After the Ottomans: The Renewal of the Syrian

Orthodox Church in the Twentieth and Twenty

First Centuries1

In the aftermath of the First World War and the break-up of

the Ottoman Empire, members of the Syrian Orthodox Church

found themselves scattered and divided amongst a new network

of nation states. Like their co-religionists in the Church of

the East, many Syrian Orthodox Christians had died or been

displaced as they got caught up in the Turkish persecution of

Armenians. In a number of regions in eastern Turkey, and

notably in the ancient city of Edessa (Urfa, Şanliurfa), the

Syrian Orthodox residents spoke an Armenian dialect and

intermarried with their Armenian neighbours so that it was

impossible for outsiders to tell them apart and many Syriani2

suffered the same fate as their Armenian friends and

relatives.

As the colonial powers oversaw the dismantling of the

Ottoman territories the Suryani found themselves divided amongst

three new countries; Turkey, Syria and Iraq. In Turkey they

were clustered in villages and small towns across the Tur

‘Abdin region and Iraq they lived mainly in the region of

Mosul and the north of the country, with a growing urban

presence of professionals in Baghdad. Syria was the exception

in many ways; apart from a handful of villages in the

Mouhafazat3of Homs, that had been Syrian Orthodox since late

antiquity, the majority of Syrian Orthodox Christians appear

to have headed for northern towns, particularly Aleppo in the

north-west and Hasakeh and Qamishli in the north-east.

A collective identity of the Suryani as a separate ethnic

group was continued by the practice of people from the same

town or village choosing to settle in the same part of Syria;

the most famous example of this are the people of Hay al- Suryan4

in Aleppo. This group are the last remnant of the Christian

population of Edessa, who were forced into exile by Turkish

forces in 1923 and walked in convoy as far as the outskirts of

Aleppo. Having over a period of years built huts and then

apartment blocks on the places that their tents once stood,

Hay al-Suryan still constitutes a city-within-a-city in Aleppo

and this strong sense of affinity amongst the Urfali, as the

community call themselves, is a barrier to integration with

the other Suryani in Aleppo. However it is not only the Urfali

who act in this manner. Many Suryani in contemporary Syria will

refer to their heritage as Mardinli or Kharputli or relate 1 The majority of the information in this article has been

gathered through empirical research over a number of years

living and working with the Syrian Orthodox and Syrian

Catholic Churches in Syria. With the notable exception of the

work of Sebastian Brock, who has been exceptional in every

respect and spent years living with and studying the Suryani,

very little has been written about the contemporary Syrian

Orthodox Church. Therefore the bibliography is relatively

short and I have tried to avoid relying too heavily on Dr

Brock’s material by using my own experiences and points of

view as reference points.

2 Henceforth I shall refer to members of the Syrian Orthodox

Church as “Suryani” as this is the term by which they define

themselves in contemporary Syria. I am aware of the fact that

this is not universally accepted, particularly by a number of

diaspora groups who classify themselves as “Assyrian” rather

themselves to any number of towns and villages located in

south-east Turkey as they attempt to hold on to their

ancestral identity. This is not just a feature of those who

have stayed in the Middle East; those communities that have

left for Europe for example, behave in the same way with whole

villages relocating to the same region of Germany, Sweden or

the Netherlands.

Obviously these seismic changes for the Syrian Orthodox

Community have been continually exacerbated throughout the

twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the last, and by no

means the least, challenging event being the implications of

the Iraq war for native Christians. The Syrian Orthodox

than “Syrian”. These issues of designation and identity are

hotly disputed by European, North American and Australasian

diaspora communities but are given less prominence within

contemporary Syria, which is the focus of this article.

3 Administrative district.

4 ‘The Quarter of the Syrians’

population of Iraq being based in Baghdad and in and around

Mosul meant that they were caught up in some of the worst of

the fighting, and the majority of the Christian population of

Iraq has been forced to flee the country; this too has been an

event that has had a major impact on the Syrian Orthodox

population of Syria and which has raised new questions about

ethnicity and nationality as many Middle Eastern Christians

question their place in society.

