i

African Philosophy, Thought and Practice, and Their

Contribution to Environmental Ethics

by

Kevin Behrens

Submitted in fulfilment of

the requirements of the degree

DOCTOR LITTERARUM ET PHILOSOPHIAE

in

Public Philosophy and Ethics in the

Faculty of Humanities at the

University of Johannesburg

Supervisor: Professor Thaddeus Metz

October 2011

ii

African Philosophy, Thought and Practice, and Their Contribution to Environmental Ethics

Kevin Behrens

I address the question of what contribution, if any, African philosophy, thought and practice can make

to the field of environmental ethics. Countering a pervasive presumption that sub-Saharan African

thought is inherently anthropocentric and has little to contribute to environmental ethics, I argue that

the basis for a promising African environmentalism is to be found in the characteristic sub-Saharan

belief in a fundamental inter-relatedness between natural objects, often accompanied by a moral

requirement to treat nature with respect. This entails promoting harmonious, family-like relationships

between ourselves and other parts of nature. These relationships are characterised by solidarity, shared

identity, and the promotion of the well-being of one another. Taken together with a strong emphasis

on communitarian values in African societies, the prized harmonious relationships between persons

and nature cannot be conceived solely in individualist or in holist terms - both individuals and groups

must be taken into account. Based on these and other African conceptions, I articulate an ‘African

Relational Environmentalism’, that requires us to seek to become virtuous by demonstrating respect

for all parts of the web of life and promoting harmonious relationships between persons and persons,

and between persons and other parts of the web of life.

I claim that what establishes moral considerability, on this African view, is that entities are part of the

inter-connected web of life. This accords moral considerability to all persons, other living things,

groups of living things (such a species, human communities and ecosystems), as well as inanimate

natural entities that are of important ecosystemic value to other life (things such as rivers and forests).

iii

I show that, on many accounts, African thought assumes that we have a moral obligation to future

generations of both persons and other parts of the web of life, to ensure that we pass on to them a

healthy environment, capable of sustaining their lives and well-being. This is based on two

characteristic African notions: firstly, that the environment is something the present shares with past

and future generations, and secondly, that we have an indirect duty to posterity to preserve the natural

environment, out of gratitude to our predecessors who did the same on our behalf. On African

Relational Environmentalism, future generations are morally considerable because the moral circle

(the web of life) transcends generations.

Giving attention to the question of moral status, I argue that although all morally considerable things

need to be taken into account, this should not be thought to mean that they have equal moral status. I

search for principles that are able to assist in weighing up competing obligations between morally

considerable entities. I consider African conceptions grounded in the notion of life force or vitality

that suggest a sense of final value, instrumental value, well-being and partiality in African thought, and

show these ideas provide us with a set of other important considerations to take into account when

making moral choices.

I claim that African Relational Environmentalism is essentially a virtue or perfectionist ethic, but, as a

result of its focus on harmony and relationality, it is both able to entail the moral requirement to treat

other morally considerable entities with respect, as well as to acknowledge the importance of their

well-being or flourishing. I characterise harmonious relationships as being relationships of caring,

solidarity and identification, as well as ones that avoid disrupting the balance of nature. Applying

African Relational Environmentalism to two practical ethical problems, elephant over-population and

global climate change, I argue that it is able to account for our moral responsibilities with respect to

the environment at least as well, and in some respects, even better than existing alternatives.

iv

Acknowledgements

The person to whom I am most indebted is my supervisor, Prof. Thaddeus Metz. There can be few

teachers who are as generous with their time, ideas, advice and support as he is. He has been as

much a mentor as a supervisor, and it has been a privilege to have the benefit of his sharp intellect,

knowledge and experience. Moreover, he is not only a pre-eminent scholar on the ethic of Ubuntu;

as a teacher and mentor, he is also an example of an authentic person, who demonstrates caring,

sharing and empathy. I aspire to being able to demonstrate my respect towards him by emulating

his example. Thank you, Thad.

My family (Shaun, Camden, Duane and Joan) have had to put up with even more than my usual

grumpiness, task-orientation, neglect, irritability and messiness. Between them they have endured

many hours of reading drafts of chapters, verifying references, and my philosophising out loud and

venting frustration. Somehow, they have managed to remain supportive, throughout. Thank you.

I am grateful to the University of Johannesburg and the Faculty of Humanities for exceptionally

generous bursaries. I also thank the Department of Philosophy at UJ for financial support for me to

present papers at two international conferences. Those papers form the core of two of the chapters

of this thesis. It has been a pleasure to be part of this Department. The support of the academic staff,

the other post-graduate students and Mrs Brits, the departmental secretary, has been invaluable.

