D. The Declaration of the FirstSyrian Social Nationalist Revolutionby Antun Sa’adeh:

    On June 25, less than three monthsafter his coup, Husni al-Za’imengineered his election aspresident of the Republic of Syriathrough a rigged referendum. Onthis occasion, Sa’adeh wanted tomeet al-Za’im - who now styledhimself “Marshal” - and conferwith him. Marshal Za’imdeliberately avoided meeting him,as reported by Sabri al-Qabbani,who was trying to arrange themeeting.1 al-Za’im told al-Qabbanithat he could not meet Sa’adehbecause he did not want to createa new crisis that could damage hisrelations with the Lebanese1 Ibid.

government now that improvementshad been made through the releaseof Akram Tabbarah and subsequentofficial Lebanese recognition ofhis government.2 al-Za’imexplained, as relayed to us by al-Qabbani, that “the Lebaneseauthorities seriously want Sa’adehand I have already denied that heis in Syria. Therefore, I cannotsee him. Apologize on my behalfand give him my regards and bestwishes.”3

 Meanwhile, the Lebanesegovernment’s campaign againstSa’adeh’s party was intensifying.It seemed as though the governmenthad declared open war on the SSNP.More than 2,500 party members werearrested, many detained in camps.2 Ibid. See footnote 138 for further details on the Tabbarah issue.3 Ibid.

The President, the Prime Ministerand the Minister of the Interiorissued a decree in which theydissolved the SSNP, accusing it ofbreaching the peace of thecountry.4 On the diplomatic front,Riyad al-Sulh complained in aninterview with Minister of theUnited Kingdom H. Boswall, thatMarshal Za’im had financed andarmed the SSNP.5 The Lebanesegovernment, moreover, requestedthe assistance of King Faruq ofEgypt to dissuade Husni al-Za’imfrom supporting Sa’adeh.6 In4 Qadiyyat al-Hizb al-Qawmi, (The Case of the NationalParty) published in Beirut by the Lebanese Ministry of Information (in Arabic), 1949, pp. 106-109. In hisinterpellation to the government, Junblatt spoke about the illegality of this decree. See Istijwab Junblatt al-Tarikhi li al-Hukuma Hawl Istishhad Sa’adeh ‘Am 1949 (Junblatt’s Historical Interpellation to the [Lebanese] Government Over Sa’adeh’s Martyrdom in 1949), op. cit., pp. 27-29.5 Bailey to the Commonwealth Governments, 25 July 1949, in FO. 371/75320/88, PRO.6 Ziyad Sa’adeh, op. cit., p. 34.

response to the Lebanesegovernment’s request, King Faruqsent his personal envoy, Lu’ayMuhammad Yusuf, to meet with al-Za’im. Following this meeting, theSyrian Prime Minister (andbrother-in-law of Lebanese PrimeMinister Riyad al-Sulh) Muhsin al-Barazi, whose hatred of Sa’adehand his party was well-known,travelled to Cairo and then toBeirut and held consultations withthe rulers of both countries. Whenhe returned to Damascus heimmediately set about trying toachieve two objectives. The firstwas to convince al-Za’im todeliver Sa’adeh to the Lebaneseauthorities. The second was tocrack down on the SSNP andcarefully monitor its activities.7

7 At this stage, Husni al-Za’im dissolved all political parties and began to persecute the press and independent political parties. Some members and

 While in Damascus, Sa’adeh waskept informed of the Lebanesegovernment’s intensified campaignagainst his party. On July 1,1949, he formed two major groupsof SSNP combatants. LieutenantAssaf Karam was appointedcommander of one force, whichinfiltrated into Lebanon in thedirection of the town ofMashghara. The other group, headedby Zaid al-Atrash, advancedtowards Rashayya al-Wadi in thesouthern Biqa’. The plan was togain control of the whole region

leaders of the SSNP in the region of Latakia, it has been claimed, were arrested and jailed on orders fromMuhsin al-Barazi. Moreover, the house of Najib Shuwayri in which Antun Sa’adeh had taken up residence was placed under 24-hour surveillance by the internal intelligence forces. Information about the SSNP’s activities was reported to Muhsin al-Barazi who in his turn sent secret reports to the Lebanese government. See “Memoirs of Dr. Sabri al-Qabbani,” op. cit., p. 81; see also ibid.

of al-Biqa’ al-Gharbi (the westernBiqa’) and then declare the“Syrian Social Nationalist State”in Lebanon.8

 The news of SSNP combatantsinfiltrating clandestinely intoLebanon reached the Lebanesegovernment. SSNP fighters foundLebanese army units fully preparedand expecting them. On July 3,1949, a major battle occurred inthe plain of Sohmor which lastedabout four hours. The Lebanesearmy killed unit commander AssafKaram and arrested a number ofSSNP fighters.9

 On July 4, 1949, Sa’adehproclaimed the “First Social8 Sabah al-Khair al-Bina’, “Madha Hadatha Qabla al-Thamin min Tammouz” (What Happened Before July 8), op. cit., pp. 46-47.9 Ibid., p. 47.

