wazir Ali Commemoration Match Dawn printed a tribute from Amir Elahi to Wazir Ali in which the latter was cast in the role of a mentor to the former:

55 General Cannon in Dawn, 2 October 1953.

56 Mushtaq Ali in ibid.

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I owe him much. He was the man who brought me in the forefront and under whose directions I developed my bowling. Without his prophetic vision and foresight I would not have been what I am today. I remember quite clearly the day when I played for the Muslims in the Pentangular. The atmosphere and the environments at the stadium were quite harassing for a youngster who was making his debut in First Class cricket. The tension among the spectators had affected my nerves and I fared very badly. In the second match I was being dropped. But Wazir Ali had gauged fully what was wrong with me. He insisted that I should not be dropped. I was included in the second match (and) ... I was able to take the largest number of good wickets. 57

Clearly, Amir Elahi considered Wazir Ali as crucial to his own cricket development, while his tribute was used by Dawn to provide the crucial link to the development of cricket in Pakistan. The cricket histories of both players spanned the early years of Muslim cricket in Bombay to the earliest years of cricket in Pakistan, including the nation's first ever official test series against India. Furthermore, to solidify the connection from Wazir Ali through Amir Elahi to Pakistan's first test series, the latter player was able to pay his respects by participating in the former's commemoration match.

The two matches were one way for the BCCP to establish a viable / national cricket culture in spite of the absence of distinctively Pakistani traditions in the sport. Like the initial setbacks suffered by many of Pakistan's professions and institutions at the time of partition, cricket had experienced vast losses which acutely disrupted its independent development. 58 The cricket board of India remained in Delhi and held on to most of its finances and administrative personnel. This left Pakistan with scarce resources for cricket and with no one immediately in a position to manage the game. lt was for this reason that the

57 Amir Elahi in ibid.

58 it also faced competition from other sports that were experiencing the same problems the BCCP was; and, like the BCCP, they too appealed to the government for funds. Furthermore, they competed with each other for players, patrons and spectators, and at the time of partition it was not entirely certain which of them, if any, would survive. *Hockey benefited from a group of players who migrated into Pakistan from India. The international success they brought to the sport paralleled that of cricket. However, the Pakistan Hockey Federation, like its cricket counterpart, found it difficult to implement a viable domestic competition and an effective coaching program for juniors. *Squash was dependent on the patronage of the Royal Pakistan Air Force and the international success centred on a group of Pathans who were all related. However, it too Jacked funding and broader appeal: in 1957 there were only 15 professional squash players in the country and few sufficient playing facilities. *These problems also beset the organisation of sports like football (soccer), wrestling, boxing, tennis, badminton, polo, horse-racing, and track and field.

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BCCP, once formed, chose the path of nationalism. From its inception it appointed heads of government to important positions of leadership and patronage on the BCCP board, and developed a playing ethos that reflected the spirit of the national narrative by appointing team captains and managers that were committed to the advancement of Pakistan. In contrast, the national leaders extended only token recognition to the game despite the overtures of the BCCP.

THE PAKISTAN EAGLETS

Another of the BCCPs early schemes was that of the Pakistan Eaglets program. The Pakistan Eaglets were formed in the early 1950s to prepare young players for international cricket, particularly if they were likely to be called up for test duty. Justice Cornelius believed that a cricket tour to England of a team comprising test players and young hopefuls was a suitable means for the development of local talent in the absence of a recognised first-class competition in Pakistan. For this reason he developed the Pakistan Eaglets team in 1951, and later the Pakistan Eaglets Cricket Society.59 To do this he enlisted the help of trusted confidantes like the Nawab of Mamdot, Keki Collector, the BCCP and those in charge of cricket in Government and lslamia Colleges. eo

The first two Pakistan Eaglets' teams toured England in 1952 and 1953 in preparation for the 1954 test series. These teams were introduced to playing conditions, cricket grounds and training methods and facilities that had previously been unavailable to them. While in England, they trained at Alf Gover's School of Cricket, which was based in Watford. A member of that first team, Sultan Mahmud, recollects in detail the moment of his first arrival at Gover's cricket school:

There was a motor garage on the ground floor, and there were small stairs to go to the first floor. You climbed them ... and suddenly you came across a billiard table. From the billiard room you turn(ed) to (your) right (to) find the bar. Mr. Alf Gover or Mrs. Alf Gover ... would meet ... you ... there. From the bar room there was (an) entrance ... (You entered) a big hall ... (that had) coir mat(ting) spread all over the floor ... (and) synthetic rubber wickets ... He (Gover) had four different type(s) of pitches.61

59 Interview with Sultan Mahmood.

60 ibid.

61 ibid.

!38

Alf Gover and his assistants took the Eaglets through drills and techniques every day for one whole month before they were due to play a series of matches against "several clubs consisting of professionals and county players" to further hone their skills. 62 Cricketers selected to represent the Pakistan Eaglets had their trip subsidised by the BCCP and some of its generous associates if they were unable to pay for it themselves. Those who could afford the trip were asked to finance a percentage of their costs.63 The first tour to England was completely subsidised by the BCCP; subsequent tours saw to the introduction and general increase of private funds. 64 Some of the early graduates of the Pakistan Eaglets Cricket Society were Hanif Mohammed, Khan Mohammed, lmtiaz Ahmed, Fazal Mahmood and Mahmood Hussain. All excluding Khan Mohammed participated in Pakistan's test victory over the MCC at the Oval in 1954.65 The strength of the camaraderie and friendship formed by Alf Gover and his former pupils was evident at the completion of the match. Fazal Mahmood recollects how Gover shouted to him from the commentary box, '"We have won-we have won,' completely forgetting that he was British."66

THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'PAKISTANI' CRICKET CLUBS Cornelius and the earliest members of the BCCP encouraged other

prominent and affluent individuals to establish cricket clubs. The involvement of these individuals, along with that of more traditional patrons like the Nawab of Mamdot and the Pir of Pagaro, was meant to compensate for the perceived shortcomings of the domestic game in Pakistan in its earliest years. Numerous public and private figures responded to the board's proposal and began to organise cricket clubs of their own, or offered themselves as financial patrons to clubs established by less affluent members of society like school and college /. graduates. The emergence of cricket clubs with unmistakable nationalist overtones took place in Pakistan's largest urban centres, particularly in Karachi. The proliferation of these clubs and the prestige that they were expected to give

62 F. Mahmood, 2003, p.25. 63 ibid., p.24. 64 Interview with Sultan Mahmood. 65 A. Licudi with W. Raja, Cornered Tigers: A History of Pakistan's Test Cricket, Hansib, St John's, Antigua, Wl, 1997, p.154. Khan Mohammad was a regular member of Pakistani teams in the 1950s. He had appeared in the first two tests against England in 1954, but his commitment to Lowerhouse in the Lancashire League prevented him from playing any further part in the series. 66 Mahmood, p.49.

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to their patrons generated a mosaic of cricket tournaments with no discernible organisational arrangement.

These clubs began to emerge soon after Pakistan's first test series in 1952. Their large proliferation in Karachi was an indication that the BCCPs early appeal to nationalise the game did not fall on deaf ears. Prominent individuals within the new nation were keen to sponsor and promote local competitions out of a genuine desire to see the game develop and also because it put them at the forefront of that development. This allowed them to contribute to the growth of a national cricket culture while, at the same time, generating popular appeal for themselves. The rapid expansion of clubs in Karachi was an indication of how active the cricket patrons of that city were in the development of their own distinct symbolism for the national game. As Muhajirs they were keen to stamp their own experiences and historical traditions on the nascent cricket culture then developing in Pakistan, particularly since the game's earliest leadership emanated from Lahore. Unlike the political system where the Muhajirs had been the earliest national leaders, the game had from its inception been controlled and governed by Punjabis. This is why the nationalisation of cricket in Pakistan reflected more the traditional pattern of leadership in the Punjab and not the political vision of its early government leaders who were predominantly from the United Provinces.

The patrons who emerged in Karachi perpetuated the symbolism and cultural identity of the Muhajir political leadership in their local teams and tournaments. Cricket clubs like Aligarh Old Boys, Pak Moghuls and Pak Crescent emerged along with Pak Wanderers, Clifton Gymkhana, Rangers and others, and they participated in numerous local championships that were similar to those in. Lahore but differed from them in one important way: they provided a forum for the advancement of a Muhajir identity that contested the national discourse of the Punjabi-dominated BCCP. While regional conflict in cricket has never approached the levels of that evident in the political sphere, there is still a noticeable distrust shown by Karachi cricket administrators to their Lahori counterparts that has at times led to bitter accusations and disagreements. lt is within this context that the cricket patrons of Karachi have maintained their links to the cricket culture that they inherited from colonial India.

Publicity for this strand of Muhajir cricket began with Pakistan's first official cricke~magazine, The Cricketer, which began publication in early 1972. The intention of its editorial board, which included the nation's esteemed and recently retired opening batsman, Hanif Mohammed, as its chief editor, was to promote the game nationwide. However, because The Cricketer emanated from

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Karachi it provided a coverage of the game's development there that had previously been unavailable, particularly the organisation of its local cricket structure. lt underlined the contributions made by patrons and cricket clubs in Karachi as an important part of the overall development of the game in the country. lt brought to attention individuals and a cricket culture that was little understood and acknowledged, though it had been maturing for close to 20 years.

The Cricketer's depiction of local cricket clubs, steeped in the symbolism of Mughal India, and competitions, along with those responsible for funding and organising both of them, was a part of almost every monthly issue in its initial year of publication. In these issues one could detect a general pattern in the organisation of clubs and the patronage offered to them that reflected the traditional management of cricket in colonial India outside of Bombay. Invariably clubs were formed by college students or graduates who subsequently acquired the support, financial and otherwise, of prominent and affluent individuals. Quite often the latter had procured their status and wealth from the inheritance of large and profitable estates in north India. After partition they were able to compensate for the loss of their traditional landholdings by acquiring newer estates in Pakistan, left behind by departing Hindus and Sikhs, and by channelling much of their inherited wealth into the gradually developing commercial and industrial sectors of the new nation's economy.

From the early 1950s to the early 1960s many clubs were formed in the urban areas of Pakistan in the manner described above. Karachi by far experienced the largest growth of cricket clubs due to the massive influx of Muslims, particularly from north India. However, other locales, and Lahore was the most prominent of these despite its existing cricket milieu, also underwent an expansion of local club competitions. Nor was the development of cricket clubs with symbolic relevance to the Mughal period and the construction of the Pakistani national narrative entirely restricted to Karachi. While the organisation of cricket in Karachi exclusively reflected the cultural ideals and concerns of the Muhajir political establishment, cricket clubs upholding the political vision of Jinnah and the earliest national leaders of Pakistan were to be found elsewhere as well: Lahore, itself, had clubs like Mamdot and Crescent, as previously discussed, as well as Delhi Gymkhana, Prince Club and Jinnah Memorial Club that all paid homage to a bygone age of traditional authority, or the development of a nationalist political voice for Muslims in the 1940s. 67 Some of these clubs

67 Gul Hameed Bhatti, "Lahore Cricket Scene", in The Cricketer, August 1973, pp.26-27.

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were present before partition, others emerged not long after and may have had some connection with incoming migrants from India as did the Mamdot Club. BB

The Cricketer provides many examples of clubs founded by students and graduates that then acquired the support of affluent and influential patrons. The Clifton Gymkhana Cricket Club was founded in Karachi in 1953 by a group of students, Siraj Bukhari, Munawar Hussain, lshtiaq Mansoor, Misbah Bukhari and Alfred Samuel, and was granted affiliation to the Karachi Cricket Association in 1961.69 Over the years patronage and support have been extended to the club by former Prime Minister's, Khwaja Nazimuddin (October 1951 to April 1 953) and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (September 1956 to October 1957),70 Alhaj Abdul Wahab, a former speaker of the National Assembly, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizi, the Vatican's ambassador to Pakistan in the 1 950s, and Saifuddin Valika.71 The latter was a wealthy and prominent patron of club cricket in Karachi. His patronage and influence embodied the traditional feudal organisation of cricket in colonial north India. lt was conspicuously comprehensive and meticulous. Valika concerned himself with every aspect of the game and was duly feted by the cricket press of Karachi for his contributions:

He (Valika) is found visiting various cricket grounds to see first class matches. He is also patron of various cricket organisations and cricket writing associations which bring out magazines and souvenirs... Many new organisations have emerged under his patronage and due to generous donations made by him from time to time. He is also a solid supporter of the Karachi Cricket Association and the Cricketers Guild. Many times during a test series, he has announced prizes for players ... On many occasions he has also helped individual players with their personal problems.72

Valika's patronage was indicative of that given by other prominent individuals in Pakistan. lt also begins to explain why club cricket took on the appearance of a tapestry with no apparent or discernible organisational coherence. Patrons like Valika were involved with numerous local teams - some

68 For a brief summary of the founding of Mamdot Club and the Nawab's relocation to West Punjab refer to the earliest sections of this chapter. 69 Professor Siraj-ul-lslam Bukhari, "Focus on Cricket Club: Clifton Gymkhana", The Cricketer, 21 May, 1972, pp.26-27. 70 The former was also the Governor-General of Pakistan from September 1948 to October 1951. 71 ibid. 72 "Saifudin Valika and Cricket", The Cricketer, 21 April1972.

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they founded, others they merely funded. Also, they organised any number of local competitions: Clifton Gymkhana had won many of them including the Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidyatullah Cricket Tournament, the A. K. Khalid Summer Trophy, the Karachi Cricket Association Wazir Ali Tournament, the Ahmed Jaffer Cricket Tournament, the Jimmy Bomy Khambata Memorial Cricket Tournament, the Jang Gold Cup, the Major Aziz Bhatti Shaheed Memorial Cricket Tournament and the Or Rao Memorial Cricket Cup.73 Furthermore, patrons had favourite players and funded many of them even if they were not members of cricket teams that belonged to them or were heavily subsidised by them.

All this points to the importance of the game as a vessel for the promotion of traditional modes of paternalistic patronage and prestige. The traditional elites, whether in the Punjab, or those that migrated to Karachi, used the game to promote their cultural symbols and value systems, thereby sustaining the symbolic feudal links that cricket harnessed in the region during the colonial period. This was noticeable in the way that local cricket was organised in Pakistan's largest urban areas, particularly Karachi and Lahore. The manifold tournaments, often in memory of deceased or retired colleagues and peers, served to perpetuate existing socio-cultural identities and structures at the local level that have thwarted the development of a representational domestic structure for the game. The multitude of clubs and tournaments at the district level do not provide an adequate grass-roots structure for the development of the national game, and this is something that the authorities for cricket in the country have long realised.

The BCCP Council, whose membership comprises representatives of local cricket clubs, has quite frequently been an inefficient organisational body because it has for so long mirrored the conflicts amongst the traditional, commercial and military elites and their respective cultural and political concerns to the detriment of cricket. Club patrons have used their voting rights to endorse their own vested interests at BCCP selection trials, council appointments and funding bodies. This has led to a manifest division between the traditional feudal patrons of Lahore and Karachi who have long used the game to promote their own cultural and political leadership aspirations. The

73 Cricketer, 21 May 1972, pp.26-27. Two of these tournaments, the Jimmy Bomy Khambata Memorial Cricket Tournament and the Dr Rao Memorial Cricket Cup, had their origins in the Parsee and Hindu cricket cultures of Karachi prior to 1947. The fact that they were continued after partition suggests two things: a high level of continuity with the colonial cricket organisational model of pre-1947 and the slowness to adopt a 'national' equivalent after 1947; and, a continuation of traditional patronage customs whereby existing cultures are appropriated by patrons for reasons of personal prestige.

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BCCP, for its part, has tried, rather unsuccessfully, to weed out fraudulent regional representatives and claims. However, some of the measures it has often adopted have actually served to perpetuate them.

In 1980 divisional and city cricket associations were made members of the BCCP Council at the expense of provincial associations. This gave greater power to the two traditional strongholds of cricket in Pakistan, Karachi and Lahore. This change allowed both city associations to have one member appointed to Council for every 65 clubs within their jurisdictional boundaries.74 The number of clubs from Karachi and Lahore registered with the BCCP since its inception was enormous. Many of them lay defunct and in order to prevent their surreptitious representation, or the "rise to enrolment of (other) bogus clubs", the BCCP was prompted to scrutinise the records and activities of all clubs claiming active legitimacy. According to Brigadier (Retd.) Salahuddin this investigation was carried out rather perfunctorily and failed in its attempt to identify and remove clubs with fraudulent claims to existence. 75 From 1979 to 1999 no checks were carried out on club activities to ascertain whether they were still active and playing cricket. In 2000 Salahuddin, himself, was appointed as the head of a scrutinising committee to determine which clubs were active and in existence, and thereby legally authorised by the 22 February 1995 PCB (Pakistan Cricket Board) Constitution76 to participate in elections for Council.77 The inability of the BCCP/PCB to detect and police unscrupulous activities in its formal structures, and in many instances assisting in their emergence and prolongation through policies with little long-term vision, have inhibited the growth of equitable and accountable institutions for the organisation of cricket in the country. This has exhausted much needed resources of energy and capital and diverted their use from the crucial task of developing the game at the domestic and grass-roots level.

CONCLUSION

74 Brigadier (Retd.) Salahuddin, "Ad-hocism in Cricket over the Decades", in Dawn, 18 August 1999.

75 ibid.

76 The Constitution of the Pakistan Cricket Board (22 February 1995), issued by the Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (Culture, Sports & Tourism Division) in lslamabad, Published by Authority on 16 March 1995. The previous BCCP Constitution was revised and included a name change (now the PCB) and structural modifications that allowed it to be organised and registered as a company. 77 Interview with Brigadier (Retd.} Salahuddin at the National Stadium in Karachi during the third Test Match between Pakistan and England, 10 December 2000. At the time of this interview the findings of Salahuddin's committee had not yet been disclosed. Nor, to my knowledge, have they since been.

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This chapter has examined the earliest development of cricket in Pakistan to suggest the limited exposure the game had as a popular cultural pastime. it was by no means comprehensible and accessible to the masses; rather it was situated in the cultural circles of college students and graduates, the professional classes, traditional patrons and emerging commercial and industrial entrepreneurs. it relied heavily on existing patterns of feudal patronage and organisation inherited from the colonial period to compensate for its Jack of resources, infrastructure and mass appeal. it prefigured in discussions on national identity in two important ways: it preceded the accession to power of dominant Punjabis by a few short years but it was faithful to their national vision; and, it led to the early rise of an alternative national discourse, that of Muhajir elites who were equally as keen to sustain their traditional symbols and cultural identity.

The cultural divide between Punjabi and Muhajirelites remained constant throughout Pakistan's cricket history even as other less affluent cultural groups began to make their presence felt as players, spectators and critics of the game. Their gradual rise to contest the dominant ideology of cricket nationalism put forward by the traditional cultural elites is the subject of the next chapter. The subsequent three chapters will also explore at more length the peculiar and decentralised Pakistani cricket and club structure that this chapter alluded to. In this chapter the cricket system was described as one that worked to maintain social and cultural traditions and authority, but was subject to abuse and even corruption and was not the best system to identify and channel talent.

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CHAPTERS FROM ELITE SPORT TO A POPULAR CULTURE:

THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'VERNACULAR' CRICKETER

Broader networks of communication and capitalisation as well as changes in the education system provided an incentive for more lower to lower-middle class Pakistanis to play first-class cricket. This led to the gradual penetration of cricket into areas and among cultural groups that previously had no contact with the game. This chapter will assess the role played by the media in the growth of cricket as a popular pastime for numerous cultural groups in Pakistan. lt will also describe the growing bond between cricket and the commercial sector that gave rise to a more marketable and commercially attractive game that offered a career option for many in the lower classes. Crucial to the analysis of this chapter is the historical origins of media technologies and their capacity to integrate disparate groups and remote regions. In Pakistan, as in so many other countries, the media provides an instrument for the imposition of dominant ideologies and the articulation of official discourses of power, particularly when solely controlled by authoritarian political regimes. The media has long been the voice of government in Pakistan and this has prevented disenfranchised groups from engaging in public discussions to articulate their own concerns. As a case study, cricket offers an important example of the interplay between media publicity/popularisation and government attempts to appropriate popular cultures as a means of internal social control. lt also provides a suitable illustration of how subaltern groups, particularly with the growth of supranational media outlets, begin to respond to, challenge and use the dominant ideologies thrust upon them to make sense of their own political and cultural experiences for themselves. This chapter will focus exclusively on the growth of the media in South Asia and the impetus it gave to the development of cricket as a popular pastime in Pakistan. lt also examines the socio-economic changes that made the game more culturally inclusive than it had previously been. The remaining chapters will discuss the political attempt to officially appropriate the game and the counter-response to this by numerous internal and external Pakistani cultural groups.

In the last three decades of the 20th century media technologies had penetrated far deeper into Pakistani society than at any other previous time. Their existence provided a framework for a more integrated political and cultural society, more exposed to the ideals of nation-building politicians. Media developments in the late 20th century, though far more advanced, have much in

146

common with similar developments in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.1 For instance, Benedict Anderson's imagined communities were underpinned by print capitalism "whereby given vernaculars became standardised, being disseminated through the market for books and newspapers".2 Not only did this allow standardised bureaucratic languages to become national languages, it also led to the disappearance of various regional dialects that were unable to find access to newer mediums of communication. During the 20th century the electronic media further sharpened the disparity between official government vernaculars and those without such sanction, reinforcing and thereby elevating the former to positions of unassailable power.

Modern media has allowed dominant political groups to forcibly accentuate their authority and their national vision at the expense of minority cultural groups but it has not done away with the latter's desire for cultural expression or need to interpret official culture to its own liking. As has previously been discussed, the history of Pakistan is replete with instances of minority and regional opposition to official political incursions and expressions of power, cultural or otherwise. Cricket, a game that made its way from the ranks of the professional and upper classes of society to the masses largely through the media and the socio-economic changes of the latter 20th century, has become a discourse of power that all cultural groups seek to interpret, control, or shape in some way or form. The media's role in the spread and development of the game is crucial. Without it cricket would have had little cultural appeal for groups bereft of resources and alienated with the political system; nor would it have attracted the interest of authoritarian and undemocratic politicians keen to use every means at their disposal to prolong their power and advance their political ideals.

Recent scholarly interest has focussed on the role of media as a forum for public discussion and cultural exchanges. Much of this revolves around Jurgen Habermas's exposition of media usage in the "public sphere":

I A. Briggs & P. Burke, A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.2. Briggs & Burke write: "Today's television serials follow the model of radio serials which in turn follow the model of the stories serialized in nineteenth-century magazines (novelists from Dickens to Dostoevsky originally published their work in this way). Again, some of the conventions of twentieth-century comic books draw directly or indirectly on an even longer tradition. Speech balloons can be found in eighteenth-century prints, which are in turn an adaptation of the 'text scrolls' coming from the mouths of the Virgin and other figures in medieval religious art ... St. Mark, in the painting by Jacopo Tintoretto (1518-94) known as St Mark rescuing a slave, is presented like Superman in the comics four hundred years later, diving head first from Heaven to rescue a Christian captive". 2 H. Tumber (ed.), Media Power, Professionals and Policies, Routledge, London, 2000, p.104.

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By "public sphere" we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons come together to form a public. They are then acting neither as business or professional people conducting their private affairs, nor as legal consociates subject to the legal regulations of a state bureaucracy and obligated to obedience. Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions freely. When the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence; today, newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere. We speak of a political public sphere (as distinguished from a literary one, for instance) when the public discussions concern objects connected with the practice of the state. The coercive power of the state is the counterpart, as it were, of the political public sphere, but it is not a part of it. 3

This, Habermas's original treatise on the public sphere, has its fiaws and limitations but it does offer a valuable starting-point for academic discussion on the media. Habermas was concerned to evince that in a democracy private citizens could assemble to form a public grouping, independent of "state institutions or economic activity", in an attempt to reach a consensus of public interest through debate and negotiation.4 The public sphere is thus seen to be a space where citizens gather to discuss their concerns in relation to life and the political and economic spheres. The latter plays no part in defining the scope of

public discussion; rather, it is entirely accountable to the concerns and resolutions of the former. In a large society, like a nation state, the media is the conduit for the dissemination of public opinion from one person to the next. In this way the citizens of a nation can participate in the public sphere without ever having to come face to face with all members of the community. Habermas's original argument would later be revised by himself and other theorists to reflect

the realities of pluralist societies, global media cultures and supranational public spheres.5 In its newest form, taking into account the prospect for disagreement

3 J. Habermas, "The Public Sphere", in On Society and Politics: A Reader, S. Seidman (ed.), Beacon Press, Boston, 1989, p.231.

4 Tumber, pp.1 06-1 07; & Goldsmiths Media Group, Media Organisations in Society: Central Issues", in Media Organisations in Society, J. Curran (ed.), Arnold, London, pp.38-39.

5 His revised argument will form the theoretical basis of chapter 7 of this dissertation.

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and conflict within any given community, it provides a more appropriate frame to evaluate the history of media control in Pakistan.

The original public sphere argument did not seriously evaluate the shortcomings and limitations of discussions in a public space. it considers the outcome of these discussions to be the product of liberal-democratic and rationalist thinking, "unproblematic" and conflict-free in their articulation and acceptance by all concerned.6 it also does not take account of the media and public opinion - largely voiced through the media - as conduits influencing the political system.7 In Pakistan, the public sphere as articulated by Haberrnas and other scholars is a very restricted zone. The press and other systems of communication have been, and continue to be, controlled by government or heavily scrutinised and influenced by political appointees. This has meant, by and large, that media debate and public discussion have consistently reflected the views of politicians with little regard given to the opinions and concerns of those outside official circles.

Often rurnblings of discontent concerning the political system have made their way into the press, but these have been quickly detected by government agencies and those responsible for them have been reprimanded, gaoled and/or, in some instances, had their professional licenses revoked. The frequent use of stringent media laws imposed over the years by numerous political leaders and the patriarchal dependencies of media ownership, whereby newspapers, in particular, have remained in the hands of feudal landlords and their families and relied extensively upon the economic support and goodwill of government, have, to a large extent, also restricted the prospect for impartial media coverage in Pakistan. The extent of media dependency is well documented by Rai Shakil Akhtar. He demonstrates that Pakistan's two major English newspapers, Dawn and The Pakistan Times, as well as their Urdu equivalents, Jang and Nawa-e-Waqt, have long been dependent on government finances and influence. The Ayub government had effectively brought Dawn and Jang into line:

Altaf Hussain, the Bengali editor of the country's largest English language newspaper Dawn, was made industries minister under the Ayub government and the newspaper's owners, the Haroon family, benefited from government generosity in expanding their already vast industrial empire. The Urdu-language daily Jang, now the country's largest daily,

6 Goldsmiths Media Group, p.42.

7 ibid.

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also acquired new technology and real estate on concessional terms in return for editorial support for Ayub. 8

By contrast the more independent Nawa-e-Waqt has had to contend from its very inception with government interference and control. it is .a family owned newspaper that has exercised some independence in the face of obtrusive political harassment; however, its need to secure long-term survival left its editors with little choice but to comply with the wishes and demands of officialdom. The fourth major newspaper, The Pakistan Times, "was a state­owned organ with no professional, administrative, or financial independence" before its disbandment in 1998.9

The media coverage of Pakistan cricket was, until 1972, generally unaffected by government policy. The game was considered to be the obscure pastime of a small coterie of mostly educated individuals and, thereby, of trifling concern to the authorities. In this respect, public discussion of it was restricted to those who participated in the game and their small circle of social equals, and news of it reached all concerned via the sports pages and editorials of the small but influential English-language press. Under these circumstances the game's earliest development went almost entirely unnoticed by the political establishment and non-English speaking cultural groups. What eventually made the game more attractive to a larger indigenous audience and of interest to politicians was the growth of media technologies. These increasingly facilitated the spread and development of more extensive symbols and discourses of nationalism that cricket gradually came to uphold.

The growth of newspaper, radio and television coverage has been crucial to the popularisation of the game. However, it must be stressed that the media's role in the popularisation of cricket was gradual, tentative and often fraught with controversy and uncertainty. Muslim newspapers were few and they were mostly located in Delhi and Calcutta before 1947; and only two such publications were printed in areas partitioned to Pakistan in 1947.10 Many other newspapers, mostly owned by Hindus and Sikhs, ceased operating or transferred their operations into lndia.11 To counter the loss of its Hindu and

8 R. Shakil Akhtar, Media, Religion & Politics in Pakistan, OUP, Oxford, 2000, p.93. 9 ibid., pp.93-94. 10 Twenty Years of Pakistan: 1947-1967, Pakistan Publishers, Karachi, 1967, pp.539-540. The Pakistan Times and Nawa-e-Waqt (both from Lahore). 11 ibid. Two that did not were The Civil and Military Gazette in Lahore and The Sind Obsetver in Karachi.

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Sikh newspaper operators Pakistan welcomed the addition of newspapers run by Muslims that were formerly based in lndia.12

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the newspaper industry in Pakistan suffered from a scarcity of printing facilities, few machine operators and journalists - as most of these positions had previously been filled by Hindus and Sikhs.13 Furthermore, in the same period, newspapers were low revenue­generators due to small readership levels. Some 86.2 per cent of Pakistanis were estimated to be illiterate in 195114 - and the figures only slightly improved subsequently. While large levels of illiteracy existed in the urban centres, the problem was more acute in the rural areas. This severely restricted newspaper sales and provided little scope for cricket's popularisation via the press. For instance, while Dawn's cricket coverage grew as the game in Pakistan became more significant, it was predominantly accessible to the minority urban elite who had acquired a western education. The same was true of The Pakistan Times. Both papers represented the views of the educated and affluent political and industrial sectors of society. They were better financed and organised than the vernacular press - whether catering for local languages or Urdu the latter had a much more restricted readership, a phenomenon also characterising the Indian press.

Radio provided a greater means for the spread and popularisation of cricket in Pakistan than did the indigenous newspaper press. The origins of Radio Pakistan can be found in colonial India's broadcasting history. Radio broadcasting began in the Times of India building in Bombay in 1921, and its first two systematic broadcasts took place in the Radio Club of Calcutta (November 1923) and its equivalent in Bombay (June 1924).15 In its earliest days radio was an experimental medium used by "amateur enthusiasts" and private companies alike.16 "The government remained an onlooker, principally concerned with regulatory problems."17 That is until a 1934 visit to London by Viceroy Lord Willingdon changed the course of radio broadcasting in India entirely. Willingdon was convinced by the merits of Sir John Reith's argument that "the Government of India should do more to develop a national

12 ibid. These included two Urdu dailies, Jang and Anjam, and the English daily, Dawn, all from Delhi. 13 ibid.

14 ibid.

15 D. Page & W. Crawley, Satellites Over South Asia: Broadcasting Culture and the Public Interest, Sage, New Delhi, 2001, p.35.

16 ibid.

17 ibid.

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broadcasting service."18 Reith, the BBC founder, argued that "in almost every great country, a central (broadcasting) system is already in operation; where not, the tendency is towards it."19

The Government of India took this argument seriously and began to pour a substantial amount of its resources into the development of a centralised broadcasting culture. Willingdon distributed a sum of Rs. 4,000,000 to the development of radio stations and transmitters in India and consulted with Reith for the appointment of executive personnel and staff.20 In 1935 Lionel Fielden was recruited to head All India Radio. His was a very colourful and often controversial tenure as Controller of All India Radio. He was accused of favouring Muslims and developing a distinct 'Muslim' broadcasting culture and network of subordinates by his opponents; while those who worked under him were fiercely loyal to him and praised him for his vision, tenacity and work ethic. One of his supporters and earliest recruits, Syed Rash id Ahmed, described him as "the opposite of Colonel Blimp: he wanted to make friends; he wanted to learn the culture of the place; he wanted to devise what would be right in lndia."21

Field en was a visionary who entrusted those he took under his wing with the freedom and independence to develop their own regional broadcasting cultures. One such beneficiary was Rashid Ahmed. At the age of 26 he was given the opportunity to run the new radio house in Lahore when it first began to operate in the late 1930s.22 In fact, Fielden did recruit many of his proteges from the "Muslim North West". This provided some added provocation for those who carried the communal flag in the period before partition.23 However, concerns in this area are somewhat mitigated when one considers the recruitment policies of India's most recognised performance industry. In the same period, Bollywood cinema also tapped into the highly developed Muslim literary culture of the North West Provinces for screenwriters, songwriters and performers even though the owners of studios were more often Hindus and Parsees. The fact that Bollywood was not only privately owned, by mostly non­Muslims, but also nationalist shows that the recruitment of the Muslim literati of the North West Provinces in India's performing professions was more likely a

18 ibid., p.39. 19 Reith in ibid.

20 ibid.

21 Rashid Ahmed in ibid., p.41.

22 Page & Crawley, p.41.

23 ibid., p.42.

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general trend, not just a personal foible of Fielden. This general trend pertains to the primacy of Urdu literature in North Indian literary culture (the result of Mughal patronage in the traditional era and an earlier modernisation than other vernacular literatures in the colonial period) that made the Muslim literati of the North Western Provinces and Punjab desirable performers and writers in new media forms like broadcasting and film.24

Two of Field en's other recruits, the Bokhari brothers, became among the more recognised personalities in the history of radio broadcasting in South Asia. Zulfiqar, who had his formal radio training at the army training school in Simla, was "an Urdu teacher and poet and a fine broadcaster" who became "the first director general of Radio Pakistan"; his brother, Ahmed Shah, an administrator and former school teacher of Government College in Lahore, took on the position of director general of All India Radio at partition - yet another example of how popular culture figures found themselves suddenly forced to choose between the two successor states in 194 7. 25

Radio Pakistan began with just three medium-wave stations in Lahore, Peshawar and Dacca on 14 August 1947. Staff numbers at these stations were small, and equipment was old, over-used and worn out.26 In July 1951 Radio Pakistan's headquarters were moved to Karachi where a new facility housed modern radio technology that made it the equal of radio stations worldwide.27 This was the result of the initiative shown by Zulfiqar Bokhari to establish a centralised broadcasting house and news bureau in the new capital with links -"first by landline and then by short wave transmitters" - to existing provincial stations in Pakistan.28 By 1960 Pakistan had radio stations in Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Dacca, as well as Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Quetta and Multan.29 Gradually then radio became an effective mode of communication in a society whose majority of people lacked any formal education. However, the radio broadcasting culture of Pakistan had to rapidly adjust to the requirements of national politicians who were keen to project themselves as legitimate state representatives through the use of the new media.

24 R. Russell, The Pursuit of Urdu Literature: A Short History, Zed Books, London, 1992. 25 ibid., pp.41-42. Page and Crawley write that the success of the Bokhari brothers on Indian radio "gave rise to the well-known jibe that Fielden had established an Indian BBC or Bokhari Brothers Corporation." 26 "Propap" in Dawn, 20 August 1950. 27 Hamid Khalil in Dawn, 29 July 1951. Previously Radio Pakistan employees had worked mostly out of tents ("Propap" in Dawn). 28 Page & Crawley, p.47. 29 Radio Pakistan website: www.radio.gov.pk.

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Government involvement in radio led to the development of efficient technical standards in broadcasting comparable to those of western nations; but it also subjected the capable administrators and broadcasters inherited from the pre-1947 All India Radio to close political control. They were not permitted any editorial or artistic independence and were harnessed to the propagandistic purposes of the government. Moreover, there was an influx of political appointees into the service that further compromised its journalistic objectivity. Rash id Ahmed remembers the initial phase of government interference in radio broadcasting as a bleak period that led to "a rapid exodus of talent from the organisation and a depressing fall of morale."30 By 1963 Radio Pakistan had come under the control of the Information Service. The latter was a political body that administered protocol and guidelines to Radio Pakistan, the Pakistan Film Corporation, the Publications Division and the Information Division. 31 Its purpose was to control the artistic expression and creative output of these organisations.

The initial period of cricket coverage on Radio Pakistan was mostly uneventful. The game played a minor role as a cultural and political discourse. There was no conceivable reason for it to be politically appropriated and controlled. lt was not perceived as a cultural and political threat or opportunity by the central government, and many civilian politicians and military personnel were familiar enough with the game having played it in public schools and military cantonments. In this context, the earliest broadcasts of cricket in Pakistan were not marred by controversy or dispute; instead, they were rather tame affairs affording domestic cricket commentators the luxury to shape the language of the game in ways they saw fit.

Early cricket commentary on Radio Pakistan had its limitations: it was broadcast exclusively in English by two staunch proponents of English language commentary, Omar Kureishi and Jamshed Marker.32 Despite these imperfections, both Kureishi and current cricket commentator Shahzad Humayun claim that commentary in English did facilitate a popular understanding of the game, and thereby provided a basis for its adoption by other Pakistani communities. The radio-transmission of cricket matches to those who previously had little or no knowledge of them was facilitated by two factors: one technological, the other social. First, the development of cheap transistor

30 Rashid Ahmed in Page & Crawley, p.47.

31 Page & Crawley, p.47.

32 "Goodbye to Cricket Commentary", in Dawn, 17 February 1975. Kureishi has remarked that "It is an English game and therefore the commentary has to be in English".

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band radios meant that poorer members of the population could afford to listen to cricket broadcasts for themselves;33 and second, radio coverage of the game was superimposed on traditional village and urban market cultures where shopkeepers provided a public space for broadcasts. Humayun describes the growth of a collective community-centred audience for cricket in this way:

In the rural areas ... access to radio was always there; ... they didn't have too many radio-sets but still it (cricket) continued to flow to the rural areas ... (In} the urban areas ... I remember when I was a child listening to radio commentary; and roaming around the streets of Lahore I could see the shops with scoreboards and blackboards with (the) latest scores (written on them) ... I would say that if radio commentary had not been there, cricket would not be where it is today in Pakistan.34

Kureishi's description of radio broadcasts of cricket and their impact on traditional village and urban market cultures is similar to that of Humayun:

... all the shops ... in Karachi, Lahore, in the main cities, ... had big radio sets. So (too) the little shops of the bazaars who (also) had the commentary playing ... they would have a blackboard and in Urdu they would write the score so that people could read it. People use to cluster around ... listening, and the shopkeeper use to write the score ... Even in the fields and farms agricultural workers ... (would be) ploughing the field listening to the cricket.35

Universal cricket parlance and the broadcast etiquette of English language commentators like Kureishi and Marker facilitated the popularisation of the game in Pakistan. Cricket idioms like "googly" and "howzat" became

33 Page & Crawley, pp.51-52. Transistor radios were inexpensive to purchase and easily transportable. Their introduction allowed many South Asian families and communities who were unable to afford "the standard four-valve radio set" the opportunity to access news, current affairs, sport and entertainment for the first time and on a regular basis. In this way they integrated large numbers of people into the mainstream public sphere of nationalist discourse, particularly those in rural areas. "By the late 1960s, cheap transistor sets were becoming increasingly popular and by the 1970s they had become status symbols in rural areas." Furthermore, it was "no accident that the heyday of political populism in South Asia - whether in India or Pakistan - coincided with this expansion of radio ownership. Radio had become an important means for the integration of new classes into politics. lt gave opportunities for political leaders to speak to the masses directly and it opened the way for a new kind of politics which bypassed traditional mediators and encouraged the transistor owner to believe that he ( and at that time it was largely men who owned the radios) mattered nationally in his own right."

34 Interview with Shahzad Humayun, Lahore, 25 October 2000.

35 Interview with Omar Kureishi, Karachi, 25 November 2000.

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familiar terms;36 and, Kureishi's style and delivery became a benchmark for subsequent cricket commentators on radio and television37 - including those broadcasting in Urdu like Munir Hussain, Hassan Jalil and Bashir Khan. The introduction of Urdu commentary contributed to cricket's growing popularity. As an adjunct to English cricket commentary, it provided an additional impetus for the game's adoption by those who spoke exclusively in Urdu. Furthermore, Urdu's official validation as the national language of Pakistan, even in the face of staunch opposition from regional groups, increased its capacity as a cricket language, particularly as it came more and more into general use. In any case, spoken Urdu - as distinct from its literary form - was not completely unintelligible to speakers of the two main regional vernaculars - Punjabi and Sindi.

By the late 1960s Pakistan Television began its coverage of cricket matches drawing on the knowledge, skills and workers of Radio Pakistan - often recruiting writers, producers, technicians and commentators. Television provided greater scope than radio for the popularisation of cricket. In Pakistan, televisual footage of cricket matches has enabled the non-English and non­Urdu speaker to observe the game's rules and structure, as well as its subtleties, intricacies, disputes and outcomes - indeed, it has done the same even for those proficient in English and Urdu.

Television was introduced to South Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and until the advent of satellite television in the 1990s it operated under the same regime of close political control as radio.38 In its first years in Pakistan the medium offered exciting and creative opportunities to artists and technicians from other fields. Industry executives recruited at will from radio, the performing arts and photography, and this led to a vigorous blend of local and imported programs.39 However, this approach to television programming was shortlived. By the time of Ayub Khan's 1Oth year in office television had effectively become a tool of government. Ayub Khan, cognisant of its potential as "a major instrument of national integration", advised the programming staff of Pakistan

36 Rashid Aziz & Afia Salam (eds.) Pakistan Test Cricket 1982-83, Sports World Publications, Karachi, 1983, p.18. Early Urdu commentators encountered difficulties in translating much of the terminology of cricket. The word "googly" was initially translated as dhuke baaz gaind, meaning "treacherous, deceitful ball"; afterwards, Pakistanis of all regional dialects became so familiar with the English spoken popular idiom of cricket that their was little reason for words like "googly'' or "howzat" to be translated into Urdu. 37 Interview with Shahzad Humayun. 38 Page & Crawley, pp.53-55. 39 ibid., p.54. This included "Pakistan TV's excellence in the field of drama" coupled with "BBC documentaries and comedies".