A Question of Identity

One of the most divisive debates in Middle Eastern

Christianity today is that of identity. These questions hinge

on language, bloodlines, diaspora communities and political

affiliation and, trivial as these arguments can sometimes seem

to outsiders, they threaten the entire future of Middle

Eastern Christianity. In the Syrian Orthodox community these

issues are multi-layered and complex and spread from petty

local rivalries into more politically-charged questions of

politics in the contemporary nation state. To begin at the

local level there is the separatism of some groups, such as

the Urfali, who have maintained the integrity of their

traditions and bloodlines to such an extent that they are seen

as unwelcoming and exclusive to other Syriani. In Aleppo the

denizens of Hay al-Suryan are famous for marrying amongst

themselves and, on the occasions that a boy (and it is usually

a boy) chooses a spouse from elsewhere, the new bride often

feels ostracised from the wider community. This has created

the situation where the two Aleppian quarters home to the

Syrian Orthodox, Hay al-Suryan and Sulaimanieh, are often on ‘non-

speaking’ terms and there is almost always low-level hostility

between the two groups.

Another issue is raised by the question of ethnicity. The

Syrian Orthodox villagers of the Mouhafazat of Homs regard

themselves as Arabs, indeed some of them are even Bedu, so

there is no denying their Arab heritage. This is something

that they accept without questioning and they are proud of

their unbroken line of occupation in the same region of the

Syrian desert for almost two thousand years. For the other

Syrian Orthodox Christians of Syria this is a thorny issue.

As the majority of them are descended from people from the

highlands of south-east Turkey, they are adamant that they are

not Arabs and resent the implication that they are. However a

divide has sprung up even in this group between those who

regard themselves as ‘Aramaean’ and those who say they are

‘Assyrian’ and this distinction is being fiercely fought over

not only in Syria, but also across the world in a variety of

diaspora communities. This kind of debate is discouraged in

Syria by the church authorities not least because their

accommodation with the Syrian government depends on them

upholding a policy of Arab solidarity and a pan-religious

Syrian national identity in order that they are not viewed as

a destabilising influence on society. Therefore the survival

of the Syrian Orthodox Church in Syria means that they must

conform with state ideas on what it means to be a good Syrian

citizen whilst accommodating the wishes of a community who

hark back to a pre-nation state status quo. This creates a

confusing juxtaposition in which many Syrian Orthodox support

the ruling Ba‘ath Party, believing that the Party is the

balance that keeps Syria stable, whilst at the same time

railing against corruption in the system and the unstable

economic situation. The symbiotic relationship between the

Syrian Ba‘ath Party and religious minorities in the country

means that neither side can achieve stability without the

other and gives Syrian Christians a great deal more power and

influence (known in Arabic as wasta) than in any other country

in the region, save for Lebanon.