Thank you to Felicity Gallagher for superb proof-reading at the last moment, under ridiculous time

constraints. Thanks also to her and Robinn and Ros (a.k.a. Charlie’s Angels), for allowing me to

temporarily neglect their dissertations in order to be able to complete my own.

v

Previously Published Work

Chapter 3 is based on Behrens, K. (2010). Exploring African Holism with Respect to

the Environment. Environmental Values, 19: 465-484.

Forthcoming Published Work

Chapter 4 is based on Behrens, K. (2012). African Relational Environmentalism and

Moral Considerability. Environmental Ethics, Special Issue on African

Environmental Ethics, forthcoming.

Statement of Length

This thesis contains 77 941 words, in compliance with the guideline of about 75 000

words recommended by the Faculty of Humanities.

vi

Declaration

I, Kevin Gary Behrens, declare that this dissertation has not in part or in whole been submitted at

any other university or other academic institution and that the contents of the dissertation are my

own work, excepting those parts that are acknowledged to have been taken from other sources.

_______________________

Signature

vii

Table of Contents

1.! Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1!1.1! The Research Question .......................................................................................................... 1!1.2! Clarification of the Project and Scope ................................................................................... 3!1.3! Importance of the Project, Novelty of Approach and Contribution to the Field ................... 6!1.4! Clarification of Concepts ..................................................................................................... 10!

1.4.1! African Philosophy ....................................................................................................... 10!1.4.2! Indigenous and Traditional Thought or Practice .......................................................... 13!1.4.3! Ubuntu .......................................................................................................................... 15!1.4.4! Western Thought .......................................................................................................... 15!1.4.5! Moral Considerability and Moral Status ...................................................................... 16!1.4.6! Intrinsic Value and Related Terms ............................................................................... 17!1.4.7! Anthropocentrism ......................................................................................................... 18!1.4.8! Individualism and Holism ............................................................................................ 18!1.4.9! Biocentrism and Eco-centrism ..................................................................................... 19!

1.5! Overview of Chapters .......................................................................................................... 20

2! Overview and Taxonomy of Western Environmental Ethics ................................................ 24!2.1! Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 24!2.2! Western Environmental Ethics: A Brief Historical Overview ........................................... 25!2.3! Two Central Debates ........................................................................................................... 32!

2.3.1! Anthropocentrism v. Non-anthropocentrism in Western Environmental Ethics ......... 32!2.3.2! Individualism v. Holism in Western Environmental Ethics ......................................... 40

3! African Thought and Harmonious Relationships with Nature ............................................. 47!3.1! Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 47!3.2! Anthropocentrism in African Thought ................................................................................ 49!

3.2.1! A Presumption of Anthropocentrism ........................................................................... 49!3.2.2! Beyond Anthropocentricism: The Interrelatedness and Interdependence of Nature ... 53!3.2.3! Why Has this African Non-Anthropocentric Respect for Nature Been Overlooked in

the Literature? ............................................................................................................. 56!3.3! Harmonious Relationships with Nature ............................................................................... 62!

3.3.1! African Moral Concern for Persons as the Key to Understanding Moral Concern for Nature ......................................................................................................................... 62!

3.3.2! Analogy with Family Relationships ............................................................................. 65!3.3.3! Towards A Characterisation of Harmonious Relationships ......................................... 66!

3.4! African Environmental Ethics: Embracing Both Individualism and Holism ...................... 70!3.4.1! A Rejection of Some Dualistic Thinking ..................................................................... 70!3.4.2! Holism and ‘African Relational Environmentalism’. .................................................. 72!3.4.3! Individualism and ‘African Relational Environmentalism’ ......................................... 77!

3.5! Conclusion: An African Relational Theory of Right Action ............................................... 83

viii

!4! African Thought and Moral Considerability .......................................................................... 85!

4.1! Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 85!4.2! What is Moral Considerability? ........................................................................................... 87!4.3! What Kinds of Things Are Morally Considerable in African Thought? ............................. 89!

4.3.1! Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by Interrelatedness ........................................ 90!4.3.2! Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by Life Force ................................................. 93!4.3.3! Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by Totemism, Inhabiting Spirits and Folklore

.................................................................................................................................... 94 !4.3.4! The Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosystems ............................................... 95!4.3.5! The Moral Considerability of Artefacts ..................................................................... 101!4.3.6! Summary: Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by African Thought .................. 102!

4.4! Interconnectedness in the Web of Life as the Basis for Moral Considerability ................ 103!4.5! The Plausibility of a Web of Life Criterion of Moral Considerability .............................. 108!

4.5.1! The Moral Considerability of Inanimate Natural Entities .......................................... 109!4.5.2! The Moral Considerability of Supernatural Entities .................................................. 115!

4.6! The Promise of a Web of Life Approach to Moral Considerability .................................. 116!4.7! Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 117

5! The Moral Considerability of Future Generations in African Thought ............................ 119!5.1! Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 119!5.2! Western Philosophy and Inter-generational Moral Obligation.......................................... 122!5.3! Moral Obligations to Future Generations in African Thought .......................................... 125!5.4! How Reasonable is The View that Future Generations are Part of the Web of Life? ....... 129!