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Television to broadcast programs pra1s1ng his leadership and achievements during his "decade of development".40 This approach to television management was just as vigorously pursued by subsequent politicians including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who asked for more stations to be built in outlying regions to reinforce his own brand of political populism over larger sections of the population.41

A second drawback of government control of the television industry has been the prevalence of official vernaculars and cultures over those of regional groups. Television has reinforced the national narrative and the languages of government through audio-visual programming sympathetic and supportive of political authoritarianism and dismissive of its alternatives. The forcible projection of official political and cultural uniformity has over the years discouraged, proscribed and suppressed any genuine effort to develop television programs reflecting the pluralist realities of Pakistani society. The continuation of similar authoritarian media policies that had previously brought radio and the tabloid press under the heavy scrutiny and control of the government brought the quality and integrity of television programs, and the industry in general, like other sections of the media, under question. In order for the industry to survive at all television executives have pampered to the interests of the ruling elite turning to them for subject matter, news content and approvai.42

The advent of television did not initially alter the disinterest shown to the game by the national government. In the mid to late 1960s the Pakistani cricket team were underperforming on the international stage and offered little attraction for nation-builders. This changed very quickly in the 1970s once Bhutto came to power: one day cricket began to be taken seriously and the national team's fortunes took a turn for the better. In the meantime, televised broadcasts of cricket in the late 1960s were left to generate their own momentum and appealed mostly to affluent Pakistanis who could afford television sets and had long been accustomed to the game through the tabloid press and radio. Televised broadcasts began to make large strides into Pakistani society in the 1980s when the medium became more affordable for many and replaced the central role that radio played in the private and public spheres.

40 ibid., p.55.

41 ibid. Two in particular: one in Peshawar, and one in Quetta. When advised that these would take 12 to 14 months to construct, Bhutto replied: "I am not asking you to build me a couple of nuclear reactors; alii want is two television stations. I'm giving you three months!"

42 Akhtar, pp.78-79.

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Television broadcasts of cricket reached the people in much the same way radio had: through traditional urban and rural market cultures. Instead of turning to radio for match updates and scores many shopkeepers purchased television sets and began screening cricket matches from their premises. Blackboards used as scoreboards were still maintained for passers-by who had little or no time to sit and watch games. In this way, customers could see events on the cricket field transpire in real life and real time, and begin to identify with the nation's players irrespective of their ethnic and political affiliations or their disdain and disapproval of political leaders. This process heightened with the development of colour television and the advent of one day cricket. The rise of a large television audience for cricket in the 1980s coincided with the wider emphasis that the one day game placed on national colours, symbolism and competition. The crescent and the colour green found on the one day uniform were symbolic representations of nationalism. In shops or bazaars they reinforced national identity during the telecast of cricket matches to an audience often at odds with the political vision of their leaders, and with little empathy or attachment to other ethnic, cultural and social groups in Pakistan.

With very few exceptions the cricket that Radio Pakistan and Pakistan Television have covered is that of the international game. As such, it is the national team that Pakistanis in the bazaars, shops and homes of cities and villages throughout the country identify with. This may help explain why there is little community interest shown to the domestic game, even when pertaining to regional teams. Televised cricket, like radio, has popularised the players and symbols of the national team and this has coincided with the nationalist politics of its leaders. The advent of television coincided with the declining years of Ayub Khan's leadership, but this did not stop him from using the medium for propagandistic reasons to attempt to save his political career. Both Bhutto and Zia were also notorious for using television to underpin their political objectives and undemocratic policies.43

The projection of the Pakistani cricket team and national symbolism through cricket via an expanding and more nationally integrated television industry has offered the potential for greater levels of national consciousness than has previously been the case in Pakistan. it permeates many sections of the national community and, in certain instances, transcends national borders to reach the Pakistani diaspora, particularly in England, the United States, the Gulf States, Kenya and Australia. The rise of television has fostered national consciousness among disparate cultural groups particularly through the

43 Page & Crawley, pp. 53-57.

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coverage of international sport that promotes rivalries and competition between nations. However, it must be stressed that the symbolic significance of constructed national identities through the telecast of international sport provides a loose and flexible framework for the use and rejection of national identity by numerous cultural groups. The Pakistani cricket team is strongly supported by internal and external Pakistani cultural groups; but in no way have these same groups become amenable to the national vision of the central government in lslamabad. The construction of national identity is something that all cultural groups participate in regardless of their acceptance by more dominant and powerful political groups. An examination of the debate that centres around the construction and contestation of Pakistani national identity through the growth of national and international television and sports cultures will be undertaken in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. In the meantime, it is important to acknowledge that the advent of television assisted in the construction of national communities in much the same way that print capitalism had helped establish such communities before the 2oth century, though at a far more advanced and accelerated pace.

A lesser but still important contribution to the popularisation of cricket in Pakistan has been the development of a substantial sports goods industry. Sialkot, which lies to the northeast of the Punjab, is the centre of a thriving sports goods industry that dates back to the 19th century. Sports equipment produced in Sialkot is exported to numerous, mainly, western countries like the United States, England, Germany and Australia. The Pakistanis boast of the craftsmanship of their sports goods workers, and of the "superior" quality of their wood and tanned leather.44 Many of ·the factories that manufacture sports products were under the ownership of Hindus prior to partition. These factories have since come into the hands of Muslims, many of them immigrants from lndia.45

The sports goods industry provided opportunities for less affluent Pakistanis to familiarise themselves with cricket, as well as other sports. Many of Sialkot's workers were skilled and unskilled lower class citizens who lacked the finances to put themselves or their children through college and university. In these circumstances it was not uncommon for many children to follow their

44 M. Aslam Hayat in Dawn, 14 February 1949.

45 Sports Guardian, September 1951, vol.1, no.4, pp.1 & 18. In 1951 Sialkot exported 95 per cent of its sports goods. In March 1950 Australia imported sports goods to the value of 6 833 pounds, 834 pounds from Pakistan and 5 from India. In cricket bat sales alone Pakistan exported 16 pounds to India's nil. The corresponding figures for September 1950 saw Australia import 23 851 pounds, 315 from Pakistan and 135 from India. Pakistan's cricket bat exports were worth 1407 pounds to India's 61.

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parents into the trade. The craftsmanship of the sports goods trade was a skill handed down from generation to generation; it was not unusual to find numerous members of individual families working in the manufacture of sports products.46 Many of the workers learned about the game through their trade; others were to learn it, in turn, from the workers themselves. Over time, and in the context of the early success of the Pakistani cricket team on the international stage, Sialkot's sports goods industries played a role in familiarising subaltern youth with the game.

The popularisation of cricket through media outlets and the sports goods industries, and changes in the socio-economic conditions and educational expectations of Pakistani elites, who shifted their allegiances and occupational preferences away from traditional professions like that of the army, and cultural pastimes like that of cricket, and on to the professional services, allowed many lower-class and predominantly non-English speaking cricketers - what Richard Cashman refers to as "vernacular cricketers"47 - to play cricket for Pakistan's national team. Cricketers began to be recruited from poorer urban areas or small villages and towns contiguous to big cities like Lahore to take the place of mostly educated and affluent players from Lahore and Karachi. This mirrored the changes experienced in the most traditional of colonial India's elite professions, the army. In Chapter 2 it was argued that the post-1947 Pakistani army officer recruits differed from their Sandhurst-trained predecessors in two distinct ways: first, they mostly came from "the small towns and villages of Central Punjab" and were traditional and more religiously devout in their outlook;48 and, second, they had no prior historical association with the military and possessed meagre resources, having accrued little or no material gain from colonial policy.49 However, once they acquired traditional positions of authority through their leadership of the army their identity and status began to change. They accumulated power and prestige that enabled them to achieve equality with the traditional elites of Pakistan.

Pakistani cricket has also broadened its recruitment base. The original network of college alumni steeped in the traditions of British education and English language and culture have been relegated to a minor role in the game.

46 M. Aslam Hayat in Dawn.

47 R. Cashman, "The Paradox of Pakistani Cricket: Some Initial Reflections", The Sports Historian, no.14, 1994, pp.21-37. 48 S.J. Burki & C. Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military, Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado), 1991, p.7. 49 ibid. There were some exceptions to this: the Arains as a group benefited considerably from the British.

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They have been displaced as players by professionals from lower socio­economic echelons and as patrons by the newly emergent business and industrial elite. The modern Pakistani economy with its gradual shift to urban commercial and industrial markets has generated an economic culture at variance with the traditional military landholding structure which was intrinsically tied to the elite amateur cricket landscape of colonial India and early postcolonial Pakistan. As the game expanded and became more commercial and professionalised it was no longer possible to limit recruitment to the anglophone landed families. A new generation of domestic cricket players from less privileged backgrounds have emerged to take their place.

Former test cricketer Majid Khan believes that the deterioration of college cricket had as much to do with the neglect shown to sport and sports facilities by educational authorities from the mid 1960s as it did with the changing economic milieu in Pakistan. These authorities decided that the construction of more buildings and classrooms in existing schools and colleges would accommodate the larger student intake brought about by increasing levels of affluence in Pakistan. This decision led to a drastic reduction of playing fields in schools and colleges. Thus, a changing educational philosophy with its emphasis on preparing students for the professional services offered little incentive for sports participation. Behind this lay a shift away from landlordship, bureaucratic employment and army service to professional and informational services. This, according to Majid, led to a shift in the recruitment policies of domestic cricket clubs who looked to poorer rural and, to a lesser extent, urban youth to fill the absence brought about by the virtual disappearance of sport in schools and colleges. 50

Poorer youth played improvised games of cricket in spontaneous settings where space could be found. Their familiarisation with cricket came from radio and, increasingly from the 1980s onwards, television broadcasts that had gradually penetrated previously neglected rural and urban zones where the game was little known. Their recruitment by club teams led to changes in the organisation of grass-roots cricket. The school and college system was replaced by under-age championships. In the latter, young players were invited to trial for club teams, and the best of them were then sent off to trial for regional and national under-age teams .51 Of course, the difficulties of travelling to urban centres for trials, as well as the cost of playing competitive cricket on a permanent basis may explain why those closest to urban centres have more

50 Interview with Majid Khan, Zaman Park, Lahore, 2 November 2000. 51 ibid.

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frequently made the transition to the domestic game than those further away. There is also much that remains to be said about the flamboyant and improvised style of cricket that these players develop in their original surroundings and its significance to the national team. The majority of them encounter formal training programs, proper cricket pitches and suitable attire and equipment when they first make their way into domestic teams. This then may be a factor in the unpredictable and unconventional style of cricket often exhibited by the Pakistani team on the international stage.

There is a lack of serious literature on the alleged flamboyant and spontaneous type of cricket played by Pakistani players. Most of the writing on the subject has emanated from the western media who are more often than not at a loss to explain the success of third world cricket countries over western opponents with much more organised sporting cultures and much greater financial resources. In fact, criticism of the cricket ability and temperament of the former can be traced back to the days of Lord Harris's Governorship of Bombay where native players were often derogatorily referred to as "excitable asiatics", lacking the mental application and physical stamina of Europeans.52 This kind of 'essentialist' characterisation of the non-European cricketer was also on show in the tabloid assessments of players like Ranjitsinghji and Duleepsinghji who both becarne celebrated and successful English cricketers. Their talents were often described as being mystical and somehow defying logic simply because they exhibited a range of shots and a style of play that at the time was foreign to an English audience. This orientalist logic has carried through to the present day.

A more serious evaluation of the approach to the game by Pakistani and other third world cricketers would take into account the playing conditions, training methods and resources available to administrators in poorer and less developed cricket regions. This is certainly the case in Pakistan where a plethora of ill-prepared or unsuitable cricket playing areas, a lack of suitable funding and coaching clinics for juniors, a poorly followed domestic scene with an overwhelming majority of games played over two days or less, and a governing body that channels its resources primarily into the management of the international team abound. Thus, the players that emerge in this kind of environment are obviously different to those that do so in countries like Australia and England. In most instances these players are often the product of various improvised and localised cricket cultures that can be found throughout the

52 R. Cashman, Patrons, Players and the Crowd: The Phenomenon of Indian Cricket, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1981 p.12.

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country. The skills and attitude to the game that they develop in these informal cricket environments are not easily unlearned once they acquire more formal and internationally accepted coaching. Often their cricket performances are hybrids of both formal and informal cricket play; and with the advent of the one day game this type of approach to playing cricket has become commercially attractive and marketable to international audiences. 53

An example of a Pakistani cricketer who exhibited these hybrid qualities in his game is Javed Miandad. Javed was born in Karachi in 1957. His family migrated to the city at the time of partition from the Kathiawar Peninsula in western India where his father had been employed as "an official in charge of sporf'.54 His family had some wealth but lost all its possessions when they decided to leave India for Pakistan. Once in Pakistan his parents struggled to find work and raise 7 children. After some time Javed's father became a cricket official in Karachi and helped him and his three brothers, Anwar, Bashir and Sohail, develop into first-class cricketers. Javed's cricket pedigree was by no means strong, although his father had been familiar with the game during his time as a sports official, and may well have played it at a reasonable standard himself. Despite this his father was determined to imbue Javed and his brothers with the necessary knowledge and skill to become successful cricketers, and this helped all of them considerably in their development. 55

Javed had always praised his father's application and coaching as reasons for his rapid rise as a cricketer. lt helped him hone his skills and provided the polish needed to adjust to the demands and expectations of international cricket. He made his first-class debut for Karachi Whites at 16 years and 5 months and at age 17 was selected to represent Pakistan in the inaugural World Cup of 1975.56 Aside from his father's coaching Javed learned the game and mostly played it on the streets of Karachi. lt has often been commented that the attitude and cheek he acquired playing in street tournaments remained with him throughout his international career. Javed's behaviour and playing style were unpredictable. At times they brought him the accolades of his peers and opponents; on other occasions he was attacked by the same people. lt was difficult to predict which persona he would adopt in the

53 The emergence of the 'vernacular' cricketer coincided with the rise of one day cricket and a new emphasis on entertainment in test matches. The skills of street cricket were more relevant to this style of play so the popularisation of the cricket culture in Pakistan soon began to pay dividends in Pakistan's international performances.

54 A. Licudi with W. Raja, Cornered Tigers: A History of Pakistan's Test Cricket, Hansib, SI John's, Antigua, Wl, 1997, p.141.

55 ibid., p.142.

56 ibid.

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lead up to test matches: he could be a shrewd tactician; a trickster or a team player. Fortunately for Pakistani cricket he was more often than not an entertaining match-winner who is now celebrated as the country's most esteemed batsman having scored 8832 runs in 124 test matches at an average of 52.27 including 23 centuries and 43 fifties. 57

Pakistani cricket history is full of stories like that of Javed. Young players mostly from humble backgrounds who have either been plucked from obscurity, or spotted seemingly before they have matured as cricketers in the lower echelons of the domestic game, and thrust into the test side. Abdul Qadir is one such player. He was the son of a muezzin (a mosque official calling the faithful to prayer) whose family were very poor. Before and after school he helped his parents sell produce, mostly vegetables, to buyers in his local area. 58 His family's meagre earnings were evident in his early cricket experiences: he was an aggressive cricketer who "was largely self-taught as a bowler. He could not afford equipment and played in traditional clothes of long baggy shirt and trousers, known as shalwar kameez".59 Aqib Javed, on the other hand, was rushed into the test team prematurely as a 16 year old in 1988/89 on the authority of lmran Khan. lmran was impressed by Aqib's attitude and application at a net session and had him chosen for Pakistan's tour to Australia and New Zealand where he made his test debut against the latter in Wellington in February 1989.60 Both Abdul Qadir and Aqib Javed, like Javed Miandad, and many others like them, had grown up playing street cricket where much of what they learned they carried with them throughout their test match and one day cricket careers.

Media growth and socio-economic changes in Pakistan allowed players like Javed Miandad, Abdul Qadir and Aqib Javed, cricketers from poorer and displaced backgrounds, to be integrated into a Pakistani national framework. In actual fact, they became prominent ambassadors and spokespersons of the Pakistani nation the more cricket became successful as an international sport and the more its popularity grew amongst Pakistani cultural groups at home and abroad. The exposure given to players like them and the national cricket team by expanding local and global media networks provided many neglected and politically disenfranchised groups in Pakistan with some access to, and cognisance of, a feasible national structure that could not be achieved in other

57 ibid., p.149. 58 ibid., p.178. 59 ibid. 60 ibid.

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areas of Pakistani society. As the game grew more in tune with the masses than it had on any other previous occasion Pakistani cricket nationalism became a more successful national construct than that of its political correlative. In other words, Pakistani cultural groups were, on the whole, more accepting of a national narrative in the context of international sport than they were of one at the political level.61 By the early 1970s the alternative 'Pakistani discourse' of cricket began to achieve its first lasting international success just as the unitary, authoritarian political system with its "two-nation" ideological underpinning suffered the humiliation of military defeat and partition over East Bengal. Thus, not only did Pakistanis feel included in the cricket culture, but it was also something that they could take pride in at a time when there was precious little else for Pakistanis to feel good about.

One reason why cricket has provided the potential for unity is that many of its players from the 1970s onwards came from communities that previously had no access to the sport. With the rapid growth of media in Pakistan these players became role-models for under-privileged and disenchanted people from poorer districts and towns. They were readily identified as representatives of the communities they came from, particularly by young boys who aspired to be like them; and, in turn, they maintained their links to these communities through appearances, funding and in other ways providing a channel for cricket to penetrate and take hold in these areas.

The emergence of lower-class vernacular cricketers coincided with the rise of less affluent and traditional cultural groups into positions of power in the armed services. In some respect the stories of both are quite similar: the rise to cricket prominence and military authority of groups previously denied any such opportunity. Beside being less affluent, both were less fluent in English and more articulate in regional dialects, particularly Urdu and Punjabi, more pious and traditional in their beliefs and practices, and more prone to contest official authority and anglicised customs and etiquette. As far as cricket is concerned this has given rise to three important developments that have characterised Pakistan in the last quarter of the 20th century: it has given Pakistani cricket recognition and appeal in third world countries, particularly the Gulf States and Kenya; it has made Pakistani cricket authorities more active in the international affairs of the game often contesting the biases of ICC rulings to promote their concerns and those of third world cricket nations; and, on a few occasions, it has acquired for Pakistan the disdain and disapproval of cricket journalists and

61 Even though, as will subsequently be shown, Pakistani cricket nationalism has been and continues to be a contested discourse, it has, to date, far surpassed the capacity of government to integrate disparate groups and communities.

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players whose misconceptions, often prejudicial and demeaning to the people of Pakistan, portray the country as a bad destination and its cricket culture and hospitality as second-rate.

Pakistani cricket has particularly appealed to third world cricket nations with sizeable Pakistani diaspora communities. In the early 1980s it began to develop quite rapidly in the Gulf States where large numbers of Pakistani migrants were based for work. The principle fillip to the growth of the game in the region came from the establishment of an ICC officially sanctioned one day tournament in Sharjah and Pakistan's official patronage and support of this tournament. The Rothman's Cup, as the tournament came to be known, was organised by former Pakistani test cricketer Asif lqbal and privately financed, for the most part, by the Arab entrepreneur Abdulrahman Bukhatir. 62 Bukhatir's personal history and association with the game make for interesting reading. He developed an understanding and appreciation for cricket when he played it as a schoolboy in Pakistan. When he returned to Sharjah he was laughed at by his peers for embracing the game wholeheartedly and seeking to develop it there. They did not share his knowledge and enthusiasm for cricket and saw his ambition as imprudent and of little worth. Bukhatir did not relent and eventually brought cricket to Sharjah. Of his early struggle to do so he fondly remembers how:

Yes, I know I was really chasing a childhood dream all those years ... I used to worship the big names of cricket, like Hanif Mohammed, (sic) When I returned to Sharjah I didn't even play for a long time but I wanted so much to promote the game here that I started playing again, to be an example. 63

The Rothman's Cup became the venue where retired Pakistani cricketers were given lucrative send-offs in benefit matches that commemorated their cricket achievements. Importantly, it also sustained and perpetuated national identity and symbolism for immigrant Pakistani workers. This was achieved in three important ways. First, Pakistan helped promote the growth of the game in the region by providing players, coaches and Pakistani cricket culture through benefit matches and the promotional work and memorabilia associated with them. Second, many of the most prominent players in the United Arab Emirates national cricket team and domestic competition are of Pakistani origin. Finally,

62 0. Noman, Pride and Passion: An Exhilarating Half Century of Cricket in Pakistan, Oxford UP, Karachi, 1998, pp.11 &208.

63 Abdulrahman Bukhatir in "Asia Cup in Sharjah", Dawn, 4 April1984.

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Sharjah was for most of the 1 980s and 1 990s a neutral venue for India/Pakistan matches that for political reasons could not be played in either country. These matches heightened national passion amongst immigrant workers in the Gulf States and Pakistani cultural groups at home. They were carried to all concerned by media companies broadcasting and reporting events as they occurred on the cricket field.

The proactive and appositional stance of the PCB to many ICC rulings has also helped to foster national consciousness amongst many of Pakistan's cultural groups that have access to media coverage of cricket. Pakistan's cricket authorities and many of its prominent players have long supported innovations like the use of neutral umpires at cricket fixtures and the ICC endorsement of an international panel of umpires to thwart accusations, often levelled at their own match officials, of unfair umpiring that favours the host nation.64 lt took some time for the ICC to make official the use of neutral umpires; Pakistan had experimented with the concept as early as 1981 in a home series against the West lndies.65

The PCB, along with the BCCI, were also active in wresting the World Cup of cricket away from England. Both South Asian cricket bodies had to overcome the opposition and ridicule of many ICC board members and cricket journalists from western cricket playing nations, particularly those of England who saw the World Cup as their own and considered its relocation to South Asia as a violation of cricket tradition. The Daily Telegraph's Christopher Martin­Jenkins saw England as the "ideal venue" and India/Pakistan as the "unruly sub-continent":

He decried the ICC decision as a triumph for 'money and politics' over cricket. In so doing, he rewrote two hundred years of cricket history, dominated as they had been by English money and politics. When national pride is pricked, facts and logic are quickly superseded by myth and emotion.66

The two World Cup tournaments held in South Asia (1 987 and 1 996) were accompanied by large media advertisements that heightened the popularity of the game in the region and reinforced national consciousness through the display of symbols, team colours and jingles. In 1996 Pakistan Television pitched its advertisements predominantly to a youth market.

64 Interview with Arif Ali Khan Abassi, Karachi, 25 November 2000. 65 ibid.

66 M. Marqusee, War Minus the Shooting, Mandarin, London, 1996, p.16.

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Television commercials and music videos were produced to promote the prospect of a Pakistani victory. These were a mixture of indigenous musical traditions and western influenced rap and rock genres that appealed to parochial national sentiments through slogans like Hum jeetain Gae (We Will Win) and cricket he shehezad (the princes of cricket). 67

Pejorative and discriminative media stereotyping of Pakistan and its cricket organisation and players has further perpetuated the popularity of the game and the semblance of national identity that has emanated from it in more recent times. Subhash Jaireth in his article "Tracing Orientalism in Cricket"68 argues that the unflattering portrayals of Pakistani cricket by the western media derive from the orientalist practice of speaking for, constructing and "essentialising the 'other'".69 He claims that all third world cricket nations are poorly represented by western journalists and players, but none more so than Pakistan. All are depicted as undesirable destinations with "sub-standard living, crook food, undrinkable water and shocking umpiring" where flies, heat, dirt, dust, dysentery and "abject poverty in the form of slums, shanty towns and beggars" proliferate.?O However, what distinguishes Pakistan from all the others, and more particularly India, and makes it the least preferred destination of all is Islam. According to Jaireth Islamic Orientalism is more severe a discourse than that lacking a religious component, and this leaves Pakistan in an untenable position with little sympathy and even less support from the community of cricket nations, let alone the western press.71

Jaireth is right to point out the blatant biases towards Pakistani cricket and its players, particularly the media assertions of numerous western journalists and cricketers, as they are rife and plentiful. However, by doing so, he simplifies and views them both as invariable constructions of a dominant tabloid and media consortium discourse whose primary aim is to denigrate and destroy the game in Pakistan. This is not the case at all. Undoubtedly, prejudicial media assertions are the outcome of ignorance and cultural chauvinism on the part of those who write them, but they are not, nor have they ever been, deliberate attempts to remove cricket from the cultural landscape of Pakistan. If anything, criticisms of the Pakistani game are the product of

67 ibid., pp.69-71. 68 S. Jaireth, "Tracing Orientalism in Cricket: A Reading of Some Recent Australian Cricket Writing on Pakistani Cricket", Sporting Traditions, Vol. 12, Issue 1, November, 1995, pp.1 03-120. 69 ibid., p.115. 70 ibid., p.108. 71 ibid., p.114.

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conservative forces from traditional cricket-playing regions who feel threatened by the growth and popularisation of cricket in newer third world environments with a heavy concentration of the world's population and where the English language is not the dominant vernacular spoken. This applies to South Asia as a whole, as India is the largest cricket market in the world. Where Pakistan differs from India is in its religion. As Jaireth points out in his article, many western journalists and cricketers, little versed in the religious observances and customs of the people in Pakistan, find cricket in an Islamic nation difficult to deal with and accept. This said, many of them eventually do come to appreciate the cricket culture and support offered by Pakistan and its people. In the process they develop a better understanding and acceptance of the difficulties faced and hardships endured by those who live there, and in some instances return to offer their services in some helpful way. Jaireth, himself, concedes how former Australian fast bowler Dennis Lillee once described Faisalabad as the "worst place I've ever seen" teeming with "filth, mud, flies, the lot ... ", and promised to never set foot in Pakistan again. Yet, years later, Lillee returned there to coach promising young fast bowlers.72

As mentioned, negative descriptions of Pakistan and the cricket played there can frequently be found in the tabloid press and television broadcasts of western nations. All such references are not part of a systematic agenda to extinguish the Pakistani game, nor do they speak for all in the media. There is no consensus or unanimity of thought on the subject in the western press and broadcast media. There have always been voices in both who have been more liberal-minded and accepting of foreign customs and cultural differences, then there are those who were not that way to begin with but, who, over time, have become more conscious and tolerant in their behaviour towards others. More importantly, and in light of the argument in this chapter, the indigenous Pakistani media has itself used derogatory accounts of the local game by western critics to augment a semblance of Pakistani national identity and unity amongst a growing internal and international cricket audience. The popularity of cricket in Pakistan and amongst Pakistani communities abroad has increased due to the negative publicity and criticism the local game has endured in the western media. Indigenous journalists, television and radio commentators and cricket players and administrators have frequently debated and, often vehemently, opposed all such criticism.

Pakistani cricket has been accused of many harmful and unethical practices. In its earliest years its cricket grounds and pitches, umpiring, hotel

72 ibid., p.108.

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accommodation and cuisine all came into question. Local journalists and players, particularly Abdul Hafeez Kardar, were contemptuous of all such accusations and the sycophantic and supine individuals in the cricket board who accepted them without reason and justification.73 In more recent years numerous other criticisms have been added to this list. Pakistani cricket is now seen to be tainted with 'cheats' who accept third party payments to 'fix' matches - in other words to orchestrate their results to accord with the wishes of those issuing these fees - and who tamper with cricket facilities and equipment -particularly ball-tampering and the whole reverse swing debate, which is now no longer a debate but an accepted tactic used by all cricket teams - to manufacture unjust results in their favour.

There is much to be said about recent developments in international cricket that have mired the game in controversy and reduced its credibility to a world audience; however, in the context of cricket nationalism in Pakistan, they have allowed those in positions of media control there to cultivate a siege mentality approach to all the criticism levelled at them and their cricket, whether just or unjust. Pakistanis see themselves as doing something to weed out all such inimical practices when, and if, they arise; and they are irritated by what they perceive to be a lack of urgency shown by the cricketing authorities of other countries who do little in the way of cleaning up their own game other than criticise that of Pakistan's.74

The whole match-fixing scandal is a good case in point. Pakistanis see their role as a proactive one having established a judicial process to rid the game of all such perpetrators. Pakistan's cricket authorities, journalists and players remain critical of the inactivity shown by other national cricket boards' to similar such practices from their own players, 75 and cynical of the distrust and suspicion shown to them and their internal judicial process by the international media and the member states of the ICC.76 Calls for both Mark Waugh and Shane Warne to appear at the Salim Malik hearing were for some time portrayed as unreasonable by the Australian media and its cricket board whose intention, it was said, was to protect its players from being misrepresented and wrongfully accused of malpractice by the Pakistani judicial process. They adhered firmly to this position even while they were assured by the judges in the

73 A. Kardar, Memoirs of an All-Rounder, Progressive Publishers, Lahore.

74 Interview with Arif Ali Khan Abassi.

75 This excludes the South African cricket board whose own internal investigation led to the dismissal of its former captain Hansie Cronje.

76 Noman, pp.294-297.

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case that both Waugh and Warne were not on trial but would only appear to

give evidence that rnay have led to the impeachment of Malik. Instead the

Australian media, frustratingly for Pakistan's cricket authorities and judicial

system, persisted on discrediting the Malik investigation by depicting it as a

charade and circus while wholeheartedly supporting the ACBs reluctance to

release its players for questioning. This was evident in its vitriolic and distorted

coverage of proceedings as they developed in the hearings of several of

Pakistan's more prominent cricketers who, along with Malik, were also under

investigation. On 10 September 1998 both The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald were contemptuous and mocking in their descriptions of Malik,

Wasim Akram and ljaz Ahmed when a Pakistani inquiry found all three to be

"responsible for match-fixing" and recommended that they be stood down from

test duty. The front page headline in The Australian read, "Hat-trick ...

Pakistan's three match fixers finally given ouf';77 while that of The Sydney

Morning Herald unequivocally vilified the game in Pakistan and subliminally

accused all its players of wrong-doing by referring to them as a "Team of cheats: Test cricketers took bribes".78

lt is this type of tabloid coverage that irks many in Pakistan, and it has

continued unabated and with little consideration of the hurt it causes to people

who have worked very hard to make the game there marketable, exciting and

attractive to a domestic and world audience. Scathing and defamatory remarks

and publications castigating the standards of Pakistani umpiring and the

sportsmanship of its players have led to unnecessary acrimony and distrust

between the players and officials of Pakistan and those of other countries which

could so easily have been avoided. The whole reverse-swing debate amounted

to little when "a court verdict in London effectively cleared" Pakistani bowlers,

particularly Wasim Akram and Waqar Younis, of ball-tampering.79 The

subsequent adoption of reverse-swing bowling by seamers from all other cricket

nations has not only vindicated the integrity of Pakistani cricketers on this issue,

but, in hindsight, it has made all previous criticism of it seem rather demeaning

and fatuous.80 Former Pakistani cricket executive Nur Khan sees the ironies in

accusations of Pakistani ball-tampering and biased umpiring:

77 The Australian, 1 0 September 1998. 78 The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 0 September 1998. 79 Noman, p.246. 80 I refer here to Geoffrey Boycott's quip that "Waqar and Wasim could make an orange swing" (quoted in Noman, p.246), and Don Oslear and Jack Bannister's book (D. Oslear & J. Bannister, Tampering with Cricket, Collins Willow, London, 1996) which is a 216-page diatribe of the art of reverse-swing bowling as practised by Pakistani bowlers like lmran, Wasim and Waqar in England during test and county championship matches.

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... how petty the world of cricket has been and how hypocritical. We are the ones arguing for neutral umpires while most of the others have been resisting, and yet we took much of the blame. That is the irony. There may have been foul play by some Pakistani umpires but the point is that we have a strong section amongst the administrators, players, and viewers of the game who will have nothing to do with winning through cheating. lt is this constituency that the world of cricket has not supported.a1

In the writings of numerous Pakistani players, journalists and administrators, and in interviews conducted by myself, it is quite apparent to many that the national game has its problems. None of them have ever tried to deny that inefficiencies and power struggles at the board and administrative levels have frequently occurred; nor have they set out to absolve the indiscretions and errors of players, administrators and officials alike. There is an awareness by all concerned that the game in Pakistan can be vastly improved. Former cricket commentator Omar Kureishi concedes this when he notes that:

Pakistan has a poor external image and cricket suffers from it. lt is frequently seen as a dour, sad, and corrupt place. This image rubs off on the cricket team. We need to reform our institutions, get our house in order. This will project a more positive image from which the cricket team will benefit. Frequently our team makes friends, plays exciting cricket, and has a pleasant demeanour, but the negative image of the country sticks to the team. Things got particularly bad during Zia's period when the country went through a puritanical period, with no joy and no institutions. This stuck with the team, no matter how beautiful their cricket was. 82

Many Pakistanis who play and report on the game have developed ways of coping with all the criticism that comes their way. Most of the time they half expect it and feel that the international game would somehow be poorer for its absence. However, what irritates them most and allows them to identify with the semblance of national unity that cricket gives to them is the realisation that much of the criticism and blame that its cricket team and culture incurs is the direct result of Pakistan being a Muslim nation. To many in Pakistan the world seems unnecessarily judgemental because for years they have been the only

81 Nur Khan in Noman, p.246.

82 Kureishi in Oman, p.247.

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Muslim cricket-playing nation, 83 and one willing to deal with the difficulties that arise in the game from time to time when others are not, particularly England and Australia.

CONCLUSION This chapter has detailed the rise to popularity of cricket in Pakistan and

the emergence of vernacular cricketers to positions of cricket prominence. lt has argued that the development of media technologies, particularly radio and television, and socio-economic changes in Pakistan by the 1970s gave to the game a larger internal and international audience that it previously lacked. The spread of cricket to less affiuent urban and rural communities gave it greater national appeal and allowed for a semblance of national identity and unity to develop that has to date been lacking in other political and institutional arrangements in the country. The gradual introduction of players from these communities to the national team reinforced the nascent ties between · community and national discourse that cricket was beginning to fprge. These ties were also strengthened by diaspora communities who were themselves beginning to engage in the debate on Pakistani nationalism. They were also hardened by the negative portrayals of western journalists and players that made their way to Pakistan through the international media. The popularisation of the game and the emergence of vernacular cricketers made the discourse on cricket nationalism, and thereby the national narrative of Pakistan, more available to communities who previously had little or no access to it. lt is in this context that undemocratic and authoritarian politicians in Pakistan began to involve themselves in the administration and control of the game. They r(3alised that it was slowly giving a window of opportunity to minority groups to participate in discussions on national identity and nationalism, and they moved swiftly to prevent this from happening. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

83 If one disregards the modest achievements of the United Arab Emirates team and the recent acceptance of Bangladesh as a test playing nation.

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CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICAL UMPIRE: CRICKET NATIONALISM

AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES

The appropriation of cricket in Pakistan by authoritarian politicians controlling the state is the contemporary outcome of a political culture based on the myth of Muslim homogeneity and exclusiveness. The recognition and success acquired for Pakistan on the international stage by its cricket players, especially from the 1970s onwards, has encouraged the state's active involvement in the cricket affairs of the country. In seeking to tap into the prestige of the test team and its superheroes, unpopular and authoritarian political leaders have made it their civic duty to manage the cricket culture. it is, after all, one of the few institutions to have generated a sense of Pakistani rather than ethnic, linguistic or sectarian identity and to have thereby validated the Muslim separatist discourse. Additionally, their attempt to fulfil the role of patrons and managers is both a symbolic gesture acknowledging cricket's internal mass appeal an,d a political strategy to procure domestic approval of their authority and vision by associating themselves with the game. it provides the basis for the perpetuation of the official national discourse and the validation of their established political power at the domestic level to a larger world audience. The projection of a separate cricket tradition in support of the "two-nation" theory is at variance with the historical origins and development of the game in the subcontinent.

'APPROPRIATION' AND POPULAR CULTURE IN PAKISTAN Before discussing the significance and extent of government involvement

and control of cricket, an explanation of the term appropriation is required. In postcolonial studies the term is used to analyse either imperial - and therefore dominant - surveillance, usurpation and assimilation of indigenous geographical, political and cultural terrain for reasons of subjugation and control. Alternatively, it can represent indigenous attempts to better facilitate their own construction of "social and cultural identities" in opposition to imperial power by using the latter's "tools" as a means for political resistance.1 it is the latter of the two that is currently in vogue amongst postcolonial theorists. However, while the attempt to construct an official national narrative and numerous competing and counter-narratives in Pakistan provides ample scope for a methodological examination of the country's political development in the

I B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin, Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies, Routledge, London, 1998, pp.19-20.

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post-1947 period, cricket provides a further variation on the latter of the two theories of appropriation. This dissertation has thus far shown that cricket in Pakistan, while fostered and promoted by the elite sections of society, developed independently of the official political discourse generating little interest from politicians until its international success and growing domestic popularity prompted a recognition that it could be harnessed to confer political legitimacy. lt is at this point that cricket is targeted for official appropriation, though, as will be further demonstrated in the following chapter, this creates further socio-cultural complications and generates new arenas of division and conflict.

The study of popular cultures and their appropriation by authoritarian political regimes has long concerned cultural historians and postcolonial theorists. They argue that the appropriation of popular cultural expressions and practices, and those of subaltern and minority groups, are motivated by fear, control and, ultimately, power. Essentially, unpopular and authoritarian political regimes appropriate cultures they fear will grow to be unruly and unmanageable if allowed to develop independently. For purposes of state control and power the political appropriation of popular and unofficial cultures is done to validate the authority of national politicians by depicting them as spokespersons and protectors of the various customs and pastimes of its citizenry. Subsequently, as spokespersons and protectors, these politicians put themselves in a position to influence and regulate all such cultures. They present themselves as purveyors of cultural and social plurality while working to homogenise all autonomous expressions of popular culture to their political vision of the national interest. In a pluralist society like Pakistan, government intervention in, and regulation of, cultural pastimes with an identifiable following and the potential to develop into significant markers of national sentiment has been considered crucial to the validation of authoritarian leadership.

Historians and theorists have long pointed to the difficulties associated with defining terms like appropriation and group cultures or cultural identities. Appropriation, and more particularly political appropriation, is always linked to the concept of power. Often this is simplistically defined as a trait of a person or a group of people who possess the means to control, validate and terminate social structures and discourses that define the limits of authority over a larger body of people within geographical parameters. This definition is problematical and has been described as such by Peter Burke:

... power is a concept which is often reified. lt is easy to assume that one person, group or institution in a given society

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'has' this power while everyone else lacks it - the 'ruler', for example, the 'ruling class', or the political 'elite'. As the American political scientist Harold Lasswell once asserted in his usual trenchant style, 'Those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass.' Historians have often made this assumption.2

Furthermore, the term appropriation subsumes that group cultures or cultural identities are stable and monolithic in their articulation and practice, and have been so for a very long time. Thus it can be erroneously assumed that cultural expressions and identities are easily defined and categorised, thereby perpetuating existing stereotypes. In other words, they can be used to determine the limits of inclusion and exclusion through the imposition of boundaries that arbitrarily define the extent of group belonging.3 However, as Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao point out the word appropriation is "multi­directional" and "broad" in its definition and it "cannot, therefore, be relied upon to set clear limits as to where the concept of cultural appropriation begins and ends."4 Hence, this makes it difficult to establish "a theoretical basis for connecting a particular cultural practice" to a particular group. 5 it also makes it particularly difficult to appropriate a culture like cricket, or its Pakistani variant, in a holistic and pure form because the game itself was never that way to begin with. As was described in earlier chapters cricket had undergone rapid change in its English heartland at the time of its introduction to India, and acquired a different hue and character once there.

The discussion of appropriation draws attention to the difficulties of its definition. Further, it also describes the impracticability of controlling and shaping the meaning of traditions, identities and practices of particular cultural groups or bodies that are themselves heterogeneous and fluid to begin with. Appropriation is a difficult term to describe when what is being appropriated is not easily discernible, and when exchanges between groups, be they cultural or economic, are not entirely based on power relations where the dominant group is always expected to prevail because it has the requisite resources and strength to do so. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has explained the methodological objectives of the Subaltern Studies group whose aim it has been to show that

2 P. Burke, History and Social Theory, Cornell UP, lthaca, New York, 1993, p.76.

3 B. Ziff & P. V. Rao, "Introduction to Cultural Appropriation:A Framework for Analysis", in Ziff & Rao (eds.}, Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation, Rutgers UP, New Brunswick, 1997, p.5.

4 ibid., p.4.

5 ibid., p.5.

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political, economic and cultural exchanges between groups and individuals are more complex and ambiguous in their outcomes than had previously been acknowledged. She writes that:

The Subaltern Studies group seems to me to be ... proposing at least two things: first, that the moment(s) of change be pluralized and plotted as confrontations rather than transition (they would thus be seen in relation to histories of domination and exploitation rather than within the great modes-of­production narrative) and, secondly, that such changes are signalled or marked by a functional change in sign-systems. The most important functional change is from the religious to the militant. ..

The most significant outcome of this rev1s1on or shift in perspective is that the agency of change is located in the insurgent or the "subaltern."6

Bearing in mind the revisionist arguments of cultural historians and the Subaltern Studies group, an assessment of the political appropriation of cricket in Pakistan is not without its problems. As is shown in Appendix 1, Pakistan's political leadership, though authoritarian throughout most of its history, has nevertheless not been monolithic. Different military or populist rulers exercised their authority in individually distinctive ways reflecting diverse cultural origins, linguistic traditions and religious background. There has not been much continuity in their vision of Pakistani nationhood; just a consensus that the ruling authority must possess absolute power. While the political beliefs and priorities of each individual leader have varied, what has remained unchanged is the assumption that governance involves the peremptory coercion of civil society and the implicit rejection of compromise and consultation as part of the political process. In this context cricket and other popular cultures that begin to generate their own momentum are quickly brought into line by politicians who have nationalist agendas to uphold. The rest of this chapter will discuss the extent to which the political appropriation of cricket was carried out. In light of the theoretical discussion undertaken in this chapter it will also be shown how difficult a task this has proven to be.