The Experiment; Ma‘arrat Saidnaya

On the Feast of the Cross, 14th September 1996, the Syrian

Orthodox Patriarchal Monastery of St. Ephrem the Syrian was

consecrated by the current Patriarch, Moran Mor Ignatius Zakka

Iwas I. The monastery, known as Dayr Mar Efrem by the Suryani, was

an initiative by the Patriarch to try and instil some sense of

coherent identity into Syrian Orthodox priests, monks and

deacons that could then be relayed to the wider community,

whether in the Middle East or further afield, by these future

church leaders. One of the most significant problems for the

Syrian Orthodox, and for other Christians in the same

situation, is language. Historically all members of the

Church spoke classical Syriac or, later, the modern Syriac

dialect known as Turoyo or Turani for the Tur ‘Abdin region

where it originates. Only the Suryani villages of central Syria

had spoken Arabic for any length of time5 and this situation

was further complicated by regional differences, such as the

fact that the Urfali spoke a dialect of Armenian native to

Edessa. In the twentieth century this became a major issue as

the generation who had emigrated to Syria continued to speak

their vernacular, whilst their children were in the common

immigrant situation of speaking the ancestral language at home

and the language of the country at school and work. A

fracture appeared with the second generation to be born in

Syria as these children largely spoke only Arabic, and

although they could understand their grandparents, they were

not fluent in the languages of their ancestors. If this had

just been the situation in Syria it would have been

complicated enough, but with so many families leaving for

destinations across the globe it meant that for the first time

the Suryani had no common language of communication.5 It is difficult to be certain but the sources show a movement

towards the use of garshuni (Syriac characters writing Arabic

words) from around the seventeenth century onwards suggesting

a slow decline in the use of Syriac.

The Patriarchal Monastery was the proposed solution to this

growing crisis. By founding a centre where all aspiring

clergy from across the globe have to study in order to be

ordained in the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch ensured

that all clergy share the same formative experience and are

taught the same doctrinal and liturgical traditions; a major

issue considering the schisms that have already occurred in

India and Sweden.6 Secondly all classes are conducted in

classical Syriac, which serves a dual purpose; not only does

it make sure that the future priests are fully cognisant of

the language in which they will conduct the liturgy, it also

means that they all have a common language in which to

converse and socialise outside the classroom or church. In

this way it is hoped that bonds of friendship forged between

these young men will be an extra strand helping to unite the

6 These divisions both occurred because the communities in

question wanted the right to appoint their own ecclesiastical

leaders, rather than have a man chosen for them by the

Patriarch in Damascus.

diaspora community across the globe and prevent a polarisation

and loss of a coherent, central Syrian Orthodox identity.

In this way the Monastery of St. Ephrem acts as a spiritual

centre for all Syrian Orthodox Christians. The difficulty of

accessing the Syrian Orthodox monastery in Iraq7 and sporadic

instability, caused by conflict between the Turkish government

and the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), limiting access to the

traditional seats of Syrian Orthodox learning in Turkey8 has

meant that these foundations can no longer serve as the

administrative and ceremonial centres of the Syrian Orthodox

Church. In Syria where the Church hierarchy has been at pains

to conform and become an integral part of modern Syrian

society, there have been the right political and social

conditions for such a project, but not an existing monastery

that could be adopted to fill such a role. The only two Syrian

Orthodox monasteries to survive late antiquity passed to the

Syrian Catholic Church in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries9 meaning that a totally new location was required for

the new foundation.

The success of the project has in large part been down to

an intelligent investment by the Patriarch. By buying up many

acres of land across the valley from the ancient Christian

shrine of Saidnaya, he tapped in to an existing Christian

pilgrimage site and created a sense of continuity of worship

even though the region is not an historic home for the Suryani.

The shrine of Our Lady at Saidnaya is said to go back to the

sixth century and its most important treasure is an icon of

the Virgin believed to have been painted by the Evangelist

Luke. Whatever the truth of these beliefs, the mountains

around the town are filled with small chapels, many converted

from early Christian tombs, and a converted pagan temple at

Cherubim above the settlement, which all attest to the fact

that Saidnaya has been Christian since late antiquity.

Therefore, by building a monastery overlooking these sites the

Syrian Orthodox hierarchy has reinforced this sense of an

ancient Christian heritage in Syria and subtly suggested to

their flock that there is an ancient continuity of worship in

the region that they are continuing; the fact that this new

centre is the furthest south the Syrian Orthodox have ever

been, with the notable exception of their presence in the Holy

Land, is conveniently overlooked in favour of political

expediency. Saidnaya is practically a suburb of Damascus

these days as the city continues to expand, and the town is

used in Syrian tourist literature, along with nearby Maaloula,

as a symbol of Syrian tolerance and amity with Christians; by

subscribing to the government endorsed image of a Christian

‘Holy Valley’ at Saidnaya the Syrian Orthodox hierarchy is

demonstrating that the Church is putting down roots in Syria

with the blessings of the ruling regime.