Nationalist Revolution” againstthe Lebanese government. Heannounced the revolution in acommuniqué which declared thisgovernment “tyrannical andunfaithful to the will of thepeople.”10 He also charged theparliament with being unlawful andunrepresentative of the trueaspirations of the people.”11 Thechief objective of Sa’adeh’srevolution was to install a neworder in Lebanon based on theprinciples of the SSNP.12

 

10 See the “Communiqué of the Supreme Command of the First Social Nationalist Revolution: On the Revolution, its Procdures and Objectives,” in Antun Sa’adeh, Mukhtarat fi al-Mas’alah al-Lubnaniyyah (1936-1943) (Selections on the Lebanese Question), op. cit., pp. 202-207; For an English translation of this Communiqué, see Appendix II. p. 91.11 Antun Sa’adeh, Mukhtarat fi al-Mas’alah al-Lubnaniyyah (1936-1943) (Selections on the Lebanese Question), op. cit.,pp. 202-207.12 Ibid.

Armed groups of the SSNP launchedattacks on a number of gendarmerieposts near the frontier and insome areas of the southern Biqa’(Rashayya and Mashghara) as wellas in the mountains overlookingBeirut. The government decided totake action against the village ofBshamoun in view of the largenumber of SSNP fighters thought tobe based there. A British officialof the Beirut Chancery describedthe government action in apolitical summary: The village was surrounded bygendarmerie who arrived in lorries, andin the ensuing engagement, the officercommanding the [SSNP] force, CaptainTewfiq Chamoun, was killed. Severalmembers of the [SSNP] were injured andconsiderable numbers arrested.13

13 Howes to F.O. No. E. 10339 of 30 July 1949, in FO. 371/75318/88, PRO.

 At Rashayya and Mashghara, SSNPunits were repulsed. As was thecase with previous attacks, thegendarmerie had had prior warningof their approach.14 It has beenpointed out that “the governmentreacted vigorously in both thesevillages where the homes of knownsympathisers of the [SSNP],including that of the Moukhtar ofMashghara, were dynamited.”15

 Sa’adeh was then betrayed by Husnial-Za’im who had promised to lendhim support. On July 6, al-Za’iminvited Sa’adeh to his palace tomeet with him. When Sa’adeharrived, al-Za’im had him arrestedand delivered to the Lebanese

14 Howes to F.O. No. E. 10339 of 30 July 1949, in FO. 371/75318/88, PRO.15 Ibid.

authorities.16 The Syrianauthorities also arrested a numberof SSNP members in Syria, as wellas Sa’adeh’s wife and threechildren who were in Latakia.17

 The reaction in Syria to al-Za’im’s sudden volte-face was one ofintense disgust and virulentcondemnation. As one authorstates, “this was not confinedonly to Sa’adeh’s followers, but

16 It was reported that two Lebanese officials were awaiting Sa’adeh at al-Za’im’s palace to take him back to Lebanon. They were: the Director of Security forces, Farid Shihab, and the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Mansour Lahhoud, chief aide decamp of the Lebanese President. It was claimed that Husni al-Za’im asked the two Lebanese envoys to kill Sa’adeh on the way to Beirut as he “attempted to escape.” But the two envoys flatly refused to kill Sa’adeh and be responsible for his assassination. They decided to deliver him to the Lebanese Government. See Seale, op. cit., p. 70; Bishara al-Khuri, Haqa’iq Lubnaniyya (Lebanese Truths), vol. III, Beirut: Awraq Lubnaniyyah, 1961, pp. 240-241.17 See an extract from Damascus to F. O. No. E. 69, of9 July 1949, in FO. 371/75320/88, PRO.

among the general populace, whofelt that traditional Arabhospitality had been grosslyviolated.”18 al-Za’im’s move mighthave shocked many politicians andobservers but it did not come as acomplete surprise to someofficials of the SSNP who hadgrown suspicious of al-Za’im’sbehaviour. As a matter of fact,Elias Qunayzah, Sa’adeh’s personalsecretary, had warned him just afew hours before the meeting withal-Za’im that something might beamiss, and advised him againstgoing. Sa’adeh put aside thequestion of personal safety andtook a chance. It was reported by the Arab NewsAgency that the Lebanese government18 Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military,1945-1958. Ohio: Ohio State Univrsity Press, 1964, p.133.