5.4.1! Ownership of Land and Moral Obligation to the Future ............................................ 130!5.4.2! Gratitude and Moral Obligation to the Future ............................................................ 131!

5.5! Western Philosophical Support for Duties to Posterity Based on Gratitude ..................... 137!5.6! African Communitarianism as a Crucial Aspect of Inter-generational Justice ................. 140!5.7! Strengths of this African Notion of Moral Obligation to Future Generations ................... 145!5.8! Moral Obligations Towards Future Generations of Other Species ................................... 148!5.9! Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 149

ix

6! Weighing Up Competing Moral Obligations ........................................................................ 150!6.1! Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 150!6.2! Conceptions in African Thought of Relevance to Weighing Competing Moral Claims ... 155!6.3! Degrees of Moral Status in African Thought .................................................................... 156!6.4! Final Value ........................................................................................................................ 164!

6.4.1! A Sense of Final Value in African Thought ............................................................... 164!6.4.2! Taking Account of Degrees of Final Value ............................................................... 165!

6.5! Instrumental Value ............................................................................................................ 166!6.5.1! A Sense of Instrumental Value in African Thought ................................................... 166!6.5.2! Taking Account of Instrumental Value ...................................................................... 171!

6.6! Well-being ......................................................................................................................... 172!6.6.1! A Sense of Well-being in African Thought ............................................................... 172!6.6.2! Taking Account of the Valuing of Well-being ........................................................... 175!

6.7! Partiality............................................................................................................................. 180!6.7.1! A Sense of Partiality in African Thought ................................................................... 180!6.7.2! Taking Account of a Sense of Partiality in African Thought ..................................... 187!

6.8! Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 189

7! African Relational Environmentalism: Towards a Theory ................................................. 193!7.1! Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 193!7.2! How does Interdependence Entail a Moral Duty to Promote Harmonious Relationships? ..... ........................................................................................................................................... 194 !

7.2.1! A Perfectionist or Virtue Ethics Account of Morality ............................................... 196!7.2.2! The Relationship Between Respect and Virtue .......................................................... 200!7.2.3! The Relationship Between Well-Being and Virtue .................................................... 203!7.2.4! Summary: Why Should We Promote Harmonious Relationships? ........................... 204!

7.3! How can Harmonious Relationships with Nature be Characterised? ................................ 205!7.3.1! Harmonious Relationships as Caring Relationships .................................................. 205!7.3.2! Harmonious Relationships and Balance in Nature ..................................................... 207!

7.4! African Relational Environmentalism: A Summary ........................................................ 211

8! Applications .............................................................................................................................. 216 8.1! Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 216!8.2! Elephant Over-population in South Africa ........................................................................ 216!8.3! Global Climate Change ..................................................................................................... 228!8.4! Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 237!

1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Question

Commenting on a trend by environmental ethicists to appeal to non-Western traditions as sources

of alternative perspectives on environmental values and practices, Workineh Kelbessa writes:

Despite the fact that advances have been made through recent discourse on the

environmental concern of non-Western traditions, most of the related research has

centred on Asia, Native American Indians, and Australian Aborigines, with little

attention being paid to most of Africa…. Those who have studied non-Western

religions and philosophies… have overlooked the contribution of Africa to

environmental ethics. They have either kept quiet or what they said about Africa

was rather thin compared to what they said about Native Americans, Asians and

Australian Aborigines (Kelbessa, 2005: 19-20).

Implicit in this comment are two claims. The first is that Africa has a contribution to make to

environmental ethics. The second is that this contribution has not been studied or considered

nearly seriously enough. Since it is widely acknowledged that the beliefs and practices of the

other indigenous peoples Kelbessa mentions have a meaningful contribution to make to this field,

it would be a worthwhile project to investigate what contribution (if any) African thought can

make to this field of enquiry. That is what I aim to do in this thesis.

J. Baird Callicott epitomises Kelbessa’s claim above and provides a reason for the lack of

attention given to African indigenous thought by environmental ethicists. In his comprehensive

survey of the ecological ethical traditions of communities across the globe, Earth’s Insights, he

claims,

2

Apparently… Africa looms as a big blank spot on the world map of indigenous

environmental ethics for a very good reason. African thought orbits, seemingly,

around human interests. Hence one might expect to distil from it no more than a

weak and indirect environmental ethic, similar to [a] type of ecologically

enlightened utilitarianism, focused on long-range human welfare (Callicott, 1994:

158). 1

Callicott’s judgment of the potential of African thought as a source for a promising environmental

ethic is predicated on a belief that African worldviews are essentially anthropocentric –

completely centred on human interests. I shall show that this presumption of anthropocentrism is

fairly pervasive in the literature. Since environmental ethics has, for the most part, been

characterised by a strong rejection of anthropocentrism, it is hardly surprising that African

indigenous thought has not been given much attention by environmental ethicists. I hope to show

that this presumption of anthropocentrism is false, and that some African conceptions regarding

nature provide promising values to underpin an ethic of environmental responsibility. I identify a

strong emphasis on the interrelatedness or interdependence of everything in nature, on a

requirement to treat nature respectfully, and on the need to live harmoniously with nature in some

African thought. I argue that this is best construed as a rejection of anthropocentrism, and with its

special emphasis on relationality, provides a basis for a very promising environmental ethic that

differs from many Western models in significant respects.