This policy has definitely succeeded with the wider Syrian

Orthodox community, who regard the Patriarchal Monastery as

being akin to the Vatican for the Suryani,10 but has perhaps

been less successful amongst those who are resident in the

country and there are a variety of underlying social problems

that have caused this apathy towards the Church, not least a

resentment of any money spent on ecclesiastical building

projects at a time of economic hardship. Whilst this

resentment can be understood, it must nevertheless be noted

that the Syrian Orthodox Church appears to have spent

significantly less money on such projects than some other

denominations, and that projects such as Dayr Mar Efrem have

become so much part of the Church infrastructure that the

money spent on their construction must be viewed as a positive

move for the future evolution of the Church rather than the

creation of an unnecessary white elephant.

7 Dayr Mar Mattai near Mosul

8 Dayr al-Za‘faran and Dayr Mar Gabriel in south-east Turkey

9 Dayr Mar Musa al-Habashi (the Monastery of St. Moses the

Abyssinian) east of the town of An-Nabk in central Syria,

passed into the hands of the Syrian Catholic Church in 1831.

Approximately 45km north-east of Dayr Mar Musa is the town of

Qaryatayn where Dayr Mar Elian esh-Sharqi (the Monastery of

St. Julian of the East) is located. This foundation appears to

have fallen into disuse at some point between the sixteenth

and eighteenth centuries, but legal challenges over ownership

between the Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic Churches

continued until the 1950s. In both these cases the change of

ownership was due to the local population converting to

Catholicism from Orthodoxy. In An-Nabk the change appears to

In an echo of the Patriarchal Seminary and Monastery, the

Metropolitan of Hassakeh, Mor Eustathius Matta Rohom, has

built another monastery at Tel Wardiyat, west of Hassakeh.

This is the Monastery of Yoldat Aloho (the Theotokos or God

Bearer) dedicated to the Virgin and which was consecrated in

2000. However, although an interesting building harking back

to the style of the fifth century (it is modelled on the

Church of Qal’at Sem‘an, the site where Simeon Stylites stood

on a column for 36 years in the mid fifth century), it has so

far functioned more as a community centre than a monastery due

to a lack of vocations to fill it.

Economics and Atheism: The Problems of Those Who Stay Behind

Some years ago, whilst walking through the streets of Hay al-

Suryan with a friend, an interesting observation was made to

have been relatively peaceful as the entire community

converted en masse, but in Qaryatayn only a proportion

converted and this has led to friction with the remaining

Syrian Orthodox community.

me. My friend pointed out that we were both the same age and

had been born in the 1970’s and that in the thirty years since

our birth (as it was then) Hay al-Suryan had gone from a shanty

town with no electricity, mains water supply, sanitation and

roads into the suburb of apartment blocks that we were now

walking through. His point was that instead of people

castigating Syria and her people for being backward, we should

instead be praising them all for how far they had come in such

a remarkably short period of time. Such a massive

improvement, he said, was even more exceptional in the case of

the Syrian Orthodox Community of Aleppo, who had only moved to

the city from the 1920s onwards. He was absolutely right of

course, but this is one point that outsiders, and members of

the community themselves are apt to forget and it needs to be

remembered when we address the causes of discontent amongst

the Suryani who have stayed in Syria.

10 In June 2008 the author attended the consecration of a

Bishop for a diocese in Kerala, India and witnessed firsthand

the excitement and awe of the family and friends of the new

Bishop who had travelled to Syria for the consecration.