had requested the Syriangovernment to co-operate inpreventing members of the SSNPfrom crossing into Syria. TwoLebanese envoys, Farid Shihab andMansour Lahhoud, the Director ofSecurity Forces and the Chief ofStaff of the Armed Forces,respectively, were sent toDamascus and discussed the matterwith Syrian officials.19 Inresponse to the Lebanesegovernment’s request, Syria closedher frontier with Lebanon on July7, 1949. The move, as reported byReuters, was designed to preventthe infiltration of SSNP memberswho had been engaged in guerrillawarfare with Lebanese troops.20

 19 Broadmead (Damascus) to F.O. Press Extract/Sharq al-Adna Radio (Damascus), No. E. 8446, of 8 July 1949, in FO. 371/75320/88, PRO.20 Ibid.

Why did al-Za’im suddenlysurrender Sa’adeh to the Lebaneseauthorities? There are severalpossible answers to this question.Firstly, al-Za’im might have foundhimself under pressure fromneighbouring countries as well asfrom a few of the interested GreatPowers sensitive to any change inthe political status of theregion. As mentioned above, Egyptmay well have intervened and putpressure on al-Za’im to hand overSa’adeh.21 It is quite possiblethat France joined Egypt inputting pressure on al-Za’im. As21 al-Qabbani reported that al-Za’im admitted to him on the day Sa’adeh was executed that he had deliveredSa’adeh to the Lebanese government under pressure from King Faruq. The Egyptian King wrote a letter to al-Za’im in which he told him that his secret services had informed him that Sa’adeh’s party was sponsored by Britain to cause problems on this coast of the Middle East as a pretext for intervention by the two Hashemite governments (Iraq and Jordan) and Britain. See “Memoirs of Dr. Sabri al-Qabbani,” op. cit., p. 119.

Haddad argues, both Egypt andFrance “were friends of Lebanonand opposed to the Greater Syriascheme.”22 The SSNP advocated a“Syrian Unity” scheme very similarto that of “Greater Syria.” Hadal-Za’im supported Sa’adeh to theend, the realization of such ascheme would have become a realpossibility. Neither France norEgypt would have liked to see thishappen. Indeed, one should not besurprised that al-Za’im wouldsubmit to the pressure of Egyptand France. He had a closerelationship with both countries.He had adopted a pro-Egyptianpolicy and an anti-Hashemiteattitude after he was promisedSaudi-Egyptian formal recognition22 George Haddad, op. cit., p. 399.

and financial aid for his regime.23

Thus, he had proclaimed that“Greater Syria” was out of date.24

As far as his relationship withFrance was concerned, there wererumours that he “was a Frenchtool.”25 There was even “acarefully suppressed but constantrumour of closer and closerlinking of his fortunes to thoseof France.”26 al-Za’im, it shouldbe noted, had received Frenchmilitary training and seemed tofavour French methods in the army.A few days before Sa’adeh’sexecution, he had openly stated,“France is our friend and we shall23 Gordon H. Torrey, op. cit., pp. 134-136. The Hashemite family at the time ruled both Jordan and Iraq, the latter country treated very cautiously by the Syrian government due to its potential political and especially military power. 24 Ibid., p. 135.25 Ibid., p. 138.26 Alford Carleton, “The Syrian Coups D’État of 1949,”Middle East Journal, vol. 4, No. 1, p. 8.

do anything to keep her friendship- a new era of understanding andcollaboration [will] be openedbetween Paris and Damascus.”27 Indescribing al-Za’im’s closerelationship with both Egypt andFrance, Alford Carleton states: Far greater uneasiness was created bythe suspicion of [a] particularly closerelationship between Za’im and theEgyptian and French legations. To thesenations, interested in the maintenanceof a certain balance of power in theArab world, hearty support of HusniZa’im was a [foregone] conclusion. Ashis own position grew more insecure, itwas natural that he should lean moreand more upon the support of friendlypowers.28

 Secondly, al-Za’im had perhapsrealized that by supporting27 Quoted in Gordon H. Torrey, loc. cit.28 Alford Carleton, op. cit., p. 7.