1 Callicott’s judgment of African indigenous environmental ethics is not as negative as this quotation, taken alone,

seems to imply. I shall show below that his (undeveloped) recognition that ‘[i]n [the] notion of embedded

individuality – of individuality as a nexus of communal relationships – we may have the germ of an African

environmental ethic’ (Callicott, 1994: 167) is insightful, and does, indeed, identify a theme in African thought with

significant potential for environmentalism.

3

The question I intend to answer is, ‘What contribution, if any, can African philosophy, thought

and practice make to the field of environmental ethics?’ As a specialised branch of applied

ethics, environmental ethics has not only been concerned about human moral obligations towards

nature and the application of existing ethical theories to practical ecological problems, it has also

wrestled with much more fundamental questions about the very applicability of traditional ethical

theory to environmental questions. It has posed strong challenges to human-centred pre-

suppositions, and opened up important debates in philosophy about whether animals, species,

plants and other natural entities can have final value, and how this value should be properly

construed. It is to these debates that my question addresses itself, primarily, seeking to identify

and evaluate any contribution African thought can make to this on-going ethical discussion.

1.2 Clarification of the Project and Scope

I have deliberately chosen not to restrict my question to a study of African philosophy alone, for a

number of reasons. Firstly, the existing English language literature on African environmental

philosophy or ethics is rather limited. Secondly, there are other sources of African thought, such

as folklore and traditional religious beliefs that might not properly be thought to be philosophy,

yet have a bearing on philosophical issues, and could provide helpful insights related to my

project. Thirdly, some authors attempt to derive values from traditional practices associated with

agriculture, hunting, etc. These might, similarly, be of significance to the field of environmental

ethics. My sources will, therefore, extend beyond philosophical texts, embracing anthropological,

religious and cultural studies.

4

In terms of methodology, my work will involve some kind of reconstruction and derivation of

African values based on a wide variety of source material. My objective will be to review the

available African sources and hopefully to uncover, analyse and assess any general themes or

common, broadly-held values in African thought that might be of relevance to the ethical

consideration of environmental issues. I hope to map out the diverse views that exist, and to

identify any themes that provide promise for further development in the thesis into an African-

inspired moral theory embracing environmental concerns. My project is intended to be more

analytical and developmental than simply descriptive. I do not seek to ‘discover’ an African eco-

philosophy and describe it, but rather to systematically develop an environmental ethic based on

some pertinent and distinctive themes or conceptions in African thought.

It is important to clarify from the outset that the focus of my project is on the values of the

indigenous peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, and thus excludes African cultures to the north of the

Sahara, as well as the various European and Asian settler communities and their descendants who

have made their home in Africa. However, since many secondary accounts of African values,

thought, culture, religion, philosophy and practice provide relevant information and perspectives

on my subject, I shall make reference to such non-indigenous sources where they are helpful to

my project. My focus is on the thought, values and practices of indigenous Africans, and I hope

to create an attractive approach to environmental ethics grounded in these indigenous ideas.

Thus, when I speak of ‘African philosophy’ or ‘African thought’, I mean the philosophy or

thought of indigenous sub-Saharan Africans. This is not to question the valuable contribution to

our understanding of African thought or philosophy made by non-indigenous theorists or

commentators, but is intended merely to keep the focus on the contribution of indigenous African

ideas.

5

Sub-Saharan Africa comprises many different societies, and their values and beliefs are

unsurprisingly extremely varied. Nonetheless, some common themes seem to recur and to be

shared by many of the indigenous peoples of the region. It is to such common themes that I

address my enquiry. Clearly, then, I am not suggesting that a single African worldview exists,

nor that the themes I focus on fully describe all African views. My primary objective is to

demonstrate that, contrary to common perception, there are themes in African thought that can

make a meaningful contribution to the on-going search for an ethical approach to the environment

that grounds the protection and responsible use of nature.