Again it is obvious, but needs reiterating here, that the

majority of Suryani who have remained in Syria are those who do

not have the skills that other nations require – otherwise

they would have become part of the brain-drain that entices

doctors, scientists and academics overseas. A frustration

with lack of economic progress is often tied to anti-

clericalism as many members of the community perceive that

married parish priests are significantly better off than many

of their parishioners. Obviously this is sometimes, but not

always, the case and the growing lack of respect for priests

is linked to many other social factors. One of these problems

is in the process of being resolved if the Patriarchal

Monastery can maintain a certain standard of academic

achievement, and that is the question of clerical education;

with such a surge in anti-clericalism and a growing lack of

respect for the priesthood, families encourage their children

to study medicine, or failing that, engineering in order to

achieve wealth, status and a possible passport overseas. A

clerical career is not considered desirable for the brightest

and the best, and it is perhaps no surprise that the largest

number of vocations comes from the poorest regions of the

country, like the desert villages, where both education and

steady employment are a distant dream for most teenagers. The

urban Suryani who have greater educational and employment

opportunities are far less likely to enter the church.

Unfortunately this perception is exacerbated by the fact that

the parish priests are less educated than monks in the Syrian

Orthodox Church. The fact that married clergy can never rise

beyond the rank of parish priest means that the Patriarchate

has a policy of only sending monks overseas for postgraduate

studies. Whilst one can see the need for the education of

future church leaders, it also means that there is

dissatisfaction with the level of education of many parish

clergy. If the spiritual life is to be reinvigorated in the

Church it is a movement that needs to permeate the secular

life as well as being a renewal in the monasteries; it is

short-sighted to not be looking at the education of future

generations and, whereas young boys are able (subject to the

periodic interference of the Turkish state) to attend

afterschool classes in Syriac in the Tur ‘Abdin at the

Monastery of Mar Gabriel, such options are not open to

children in Syria. Primary school Syriac classes are

available in some areas and Friday classes in others, but

neither of these arrangements offers a comprehensive education

in Syriac language and culture so that most of the children

swiftly forget what they have learned on entering secondary

school and leaving the classes behind. Without a comprehensive

plan to focus on community education spiritual renewal will

become increasingly difficult in Syria itself and the

community will have to start to look at the diaspora for a

lead in these matters; within the diaspora communities there

is generally a higher standard of living, particularly for

those whose ancestors moved to countries such as the USA in

the 1930s, and this financial security has enabled their

descendants to take more interest in their culture and history

and so for the first time, second or third generation Syrian

Orthodox overseas are beginning to see their language and

literature as a valid area of research.11 This is a situation

that is polarising the two communities and, unless those

remaining in Syria re-evaluate their opinions on culture –

which is currently placed low on their list of priorities, in

another couple of generations it will only be the diaspora

community that possesses the knowledge to keep ancient

traditions alive.

This disillusionment is actually the fault of both sides.

Some clergy are obviously rapacious and do feather their own

nests, but many other members of the congregation have

unrealistic expectations of just how much financial help the

Church is able to give them and this colours their attitudes

to all aspects of church life. Another far bigger problem is

that of education. The fall in calibre of priests in the mid-

to late-twentieth century meant that many priests barely

understood the words that they recited in the liturgy, much

less had the doctrinal and linguistic knowledge necessary to

adequately explain this to the people, in turn this led to a

loss in faith in all aspects of the priestly vocation and they

had diminishing authority in matters of pastoral care as

people failed to respect the authority traditionally embodied

by the person of the priest.

In 1997-1998 this author was involved with a series of

social experiments to raise knowledge in Aleppo, and later

repeated these ideas with Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic

villagers in the town of Qaryatayn and the results were

startling.12 A community leader collected a “tax” on all the

old men he found playing backgammon in the community centre

whilst Holy Communion was being celebrated in the church.

Then on the following Sunday he hired a bus and I was asked to

lead them on a tour of ruined churches in the mountains to the

west of Aleppo, the so-called ‘dead cities’. By explaining

the history of the sites they began to engage with their

Christian heritage in the region and were soon praying in a

ruined chapel with an elderly deacon leading the prayers.