In Pakistan the practice of appropriating popular culture for political reasons has not been confined to cricket. Musicians, painters and filmmakers

6 G. C. Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography" from In Other Worlds, Routledge, 1987, in A. Elliot (ed.), Contemporary Social Theory, The Blackwell Reader, Oxford, 1999, p.244.

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along with artists in other creative professions have all come under the scrutiny of the central government. They have been expected to conform to the expectations of their political leaders and to apply their creative talents to subject matter that is sympathetic to the Muslim separatist discourse. A series of repressive laws including censorship and the withholding of funds from dissident artists has inhibited the blossoming of artistic expression free of government influence, though it has not completely stifled it. Those who have pursued an independent direction, particularly one critical of the central authorities, have often been persecuted and had their work suppressed.

i) The Sonic Arts

Regina Burckhardt Qureshi in her seminal study on Pakistan's sonic arts has found that different political regimes have influenced the direction that music, poetic chant and religious recitation have taken in Pakistan. She argues that from 1947 to well into the 1960s- taking in the early Muhajir leadership and that of General Muhammad Ayub Khan - "the ruling immigrant elite" of Karachi and the "feudal-military elites" of the Punjab were active patrons of "classical musicians, mostly of (Hindustani), but also of Punjabi origin."? They sponsored radio programs on Radio Pakistan, performances and recordings, and linked these to their national agenda through initiatives like "a choral national song genre based on the poetry of the national poet, Muhammad lqbal", that encouraged the active participation of Pakistani communities throughout the country that had access to this media. 8 This early national patronage of the sonic arts reflected the interests of the feudal leaders of north and north­western colonial India who were long exposed to the syncretic musical traditions of the Mughal period.9

This changed dramatically under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He founded the National Institute of Folk Heritage, or Lok Virsa, to subsidise and package folk artists, mostly from Sind, as the embodiment of his national vision for the sonic arts. The Lok Virsa's sponsorship of festivals, concerts and recordings, along with its capacity to preserve and publicise folk culture, became crucial in the popularisation of folk music during Bhutto's leadership. Its cultural agenda reached its apogee with the introduction of television. The medium allowed folk artists like Allan Faqir and Mai Bhagi to become the voice

7 R. B. Qureshi, "The Sound of Pakistani Culture: Fifty Years of Building, Contesting, and Negotiating National Identity through the Sonic Arts", in C. Kennedy, C. Erns!, K. Mcneil, & D. Gilmartin (eds.), Pakistan at the Millennium, OUP, Oxford, 2003, pp.134-135.

8 ibid., p.134.

9 ibid., p.133.

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of the Pakistani people, and to be recognised as such by international audiences.10

The period after Bhutto saw a complete change in direction for the sonic arts. Zia's lslamicisation program gave rise to a more austere and controlled musical culture that privileged "religiously approved chant and recitation over secular music and musical instruments, and forg(ed) sonic connections with the Arab homeland of Islam ... (as opposed to) retaining South Asian styles."11 The period after Zia's demise to the present is characterised by a cultural struggle to determine Pakistan's national sonic culture. This struggle reflects much of what will be said about cricket in the same period in the following chapter. Essentially, Pakistan's sonic arts have become examples of the hybridity, impurity and intermingling that Rushdie talks about when discussing The Satanic Verses.12 There is still the desire amongst politicians to promote a national music culture, but there is conflict amongst them as to what this should be. Domestically folk music competes with that of religious chant and recitation; in turn, these compete with a burgeoning youth culture that mixes traditional music with western influences like hip hop and is sustained by commercial radio, international recordings, cable television stations like Zee TV and MTV and access to the music of the Pakistani diaspora of England. Internationally a "Pakistani voice within World Music" has to take into account the music of the Pakistani diaspora, particularly the hip hop cultures and hybrid western/South Asian sounds that emerged in England in the 1980s and continue to develop to this day. An example of the importance of the diaspora to the development of Pakistani music is offered by Qureshi. She describes how the traditional ghazal and qawwali of north India were rejuvenated in Pakistan itself, particularly amongst the less westernised middle class, once they had been exported to England and found a foothold there.13 This made them part of a desirable global popular culture and not the art form of a restricted elite segment of society.

ii) Painting as Protest

10 ibid., p.136. 11 ibid., p.137. 12 J. Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative", in The University of Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform, Vol.25, (3 & 4), 1992, p.751. Rushdie writes that: "The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. lt rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world."

13 ibid., p.139.

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The failure to comply with the demands of the central government has often hindered the careers of many creative artists and entirely destroyed others. Two notable examples can be drawn from the world of Pakistani painting. One, Sadequin, a flamboyant and audacious painter of the 1970s, appeared before the Punjab District Court "for inciting a riot";14 the other, A. R. Nagori, was branded a "subversive" and "blacklisted from any government exhibition or facility" during Zia's leadership.15 Both artists were incensed at government policies that were socially divisive and detrimental to nation­building. Sadequin, the more outspoken of the two, and "a showman, actor, and his own best promoter'' according to Marcella C. Sirhandi, toyed with his opponents and the status quo. He openly rejected political and religious justifications for social inequality and enraged politicians, the ulama and the wealthy alike. In condemnation of him religious fanatics carrying placards with 'Kill Sadequin' written on them burned an exhibition of his works in 1976.16 Nagori, also concerned with social issues and government inefficiencies, painted on behalf of Sindi peasants and in opposition to stringent censorship laws. His paintings were graphic and confronting. In Target (1986) he portrays a Sindi peasant as a standing target caught between the armed forces, the representatives of government expropriation, and the dacoits, the criminal gangs who roam the interior. Both are heavily armed and dangerous and offer little in the way of hope and refuge to the hapless peasant.17 In Sarasvati (1986) he depicts his disapproval of government censorship laws by painting the Hindu goddess of the arts as powerless in the face of an axe-wielding wolf­his "symbol for oppressive government forces" - and a pen-monitoring "faceless man in a green military uniform."18

Music and painting provide a forum for the articulation of national consciousness, and it is for this reason the central government of Pakistan has attempted to control through strict censorship laws and political persecution the artistic expression of practitioners in both these fields. Artists, like professionals in other areas, are not only subject to the demands of market economies but also to the manipulation of powerful and authoritarian heads of state. Often their survival and success depends on the patronage and goodwill of the latter. Cricketers find themselves in the same predicament. The prospect of economic

14 M. C. Sirhandi, "Painting in Pakistan: 1947-1997", in Kennedy et. al., 2003, p.31. 15 ibid., p.37. 16 ibid., p.31. 17 ibid., p.36. 18 ibid., p.37.

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rewards and social prestige encourages them to uphold the 'national' vision of politicians and the cricket administrators they appoint. They represent the 'nation' by wearing uniforms that display national symbols and colours, and they are seen as representatives of the nation during matches, at interviews and in post-match conferences despite any hostility they may have to government and its political agenda. Furthermore, the global sports environment, unlike its equivalent in the creative arts, has throughout the 20th century promoted identity along nationalist lines and offered politicians, like those in Pakistan, the opportunity to project themselves and their national vision as united, successful and in harmony with the expectations of its people.

Political appropriation, however, is a double edged sword. Political regimes cannot avoid dealing with both positive and negative incentives that arise from their appropriation of popular cultural forms like cricket. On the one hand they provide opportunities for prestige and recognition on a large scale; on the other hand international competition also allows dissident groups to utilise the game for their own political objectives. As one of the very few incompletely regulated windows to the outside world, cricket provides an arena for dissidents to publicise their grievances globally.

CRICKET BEFORE ITS POLITICAL APPROPRIATION The attraction of cricket to the authoritarian political leadership of

Pakistan took some time to develop. In the 1950s and 1960s politicians mixed with cricketers and journalists but they made no conscious political effort to appropriate the game and use it as an instrument to enhance their prestige and authority. Records exist of civilian and military politicians involving themselves in cricket board affairs from the mid-1950s. Between 1954 and 1963 three of Pakistan's earliest political leaders, Mohammed Ali Bogra, lskander Mirza and General Muhammad Ayub Khan, became Presidents of the BCCP.19 Thereafter, the first BCCP Constitution (1963) recognised the Head of State as its Patron. However, decisions to appoint heads of state to prominent positions of the cricket board did not come from the politicians themselves. Instead, the earliest cricket authorities, particularly Cornelius, saw it in their best interests to involve the government in the affairs of the cricket board to validate both the game and its organising body as national institutions. lt was also a way to generate resources, financial and otherwise, that the game and the board were critically short of at this time.

19 Brigadier (Retd.) Salahuddin, "Ad-hocism in Cricket over the Decades", in Dawn, 18 August 1999.

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Active government involvement prior to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's rise to power was at best low key. Politicians were preoccupied with developing suitable political and economic institutions to validate the nation's existence and were generally unresponsive to activities perceived as being outside the formal political arena. A critical shortage of funds, industry and skilled workers, a severe refugee problem and diverse, ethnic, cultural and linguistic traditions meant that many socio-cultural activities and pastimes had to fend for themselves in the period before the 1970s. Significantly, the most noticeable act of political intervention in the affairs of cricket prior to 1971 was the adjournment of India-Pakistan test matches from 1960-61 until 1978. If anything, the use of cricket as a political instrument in this period came from an entirely different source altogether.

CROWD DISTURBANCES AT CRICKET GROUNDS Crowd disturbances and riots at international cricket fixtures in Pakistan

have occurred regularly. During February-March 1969, the last year of President Ayub Khan's political leadership, a three test match series against England was continuously disrupted by opponents of the political regime. The political crisis that befell the Ayub Khan government reached a crescendo of sorts on the cricket field throughout this series. Many dissenters and protesters used test match venues as a public forum for political agitation against the government. The socio-political turmoil that afflicted Pakistan on the eve of the Lahore test match included "railway and dock strikes for wage rises, power blackouts, students' protests against academic stagnation and financial rigidity, processions, mass demonstrations flaring into violence, fanatical assassinations, all aimed against the authoritarian regime of President Ayub Khan."20

Frequent crowd disruptions and the loss of valuable playing time were a feature of test matches in Lahore, Dacca and Karachi. Crowd abuse levelled at Ayub Khan, including the chant of "Ayub is a dog", led to skirmishes between spectators and police officers that made their way on to the playing arena.21 In response to expected disturbances in the lead up to each of these test matches the cricket board made crucial decisions to reduce - if not completely eliminate -their potential to disrupt play and escalate into violence. These included the selection of Aftab Gul, of the rebel Students' Action Committee, in the test team

20 R. Robinson, The Wildest Tests, Cassell, Stanmore (Australia), 1979, p.91. 21 ibid., p.92. Chairs and debris were thrown at police officers and on the playing surface by sections of the crowd.

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for Lahore as "insurance that riots would not stop the match";22 and, the selection of East Pakistan's first ever, and only, test match player for Pakistan, Niaz Ahmed, in the Dacca test ahead of the more appropriate choice, Asif Masood.23 These disturbances reached their apogee during the Karachi test when play was abandoned due to on-field demonstrations in support of a teachers' general strike for better wages and working conditions, 24 leaving the MCC team manager, Leslie Ames, to respond to BCCP President Syed Fida Hassan's request for the crowd to be given "one more chance" with "The (MCC) team will catch the first available plane to leave for home."25

Clearly, the international political agenda of the government affected the cricket culture even without formal government manipulation. The crowd violence was both an organised and spontaneous response to Ayub Khan's leadership and the crisis that befell his government in the late 1960s. Protesters used cricket venues to highlight their opposition to the official Pakistani national discourse to a world audience. The use of excessive force to quell the X disturbances was an early indication of government's willingness to intervene in cricket affairs when some aspect of the game impinged on the "two-nation" discourse of national legitimacy. it also set a precedent for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his political successors to devise methods of control that would prevent riots from happening again.

THE CESSATION OF INDIA/PAKISTAN TEST MATCHES The adjournment of India-Pakistan test matches had no direct link to an

official government decree on either side of the border. Rather, the cricket boards of India and Pakistan seem to have supported the severing of formal diplomatic ties between the two nations at the political level with the decision to do likewise for cricket. Mike Marqusee has written that cricket relations between Pakistan and India deteriorated at the same time as the geopolitical and ideological objectives of both countries began to come into conflict. From 1956 Pakistan became aligned with the United States while India, as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, maintained cordial relations with the government in

22 ibid. This did not prove successful as riots and other crowd disturbances were noticeable particularly on the afternoon of the fourth day when Pakistan was battling to avoid defeat. 23 0. Noman, Pride and Passion: An Exhilarating Half Century of Cricket in Pakistan, OUP, Karachi, 1998, p.129.

24 The Sunday Tribune, 9 March, 1969.

25 ibid.

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I

Moscow.26 As a result, Pakistan and India last played cricket against each other in India in 1960-61 and did not meet again until 1978.

The strain in cricket relations between the two boards that began to develop because of the political situation in the region were in striking contrast to the cordial and cooperative ties that had existed for most of the 1950s. In this initial period after partition the most prominent players and administrators for cricket in both countries had cultivated strong friendships, or were at least known to each other, from their days as products of colonial India's domestic game. These colonial ties slowly began to waver and disappear altogether as newer players and officials from India and Pakistan emerged and gradually entered the cricket scene in both countries. This combined with the rise in hostility between the governments of India and Pakistan at the political level brought an end to the mutual support and friendship that the two boards had been forging. The new relationship was one of acrimony and distrust, and it soon began to resemble the animosity and aggression present in official circles. In fact, political tension and the rise of national chauvinism on either side of the border had, by the early 1960s, begun to strain old friendships themselves. Omar Kureishi remembers this all too well during the test series between India and Pakistan in 1960-61:

I met an old acquaintance of mine on the steps of the Feroze Shah Kotla pavilion in New Delhi. The match was going badly for Pakistan and the crowd's frenzy was frightening, the cruel, gloating, anticipation of the spectators at a public hanging. In normal circumstances, I would have been delighted to have seen this acquaintance again. I would have shaken his hand warmly, embraced him and possibly thumped him (in) the back and dug him in the ribs.

When he greeted me, I judged his smile to be a smirk (paranoia is the illness of Man) and when he asked me how I was, I snapped at him, a vicious cur-like snapping, "I would be happier if your umpires were not cheats." How low could I get? A shabby, petty, degrading performance. it is not often tha(t) I feel contempt for myself. But there it was. Would I have reacted in a similar manner had we been playing England? That's what bothered me.27

26 M. Marqusee, War Minus the Shooting, Heinemann, London, 1996, p.209.

27 0. Kureishi, "The Ford was Willing", part of his "The Past is Another Country", in Dawn, 6 July 1984.

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The uneasiness and distrust that slowly crept into the cricket relations of both countries affecting decisions made at the board level and friendships between old cohorts like that of Kureishi and his old acquaintance in New Delhi's Shah Kotla stadium began to impact on the players themselves. With hindsight it is not too difficult to see how the India-Pakistan series of 1960-61 turned out to be the last played between the two for nearly 18 years. A story told by Kureishi again describes the extent to which media innuendo had supplanted the reflective and amicable accounts of journalists reporting on India-Pakistan test matches in the 1950s. Kureishi reflects, with a good deal of disappointment, on an incident that was alleged to have taken place before the Ahmedabad test during Pakistan's 1960-61 tour of India:

At Ahmedabad, just before the Test match, a young boy, supposedly with a razor-blade concealed in his palm, shook hands with Hanif (Mohammed). Hanif's hand was cut. Much was made of it and accusations were hurled that it was a deliberate attempt to injure Hanif, who, by now, had his hand bandaged.

it was too long ago for me to remember all the 'gory' details, but it seemed to be an incident blown out of all proportion. lt was certainly not a part of a conspiracy to incapacitate Hanif, as was alleged.28

Media accounts of this alleged incident emphasised the BCCPs position in matters pertaining to international relations. By the 1960s the BCCP was an organisation that willingly aligned itself with the nation's political leaders and their foreign policy objectives despite the latter's detachment from the game. it had unmistakably become an unsolicited supporter of the official national discourse, and this reflected its continued opposition to India-Pakistan test matches.

The most immediate ramification of the cricket impasse reached by the two boards was a lack of much needed competition and match fitness for players in both countries. This was to have a negative impact on South Asian cricket in the 1960s generally. Arguably both India and Pakistan performed poorly during the decade. Pakistan won only two test matches, against New Zealand at home in 1965, and played far too few games of cricket for a nation set to fulfil the promise it exhibited on the playing field in the 1950s. The absurdity of this situation and the internecine militancy of decision-makers on

28 0. Kureishi, "The razor blade that cut Hanifs palm", in Dawn, 29 June 1984.

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either side of the border was not lost on the two most senior cricketers for India and Pakistan during the 1965 war.29 At the time the cricket captains of both countries, Hanif Mohammad (Pakistan) and Mansur Ali Khan, the Nawab of Pataudi (India), in a conciliatory gesture while selected to play for a Rest of the World team against England, wrote a letter to their respective governments urging a cessation to hostilities: "We wish to express deep regrets at the war between India and Pakistan. We find unity on the cricket field by reaching for a common objective. We fervently hope both countries can meet and find an amicable solution".30

BHUTTO'S CRICKET PATRONAGE it was under the leadership of Bhutto that cricket was first brought into

the political mainstream. Unlike his predecessors, particularly Ayub Khan, Bhutto was a 'populist' leader that saw himself as a spokesman and democratic representative of the people, releasing them from the restricted and oppressive rule of authoritarian politicians. In light of this, Bhutto identified with and subsidised certain popular cultures, particularly sports like cricket, to procure the political support and approval of large sections of the population. The establishment of the Z. A Bhutto Institute of Sports and Culture was, according to Shahid Javed Burki, driven "on essentially political grounds" to develop "a political rapport between himself and the people."31 However, like many of Bhutto's plans, this project, whose aim was to generate the support of the masses, was driven by underlying political concerns. Bhutto sought to control a burgeoning national sports culture that was developing links to other parts of the third world that were otherwise closed to him because of Pakistan's membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENT0).32 Both SEATO and CENTO were "Cold War treaties organised by the United States and directed against the Soviet Union. Membership of them ran counter to the non-alignment principle that was at the heart of the idea of the Third World." Pakistan's membership of them, "especially as it was a developing nation itself, acquired for it the disapproval of

29 The second India-Pakistan war began 5 August, 1965, and ended on 22 September when a UN ceasefire was agreed to by both nations. lt was principally fought over Kashmir but hostilities took place in other parts of South Asia including the Punjab. 30 Hanif & Pataudi in Kureishi, Dawn, 29 June 1984. 31 S J Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977, (2nd edition), Macmillan, London, 1988, p.152. 32 ibid., p.153.

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other Third World nations" who saw them as instruments of western neocolonialism.33

The growing importance of sport as a symbol of nationhood in the 1970s saw Bhutto appoint his own government ministers and party members as executives of the more established sports g~erning bodies. This created a precedent for his successor, General Muhammad Zia ui-Haq, to do likewise. The sudden need from the 1970s for politicians to manage the affairs of sports bodies, particularly that of cricket, coincided with the game's growing commercial appeal worldwide, and the influx of a sizable Pakistani contingent into English county and league cricket. The larger international profile that Pakistan acquired as a result of the changes that the game as a whole underwent in this period provided a basis for its national politicians to legitimise · their authoritarian positions. The politicisation and control of cricket gave to them international exposure and a national framework that could underpin their political longevity and vision. In other words, the success of the national cricket team and that of its players in English domestic cricket was seen to justify the national discourse and political process.of Pakistan.

Beside the favourable political exposure an association with a successful cricket team could give to him and his national vision, Bhutto had also been a player of the game in his younger days. Therefore, his decision to appropriate the game to better develop it and to raise the standard of cricket in the country was also partly influenced by two other factors: his passion as a player and spectator; and, traditional laws of patronage whereby Bhutto saw himself as a leader with the political vision to redress problematical areas of national significance. The BCCP had not made it difficult for Bhutto or any other head of state to assume leadership of the game. Their constitution ratified the Head of State as the Chief Patron for cricket, and they had often endorsed the views of national politicians by openly supporting their political agendas and inviting them occasionally to resolve disputes that emerged in the game from time to time.

Two of Bhutto's most important appointments were Kardar, who at the time was the Minister for Food and Education in the Punjab, as the President of the BCCP, and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, the Minister for Education in the Bhutto government, as the President of the Sports Control Board. In 1977 they came into conflict over player payment disputes and Bhutto was required to intervene. Bhutto sided with Pirzada and this led to Kardar's resignation. Kardar, a long-

33 C. Valiotis, "Cricket in 'a nation imperfectly imagined': Identity and tradition in postcolonial Pakistan", inS. Wagg (ed.), Cricket and National Identity in the Postcolonial Age: Following On, Routledge, London, 2005, p.122.

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time friend of Bhutto, 34 was appointed as the head of the cricket board because of his disciplinarian and meticulous approach to cricket organisation which was a product of his days as a charismatic leader and ambassador for Pakistani cricket in the 1950s. His undying devotion and loyalty to the national team had long been unquestioned and unchallenged. He was seen by many as the right person to steer Pakistani cricket back on the rails after its disappointments in the 1960s.

For the first time in its short history the BCCP was given an official headquarters at Qaddafi Stadium in Lahore. From here Kardar presided over vast changes to the domestic game, bringing it into line with professional sport elsewhere in the world and providing a greater incentive for local cricketers to continue playing the game. Financial institutions and commercial houses were given permission to organise cricket teams to revive the flagging state of the domestic game. However, the steps taken to commercialise the game and improve player remuneration and career prospects in Pakistan during Kardar's tenure as BCCP President (1972-1977) were deemed to be insufficient and not on a par with developments elsewhere in the cricket world by several of the more established players. This set Kardar on a collision-course with the players in question, Pirzada and, ultimately, with Bhutto.

Kardar had been offended by the position of leading players, lmran Khan, Majid Khan, Mushtaq Muhammed, Sadiq Muhammed, Wasim Bari, Asif lqbal and Zaheer Abbas, that test match allowances should be increased to facilitate the loss of income that they stood to incur when on national team duty. His authoritarian outlook and obstinacy in the face of this challenge threatened to derail cricket relations between the players and the establishment. Kardar saw this issue in nationalist terms, questioning the loyalty of the players to Pakistan, particularly since he felt that he had done much to improve their lot in the game during his presidency; on the other hand, the players' time in England had made them conscious of the contractual and organisational arrangements of cricket there where the game was more lucrative and competitive, its facilities much better and more plentiful, and the rewards and publicity arising from it more substantial and enticing.

Pirzada's reversal of Kardar's decision to reject player payment increases created conflict within cricket's administration and in media circles.

34 A. H. Kardar, Memoirs of an All-Rounder, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1987, p.283. Kardar writes that: "As an administrator of cricket I was his (Bhutto's) favourite. He took my word as final and would always tell me, "Who knows cricket better than you"?." However, by 1977 Bhutto was beginning to question Kardar's authority on cricket and for the first time took issue with him over his running of the game.

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The press coverage in the period universally approved of Pirzada's actions which stemmed from the country's highest office, where the decision to overrule Kardar was first made. lt included many BCCP members, alienated with their President's approach to leadership, and numerous journalists, who felt that the game in Pakistan needed to keep abreast of cricket procedures in other parts of the world. On Kardar's side stood many old cricket teammates like Fazal Mahmood and Munawar Ali Khan. Fazal described the demands of the players as those of "Money-sick" cricketers.35 Munawar, the nephew of the Nawab of Mamdot, who opted out of cricket to pursue a career in business on the eve of the ICCs decision to recognise Pakistan as a test-playing nation, described events leading to Kardar's resignation in political overtones, pointing to the impropriety on the part of Bhutto as an act of revenge for an act of betrayal by Kardar:

(Bhutto's decision to overrule Kardar which had been carried out by Pirzada) was a sinister political plot, or a classic tale of conspiracy to stab Kardar in the back, Brutus style, by his old partymen, with the dual purpose of cutting him to size for the resounding popularity he had gained and as a reprisal for his quitting the party as Minister in the Punjab government. lt was then commonly known that Z. A Bhutto, the all too powerful autocratic ruler of the time, did not take kindly to resignations from his party, so that it could well be construed as a set-up for Kardar's gruesome murder through a political coup of sorts. 36

PAKISTANI CRICKET UNDER ZIA'S RULE Zia hardened executive control of cricket in Pakistan by appointing

retired Generals to the Presidency of the BCCP. This was an adjunct to his reforms in political, bureaucratic, commercial and legal organisations and departments that placed "senior military officers" in crucial administrative positions of power to strengthen and consolidate military rule and authoritarianism in Pakistan. 37 His position in relation to the administration of cricket in the country was similar to that of traditional Islamic civilian rulers in

35 Fazal Mahmood in Haleem Ahmed, "Fazal says our top cricketers are money sick", Dawn, 2 October 1977.

36 Munawar Ali Khan, "Who Killed Kardar and our Cricket?", in The News on Sunday, 27 August 2000, Sports 15. The reference to Kardar's death in this passage is, of course, to be taken figuratively. Though disillusioned by the actions taken against him by Bhutto over player payments, Kardar died of natural causes at his Lahore home in 1996!

37 C. Baxter, Y. Malik, C. Kennedy & R. Oberst, Government and Politics in South Asia (4th edition), Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1998, p.236.

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their dealings with religious authorities - a position Zia himself adopted to win the support of Pakistan's religious clerics. 38 Zia intervened in the affairs of cricket only when there were disputes to resolve and diplomatic scores to settle. Otherwise, cricket patrons and players, like the u/ama, were free to cultivate their own traditions and practices so long as they did not clash with the political authority of Zia.

Zia inherited the cricket crisis that arose out of the commercial and professional challenges that the game's international authorities and national governing bodies confronted in the late 1970s. During his early years as ruler Zia saw to an end the dispute over player payments that divided Bhutto and Kardar. No sooner had this drama been resolved when a new cricket crisis unfolded to test Zia's patience and diplomatic skills. Kerry Packer's World Series Cricket was a threat to cricket establishments worldwide. In Pakistan Zia and influential cricket officials were categorically at odds with the breakaway world competition proposed by Packer. Zia informed Pakistan's rebel cricketers - essentially the same group of players that previously demanded greater financial awards for their test match appearances39 - of this in no uncertain terms. In a meeting he held with Mushtaq, lmran and Zaheer in January 1978 he questioned the loyalty of the players to Pakistan and advised them that playing for "the highest bidder'' was unethical, particularly when "jobs and other incentives" were open to them in their home country.40

The Zia government intensified its control of cricket in the country as the game began to impinge more directly on constructions of national identity and consciousness. The exposure of domestic players to different and lucrative national and transnational cricket cultures challenged the national discourse of Pakistan in ways the game had never done before. The impact of global media networks, the enticement of lucrative sponsorship packages and entrepreneurial finance and the rise of transnational cricketers with conflicting loyalties to nation and alternative international influences alike reduced cricket's capacity to be used as a vehicle for the transmission of national propaganda by the Zia government. These developments constrained but did not deter Zia's efforts to bring the game in line with his vision for national unity.

38 See Appendix 1 on Zia and his political leadership of Pakistan. For more information on traditional Islamic civilian rule and its recognition of the importance of political and religious institutions working together to govern more efficiently and in accordance with Islamic practice through a process of consultation and patronage consult the work of G. E. Grunebaum, Classical Islam: A History, 600-1258, Alien & Unwin, London, 1963 (translation by K. Watson, 1970); and P. Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, Thames & Hudson, 1968, pp.33-76. 39 In this case Mushtaq Muhammed, lmran and Majid Khan, Asif lqbal and Zaheer Abbas. 40 Dawn, 20 January 1978.

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Zia feared that transnational media coverage and control of cricket would undermine his political position as the legitimate ruler of the nation. In this context cricket was in the same position as other domestic cultures with the potential to challenge his authority: the game needed to be controlled by his government to reflect the political interests of his leadership; and, any perceived or noticeable threat to this needed to be quelled before it gathered momentum. The changing fortunes of the Pakistan test team in the 1970s from that of an international under-achiever to a competitive and successful unit coincided with the growth of global media coverage for the game, a rise in player payments and sponsorship and the advent of World Series Cricket which threw its unqualified muscle behind these changes and thereby hastened their acceptance and approval by international audiences and the reluctant governing bodies of cricket nations worldwide. it was in response to these changes that Zia involved himself more conspicuously in the running of the game. Despite the threat that transnational forces could bring to a nation that was politically divided and culturally in discord with the national vision of its political leaders, Zia saw a window of opportunity in managing the cricket affairs of the country. The provisional unity achieved by the cricket team on the playing field and their growing success internationally allowed him as spokesperson and chief patron of the game to convey to Pakistanis and others the possibilities for national fulfilment when working under him. lt was for this reason that one retired military general after another assumed the leadership of the BCCP during his time as political leader of Pakistan.

Under Zia the military-presidents of the BCCP were given every opportunity to exercise control and leadership in the affairs of cricket. While some of them proved more capable than others, all were criticised by members of the press and cricket players and administrators both past and present. Air Marshal! (retd.) Nur Khan, who had a background in sports administration and corporate management with the Pakistan Hockey Federation and Pakistan International Airlines respectively, was seen to be the most efficient. He and his cricket board secretary, Arif Ali Khan Abbasi, began commercialising the game through corporate sponsorship and merchandise agreements with national and regional commercial organisations This reached its apotheosis in the 1990s under the latter's treasureship and presidency of the PCB when sponsorship deals with multinational corporations like Pepsi and Coca Cola were reached and when the cricket board itself was fully privatised.41 Despite these successful financial agreements, Nur Khan's Presidency was volatile and often

41 Interview with Arif Ali Khan Abbasi in Karachi, 25 November, 2000.

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criticised by members of his own board. Both he and Abbasi were accused of "high-handedness" and numerous financial misdeeds. The BCCP Council disapproved of arbitrary decisions taken primarily by its secretary which resulted in "serious irregularities and misuse of funds." They summoned Zia to intervene and bring about an end to such practices.42

In the early 1980s vocal members of the BCCP Council like ljaz Butt, the Chairman of the Council of Lahore City Cricket Association, protested against the financial irregularities that began to appear in the management of the game under the leadership of Nur Khan. He took issue with numerous undisclosed losses incurred by the cricket authorities that amounted to 4,778,625.00 rupees.43 He was also infuriated by the manner in which Nur Khan and Abbasi avoided explaining these losses to the council, and carried on as if nothing of importance had happened. This was a breach of Article 42 of the BCCP Constitution which according to Butt's press conference statement of early February 1984 stipulated that:

'In case of emergency the President may if he is of the opinion that the interest of the Board so require, exceed the limits of the financial power conferred upon him by the Council but he shall inform the Council at the next meeting of the expenditure so incurred by him.' Mr. Nur Khan has persistently failed to meet this requirement. This infraction and infringement of the constitution is a result of his total disregard for the General Body Council. These expenses thus remain ... illegal.44

Butt appealed to Zia in his capacity as President of Pakistan and Chief Patron of the BCCP to remove both Nur Khan and Abbasi from their positions. He was adamant that they were unscrupulous and dishonest in their management of cricket affairs and detrimental to the advancement of the local game.

Article 41 sub-clause (11) of the Constitution of the BCCP lays down "The Council shall lay down the financial powers of the President, Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary and shall also prescribe procedure for operations of accounts." To this date these powers remain unspecified and

42 Dawn, 10 January 1983.

43 Dawn, 5 February 1984.

44 ibid.

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undetermined in spite of repeated objections on this account in the General Body meetings.45

He also pointed to the intrigue that surrounded his and Razaullah Khan's removal and reinstatement to the board in 1983, and the continued withholding of accounts from him that would have undermined the veracity and efficiency of Nur Khan's leadership.46 All this proved too much for Nur Khan who within days of the press conference and the media frenzy that surrounded it announced his resignation; although he did stay on as President of the Pakistan Hockey Federation, a position he held concurrently with that of the cricket board47

In the wake of Nur Khan's departure Zia appointed another retired military officer to replace him. Major General Ghulam Safdar Butt, the Chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), was welcomed in some quarters but was mostly seen to be just another political appointee with a brief to run the BCCP for the military government. Safdar Butt was like Nur Khan, a retired military officer, faithful to his station and government, and appointed to head crucial economic and cultural assets within the nation. Quite often these political appointees were given leadership of multiple corporations and institutions at the same time, as both Safdar Butt and Nur Khan had been given. This was part of Zia's strategy to limit power to a few well chosen and trusted confidantes that were not likely to question his judgement or, in the long run, usurp his authority. This type of procession had not gone unnoticed in the press or in public life. In cricket circles criticism of political appointees was rampant amongst the media and players. In one issue of Dawn Kardar made some unflattering remarks of Safdar Butt's ability to manage cricket in Pakistan. He wrote that the BCCP:

45 ibid.

46 ibid. In his press conference of 1984 Butt described two incidents involving Nur Khan's duplicity when dealing with requests for independent evaluations of BCCP expenditure. The first one in early 1983 came at the end of a very public press attack on Nur Khan: "Mr. Nur Khan directed the Treasurer to give access to the accounts to Mr. Nusrat Azim and myself and place the same before us at Lahore on January 8-9, 1983. Before we could see these accounts Mr. Nur Khan ... suspended me on January 5, 1983 and barred me from participating in any meeting of the Council/General Body ... I took the matter to the court but Mr. Nur Khan withdrew the case and reinstated both Mr. Razaullah and me." The second took place at the end of the year: "In the last General Body meeting held on November 30 1983 I raised certain specific objections regarding the budget and the audited accounts and when the minutes were circulated after one month on 29-12-1983 it was stated that the accounts were passed unanimously. I sent my written objections to the minutes circulated on January, 1984. In actual fact Mr. Nur Khan asked me to see the accounts personally in Karachi, but despite my going to Karachi the accounts were not shown to me." 47 Dawn, 6 February 1984.

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is mistakenly persisting with the notion that enthusiasm can be a substitute for knowledge and talent... I should have thought that a Chairman of WAPDA, which demands whole-hearted attention to meet the challenges of the energy crisis and arresting the spread of the cancer of waterlogging and salinity of the agricultural life of this country would have kept him (Safdar Butt who was at the time both BCCP President and WAPDA Chairman) fully occupied 24 hours of the day.48

The military-presidents of the BCCP were not merely content to control the game at an organisational level, they were equally concerned with the behaviour and patriotism of their most senior players. This was particularly the case when these players were exposed to transnational cricket cultures and influences that were seen to compromise the national project. The advent of World Series Cricket, the appearance of Pakistani players in English county cricket, the growth of global television coverage and viewership, commercial endorsements, publicity and book sales, and the success of the Pakistani national team in test and one day cricket gave to the players in their role as international ambassadors for the nation a greater awareness and exposure of political corruption at home. A few of these players had dared to defy Zia's admonishments during the World Series Cricket crisis; many more of them had learned of more formal and suitable approaches to cricket management during their time in England and in other countries as international cricketers. Upon their return to Pakistan they used their greater knowledge of the world to attack the inefficiencies of the domestic game and the obtrusive interference of the military in its day to day running. As international spokespersons for Pakistani cricket, and Pakistan in general, they offered global audiences alternative appraisals of life and leadership in Pakistani society. These were quite embarrassing to the Zia government as they portrayed and, at times, ridiculed his appointed staff as ill-informed, ignorant, intrusive and peremptory.

Noted international cricketers who criticised the interference of the military in cricket organisation and game strategy - a significant issue for cricket players; especially from the 1980s - included lmran Khan, Majid Khan and Wasim Akram. They have been critical of the appointment to official positions of individuals lacking knowledge of the game, and they continue to stress the need for greater regional development that will promote a stronger community

48 Dawn, 6 February 1984.

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supporter base than that generated by the restricted popular appeal of a domestic game centred around corporate and commercial organisations.49

In his autobiography, All Round View, lmran Khan relates some of the incidents involving him and several retired military officers appointed in various administrative positions for cricket. There is his humorous account of Safdar Butt's ignorance in matters pertaining to soil selection for cricket pitches; and his unfavourable portrayal of Colonel Rafi Naseem's attempts to impose authority over his captaincy and the test team. In the first example lmran writes that:

General Safdar Butt ... told me when he took over (the BCCP Presidency) that he could produce three types of pitch - fast, faster and fastest - through the expertise of WAPDA soil experts. Vast sums of money were spent in transporting Nandipur mud from an area near Sialkot. One or two pitches were actually destroyed in the process. 50

With Rafi Naseem, the then Secretary of the BCCP, lmran had a hostile relationship and quite a few unpleasant exchanges. During a one day match against the West lndies in Peshawar in 1985 they argued over the merits of the umpire Mian Aslam, a friend of Rafi Naseem's. This escalated into an ugly exchange of words where it is claimed by I m ran that Rafi Naseem "demanded an apology'' or he would come out with lmran's alleged '"activities at night."' He also informed I m ran "that BCCP officials could do as they pleased and that the captain had no jurisdiction over the dressing-room."51 This was resolved by the BCCP President who assured lmran that nothing of the sort would happen again; lmran had requested Rafi Nasim's resignation. Yet in the very same series another argument broke out between the two over lmran's failure to collect the signatures of teammates for a BCCP functionaries' young son; I m ran had his pads on awaiting his turn to bat.52 Towards the closing stages of a tightly fought contest between the West lndies and Pakistan, where the series was tied at two games each, Rafi Naseem entered the dressing room and proceeded to castigate lmran for his disregard of a cricket official's request. When the game had been lost and the series decided in favour of the West lndies, lmran's captaincy came under review. At this point, according to lmran,

49 1. Khan, A// Round View, Chatto & Wind us, London, 1 988, pp.156-168; & W. Akram, Wasim: The Autobiography of Wasim Akram, Piatkus, London, 1 998. 50 I. Khan, p.158. 51 ibid., pp.164-65. 52 ibid., p.165.

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Rafi Naseem took the opportunity to sabotage his claims for the position by trying to get the players to speak out against him and by bringing the "dressing­room" incident involving the players signatures to the attention of the enquiry committee charged by the BCCP to look into the affairs of the cricket team. All this was to no avail:

At one session, Rafi Naseem walked in and told a player to tell the committee that girls used to visit the dressing-room. He was not above concocting anything. The players all stood by me: Mudassar (Nazar) was sounded out about the captaincy but refused it. Rafi Naseem even obtained statements from association officials, whom I had never even met, accusing me of arrogance, while the autograph incident was also cited as an example of my high-handedness ... Nothing worked, so the BCCP was forced to reappoint me as captain for the series against Sri Lanka ... The BCCP also passed a law that all members of the council could come to the dressing-rooms whenever they desired.53

In response to the growing confidence and influence of several of the nation's senior cricket players Zia was cautious but, at the same time, resolute. At no time did he reduce the role of the military in the affairs of cricket; he stood by those appointed to officiate over the game and gave them his unqualified support and backing - that is until they became expendable at the end of a disappointing series of test losses or during periods of board intrigue and mismanagement; in which case the military as an institution did not suffer as replacements were always drawn from within its ranks. Simultaneously, Zia cultivated cordial relations with the odd senior player; his friendship with lmran, though circumspect, was noteworthy and facilitated an understanding between the two of them that did not harm the public image of either. This was in spite of the fact that greater commercial coverage of cricket and increased publicity for the players led Zia to play a more active and conspicuous diplomatic role in relation to the game than ever before. Previously he was content to sit back and allow others to do his bidding for him - much in the mould of a traditional Islamic ruler. This is similar to Zia's modus operandi in other arenas. He would intervene only when conflicts between military administrators and players became dysfunctional. However, the globalisation of Pakistani cricket nationalism and the increasing importance of the game as a symbol of national identity to many around the world by the late 20th century left him with little choice but to personally intervene in the running of the game. In fact, during the

53 ibid., p.166.

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1980s there was a discernible contest between Zia and lmran, sustained by the press, over who was really the face of Pakistani cricket.

Zia's timely interventions were many and have been referred to as "cricket diplomacy" by Omar Noman. The political importance that cricket began to acquire during his leadership saw him increase his public appearances as the Chief Patron and authority of the game in Pakistan, particularly when competitive matches against India recommenced in late 1978. In his speeches and press releases he publicly admonished Pakistani players to be at their best when playing against the Indian team and rebuked them if they fell short of his expectations. However, when they did well, as they did in wrapping up the 1982-83 home series against India by winning the fourth test in Hyderabad, Zia was at his most gracious and benevolent, and showered the team with gifts and words of praise:

Throughout the present series the Pakistan team showed consistent and exemplary team spirit, discipline and stamina which deserves the highest praise of all cricket lovers in the country. On this occasion the whole nation joins me in extending warmest felicitations to Captain lmran Khan and members of the Pakistan Cricket Team. 54

Zia's cricket diplomacy was also on show when addressing India's cricket players. During the Lahore test match between Pakistan and India in the 1984-85 home series Zia commemorated Sunil Gavasker's 100th test appearance by awarding him a silver tray and a pictorial book, Journey through Pakistan.ss Zia also made an unexpected appearance in Jaipur, Rajasthan, to watch the second test between India and Pakistan in 1987. His visit to Jaipur came at a time of increased diplomatic tensions between the governments in Delhi and lslamabad, arising out of the insurgencies in Indian Punjab and Kashmir, and was meant to be a gesture of goodwill and for peace in the region.56 This was a politically symbolic trip and an ingenious diplomatic manoeuvre on the part of Zia. it also showed the level of diplomatic importance that cricket had acquired in South Asia, but more so in Pakistan, by 1987, and the need for Zia to use it as a forum for political discussion and as a symbol of his political validation as a national leader.