To further clarify my project, I propose to go beyond a mere reconstruction, discussion, review,

analysis and interpretation of African philosophy, thought and practice and their contribution to

environmental ethics. Apart from demonstrating that African thought has a contribution to make

to this field, and is not so inherently anthropocentric as to be of no interest to environmentalists, I

propose to develop the themes I have identified as valuable, and express them in their most

plausible and meaningful formulations. Furthermore, I intend to develop these themes further

into an ‘African-inspired’ environmental ethic. Having identified some distinguishing

characteristics of African thought on the environment, namely, its emphasis on the

interrelatedness or interdependence of everything in nature, its respect for nature and all life, its

fundamental focus on harmonious relationships, and its sense of ‘embedded individuality’ 2

within community, I shall articulate and explicate an environmental ethic grounded in these

African conceptions. I name this approach ‘African Relational Environmentalism’.

2 This is Callicott’s phrase. See Callicott, 1994: 166-167.

6

1.3 Importance of the Project, Novelty of Approach and Contribution to the Field

The quest for a theoretical ethical framework that can best account for our moral obligations to

other persons, as well as to nature and the earth as a whole, is an important, continuing process. I

believe that African thought can provide insights and perspectives that might further clarify,

enlighten and inform the critical areas of debate underlying this quest.

Given the seriousness of the looming ecological crisis the earth faces, and the very real possibility

that we may be approaching a point where the damage our species is doing to the earth is

irreversible, with possibly catastrophic consequences, any contribution that might assist human

beings to drastically reconsider how we treat nature is important. For the nations of Africa, and

other developing nations, the struggle for a better life for their people, for development and for

poverty reduction are understandably very important concerns. The temptation to place

immediate human needs above those of the rest of nature, and to make many of the same mistakes

the West has made – leading to further degradation of the earth – is clearly strong. The argument

that the West has had its turn, and that, as a matter of justice, developing nations should not be

prevented from improving the quality of the lives of their people, now, is understandable. I hope

that an ‘African-inspired’ environmental ethic might assist in articulating an approach to the

environment that can fairly balance all of these concerns.

The starting point for Callicott’s project in Earth’s Insights (1994) is the belief that ecologically

responsible programmes, policies and interventions are not likely to be adopted by societies

unless we develop a new consciousness regarding nature. Along with most environmental

ethicists he believes that a radical change in how humans value nature is required for human

behaviour to change sufficiently to avert an ecological crisis. Indeed, the quest to articulate such

7

a way of valuing nature lies at the very heart of the on-going project to develop an ‘environmental

ethic’. As Callicott asserts,

A persuasive environmental ethic, however, cannot be constructed de novo. It

must be located in a more general cognitive context, and it must retain continuity

with the moral ideas and ideals of the past. Accordingly, the handful of Western

philosophers working in the field of environmental ethics have begun with various

strains of Western moral philosophy and sought to extend them to the new

environmental questions (Callicott, 1994: xv).

Acknowledging the diversity of human cultures and experience, Callicott claims:

The revival and deliberate construction of environmental ethics from the raw

materials of indigenous, traditional, and contemporary cognitive cultures represents

an important step in the future movement of human material cultures toward a

more symbiotic relationship – however incomplete and imperfect – with the natural

environment (Callicott, 1994: 5).

He thus embarks on a survey of the beliefs, practices and values of various cultures across the

globe in a search for existing traditions that might be developed into an ethical system able to

ground ecological responsibility. One important reason for identifying and articulating

indigenous traditions which value nature is to provide particular cultures with familiar grounds on

which to construct an ecological consciousness, and to establish continuity with moral constructs

and traditions familiar to them. An environmental ethic that incorporates indigenous African

moral ideas and builds a foundation for ecological protection on indigenous mores is more likely

to find acceptance amongst Africans than one that does not.

8

My reasons for seeking and identifying indigenous values that affirm ecological responsibility go

far beyond that, however. Callicott also claims that this quest is of value to the broader global

community, too. Indigenous thought is able to enrich and complement the developing

environmental consciousness of the West. ‘To augment personal commitment and structural

reform, developing a network of indigenous environmental ethics will help set us on our way

toward that goal. But we shall need some common environmental attitudes and values on which

to base a common vision of a whole and healthy world’ (Callicott, 1994: 4). Indeed, one aim of

my project is to achieve just that, to articulate an ‘African-inspired’ environmental ethic that

enriches discourse in the field, adding new perspectives that might assist in clarifying some of the

continuing philosophical questions in the field of environmental ethics.

In addition to contributing to the field of environmental ethics, I trust that this project will also

make a contribution to the development of African moral thought. African philosophy, for many

reasons, ranging from the historical denigration of African culture by others, to colonial cultural

hegemony, to racist and politicised accounts of Africa, to the oral, non-literate nature of

traditional African thought, and so on, has been relatively slow in its development3. Nonetheless,

it has made great strides in recent decades, especially in establishing itself as a field with its own

voice, perspective and contribution to make to the academy. It is my hope that this thesis will

contribute to and stimulate the field of African philosophy further.