Sa’adeh he might drive theLebanese government into the armsof the dreaded Hashemites of Iraqand Jordan. Riyad al-Sulh “wasprepared to move towards closercooperation with the Hashemites,”as mentioned in a summary for themonth of April prepared by theBritish Chancery of Beirut.29 Thesummary continues, “in this he[al-Sulh] succeeded in carryingthe President with him and onApril 18th the President and thePrime Minister informed HisMajesty’s Government that theywere prepared to cooperate withIraq even to the extent ofacquiescing in the FertileCrescent scheme provided Iraq wasprepared to guarantee theintegrity of the Lebanon.”30

29 Chancery to F.O. No. E.6549, 30 April 1949, in FO 371/75318/88, PRO.30 Ibid.

 Thirdly, had al-Za’im continued tosupport Sa’adeh, the Syrian SocialNationalist Revolution would haveput an end to the confessionalpolitical system of Lebanon andthereby threatened the establishedsectarian interests of many groupsin Lebanon and, by extension,Syria.  Accordingly, al-Za’im relented tothe pressure of Egypt, France andother interested countries inreturn for formal recognition,support and benefits for hisregime. The economic agreement hesigned with Lebanon shortly afterSa’adeh’s execution, which put anend to a long period of disputebetween him and the Lebanesegovernment, was seen as one of the

benefits accrued.31 By thisagreement, “Lebanon agreed to drawher supplies of grain from Syria.The agreement also provided for anincrease in customs duties oncertain articles, principally ontextiles and yarns for which Syriahad been pressing for some time.”32

Moreover, it was agreed betweenthe two governments thatdiscussions should continue inorder to rectify the disparitybetween the two currencies,31 This agreement was submitted to the Lebanese President, Bishara al-Khuri, on July 7, 1949, i.e., the day Sa’adeh was delivered to the Lebanese authorities. It was signed on July 8, the day of Sa’adeh’s execution, at Shtaura. In 1950, the Syrian treasurer, Hassan Jabbara, who signed the agreement, confirmed in a meeting with the Economic Committee ofthe Syrian Chamber of Commerce, that the price the Syrian governnment paid for the Lebanese government to sign the economic agreement was to sacrifice AntunSa’adeh. See Sabah al-Khair al-Bina’, “Madha Hadath Qabl al-Thamin min Tammouz” (What Happened Before July 8th), op. cit., p. 47.32 Howes to F.O. No. E.10339, of 30 July 1949, in FO. 371/75318/88, PRO.

amounting to as much as seven percent in favour of the Lebanesepound.33

 Another material benefit ofpossible allure was the 25,000Lebanese pounds that the Lebanesegovernment is rumoured to haveoffered as a reward for Sa’adeh’scapture. al-Za’im may very wellhave been tempted by this prize.34

 On July 8, 1949, the Lebanesegovernment executed Antun Sa’adehafter a summary trial before amilitary tribunal.35 Some of his33 Ibid.34 See George Haddad, op. cit., p.399.35 Sa’adeh’s trial was held in secret to prevent the dissemination of news of possible use to members of the party still at large. Units of the army erected an impenetrable cordon around the court to check any attempt at infiltration. For details about this trialand Sa’adeh’s execution, see the following references: a) An interview with Ibrahim Barri, the clerk of the court that executed Sa’adeh, by Sami Barri. Published in Sabah al-Khair al-Bina’, Issue

comrades were also executed.36 Itwas obvious that the sentenceSa’adeh and his colleaguesreceived was decided before histrial. Sa’adeh’s lawyer, EmileLahhoud, asked the court topostpone the trial for one week sothat he could study the case. Hisrequest was rejected by the court.He then asked that the trial bepostponed three days instead of

no. 256, 12/7/1980, pp. 18-20; b) “Haddathani al-Kahin al-Lazi A’rrafahu” by Sa’id Taqi al-Din in al-’Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works), Vol. 5, 2nd edition, Beirut: al-Nahar publications, 1980, pp. 51-56; c) Jubran Jurayj, “Marwiyat al-Lahazat al-AkhirahQabl Istishhadih” (Narrations of the last moments before his martyrdom), in Sabah al-Khair, Issue no. 387, 9/7/1983, pp. 10-11.36 Twelve of Sa’adeh’s colleagues were sentenced to death. Six of them were executed at dawn on July 21, 1949. They were chosen by the government on the basisof confession and nationality, i.e., each from a different religious sect and representing Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The remaining six had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment with hard labour. Other SSNP members who were prosecuted received sentences ranging from three to fifteen years imprisonment.

one week. His second request wasalso rejected.37 In response to thecourt’s determination to proceedwith the trial, Lahhoud,recognizing that conviction and adeath sentence were alreadydecided, quit the courtproceedings in protest, saying: “Ismell the scent of gunpowder.”38

 The Lebanese government thoughtthat by executing Sa’adeh hisparty would be eliminated from thepolitical scene. This, however,was not the case. Although theSSNP was outlawed by the Lebanesegovernment following its executionof Sa’adeh, the party continued to

37 See an interview with Ibrahim Barri, the clerk of the court that executed Sa’adeh, by Sami Barri. Published in Sabah al-Khair al-Bina’, Issue no. 256. 12/7/1980, pp. 18-20.38 SSNP, Antun Sa’ade, Leadership and Testimony, op. cit., p.26.

exist and play an important rolein the periods to come.