They requested another such trip several weeks later and have

held similar trips ever since. Indeed, on a visit to the

community centre some 7-8 years after that initial journey I

was proudly led into a room of elderly men drinking coffee and

playing backgammon under several enlarged, framed photographs

recording our first day out. This strategy has also been

extended to youth and women’s groups and is now a preferred

way of spending days out for the community, with an early

start and breakfast on the road followed by some visits,

before a late lunch (around 3-4pm) at a local restaurant.

This interest has also been noted by some of the younger

priests. After a lecture to a social group for middle-aged

married couples, one priest observed to me that more of them

were attending the church services properly rather than

turning up for the last five minutes because his explanation 11 See for example Nicholas Awde, Nicholas Al-Jeloo and Nineb

Lamassu, Modern Aramaic (Assyrian/Syriac) Phrasebook and Dictionary

(Hippocrene Books, New York, 2007, 300 pages) as an example of

the new movement of young diaspora scholars reclaiming the

academic initiative in the study of their language and, most

notably the foundation of Gorgias Press by George Kiraz, a

Syrian Orthodox Christian now resident in New Jersey. Gorgias

Press re-issues out-of-print books and articles relating to

Eastern Christian culture, but also provides a specialist

publishing outlet for scholars in the field. By mixing

established academics with PhD theses and other works by young

scholars, Kiraz is almost single-handedly keeping Syriac

literary culture alive outside the Middle East. It must be

noted at this point that Lebanese publishing houses frequently

print on these themes but are generally quite Maronite-centric

and difficult to obtain outside the country.

of the liturgy meant that ‘now they understood what they were

listening to and watching and it wasn’t so boring as before’.13

As the benefits of community education are realised the bonds

of the Syrian Orthodox community in Syria are strengthened

and, as younger members of the congregation noted, with a

strong support network of relatives and friends, the only

motive to emigrate is a purely financial one; making staying

in Syria appear rather more attractive when factors of

friendship, lifestyle, language and culture are added into the

equation.

The problem in the more remote areas is one of self-esteem.

As poor towns and villages in the Syrian desert, towns like

Qaryatayn are forgotten by the majority of the population and

opportunities for work are limited. This means that there is

an exodus of young people, both Christian and Muslim, from the

area as they leave in an attempt to find jobs and send money

back, in the hope of one day building a house and returning

to their natal village. In a situation like this lack of

morale is the biggest problem facing the community as a whole

and that was raised almost accidentally by the presence of

‘outsiders’ in the form of a team of archaeologists working at

a ruined monastery on the edge of town. It quickly became

apparent that the presence of foreigners and cosmopolitan

Syrians from Damascus and elsewhere was a source of pride to

the villagers. By taking an interest in the Christian history

of the region and questioning village elders about their

memories and experiences, the villagers felt somehow validated

and began to show more interest in their own culture. Lack of

finance has meant that the results of this are still limited

but the excavation coincided with the appointment of two

dynamic new parish priests (both monks) who have revitalised

village social life; schemes such as a share-cropping system

where villagers can farm land owned by the Syrian Catholic

Church and then pay ‘rent’ in the form of a percentage of the

produce are working well and moves by the two parish priests

to foster a ‘Christian’ rather than denominational identity by

running a joint Friday class (equivalent to Sunday School) for

all the Christian children of the village together are

definitely beginning to bear fruit.

The Challenges of the Twenty First Century

Whilst both the top-down model instituted by the

Patriarchate and the bottom-up model put in place by parish

clergy and community workers have both been successful, the

big question now is how these green shoots of community

recovery will withstand the massive pressures that Syrian

society has been under over the last few years. In the summer

of 2006 Syria was deluged with refugees from the conflict

between Lebanon and Israel, and this was in addition to the

numerous Iraqi refugees that had been fleeing into the country

since the Iraq war began in 2003. These huge numbers of

displaced persons would have placed an enormous burden on the

infra-structure of a far more developed country than Syria,

and have caused massive problems with the extra demand for

such basic necessities as electricity and water supply.