54 Dawn, 19 January 1983.

55 Dawn, 18 October 1984.

56 Noman, p.222.

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CRICKET NATIONALISM AND THE "TWO-NATION" THEORY The fundamental basis upon which the official national narrative of

Pakistan rests, namely its opposition to India, extends to the cricket field. From

the moment test matches between the two nations recommenced the Zia

government has used the game to its advantage. Pakistan's cricket rivalry with

India can be viewed as an example of sportive nationalism. John Hoberman

argues that "sportive nationalism exists, not as an inchoate mass emotional

condition, but as the product of specific choices and decisions made by

identifiable political actors."57 From 1978 Pakistan's ruling authorities have

chosen and decided to use its national team's cricket success against India,

particularly in the one day game, 58 to justify their national vision and political

legitimacy to an international audience and to the various regional and ethnic

groups within Pakistan who disapprove of their claims to power. This strategy

has been supported by large media campaigns that identify India as the 'enemy'

while perpetuating the jingoistic rhetoric of nationalist solidarity59 - interestingly,

the notion of national regeneration in defiance of a perceived and contiguous

threat is now reciprocated by Indian politicians like Bal Thackeray and the Shiv

Sena who see Pakistani cricket victories over India as detrimental to their local

game, making a mockery of Hindu virility in the process.60

The importance to Zia of cricket matches involving India are clear to the

reader in the examples provided above. Zia did his utmost to ensure that his

57 J. Hoberman, "Sport and Ideology in the Post-Communist Age", in L. Allison, The Changing Politics of Sport, Manchester UP, Manchester, 1993, p.18. 58 Marqusee, p.211. Mike Marqusee writes of Pakistan's one day dominance over India in a 10 year period beginning in April 1986 when Javed Mianded hit a last ball 6 to win the Austral-Asia cup final in Sharjah for Pakistan. In 26 one-day matches played between the two, Pakistan won 21 of them. 59 ibid. Marqusee describes the national hysteria surrounding the Pakistani media's promotion of the 1996 cricket World Cup. In its theme song 'Jasbaan-e-Junoon ('The Joy of Madness'), performed by the rock group Junoon, the lyrics appealed to national sentiment: 'Pehchaan kabhina bhulo' ("Never forget your identity'), 'apne ghar apne sarzamin' ('our home, our native land') and 'Pakistan khabina bhulo, Pakistan hai tumhara, Pakistan hai hamara' ('Never forget Pakistan, Pakistan is Yours, Pakistan is ours'), are some examples. 60 ibid., p.212; & I. Talbot, Inventing the Nation:lndia & Pakistan, Arnold, London, 2000, pp.227-229. Thackeray, a former political cartoonist, founded the Shiv Sena to cater for the interests of Bombay's Maharashtrian community . He ran the organisation with an iron fist and was an outspoken and controversial critic of non-Marathis, particularly non-Hindus. Talbot writes of Thackeray's resilient and uncompromising dislike of Pakistani cricket and Muslim cricket supporters within India:" ... he wanted Indian Muslims to prove their national loyalty with 'tears in their eyes' whenever India lost to Pakistan. On the eve of the 1990-1 tour, the Shiv Sena press ranted that the presence of the Pakistani team was an 'insult to the nation's integrity' and a security threat. The visit was eventually cancelled after the Shiv Sena supporters poured oil on the test match square at the Wankhede stadium in Bombay. Three years later another Pakistani tour was called off at the last minute." (p.193)

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team's players were available and at their best during these matches. He also

made token political appearances and presentations at several of these

matches to convey his authority and a sense of national unity to audiences at

home and abroad, especially during periods of regional unrest. For its part, the

BCCP followed Zia's lead. In the 1980s they were particularly severe on their

players in the lead up to a test series against India. They ran player camps for

seasoned internationals and test match hopefuls well in advance of the playing schedule. In one such instance, 38 players were summoned to appear in

Lahore for a probables camp in August 1983. Many of these players were

based in England where they played league cricket. The uncompromising

nature of the BCCP request left most of these players out of pocket and in

search of newer cricket opportunities once their contracts with English league

teams were terminated.61 The irony to this story is that the majority of the

players chosen for the probables camp stood little if any chance of forcing

themselves into the national team. The unsympathetic stance of the BCCP in

matters regarding these players livelihoods left a lot to be desired. Then again,

the BCCP strategy in India/Pakistan matches was at all times informed by the

official national discourse that held India as the enemy; and this meant that

Pakistani players, even if they were unlikely to be chosen for national duty, had

to be prepared as thoroughly as possible for the challenges that lay ahead.

The political appropriation of cricket in Pakistan has seen the game

become more aligned with the foreign policy imperatives of its government.

Bhutto had used cricket along with other sports to develop diplomatic ties with

other third world nations that took issue with Pakistan's membership of SEATO

and CENTO. Under Zia the BCCP worked assiduously to strengthen its

international profile and to dismantle the old colonial network that controlled the

game. In recent years Pakistan has been proactive in its endorsement of 'third

world' cricket nations like Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh in their pursuit

for ICC test match status. They also strongly support the development of the

game in Kenya and the Middle East, where many Pakistanis reside and play

cricket, to make cricket more representative internationally. lt is also considered

a means to redress the strong and conspicuous western orientation of the I CC.

Pakistan has long resented Britain's monopolistic control of world cricket.

Zia's lslamicisation program saw greater levels of Islamic content

permeate the popular culture of Pakistan. His appointment of officials to control

and monitor the proceedings of numerous cultural organisations and pastimes,

and his reforms in education, economics and the legal system gave rise to a

61 Dawn, 19 June 1984.

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greater social practice of Islam in everyday public life. The practice of Islam became synonymous with many professions and popular customs. it soon became more noticeable in the administration and promotion of cricket itself. At the end of the 20th century Pakistani cricket authorities and players had developed religio-cultural safeguards to shield themselves from the pejorative and defamatory remarks that western cricket players and officials had made about their country, playing facilities and integrity over the years. In response to accusations vilifying the ethical standards of Pakistani umpires and players for unfair dismissals and match-fixing, and criticism of local hospitality laws, including food, hygiene and accommodation, the cricket authorities and players of Pakistan have become self-sufficient and forged their own distinct way of doing things. One of these ways has been to identify themselves more readily with Islam and to see themselves as the Muslim representatives of a game controlled by Anglo-Europeans. However, the u/ama continue to distance themselves from the game, as they have done with many other British traditions. 62 Islam as practised by Pakistani cricket authorities and players is both of religious and symbolic value, and its purpose is to solidify team unity and cohesion against those who object to the way in which they organise and play the game.

COUNTER-CRICKET NARRATIVES Alternative narratives of cricket nationalism are more prevalent amongst

the Pakistani diaspora than they are at home. This is because the repressive rule of authoritarian leaders does not extend to diaspora communities as it does to those in Pakistan. Without the inhibitions of authoritarian rule and reprisals for dissent that restrict national debate within Pakistan the former are free to contest unpopular and undemocratic constructions of identity. This will be the subject of the following chapter. In the remaining section of this chapter the nature of appositional narratives to official cricket nationalism in Pakistan will be discussed. These are few and have been little examined. In fact, there has been no significant scholarly evaluation of their relevance to Pakistani nationalism. and national consciousness to date. However, they do exist and they are enough to warrant the attention of politicians when they are perceived to be getting out of hand.

62 Dawn, 20 July 1983. Dr Asrar Ahmad "a distinguished religious scholar" denounced cricket because "it paralysed all constructive activity throughout the duration" of a game, and its television coverage was "likely to arouse an erotic sensation among feminine spectators." He, like many other religious authorities, called for the game to be banned.

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i) Pakistani international cricket players

The first and most recognisable alternative to official Pakistani cricket nationalism and national identity has come from the players themselves. As discussed above in relation to the changes the international game had to endure from cultural and economic global enterprises from the second half of the 20th century and the stresses this had for home sports governing bodies, Pakistan's cricket players during this period became more vocal and placed more demands on constructions of nationalism than they had at any time previously. Their rise as a voice in the debate over national identity coincided with the government's appropriation of cricket. This set both of them on a collision-course. In lmran Khan's confrontation with Rafi Naseem it is evident that the clash between the players and government officials with a political agenda to uphold was quite detrimental to the fortunes of the cricket team: lmran points out that coming as it did during a closely fought decider between his team and that of the West lndies, it affected his judgement and efficiency as a captain and was thereby instrumental in Pakistan's loss.

The clash between the two was crucial to an understanding of the underlying conflict over identity that exists in Pakistan and that one government after another has tried to mask since 1947. Because Pakistan is a nation brought to existence by its political elite and constructed to represent their vision of nation-statehood, they have not taken kindly to requests or challenges for change by other social and cultural groups. This has certainly been the case in the control of cricket since Bhutto took a more active involvement in the affairs of the game in the early 1970s. Kardar's leadership of the BCCP during this period and, more importantly, his whole outlook in life, which was the product of colonial educational policies and etiquette mixed with indigenous nationalist objectives, and represented the ideals of Pakistan's earliest politicians up to Ayub Khan, carne under challenge from domestic cricket players exposed to western culture and, ultimately, from Bhutto himself. Kardar's demise as a voice of authority and reason in debates concerning national identity earned him the sympathy of his cricket colleagues, but little else.63 He was seen to be expendable in the changing cultural and political climate of Bhutto's Pakistan.

Under Zia challenges to the official national discourse became more punishable and this destabilised the domestic game in unexpected ways even as the Pakistani cricket team was enjoying enormous success internationally.

63 Interviews with Hanif Mohammed (Karachi, 20 November 2000) and Sultan Mahmood (Lahore, 29 October 2000).

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Numerous intrigues and rivalries began to fester over leadership of the BCCP and the national cricket team. Part of this was the result of Zia's hardened Islamic approach to government. Zia expected players and administrators to always be at their best and most proficient when representing Pakistan abroad. The image of a nation resolute and strong under the banner of Islam was very important to him. Anything that contravened this, and this included scandal, poor performances and unsatisfactory conduct, was dealt with harshly. Not even military generals appointed to run the game were exempt from his wrath. However, hardened social controls in everyday public life in Pakistan meant that players often availed themselves of pleasures and luxuries abroad and transgressed against the Puritan Islamist values that were increasingly being enforced at home.64 Also, the fact that players and administrators were under threat to behave and perform allowed rivalries to intensify. Those seeking to undermine and sabotage the credentials of incumbent players, test captains and officials were aware that rumour, defamatory remarks and outright opposition could work to their advantage as they were more than likely to come to the attention of Zia who would be pressed upon to act and resolve them.

The Pakistan tour of Australia in 1983 was replete with scandal and misconduct that besmirched the reputation and career of a player like Qasim Omer. In recent times Omer has sought to explain the events of that tour in ways unflattering to officials of the Australian Cricket Board and the commentators of Channel 9, by suggesting that all were involved in an intricate match-fixing racket that offered Pakistani players financial bribes and sexual favours for their compliance. Omer suggests that he was paid (Aus)$500 "to throw his wicket away in the first Test in Perth in 1983". Allegations levelled at Australian cricket officials and commentators have not been substantiated; but there is no doubt, according to the diary entries of a woman who worked at the Channel 9 canteen at the time, referred to as Miss P in The Sydney Morning Herald article, that the Pakistani team "was almost awash with sexual offers on that tour ... But this was voluntary."65 If nothing else, this tour is an example of the extent to which players, freed from the repressive social controls of the Zia regime in the 1980s, could behave. The aftermath of this behaviour and the loss in the test series meant wholesale changes to the team, simply because they were adjudged by Zia to have lowered their standards and given the nation bad publicity abroad. This austere judgement of player behaviour continues to date.

64 H. McDonald & K. McCiymont, "Sex, Lies and Cricket", in The Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday 13 March 2001.

65 ibid.

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A rift between the Pakistani coach, Javed Miandad, and a group of senior players on a 2001 tour to New Zealand, where it was said in a leaked report by team manager Faqir Aizazuddin that "Although Miandad wanted to combine the players' efforts, talent and experience, the senior members of the side gave little thoughts to his words", offers another example of government intervention to control its cricket players.66 The report stated that the senior players were averse to Miandad's tactics and showed little interest in tour matches. The PCBs response to this was clearly voiced by its Chairman, Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, who promised a meeting to appoint a new captain and advised Miandad to stay on as coach despite his request to relinquish the position.67

ii) Street cricket cultures as counter-narratives Other notable ways in which alternative narratives of cricket nationalism

have been expressed can be found in the street cultures of the masses throughout Pakistan and in the cricket milieus of the NWFP and Baluchistan. The only writing on this type of cricket to date has been that of travel writers, journalists and others in a freelance capacity or out of general interest. What is captured in their writing is the excitement and energy of those who participate in numerous informal and improvised cricket matches played against colourful urban and rural backdrops that include religious places of worship, monumental historical architecture, billboard hoardings advertising the latest in toiletries, computer technology, automobiles and the Bollywood film industry, vast tracts of arid and verdant land and the imposing peaks of some of the world's largest mountains. These accounts often conceal the political and cultural significance of an alternative and vibrant cricket idiom that is the product of alienated and impoverished communities in Pakistan.

Street cricket, or galli cricket as it is most commonly referred to in South Asia, is left alone by the authorities because it is a useful nursery of talent, but in a passive sense it is also an oppositional discourse because of its potential to capture the diversity of Pakistani society and to provide a better appreciation of the variety of narratives that inform Pakistani nationalism, and that have to date been subdued by its politicians. Deprived of access to the formal cricket culture because of their poverty and a lack of infrastructure for the game, these cricketers have invented their own means of playing cricket and their own unique way of doing so. Because of the lack of serious writing on the various informal cricket cultures of the masses that are scattered throughout Pakistan it is hard to gauge and appreciate the variety and intensity of these games and

66 "Rift in Pakistan Team Exposed", Associated Foreign Press, Monday 2 Apri12001. 67 ibid.

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their significance to the national narrative. These games have arisen out of complex motives that are linked to national and global media, communication and commercial industries, along with government attempts to eo-opt the

masses into an overarching national identity and the numerous regional and cultural responses of opposition to this. At one level the players of informal cricket cultures identify with Pakistan and its national cricket team. This can be seen in their donning of the traditional white uniform and the Pakistani one day alternative strip, and their support for the team that is evident when they gather to follow its fortunes through broadcasting mediums provided by shopowners and others in traditional market and domestic settings. At another level entirely, their improvised organisation of matches, teams and playing areas, and their

flamboyant and less rule-bound style of play is clearly at odds with the formal rules and regulations of the PCB and the international authorities for the game.

In this way, players and organisers of informal cricket matches show initiative and innovation that defies the construction of official Pakistani cricket nationalism.

The use of informal cricket cultures in opposition to the dominant discourse of cricket nationalism becomes more apparent when assessing the

occasional organised offshoots of these games. Street cricket tournaments organised by independent community and religious groups challenge the authority of the PCB and the political regime in their capacity as spokespersons

for the game. Their use of improvised arrangements that subvert the rules, structure and leadership of the official discourse for cricket provide numerous and viable alternatives that empower communities alienated by the political system. These tournaments which are a hybrid version of the official game and various adaptations of it allow communities and cultural groups left out of the official narrative of Pakistan the opportunity to construct their own identities using cricket to represent their regional and cultural allegiances and to interpret the level of their national association.

In the 1990s numerous street cricket tournaments sprung up in several South Asian cities. In Pakistan itself these tournaments particularly flourished in Lahore and Karachi. There are differences in the interpretation of rules and the

playing areas of each of these tournaments but essentially they are "either held in small grounds under floodlights or on deserted streets under normal street lighting."68 These tournaments are mostly staged by interested groups and are likely to be played when organisers and players agree over dates and venues; there is no formal calendar for the staging of such tournaments. One constant in

68 E. Levine, Cricket: A Kind of Pilgrimage, Local Colour Ltd., Hong Kong, 1996, p.133.

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the scheduling of these tournaments during the 1990s has been the fasting period of Ramadan. Street cricket tournaments seem to proliferate during this period. Generally they are staged sometime between sunset and sunrise to not interfere with the hours of fasting and prayer, and they are viewed as an important, though minor, cultural adjunct and diversion to the more formal aspects of religious observance by many. They also allow for the presence of a carnivalesque and celebratory aura that helps to solidify the bonds that bring these communities together during Rarnadan;69 again, this should not be overstated in relation to religion and the importance of fasting and prayer to the faithful in this period.

In one particular tournament staged in Lahore and organised by Shebab­e-Mili (Youth of the Nation) with the support of the Urdu newspaper Daily Pakistan, 264 teams were entered.70 An interesting insight to all this is that Shebab-e-Mili is a religious group and through the support offered by the Daily Pakistan they were able to promote the tournament and themselves as an organisation. This is instructive in three possible ways: first, it shows the link between the masses and religious organisations and groups who provide cultural entertainment to be strong; second, religious groups who are opposed to the elite anglophone official cricket culture per se are less so to the hybrid and informal variants played by the masses; and, third, and possibly in opposition to the second point, there may perhaps be a generational shift occurring amongst religious clerics which sees younger members of them willing to at least tone down their traditional dislike for cricket as they are beginning to do so in other cultural areas.71

The informal cricket culture of the masses has similarities to the street theatre, or Parallel Theatre Movement, productions of various disenfranchised and discriminated groups in the Punjab. These theatrical productions have been set up in opposition to the "commercial theatrical tradition of urban Punjab" and are performed "in various outdoor locations including on street corners as well as the lawns of cultural centers like the Goethe Institute of Lahore, at inner-city

69 ibid. 70 ibid., p.136. 71 R. S. Akhtar, Media, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, OUP, Oxford 2000, p.61. In a sample conducted by the author that included 50 members of the Pakistani ulama it was found that amongst them there was strong approval "(85 per cent yes) that in this age of global media the Muslim people should compete with others to project their point of view, and make efforts to attract the global audience. They also approved (69 per cent) that students in religious institutions should be provided with television and radio."

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locations as well as factory sites and village "maidans" or open parks."72 Alternative street theatre emerged during the Zia period and attempted to subvert dominant constructions of identity, patriarchal authority and political appropriation of the dramatic arts and other popular artistic and cultural expressions. it appealed particularly to women, religious minorities and the poor who used this type of theatre as a forum to voice their dissent at the government and its repressive policies. Street theatre groups emerged initially in Lahore and spread rapidly into other areas of the Punjab including Rawalpindi and Multan; more recently various spin-offs can be found outside of the Punjab, particularly in Karachi.73 What is interesting about them other than their discernible opposition to the government and the risk they take to depict this in their performances is their diverse and conflicting membership. Because recruits of street theatre performance groups come from a wide array of social and class backgrounds this can often lead to protracted debate over what to perforrn.74 Nevertheless, these theatrical productions are crucial because like their cricket variants they offer alternative appraisals and counter-narratives to the dominant discourse of Pakistani nationalism. Or, as argued by the author herself,

I am convinced that the Parallel Theatre Movement in Pakistan constitutes a locus of cultural conflict where issues concerning women's rights, class structures, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and language politics are defined and contested in the evolving and often conflictual relationship between the Pakistani state and Pakistani society. lt is also my contention that the subject matter of Ajoha (one of these groups) and its counterparts is "revolutionary" in the sense that it questions previous and current state policies that have curtailed the rights of women and secular individuals as well as leftist intellectuals and writers like Faiz Ahmed Faiz.75

There has not been a palpable and transparent attempt by the cricket authorities or politicians of Pakistan to appropriate the informal cricket culture of the masses. To date this alternative cricket idiom has not been perceived as a

72 F. Afzai-Khan, "Street Theatre in Pakistani Punjab: The Case of Ajoka, Lok Rehas, and the Woman Question", in The Drama Review, 41, 3 , Fall, 1997, New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p.40. 73 ibid.

74 ibid., p.41. The author writes that recruits come from the "urban working class to the upper-middle-class urban intelligentsia."

75 ibid., pp.40-41.

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threat to the official national narrative. However, as raised in the previous chapter, most cricket recruits these days are from poorer urban and rural localities and this may point to some level of government control over these less formal variants of the game. This type of argument is complicated and contentious and highlights the myriad permutations and ironies of Pakistani society. On the one hand, one can argue that the government indirectly appropriates the informal cricket culture of the masses by its active recruitment of street cricketers and their subsequent adoption of the more formal aspects of the game including the etiquette and structure of the dominant culture; on the other hand, there is cause to believe that these street cricketers carry with them the flair, pluck, flamboyance, uncertainty and improvised nature of the subaltern culture, and that this goes a long way to explaining the distinct character and idiosyncratic appearance of Pakistani cricket to international audiences. lt was briefly argued in the previous chapter that Pakistani cricketers whose origins are outside of the power elite fuse aspects of both the informal and formal variants of cricket to produce a hybrid style of play that is distinctly and identifiably their own. This in turn helps to enrich the official narrative of Pakistani cricket nationalism even while it is being controlled by the political elite. In other words, alternative and subaltern approaches to playing cricket are inadvertently seeping into the formal game under the unsuspecting guard of its controlling authorities.

iii) Alternative regional cricket cultures As well as the narratives of international Pakistani cricketers and street

cricket there exist alternative regional cultures of cricket that have very little writing on them. Both Baluchistan and the NWFP have had structure imposed upon them by the PCB from the very beginning of domestic cricket in the country. Cricket in both these areas was primarily centred in Quetta and Peshawar respectively where a paucity of facilities and funding went into the recruitment of players mostly from Lahore and Karachi so that teams representing these regions could exhibit a veneer of national cooperation. Both these cities have had teams in local cricket and secondary school competitions, but they lacked the infrastructure and supportive capacity of the PCB which was too distant to them, and which itself lacked suitable funding and structure to run cricket on a nationwide basis.76

Despite these setbacks, informal variants of cricket have sprung up in Peshawar, Quetta and amongst the Afghan refugee communities stranded in Pakistan. Street cricket has proliferated amongst the youth of both these

76 S. I. Bokhari, "Cricket in Baluchistan needs Encouragement", in Dawn, 8 September 1975.

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centres and those of refugee communities. lt is intrinsically linked to the identity of ethnic Pathans, both in the NWFP and the urban areas of Baluchistan where they are heavily concentrated, and for this reason alone it offers an alternative and counter-narrative to the official discourse. Of course, Pathans have represented Pakistan at the national level, but their allegiances and identities are every bit as fluid and adaptable as the street cricketers from other regions. As Stuart Hall reminds us:

Cultural identity ... is a matter of "becoming" as well as "being." lt belongs to the future as much as the past. lt is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history, and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous "play" of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in a mere "recovery" of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.77

Therefore, the Pathans who have played cricket for Pakistan identify both with the national team and their regional culture. They are comfortable with both because cricket has provided them with the opportunity to broaden their cultural identities and to relate to the national discourse in ways they have not been able to do so politically. In light of this, and despite strong government control, cricket in Pakistan has been far more successful at bridging existing cultural differences and promoting national unity than have the nation's political leaders. The game is far closer to the ideals of the Pakistani project and more representative of the nation as a whole. lt continues to grow in its appeal to the masses because it has allowed for their inclusion, whereas the political system has not.

Another development of cultural significance has been the adoption of cricket by Afghan refugees. An estimated 3.5 million refugees found themselves seeking sanctuary on the Pakistan side of the border during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Of these, 2.2 million were in camps in Peshawar and its surrounding districtsJB lt was there that many of these refugees were first

77 Quote by Stuart Hall in bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation, South End Press, Boston, MA, 1992, p.S.

78 Levine, p.71.

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exposed to cricket. During the 1990s Emma Levine found that Afghan youths were quite receptive to the game and looked forward to its development as a national sport in the not too distant future: "They (Afghan youths) spoke of their admiration for the Pakistani players. If peace ever comes to Afghanistan, they said, they would be able to field a good cricket team when they returned home."79

In 2001 Afghanistan was arranging to send its first cricket team on a tour to Pakistan for four unofficial one day games against local teams in Peshawar and Rawalpindi. The PCB announced through a press statement that the tour was "a gesture of goodwill between the two countries to promote cricket in Afghanistan."BO This was during the Taliban's hold on power when Afghanistan had been isolated from the community of nations because of the repressive and inhumane rule of its leaders. Pakistan was the only nation that recognised the Taliban's rule as legitimate and its support of Afghanistan's cricket team was an indication of the extent to which the game in Pakistan had become aligned to the foreign policy interests of its government. On the other hand, the adoption of cricket by Afghan youths within the context of Pathan street cricket cultures in Peshawar that were heavily linked to ethnic identity politics and the global Pakistani cricket package that came to them via the media allowed for the development of yet another alternative discourse to that of the official Pakistani narrative. This alternative discourse was that of Afghan youths stranded in Pakistan who were trying to make sense of their cultural and political displacement in light of the circumstances that surrounded them in the 1990s. The fiuidity of cultural exchange that cricket fostered in the NWFP saw Afghan youths identify with the superstars of Pakistani cricket and, in turn, this was used by them to shape meaning from the game to reflect their cultural experiences and political predicament during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. it was a discourse expressive of explicit political and cultural symbolism that had been fostered in Pakistan and contravened with the official national narrative of its government.

CONCLUSION The political appropriation of cricket in Pakistan came at a time of

increased exposure for the game worldwide. Both Bhutto and Zia used the growing success of the national cricket team in the 1970s and 80s to validate the legitimacy of their rule and the official national discourse of Pakistan. The

79 ibid.

80 30 April, 2001, Karachi, undisclosed source.

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greater international profile of Pakistani cricket from the last quarter of the 20th century has given rise to government intervention in the running and control of the domestic game and national team selection. Cricket has thus become a crucial component in the political construction of national consciousness and identity, seeking as it does to forge a unity out of the disparate cultural groups that exist in Pakistan.

This chapter has also discussed the coexistence of alternative narrations of cricket nationalism to that of the dominant discourse. These are specific to particular cultural groups and compete for space and recognition in the overall discussion on identity and political socialisation. On the one hand, they emphasise the conflict that exists between the dominant national discourse and the competing narratives of ethno-cultural groups who demand a greater say in matters pertaining to their sense of identity and group belonging; on the other hand, they capture the capacity for adaptation inherent in individuals who are exposed to these competing ideologies, and the levels of acceptance and resistance shown to them in the face of mounting pressures to conform to, reject, or adopt several or all aspects of them. This conflict over national and cultural identities that is a feature of contemporary Pakistani society is explicit in competing narratives of cricket nationalism and transnationalism - as in the case of Afghan youths in the NWFP. Players have not found it difficult to uphold their own cultural and regional identities even when appearing in test matches for Pakistan. The parochial and authoritarian nature of political leadership in Pakistan has not deterred them from cultivating multiple identities to relate to changing circumstances taking place at home and abroad that have impacted upon them. They have become flexible and alternate frequently and quite easily from regional and national to global cricket cultures, and from low-key and informal to highly organised, controlled and professional ones. These have all placed constraints on those who monopolise power in Pakistan and who purport to speak for all. The latter's voice of authority and their calls for political unity are under threat in cricket circles as they are in society at large. They are particularly at risk from the constructions of cultural, national and global identities currently undertaken by the Pakistani diaspora in England. The next chapter will begin to assess the significance of these communities to the discourse of Pakistani cricket nationalism to describe the extent to which they contribute to and impact on the narratives of subaltern groups and the political elite. The aim will be to show the fluidity of national constructions of identity in a global world and how this provides a better understanding of what it means to be Pakistani than that forcibly offered by the government of Pakistan.

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CHAPTER 7 RUNS IN THE OUTFIELD:

THE PAKISTANI DIASPORA AND CRICKET IN ENGLAND

In an age of heightened global flows and disjunctures the transnational appeal of the idea of Pakistan has grown. The socio-political context of diaspora marginalisation in England, along with stronger transnational linkages between migrants and their regions of origin in Pakistan, has led to the development of other Pakistani identities that subvert the authoritarian political discourse of officialdom in lslamabad. it has been argued throughout this thesis that the official narrative of Pakistan has not been successful in constructing a monolithic vision of 'national identity' that could displace the older sources of identity - region, language, sectarian religion and social status-group. The actual communities that make up the Pakistani population in Pakistan and the diaspora have sought to construct alternative narratives that provide diverse interpretations of the nature of Pakistani identity that make sense of the cultural realities each group has to grapple with in an increasingly globalised environment.

The chapter will divide into two sections. The first will assess the relevance of postmodernism, globalisation and cultural hybridity theory to the construction of identities beyond the parameters of the nation state. The point to make here is that global national identities like those of Pakistani communities in England are flexible in their composition and hybrid in their articulation, and are one strand of a complex web of multiple and disjunctive identities in response to diaspora rejection and marginilisation from mainstream society. The cultural chauvinism of English society and the reality of lslamophobia and institutional racism has solidified the links between the diaspora and the concept of Pakistan despite the inherent situational and growing cultural divisions between the two. In this context the cultivation of traditional and western popular cultural idioms by the Pakistani diaspora provides numerous imagined and powerful cultural expressions of empowerment for an otherwise divided and heterogeneous people.

The second section will analyse the emergence of disparate British­Pakistani cricket cultures and their relevance to discussions on Pakistani national consciousness and identity. it will be argued that these discourses from diaspora communities in England provide crucial insights into the construction of political and cultural identities. Their disposition to be pluralistic,

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heterogeneous and composed of numerous cultural and political influences reflects the reality of historical human interchange. As such, they are rebuttals of simplistic modernist constructions of identity, particularly of the type emanating from the discourses of authoritarian political leaders like those in Pakistan.

The growth of Pakistani identity politics and South Asian culture in England relates to the peculiarities of post war immigration. In the 1950s migrants from India and Pakistan arrived in England "to fill gaps in the lower orders of the British labour market" during a period of post war economic expansion.1 Mostly unskilled, they sought and were given work in menial factory jobs predominantly in the West Midlands, Lancashire and Yorkshire. Their work was tedious, repetitive and excessively time-consuming. Their wages were minimal and placed them on "the lowest rungs of the British employment hierarchy."2 The majority of them had rural origins and arrived in England on chain migration schemes supported by the British government. They were part of a broader population movement that took place in the 1950s and early 1960s when migrants from the newly independent states of the former British and French colonial empires, bereft of funds and opportunity, resettled in the developed nations of Europe and North America to escape poverty. These migrations were directly related to the history of colonial exploitation that left former colonies with a surplus workforce, "but with insufficient means to make this labour productive". 3

The nature of chain migration, encouraged as it was by immigration officials in England, led to the over-representation of migrants from particular South Asian regions and villages in specific manufacturing sectors. Pakistanis, predominantly from Mirpur but also from the Punjab and Bengal, and Indian Punjabis, both Hindus and Sikhs, Bengalis and Gujeratis were drawn to the production of textiles, engineering and metal goods, metal manufacturing and chemicals, and transport and communications4 According to the 1971 British

I V. Robinson, "Boom and Gloom: the Success and Failure of South Asians in Britain", in C. Clarke, C. Peach & S. Vertovec (eds.), South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1990, p.273. 2 A. Brah, Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities, Routledge, London, 1996, p.21. 3 ibid. 4 Robinson, "Boom and Gloom ... ", p.277. Referring to the 1971 Census Robinson writes that Pakistanis comprised 18.9 per cent of the workforce in textile production, 17.8 per cent in engineertng and metal goods, 11.3 per cent in metal manufacturing and chemicals, and 6.8 per cent in transport and communications. The Indian equivalent was 6.8 per cent, 17.7 per cent, 11.3 per cent and 10.5 per cent, respectively. He also points to the spatial clustering of South Asian migrants into the 6 conurbations of

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Census, the majority of immigrants from Pakistan were concentrated in London (22 per cent), the West Midlands (17 per cent) and West Yorkshire (16 per cent), particularly in Bradford. Furthermore, Vaughan Robinson argues that South Asian immigrants found themselves clustered in cities that were not "dependent upon an essentially twentieth-century economic base", and concentrated in neighbourhoods "which encircled the commercial heart of a city, where they were in close proximity both to public transport and to places of work such as foundries or textile mills."5 For the most part these areas lacked suitable social services and educational facilities, and as a consequence unemployment was high and criminal activity developed as an alternative source of income on the margins of the immigrant community. 6

The earliest migrants from Pakistan identified with their places of origin and not with England. They were well aware of their obligations and ties to family and their home regions in South Asia. Despite the low wages, long hours and menial duties they were exposed to in England, their income far exceeded their meagre earnings back home. For this reason most of these migrants were young men, often married, who had made the journey to England on behalf of their extended families - including spouses, children, parents and siblings - to raise sufficient funds for the upkeep of all. Their stay was meant to be temporary and they did not, initially, envisage acculturation to, and permanent settlement in, the host community as they were duty bound to return home and reunite with family who had entrusted them with scarce resources for the undertaking.

These migrants were not in any way confused about who they were, where they came from and why they were in England. In light of the discussion of previous chapters they all identified with their regions of origin in Pakistan and not with the nation itself. In the early 1950s to the early 1960s the idea of Pakistan had made little impact on peasant migrants from Mirpur and rural parts of the Punjab and Bengal. In fact, it is the argument of this chapter that a Pakistani identity, subscribing to the concept of Pakistani nationhood, albeit diverging in some respects from the official narrative of the Pakistani government, developed among the diaspora in England due to experiences there and not simply because of influences emanating from the home country. The conscious adoption of a Pakistani identity developed later and was the result of the distinctive English practice of standardising complex and

Greater London, the West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Tyneside and West Yorkshire.

5 ibid., p.279.

6 Brah, p.22.

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variegated identities into a whole rather than any concerted effort on the part of the Pakistani government to impose its vision of a Pakistani identity. At a later stage global cultural transmissions between Britain and South Asia generated a kind of international Pakistani popular culture whose elements became conceptual building blocks in the construction of a second and third generation English diaspora Pakistani identity. This became crucial in the construction of a Pakistani consciousness among the diaspora in opposition to their marginilisation. On the other hand, those who migrated from Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s shared a common religious heritage that provided a bulwark against the assimilative embrace of western cultural influences and offered some level of unity, but they differed from one another on issues of kinship and culture that were specific to their local origins and often had more in common with members of other religious groups from their native regions than they did with fellow Muslims from other parts of South Asia.

Distinctive 'Pakistani' diaspora identities began to appear in the early to mid 1970s when more and more migrants settled permanently in England. Permanent settlement was never systematically imposed by the British government or consciously espoused by immigrants but came about in response to changing immigration laws, economic conditions and social realities that prolonged the stay of migrants to the point where they could no longer return to Pakistan. Among these were the introduction of the 1971 Immigration Act which debarred anyone not a dependent or fiance of an English citizen from entering England,? a growing economic recession which made remittances less feasible, particularly when families were reuniting in England, a trend aggravated by the down-sizing of the public economic sector that led to the retrenchment of many Pakistani workers, and the exposure of subsequent generations to an English education and western cultural idioms that challenged and ultimately redefined existing notions of diaspora identity. Many of the first generation of migrants never relinquished hope of returning to Pakistan but their children, raised and schooled in England, did not share this aspiration and saw their British place of residence as their real homeland. With settlement and the emergence of English born children of Pakistani heritage diaspora identities began to reflect conscious and involuntary efforts to reconcile the inherited / traditions of the homeland culture with popular cultural influences and styles from the west.

it is worth examining the basis of the diaspora's appropriation of the idea/ of Pakistan within the context of England and in relation to notions of

7 ibid., p.37.

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postmodernity, globalisation and hybridity. The concept of Pakistan as an imagined homeland is crucial to the Pakistani diaspora and is the direct result of the lslamophobia and institutional racism that they have endured in England. lslamophobia is the term adopted by the Runnymede Trust in their studies of racism in England and the effect this has had on migrants, particularly British Muslims. lslamophobia can be summarised as:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to Muslims because of their religion. lt can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and stereotyping which disadvantage Muslims. a

The Runnymede Trust in their 1997 study depicted lslamophobia as an extensive and ubiquitous problem in English society. They found that political, social and cultural institutions, as well as everyday opinion, expressed "closed views of Islam" and regarded it as "inferior to the West - barbaric, irrational, primitive, (and) sexist"; and as "violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism (and) engaged in 'a clash of civilisations."'9 The consequence of all this has been the continual justification of discrimination and open hostility towards Muslims that has contributed to their overall exclusion from mainstream society. The study pointed to police harassment, employment and service inefficiencies, educational biases, and the media portrayal of Islam as an "essentially foreign" and hostile religion as major issues working against Muslim integration and acceptance into English society.

Police harassment is of particular concern to British Muslims. They perceive the police service to be racist in its "disproportionate use of stop and search powers, discrimination in responding to calls, harassment of Muslims, 'macho, nationalistic and colonial' attitudes, and the failure of the service to recruit and retain Muslims."10 Complaints against police maltreatment include numerous stories like that of a 29 year old undisclosed victim who was physically assaulted by police officers in December 2003 and taunted with racist remarks like, "Where is your God now?" And, "You will remember this day for

8 Adapted from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report cited in R. Richardson (ed.), lslamophobia: issues, Challenges and Action, A Report by the Commission on British Muslims and lslamophobia, Trentham Books, Stoke on Trent, UK, 2004, p.14. 9 R. Richardson (ed.), lslamophobia: A Challenge For Us All, Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and lslamophobia, The Runnymede Trust, UK, 1997, p.5 & pp.6-12. 10 Js/amophobia, (2004), p.36.

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the rest of your life you fucking bastard". A medical examination three days later found the victim nursing "injuries to his face, scalp, neck, chest, back, upper arm, elbow, forearm, abdomen, thigh and both feet. Tests found blood in his urine."11

This type of behaviour towards British Muslims has alienated them and despite their cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences they have come together to openly criticise and quite often oppose the institutional bastions of English conservatism. Having been categorised as one group of people perennially different and culturally inferior to white English society, British Muslims have united over issues and instances of prejudice directed at them. This can be seen in classrooms throughout England.12 in organised rallies for cultural and religious preservation like the numerous marches against the publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in 1989,13 and spontaneous uprisings of open defiance against the perceived injustices of law enforcement like those which took place in Bradford in 1995 and 2001 and in numerous other cities with a high concentration of British Muslims.

Roger Ballard has argued that issues of race relations and hostility towards Islam in England and other European countries are the product of medieval constructions of Europe. He refutes pre-20th century biological justifications of European supremacy on the grounds that its arbitrarily constructed boundaries offer no scientific or historical basis for skin colour differential between Europeans and others; nor have they done away with internal social, cultural and linguistic variations and external borrowings and

11 ibid., p.37. 12 L. Archer, Race, Masculinity and Schooling: Muslim Boys and Education, Open University Press, Maidenhead, Berkshire, England, 2003, pp.122-127. Louise Archer examines a series of responses to racism by Muslim students in the British school system. These range from violence and counter-racism to the complete disregard of abuse. 13 Interview of Ashis Nandy conducted by Nikos Papastergiadis in N. Papastergiadis, Dialogues in the Diasporas: Essays and Conversations on Cultural Hybridity, Rivers Oram Press, London, 1998, pp.1 00-1 06. Nandy warns of the limits of a perceived Muslim unity when he criticises the paucity and "bankruptcy of the global knowledge system, when faced with problems of freedom and dissent." He argues that academics and the media in the west interpreted protests by Muslims in opposition to The Satanic Verses in an unjust and partisan manner by casting them as "intrinsically violent", 'unified in their support of Khomeini" and opposed to freedom of speech. This being another example of the stereotyping of Muslims as unruly and irrational by experts from the west who give scant regard to the depth and complexities of human expression and cultural difference, particularly when it is deemed to be that of a subordinate group of people -an Other.

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similarities.14 Rather, the idea of Europe was predicated on the perceived "disjunction between Christendom and Islam" upheld by the Church and mythologised during one Crusade after another by those charged to win back the Holy Land. The rationale for the Crusades was grounded on the conceptualisation that Islam was a hostile, impure and duplicitous "other'', and, if not checked, it would subdue and persecute the Christian faithful. Definitional dichotomies were constructed whereby everything Christian was seen as "chaste", "merciful" and "righteous", and everything Muslim as "licentious", "vicious" and "sinful" .

... it follows that the ascription of such catalogue of inadequacy to Islam and its Prophet was of immense convenience to the Crusaders since it allowed them to comprehensively differentiate themselves from their opponents whilst also underlining the inherent justice of their cause ...

Given their use of such a frame of reference, the quite outrageous way in which the Crusaders behaved towards all those whom they encountered once they had crossed the Bosphorous and entered Muslim-controlled territory becomes more explicable- although in no sense more justifiable.15

This religious 'Enlightenment' racial

cultural prejudice is combined with biological prejudices that are still part of the 'white' British

construction of the 'foreignness' of non-white immigrants. But while the Christian West Indian and Hindu and Sikh Indians are also subjected to this racism, British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the other hand suffer on both counts: racial and colour discrimination and lslamophobia; and this has led to their cultural alienation and social ghettoisation in England.16 Identification with Islam among Muslims in the diaspora is stronger than any other mode of identity. it is the one constant shared by all of them, and it is particularly so because of the historical distortions and fabricated biases of those in positions of power in the west. it helps to explain their united front against anything that aims to undermine and disparage the religious tenets and ritual practices of their faith. it has been and continues to be the one thing that unites all among

14 R. Ballard, "Islam and the Construction of Europe', in WAR. Shahid & P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kok Pharos, Kampen, 1996. 15 ibid.

16 ibid.