E. The Execution of AntunSa’adeh & the Recognition ofIsrael:

 In analyzing the various reasonsbehind al-Za’im’s decision torenege on his commitment toSa’adeh and hand him over tocertain death, one considerationstands out above all the others.It can be deduced by reviewingSa’adeh’s stance on thePalestinian question and hiscontinuous calls for a war ofliberation. This chapter will showthat Sa’adeh’s execution is linkedto the question of Israel’srecognition by Arab states.39

 39 See, for instance, Adib Qaddura, Haqa’iq wa Mawaqif(Truths and Stands), Beirut: Fikr Publications, 1989,p. 116; Usama Sam’an, in Sabah al-Khair , Issue no. 791, 6/7/1991, pp. 28-30; Marwan Salim, in Sabah al-Khair al-Bina’ , Issue no. 743, 7/7/1990, pp. 40-43.

Isam al-Mahayiri, a fomer Chairmanof the SSNP and SyrianParliamentary deputy, argues thatforeign administrations,apprehensive at the SSNP’s rapidadvancement in Syria in the wakeof al-Za’im’s coup, may havedecided to incite the Lebaneseauthorities to move against theparty. By destroying or at leastweakening the SSNP, it would notbe able to co-operate with the newregime in Syria, and consequentlywould not be able to threaten “anyplan drawn up for the proclaimedJewish State.”40

 By “any plan drawn up for theproclaimed Jewish state,” al-Mahayiri seems to be referring toIsrael’s newfound existence and40 Isam al-Mahayiri, “Ana Isam al-Mahayiri ‘Ashhad” (I, Isam al-Mahayiri, Testify), in Sabah al-Khair al-Bina’ , Issue no. 586, 4/7/1987, pp. 24-31.

recognition thereof as a new andundeniable reality by the Arabstates. This was the central issueat stake at the time. According tosome analysts of the Arab-Israeliconflict, Israel’s neighbouringArab states, i.e., Syria, Egypt,Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon,were willing to come to terms withthis new reality on certainconditions.41 Their armies’invasion of Palestine, as claimedby Simha Flapan, “was not aimed atdestroying the Jewish state. Itwas intended to prevent Abdullahfrom annexing the Arab part ofPalestine as the first step in theimplementation of his British-inspired Greater Syria plan.”42

 

41 Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, New York: Pantheon Books, 1987, p. 130.42 Ibid., p. 151.

Abdullah, as revealed bydeclassified Zionist documentsrelating to his contacts andagreements with various JewishAgency representatives, had atacit agreement with Israel whichstipulated that he would beallowed that part of Palestineintended for a Palestinian Arabstate and in return would notinterfere with the establishmentof a Jewish state.43 Moreover,Israel would help him realize theold Hashemite plan for a GreaterSyria, embracing in addition toTrans-Jordan and the Arab part ofPalestine, Syria, Iraq andLebanon. Regardless of whetherIsraeli officials were serious intheir promises about Greater Syriaor had no intention of keepingthem, Abdullah needed peace with43 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

Israel to consolidate hisannexation of the Arab part ofPalestine.44

 It should be recalled, moreover,that one of al-Za’im’s actions inrelation to the Jewish state atthe time was his proposal tonegotiate the signing of a peacetreaty. Two days after hissuccessful coup, he instructed thearmy to open armisticenegotiations with Israel andoffered to meet personally withIsraeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in order to negotiate afull-fledged peace.45 He alsooffered the resettlement of300,000 Palestinian refugees inthe Jazira district of northernSyria. His proposal “was44 Ibid., pp. 15-53.45 The armistice treaty between Syria and Israel was signed on July 20, 1949.

enthusiastically received by theUS administration, which at thetime was convinced thatresettlement, with Americanfinancial and technical aid, wouldsolve the refugee problem and playan essential role in the economicdevelopment of the Arab states,thus strengthening their ties tothe West.”46 Whether al-Za’im’sproposal should be considered partof a plan drawn up for the Jewishstate in which foreignadministrations were involved, oran initiative taken by al-Za’imalone, is open to question. Butwhat has been revealed by a formerAmerican diplomat about the USadministration’s covert supportfor the Za’im coup adds someweight to the suggestion that: a)there was a foreign plan for the46 Simha Flapan, op. cit., p. 210.