Whilst the Lebanese were short-term visitors and soon moved

back to their country when the bombing ceased, things have not12 For further details see Loosley, E, Archaeology and Cultural

Belonging in Contemporary Syria, World Archaeology (2005), pp.

589-596.

13 Pers. Comm. Fr. Antoun Deliapo, Hay al-Suryan, Aleppo.

been so easy for the Iraqis. As a much larger proportion of

Christian Iraqis has fled the country than any other group,

the Syrian Christians have been directly affected by the

events across the border and, whilst in an ideal world this

would have brought out a fraternal feeling, the reality is far

more fraught with discord.

The Syrian Orthodox Church was not by any means the largest

Christian denomination in Iraq, but they were present around

Mosul and in Baghdad in numbers significant enough to have an

impact on the Syrian Orthodox community in Syria. One of the

main problems has been inflation caused in basic foodstuffs

due to the demands of another 1-1,500,000 people (official

figures vary, but the Syrian sources always quote this number)

flooding into the country and, more specifically for

Christians, the fact that the incoming Christian refugees into

Syria have moved into the poorer Christian suburbs of the

cities, pricing many younger Syrian Christians out of the

market. In a situation like this the issues of daily survival

outweigh other considerations and the Iraq war has added

another strain on the Syrian Orthodox hierarchy which already

has tensions due to friction between a perceived “Iraqi” and a

“Tur ‘Abdini” faction in the Church leadership. How much this

rift is a reality and how much it is a power struggle between

those at the top of the ecclesiastical tree is another issue,

but the situation has been recognised by the laity;

particularly as the Patriarch is elderly and in poor health

and the community debate who might be a likely successor.

It is obvious that the Syrian Orthodox Church has as much of

a stake in seeking peace in the region as any other

organisation in the region and the situation in Iraq is a very

real and immediate problem for the Church. A lasting peace

plan with Israel would enable the Syrian government to enter

into normalised economic relations with the wider world and a

growing economy would both stem emigration and encourage more

vocations and cultural research as the necessity to

financially support relatives recedes.

Until that time the cultural and spiritual future of the

Syrian Orthodox Church rests on the Patriarchal Monastery and

the fragile threads of a few individuals such as George Kiraz

of Gorgias Press and Malfono (teacher) Isa Gulten in the Tur

‘Abdin who tirelessly works at keeping the Syriac language

alive, as well as a few enterprising priests, monks and

community workers across the country. The encouraging shoots

of renewal are beginning within the diaspora community and it

is to be hoped that in this way the knowledge is not lost and

can be re-established at a time in the future when some of the

emigrants feel secure enough to return to the Middle East.

Dr Emma Loosley is Lecturer in Oriental Christian and Islamic

Art and Architecture at the University of Manchester. She

studied at the University of York, the Courtauld Institute of

Art, University of London and the School of Oriental and

African Studies, University of London. Until taking up her

position at the University of Manchester in 2004, she lived in

Syria for four years working and studying with the Syrian

Orthodox and Syrian Catholic Churches. Her current research

is on the material culture of Christians in Iran and she

supervises a number of PhD students on a variety of topics

related to Christian and Islamic Art and History.

emma.loosley@manchester.ac.uk

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brock, S., ‘The Syriac Churches in Ecumenical Dialogue on

Christology’, in O’Mahony, A. (ed), Eastern Christianity: Studies in

Modern History, Religion and Politics, Melisende, London, 2004, pp. 44-

65.

Brock, S., ‘The Syrian Orthodox Church in Modern History’, in

O’Mahony, A. (ed), Christianity in the Middle East: Studies in Modern History,

Theology and Politics, Melisende, London, 2008, pp. 17-28.

Loosley, E, Archaeology and Cultural Belonging in Contemporary

Syria, World Archaeology (2005), pp. 589-596.

Rassam, S., Christianity in Iraq, Gracewing, Leominster, 2005.