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the Pakistani diaspora and their primary source of cultural, social and spiritual growth despite all that may divide them.17

it is this strong conviction of Islam as the correct path in a hostile political milieu that allows notions of Pakistan as the imaginary homeland to flourish. Despite its failures as a political concept in its place of origin the idea of Pakistan resonates among disenchanted and marginalised members of the diaspora in England because of its pledge for salvation to Muslim minorities in a land where they are overwhelmingly outnumbered by a 'hostile' cultural and religious 'other'. In colonial India this hostile 'other' centred around essentialist constructions of Hinduism; in England it has focussed on similar constructions of white English society for its failure to accept them. And this has happened despite the failure to justify the "two-nation" theory and the historical authenticity of Pakistan by politicians before and after partition.

Among the diaspora there are many expressions of Pakistan as an imagined homeland. This points to the diversity of all those who have been categorised as Pakistani, or who have come to embrace a Pakistani identity amidst multiple other ways of defining themselves, as individuals and as part of numerous cultural groups. Individual and group identities vary from person to person and are contingent upon experiences and interpretations encountered in the diaspora via multiple and complex systems of socialisation and communication. Pakistan as a concept promising political and religious freedom from oppression may unite the diaspora in the face of racism, but for many it serves no more than a symbolic basis for their cultural uplift. Pakistan has become a hybrid term, a multiple imagining, for marginalised Muslims who seek to overcome ignorance in England where the majority of the second generation onwards believe they belong, and not a call for repatriation to a spiritual homeland that most of them have never set foot in. One of the ironies of post war migration to England is that the first generation of migrants still have ambitions to return to their homeland, but for many it is one based on ethnic and regional associations and not on a national covenant; whereas the concept of Pakistan as an imagined homeland is proclaimed by subsequent generations who were mostly born in England and whose knowledge of the place is derived from assorted transnational linkages from within the family and cultural group, or from global providers of information and cultural packaging.

MIGRATION AND IDENTITY: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

17 Interview with Haroun Khan, Jang Publications Office, Borough, London, 7 July 2004; & meeting with Dr. Humayun Ansari, Royal Holloway, University of London, 29 June, 2004.

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Theories of postmodernism, globalisation and hybridity have come to provide the conceptual framework for current academic discussions on post war migrant groups and their experiences in transnational locations of competing and disjunctive cultural flows.18 They are particularly useful when looking at the Pakistani diaspora in England as it sets about to construct new imagined worlds and postmodern identities that traverse the borders of the nation state as imagined by European modernists.19 Definitions of postmodernism vary from scholar to scholar but they all share the belief that the world has experienced vast changes and disruptions that have drastically altered or completely destroyed the certainties and essentialist metanarratives of the modernist project leaving a chaotic void with no fixed point of identity for the victims of this process.

Not all accounts of postmodernism are this sombre. Zygmunt Bauman argues that transnational cultures and diaspora identities can undermine the modernists' fondness for absolute order and structure. Ultimately he feels that this will restore some level of pristine human spontaneity that will allow civil society to prosper. He does not anticipate the total subversion of social structure, for how else are societies to function? But he does believe that political systems need to decentralise and be tolerant of difference, disjuncture and change within their legislative and juridical boundaries. Bauman views postmodernism as a work in progress whose aim is to improve upon the modernist project by freeing up the decision-making duties and essentialist identity constructions of universalists to allow for "individual freedom".20

... the postmodern mind would point out, against its critics, that despite appearances to the contrary it is not a 'destructive destruction', but a constructive one, in which it has been engaged all along. Its job has been a sort of site-clearing operation. While renouncing what merely passes for the truth, dismantling its past, present and future putative, ossified versions, it uncovers the truth in its pristine form which modern

18 This section of the chapter will look at the arguments of some of these theorists including those of Arjun Appadurai, Zygmunt Bauman, Stuart Hall and Pnina Werbner. 19 A. Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy", in Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, pp.27-48. 20 Z. Bauman, "Making and Unmaking of Strangers" (1995), in P. Beilharz (ed.), The Bauman Reader, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2001, p.216; & Z. Bauman, "Postmodernity, or Living with Ambivalence", in A. Elliot (ed.), Contemporary Social Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1999, p.368. Bauman writes that: "Postmodernity is no more ( but no less either) than the modern mind taking a long, attentive and sober look at itself, at its condition and its past works, not fully liking what it sees and sensing the urge to change. Postmodernity is modernity coming of age ... "

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pretensions had maimed and distorted beyond recognition. More than that: the demolition uncovers the truth of the truth, truth as residing in the being itself and not in the violent acts perfclrmed upon it; truth that has been belied under the domination of legislative reason.

All in all, postmodernity can be seen as restoring to the world what modernity, presumptuously, had taken away; as a re­enchantment of the world that modernity tried hard to dis­enchant.21

The above paragraph points to the optimistic outlook of postmodern theorists who have unquestionably embraced the apparent constructive 'destruction' of this theory and in the process, unwittingly or otherwise, framed their own essentialist division between those who welcome the 'void' and those who fear it. The former, postmodern subjects, often diasporas caught between two or more worlds, are described as basking in the light of their hybridised and ambivalent identities, embracing complexity and disjunctive lifestyles at will; the latter, universalists in a last-ditch attempt to cling to power, proclaim their authority by suppressing the threat of unauthorised difference, deviance and diversity.22 The problem with this is that migrants and diaspora communities do not knowingly construct postmodern identities. Their proclivity to appropriate and synthesise numerous cultural idioms and practices is the result of them having to come to terms with new and often unfavourable and unsympathetic environments. In other words, they do not enter foreign soil with a blueprint in hand; instead arrangements as to who they are and where they are heading are improvised, changed and revised over time and often they will create as much conflict internally as they are likely to with external cultural groups and with host communities. The complexity of the problem is better understood when postmodern diaspora identities are examined within the field of globalisation theory.

The thought of defining postmodern identities within globalisation theory may seem a little odd but it is not without some recent historiographical attention. C. A Bayly argues that postmodernists themselves cannot escape constructing their own "underlying" metanarratives in their attempts to describe the experiences of subaltern and marginal groups, "the people without history". Their writing makes constant reference to the symbols of Western

21 Z. Bauman, "The Re-enchantment of the World, or, How Can One Narrate Postmodernity?" (1992), in Beilharz, pp.190-191.

22 Bauman in Elliot, pp.363-364.

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Enlightenment thought in the "long" 19th century: "state, religion, and colonialism".23 Bayly sees the writing of world history as accommodating the histories of groups on the margin and "people without power". In fact, he claims that before the "long" 19th century and its desire for uniformity, history was often written of people on "the fringes" who became "historically central": "Nomads and tribal warriors became imperial generals. Barber-surgeons became scientists. Dancing women became queens. People easily crossed often flexible boundaries of status and nationality. Historical outcomes remained open" .24

Bayly does not deny that these histories were written from the perspective of those with the resources to survey the cultures and lifestyles of groups on the fringes, on the contrary he is advocating that their study within world history will reveal much about where they are located in relation to others and to concepts of power. Despite Bayly's criticism of them, postmodernists, postcolonialists and others examining subaltern groups and marginalised individuals in numerous societies have helped to locate the existence of the 'other' within historical time and experience more than was the case in the 19th century and in the period preceding it. Their difficulties in overcoming references to existing social structures and categories are often unavoidable, but their examinations have at least attempted to redress Eurocentric accounts of the 'other' with perspectives more in touch with the experiences, predicaments and opinions of those "without history".

it is in the mid to late 20th century intensification ofcommunication and exchange networks that the postmodern condition has emerged. This period has ushered in large scale global transformation of existing practices of political and economic management that have seemingly brought about a rapid dismantling of the modernist preoccupation with universal standards of truth, order and compliance. Globalisation is said to be:

predominantly associated with ... flexible and spatially extended forms of production, the rapid mobility of capital, information and goods, the denationalizing of capital, the deterritorialization of culture, the interpenetration of local communities by global media networks, and the dispersal of socio-economic power beyond the Euro-American axis. These factors make the world seem more open and more interconnected.25

23 C.A. Bayly, The Birth ofthe Modern World, 1780-1914, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2004, pp.B-9. 24 "b"d 9 I I ., p ..

25 N. Papastergiadis, The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000, p.76.

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This description of globalisation points to greater levels of socio-economic power and wealth distribution today than was the case even one generation ago. Proponents of this position postulate that the world has become a global village where cultures, capital, ideas and people intermingle with each other independent of overarching political and economic forces. The reality of global forms of movement and interchange is more complex than the proponents of unfettered globalisation theory are willing to admit. They are also grounded in historical processes of "polarization, marginalization and regulation" that have shaped much of what the postmodern world has become.26 That is, global exchanges and flows are not a recent phenomenon; they have been just as crucial to an understanding of the past as they are to explanations of human relations in the present. lt makes more sense to speak of multiple globalisations - those preceding the 20th century as well as those that currently compete against the 'Euro-American' global axis - than it does to refer solely to one overriding and very recent globalisation, even if the power and influence of the latter is indubitable.

Historians have long acknowledged previous globalisations and their impact on contemporary international relations. A. G. Hopkins writes of the universalism of the 18th century as a "recognizably modern form ... (of) global civil society".27 He also points to "cosmopolitan aspirations" and "complementary and competing programmes of internationalism" as diverse and wide-ranging as missionary and humanitarian activity and free trade capitalism as examples of globalisation even if "they fell short of embracing the (entire) world".28 In fact, it is misleading to think of globalisations as all-encompassing and universally accepted enterprises. Not even the current Euro-American variant can be deemed so. lt too is complex and comprises numerous competing strands even if its most recent phase, post World War 11, is widely regarded by many as the pinnacle of global interaction. lt is more appropriate to think of globalisations as striving for universality but falling short of that mark because of competing globalisations and alternative local cultures that resist the entirety of the former's promises, temptations or constraints. A glance at history beyond that of the modern European powers will show any number of Afro­Eurasian empires and numerous millenarian movements as having global

26 ibid.

27 A. G. Hopkins, "The History of Globalization - and the Globalization of History?", in Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History, Pimlico, London, 2002, pp.12-13. 28 ibid.

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aspirations, even if limited to the world as known by them.29 However, it is the modern European powers and their competition for the world's resources that has led to contemporary global relations.

The current Euro-American global structure has its roots in the 1500s when Europeans first set out to explore, study and extract resources from parts of the world they knew little or nothing about. Robert Marks writes that this world was not entirely devoid of global patterns of similarity: despite diverging folk customs most people shared a similar material world involving agricultural production for subsistence and market exchange, and "faced similar challenges in dealing with nature, the ruling elites, and one another".30 However, with the voyage of Christopher Columbus to the New World trade links were established between the Americas, Europe and Africa, and afterwards to China when the Spanish entered the Philippines in 1571, allowing for a more global integration of markets, people, capital, customs and disease in the 16th century than had previously been the case.31 This set the stage for what J. R. McNeill and William McNeill describe as the complex uniformity of modern day global relations. Both argue that the 1500s were a period of distinct cultural practices and social complexities for isolated communities around the world that gradually began to disappear when European political and economic methods and cultural pastimes slowly took hold. The complex uniformity of global relations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries are the apogee of distinct global exchanges that took place in the 1500s and "the great technological shifts in communications and transport" of the 1800s and 1900s that allowed for the rise and ascendancy of the modern day Euro-American global paradigm and its myriad competing strands.32

The Euro-American global system has intensified and accelerated communication, information and market exchanges around the world, but it has not made any of them free of political and cultural power and influence. Current global relations reflect an unmistakable western bias in cultural production and packaging, and in political and economic management and exploitation. The

29 Bayly, p.42. Bayly writes that "the rationale underlying global networks of people, monetary transactions, and ideas for much of the population of Mediterranean Europe, Asia, and Africa in 1750 bore some similarities to that underlying those which had existed five or even ten centuries earlier". 30 R. M. Marks, The Origins of the Modem World: A Global and Ecological Narrative, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, England, 2002, p.22. 31 ibid., p.67. 32 J. R. McNeill & W. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History, Norton, New York, 2003, pp.155, 258-259, & 268-269. In the 1800s steamships, railroads and telegraphs brought the world closer together. In the 1900s the telephone, radio, television, film, automobile, airplane and interne! did likewise.

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primary globalising institutions of information and capital are owned and managed by the west and disseminate the symbols, ideas, images and technologies sympathetic to western governments and transnational corporations. They also exert pressure on poor and newly independent nations for favourable market conditions and minimal media restrictions.33 Hopkins argues that opposition to the Euro-American global paradigm is at present under-theorised:

lt rests on a very generalized hostility to capitalism that harks back to the arguments put by advocates of the dependency thesis in the 1960s and 1970s, though few of the present generation of protesters seem to be aware of the connection. 34

He refers to recent "militant demonstrations" against globalising institutions in Seattle and Prague as "supra-national forms of political expression" in opposition to the free market capitalism of dominant global political and economic establishments. These protests and the rapid support they generated worldwide via the same global media networks used by proponents of unfettered globalisation suggests a growing awareness of issues like "world poverty", "sweated labour'' and "environmental degradation", and an active push to have them redressed.35

Opposition to dominant western influences has often come in subtle measures from within existing global power relations. Recipients of 'global' media and culture have not been content with the mere acceptance of patronising and misleading culturally packaged descriptions of themselves. They have interpreted and used global cultural flows available to them to make sense of their own political and cultural experiences where this has been possible. This has allowed them to construct alternative identities to those given to them by others with more political power and global capital. Arjun Appadurai's work is invaluable in overcoming simplistic centre-periphery explanations of global relations and identity formations. He does not refute the overall power of Euro-American political influence in global affairs, but he does point out that beneath its superstructure lies a complex and overlapping web of

33 Papastergiadis, (2000), Some of these globalising institutions include the G7, World Bank, GATT and IMF. 34 Hopkins, p.19.

35 ibid.

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imagined worlds and multiple identities.36 These are formed in numerous ways but Appadurai arranges them into 5 groups:

ethnoscapes (people who move between nations, such as tourists, immigrants, exiles, guestworkers, and refugees), technoscapes (technology, often linked to multinational corporations), financescapes (global capital, currency markets, stock exchanges), mediascapes (electronic and new media), and ideoscapes (official state ideologies and counter­ideologies).37

Appadurai doubts whether nation state supremacy and simplistic constructions of national identity are adequate to explain the multidimensional intensity and severity of current global flows. Instead he argues for an increased and palpable disjuncture in patterns of identity formation taking in multiple imagined worlds and underscored by intricate and varied layers of homogenisation and heterogenisation from within the uncertain landscapes of the contemporary global cultural economy.38

These uncertain landscapes provide a basis for a better understanding of cultural hybridity theory and the complex array of Pakistani diaspora identities in England. Cultural hybridity is the term fashioned by academics in the social sciences to explain the effects of heightened global contact on the personal and collective identities of people from all corners of the world. As a theory it is a recent addition to the numerous and much debated intellectual observations of postmodernists and globalisation theorists. Arguments centre around the nature and extent of change people's personalities and cultural identities have undergone since the world became more integrated through various transnational networks that have placed enormous constraints on preexisting national and regional identities.

lt is important to point out that cultural borrowings and the changes they have made on the way people see themselves is not a new phenomenon in history. Identities are dynamic and have changed from time immemorial. What cultural hybridity theorists argue is not for the uniqueness of the ideas underpinning their field of enquiry but the amount of change and variations in

36 Appadurai, pp.32-37. 37 J. A. Braziel & A. Mannur's introductory comments to A. Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy", in Braziel & Mannur (eds.), Theorizing Diaspora, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2003, pp.25-26. 38 Appadurai, (1996), pp.42-43.

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change that individuals and communities have experienced from recent global flows.

(B)ricolage doesn't just apply to symbols but also to structures and institutions; and while mixing has accelerated in recent times it is as old as the hills, so the roots themselves are mixed. Cultural melange and cosmopolitanism, then, is not merely a precious elite experience but a collective condition and experience. Global melange does not merely follow but also precedes nations.39

Thus, while cultural mixing is not new and certainly occurred during the modernist period when political leaders were determined to construct quintessential national identities through common rituals and dialects, the variety and complexity of postmodern cultural identities is the result of increased global flows that have led to an unparalleled movement of people, capital, ideas and information that has rapidly altered perceptions of existence and belonging. In other words, identities of common cultural ancestry, though never permanently fixed, are less convincing today than ever before. And, their survival is contingent on rapid change to cope with the myriad other influences that alter the basis of their original morality and purpose.

The work of Stuart Hall is crucial to an understanding of a Pakistani diaspora consciousness in all its manifestations. Hall argues that culture and knowledge "are not fixed entities but parts of a system of representation which is permanently in process" .40 He champions the emancipatory politics of difference practised by migrant groups and the forging of "interrupted" and "hyphenated" identities in the uncertain landscapes of postmodern localities that help to undermine the binary oppositions of western episteme.41 Ultimately, Hall values a world that accepts these new identities and their proclivity to mutate into countless others over time for whatever reason and in whatever context. He envisions the future to belong to those who forge their identities in this way, the "impure" - as he ironically categorises them in a subtle allusion to the modernist apprehension of disjuncture and difference.42

39 J. Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization & Culture: Global Melange, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, UK, 2004, p.115. 40 C. Rojek, Stuart Hall, Polity, Cambridge, 2003, p.2. 41 ibid., pp.5-6. 42 ibid., pp.186-198.

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THE PAKISTANI DIASPORA AND THE POLITICS OF EMANCIPATION

Pakistani diaspora identities reflect an emancipatory politics of difference and challenge the binary oppositions of western episteme as Hall has argued. In more recent times their popular culture has evinced their desire to resist the racist and demeaning constructions of English society, endured in silence by the first generation of immigrants, with alternatives that empower them as a group and as individuals. These popular expressions are often a complex mix of parental and western influences and are articulated through numerous mediums including film, literature, sport, music, newspaper and magazine publications, websites, clothing and street patois and attitude.

The difficulties of coming to terms with at least two distinct and overarching systems of acculturation - parental (home), western/English (away from home) - for many in the diaspora was conveyed by an interviewee at the Jang publications office in London. He spoke of boundaries within the home and those in the wider society, and the need to adapt to both. Both processes of socialisation led to difficulties and confusion and ultimately allowed for the forging of complex identities. For the most part these incorporate a pride in Islam and numerous Pakistani customs but a rejection of parental social submissiveness and hopes for repatriation. At the same time they exhibit an acceptance of England as home and the adoption of numerous western cultural idioms and fashions combined with an open defiance of western orientalist constructions and lslamophobia.43

These types of cultural constructions have come to be referred to as offering a path to a third identity. That is, global cultural and diasporic identities that lay somewhere in between the uniformity of 'sedentary' urban identities, particularly of global cities, and the diversity of identities brought about by migration and communication.44 There is no doubt that global cities are 'contact zones' that have endured the growth of vast numbers of complex identities, but there is a problem when grouping any of these identities into an ensemble. For one, they are constantly evolving, have complex strands and are of numerous sources; and, they imply a lack of existing diversity within the identities to be found in global cities before 'contact' has been made with any of them. lt is best to speak of them in the plural as a third identity of miscellaneous and fragmented discourses that compete for exposure within the constructions of

43 Interview with Haroun Khan Jang Publications Office, Borough, London, 7 July, 2004. 44 Papastergiadis, (2000), pp.94-95.

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elite institutions of authority and official and competing narratives of national identity as Jean Francois Lyotard does. David Harvey writes of Lyotard:

He (Lyotard) takes the modernist preoccupation with language and pushes it to extremes of dispersal. While 'the social bond is linguistic', he argues, it 'is not woven with a single thread' but by an 'indeterminate number' of 'language games'. Each of us lives 'at the intersection of many of these' and we do not necessarily establish 'stable language combinations and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable'. As a consequence, 'the social subject itself seems to dissolve in this dissemination of language games'.

The 'atomization of the social into flexible networks of language games' suggests that each of us may resort to a quite different set of codes depending upon the situation in which we find ourselves ... 45

it is with this in mind that the popular cultural expressions of the Pakistani diaspora can best be defined. These expressions identify with the concept of Pakistan but they do so to capture the diversity of experience and the variety of realities among the diaspora.

The Pakistani experience in England is played out by an 'indeterminate number' of 'language games'. These 'language games' are both celebratory and political. They celebrate cultural difference and diversity, yet they are also able to stimulate temporary unity when either any of its constituent parts or the thread that binds them all - Islam - come under threat. In light of this, the Pakistani diaspora should be viewed as a complex conglomerate of multiple cultural strands that compete with one another at a quotidian and sub-group level over many issues ranging from community organisation and representation to education, social class, language and lifestyle preferences. At the same time they compete with numerous other cultural expressions in English society and an overall political and institutional chauvinism that regards them all as inferior, thereby allowing them to sustain a similarity of purpose in opposition to their marginalisation.

Pnina Werbner has written extensively about the divisions and occasional unity of the Pakistani communities in Manchester. She argues that at an organisational level its representatives often compete aggressively for the support of constituents and are at odds with one another on issues of ideology and community development. The affairs of the community as a whole are the

45 D. Harvey, "Postmodernism", in A. Elliot (ed.), p.309.

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focus of three central organising bodies each with its own area of interest: the Central Mosque, the 'Pakistani' Community Centre and the Race Sub­Committee. All three organisations are rife with conflict and dispute. In the Central Mosque conflict over spiritual leadership for the community as a whole is played out by followers of different sects (Sunni/Shia), religious approaches (reform/mystical), and loyalties and denominational observances (Deobandi, Tablighi, Sufi and UK Islamic Mission).46 The 'Pakistani' Community Centre is a site of dispute over issues concerning national identity where local "divisions between religious purists and secularists, 'rich' and 'poor', workers and businessmen, democrats and nationalists" continue to exist.47 The Race Sub­Committee deals with issues pertaining to "anti-racism" and "equal rights" for Pakistanis as a group, and this can be difficult in light of all that divides them. There is a further division to those above and this relates to existing "district, caste and biradari (lineage) affiliations" and concepts of individual honour in the context of Punjabi "village politics" that have survived the journey to England.48 Despite these divisions all Pakistanis in England have united over insults to their religion and the perpetration of violence and perceived injustice to any of its communities.

Werbner attributes these divisions to the multiplicity of the Pakistani diaspora discourse in England. She argues that this discourse is not simply informed by religious practice and political organisation alone. There are at least two main "traditional spaces" of popular culture that have made their way to England giving rise to additional divisions along generational and gender lines. These are a feminised South Asian wedding culture (the mhend1) and a young male youth culture revolving around sport, particularly cricket. The former is a rite practised in seclusion that "licenses fun, music, dancing and transvestite masquerade"; the latter is more accepted in the public sphere of the diaspora discourse because it promotes masculine bravado and competitiveness which are regarded as crucial qualities for the preservation of family, faith and honour.49

The importance of Werbner's argument is that it undermines popular misconceptions held in the west that Pakistani culture is monotonous and sober, based entirely on the strict observation of religious law and ritual. She

46 P. Werbner, Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims: The Public Performance of Pakistani Traditional identity Politics, James Curry, Oxford, UK, 2002, p.31. 47 ibid. 48 ibid. 49 P. Werbner, '"Our Blood is Green': Cricket, Identity and Social Empowerment among British Pakistanis", in J. MaCiancy, Sport, Identity and Ethnicity, Berg, Oxford, 1996.

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has shown this not to be the case in her research on mhendi celebrations and cricket. She describes both cultures as fun and sensual, emphasising the body as a vehicle for youthful energy and exuberance and not simply as a docile appendage to the mind entirely concealed from the public eye. Her depictions of the "impieties of frolicking, song, play and dance" and the role of women as "seducers" goes against popular stereotype and transcends the attempts of religious elders to construct a monocultural diaspora narrative. 50 Attempts by the latter to construct collective identities lacking diversity and internal conflict have been dealt a further blow by the popularisation of both cultures on a global scale. Mass media, argues Werbner, has projected these cultures to the world. Film, television, the interne!, the music industry and the performing arts have given the widest possible circulation to both allowing for their commercial growth worldwide. Of the mhendi celebrations which can be viewed in countless Bollywood and Lollywood films Werbner writes:

What was feminized, restricted, hidden and marginal has become inclusive and dominant. What was sexually segregated is now publicly mixed. What was unofficially licensed as satire in hidden female celebrations is now licensed in public. Popular cultural stars - male and female -are adored and hero-worshipped. Women stars appear in public as sensual beings who sing, dance and openly fall in love.51

While Werbner's argument is discerning and allows discussion on the complexity of Pakistani diaspora identities to move in a forward direction, its division of the diasporic public sphere into three main spaces - traditional folk culture (mhend1), western culture (cricket) and religious austerity - conceals greater disjunctures that are palpable in other popular cultural discourses like cricket. 52 The rest of this chapter will highlight the role of cricket as a conduit for cultural unity and individual expressions of self empowerment among the diaspora.

PAKISTANI CRICKET IDENTITIES IN ENGLAND "1 The role of Pakistani cricket in England provides an illuminating case / \If

study of collective community consciousness mixed in with separate and flexible ~

50 Werbner (2002), pp.192-193 & 218. I 51 Werbner (1996), p.94. 52 For a discussion on the disjunctures palpable in British-Pakistani film, literature and Bhangra music refer to Appendix 3. /

1 I I . jl"' "j ) [UJ V( v'i 0-<' ---------.J 230 '' _,

emancipatory layers of cultural empowerment. These identities not only typify the struggle that British-Pakistanis have undergone, they also point to the myriad ways in which identities themselves, particularly national and cultural, have become malleable in 'contact zones' of large global flows like those that prevail in England. Pakistani cricket in England is a variegated concept. it encapsulates the variety of Pakistani identities that are visible in England, as well as highlighting the flexibility of national identities in a more tightly integrated world.

The popularisation of cricket among British-Pakistanis first took place during the 1970s as it did in Pakistan itself. The reasons for it doing so are quite similar in some instances and vary in others. This is not to say that there was no appreciation of cricket by Pakistani migrants in the period preceding this, but rather the cricket they may have viewed and played was limited to a few of them and was entirely 'English' in appearance. The earliest migrants had much in common with uprooted peasants in Pakistan as most had come from regions that had been devastated by the loss of life and livelihood brought about by partition. They also lacked a strong consciousness of the concepts of nationhood and its implication in the short and long term.

In an interview conducted at the Girlington Cricket Club Ground in Bradford, Abid Shah, who migrated from Mirpur as an 11 year old in 1970, described how his interest in cricket came from racism and the growth of Pakistani cricket internationally, particularly the successes of the national team from the early 1970s onwards. What was also interesting about this interview was Abid's account of English schoolteachers who encouraged South Asian students like himself to take up the game. According to Abid his schoolteachers thought that those of South Asian heritage would be more suited to playing cricket than football which was deemed the more 'English' game of the two. lt was taken for granted by them that South Asians would be better at cricket. 53

The apathy shown towards the game by migrants in the 1950s and 1960s related to their unfamiliarity with constructions of Pakistan which were only then taking place. 54 Early Pakistani cricket tours of England generated little if any support amongst those who had immigrated from Pakistan. In Chapter 3 the 1954 tour of England was described as significant because it was the first of such tours to the 'homeland' of cricket, and it brought unexpected success, including an Oval test victory, for an unheralded and inexperienced team

53 Interview with Abid Shah, Girlington Cricket Club Ground, Bradford, 17 July 2004. 54 Other contributing factors included a lack of ·leisure time, resources and a general unfamiliarity with the game.

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working on meagre resources. However, this early success had a bigger impact on the British cricket audience than on the Pakistani migrant community. lt also had a big impact on the cricket administrators and the media in Pakistan. In interviews with various cricketers of the period, including Hanif Mohammed, Fazal Mahmood, lmtiaz Ahmed and Col. Shujauddin, it was apparent how this tour was organised for Pakistan to be accepted by other cricket playing nations within the existing international framework for cricket and within the limits of colonial social etiquette.55

Subsequent Pakistani tours to England in the 1960s were less successful and exciting than the initial visit in 1954. The Pakistani team toured in 1962 and 1967 and were soundly beaten by the MCC, failing, indeed, to win any test matches at all. The 1960s were a bleak period for Pakistan: domestically there was bickering that led to a gradual transition of the game from one based on colonial ties to one that would attempt to embody a 'Pakistani' identity, and internationally there was little cricket played and a glaring lack of progress with only two test victories against New Zealand to show for the whole decade. The English tabloid press gave little coverage to the Pakistani team other than to record its dismal showings in test matches in England and the usual cataloguing of test scorecards from around the world involving matches played by Pakistan. These results did not impact on first generation migrants who were unconcerned with cricket and concepts of Pakistani identity and who were either illiterate or semi-illiterate in English. The sense of Pakistani identity was weak amongst them. Most of them identified more strongly with their home regions to which they envisioned themselves returning in due time. The disappointment generated by the discrimination they endured was, at this stage, mostly channelled into these hopes for repatriation.

lt is in the 1970s that British-Pakistanis first began to identify with the Pakistani cricket team. it is difficult to pinpoint a precise date for the emergence of support for Pakistani cricket in England. What can be discerned however are gradual changes to the game and to the long term expectations of many among the diaspora that slowly entwines both. As we have seen in Chapter 6, the 1970s witnessed unprecedented government interest and funding that gave to domestic cricket in Pakistan a much needed boost. This allowed players to emerge who were given greater incentive to perform over longer periods of

55 For more on this tour refer to Chapter 3, particularly to references of Abdul Hafeez Kardar as a stern and authoritarian leader who taught his young players how to behave in social situations with the English, and who gave sterling and memorable speeches at official gatherings where his audience was comprised of numerous and distinguished English cricket and political luminaries.

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time. There were also more cricket grounds built and an increase in competitive matches due to the development of headquarters for the home cricket board that allowed the players emerging to better harness their skills and camaraderie.

A new more effective packaging of Pakistani cricket as a global commercial product also became noticeable during the 1970s. The national team began winning abroad more frequently and its players accumulated media exposure which led to celebrity-status. Its appeal to British-Pakistanis gradually burgeoned once Pakistani players began to perform with unequivocal success in test, county and league matches. This coincided with the rise of popularity for the game in Pakistan itself. However, while the latter allowed government in Pakistan to appropriate the game as a tool for nation-building, this had no impact on the Pakistani diaspora in England who were free to use cricket as they saw fit and without the intervention of politicians from Pakistan. This is how Pakistani cricket became symbolic to the imagining of community identities for the diaspora in England. The success of players from cultural backgrounds similar to theirs has empowered them and become a cause for celebration, particularly when it is achieved against players who are seen to symbolise the white establishment that has denied them opportunities for advancement. Faisal Bodi in an article for The Guardian describes how:

Every big six from Wasim Akram is also a blow against the establishment, a way of striking back at a 'nebulous' system that keeps them underfoot. You might keep us down some of the time, the (British-Pakistani) youngsters seem to be saying, but you're not going to keep us there all of the time. 56

In light of the argument in this chapter, lslamophobia and institutional racism provide the impetus for British-Pakistanis to identify themselves in opposition to the cultural values and political authority of their detractors. They are not averse to seeing themselves as English; they are simply against constructions of 'Englishness' that do not allow for their inclusion and demonise their cultural heritage.57 Pakistani cricket's reception by the South Asian Muslim

56 F. Bodi, "Every six from Wasim is a blow against the establishment", in The Guardian (London, England), June 21, 2001.

57 J. Carve! (social affairs editor), "Tebbit's cricket loyalty test hit for six", in The Guardian (London, England), January 8, 2004. In a recent report on national identity published by the Office for National Statistics 75 per cent of Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK identified themselves as British. This contrasted with data showing that the groups "least likely to identify themselves as British were those recording themselves as "other white", including Europeans and Americans. Less than 40% of this group said they were British, English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish". Add to this the

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population in England is not just a statement of defiance, nor is it about cultural exclusivity, it is a narrative for integration into English society as well as an additional discourse in the debate on Pakistani national identity. lt is both because it deals with both. Global forces and relations are such that identities cannot be made to conform to simplistic notions of national belonging and within the limits of arbitrarily constructed geographical spaces. The Pakistani diaspora identities are crucial to an understanding of both South Asian and British history as they are a testimony to the relations and interactions of communities that have been linked across the vast distance of the Eurasian land mass by the ebb and flow of political/economic currents.

The identification with the Pakistani international cricket team by the Pakistani diaspora in England is the result of changes in the social context of the latter. The reunification of families as immigrants brought their wives and children to join them, and the education of the children in English schools has gradually led to an abandonment of the intention to return to Pakistan, but the continuing racial and religious discrimination has complicated the formation of a British Asian Muslim identity. The rest of this chapter will look at racism in English cricket, to be followed by an evaluation of the rise of Pakistani cricket cultures in England - particularly in West Yorkshire, and, finally, a critical look at efforts by both the English authorities for the game and British-Pakistanis themselves to address issues of racism through applied initiatives that aim to harmonise relations on cricket fields throughout the country. There will also be a final word on the relevance of diaspora cricket cultures to constructions of Pakistani identity on account of the velocity of contemporary global relations.

RACISM IN ENGLISH CRICKET British-Pakistanis have endured racism on the cricket field that parallels

that of the wider society. Racism has come in the form of political and media attacks on the integrity of British-Pakistani loyalties to England, playing abilities and cultural practices and identities. There has also been a vituperative assault on Pakistan the nation, its cricket team and the support it generates among the diaspora by English cricket players, officials and the tabloid press. These have all had an effect on the way British-Pakistanis view themselves and their relations with other groups, the cricketing authorities and the leaders of numerous socio-political institutions. The argument in this section will be divided into two parts: the first focussing on the xenophobia of sections of the political

figures of those who saw themselves as predominantly Scottish (73% in Scotland) and Welsh ("In Wales 35% said they were British and 62% Welsh").

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spectrum and the media; and the second on socio-economic inequity and its impact on British-Pakistani cricket identities.

i) The English media and the immigrant communities' support for 'alien teams'

British MP Norman Tebbit caused a stir in 1990 when he announced his plan for a 'cricket test' in an interview with The Los Angeles Times.

A large proportion of Britain's Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do they cheer for? it's an interesting test. Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?58

Tebbit proposed his cricket test to ascertain the level of support and loyalty shown to England by its cultural minorities, particularly all non-white diaspora communities. When referring to British-Pakistanis, who were quite vocal when following the fortunes of the Pakistani team, Tebbit reasoned they should only seriously be accepted as English if they turned their backs on Pakistan and offered allegiance to England and its players. This simplistic, divisive and misleading logic evoked the racist strains of Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech made to the British Parliament in the 1960s. it also caused a political and media frenzy in England at the time as the debate divided those who upheld Tebbit's test from those who stood against it irrespective of party ideological lines. 59

In more recent times Tebbit's cricket test has been criticised for what it really is: a racist slur on immigrant communities with the intention to exclude them from integrating into English society. British-Pakistanis have taken umbrage to Tebbit's test arguing that it is a thinly veiled piece of Jslamophobia that calls for assimilation to "an a priori ideal of Britishness- if this exists".60 The Tebbit test is also inimical to social relations between communities because it is designed to promote resentment against those deemed as outsiders - and in this case it is non-white and non-European people but particularly British­Pakistanis who are deemed as such. This aims to both intensify and exploit host

58 Tebbit in ibid.

59 "Thatcher disowns cricket test claim", in The Times (London, England), 25 May, 1990. Interestingly Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher distanced herself from Tebbit's test when writing a letter to the Organisation of British Muslims, "I do not agree with what he said and I am glad that you have written to Norman to Jet him know of your concerns". The organisation then wrote to Tebbit himself asking for an apology that would not be forthcoming. 60 F. Bodi, "The Blame Game: British Muslims and Citizenship", the Islamic Human Rights Commission, www.ihrc.org.uk, 4 May, 2002.

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community xenophobic racism without directly raising the race issue. 61 After all, there is no questioning of Americans, Australians and Europeans who continue to support the sports teams of their respective countries of origin even while they reside in England. There is a clear point of reference to Tebbit's test that is not lost on those that it was designed to hurt:

We may embrace Englishness, wear the national team shirt with pride, paint the cross of St George onto our cheek but when we attend cricket or football games and hear chants such as 'I'd rather be a Paki than a Turk', witness mass Nazi salutes, are spat on, and, at worst, are assaulted, it tends to make it difficult to cheer the country of our birth (England).62

During the 1990s the cricket test could not be put to rest as sections of the media continued to refer to it. An article written in Wisden Cricket Monthly by Robert Henderson and titled "Is it in the Blood?" raised the spectre of racism once again in denigrating non-white immigrant support for teams other than England63. Henderson argued that the cricket test was infallible as it demonstrated without question the lack of English character to be found in migrants, and this included those playing for England and not just supporters of the game: "it is difficult to believe that a foreign-born has any sense of wanting to play above himself simply because he is playing for England".64 On the contrary, he sees the so called "foreign-born" - and therefore the faceless, nameless, non-English domicile - as instinctively relishing the prospect of English defeat to assuage postcolonial fantasies of disillusionment and disempowerment:

Norman Tebbit's cricket test is as pertinent for players as it is for spectators. it is even possible that part of a coloured England-qualified player feels satisfaction (perhaps subconsciously) at seeing England humiliated, because of post imperial myths of oppression and exploitation.65

61 "Tebbit bowls a no-ball" (Race in Britain- Observer special), in The Observer, 22 April, 1990. 62 R. Kaushal, "The Tebbit test is just not cricket" (Race in Britain - Observer special), in The Observer, 25 November, 2001. 63 R. Henderson, "Is it in the Blood?", in Wisden Cricket Monthly, July, 1995. 64 Henderson in "Towards a Cricket of the Future" (1996), in C. Searle, Pitch of Life: Writings on Cricket, The Parrs Wood Press, Manchester, 2001, p.50. 65 Henderson in M. Marqusee, Anyone but England: Cricket, Race and Class, Two Heads Publishers, London, 1998.

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Henderson's observations became even more controversial when he named specific players as lacking English character. He accused Phillip DeFreitas and Chris Lewis of being imbued with "the generally resentful and separatist mentality of the West lndian-descended population in England".66 Worse still, he regarded them as "interlopers" and detrimental to English "team spirit" and morale.67 As far as Henderson was concerned there should be no place allocated for such players on the English cricket team:

For a man to feel the pull of 'cricketing patriotism' he must be so imbued with a sense of cultural belonging that it is second nature to go beyond the call of duty ... is that desire to succeed instinctive [Henderson's italics], a matter of biology? There lies the heart of the matter. 68

Henderson's article so incensed Derbyshire County players DeFreitas and Devon Malcolm - both England representatives, and both "interlopers" in the author's sense of the word - that they took legal action against it. They were ably supported by their county team and the Professional Cricketers' Association.69

The article struck a chord with politicians and others in the media who wanted to be seen as doing something for cricket players whose heritage lay elsewhere. In a sitting on 'racism in sport' in the House of Commons (28 June, 1999) the Minister of Sport, Tony Banks, responded to the question of John Bercow (MP for Buckingham), "Does the Minister share the view that the England cricket selectors are themselves failing adequately to recognise the talents of non-white players?", with:

66 "b"d I I .

67 ibid.

68 ibid.

One of the lessons that we must learn from the world cup is the enormous fervour and enthusiasm for cricket among our Asian communities. As I have said before, English cricket will be transformed, as English football was transformed, the more that the ethnic minorities in our country become involved in those sports. For example, the appointment of Nasser Hussain is a good step forward. The cricket authority- the England and Wales Cricket Board - is aware of the need to do far more in the Asian communities to scout for talent, to nurture that talent

69 Searle, p.50.

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and to get it through the county structures and into the English team.?O

This response is typical of those in mainstream society who are keen to redress the inadequacies and biases of cricket organisation in England. lt is unintentionally patronising and high-handed, and fails to grasp the nature of British-Pakistani grievances. lt is often maintained that all will be well when players of minority cultural groups are chosen to play for England, but, this is still a very rare occurrence. Even the few of them to do so have been expected to assimilate to traditional norms of behaviour, both as cricket players and as representatives of England. The selection of Nasser Hussain as national team captain is a case in point. The English authorities for the game hail Hussain for his British ways, and they are keen for him to be a spokesperson for other cricketers and supporters whose heritage comes from South Asia. When Hussain bemoans and is disconcerted by the lack of support shown to the English cricket team by its ethnic minorities his pleas fall on deaf ears:

Hussain's words (are) ignored partly because his mother is English and he was not brought up as a Muslim. Perhaps more significantly, he also does not communicate in any Asian language, of which Urdu, Hindi and Punjabi are the most important. 71

This was reiterated in an interview conducted in Bradford where Hussain was described as not being a role model for British-Pakistanis because he is not a practising Muslim and avows to being 'typically' English. The interviewee stressed the importance for young British-Pakistani players coming through to appreciate that they did not need to give up their religion or renounce other inherited cultural traits in order to play for England. That Hussain has, renders him irrelevant as a role model for most young British Pakistanis.72

ii) Inequity and British-Pakistani cricket identities British-Pakistani cricket identities have been challenged on three fronts:

first, players of Pakistani extraction, like those of other cultural minorities, have been denied opportunities and access to mainstream cricket; second, British­Pakistani spectators have been abused and assaulted for their support of

70 Minutes for the House of Commons, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Monday, 28 June, 1999. 71 Ahmer Khokhar, "A case of national pride", in The Times (London, England), 31 May, 2001. 72 Interview with Masood Sadiq, radio tutor and broadcaster of British-Pakistani community issues in West Yorkshire, Manningham Lane, Bradford, 14 July, 2004.

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Pakistani cricket teams, and on other occasions merely on the basis of their appearance; and, third, the Pakistani cricket team, which inspires pride and confidence in many of them, has been the subject of ridicule and malicious criticism levelled at it by sections of the English media, some of its cricket players and officials and numerous spectators.