3 In section 3.2.3 in the following chapter, I provide an account of why African ecophilosophy, in particular, has not

been given due consideration in the literature of environmental ethics.

9

I have already cited Kelbessa bemoaning the fact that Western philosophers have paid little

attention to African thought on the environment. However, no systematic attempt to articulate

what an attractive African environmental ethic might be has been undertaken by African thinkers

writing in English, either. I am not aware of any attempt thus far to provide a systematic

summary, organisation and critical analysis of the work that has emanated from sub-Saharan

philosophy and thought about the environment. The closest to such a project is Kelbessa’s

doctoral thesis (2001). However, his central concern is not exactly to embark on such a

comprehensive treatment of African environmental thought. His main contribution is to analyse

the religious, cultural, and ethical beliefs and practices of a specific group of African people, the

Oromo of Ethiopia, as they relate to environmental ethics. In his penultimate chapter, he does

attempt to draw some conclusions from his research findings with respect to how these ideas

relate to modern Western environmental ethics, as well as to the perspectives of other indigenous

communities. His main point is merely to suggest that his findings indicate some useful

perspectives on some of the debates which can be added to the mix, in the search for a promising

environmental ethic. He does not, as such, attempt to analyse the whole body of African

philosophy, thought and practice in terms of its potential contribution to environmental ethics or

to develop a basic principle to govern our interaction with nature. I hope to be able to make a

contribution to this field in terms of providing such an overview and analysis. I propose, further,

to clarify this theory by applying it to two important practical environmental problems, namely

the management of elephant over-population and global climate change. No such project has

been attempted before, to my knowledge.

10

In summary, my project involves mapping out and critically reviewing African thought regarding

the environment gleaned from historical as well as modern sources, including the work of African

philosophers, anthropological, social-historical and religious studies, accounts of traditional

agricultural, hunting and conservation practices, as well as indigenous folklore. My final goal is

to identify any recurring themes that appear to hold promise as a basis for an African-inspired

environmental ethic, and to develop these further into an attractive moral theory grounded in

identified African values with respect to the environment.

1.4 Clarification of Concepts

In the section that follows, I clarify my use of some important concepts, terms and phrases used

in this thesis.

1.4.1 African Philosophy

A plausible case can be made for the view that even in pre-literate times such a thing as

‘philosophy’ existed among the peoples of Africa. Of course, such philosophical ideas expressed

in folklore, myth and oral tradition would fail to meet the standards of some to be counted as true

philosophy, since in a pre-literate form, one would not expect to find robust, analytical

argumentation. Thus, much contention surrounds the issue of what should count as ‘African

philosophy’. H. Odera Oruka, the father of the so-called ‘sage’ school of African philosophy, has

identified four major trends in African philosophy, which he names ‘ethnophilosophy’,

‘philosophic sagacity’ (or, ‘sage philosophy’), ‘nationalist-ideological philosophy’ and

‘professional philosophy’ (Oruka, 1998: 101). ‘Ethnophilosophy’ is characterised by the attempt

to describe the philosophical thought reflected in the oral traditions, rituals, and traditional beliefs

11

of African peoples. This approach to African thought is centered on communal or shared ideas or

traditional wisdom and a description of these essential ideas. Ethnophilosophy is much disputed,

with many claiming that it is primarily descriptive, and lacking in philosophical reasoning

(Kaphagawani, 1998: 89-93).

‘Philosophic sagacity’ is premised on a claim that some specific individuals within pre-literate

African societies who are broadly perceived as wise, go beyond the common philosophical

thought of their culture, and use critical and independent thought to think and express themselves

philosophically. The efforts of this movement have thus gone in to identifying sages,

interviewing them, recording their thought and critically reflecting on it (Kaphagawani, 1998: 93-

95).

‘Nationalistic-ideological philosophy’ is a trend to give expression to new economic and political

theories based on traditional African communitarian and socialist-like ideals, often including

alternative concepts of politics to standard Western models. This movement was given impetus

by the works of the so-called ‘philosopher kings’, statesmen who led African countries in the

early years after independence, and wrote political philosophy. Indeed, this sort of work was to

characterise much African philosophy for most of the period immediately following the

independence of most African countries (Kaphagawani, 1998: 95-97).

‘Professional philosophy’ is a term applied to the work of trained African philosophers who seek

to apply the usual academic tools and methods of philosophy, including argument and criticism,

to any of the subjects historically considered by philosophers, to produce their own philosophical

work. As might be expected, much of this work is done with specific reference to indigenous

12

African thought or values or context, but this need not necessarily be the case (Kaphagawani,

1998: 97-8).