new state of Israel, constitutingpart of an overall strategy forthe whole Middle East region, andb) for the successful realizationof this scheme al-Za’im’sparticipation was deemedessential. As indicated earlier, al-Za’imengineered his coup with hints ofhelp from the American embassy inDamascus. The State Department ofthe United States, according tothe crypto-diplomat in the U.S.Legation in Syria in 1947, MilesCopeland, had at the time threemain objectives in the MiddleEast: (1) to prevent regionalstruggles which might involve theAmericans and the Soviets, therebyturning the Cold War into a hotwar; (2) to enable governments inthe area to become sufficiently

strong, both politically andmilitarily, so that they couldparticipate effectively in theFree World’s efforts to containinternational communism; (3) toeffect environmental conditionsfavouring American commercialinvestment.47 The State Department,Copeland elaborated, wanted toinsure the rise of “the right kindof leaders” in the Middle East,ones who would co-operate with theUS in order for it to attain itsobjectives and create the desiredconditions for American commercialinvestment, particularly for oilcompanies that were becomingincreasingly active in the area.48

With American investment and apeace settlement, he argued, Arab47 Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, p. 33.48 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

countries would be the principalbeneficiaries. As he put it, “ouroil companies were going to makethem [the Arabs] rich. They wouldbe the principal beneficiaries ofan ‘amicable settlement of thePalestine question’.”49 In anycase, American diplomacy decidedthat Syria should be the initialstage for its venture ofinterfering in the internalaffairs of sovereign states of theMiddle East and for establishingleaderships that would besubservient allies of the UnitedStates of America. Thus, theAmerican Legation in Syria formeda “political action team” underMajor Stephen Meade50 to providecovert support for a coup thatwould be led by Husni al-Za’im.49 Ibid., p. 36.50 Major Meade was described by Miles Copeland as the ‘man-of-action' in the Embassy. see ibid., p. 41.

This team, as Copeland revealed,“systematically developed afriendship with Za’im, then chiefof staff of the Syrian Army,suggested to him the idea of acoup d’état, advised him how to goabout it, and guided him throughthe intricate preparations inlaying the groundwork for it.”51

 In addition to al-Za’im’s proposalto negotiate the signing of apeace treaty with Israel followinghis successful coup, the Syriangovernment ratified an agreement(the American Tapline Agreement)concluded with ARAMCO (the ArabianAmerican Oil Company) permitting apipeline from Saudi Arabia to gothrough Syrian territory to theLebanese port of Sidon. 51 Ibid., p. 42.

As far as Egypt was concerned,documents published by the IsraeliState Archives amply demonstrateits willingness, at the time, tomake peace with Israel, eventhough it was ostensibly backingthe Mufti and his All-PalestineGovernment in Gaza.52 In Septemberof 1948, an Egyptian diplomat wassent by King Faruq to Paris tomake contacts with the Israelisand to explore the possibility ofa separate peace with Israel.53 Itis beyond the scope of this essayto report the results of thesetalks and the reasons for thefailure to achieve a peace treaty.However, two points must bestressed: 1) An armistice treaty52 The Mufti’s government in Gaza was set up under Egyptian auspices on September 22, 1948. It was recognized by most Arab states as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. See Simha Flapan,op. cit., pp. 148 and 205.53 Ibid., pp. 205-206.

between Egypt and Israel was infact signed on February 28, 1949;54

2) There are still classifieddocuments and reports written byIsraeli officials on theircontacts with representatives ofArab governments concerning peaceefforts at the time.55

 It can be concluded, accordingly,that recognition of the Jewishstate by its neighbours was acentral issue at the time, aroundwhich various plans were probablytailored. According to al-Mahayiri, however, any plan thataimed to achieve the recognitionof Israel would be vigorouslyopposed by the SSNP. He and otherSSNP writers claim that foreignadministrations, together with54 The Egyptian-Israeli armistice was the first signedbetween any Arab country and Israel.55 Ibid., p. 205

Zionism and Arab “reactionary”states, viewed the SSNP as a majorobstacle to their plans for aJewish state and for this reasonplotted against its leader.56 Whywould the SSNP seem a majorobstacle to plans for Israel?According to SSNP writers, theanswer is because: 1) A great influence enjoyed bythe party within the circles ofSyrian army officers became widelyfelt, especially after the coupd’état of Husni al-Za’im, in whicha group of officers known fortheir support of and/orassociation with the SSNPparticipated.57

 

56 SSNP, Antun Sa’ade: Leadership and Testimony, op. cit.,p. 25.57 Ibid.

The SSNP had been growing rapidlyin Lebanon. As claimed by theparty: ... the SSNP had been expandingtremendously in all the Lebanesedistricts, and especially in the heartof Beirut and in the chiefly Mohammedanareas, where it contested the influenceof the then Premier, Riyad al-Sulhhimself, and in the Maronite areas,where it defied ‘al-Kata’ib al-Lubnaniyyah’ (the Lebanese PhalangesParty) which stands for theisolationist current of thought whosedanger and Zionisation Sa’adeh hadalready envisioned.58

 2) Sa’adeh’s radical stance on thePalestine question and hiscontinuous calls for a war ofliberation. 