British-Pakistani cricketers have long maintained that opportunities have been denied them by official county and league organisers. They also complain of racist attitudes and social customs that marginalise and ultimately exclude many of them from mainstream competitions. In the past decade these concerns have become the focus of study groups organised by the England Cricket Board (ECB), academic departments like the Centre for Sport Development Research (Roehampton Institute London) and The Centre for New Ethnicities Research (University of East London), and independent research teams like 'Hit Racism for Six'. That there is a problem for players of cultural minorities to be accepted on their own merits was certainly recognised by the Essex Cricket Authority (ECA) and the London Community Cricket Association (LCCA) who commissioned both The Centre for Sport Development Research and The Centre for New Ethnicities Research to "find out why so many black and Asian players in the area take part in competitions outside the official ECA Leagues".73

The product of this research, Anyone for Cricket?, was compiled by lan McDonald and Sharda Ugra. Conducted in Essex and East London during the 1997 cricket season, questionnaires were sent to club secretaries and interviews were held with "lower league or equivalent Sunday players". While the sample proved smaller than first envisaged, 74 the findings were a crucial reminder of the split that exists within league cricket. Both McDonald and Ugra were able to identify "two distinct but related cricket cultures" between affiliated (white) and non affiliated (black and Asian) clubs:

In Sunday cricket, black and Asian players rarely play matches involving white players or against predominantly white teams. Black and Asian cricket is played on urban public grounds, is primarily a competitive sporting occasion, and largely exists

73 P. George, "County Cricket Clubs Plagued by Racism", in Independent on Sunday, 5 April, 1998.

74 I. McDonald & S. Ugra, Anyone for Cricket?: Equal Opportunities and Changing Cricket Cultures in Essex and East London, Centre for Sport Development Research (Roehampton Institute London) in association with The Centre for New Ethnicities Research (University of East London), 1998. Of 450 questionnaires sent out 60 were returned. There were 45 players interviewed, "18 were white, 17 were Asian and 10 were black".

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outside of the official structures of the ECA. Cricket matches involving white players are situated in rural, private grounds, are primarily a social occasion based on the traditional rituals of English cricket, and exist largely as part of the official structure of the ECA.75

Much of what is happening in Essex and East London correlates with events in other parts of England. McDonald and Ugra revealed great discrepancies in power between affiliated and non affiliated clubs that effected the "continued exclusion of many black and Asian clubs" and players. Complaints of "cultural stereotypes" and strict regulations to keep players from progressing into official leagues have been expressed by any number of British­Pakistani cricketers, administrators and support staff. In Essex one interviewee said:

When we first applied for the league they (the authorities) used to give us all silly excuses; 'You don't have a sight screen', 'Oh, there isn't a bar facility', Oh, there isn't any shower in the changing room', ... make silly excuse, so they could stop you.76

In Bradford the situation was quite similar. Taj Butt, the Equality Policy Officer of the Department of Arts, Heritage and Leisure for Bradford Council and the Chairman of the Quaid-e-Azam League in Yorkshire, described how British­Pakistanis began to play cricket in the 1970s and early 1980s when

racism was rampant in an area like Bradford, and sport or cricket was no exception. If ... your skin was a different colour you ... found out about it when you played cricket. The racist abuse happened in every single match. lt was very much a part of cricket.77

In nearby Dewsbury Hanif Mayet, a social worker and founder of Mount Cricket Club, described the alienation he experienced as one of the few young cricketers of South Asian pedigree who tried his hand at league cricket in the 1970s. Having captained his High School and Dewsbury College, league cricket in the area offered different obstacles to overcome:

75 ibid.

There were no Asian cricketers. I'd go to practise and turn up to the match and I'd always be the twelfth man. If they were a

76 ibid., p.30.

771nterviewwith Taj Butt, Manningham Sports Centre, Bradford, 12 July 2004.

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man short I'd be slotted in, but even though they knew I could bat, I'd go in at number 10 or 11. it was a waste of time, basically, so we used to play in the street with a tennis ball but one day I thought, "This can't go on, we've got to do something about it. "78

Strict social etiquette and Victorian ideals of cricket are still observed by affiliated clubs and ruling authorities for the game throughout England. These further alienate British-Pakistani cricketers and are often used as justification for their continued marginalisation by those in charge of official leagues. The cricket of affiliated clubs is quite often characterised as being social in its structure. Concepts of teamwork and camaraderie are much heralded, as are ideals of good sportsmanship and fair play; and much is made of the picturesque and verdant surrounds of cricket grounds in the English countryside. In contrast, the cricket of cultural minorities is just as often described as highly-competitive, with daring strokeplay and aggressive bowling, played on poorly-prepared inner city pitches or makeshift wickets on frequently used public grounds. Variations between these two cricket cultures extend beyond the boundary and into post match team celebrations and social gatherings like the end of season awards' night.

One of the ways in which distinctions are made socially involves the consumption of alcohol. Players of affiliated clubs and county teams see the after match drink as an important social occasion: a way for team members to bond and team spirit to grow. Cricketers from other cultural groups often find these drinking sessions quite daunting and unnecessary. When they are in teams replete with players of their own background post match festivities and gatherings will take on a different hue or character altogether. If they are in teams comprised predominantly of white English cricketers then the pressure to conform, tci not be seen as rejecting teammates, becomes enormous, particularly in surroundings where cultural differences are perceived to be obtrusive, threatening and divisive.

For British-Pakistanis who are predominantly Muslim the social drink becomes an even larger obstacle to overcome. They are prohibited from consuming alcohol by the Quran and this has given rise to misunderstanding and acrimony between them and teammates. British-Pakistani players who have appeared in league teams have often been cast as outsiders - not 'one of the lads' - and reproached for not conforming to club tradition. They have confronted the wrath and hostility of teammates, club officials and members

78 H. Mayet in J. Rendall, "Some Corner of a Foreign Field", OSM, June 2002.

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simply because they refuse to drink with them at the completion of play. All attempts to explain the nature of their refusal have gone unacknowledged leaving them discomfited and on the outer in matters pertaining to club culture and team morale.79

This type of misunderstanding occurs in other social situations involving Muslims and the wider English society. In an interview conducted in London a young Muslim man explained the pressure he felt when his work colleagues -mostly white English- decided to celebrate his 21st Birthday over some drinks at a local pub. He had never been into a pub before and he stood outside for up to an hour as his friends waited for him:

There I stood for a good hour thinking what am I going to do here? I don't drink. How do I associate with these people? If I have to drink, do I have to drink orange juice in a glass that has had (alcohol) in it? All these things made (me) think, hold on a moment what's going on here? These people I know but I can't mix with them outside the work environment. SO

Finally, the interviewee walked into the pub, was welcomed by his friends and drank a coke out of a can.

Over the years British-Pakistani cricket organisers and players have come to believe that their abstinence from alcohol is used against them by league cricket officials and clubs. They argue they have been denied access to the best cricket facilities and teams because their bar takings are negligible and cannot allegedly justify the staging of a match.81 In Bradford Taj Butt described how this issue was very controversial and denied opportunities for players from cultural minorities to progress as cricketers. League clubs that had their own grounds were reluctant to have them used by British-Pakistani teams even on Sundays when they were not in use. For many years British-Pakistani players resorted to matches on council grounds. In recent times things have improved a little. League clubs that have come close to folding now acknowledge the growing economic feasibility of matches involving British-Pakistanis and they have bought into their popularity despite their continued suspicion of them. 82 These clubs will often provide catering for British-Pakistani cricketers and their

79 Interview with Taj Butt.

80 Interview with Haroun J. Khan.

81 Interview with Abid Shah.

82 Interview with Taj Butt.

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supporters. However, there are still league clubs who continue to refuse the use of their grounds to British-Pakistani teams. 83

British-Pakistani spectators have also come in for criticism and abuse. They have been censured and disparaged by the English tabloid press for supporting Pakistan as was discussed above in relation to the 'cricket test' and its proponents. There have also been attempts by the England cricketing authorities and team spectators to deter them from expressing their full support for Pakistan and/or to keep them from attending matches. Officials of test and county cricket have banned the entry of Pakistani banners, flags and musical instruments like drums and trumpets from cricket venues.

There has been much written on the role of music as a discourse against oppression and inequality, and equally as much on its potential to unify and empower subaltern groups in spaces of fear and marginalisation. Among slave communities in the Americas drumming was used to express resentment towards the plantation system. Alarmed at its political potential, colonial authorities banned it among slave populations only to see it go underground and remain spiritually and politically significant to those enslaved.84 Its banishment from cricket matches involving Pakistan is meant to suppress the cultural potency and significance it gives to those who are looked down upon by society at large. Former radio broadcaster Masood Sadiq was quick to point out in an interview that despite these restrictions British-Pakistanis have not been deterred. On Pakistan's 2001 tour of England they turned up in substantial numbers prompting commentary teams to remark that "England seemed to be playing in Pakistan" and not at Edgebaston, Old Trafford and Lords: "Even with trumpets and drums banned these supporters (will) still come out to support Pakistan".85

British-Pakistani supporters have also been victims of assault and rampant racial abuse at cricket matches, particularly when Pakistan is on show. Headingley Cricket Ground in Leeds, where a large population of British­Pakistanis reside, has seen numerous disturbances and confrontations. In his own research on the subject Jack Williams has written of distasteful gestures and language that British-Pakistanis have had to put up with due to the "customary racist partiality of the police and the private security firms" that patrol

83 ibid.

84 E. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made, Pantheon Books, New York, 1974; & S. Clarke, Jah Music, Heinemann, London, 1980, pp.25-26. 85 Interview with Masood Sadiq.

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this venue.86 In the 1992 test match between England and Pakistan a pig's head was thrown at Pakistani supporters; in 1996 skirmishes broke out between the supporters of both teams after unrelenting racist taunts like 'Stab the Pakis' had gone on for some time and despite the prior removal of one third of seats from the notorious western terrace.87 In the latter match a British-Pakistani spectator said he would never return to Headingley because he feared for his life:

A different culture has come into the game ... lt was definitely more than drink. There were some of them (English supporters) who were stone cold sober who were making remarks, both at the players and us. As the day went on they got more and more liberated from their inhibitions. 88

Finally, the abuse and criticism the Pakistani team and its touring officials has received at the hands of the English media has angered British-Pakistanis and strengthened their loyalties to Pakistani cricket. English criticism of Pakistani cricket began on the 1954 tour when there was no discernible supporter base for the Pakistani team and has continued to this day. lt has an affinity with Roger Ballard's discussion earlier in the chapter on the medieval constructions of Europe. The nation of Pakistan and its cricket culture are held to be inferior to their English equivalents. So too are its players and supporters even if they have since acquired British citizenship. The fact that Pakistanis are predominantly Muslim has seen historical conceptualisations based on centre­periphery dual isms that are unfavourable to them enter the discussions of those who malign them. The criticisms of Pakistani cricket were briefly looked at in an earlier chapter. They are not unlike the negative comments made about other national cricket teams and governing bodies, except that the latter are less frequent and are not done so in the presence of a large migrant population from Pakistan.

Chris Searle who has written extensively on racism in English cricket has looked critically at the role played by the English tabloid press in "inflaming anti­Pakistani feeling among white readers in Britain with relish".89 In December 1987 England captain Mike Gatting took issue with the umpiring of Shakoor

86 C. Searle in J. Williams, Cricket and Race, Berg, Oxford (UK), 2001, p.160. 87 Williams, ibid.

88 M. Engel, "The White Rose Meets its Match", in The Guardian (London, England), 16 August, 1996. 89 C. Searle, "Cricket and the Mirror of Racism", in Race & Class, 34, 3, 1993, p.47; & C. Searle, Your Daily Dose: Racism and the Sun, London, 1989.

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Rana in a test match at Faisalabad. The Sun newspaper in London unleashed a vitriolic and racist attack on Rana, Pakistani cricket and Pakistanis in response to this incident. Banner headlines and editorial comments were read throughout the country and referred to "the crackpot of Karachi" (in reference to Rana), "our boys out there are being cheated left, right and centre by the Pakistanis", "Pak yer bags!" and "Thank God the tour of Pakistan is over at last. If our cricketers never want to see the bloody place again, who can blame them?". 90

In 1992 it was the 'ball doctoring' issue that made headlines. This time the English press alleged that the home team's inability to match Pakistan in the test series resulted from the scurrilous and furtive actions of Wasim Akram and Waqar Younis who were accused of scuffing cricket balls to exact reverse swing. They were arraigned by many, including cricket correspondents, and by players and officials eo-opted into reciting personal opinion columns and invective, for doing this in test and county cricket matches, and even taken to court over it by English player Allan Lamb who claimed to have had the secret of its success revealed to him. That this so called controversy soon disappeared when cricket bowlers from other countries learned to reverse swing themselves, and applied it almost as effectively as Wasim and Waqar, and lmran Khan and Sarfraz Nawaz before them, was a testimony to the integrity of the Pakistani players and the xenophobia of the English press, its players and officials over the entire issue. The affect this issue and others like it have had on the Pakistani diaspora is best summed up by the editor of The Daily Jang in London:

... the barrage that went on against Pakistan, the psychological affect it had on immigrants was this: if in a form of activity (cricket/sport) where the standard of judgement is completely objective... I cannot get the recognition I deserve, the recognition that is mine - they're the team that have just won the World Cup (1992) for God's sake! ... what chance do I stand in matters like job applications, in matters like housing applications, in matters like applications for a place in Oxford, Cambridge, or any of the good universities where the standard of judgement is so much more subjective?91

British-Pakistanis are angered by criticism of this kind. They deplore the double-standards of the English press and supporters and consequently feel empowered by the achievements of the Pakistani team. At the local level, where

90 Searle, 1993, p.46.

91 Interview with Shahid Sadullah, Editor of The Daily Jang, at the Jang Publications Office, London, 2 July, 2004.

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they have imagined Pakistaniness for themselves, Pakistani cricketers are looked upon as role models. Any unnecessary criticism of them is regarded as an insult, particularly when it is done to besmirch their reputation, accomplishments and the joy and strength these give to many in England. lt is the global package of Pakistani cricket that appeals to the diaspora, much as it does for the people of Pakistan. Wasim Akram and Waqar Younis are global icons who in the mid to late 1990s assumed the role once held by lmran Khan.

I m ran Khan is the most recognisable face and name of Pakistani cricket. For this reason he is held in high regard by the diaspora in England. They see him as dashing and debonair having acquired enormous success on the world stage and respectability among English and Pakistanis alike. His captaincy is particularly celebrated, especially when winning the World Cup for cricket in 1992. lt has earned him many fans worldwide, but none more so than those in Pakistan and England. His leadership skills and playing ability are much lauded by the diaspora long after his retirement from the game. He has become the archetypal Pakistani global icon and for this reason young players and supporters in Pakistan, England and elsewhere still look to him for guidance. For one such supporter in England lmran Khan was responsible for raising the self-esteem of British-Pakistanis in areas other than cricket:

He (lmran) extended the boundaries of what young British Pakistanis like me could dream of. lmran Khan was the embodiment of what until then had seemed a comical oxymoron: the sexy Pakistani. 92

But more importantly, this same supporter articulates the significance of lmran Khan to the construction of identities that celebrate the global success of Pakistan in light of the racism he and others like him have had to endure:

For Pakistanis there was a particular pride in seeing him dazzle us with his brilliance. He was, after all, one of us, only better. lmran was the best case scenario of what our generation could be. 93

lmran's supporters in England have defended him each and every time he has been criticised by the English press. They sympathised with him when he divorced from his wife Jemima Goldsmith; whereas others who condemned

92 S. Manzoor, "lmran was the guy who made Pakistanis sexy", in The ObseNer, 27 June, 2004.

93 ibid.

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his marriage to her in the first place felt vindicated by its dissolution. This included the English elite and first generation Pakistani immigrants who were appalled at their proposed nuptials. Y. Alibhai-Brown, in a mixed marriage herself, offers a humorous slant on the positions of both in an article for The Independent. She ridicules the views of English detractors,

the "young, blonde innocent (Goldsmith), who had been smitten, manipulated or duped by the big, handsome Pathan who slept on satin. Yes, he was a magnificent cricketer at one time, but did he really imagine this made him one of us?94

and those among the diaspora,

"What, Muslim girls not good enough for him now?" "Take away his passport. He has shamed our country and religion."95

for obfuscating the reasons for lmran and Jemima's separation. Both were alarmed at the prospects of a successful mixed marriage, particularly one as high profile as theirs. On the other hand, younger members of the diaspora were elated because lmran's marriage, like his cricketing achievements and fame, was further proof that Pakistanis could successfully negotiate the limits imposed on them by English society.

IMAGINING PAKISTAN IN ENGLISH CRICKET The versions of British-Pakistani cricket that appeared in England during

the last quarter of the 20th century are different to one another despite the fact they are all fomented by racism and the need to overcome it. This section will focus on the growth of the Quaid-e-Azam League in West Yorkshire as it is a competition that challenges the predominance of the Yorkshire County Cricket Club (CCC) and its exclusion of British-Pakistani players. However, a brief summary of 'Pakistani' cricket in other areas of England will be looked at first as they too have much to say about race relations and cultural empowerment for British-Pakistanis.

i) Disparate Pakistani cricket cultures in England My research centred almost exclusively on the development of an

alternative club cricket structure in Bradford as it is the most organised and recognised expression of British-Pakistani resistance to the official cricket

94 Y. Alibhai-Brown, "I was sleeping with the enemy", in The Independent (London, England}, 28 June, 2004.

95 ibid.

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culture of England. There has been little research undertaken on the disparate cricket cultures of British-Pakistanis other than the commissioned works of the ECB, McDonald and Ugra, and the Hit Racism For Six group already alluded to in this chapter. The primary reason for the Jack of a greater appreciation of the diversity of British-Pakistani cricket has been the belief that Pakistan is a monolithic construct that appeals to all whose lineage is from there. This thesis has shown the opposite to be true. In England common factors like racism unify British-Pakistanis but their political and cultural expressions are specific to the areas out of which they arise. This will become more evident in the case study on the Quaid-e-Azam League in West Yorkshire. In the meantime the different British-Pakistani cricket cultures that operate in England can best be summed up by the Chairman of the Quaid-e-Azam League:

... different communities operate in different areas... A Kashmiri community living in Bradford would be quite different to a Kashmiri community Jiving in the London area, or the Birmingham area, or the Manchester area. The community in Bradford is actually quite close-knit. Most people will know each other ... because we are quite segregated from a lot of the white community here. Obviously (this is) not ... good, but ... its helped us to organise ourselves a Jot better. 96

McDonald and Ugra looked at the organisation of cricket among British­Pakistanis in Essex and East London. They have found similarities in the structure of cricket there to those that exist in other areas. In 1997 there were 504 clubs in the area presided over by the ECA, yet only 296 of these were registered while the rest were left to fend for themselves. 97 The 208 non affiliated clubs were comprised almost entirely of British-Pakistani, Indian and West Indian players - almost three times the number of cricketers from these communities that were on the playing rosters of affiliated clubs. The questionnaires sent out to various club secretaries, players and umpires confirmed glaring disparities between the cricket cultures of affiliated and non affiliated teams. Ethnicity was found to be the predominant cause of divisions between the two in areas ranging from recognition of cricket ability, access to facilities and motivation for playing.9B

96 Interview with Taj Butt.

97 McDonald & Ugra, p.3.

98 ibid. As was mentioned earlier British-Pakistani and British-West Indian cricketers were denied access to mainstream leagues and cricket grounds due to pejorative cultural stereotypes. Also,

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Jack Williams has briefly examined the extent of British-Pakistani cricket in Lancashire, the West Midlands and Leicestershire. He has found a number of trends that correlate with the cricket played by minority cultural groups in Yorkshire and parts of London, particularly that of East London and the wider county of Essex. Williams paraphrases the results of a survey published in 199499 of ethnic group participation in the cricket of Greater Manchester. This showed that "for every four of African-Caribbean descent who played cricket, four of East African Asian descent, eighteen of Indian descent, twelve of Pakistani descent and eight of white British descent played cricket".100 Evidence offered by this study demonstrates the growth of cricket among South Asian descendants compared with a fall in the participation rate of white English and West Indian descendants.

Williams also looks at British-Pakistani cricket teams that play out of Liverpool, Bolton and Blackburn in Lancashire, Birmingham in the West Midlands, and Leicester. What is prevalent in all these areas are divisions between cultural groups from different parts of South Asia, the West lndies and England. Very rare is a cricket team with an equal number of players from two or more cultural groups. What has occurred in recreational and club cricket organisation throughout England over the past 30 years has been the development of teams on almost exclusive ethnic lines. This is also the trend among teams whose players have South Asian ancestry. Players of Indian ancestry very rarely mix with those whose origins lay in Pakistan. British­Pakistanis and British-Indians have formed their own clubs. These clubs represent the diversity of South Asian identities to be found in England. Often the sharing of "kinship, clan identity, language, residential area, religion and ancestral villages or towns" in South Asia are the basis upon which clubs have been formed.1 01 The names of clubs often relate to these same socio-cultural indicators - although it is also the case that some clubs are named after regions and districts in England where they have settled.102 At times even the sharing of religion has not been enough to prevent club structure from fragmenting into smaller units or groups. In Bolton and Blackburn separate clubs have usually

they were more competitive and aggressive on the cricket field than white players who were more apt to regard weekend club games as social outings. 99 Cited in G.K. Verma & D.S. Darby, Winners and Losers: Ethnic Minorities in Sport and Recreation, Falmer, London, 1994, p.122. 100 Williams, p.173. 101 ibid., p.176. 102 ibid.

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been formed for Muslims of Indian and Pakistani descent, even when the players in these clubs attend the same mosque.1 03

ii) The Quaid-e-Azam League in West Yorkshire The Quaid-e-Azam League began in 1980. Its inauguration and

continued success has been the by-product of permanent settlement. The majority of Muslims in West Yorkshire are from Mirpur in Azad Kashmir. Like others from South Asia who had made the post war journey to England the Mirpuris had no desire to settle there. Most of them were young men who sent remittances to their families in Mirpur and were determined to return to them at some point. Over time this ambition became less feasible and many more Mirpuri migrants opted to have their families join them in England rather than to return home themselves. This was comparable with the actions of other South Asian migrants who settled in other parts of England, but unlike any of them the Mirpuris differed in two respects: permanent settlement for them was achieved much later than other migrants; and, they identified more with Kashmir than they did with Pakistan.

For Mirpuris permanent settlement in England began to occur sometime in the late 1970s. Up until then immigrant workers in the textile factories of West Yorkshire had lived double lives, spending substantial periods of time in both England and Kashmir. As transnational commuters they worked long hours and for the most part saved substantial amounts of their income while in England, and spent the bulk of it when returning to Kashmir "most usually by building splendid new houses for themselves and their families".104 This gave rise to what Roger Ballard refers to as "a spectacular, if highly localised and very temporary, economic boom" in Mirpur in the 1970s.105 The prosperity generated from emigrant remittances was shortlived. The economic boom in Kashmir of the early to mid 1970s began to unravel by the end of the decade as periodic visits by expatriates came to a standstill almost overnight.

The late 1970s turned out to be a watershed period for the permanent settlement of Kashmiris in the north of England. The British government curtailed the practise of Kashmiris bringing sons and nephews posing as sons, who had reached the age to enter the labour market, to England instead of wives and daughters. Rights to family reunion were then drawn up so that Kashmiris would only bring members of their immediate family with them and no

103 ibid.

I 04 R. Ballard, "The Kashmir Crisis: A View from Mirpur", in Economic and Political Weekly, 1991, pp.513-517. 105 ibid.

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one else.106 This along with England's economic recession from the late 1970s that saw the closing of one mill after another brought an end to the Kashmiri transnational commuting of earlier in the decade. The recession hit them as hard as it did other members of England's working classes, but the resources they had at their disposal there, like welfare services, "were far superior to anything available in rural Mirpur".107

The Mirpuris of Bradford and West Yorkshire, like other British-Pakistanis who emigrated in the early post war period, identified more with their region of origin than they did with Pakistan. Mirpuri identity in England has been strong for the reasons discussed above. The unusual nature of transnational commuting they adopted and their close-knit ties to one another allowed for the forging of a distinct South Asian cultural identity in the north of England to those being forged in other parts of the country. This has gradually eroded with permanent settlement. Certainly those with Mirpuri heritage I interviewed and spent time with during my stay in the north of England still valued their South Asian regional roots but they have also in the intervening years adopted a British-Pakistani identity and an acceptance of common experiences with others that have done so as well. This has largely been the result of lslamophobia and the propensity of the wider society to cast all from Pakistan as one people.

The Quaid-e-Azam League forms an alternative to official club games in the West Yorkshire area including those played in Bradford, Dewsbury and Huddersfield. Since its inception it has grown to encompass teams from as far afield as Manchester and Sheffield. lt has also generated interest in Nottingham where local British-Pakistani cricketers have argued for inclusion for some time now. Originally the League was organised to cater for the cricketing interests of Mirpuri migrants in West Yorkshire who were denied the opportunity to play the game by the established clubs in the area, or who were bereft of the necessary skills to do so. lt grew out of the social and informal cricket games Mirpuris played against one another in the mid and late 1970s. The inaugural competition comprised 6 teams from Bradford, Dewsbury and Rochdale. Shezan Cricket Club achieved the distinction of winning the first title.108 The league has since expanded to 30 teams that play over three divisions.1 09

I 06 R. Ballard, "The Impact of Kinship on the Economic Dynamics of Transnational Networks: Reflections on some South Asian Developments, Workshop on Transnational Migration, Princeton University, 29 June- 1 July, 2001, p.24, [draft only]. 107 ibid., pp.25-26. 108 Quaid-e-Azam Sunday Cricket League webpage, www.quaideazam.org.uk, accessed 21 January, 2005. 109 Interview with Taj Butt.

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The cricket culture of British-Pakistanis that grew alongside that of Yorkshire league cricket had both positive and negative affects. From a positive perspective it ushered in numerous English raised cricketers of Pakistani heritage and an awareness of the growing cultural presence of British­Pakistanis in the area; in contrast to this it heightened racism in the sporting arena now that British-Pakistani players came more in contact with the white population. Originally the Yorkshire cricketing authority and its constituent members could argue that British-Pakistani players lacked the skills to be chosen for club cricket, but with the passing of time this argument could not be sustained. lt became blatantly obvious in the actions and words of club managers and senior players, particularly some of England's most renowned post war cricketers like Ray lllingsworth and Brian Close, that British-Pakistani players were not being given the same opportunities to progress as were those who came from 'acceptable' British stock.110

The major issue that antagonised British-Pakistanis during the 1980s and 1990s was the official policy of the county authorities that denied anyone not born within its borders the right to play cricket for Yorkshire. For an immigrant population with large numbers of children settling in Yorkshire in the late 1970s and early 1980s this decision, so proudly adhered to by members of the county club, was a devastating blow for cricketers of British-Pakistani heritage, as it was for Indians and West Indians as well. In more recent times young players of migrant communities born in England have emerged and staked their claim for inclusion. Their rise and Yorkshire CCCs response will be looked at later in this chapter. For the moment, the 'birthright' policy and lslamophobia in the wider society which penetrated cricket fields and attitudes111 allowed British-Pakistani cricket to flourish separately through the Quaid-e-Azam League in the early to mid 1980s. Gradually British-Pakistani cricketers made their way into official league teams despite the racism they endured because their talent was obvious

110 c. Searle, "Race Before Wicket: Cricket, Empire and the White Rose" in Pitch of Life, pp.14-19. Searle discusses how in the words of both Close and lllingsworth it is often implied that British­Pakistani players are outsiders who need to "integrate" themselves and not expect Yorkshire cricket to change for them.

111 'b'd 15 I I ., p. . David Lawrence, a black England fast bowler, described how in 1985 he was taunted by the partisan supporters of Yorkshire at Headingley Cricket Ground when appearing for Gloucestershire in a county match: "lt makes me sick when I hear Yorkshire committee men saying they have the best, most loyal supporters in the world; that there weren't any racist fans in the crowds. it's absolute rubbish. I was standing on the boundary line and there was a whole section calling me all the names under the sun. They called me nigger, black bastard, samba, monkey, gorilla, they threw bananas and I had (to) take these insults".

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to club secretaries, particularly those who managed clubs at the lower end of the points table who were desperate to improve to offset financial losses.

The Quaid-e-Azam League grew to counter the exclusion of British­Pakistanis from cricket during the period when many of them permanently settled in Bradford and West Yorkshire's other urban areas. Permanent settlement may have a more crucial role to play in the development of this league than many have previously realised. The naming of the league relates to that of the domestic cricket competition in Pakistan - though I think this a minor point. More importantly, it pays homage to Jinnah and therefore to Pakistan itself and its foundation as a nation for Muslims in South Asia. How is it that isolated rural regionalists like the Kashmiris who emigrated to England begin to identify with Pakistan to such an extent and begin to commemorate its founding father in cultural pastimes like cricket? And why do they adopt cricket as a significant marker of cultural identity when it is little played in Kashmir itself where it has next to no domestic organisation or structure?

In recent times Azad Kashmiris have become the most vocal proponents of Pakistan because of the political division of Kashmir. As a frontline state in the conflict over national prestige and political legitimacy waged by India and Pakistan Kashmir has borne the brunt of loss and adversity. As the one Muslim majority state that was not included in Pakistan the region has thus become symbolic to the existence of Pakistan and its justification that Muslims in South Asia have a separate national identity. The rhetoric of the "two-nation" theory has corresponded to the political realities experienced by Azad Kashmiris since 1947 and this has gradually given rise to a politics of identity centred overwhelmingly on religion to the exclusion of regional sub-nationalism, language, sect or class. Thus Mirpuris, like the Muhajirs in Pakistan, itself, did conceive of their identity in terms of the 'official discourse' of Pakistani nationalism. They brought this unidimensional religious identity with them to West Yorkshire when they emigrated. Their close ties with one another and with family in Pakistan which they maintained through the period of transnational commuting and continue to do so through travel and remittances allows for the perpetuation of Kashmiri identities strongly influenced by the "two-nation" theory to flourish in England as they have in Azad Kashmir itself.

lt is in this context that they named their autonomous cricket competition, the Quaid-e-Azam League, after Jinnah. Its naming represents a desire to maintain cultural links and political identities to the homeland among migrants coming to terms with the reality of permanent settlement in West Yorkshire. Their efforts to establish their own competition is a strong indication of them

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accepting that their lives and those of their families would now be entirely based in England. The transplanting of Pakistani symbolism like the reference to Jinnah and the naming of clubs after regions in Pakistan112 is significant to migrants seeking to establish strong community links to better facilitate their entry and settlement in a new environment and to offset the hostility shown to them by the local population.113

At this stage it is important to point out that a Kashmiri identity based on the "two-nation" theory becomes even more militant in Kashmir and better supported in England from the late 1980s. The rise of movements with worldwide appeal, growing political intrigue, and skirmishes in Kashmir have transformed the former "happy valley" into a conflict zone with far-reaching repercussions. The secessionist struggle of December 1989 and fighting in the Kargil region in 1999, communal riots, strikes, the tampering of electoral votes in June 1987, and unpopular political alliances forged by a faction of the National Conference and the Congress-I party in the 1 980s have led to a tragic loss of life and to a hardening of religious identities.114 This has largely excluded Azad Kashmir from the detente with India that has characterised the Musharaf era, and has given rise to transnational support for Kashmir through funding and other means by British-Pakistanis of Kashmiri origin. This support and the exposure this issue engenders through global communication networks along with the presence of lslamophobia in England has strengthened the cultural identities of British-Pakistanis of Kashmiri origin. These identities are informed both by regional Kashmiri influences and national Pakistani ones.

When the Quaid-e-Azam League was established allegiances to Kashmiri militancy abroad were non existent. The naming of the league merely captured the loyalties and views of its migrant organisers and players, many of whom had been exposed to lslamophobia and cultural chauvinism during their

112 Interview with Taj Butt. Clubs have been named after famous figures like Jinnah, regions and towns. British-Pakistanis have done this wherever they have settled. In Bradford clubs have a strong Kashmiri flavour. These include current clubs like Kashmir CC, Khan CC, Attack West Bowling CC, Azad CC, and Kashmir 'B' CC. Elsewhere there are clubs with appellations referring to the Punjab as there are others that reflect the origins of those who came from other regions - and sometimes religions as in the case of British Sikhs - in India, Pakistan and the West lndies. 113 There may also be an argument for Jinnah, a Muhajir himself, as a symbol for those migrating from Pakistan to England. This certainly becomes more relevant when racism sets in and British-Pakistanis begin to identify themselves as members of a religious minority under siege and in need of 'salvation'. 114 1. Talbot, India & Pakistan, Arnold, London, 2000, pp.273-277. Talbot writes: "The scale of the Kashmir disorder was such that by the mid-1990s an estimated 400,000 security services personnel had been deployed, a quarter of a million Hindus had fled to Delhi and beyond, and there had been 15,000 casualties including militants, civilians and service men." (p.273)

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working lives. The significance of this competition becomes more relevant as the issue of Kashmir begins to heat up in the years that follow permanent settlement. References to Jinnah are far more appealing in the context of the Kashmiri conflict now than they were over 20 years ago. However, in 1980 the symbolic value of Jinnah to migrants from Mirpur was an important part of their settlement in West Yorkshire in light of who they were and how they set about to adjust to their new lives abroad.

The popularisation of cricket among Mirpuri migrants in West Yorkshire is similar to that of other British-Pakistanis. it is the Pakistani national team and international cricket that they have been exposed to and support. This is the outcome of the global packaging of cricket, and more particularly its Pakistani adaptation, by western, and more recently South Asian, media networks. Satellite television and the internet are but recent and more advanced media technologies to those of radio and national television coverage that first provided news of cricket to Mirpuri migrants. Newer media technologies simply do so at a far greater rate than their precursors, but the construction of transnational Pakistani identities were initiated by the latter and only intensified by the former. The appearance of Pakistani cricketers in English county and league teams, and the success of Pakistan internationally, but more particularly on English cricket fields, is another crucial reason why support for them has come from migrants and their descendants in West Yorkshire. The presence of lslamophobia has generated a strong attachment to the Pakistani cricket team and this in turn empowers the diaspora in its dealings with the wider English society.

The Quaid-e-Azam League is an amateur competition played on Sundays and it does not limit itself to British-Pakistani players, officials and organisers. it encourages the members of other cultural groups to participate and over the years white English, British Indian and West Indian players and officials have done so. However, the majority of those involved in staging the competition, as well as those who play and officiate, have been British­Pakistanis.115 All involved rely on the good will of official clubs for match venues and practice facilities and often this has not been forthcoming. There has been a general dislike shown to the Quaid-e-Azam League by the secretaries of official clubs who concoct all kinds of excuses to deny access to facilities and grounds. Quite often they will argue that British-Pakistanis are 'unsociable' and 'abstemious', will not mix easily with others and that their

115 Interview with Taj Butt.

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matches are revenue disasters.116 Of course, as in other areas, this type of thinking has begun to change in more recent times. Official clubs with financial constraints are particularly keen to hire their grounds and facilities to Quaid-e­Azam teams who generate profits that would otherwise be lost to them. The Quaid-e-Azam League is very popular among British-Pakistanis in the area and matches are promoted as social occasions and are attended as such particularly as the season winds to a close.117 Official clubs have also opened their doors to players from the Quaid-e-Azam League - sometimes en masse -to help offset declining attendances from long time patrons and dwindling performances from teams desperately under resourced.

This has given rise to the gradual entry of British-Pakistani players in the official league competitions of West Yorkshire. The Quaid-e-Azam League has been the breeding ground for British-Pakistani league cricketers, and they have remained loyal to it. Players who have been able to break into the affiliated cricket competitions of West Yorkshire will play there on Saturdays and then back up on Sundays for Quaid-e-Azam league matches. This notwithstanding, their breakthrough into West Yorkshire league cricket continues to underline existing race relations as well as helping to overcome them. The example of the Girlington Cricket Club in Bradford will help to highlight the nature of race relations in Yorkshire league cricket over the past 20 years.

The transformation of the Girlington Cricket Club from an all white team to an all British-Pakistani one was explained by a former player, Abid Shah. In 1977, when he was in his late teens, he and other Mirpuris formed a team of their own, the Punjab Cricket Club. This team had its origins in the Sunday school league that Abid and other Mirpuris had participated in as schoolboys. They had difficulties finding teams to play against, and generally were not accepted by established white clubs in the area. it took them one year to find a ground to play on. Most existing teams in the Bradford League were not prepared to offer their grounds to an Asian team for numerous reasons. These included racism and the unlikelihood of them making money through bar takings. Bradford Council also had its reservations as the Punjab Cricket Club was one of only a few British-Pakistani teams and this made it difficult to justify public space for cricket over long periods.

116 ibid.

117 Email from Taj Butt, 26 August, 2004. Taj Butt wrote of the 2004 Quaid-e-Azam League final which I missed because of my return to Australia: "We were very lucky with the Quaid-e-Azam Cup final, we got a really good crowd around 1500 people and it was sunny and hot all day. As soon as the match finished the heavens opened and it poured down. We had to move the awards ceremony inside but apart from that it was perfect."

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In 1982 the Punjab Cricket Club changed its name to Kismet. The name change took place to appeal more to a regional Kashmiri identity for financial support and to seem less intrusive to white administrators and players. Despite this the club folded due to financial difficulties. After a period of absence Abid and his friends joined the Girlington Cricket Club in Bradford in 1988. The club had approximately 40 members of which three were British-Pakistani. From the mid 1990s to the present it has had a majority British-Pakistani membership and a team comprising of all British-Pakistani players. This is not an unusual occurrence and has happened to other district teams in the inner city areas of Bradford. In fact a dual culture of cricket has emerged in the urban areas of West Yorkshire whereby inner city clubs have opened their doors to players of cultural minorities while those in the outer affluent suburbs have not or rarely done so. Abid commented that white players left as more and more British­Pakistani players turned up to play. They either retired from the game or joined the ranks of other 'white' teams. The only remaining white member of Girlington is its President, Gilbert Coudson. He is also the President of the Bradford Central League. A few of the retired white players still turn up to watch the occasional game and are invited to club functions and parties like the end of season awards night. Others have taken to umpiring and occasionally officiate at matches where Girlington are playing.118

The majority of Girlington's current senior players plan to take up administrative positions to help young British-Pakistani cricketers come through the ranks when they themselves retire playing. There is a great deal of interest shown in the garne by British-Pakistani youths and those coming from Pakistan. This can be gauged in the ever increasing number of young British-Pakistani players in Bradford's junior leagues and the support this generates. Girlington has a junior side (its under-13s) whose players were all British-Pakistani in 2004. In addition, the last three years has seen three young players from Pakistan make the senior team. They have since married British-Pakistani women and have settled in Bradford. In fact, marriage is described as one of the ways to maintain crucial transnational links in cricket between Pakistan and the diaspora in England. Finally, many British-Pakistanis frequent league games as supporters now that players from their own cultural background have begun to appear in them. This is more the case in junior league matches where parents have become involved in numerous areas including administration, coaching, catering, organising travel arrangements, laundry and fundraising.119

118 Interview with Abid Shah.

119 ibid.

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ADDRESSING ISSUES OF RACISM In more recent times British-Pakistani cricket organisers and clubs have

had greater success at redressing racism in the game. This has made some impact on officials in Yorkshire who are making an effort to include them and other cultural minorities as they have come to realise their growing importance to English cricket. British-Pakistanis have imagined Pakistan for themselves and this has included reappraisals of the national discourse of lslamabad to make sense of their own cultural disjunctions and geographical shifts in the post war period. Narratives of the Pakistani discourse in England highlight the experiences of migrant groups in a cultural landscape of uncertainty, displacement and exclusion, but they have also helped to facilitate integration. These narratives have allowed British-Pakistanis to adjust to life in England. They are crucial to the forging of identities that are relevant to post war English society because they are statements of disapproval and integration. They denounce lslamophobia and institutional racism while staking their claim for cultural inclusion. In other words, British-Pakistani identities relate to conditions and outcomes in England. However, the intensification of global forces has also made them relevant to discussions of the Pakistani experience abroad. Pakistan is a contested concept and at no stage can it be limited to those who reside within it.

British-Pakistani cricket has at all times sought to integrate with the official game in England. The aim of players in unofficial competitions like the Quaid-e-Azam League is to become better cricketers, gain recognition and progress to the highest levels of the game. This includes playing in the County Championships and for the England XI. British-Pakistanis have made numerous attempts at the grass roots and unofficial levels to adjust to English cricket conditions and traditions. The Mount Cricket Club in Dewsbury is a case in point. lt has been established for 28 years and its membership is mostly of South Asian heritage, the majority of whom are British-Pakistani or British­Muslim. The club has had enormous success in Dewsbury winning the local championship, the Sheard Cup, three years in a row (2001-03) and contesting the final in 2004. lt was also the first British South Asian team to be invited to play in the prestigious Dales Council League based in Leeds.120

Mount Cricket Club's commitment to the English game is obvious in two distinct ways: first, they aim to develop their own playing ground; and, second,

120 Interview with Farid Karolia, Chairman of Mount Cricket Club (Dewsbury), in Dewsbury, 14 July, 2004.

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they are making sure that young players of South Asian heritage have the best possible opportunity to succeed. Planning for the ground has already been approved by the local council, but the 450 000 pounds required for its development is beyond the capacity of the local community. Because most of its members are Muslims the club administrators cannot accept lottery money, so they are exploring other avenues in an effort to raise the necessary funds.121 On the other hand, junior Muslim cricketers have been disadvantaged by Yorkshire CCCs under age selection trials. Most of them are carried out during the week after school has finished, and these are not suitable to Muslim boys. Muslim boys go to mosque for up to two hours at the completion of classes and cannot attend trial matches and coaching clinics that would benefit their development as players. So these opportunities are lost to them.122

Founding members of the Mount Cricket Club, Farid Karolia and Hanif Mayet, have discussed this problem with the cricketing authorities of Yorkshire in an effort to improve the opportunities of young Muslim cricketers. They have pointed to the conflict in cultural traditions between the coaching schedules of Yorkshire cricket and the religious obligations of practising Muslims. As a result, some trials have taken place on a Sunday to give these young cricketers their chance to impress for selection.123 Farid and Hanif also have some difficulty convincing Muslim parents of the merits of cricket, particularly when the latter have had no major exposure to the game and see it as something that distracts the attention of youths from more important community concerns, primarily religion and education (or, "mosque attendance and good grades").124

In Bradford similar efforts have been made to give British-Pakistani youths the opportunity to improve as cricketers. At the clubhouse of West Bowling, 125 a Quaid-e-Azam League team, programs have been devised to help 16 to 25 year-olds in a number of areas including cricket and other sports through coaching clinics, environmental issues "in partnership with Bradford Environment Action Trust (BEAT)", employment opportunities through

121 ibid. 122 ibid. 123 ibid. 124 ibid.