For my purposes, all four of these trends in African philosophy will be included in my sources, to

the extent that they are relevant to my central research question. It is not necessary for my project

to rigidly define the boundaries between concepts such as African philosophy and African

indigenous thought. Since my project includes the consideration of both, and does not require

them to be dealt with distinctly, I do not need to be too precise in my use of these terms. No

doubt, there will be times when it might be hard to distinguish exactly between an

anthropological account of the beliefs of an African people and ethnophilosophy. The convention

I shall apply is that where it seems to me that the author is self-consciously engaging in

philosophy, I will usually use the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’ to describe the work or

author. Otherwise, I shall use ‘African thought’, which could, when used very broadly, include

anything that might be called ‘African philosophy’.

I have already described how I shall use the adjective ‘African’, above. Briefly, by African

philosophy or thought I mean the thinking expressed by the indigenous peoples of sub-Saharan

Africa. I do not hereby mean to make any judgement on whether non-indigenous authors

reflecting philosophically on issues from an African perspective, or grounding their work in

indigenous African themes, should be regarded as ‘African philosophers’ or not. I choose to

delimit my use of the term in this way for purely pragmatic reasons: namely, to keep my focus on

African indigenous thought.

13

1.4.2 Indigenous and Traditional Thought or Practice

The concept of indigenous peoples is fraught with definitional problems. I shall use it simply to

refer to cultural communities in sub-Saharan Africa who have inhabited some part of the

continent since before the colonial era, who still do so, and who continue to identify themselves

as distinct ethnic or cultural communities. Thus, indigenous thought is the thought of members of

such communities, grounded in ideas, concepts and mores that have been passed down through

generations. Clearly, no culture is static, and changing circumstances, as well as the influence of

other cultural perspectives must with time, lead to changes in values and customs. Kelbessa

provides a helpful approach to this in his description of ‘indigenous knowledge’ as

… connoting something which was created and preserved by previous generations,

and has been inherited wholly or partially and further developed by subsequent

generations…. Indigenous knowledge is constantly evolving, and involves both

old and new ideas and beliefs. …rural people do not slight imported values or stick

solely to their ancestral custom. Instead they have tried to improve their tradition

in line with the new circumstances and thereby adapt foreign values to their way of

life. Therefore, indigenous knowledge embodies both internally generated and

externally borrowed and adapted knowledge (Kelbessa, 2001: 1).

I shall use the phrases ‘indigenous thought’, ‘indigenous values’, ‘indigenous customs’ and

‘indigenous practice’ similarly. I shall also use the term ‘traditional’ as broadly analogous with

‘indigenous’.

14

It is not always easy to make a clear distinction between what we might call traditional

philosophical thought and the indigenous religious beliefs of the peoples of Africa, as Africans

often do not themselves neatly distinguish between the spiritual, intellectual and material aspects

of life. Religious views have also not remained static since before the colonial era, and have

evolved, assimilated other religious ideas, and have sometimes been partially assimilated into

other religions, as in the case of the African Independent Christian churches. Nonetheless, there

are some notions that appear more religious than obviously philosophical, and, at times it is more

appropriate to speak of ‘traditional religion’ rather than ‘traditional thought’. For example, the

belief in the continued presence of ancestors who have died, and the requirement to respect the

ancestors is a religious concept commonly held across most of the region, and it is preferable to

identify this notion as being religious in character.

In this thesis I will identify a number of themes or conceptions in African thought suggesting that

nature ought to be valued and treated respectfully. It ought to be obvious that this does not imply

that these values are necessarily reflected in the actual behaviour of modern African states or their

people. It would be naïve to assume that the people of Africa are any less prone to excessive

consumption, materialism, pollution and prioritising human development over environmental

integrity than people in other parts of the world. However, as I claimed above, there is good

reason to believe that Africans will more easily reject such damaging behaviours if they are

encouraged to do so on the grounds of values and conceptions of nature that resonate with their

own traditions and mores – even if these are not currently widely followed. The existence of a

‘stewardship’ tradition in Judaeo-Christian thought has not caused all Jewish or Christian

believers to be strong environmentalists – far from it, in fact – but appealing to this tradition in

15

their own value system can go some way to encouraging them to reconsider some of their

behaviours.

1.4.3 Ubuntu

The term ‘Ubuntu’ is used frequently in the literature on African philosophy and ethics, most

particularly in Southern Africa. It is difficult to render into English, simply, but it conveys a

sense of ‘human-ness’. The term is often used broadly as a descriptor of African philosophy,

morality and worldviews, and I shall often employ it in this manner. The word ‘Ubuntu’ is

common to many of the Nguni languages (e.g. Zulu and Xhosa). Cognates of the term are found

in other languages of the region: for example, ‘Botho’ is the equivalent of ‘Ubuntu’ in the Sotho

languages, as is ‘Hunhu’ in some of the languages of Zimbabwe.