58 Ibid.

It should be emphasized that in aseries of articles published inthe weekly Kull Shay’, Sa’adehattributed the causes of thedefeat in Palestine to thementality and politics with whichthe various “Syrian” governmentsfaced the Palestinian problem. Heconsidered this shameful defeat anational disaster and laid theresponsibility for it as well asfor previous national disasters(i.e., the loss of Cilicia andAlexandretta) on theuncoordinated, haphazard andparticularistic politics of the“Syrian” states and on theircontradictory trends and lack of acommon national cause.59 In thiscontext, many writers, politicalleaders and observers have59 See Antun Sa’adeh, Marahil al-Mas’alah al-Filastiniyyah: 1921-1949, (The Stages of the Palestine Question), Beirut: SSNP, 1977, pp. 99-110.

levelled similar criticism at theArab leaders for theirmanipulation of the Palestinecause. One author, for instance,saw that Palestine “was merely oneof the battle-fields on whichcontradictory trends in the Arabworld were fought out.”60 The sameauthor stated: The Arab states invaded Israel not asunited armies determined to defeat acommon enemy but as reluctant partnersin an intrigue-ridden and uncoordinatedcoalition, whose members were motivatedby mutual suspicion and mistrust. Itcould not have been otherwise since theinvasion was dictated as much by theaspirations of the Arab states to stopeach other as by their hatred of thenew Jewish state.61

 

60 Simha Flapan, op. cit., p. 130.61 Ibid., p. 197.

Such motivations of mutualsuspicion and mistrust and theirconsequences were seen by Sa’adehas a manifestation of thebankruptcy of Arabism and itsfailure to be a unified doctrine.Sa’adeh’s fierce criticism ofArabism generated a lively publicdebate. As Yamak says: “Many Arabnationalists who felt insulted bySa’adeh’s remarks rose to thedefense of Arabism by accusing himand the SSNP of collaborating withthe enemies of the Arabs.”62 On theother hand, many thoughtful Arabnationalists considered Sa’adeh’sremarks legitimate criticism andsome of them even joined hisparty.63 At this stage, the62 Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis. op. cit., p. 65.63 Two of the most prominent among them were: MuhammadBa’albaki, editor of Kull Shay’, which was then knownboth for its pan-Arabism and support of Riyad al-Sulh; later Ba’albaki became chairman of the party’s

relative success of the SSNP inboth Christian and Muslim quartersof Beirut and particularly amongeducated segments of thepopulation, began to alarm thegovernment and some traditionalleaders.64 As Yamak puts it: ... the traditional political leadersand particularly Riyad al-Sulh and hisfollowers were greatly concerned aboutits [the SSNP’s] relative success amongthose segments of the population whomthey regarded as their naturalsupporters. It is thus believed thatthe idea to get rid of Sa’adeh and theSSNP began to take form about thattime, i.e., toward the end of 1948.65

 

Higher Council; and Sa’id Taqi al-Din, a well-known writer who later also became a member of the party’s Council of Chiefs. See Yamak, ibid., p. 65.64 At this stage, the government banned the SSNP’s official newspaper al-Jil al-Jadid in an attempt to isolateSa’adeh from public opinion.65 Yamak, op. cit., p. 65.

It should be noted that during the1948 Palestine war, Sa’adehexerted efforts to secure weaponsfor his party in order for it toparticipate in the fighting. In anarticle published on February 5,1949 in Kull Shay’, he explained howthe Arab regimes declined hisappeals for weaponry.66 Withhindsight, it can be argued thatArab leaders might have feared thethought of an SSNP empowered withmilitary weapons turning theseweapons against them in the eventof defeat.66 In this article, Sa’adeh revealed that Adib Qaddura, the party’s chief of defence, and other SSNPofficials of the SSNP Jerusalem branch, made contact with Arab forces in Palestine as well as with officials of the Arab League’s military committeee and some Arab governments, requesting arms for SSNP volunteers to fight in Palestine. The answer they were given: “No arms for the Syrian Nationalists.” Nevertheless, an SSNP unit participated in the fighting between Lydda and Ramleh. See Antun Sa’adeh,Marahil al-Mas’alah al-Filastiniyyah: 1921-1949, op. cit., pp. 183-186.