125 West Bowling were the subject of a BBC2 documentary on the Quaid-e-Azam League in 1994. For more information see: "In a League of their Own", On The Line (BBC 2), V. Symson (ed.), A. Mitchell (narrator), 1994.

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workshops on job applications and interview skills and community projects that promote "anti crime, healthy living, and educational initiatives".126

The Great Horton Cricket Club under-11s team, comprised almost entirely of British-Pakistani players, were invited in July 2004 to the Yorkshire Dales for a game against an all white local team. This game, to which I was invited by Taj Butt, was such a rousing success that a follow-up was arranged in August. Since then interest in these matches has extended beyond those organising and participating. Taj was asked to attend a national conference on social cohesion to facilitate a workshop to explain the merits of cross-cultural cricket matches like those taking place in the Yorkshire Dales.127 Subsequently, another match was planned for 2005 as well as a cricket tournament in August on the Isle of Man where a combined Bradford under-15s team was invited to play against teams from Bangalore (India), Scotland, Ireland, Holland and the Isle of Man.128 The composition of the Bradford team was significant as it comprised players from various district clubs including Great Horton, Girlington, Bowling Old Lane and others. lt was also a racially mixed team.129

There has also been some attempt in the last decade by the ECB and the Yorkshire CCC to listen to minority cricketers in an effort to improve race relations in the game. Initiatives like a multi-racial match in 1999 organised by the West Yorkshire Police, Yorkshire Cricket Development and Keighley Cricket Academy to raise awareness of the Black and Ethnic Minority Forum is at least a recognition of the difficulties that members of minority cultures have when dealing with racial prejudice.130 Also in 1999 Yorkshire began signing young British-Pakistani players like 15 year old Tabassan Bhatti from the Saltaire Cricket Club in Bradford. This was Yorkshire's attempt to develop a first class South Asian player who would represent the county. No such player had done so by 1999 and the county had been accused of racism for failing to bring any of them through.131 Its staunchest critics were British-Pakistanis, other minority

126 West Bowling Club brochure for youth programs (from July 2004), WBYI (West Bowling Youth Initiative), Parkside Road, West Bowling (at Parkside Sports Centre), n. a., n. d. 127 Emails from Taj Butt, sent 26 August, 2004 & 9 February, 2005. This was the "Yorkshire and Humber Regional Community Cohesion Event" organised by a sub-group of the National Rural Network, the Rural Network for Community Cohesion. it took place on Tuesday, 28 September, 2004 at Northern College, Wentworth Castle, Stainborough, Barnsley.

128 Email from Taj Butt, sent 4 January, 2005. 129 Email from Taj Butt, sent 9 February, 2005. 130 "ECB chief backs Yorkshire drive to boost multi-racial cricket", in White Rose, October, 1999. 131 "Where racism just isn't cricket", Guardian Education, The Guardian (London, England), 25 May, 1999.

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groups like those from the West lndies who also have never had one of their own play for the county, sections of the media, some cricket administrators, and international figures like lmran Khan. Yorkshire selected its first British-Pakistani county player in July 2004. lsmail Dawood achieved that distinction, though having been born in Yorkshire he played first class cricket with Gloucestershire and Northamptonshire before returning home to make history.132

A further confirmation of the gradual acceptance of minority cricketers comes in the correspondence made between Solly Adam and Howard Clayton on 13 July, 2004. Adam is a retired cricketer for Mount Cricket Club, a sports goods' trader, the primary sponsor of the Quaid-e-Azam League and known for introducing numerous players from India and Pakistan to English cricket. He is an enigmatic figure who openly criticises British-Pakistanis and other cultural minorities for their views of English cricket, yet he also endeavours to encourage their inclusion into mainstream society. I will quote the text in full as it offers some explanation of Yorkshire's efforts in more recent times to invite British-Pakistani players to attend the county's official trial matches in the lead up to the 2005 cricket season.

Solly

I have been to the YCB (Yorkshire Cricket Board/CCC) Office today and have spoken to Geoff Cope.

He tells me that if you send names, addresses and telephone numbers of any young player (over 17) from the Quaid-e-Azam CL (Cricket League) to Rachel 0' Halloran, who is the Cricket Secretary of the County Club, they will be invited to Trials in the close season.

Such trials are only held about once a year. They may be held indoors at the Cricket Centre.

For players who are under 17, please send their names and addresses to me for including in Pathways Trials in October/November.133

The letter reveals an openness to British-Pakistani cricket and a desire to remove it from its marginal position in relation to the national game. However, there is always the concern that this may merely be a token gesture despite the

132 "Dawood makes history'', in Metro (London, England), 22 July, 2004, p.53. 133 Email by H. Clayton to S. Adam, 13 July, 2004.

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noblest of intentions. A Jot of work remains to be done to remove the racist attitudes and stereotypes that are a part of the game's culture, whether on the playing field, after-match socials, in the boardrooms of organising committees and selection panels, and in the reporting and coverage of matches throughout the country, before various British-Pakistani cricket discourses come to be accepted by the wider society.

CONCLUSION This chapter has argued that various cricket identities forged by

members of the Pakistani diaspora from the late 1970s onwards have coincided with the emergence of 'Pakistani' political identities. The historical reality of early post war migration and the cultural segregation and alienation of migrants from the wider English society, along with their subsequent politicisation and cultural uplift through numerous expressions of protest and empowerment, are just as important to the rise of diaspora cricket identities as they have been to those that emerged in other political and cultural spheres. So too are descriptions of lslamophobia, postmodern influences, global networks and cultural hybridised identities that were discussed at some length in this chapter. The presence of racism and institutional policies of exclusion were said to usher forth a plethora of identities and social realities that contravened with modernist prerogatives of order, structure and the marginalisation of difference and deviance. These have been ably nourished by global flows and disjunctures that have disabled existing national boundaries without drastically altering the political power and influence of developed nations who feel themselves besieged by the rise of multiple politicised identities internally and in other parts of the world. In England newer cultural hybrids have emanated from within the Pakistani diaspora, and these are just as exposed to forces of globalisation as other cultural identities have been. Despite their differences the Pakistani diaspora have forged discourses of an imagined Pakistan that empower and give voice to their marginalisation.

These discourses of an imagined Pakistan in England are constructed on the basis of the "two-nation" theory whereby hostility shown to Islam by a perceived and overbearing 'adversary' provides the stimulus for expressions of cultural salvation. These expressions are made in England where the essentialised adversary is that of white English culture and power. They are not made on behalf of the Pakistani government as the experiences that underpin them have nothing whatsoever to do with politics in Pakistan. On the contrary,

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they are separate imaginings of the "two-nation" theory in the context of diaspora marginalisation and cultural segregation in England. As such, they can only ever be alternatives to the official nationalist discourse of Pakistan.

In addition, the chapter has looked at the rise of Pakistani national identities in English cricket. lslamophobia has seen many British-Pakistani players imagine Pakistan for themselves on cricket fields throughout England, and this parallels similar responses in other areas of society. British-Pakistani cricket identities, whether in East London, greater Essex, the Midlands, Lancashire, or Yorkshire, are statements of defiance and integration. They oppose the marginalisation of the wider English society including that of cricketing authorities, players, supporters and the media, yet they also seek approval from these same institutions and people. Race relations in cricket are indicative of those in other areas of English life. The adoption of Pakistani idioms, symbols and cultural identities during the period of permanent settlement are crucial for survival in a hostile and unsympathetic environment on the cricket field as they are off it. Numerous examples of this occurring were alluded to, but more depth and coverage was given to the Quaid-e-Azam League in Yorkshire as this is the most fully realised and recognisable affirmation of the British-Pakistani position in English cricket. lt is the best example of an imagined Pakistan on the cricket fields of England; a defiance of racism and exclusion, yet an assertion of empowerment and belonging.

British-Pakistani cricket identities are also an addition to the discussion on Pakistani nation-statehood. The current state of global relations and interactions allows for the transfer of ideas and their rapid transformation into numerous cultural and political discourses the world over. In England the Pakistani diaspora has used the "two-nation" theory to make sense of its own marginalisation and segregation. This has been possible because of increased global flows that have allowed them to interpret ideas and construct realities from ideological perspectives that would have made little sense to them had they stayed put in South Asia. Likewise, the game of cricket they identify with is also made available to them by global flows, particularly media coverage of Pakistani cricket.

Current global relations also allow for an interchange of ideas and influences between the cricket played by British-Pakistanis and that of Pakistan itself. British-Pakistanis have borrowed the symbols of the Pakistani national cricket team as much as they have used the symbols of their own regional origins, identify with the Pakistani players and take umbrage at their denigration by the English tabloid press, and fete them and the team when they tour

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England. On the other hand, Pakistani cricketers socialise extensively with British-Pakistani communities when they are in England, and they pass comment on the racism of English cricket and its marginalisation of British­Pakistanis like lmran Khan has done on a few occasions. There is also the continued transnational commuting of Pakistani players who make their way to England to play cricket, and the occasional British-Pakistani who goes the other way to play in the domestic competitions of Pakistan.

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CONCLUSION

There are diverse visions of Pakistani nation-statehood and national identity. This thesis has endeavoured to delineate some of those visions that cannot be encompassed by the narrow and simplistic narratives of Pakistan put forward by its political elite. Pakistan was born out of the peculiar political power dynamics and power struggles brought about by the unexpectedly precipitate British withdrawal from India. Its extraordinarily swift gestation took all by surprise, not least Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the other Muslim League leaders who were probably still unsure of their ultimate objective even after the collapse of the Cabinet Mission scheme. The original formulation of the Pakistan scenario was largely the work of Jinnah and his largely Hindustani party cohorts. They set out to give political substance and meaning to a vision of a Muslim nation state in the Muslim majority regions that lacked historical precedent and popular acceptance. Their authoritarian approach to leadership became the benchmark for all subsequent politicians, including the Punjabi military elite who usurped political power in the country by the late 1950s.

Pakistan's peculiar birth and its autocratic political history was described in Chapters 1 and 2. Both chapters provide a historical background for themes that permeate throughout the thesis. Foremost is the flawed notion that Pakistan could become a homeland for India's diverse and unevenly distributed Muslims. Just as important has been the lack of any traditions of unity amongst the Muslim majority regions that became the territorial basis of the new nation state. These regions were fragmented by any number of variables: ethnicity, class, language, culture and sectarian/denominational divisions. In its official discourse Pakistan continues to assert the "two-nation" theory with the Indian Union now functioning as the enemy 'Hindu nation'. The national leaders who uphold this discourse seek to impose it on its citizens to the exclusion of the other variables of identity that had hitherto characterised the politics of those regions. In turn, the latter attempt to subvert the leadership credentials and proclamations of the former by asserting their own visions of identity that belie the validity of the official national narrative.

Chapters 1 and 2 are crucial to an understanding of identity issues among Pakistanis within a national and global context. At one level they call to attention the failure of the Pakistani project when confined to the narrow limits and authoritarian vision of its political leaders; at another level they highlight new and multiple imaginings of Pakistan that had emerged in response to inflexible and coercive constructions of identity and national belonging by the

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end of the 20th century. This thesis has examined the conflict between the political elite of Pakistan and Pakistani cultural groups in Pakistan and England. it has done this using the game of cricket as a case study to evaluate the extent of opposition shown, and the level of appropriation undertaken by, these groups when confronted with the nation-building prerogatives of those who profess to speak for them.

The importance of cricket to Pakistani cultural groups cannot be understated. The game has done more for national unity and cultural integration within Pakistan and among Pakistani diaspora communities abroad than has the political system. This is the long term outcome of the rise of sport to a position of cultural and national significance in a global landscape of competitive markets and economies. Chapter 3 argued that sport began to be codified and transplanted to different peoples throughout the world from the late 18th century, and served numerous functions depending on where it was taken. The rise of sport as a codified product differed from its various folk-cultural precursors and represented the outlook of the middle class graduates of Victorian public schools in England. Sport to these graduates meant more than a cathartic release. They played numerous games of their own invention to prepare and discipline themselves for the travails of economic competition at home and abroad. They also believed that it would be of benefit to others less fortunate than themselves, in England and in colonies throughout the world, as it would allow for them to adjust to various roles and expectations within the context of a capitalist world system.

The game of cricket has an interesting history in relation to its introduction into India and the growth of industrialisation. Chapter 3 looked at both aspects to underline the peculiar nature of cricket organisation and patronage inherited by Pakistan, that differed with the "two-nation" theory of its earliest leaders. The MCC-codified game entered India through the public schools that had been established there. it was associated with the indigenous landholding classes and British officials, its largest patrons. In Bombay it acquired the patronage of industrialists, and the game there developed strong links with the commercial sector of that city. Codified cricket differed enormously from that played by East India company officials, military men and fortune­seekers before 1857. Generally, the latter played the game amongst themselves in informal settings and with little desire to fraternise with the native population for the purposes of 'civilising' them.

The MCC game, though encouraged along communal lines by the British, was organised by its indigenous patrons to reflect traditions of cultural

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integration that were part of Indian history. This soon expanded to encompass a national framework for Indian cricketers with the introduction of a governing body, the BCCI, a regional championship and the selection of national touring sides comprised of all cultural and religious groups that played the game. At no point in this period did Muslim cricketers and organisers imagine themselves to be a part of anything other than Indian cricket. The game of cricket, like any other variable of identity in the period before 1947, did not allow for the conception of a Pakistani logic or collective identity. This was something that could only develop once Pakistan as a nation came into being.

Chapter 4 looked at the early attempts to develop a specific Pakistani cricket culture in the new nation. lt discussed the separate lines of development that cricket and politics took from the 1950s until the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to power, and the reasons for this. The inaugural BCCP Vice-President, Justice Cornelius, worked to bring the two lines together by appointing the head of state as the chief patron of the cricket board, but politicians at the time showed little interest and lacked active involvement in the game other than the occasional token appearance at test matches as respite from official duty. Cornelius and the BCCP were left with no choice but to continue with the existing patrons of the colonial game who found themselves on the Pakistan side of the border after partition. These patrons were few and limited the game's appeal to a handful of strong clubs and colleges, predominantly in Lahore, that upheld Victorian ideals and etiquette. Cricket infrastructure and resources were also very scarce and hindered the early progress of Pakistani cricketers. Much of this was due to the loss of BCCI control and finance, as well as the departure of significant Hindu and Sikh contributions to the development of the game in the region.

There was no official or popular acknowledgement of cricket as a symbol of national unity and collective integration until the game began to find roots in the wider society. Chapter 5 argued that socio-economic and technological changes in Pakistan facilitated the gradual popularisation of cricket. Increased levels of industrialisation and market commodification allowed the educated classes to take up lucrative positions in the commercial sector that removed them from traditional areas of employment, like the army. In turn, the lower classes, many of whom had been displaced by the restructuring of the economy, were recruited into the army to take the place of the educated classes. These new recruits mostly lacked formal education, spoke regional dialects, mainly Punjabi, and had no prior association with the military. The cricketers who began to emerge during this period had much in common with

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the new army recruits. They too came from similar surroundings and began to replace college players whose numbers were diminishing due to the downgrading of sport in educational institutions.

Much of this newly found interest shown to the game by its new recruits had arisen in spaces where cricket had little if any prior exposure. Rural and lower class urban communities grew more in touch with cricket rules and customs once networks of communication expanded to include them into constructions of supra-community and national belonging. These were brought about by superimposed radio and television broadcasts of cricket onto traditional community and market spaces. Conceptions of Pakistani nationalism in sport began to resonate among disenfranchised sections of society in ways its political variant could not. The appearance of test cricketers from similar poor backgrounds, the introduction of a universal cricket parlance and the ancillary use of Urdu in broadcasts perpetuated salient but transient notions of national unity and competition within a global sports context and cultural milieu. This could not be replicated at the political level.

The fact that cricket proved more successful in uniting disparate cultural groups was reason enough for authoritarian politicians to assume the leadership of the game. By the early 1970s it was no longer feasible for them to allow cricket to generate its own national momentum. Chapter 6 described the political appropriation of cricket in Pakistan, beginning under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and intensifying under Muhammad Zia ui-Haq. lt examined how Bhutto and Zia used the game and the success it generated to procure political legitimacy for themselves at home and abroad. From this moment the organisation of cricket at the formal level became associated with the official national discourse. This, however, created numerous other variations to official cricket nationalism that challenged the monopolistic control of the game in Pakistan. The second half of Chapter 6 details alternative responses to government control of cricket. These capture the myriad constructions and flexible nature of cricket identities in Pakistan. Players move with ease between formal and informal cricket settings, and they continue to uphold their own class and regional identities even within the official circles of the PCB. Much of this is consistent with the transient national unity experienced by viewers in community and market spaces, both they and the players are free to manoeuvre between various cricket landscapes and within numerous cricket narratives. This is something that global diaspora groups have participated in as well.

The aim of Chapter 7 was to emphasise the constraints of dogmatic nationalist discourses in global environments of multiple and disjunctive

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identities. The case study of England and the formation of Pakistani cricket identities within its borders offers but one example of the limits of modernist nationalist discourses when defining the complexities of human belonging. In this chapter it was argued that British-Pakistanis saw themselves as English even while they were constructing cricket and other cultural identities that symbolised the values of Pakistani nationalism in South Asia. British-Pakistanis did this to counter the prejudices levelled at them by the white English society. In so doing they captured the malleable essence of national identities that are the product of innumerable and complex socio-political relations and realities. British-Pakistanis appropriated the "two-nation" theory and used it specifically within the context of race relations in England. They constructed identities that empowered them but differed from one another depending on where they were located. In West Yorkshire a fully-fledged alternative competition, the Quaid-e­Azam Trophy, was organised. This was the most pronounced response to social alienation and discrimination in English cricket, but it was specific to cricket relations in West Yorkshire and not to those found elsewhere in the country.

The example of British-Pakistanis in West Yorkshire attests to the complexity of national identities in increased transnational landscapes of communication, travel and cultural exchange. In relation to cricket and other cultural pursuits, the British-Pakistanis of West Yorkshire have borrowed extensively from the Pakistani national narrative to make sense of their specific concerns at the local level. In addition, they see themselves as English nationals, particularly the younger of them; but they view the narrative of English nationalism as inflexible and uncompromising. In this context, they do not abandon their cultural identities, which are eclectic constructions of their own experiences and are heightened by the discrimination of the wider society; rather, they view them as crucial components of their own English identities. Thus, at the local level the Pakistani national discourse helps them to convey their sense of belonging and acceptance in English society. At no point does it delineate a return to a 'homeland' most of them have never set foot in. This certainly applies to the Quaid-e-Azam Trophy. The West Yorkshire competition is a call for inclusion not exclusion. British-Pakistanis arranged this competition to offset their perceived exclusion from league and county cricket. They saw it as a vehicle for their improvement as cricketers and a preparation for their eventual acceptance by the Yorkshire CCC.

By the same token, the British-Pakistanis of West Yorkshire identify themselves with their regional Mirpuri identities of origin at the global level.

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Many of them accept the political reality of Pakistan, but this does not remove their identification for Mirpur, its history and traditions. The Pakistan discourse makes more sense to them in West Yorkshire than it would in Pakistan itself. Most Mirpuri migrants support the Pakistani cricket team when it tours England because of experiences in that country; it would not be nearly as important an issue or concern for them had they not migrated to England in the first place. Thus, all aspects of the Pakistan discourse used by Mirpuri immigrants in West Yorkshire are in contrast to that of officialdom in lslamabad.

This dissertation has covered various themes and issues in relation to the emergence of Pakistani national consciousness and cultural identities in world history. Certain areas touched upon can be further expanded to capture the significance of Pakistani cultural constructions within intensifying global networks of communication and political and economic control and competition. The construction of a 'national' identity in Pakistan has not facilitated any level of universal acceptance by its numerous internal competing groups, and this applies to all facets of cultural and group belonging. This thesis has looked at the specific role played by cricketers and the game of cricket in the construction of official and competing discourses of the nation and their imagined cultural importance to disparate numbers of people who happened to be caught up within its borders by the 1947 partition. Similar studies in other cultural fields, including those of film, theatre, music, literature and poetry, other sports and individual community pastimes, be they gender, class or region specific, will all, no doubt, add to a better understanding of the complexities of Pakistani identities within Pakistan and among its numerous diaspora communities.

In relation to Pakistani cricket narratives, more research needs to be undertaken to appreciate its level of growth among rural groups traditionally not associated with the game, particularly Sindis and Baluchis. At the moment there is no existing literature on the role of cricket in these communities. There is also much to learn about the possible acceptance of cricket as a pastime by religious clerics in more recent times. Chapter 6 briefly looked at the involvement of a religious youth group in the organisation of street cricket tournaments. The growth of street cricket tournaments would in itself make for a fascinating social study. lt would reveal much about the plethora of informal contributions to the construction of national identity within Pakistan, particularly as these tournaments seem to proliferate during periods of religious and national

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celebration, like Ramadan and Jinnah's birthday. Additionally, they are reminders of group belonging at the regional and sub-regional levels where they are organised to represent specific class and cultural interests quite often excluded by dominant constructions of identity. They can also be viewed as sub-national constructions of cultural identity. This would particularly apply to Afghan refugees in NWFP and the growth of Afghan cricket, which has exclusively taken place in Pakistan.

Chapter 7 looked at the construction of cultural identities among British­Pakistanis in England. The construction of identities like those of Pakistani migrant groups points to the limitations of inflexible and uncompromising discourses of nationalism within a global context of disjunctive and heterogeneous influences. The study of Pakistani migrants to England, their cultural expressions and the role of cricket in their lives highlights the extent to which identity formations have become increasingly more malleable and difficult to articulate. A case study of other migrant groups, or an evaluation of specific cultural pastimes and their impact on these groups, would produce similar arguments that point to the diversity and complexity of individual and collective notions of identity formation.

There is little scholarly research on Pakistani cultural and cricket identities among diaspora groups in countries other than England. American­Pakistanis and British-Pakistanis would, for instance, differ in their appreciation of cricket and the role it played in their lives. Initially, this thesis was to look at the growth of a national cricket consciousness among American-Pakistanis as a comparative study to that of British-Pakistanis in England. However, time and travel constraints have for the moment postponed such a study. The difficulty of research among American-Pakistanis is that they are scattered over the length and breadth of the United States. This is in stark contrast to England, which is much smaller geographically, and where Pakistani communities have congregated in specific locations. This will, no doubt, point to differences in the growth of nationalist politics among the migrant communities of these two countries.

A further factor that will accentuate the differences between the two is the nature of migration undertaken by migrants in both countries. In England, Pakistanis came from rural communities, mostly on chain-migration schemes; thereby, they were quite closely-knit despite the pressures of globalisation and its impact on traditional community structures. In the United States, migration mostly took place at the higher levels of the professional services. Immigrants have largely gone to the United States on educational scholarships and

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remained there once they found work. They are the products of Pakistan's emerging professional classes who began to distance themselves from traditional elite professions, like the military, and pastimes, like cricket. Nevertheless, there is a cricket following among American-Pakistanis even if it is more scattered and less developed than its equivalent in England.

Other countries with a significant Pakistani presence in their domestic cricket scenes include the United Arab Emirates and Kenya, both lacking substantial analytical appraisals to date. There is also the emergence of a national cricket culture in Bangladesh after its independence from Pakistan that has received very little scholarly attention. The reason for this may have much to do with why Pakistan itself for so long lacked crucial and critical evaluations of its own domestic cricket structure. In the latter case, Pakistan, having been embedded in the cricket history of India, became a peripheral concern for scholars after partition as they continued to cover the post-1947 Indian game but not its Pakistani offshoot. Of course, much of this was the direct result of the difficulties that cricket in Pakistan encountered in the period following partition. Bangladesh, originally a part of this cricket scene and with very little in the way of development and interest shown to it, became twice removed from the traditional source of historical writing on cricket in South Asia -that of India - at the time of its independence. However, it too would allow for a better understanding of complex and multiple cultural identities within South Asian history and diaspora studies.

Overall, this thesis hopes to be an addition to the growing history of cultural identities and South Asian studies. Its aim has been to further deconstruct the notion that national narratives, or cultural identities for that matter, can be stable and uncontested systems of logic. In a world of increasing global flows and exchanges, all such narratives and identities are in continual flux. Their harmonisation internally and with one another rests on negotiation and understanding rather than the traditional use of force and rejection to coerce 'subaltern' variations to accede to the authority of their 'dominant' equivalents. A crucial part of this academic concern requires the writing of history from the perspective of groups that have traditionally been ignored or paid little attention to. In relation to Pakistani history, marginalised regional groups and diaspora communities offer crucial insights into the development of national discourses of belonging within the context of a global world environment. Other fields of enquiry that could benefit from an analysis similar to that employed in this thesis relate to other non-official popular cultural

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discourses - literature, particularly poetry in the Mushaura traditions, Lollywood cinema and satellite (as opposed to government-controlled) television channels.

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APPENDIX 1

i) The "two-nation" theory as practised by the military leaders of Pakistan

The military elite once in control of the national executive constructed a political system and an ideological rationale that sought the conformity and undisputed approval of its citizenry. They also forged military and economic alliances with the United States identifying with the latter's Cold War policies and concerns. The national and international objectives of both Muhammad Ayub Khan and Muhammad Zia ui-Haq's military regimes were pursued in spite of internal opposition to them.

a) Ayub Khan

Ayub Khan's leadership was comparable in its rationale to that of Jinnah's. He, like Jinnah, felt that the people of Pakistan lacked the necessary educational qualifications and were too culturally diverse to decide political matters at the national and. regional levels.1 Ayub Khan's political approach and methodology were tainted with the bias of one trained to ignore popular opinion and cultural pluralism. He reasoned that political accountability be restricted and autocratic rule imposed in the country to better facilitate governmental efficiency. His ascension to power smoothed the path thereafter for the entrenchment of army paramountcy, influence and authoritarian rule in the political sphere of the nation even during its democratic interludes.

During his time as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and President of Pakistan (1958-1969) he persisted with the One Unit scheme that grouped the regions of West Pakistan into one political constituent. This strategy designed to nullify the numerical advantage of East Pakistan, and not without its controversies and opposition in West Pakistan, emphasised Ayub Khan's fear of internal and centrifugal expressions of ethnic and socio-cultural heterogeneity. Ayub Khan introduced a limited electoral franchise in 1959, the Basic Democracies Scheme,2 and a revised version of the 1956 Constitution in

I C. Baxter, Y. Malik, C. Kennedy, & R. Oberst, Government and Politics in South Asia, Westview Press (4th edition}, Boulder, Colorado, 1998, p.213. 2 A. Kapur Pakistan in Crisis, Routledge, London, 1991, p.72; & Baxter, et at, p.214. The Basic Democracies Scheme was an organised attempt to appease opposition to his leadership. lt amounted to a controlled experiment in the social engineering of political constituencies and legitimacy through the use of a limited franchise whose purpose was to be "the eyes and ears of the President (Ayub Khan after 1962) as well as a transmission belt between the top and the bottom of the political system". I! provided Ayub Khan with the means to influence electoral outcomes through the strategic location of bureaucrats in carefully organised union, sub-district and district councils.

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1962.3 The Basic Democracies Scheme was a political effrontery directed by Ayub Khan to the electorate of Pakistan and to the reinstated, albeit much revised, procedure of constitutional government in the country. it smacked of political arrogance and paternalism but it, nonetheless, remained consistent with the logic of a controlled nationalist discourse and political structure.

Ayub Khan aligned himself to the United States. The support of the latter was crucial in two respects: it provided the capital and intelligence to strengthen the two primary areas of his nation-building enterprise, the military and the national economy; and, subsequently, this offered an ideological rationale for Ayub and his government to continually oppose India thereby validating Pakistan as a nation within the geopolitical framework of United States foreign policy during the Cold War.4

Ayub Khan's eventual downfall challenged the credibility and legitimacy of military rule in Pakistan and placed a number of constraints on the interim leadership of Yahya Khan, his successor. Yahya responded with legislation that aimed to reduce the disapproval of the army.s His reforms, while meant to appease the masses, also served as a subterfuge to keep the unpopular army politically active and in a position where they could continue to influence the

3 H. Feldman, Revolutions in Pakistan: A study of the Martial Law Administration, OUP, Lahore, 1967, pp. 199-201. The revised 1962 Constitution was a document that unequivocally affirmed Ayub Khan's political authority and control of the national executive. Together with the Basic Democracies Scheme and the One Unit system it gave him far-reaching powers and a formidable hold on the political machinery of government. The National Assembly, elected by the Basic Democrats, could only pass legislation with the approval of Ayub Khan and not the other way around. Ayub Khan could dissolve the National Assembly and promulgate legislation in its absence - though this had its repercussions for the President who was also required to stand down 120 days after the dissolution of the National Assembly. Importantly, Ayub Khan could "issue" a "Proclamation of Emergency" which allowed him to pass legislation and manage the affairs of the country whenever he deemed it necessary to prevent internal and external acts of aggression and threats to Pakistan's government, economy and society. Furthermore, the Constitution provided no budgeting constraints on Ayub Khan. He was authorised to spend "expenditure already approved" in the manner he wanted to.

41. Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Vanguard, Lahore, 1999, p.171. United States support for Pakistan gradually ceased in the 1960s. In 1960 Ayub Khan angered the United States government when he reached a border agreement with China. In 1962 he took issue with United States support of India during the latter's border war with China and resisted calls from Washington to view China as the aggressor. In effect, what Washington was asking him to do was to contradict his nationalist discourse by acknowledging the right of India in a regional confiict. His failure to comply with the wishes of the United States government brought him disapproval from Washington and embarrassment and opposition from within Pakistan- the arming of India by the United States undermined the logic of Ayub Khan's foreign policy and caused the first cracks to appear in what had up until then been an imposing but quite secure political leadership at the domestic level.

5 Kapur, pp.96-97. He presided over "national elections based on adult franchise; ... (repealed) the unpopular 1962 Constitution; ... (dismantled) the One Unit system of West Pakistan; and ... scrap(ped) parity between East and West Pakistan".

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outcome of national legislation. With this in mind he sought to coalesce with a democratic and civilian leader that would be amenable to the interests of the army. This would allow him to interfere with the political process without having to incense the electorate. Yahya and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had combined to remove Ayub Khan from office after the latter's growing opposition and declining health, continued their association in the lead up to the 1971 general election. The ramifications of this association and its need to overcome Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's electoral advantage in East Pakistan led to the events of 1971 that reduced the geographical dimensions and more than halved the population base of the country. Politically and culturally it sidelined the army from participating in the outcome of national legislation for almost 6 years, and it undermined the logic of the "two-nation" theory when an alternative homeland for a predominant Muslim population in South Asia was established in East Bengal.

b) Zia

The national narrative of Pakistan and its association with military leaders and authoritarian rule was restored and hardened under Zia.6 Zia's rise through the ranks of the military to become the Chief of Army Staff in 1976 was facilitated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who personally hand-picked him for the position ahead of more illustrious and more experienced military leaders. Bhutto felt that Zia's background, religious devoutness, serious demeanour and good conduct as a soldier were qualities that would see the new army chief refrain from interfering with the political process.? In a little over two years time this judgement of character proved fatal for Bhutto when Zia who had usurped his authority in July 1977 opened legal proceedings to execute him.

Bhutto's selection of Zia as Chief of Army Staff hastened the rise of the middle and lower-middle classes into the higher echelons of the Pakistani army. This marked a turning point in the leadership of the army that was an inevitable

6 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p.384. Zia was born into a "lower middle-class Arain family" in Jullunder (12 August, 1924) on the eastern side of the Punjab which was partitioned to India in 1947. The Arains were an abstemious and religiously devout peasant-proprietor group who through hard work and as beneficiaries of British land distribution policies in the Punjab increased their wealth and socio­economic status in the early decades of the 20th century. This gave career opportunities to their progeny in the armed services and in the upper echelons of the professional classes, particularly as lawyers and politicians. it was from this background that Zia was able to acquire an education at St. Stephen's College in Delhi and pursue a career in the military by joining the British India Army in 1944.

7 S.J. Burki & C. Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ui-Haq, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, pp.S-6. Bhutto believed that Zia unlike his immediate predecessors as Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant­General Gul Hassan Khan and General Tikka Khan, was more trustworthy and dutiful, and not at all interested in political power.

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outcome of British withdrawal from India. By the time that Zia was appointed to head the revamped military sector of the Bhutto government changes in the socio-economic conditions and educational expectations of the indigenous elites allowed many of them to shift their allegiances and occupational preferences away from the army and on to the professional services. This impacted on the recruitment policies of the former. The generation of army recruits on the eve of partition and after 1947 were from socio-economic classes that differed from those that graduated alongside Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. The latter were Sandhurst-trained and espoused the military traditions and expectations, as well as much of the cultural baggage, of their English superiors. They were mostly from families that had been recipients of land grants awarded by the British and were affluent, educated and well-equipped to assume positions of importance in the political and economic sectors of Pakistan in the immediate post-1947 period. These then were the "officers who took command of the Pakistani army after independence". a

Zia and the post-1947 recruits differed from their Sandhurst-trained superiors in two distinct ways: first, they mostly came from "the small towns and villages of Central Punjab" and were traditional and more religiously devout in their outlook;9 and, second, they had no prior historical association with the military and possessed meagre resources, having accrued little or no material gain from colonial policy.1 O The circumstances that gave rise to their recruitment had much to do with changing elite perceptions of identity and status. The latter were increasingly drawn into the urban sector where opportunity for employment and investment in the professional and commercial industries of Pakistan gradually began to develop in the post-partition period. Over time these elite classes began to identify their political aspirations with the socio-economic and cultural imperatives of modern capitalism and not, as had traditionally been the situation after 1857, the military. Under these circumstances they increasingly began·to propagate the need for education and civic employment to their children and came to regard the army as an anachronistic profession.

The gradual withdrawal of the elite classes from military service provided the opportunity for others of lower socio-economic standing to enter the ranks of

8 ibid., p.7.

9 ibid. Many recruits, like Zia, came from towns and villages in the Punjab partitioned to India in 1947. 10 ibid. There were exceptions to this like the Arains who, as a group, benefited considerably from the British.

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the Pakistani army. As such, the identity and status of military personnel also began to change. Zia presided over a military whose numerical strength was with the middle to lower middle classes. His promotion by Bhutto to lead the army ahead of officers who belonged to the generation of soldiers recruited during the colonial period paved the way for the indigenous trained middle to lower middle classes to assume command of the army for the first time. From their predecessors these new military leaders inherited the tradition of the army as the institutional machinery - with an identity base that subsumed internal cultural traditions that contested its authority - best equipped to manage the political culture and national discourse of Pakistan when the democratic process was deemed unproductive and civilian politicians corrupt. This induction into the highest echelon of the military structure exposed the middle to lower middle classes for the very first time to the political decision making process and elevated their social and political status to a level in accordance with established military practice. lt also allowed them to fuse aspects of their own cultural experiences into the nationalist discourse.

Zia's political leadership and vision reflected the values and attitudes of his upbringing. At the same time much of how he ruled Pakistan was consistent with how Ayub Khan had managed his political affairs. Zia inherited the tradition of political authoritarianism and the mantle of national protector of Pakistan as the military and civilian politicians that preceded him had done. He portrayed himself in a manner similar to that of Ayub Khan as the guardian of the people and the overseer of the national legislature in the face of inept politicians. His was meant to be a short tenure as national leader; he promised elections to appoint a new civilian government within three months of his military coup but refrained from doing so, thereby holding on to power until his death in 1988.11

Until martial law was lifted Zia did his utmost to discredit, incapacitate and dismantle any attempt to restore democracy in Pakistan. He implemented a

11 Baxter, et. al. (1998), p.218,& S. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan", in A. Banuazizi & M. Weiner (eds.), The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse University Press, NY, 1986. Zia strengthened and consolidated his control of the political legislature by appointing military personnel to administer crucial political, bureaucratic, commercial and legal organisations and departments. Between 1977 and 1985, when the country was under martial law, he appointed "senior military officers" to govern as "deputy chief martial law administrator('s)" in arbitrarily demarcated geographical "zones" of his own making; he placed "active and retired" army personnel in the highest bureaucratic positions and "established a 1 0 per cent quota for retired military officers at all officer-level ranks in the civilian bureaucracy"; he appointed retired army generals as chief executives of commercial industries and sporting bodies like the Banks, Pakistan International Airlines and the Pakistan Cricket Board; and he developed "martial law tribunals" that were administered by senior army staff and had equal and corresponding jurisdiction to that of civilian courts which effectively served to compromise and contain the independent authority of the latter.

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number of policies that aimed to curb the organisation and practice of democratic politics by frustrating the desire and resolve of existing and prospective democratic politicians from voicing their dissent and opposition to him. In 1979 he banned all political parties and established the Election Commission as a compulsory registration office for political parties that hoped to contest elections once democracy was restored.12 Disqualification Tribunals further inhibited the resolve of politicians as insinuations, accusations and trumped-up charges on spurious grounds disqualified the political careers of many.13

Zia's repudiation and token gestures towards the restoration of democracy in Pakistan were evident each time he purported to consult the electorate on matters of political significance. In December 1984 he held a referendum that validated his lslamicisation policies and extended his tenure as president until 1990.14 An overwhelming 98 per cent of voters approved of Zia's ideological position and this it was felt was reason enough for him to extend his presidency for a further 5 years.15 On the back of this electoral success, which was not without intrigue and suspicion, Zia held his "partyless" elections in February 1985 to elect national and provincial assemblies. However, there was no doubt in Zia's mind that the office of prime minister and the elected democratic chambers of government were to be nominal political instruments that were expected to rubber stamp his policies.16

Zia smoothed the path for rnany of his generation of army recruits to enter the upper echelons of the inherited colonial class structure in Pakistan. This subsequently engendered opposition from the existing class of elites who had ceased to rely on entry into the army as a means of maintaining their

12 ibid. In effect, this was a measure to keep a record, and better facilitate the extirpation, of all active and potential rivals. As such, most parties decided not to register with the Election Commission. 13 ibid. Although Zia had imposed punitive laws that banned individuals from organising themselves politically, in the lead up to the 1985 elections many of these laws were amended to allow for the participation of "partyless" politicians. However, most opted to not contest the elections given the mistrust they had for Zia, his continued suppression of political parties in 1985 and his propensity for intrigue. 14 L. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History, OUP, Karachi, 1997, p.482. 15 Baxter, et. al., p.218. 16 Ziring, pp.479 & 500-501. The appointed prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo had briefly been the Minister of Railways in the "Zia Cabinet" of 1978. As a Sindi he had been chosen prime minister by Zia in an effort to curb the opposition shown by many Sindis to the latter's political power. In any event, the 1985 elections were organised by Zia to give himself a civilian guise politically and to appease the growing popular resentment shown by many in Pakistan to his undemocratic and authoritarian leadership.

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political power and status. The latter remained resilient and powerful because of their economic and industrial assets, but politically their dominance was gradually becoming negligible under the auspices of military rule from the mid 1970s onwards.17 In essence, political power during Zia's leadership transformed societal norms and traditions. it blurred the socio-economic and cultural distinctions of the elite classes that had formed during the colonial period and assumed positions of authority at the time of partition and segments of the middle to lower middle classes that benefited in stature and wealth from their entry into the military after partition. Many of the latter through traditional military endowments joined the ranks of the elite classes, and, as a result, found themselves in the position of altering and redefining the socio-economic and cultural parameters of the national narrative. Zia's lslamicisation program offers a pertinent example.

Unlike any other political leader in the short history of Pakistan, Zia advanced the position of Islam in government policy. He introduced religious tenets in the nation's political and legal sectors and diminished the practice of secularism that had prevailed in both spheres prior to his seizure of power. The rise of Islamic political and legal influence under Zia's leadership has been attributed to his strict religious and bucolic upbringing.18 it was also a reflection of the changing socio-economic and class allegiances of army recruits in Pakistan after partition. The religious orientation and traditional observances of middle to lower middle class recruits facilitated the gradual introduction of a more resilient Islamic presence in the military, particularly as these non-elite classes progressed into the highest positions of the army. Subsequently, with their rise to political power through Zia's coup in 1977 government policy too came to be decidedly more Islamic in its appearance and implementation.

The establishment of Shariat Courts, Zakat laws and other policies of Islamic influence had their shortcomings in relation to army power. The national discourse as narrated by Zia did not attempt to impose a strict societal adherence of Islam in isolation of the established institutional structure and authority of the military. Rather, it sought to reconcile Islam with the tradition of army authoritarianism in Pakistan. it was not Zia's intention to raise the power and status of religious clerics above that of his own. Zia's middle to lower

17 S. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan", in A. Banuazizi & M. Weiner (eds.), The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse UP, New York, 1986, p.311. Cohen writes of the opposition shown to Islamic law by "lawyers and judges trained in the Western legal tradition", and by women from within the socio-economic elite who were "treated as inferiors in the (religious) courts, and ultimately outside of them as well". 18 Burki & Baxter, 1991, p.4. .