 It should also be emphasized thatsince the day of his return toLebanon, on March 2, 1947, Sa’adehhad begun an awareness campaignagainst the Jewish threat toPalestine and seemed verydetermined to rescue this part ofthe nation. He started preparinghis party for an inevitable war inPalestine, while reminding hisfellow citizens that savingPalestine was the responsibilityof the whole nation, not only thePalestinians. As he said in hishomecoming speech: Our struggle is continuing and you mustnever allow yourselves to forget thatPalestine is part of Syria. Thissouthern wing remains, as you know,mortally threatened. The SocialNationalists are determined to save

Palestine from Jewish designs and theircollaborators.67

 He added:

 You may from time to time hear thosewho say that delivering Palestine wouldbe at the expense of Lebanon and theLebanese and something in which Lebanoncannot get involved. In reality, savingPalestine is the most Lebanese ofenterprises, just as it is a corematter for hinterland Syria, as wellas, of course, a core matter for thePalestinians. The Jewish threat toPalestine is a threat to the whole ofSyria, a threat to all its entities.68

 In a communiqué issued on December1, 1947, concerning the UnitedNations Resolution on the67 Antun Sa’adeh, al-In’izaliyyah 'Aflasat (1947-1949) (Isolationism Has Gone Bankrupt), Beirut: SSNP, 1976,pp. 27-28; for an English translation of this speech,see Appendix I. p. 85.68 Ibid

Partition of Palestine, Sa’adehdeclared that SSNP members “are oftoday in a state of war for thesake of Palestine.” In the samecommuniqué, he instructed themilitary officials of his party tomake preparations for enlistingvolunteers in the “SocialNationalist Army.”69

 3) Furthermore, when the Syriangovernment ratified the AmericanTapline Agreement, Sa’adehimmediately wrote an articleentitled: “Oil: An InternationalWeapon Not Yet Used,” in which henoted: From the mere ratification of theAmerican Tapline Agreement, it becomesclear that we have not used this oilweapon to put a limit to the United

69 Antun Sa’adeh, Marahil al-Mas’alah al-Filastiniyyah, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

States’ support of the Zionists, andthat we concurred with it by ratifyingan important, sensitive agreement whichwas of vital importance to the U.S. forfuture military operations.70

 In his last speech, on June 1,1949, i.e., ten days before theJummayza Incident, in Burj al-Barajina (Beirut), Sa’adeh spokeabout the establishment of theJewish state and his completerejection of its existence. In thespeech, he replied to Ben-Gurion’saddress on the graduation of thefirst team of Israeli armyofficers, by saying: “The Jewishstate is training militaryofficers and the Syrian SocialNationalist state which Iproclaimed in 1935 is, in turn,preparing military officers.”

70 Ibid., pp. 127-129.

Sooner or later, he added, hisarmy would confront the enemy inorder to repossess “the land of[our] ancestors and theinheritance of [our] children andgrandchildren from the defilementof that alien state.”71

 It is against this background thatthe link between Sa’adeh’sexecution and plans for thecreation of a Jewish state is madeclear. Sa’adeh’s radical stance onthe existence of Israel, his callsfor armed struggle and for theutilization of oil as a strategicweapon alarmed the United States,Zionism and the Arab states. Thisanalysis is expressed differentlyin the following paragraph quotedfrom an SSNP publication:71 Antun Sa’adeh, Marahil al-Mas’alah al-Filastiniyyah: 1921-1949, (The Stages of the Palestine Question), op. cit., pp. 137-139.

 These radical and unwavering positionson the battle of Palestine, in which he[Sa’adeh] attributed the responsibilityfor the loss of Palestine and otherusurped Syrian parts to Arab reaction,paired with his call for armed struggleand employment of the oil weapon in theservice of the battle as a strategicweapon, and his unveiling of theAmerican imperialist role in thiscontext - all these impelledimperialism, Zionism and Arab reactionto scheme and intrigue with the aim ofliquidating Sa’adeh and his party. Soimperialism directed Arab reactionrepresented by the King of Egypt,Faruk, and Husni al-Za’im to get rid ofSa’adeh and his party.72

 Even non-SSNP proponents agree. Inhis interpellation to Parliament,Progressive Socialist Party leaderKamal Junblatt accused the72 SSNP, Antun Sa’ade: Leadership and Testimony, op. cit.,p. 25.

Lebanese government of plotting toliquidate the SSNP and its leaderbecause of his stand and writingson the Palestine question. Heargued that Sa’adeh’s project of aunited Fertile Crescent was theonly plan capable of confrontingIsrael after the failure of allArab regimes in the 1948 war.Hence, added Junblatt, theLebanese government, under thepressure of foreign and Arabgovernments, aimed to get rid ofSa’adeh in order to makerecognition of Israel possible.73

73 SSNP, Istijwab Junblatt al-Tarikhi li al-Hukuma Hawl Istishhad Sa’adeh ‘Am 1949 (Junblatt’s Historical Interpellation to the [Lebanese] Government Over Sa’adeh’s Martyrdom, 1949), pp. 22-23.