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middle class roots predisposed him to maintain his religious observances and subsequently incorporate aspects of them into society through the army and the national legislature, but they did not make him weaken or annul the authority and status of the military. Zia's authority and political vision was based on a synthesis of military authoritarianism and Islamic doctrine. The army had disciplined him to become an autocratic ruler in much the same way it had done Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan; his upbringing influenced his desire to increase the role of Islam in society. Zia fused the two in a way that his predecessors, both military and civilian, could and would not do. To do this Zia assumed the persona of a religio-political figure to bestow authority and discipline in Pakistan and to acquire complete control of the national legislature. He, and not the religious clerics appointed to advise him, decided which religious tenets and observances of the Islamic faith were to be included in the national narrative of Pakistan. Religious clerics had their status elevated because of the increased political importance of religion in society and the advisory duties that many of them fulfilled during Zia's leadership, but they were under no illusion as to who was the final arbiter in all matters sacred - and temporal. lt was Zia who controlled the manner, extent and type of religious tenets and injunctions that the people of Pakistan were expected to adhere to. During his time as CMLA and President of Pakistan he developed a system that utilised the skills of various individuals in Pakistan's religious and lay professions to underpin the basis of his religio-political authority.19

From December 1979 Zia's authoritarianism received a much needed and crucial political and economic boost. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan left Pakistan in a favourable geopolitical position to benefit from United States foreign policy. This greatly improved Zia's political fortunes and enhanced his legitimacy as a national leader among the liberal democracies of the west. Zia was no longer regarded as an international pariah by the United States and its European allies for having overthrown democracy in Pakistan and executing the democratically elected Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Instead, he was openly praised and supported by these very same countries and justly rewarded for siding with them. The United States became the largest foreign contributor to Pakistan's domestic economy when in 1981 it agreed to a 6 year (US)$3.6 billion aid package.20 Furthermore, it supplied advanced weapons technology to the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan through a pipeline operating from Pakistan21 and

19 Ziring, pp.466-467.

20 Burki & Baxter, p.18. 21 ibid., pp.18-19.

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an estimated (US)$2 billion worth of armaments to "Afghan resistance groups"

stationed in Peshawar.22

In the early 1980s Pakistan experienced a level of economic growth

defying its status as a developing country. Increases in GDP and per capita income during Zia's leadership did more to reinforce the socio-political

exclusivity of the national narrative in Pakistan than it did to harmonise

opposition and include the disenfranchised. Economic growth buttressed

domestic authoritarianism and accentuated the socio-political gap between the

upper classes and the masses.23 The national economy relied heavily on

foreign capital and lacked any substantial policy for the equitable distribution of

wealth and the social betterment of the underprivileged. The United States aid

package and similar arrangements with other foreign donors were agreed to on

the condition that Pakistan remained politically stable and economically suited

to the requirements of global capitalism. In the short term economic gains

achieved from the influx of foreign capital supported and sustained Zia's

autocratic political orientation; in the long term it forebode repercussions and

difficulties. Economic dependency saw Pakistan accrue a large amount of debt

and put it into relationships that in the long term seemed uncertain. Pakistan's

debt had reached over (US) $13 billion by the time of Zia's death - "equivalent to nearly a third of its GDP".24

The economic growth experienced by Pakistan between 1977 and 1988

offered no significant reduction to the social plight of many. Pakistan compared

poorly to India and China who both had lower per capita income levels at the

time of Zia's death. In 1986 life expectancy at birth for Pakistanis stood at 52

22 ibid., p.18; S. J. Burki, "The State and the Political Economy of Redistribution in Pakistan", in M. Weiner & A. Banuazizi (eds.), The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse UP, New York, 1994, p.324. 23 Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1987-88 (lslamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1988), in Burki, ibid., Statistical Appendix, 16-17; & Burki, ibid, pp. 318-321. 24 ibid., p.320. Furthermore, the terms for the repayment of foreign loans, which from 1970 onwards were revised to favour donor nations, became more stringent heightening the risk associated with short term economic growth based almost entirely on external resources and funds. Burki wrttes that "in 1970 average maturity of outstanding debt was thirty-one years; in 1986, this had declined to twenty-six years. The period of grace allowed by foreign creditors also decreased, from twelve to six years between 1970 and 1986. Average interest carried by outstanding debt increased nearly threefold, from 2.8 to 6.6 percent a year... In the fall of 1988, Pakistan's external reserves could finance less than one month's worth of imports". This was particularly the situation in Pakistan where foreign investment more than made up for shortages in domestic income. The gross national savings which averaged 6.4 per cent of GNP between 1973 and 1980 dropped to 4.6 per cent between 1980 and 1986. During this 13 year period the shortage of a domestic alternative to the external monetary inflow of foreign creditors became more severe as gross domestic investment was kept at 17.5 per cent of gross national income.

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years; it was 57 in India and 68 in China.25 The infant mortality rate in Pakistan for the same year was 111 out of 1000 births; India had an infant mortality rate of 86 and China 34 respectively.26 These statistics were also reflected in the field of education. Pakistan's enrolments for primary school in 1985 amounted to an estimated 47 per cent of all eligible children. This was vastly lower than in India where an estimated 92 per cent of children attended primary school.27

ii) Civilian governments and authoritarianism There are two notable periods where the national narrative of military

authoritarianism was partially challenged by civilian politicians. The first of these was between December 1971 and October 1977 when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed the political leadership of the country; the second occurred after Zia's death in August 1988 and saw Zulfiqar's daughter, Benazir, and Nawaz Sharif grapple for parliamentary political power before the military coup of General Pervaiz Musharraf on 12 October 1999 brought their struggle to an end. During these two democratic interludes the military, though absent from power in practical terms, remained an influential and feared political force. The type of military influence, and the extent of its impact on internal policy making, differed in both these periods. On the odd occasion, particularly during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's earliest years as national leader, military influence and power was on the decline and completely absent from the legislative process. Nonetheless, the military's recuperative powers within the national boundaries of Pakistan have always been strong enough to prevent the removal of their authority from the national narrative because of the symbiosis of the army high command and the Punjabi bureaucratic, landed, industrial elite.

a) Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's ascendancy to the national leadership was welcomed by many in Pakistan and the west who had tired of the dominance and intrigue of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Many of the less affluent in Pakistan were particularly encouraged by Bhutto's early efforts to reform the political system and land ownership, increase workers benefits and nationalise several of the country's largest industrial enterprises. In 1973 Bhutto reduced the power of the Civil Service of Pakistan by dismissing 1 303 bureaucrats, monitoring all future recruitment through the establishment of the Academy for Administrative Training, introducing strategies to control payment and restrict fringe benefits, and assuming the responsibility for promoting bureaucrats into

25 ibid.

26 ibid., p.321.

27 ibid.

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managerial positions.28 Bhutto's 1972 land reforms were meant to redress the

inequalities of land distribution carried out during the Ayub Khan period29

Bhutto also made it more difficult for landlords to evict peasants from land and

exempted the latter from paying "land revenue" and "water rate(s)", thus easing

the strain on their limited resources, by lugging these payments onto the

landlords.30 Furthermore, Bhutto introduced worker entitlements and business

management reforms that were more equitable. 31

In retrospect, these changes were cosmetic and were intended to

enhance Bhutto's power and prestige in the face of military and other political

rivals. In keeping with those who ruled before him and those who would rule

after him, Bhutto sought political longevity and the validation of his authority on

a grand scale. His effort to rewrite the national narrative to portray himself as

the voice of the people was every bit as misleading and manipulative as that of

the military rulers who came before and after him. 32 His reforms and political

conduct, while offering some assistance to the underprivileged, failed to redress

the discrepancies of wealth and power in Pakistan. This is because Bhutto was

more preoccupied with removing those that threatened his power than

committing himself fully to the duties of one democratically elected to govern.

His efforts to diminish the potential for military intervention and rule sustained

rather than removed. the undemocratic institutional structures and traditional

28 Baxter, et. al., (1998), pp.215-216.

29· S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977, Macmillan Press, London, 1988 (2nd ed.), p.139. He revoked the land awards granted by Ayub Khan to civil and military recipients and reduced the ceiling on land ownership from 500 to 150 acres for irrigated land and 1 000 to 300 acres for unirrigated land. 30 ibid.

31 S. Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography, lthaca Press, London, 1979, p.155; Burki (1988), p.114. Worker entitlements included a "higher basic pay, bonuses, compensation, insurance, pensions, (and) housing facilities" (Taseer); business management reforms comprised a large part of Bhutto's nationalisation program. Beginning in January 1972 Bhutto and his PPP finance minister assigned Raza Kazim and other prominent left-wing party members the task of deciding which industries were to be nationalised. Eventually 31 of the largest firms in Pakistan in "ten 'basic' industries" were nationalised . The industries affected included: "iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, motor-vehicle assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemicals, cement and public utilities" (Burki).

32 Ziring (1997), p.409. Bhutto saw himself as the upholder of the rights of the people and, consequently, referred to himself as the Quaid-i-Awam (Ruler of the People). The allusion to Jinnah's sobriquet as the Quaid-i-Azam is instructive of Bhutto's desire for power. lt is also an indication of how important a political figure Bhutto considered himself to be. Lawrence Ziring writes that "Bhutto was so convinced of his place in history that he truly believed that his was a greater destiny, and that no matter what the final outcome of his Pakistan experience, his vindication was assured. Bhutto genuinely thought of himself as a servant of the people".

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authoritarian culture of the political system in Pakistan.33 In other words, Bhutto

did not attempt to derail the power structures that obstructed democracy in

Pakistan, he merely sought to incapacitate or replace those who controlled

them to better facilitate his own authority.34

Bhutto's authoritarianism gave rise to social disturbances and the

amalgamation of disparate opposition political parties into the Pakistan National

Alliance. 35 The extent of popular resentment levelled at him increased

enormously during the period leading up to the 1977 election and reached its

crescendo in the months that followed. In the aftermath to the election the

Pakistan National Alliance called on Pakistanis to rise up in protest against

Bhutto's government. General strikes were organised that crippled an already

declining economy and led to calls from the Karachi Bar Association and

Pakistan International Airlines, among others, for Bhutto to resign.36 Bhutto

refused to and instead set about to quell the disturbances. 37

Thus, Bhutto's political style and persona failed to win him the approval

of other civilian politicians and, in the long run, alienated him from the masses.

His inability to trust others, including members of his own political party, and his

determination to go it alone, left him politically vulnerable. Ironically, his desire

to hold on to power through coercion and removal of political opponents was

33 Baxter, eta/, (1998), pp.215-216; Ziring, p.412; & Taseer, pp.151 & 163. The measures adopted by Bhutto to consolidate his own power tainted his political credibility and brought democracy in Pakistan into disrepute. These included his civil service reforms of 1973 that diminished the influence of the incumbent elite and expedited the entry of PPP members and others of Bhutto's choosing into the national bureaucracy; clandestine electoral tactics in 1977 that disrupted the campaigns of opponents and left the outcome of the election besmirched with innuendo and open to charges of rigging; and, the gagging of opponents and marginalisation of party members that dared to question him or his political tactics. 34 S.J. Burki, 1988, p.70; & Kapur, pp.146-147. A measure of Bhutto's attempt to replace military authoritarianism with that of his own can be discerned from his decision to dismiss several senior officers from their positions. This included the respective army leaders of 1972 and 1976. Bhutto never intended to weaken the military's fighting capabilities, he merely wanted its withdrawal as an active political force and its support of his political leadership. That is, he wanted the military to be loyal and answerable to him in spite of its historical roots as an independent vehicle of authority in regions allotted to Pakistan. In light of his shortsightedness, Bhutto did not alter the structure and traditions of the military, he merely replaced its leader with one he felt he could trust and made the position subordinant to his authority.

35 Burki, 1988, pp.193-194. The Pakistan National Alliance comprised "nine opposition parties ... from both the left and the right" of the political spectrum all in opposition to Bhutto's increasing power. 36 Ziring, p.418.

37 Ziring, pp.416-422; & Taseer, p.171. The cat and mouse game between Bhutto and the Pakistan National Alliance continued until Bhutto was ousted from office by the military on 5 July.

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more in keeping with the tactics deployed by the previous military rulers than

with the democratic politics he sought to endorse.

b) Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif

The period of democracy that followed Zia's death similarly reinforced the

authority of the military and its dominance over the national narrative in

Pakistan. The military's prerogative as arbiter of the Pakistan discourse went

largely unchallenged in light of the quarrels and intrigues that characterised the

feud between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The fierceness of this rivalry

frittered away the opportunity for a wholehearted and smooth restoration of

democracy. Instead, the transition to democracy turned out to be eventful,

difficult and ill-fated, and played into the hands of those who opposed and

admonished its return.

The acquiescence of the military to the return of democracy in Pakistan

was precipitated by Zia's death. Prior to his death in the crash of a C-130

aircraft that also removed several other senior generals of the Pakistan army,

Zia had promised partyless elections for November 1988.38 These elections

would not have taken place at all if the decision to hold them had been left

entirely to the incoming President, Ghulam lshaq Khan, and the Chief of the

Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Baig. Both felt that in the confusion which

followed the deaths of Zia and several of the military's top brass, democratic

elections should have been suspended. Ghulam lshaq, a civil administrator in

the mould of Ghulam Muhammad with an equal commitment to military political

power and authoritarianism, was content to govern unopposed with the

assistance of senior ministers and army officers that he hurriedly put together to

manage the nation's political fortunes in the immediate aftermath to Zia's rule. 39

His desire to postpone elections paralleled Zia's penchant for indefinitely

delaying polls.40

38 Ziring, ibid., p.385. 39 Ziring, pp.507-508. 40 ibid., p.508. lt was the Punjab High Court and the Pakistan Supreme Court that eventually tipped the balance in favour of staging the elections that Zia had promised to hold. The former abrogated Zia's dissolution of the National Assembly; and, the latter legalised the participation of political parties to contest the forthcoming election. At this juncture Ghulam lshaq refrained from challenging the judicial decisions reached by the legal system in Pakistan and agreed to the election of political parties and a National Assembly. Ziring relates that Ghulam lshaq's decision to do so reflected his desire to dilute the Islamic policies of Zia in "preference for secular politics". Ziring further adds that Ghulam lshaq was "not the devious monopolizer of power the politicians made him out to be"; rather, he abhorred the divisions that thwarted party politics in Pakistan and acted in a high-handed manner to prevent them from discrediting the domestic political sphere.

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The Bhutto and Sharif rivalry after 1988 was a bitter blow to democratic reform in the country. Their ideological, personal and regional differences made rapprochement impracticable; and, their antagonism discredited the political process. In fact, both publicly exhibited an authoritarian and inflexible approach to politics that reminded many of the previous attempt at democracy carried out by Benazir's father in the 1 970s. Bhutto had a Sindi feudal pedigree and a western education that upheld the principles of democratic representation and political accountability;41 Sharif was an industrialist with strong military ties and little political experience before making his name as the finance minister (1981-1985) and chief minister (1985 onwards) of the Punjab under Zia's patronage.42 In their efforts to outmanoeuvre each other both displayed characteristics that conflicted with their respective political principles and associations.43

At times Bhutto and Sharif seemed to be their own worst enemies. Both were notorious for scandal and intrigue, and both were implacable in their treatment of minorities. Bhutto exhausted much of her energy trying to prevent the Sharif faction of the Pakistan Muslim League from attaining leadership of the Punjab in her second term as prime minister.44 She was also implicated in her husband's fraudulent and duplicitous activities.45 Sharif was entangled in financial indiscretions that left a number of co-operative societies in the Punjab insolvent and their depositors with 20 billion rupees in losses.46 Both also took punitive measures in addressing widespread demonstrations and violence that was a feature of 1 990s Pakistan. Bhutto authorised Operation Clean-up in response to "ethnonational" disturbances in Karachi. This was an unpopular decision that, fraught with danger, led to the death of thousands and turned Karachi into a war zone.47 Sharifs first tenure as prime minister saw violence used to repress disturbances in Sind;48 his second led to the revival of

41 Talbot, 1999, pp.379-380. 42 ibid., pp.400-401. 43 Bhutto conspired with Ghulam lshaq Khan, the civilian President who was an unabashed supporter of the military, to oust Sharif from his prime-ministerial duties in 1993, and made an adversary out of Farooq Leghari, the then PPP president, who showed little party solidarity when dismissing her from office in 1996. Sharif, on the other hand, touted as the civilian face of the military was from the moment of his appointment as prime minister keen to downplay his ties to the armed services in an effort to forge an independent political persona. This gained him the rebuke of senior army staff and led to his dismissal on two separate occasions. 44 Baxter, et. al., p.221. 45 ibid., p.222. 46 Talbot, (1999), p.320. 47 Baxter, et. al., p.222. 48 ibid.' p.221.

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hostilities with India over nuclear bomb testing and the surreptitious deployment

of troops in Kashmir.

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APPENDIX 2

Sport and the Capitalist System

The British public school system and the codification of sport from the middle of the 19th century reflected the increasing desire of the middle classes to institutionalise, and therefore better manage and control, all aspects of society. This Foucaultian concern to supervise, systematise and organise people's lives to accord with their prevailing political and economic dialectic became an unmistakable reality of British domestic and imperial policy during the 19th century. Methods of surveillance and the reordering of social practice to correspond with the logic of competitive economies and profit-making proved more "efficient and profitable in terms of the economy of power" than subjection "to some exemplary penalty" .1 Crucial to Foucault's reasoning is the reordering of power that occurred during the 18th and 19th centuries and the limits and constraints that this placed on psycho-somatic expression. Foucault describes that the discourse of power enacted by secular political and economic figures did not only displace the validity and practicality of monarchical rule in an industrialising and modernising world, it also replaced traditional methods of hierarchy and control with newer versions that best suited the modernist project. This included the organisation and regulation of the masses into units of labour or productive power through institutions like schools, prisons, factories and hospitals. These institutions transformed the human condition into a state of docility and submissiveness - a "trained source of labour power" - through processes deemed to be rehabilitative.2 These "docile bodies" were then strategically employed as operatives of industry, supervised and programmed to keep the production line of the capitalist system functioning. 3

Popular games and pastimes in Britain mirrored the changes that occurred in other sectors of society. From the middle of the 19th century many of them gradually began to take on the appearance of corporate bodies with requisite executive and legal powers that conformed to the dictates and requirements of a rapidly industrialising national economy. Their codification, formalisation and legalisation came after that of other social institutions like prisons, hospitals, schools and factories that Foucault mentions were integral to

1 M. Foulcault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by C. Gordon, Pantheon Books, New York, 1980, p.38.

2 M. Foulcault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Penguin Books, London, reprinted in 1991, originally published in 1975.

3 M. Hughes-Warrington, "Michel Foulcault", in Fifty Key Thinkers on History, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.96-97.

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the growth and predominance of capitalism, but they, nevertheless, coincided with, and contributed to, the 19th century national narrative of Britain. Sports' governing bodies in 19th century Britain reinforced the ideals of muscular Christianity beyond the walls of Victorian public schools to a national audience accentuating the virtues of British economic and colonial interests abroad through organised play and competition. Sport allowed for the regulation and acclimatisation of a section of British society - affluent and poor, players and spectators - to the notion of competition as the key to social mobility and national unity. Thus, sport can be viewed as an attempt to impose uniformity on players and spectators alike; a social experiment to program and supervise a population in a confined geographical and cultural space to become "docile bodies" in training for the capitalist production line. However, this line of reasoning is problematical and misleading. While sports history does provide evidence of bodies disciplined - in Foucaultian terms - and games standardised to accord to the Marxian metaphor of a capitalisi production line, it also offers an alternative and obvious historical narrative of the difficulties of imposing order and systematising uniformity, culturally, nationally, or otherwise, through the appropriation and institutionalisation of popular games and pastimes.

The public school graduates that codified and formalised sport did so to continue playing the games they so valued as students. The rules they introduced were meant to facilitate an understanding and acceptance of games that had been played in various and different ways by the students of numerous educational institutions. Furthermore, these rules encouraged and perpetuated competition within certain spatial and time restrictions that suited the practices of economic capitalism. Organised sport also advocated teamwork, emphasised the importance of purpose and good conduct in life through project commitment, and provided the capacity for participants to maintain the necessary levels of fitness deemed crucial for employment in a rapidly industrialising Britain. Consensus on rules and outcomes also reduced the traditional potential for disorder that historically bedevilled many games and pastimes prior to 19th century codification. The belief in muscular Christian principles, a crude form of social Darwinism and an abiding faith in market economics enabled many public school alumni to view sport as an important physical and psychological tool for industrial progress and social betterment. A more probing analysis, however, reveals that irrespective of middle class enthusiasm for organised sport and its presumed benefits for national unity and social progress, the masses that took to it exhibited specific participation patterns that reflected distinct regional and class variations.

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Lower class participation in games and pastimes was always of concern to the political authorities of Britain. In the Middle Ages both the peasantry and nobility pursued different pastimes with little or no interaction between them. The latter staged hunting, jousting and archery tournaments that represented their economic and political interests and highlighted the importance of their martial traditions and social standing. Their games and pastimes became increasingly more popular - particularly jousting - during the later Middle Ages when changes to the social structure of the upper classes occurred. The power of the nobility grew once a peerage was developed and the House of Lords was founded. The increase in hereditary titles allowed the nobility to exercise more power through their landholdings and numerous other class privileges, and this made them acutely aware of the need to protect their interests from the encroachment of disgruntled knights whose own privileges were dealt a blow once their code of chivalry was dismantled. To reduce the potential for knightly retribution the nobility and peers passed laws to recruit many former knights into a professional military service. Simultaneously they entrenched themselves in power through legislation for special rights that left them exempt from certain taxes and punishment for crimes and debt.4

it is in this context that jousting became a popular outlet for a class of knights whose prestige and privileges were rapidly decreasing in the later Middle Ages. The abolition of the traditional practice of military knighthood extirpated the socio-political standing they enjoyed in feudal England and left them to fend for themselves economically. In light of this, the tournament became a symbolic reminder of the values and principles of an age gone by. Reduced to a sport, this recently discarded medieval practice of chivalric combat with all its paraphernalia and accoutrements served two significant purposes: it emphasised the authority of the noble classes who exercised their control through the organisation of tournaments and the employment of its participants - the old warring class, locating the latter in a confined spatial and socio-political milieu where they were an important but clearly managed component of a courtly extravaganza;5 and, while the nobility were keen to publicly exhibit the obsolescence of knights as a military class, they eagerly sought to maintain the latter's fierce and gallant loyalty to the sovereign, both for

4 T. Hendricks, Disputed Pleasures: Spolt and Society in Preindustrial England, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, pp.41-43.

5 ibid., p.51. Hendricks writes that the "tourney became socially exclusive and display-oriented. The wider setting now included ladies and courtly festivities ... In short, the tournament developed as an increasingly artificial environment for the display of individual honor".

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defensive purposes and as an example for the rest of society.6 As a result, the tournament became a highly specialised medieval sport that exhibited strong bonds of loyalty between the upper classes and a small number of warriors who had the wherewithal and means to overcome the increased expenditure of armament purchase, horse maintenance and the luxury of intense hours of rigorous and meticulous training sessions to pursue a career in jousting.?

On the other hand, the common people participated in their own games and pastimes. While the origins of many of these remain obscure, a vast literature exists to depict the culture of play undertaken by them in medieval England. J. M. Carter's Medieval Games: Sports and Recreations in Feudal SocietyB and E. Dunning and K. Sheard's Gentlemen and Players9 are two sources that detail the role played by the common people of medieval England in the evolution of games and pastimes into organised sport. Popular games were played by peasants and village artisans throughout England. These games varied from one region to the next leading to numerous cultural expressions of popular pastimes. They were played during holidays like Ash Wednesday as a cathartic release from the rigours, drudgery and monotony of everyday life. In many instances these games were tolerated by wealthy landowners and traders who acknowledged the importance of a day's respite from work for peasants and artisans. They did not mind the masses participating in physical contests and other celebratory rituals and activities during religious holidays so long as they were incident free allowing for a return to normalcy of village communities once festivities had ceased. This entailed the following day's return to work of fit and sober peasants and artisans in a village setting devoid of the ravages and depredations of violence and the previous day's mirth and revelry. However, the various play cultures and recreational activities of the common people often did degenerate into rowdy disturbances and melees that threatened to derail the feudal society and economy of medieval England. In response, the nobility proclaimed numerous laws to ban these games and pastimes. On at least 30 occasions between 1314 and 1667 legal prohibitions outlawing the popular recreational activities of the

6 ibid. Hendricks writes "the tournament developed as a way of both affirming the old virtues of military fealty and establishing a new solidarity among the smaller numbers who participated".

7 ibid., pp.51-54.

8 J. M. Carter, Medieval Games: Sports and Recreation in Feudal Society, Greenwood Press, New York, 1992.

9 E. Dunning & K. Sheard, Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players, ANU Press, Canberra, 1979.

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commoners were passed but proved ineffective;10 the latter continued to play in irreverent defiance of the authorities. Carter's seminal research into police arrests of participants of popular games in 13th century Wiltshire, Yorkshire, Berkshire and London reveals the extent of this defiance. Despite the apprehension of numerous transgressors, popular pastimes continued unabated until well into the 19th century.11

The failure of attempts by the nobility to suppress violence and eradicate the play cultures of the common people is something that the middle class graduates of 19th century Victorian public schools also had to contend with.12 The eventual demise of street games in the second half of the 19th century did not result from a Foucaultian analytical standpoint alone, but was rather a combination of it and the changing economic reality of the contemporary setting that brought vast changes to the lives of the peasantry and other lower class people in Britain. The growth of mechanisation and mass production led to the influx of displaced peasants into urban areas where many found work in factories. The long and arduous hours in new and intense work environments along with removal from familiar - mostly - rural surroundings did not leave time nor suitable open spaces for traditional games and pastimes. This resulted in their gradual disappearance from the cultural landscape of modernising Britain. In time some relief from the drudgery of factory work was had by way of organised sport that had been introduced into the labour environment by public school alumni. The increase of working class participation - not to mention other poorer sections of society who came into contact with organised sport through churches and other social institutions - in modern sport exposed the masses to the muscular Christian ethos and its rhetoric of physical manliness and competition. Thus, it was the combination of both the changing economic circumstances brought on by industrialisation and the systematic reordering of work life together with a Foucaultian concern to discipline society in the late 19th century that led to the development of mass participation in organised sport.

I 0 ibid., p.22. 11 Carter, pp.95-121. Court records of 1218 to 1276 reveal that 117 persons. were arrested for defying official prohibitions on popular games and pastimes, 86 of them were peasants (p.1 05). 12 B. Murray, Football: A History of the World Game, Scalar Press, Aldershot, 1994, pp.10-15. In "1840, 1857, 1864 and 1867 various towns in Surrey were still trying to stamp out street football, and in the story of a conflict between Sunday School and football in the mid-1840s it seems that football was still holding its own."

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The discussion above highlights the extent of sporting variety and class diversity in British society during the 19th century expansion of Britain's colonial empire. lt describes how over a substantial period of time Britain had developed a multivocal tradition and not a uniform discourse of socio-cultural expression. Indeed, it was only a select coterie of public school graduates who exclusively adopted the ideology of Charles Kingsley and Thomas Hughes to impose a cultural system of moral and physical conduct on large sections of British society, particularly the working classes. This discriminative and patronising belief in the provision of 'proper' guidance and instruction to the working classes for their moral and socio-economic uplift paralleled that provided to vast and disparate numbers of colonial peoples with one important distinction: the public school alumni believed that it was their duty to 'civilise' and 'enlighten' colonial subject peoples to appreciate the 'excellence' and 'progress' of the British way of life that was otherwise impossible for the latter to fathom on their own; their 'civilising mission' within Britain itself was of a different order entirely seeking to acquire the conformity of the working classes as the productive bulwark of the economy and - notwithstanding their obvious subordinate socio-economic status in relation to the middle classes - as an example of the robust and physically strong character of the British. The latter was an important endorsement of the colonial enterprise. Britain had to be portrayed as a nation of resilient and sturdy individuals, fit to rule the world and manage vast resources and peoples, in order to justify its colonial credentials.

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APPENDIX 3

In the film East is East (1999) the boundaries of Pakistani diaspora identities are blurred and constantly rearranged by the film's scriptwriter and playwright, Ayub Khan-Din. The family patriarch, George Khan, is a bundle of contradictions and a source of ridicule. He lives in Salford in 1971, is married to a white English woman - though he does have a Pakistani wife in the old country, runs a fish and chips shop, has Anglicised his name, lived an English life, and attempts to have his children conform to Pakistani tradition and custom.

The complexity of George Khan as a character says much about Pakistani diaspora experiences in England. Firstly, his marriage to his English wife occurred in 1946, before partition and before the influx of post war migrants from South Asia. The probability of this type of marriage occurring when it did is discussed by Roger Bromley. He argues that statistics in 1997 suggest that up to a fifth of Indian and African-Asian men had a white partner, and that this would have been much less the case in 1971 and almost inconceivable in 1946 when the Khans in the film married.1 However, research on migrants from India

to England before partition does show they were more accepted by the host community and more amenable to English ways than those who came after them.

Before the 20th century a small number of Indians could be found in England. They were primarily Ayahs (personal servants to Imperial staff), Lascars (sailors, army servants, or soldiers), Princes, often on short visits,2 or students seeking professional qualifications. 3 After the First World War a few

Indian soldiers who saw action in France made their way to England and found menial jobs as peddlers, "selling cheap clothing door-to-door, often in remote rural areas". By the 1930s some of them achieved entrepreneurial success despite their difficulties and were able to convince others from their local villages in India to join them in England.4 They along with more in-coming students were able to adjust to life in England for they could speak English and had served under British military officers and been taught in British schools and colleges.

1 R. Bromley, Narratives For a New Belonging: Diasporic Cultural Fictions, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2000, p.162. 2 R. Visram, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: Indians in Britain 1700-1947, Pluto, London, 1986. 3 R. Ballard, "The South Asian Presence in Britain and its Transnational Connections", in H. Singh & S. Vertovec (eds.), Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora, Routledge, London, 2002. 4 ibid.

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George's Pakistani wife offers an insight into an aspect of Pakistani migrant history that has to date had little scholarly attention. This has to do with young Pakistani men who find themselves seeking pleasure in England to compensate for their long absence from home. Until the 1960s and 1970s an absence of Pakistani women saw these men court English girlfriends whom some married even while having wives in Pakistan. Sometimes news of t~is made its way back to Pakistan causing strife among families and bringing grief and embarrassment to parents who often made arrangements to bring their sons back home to reunite them with their estranged spouses.

George's contradictions are not only a source of laughter but an indication of an individual caught between two competing worldviews. Having arrived in England before partition he set out to acclimatise to his new environment. This accounts for him buying a fish and chips shop and acquiring a few peculiar English characteristics along the way: including friends, social drinking at pubs, a new name, and an English wife. However, by 1971 George seeks to impose a strict Pakistani way of life upon his children to reaffirm his role as their father when this is challenged by their hybrid and unconventional lifestyles. He does this by arranging marriages for three of his sons to 'Pakistani' girls - one earlier in the film and two near the end. All three fail to eventuate. The first of these comes to an abrupt end when the bride to be is left stranded at the altar as the groom runs away to pursue a career in the fashion industry. The last two marriages end after both sons take issue at accusations of them as half-castes when doubts over their pedigree, particularly their mother's side, are cast by the parents of their prospective brides.

George's children are examples of the diversity of Pakistani identities among the diaspora. Born in England they all pursue different paths to fulfilment. His first son seeks a life in fashion with his homosexual partner. The next is in college studying art when he should be completing his degree in engineering. The third is pious. The fourth has a white English girlfriend, drinks alcohol, frequents discos, and eats bacon and sausage. The youngest will not take off his parka or accede to his father's request that he be circumcised. Additionally, his only daughter is befriended and worshipped by the son of his neighbour, a fascist activist who supports policies of exclusion and follows with interest the views of Enoch Powell. 5 All of them help to bring down the House of Khan and its patriarch with his ambitions for absolute power. In its place they create a "space for an intercultural, bi-racial future in which neither half of the

5 Bromley, pp.161-162.

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binary needs to dominate or be the source of regression ... "6 This fits in with Bromley's overall argument which is that George's children offer an alternative and appositional discourse to that of their father's and the wider English society. In other words, they speak as Roland Barthes would have it 'outside the sentence' from a position of marginality affecting change on the "settled discursive hierarchies" of home and England by "constructing a third space" where they can be heard.? This proposition will avoid difficulty if all levels of deviance that form the third space are not seen as a coherent whole but as discrete expressions that engage in dialogue with one another to overcome the tyranny of power that subjugates them. it does not do away with potential conflict within the third space itself. After all the range of interests and career choices made by George's children does not unite them. What does is their marginilisation in the face of his uncompromising authority.

Hanif Kureishi has fictionalised many diaspora experiences in his prose. His work abounds with a range of British-Pakistani characters both eccentric and on the margins of acceptability. The spaces they occupy are often bitter and wretched. They are disconsolate and rejected figures trying to make sense of meaning and reality. In one of his short stories, My Son the Fanatic, Kureishi goes against the stereotype to depict a young man's spiritual turn and the effect this has on the relationship with his father. The son has relinquished the expectations, comforts and accoutrements of western living - his clothes, books, cricket bats, video games, guitar, TV, video, sound system, friends, "English girlfriend", and a career in accountancy- to become a devout Muslim. He chides his father for his western habits - eating pork, drinking whisky, and keeping company with prostitutes. His father, at a loss to explain his son's transformation, seeks the advice of his work colleagues - British-Pakistani fathers like himself - and an English friend, Bettina, a prostitute who has befriended him for some time and whom he confides to about issues in his life. The story ends when the father enters the son's room and proceeds to beat him violently. The son remains composed throughout the assault putting up no resistance but issuing a wry rebuke: "So who's the fanatic now?"B

This story evinces the fragmented nature of diaspora discourses blurring the lines of what Bromley refers to as the "settled discursive hierarchies" of the home environment and that of the wider society, as well as the hybrid and

6 ibid., p.163.

7 ibid., p.1.

8 H. Kureishi, "My Son the Fanatic", in I. Chambers & L. Curti (eds.), The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons, Routledge, London, 1996, pp.234-241.

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complex cultural identities of diaspora groups. lt shows that religious austerity is not the sole preserve of community elders who fear the prospect of spiritual entropy in the west. lt has also attracted younger members of the diaspora for the very same reasons. lslamophobia and wars waged 'against' Islam in Iraq and Afghanistan in more recent times, as well as continuing hostilities in Palestine have hardened the views of many young British Muslims even if they have stopped short of renouncing western cultural influences. Radio broadcaster Masood Sadiq described how Muslims identify with their religion first and foremost, and everything else, nationality and boundaries included, was of secondary importance. In the 1990s Masood convened a radio program in Bradford that discussed issues of relevance to British Muslims, like the importance of religion in a secular age and resisting lslamophobia. lt also encouraged a proactive approach to spiritual and political progress among Muslims.9

Kureishi's story also emphasises the role of British-Pakistani parents who have grown accustomed to life in the west, have relaxed and open views of religion, and dissuade their children from becoming fundamentalist in their beliefs and turning their backs on western education and employment opportunities. The point to make here is that not everyone among the first generation of immigrants, nor all family patriarchs, are averse to secular living. On the contrary, some have adapted very well to English life; and, in some cases, to a greater extent than their children. The father in Kureishi's story is quite comfortable with the life he has and the friends he keeps. He has adopted English mannerisms and done away with many traditional ones - he is not a devout Muslim and works the nightshift to avoid his wife. What alarms him is when his son becomes pious and relinquishes many of the characteristics that would identify him with 'England'.

The music idioms of British-Pakistani youth groups and disc-jockeys also abound with references to diaspora diversity, but they are also calls for cultural empowerment. They too are examples of syncretic cultural discourses that seek to redress the imposed marginality of diaspora experiences in England. Asian dance music10 emerged in the 1980s with complex strands of cultural and rhythmical influence. Bhangra, as it is most commonly known, has its cultural roots in the Punjab, and makes use of "other musical genres such as Reggae,

9 Interview with Masood Sadiq in Manningham Lane, Bradford, 14 July 2004. 10 I refer to it as 'Asian' because the term represents all South Asian ethnic groups in England who identify with this music: Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs specifically.

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Dub, and Soul with the black sound system culture" of the early 1980s.11

Sanjay Sharma warns against simplistic views of Bhangra as a transplanted

and reinscribed folk music of the Punjab that stimulates a specific 'Asian cultural

consciousness' once in England. lt has engendered the "primacy of an Asian

identity", but it has done so from many perspectives: national, regional,

religious, cross-cultural, as well as "syncretic Asian youth identity formations

negotiated and made actively with modes of black cultural expression",12 all

from within different locations in England.

In more recent times Bhangra has mutated into a post-Bangra phase.

The music now samples a wider choice of influences that include Indian

classical and popular film music, Moroccan percussion, Qawwali, Islamic

chants, and dialogue from Bollywood films and famous Third World political

leaders and anti-western spokespersons.13 FunADaAMental, one such post­

Bhangra group, uses an eclectic selection of speeches and "rallying cries" from

numerous political leaders as varied as Gandhi, Malcolm X, and Louis

Farrakhan of the Nation of lslam.14

I'm the soldier in the name of Allah So put down the cross and pick up the 'X'

Do you know where you're goin' to Do you know where you're comin' from

You're scared of the sun, I live in the sun 1995, Elijah is alive

Louis Farrakhan, the Nation of Islam That's where I got my degree from So watch out now I'm comin' at ya! ... Back in the days of slave ships

You had us whipped, raped and lynched Took away the Quran, you gave us the bible

Now we're livin' a nightmare Where black is bad and white is supreme

Fuck that shit, I'm comin' at ya!15

Bhangra and post-Bhangra are discourses of protest and fun that have

given voice to a multitude of concerns within the diaspora. They have also

11 S. Sharma, "Noisy Asians or 'Asian Noise'?", in S. Sharma, J. Hutnyk & A. Sharma (eds.), Dis-Orienting Rhythms: The Politics of the New Asian Dance Music, Zed Books, London, 1996, p.34. 12 ibid., p.35. 13 ibid., p.51. 14 ibid.

15 (Fun'Da'Mental, 'President Propaganda', Nation Records, 1994. Published by QFM Publishing I Warner Chappell Music Ltd.) in ibid., p.52.

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crossed cultural and gender boundaries not only in their influence and exhortations, but among those who perform and follow the music and engage in the culture; and they have established ties with "Radical Asian politics" and leftist youth groups in Britain.16 In the 1950s when radical Asian politics first emerged some South Asian labourers in Southall and Birmingham began to

write lyrics in traditional languages to convey their hardships, isolation and cultural alienation. Later this gave way to the poetry of the Indian Workers Association who campaigned against the plight of workers, the brutality of racism and the excessive use of force by police officers.17 These were the first

expressions of marginality that burgeoned into various other cultural idioms of protest, including those of Bhangra and post-Bangra.

Ashwani Sharma fears that music idioms like Bhangra, post-Bhangra and those of other oppressed and marginalised groups have lost their authenticity because they are packaged by World Music labels. In other words, transnational companies in the music industry sell cultural "Otherness" by packaging the music of hybrid protest cultures into new forms of essentialism and particularism. Artists are promoted along nationalist lines as

representatives of "authentic ethnic national musical cultures" when what they play has little to do with "hegemonic national culture". Thereby the World Music genre engulfs the complex identities, specific geopolitical concerns, and heterogeneous cultural influences of musicians from various locations by its

clever packaging of them as expressions of "exotic" Otherness. Thus, argues Sharrna, World Music offers an adulterated and misleading depiction of diverse musical traditions, and it is marketed on the lines of "exotic holidays" and "Third World films": as tractable snapshots of difference, deviance and the unfamiliar.18

There is no objection to Sharma's argument that World Music labels have appropriated the sounds of the marginalised and used them to generate profit. This is what global cultural companies do, and this has happened to other cultural discourses as well. However, while these companies exert a strong influence over what is bought, seen or heard, they cannot interpret how these influences will effect change in different societies and among various cultural

groups or people. What is more, they often have to be cognisant of difference when they market their products in distant places. To maximise profit means to

16 V. S. Kalra, J. Hutnyk, & S. Sharma, "Re-Sounding (Anti)Racism, or Concordant Politics? Revolutionary Antecedents", in Sharma, Hutnyk & Sharma, pp.129-131. 17 ibid. 18 A. Sharma, "Sounds Ortental: The (lm)possibility of Theorizing Asian Musical Cultures", in Sharma, Hutnyk, & Sharma, p.23.

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accept variations in local custom and to adopt the languages and folk traditions of large numbers of people.

There is also much to be said about what is being received, and this goes to the heart of this dissertation. it is not true that globalisation has unified world opinion and culture. There are many global cultures. The concept of cultural hybridity implies difference and diversity. Irrespective of what they package global companies cannot sustain unanimity among an inordinate number of cultural identities and local traditions. They may simplify, and in some instances reconstruct, in an effort to do so, but these simplifications and reconstructions are themselves blurred and made complex by those that receive them. For the latter are drawn into the global cultural web from the perspective of their own experiences and sociopolitical realities that cannot easily be undone, and even when they unravel they do so slowly and in a manner unique to changes taking place elsewhere. it can also be misleading to think of global companies as engines working to foment a universal culture. For one, they market the cultures of non-western nations even if done entirely for profit; and, second, companies themselves differ from region to region in areas of management, employee skill level, resources, objectives, outcomes, and specific local customs that impinge on levels of productivity.

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