1.4.4 Western Thought

Just as I use the broad phrase ‘African thought’ to denote some of the ideas and values to be found

in the traditions of indigenous sub-Saharans, I similarly refer to ‘Western thought’ and ‘Western

philosophy’, etc. Again, this does not represent a claim that all people in those parts of the world

commonly referred to as the ‘West’ share a common set of values or beliefs. This does entail

generalisation, but is intended to distinguish typically Western philosophical and ethical notions

from those more typical of other cultures. I am also limited to addressing only relevant

Anglophone literature in this thesis.

16

I sometimes use phrases such as ‘traditional Western exploitative and anthropocentric values’.

This is necessary in order to distinguish the kind of values or notions about the environment that

have been largely blamed for historically poor environmental policies in the West from the

valuable revisionist and environmentally-friendly conceptions articulated by environmental

philosophers, especially in recent decades. In a sense the ‘traditional Western exploitative and

anthropocentric values’ I refer to represent the ‘foil’ against which most environmental ethics has

been developed.

1.4.5 Moral Considerability and Moral Status

In seeking to account for our moral obligations towards non-human aspects of nature,

environmental ethicists have had to use terminology that expresses the idea that not only human

beings can be the proper objects of moral obligations. As is often the case, they have chosen to

rely on a variety of terms and phrases to denote similar conceptions, so that no standard language

can be discerned. Some speak of entities towards which we can have moral obligations as

‘morally considerable’, some speak of them as having ‘moral status’ or ‘moral standing’.

Confusingly, some regard moral considerabilty, status or standing as a concept that admits of

degrees, and some regard it as something for which an entity either qualifies or not. It suits my

purposes in this thesis to distinguish between a basic sense of moral considerability, which does

not admit of degrees, and a more complex and nuanced sense of moral status or standing which

entities can be said to possess in varying degrees. In order to make this distinction clear, then, I

employ the convention of using the phrase ‘moral considerability’ only to denote the basic quality

that an entity is something that ought to be taken into account morally, for its own sake.

Something either is morally considerable, or it is not; it cannot be more or less morally

considerable. ‘Moral status’ or ‘moral standing’, on my usage, is a notion that allows of degrees,

17

so that one morally considerable entity might be said to have more or less moral status/standing

than another4.

Although this is the convention I shall hold to when expressing my own thoughts, it ought to be

clear that other authors define these terms differently, and when referring to their work it might be

necessary for me to explain how they use this terminology.

1.4.6 Intrinsic Value and Related Terms

Environmental ethicists often appeal to the concept of ‘intrinsic value’, ‘final value’ or similar

phrases to explain human moral obligation towards natural objects. However, the concept itself has

been the subject of intense philosophical scrutiny in recent decades. In the hands of different

philosophers it often means different things. More fundamentally, some ask whether the concept is

able to do the work of explaining why we have moral obligations towards things at all5.

Christine Korsgaard has famously claimed that many theorists have erred in conflating two very

different distinctions. Simply put, they have used ‘intrinsic value’ to mean the opposite of

‘extrinsic value’ as well as the opposite of ‘instrumental value’. She believes that these represent

two different distinctions, and that it is helpful to keep their meanings separate. If ‘intrinsic value’

implies that the value something has is derived from a source internal to itself, then it makes sense

to contrast this term with ‘extrinsic value’. By contrast, ‘instrumental value’ is value derived by

4 Chapter 4 deals with ‘moral considerability’ in African thought, and I explain my use of the phrase in more detail

there. In Chapter 6, I explain my use of the notion of ‘moral status/standing’ more fully.

5 See Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005).

18

virtue of being valuable to something else, or being valuable as a means. This should be juxtaposed

with a phrase meaning that something has value as an end in itself. ‘Final value’ seems a more

appropriate choice in this case (Korsgaard, 1983). Since I think it is helpful to keep these

distinctions separate, I shall use ‘intrinsic value’ when I mean the opposite of ‘extrinsic value’,

highlighting whether the source of value is internal or external to the object valued, and I shall use

‘final value’ to denote that the object is to be valued as an end in itself, to be distinguished from its

opposite, ‘instrumental value’. Obviously, other authors may use these terms differently, and

where this is pertinent to my study, I shall give an account of their use of this terminology.

1.4.7 Anthropocentrism

For environmental ethics ‘anthropocentrism’ is a view of nature that is either exclusively human-

centred, taking the only value in nature to be its usefulness to humans, who alone have final value,

or perhaps, more weakly, a view in which human interests are regarded as so much more important

than those of any other aspects of nature that human interests will almost always be more weighty,

should any conflict of interests arise (Brennan & Lo, 2008: Section 1). ‘Non-anthropocentrism’,

then, is the view that values nature and aspects of nature directly. Animals, plants, ecosystems,

species, the whole earth – all of these may be seen as morally considerable, or having a value

independent of their usefulness to humans.

1.4.8 Individualism and Holism

‘Individualism’ is the view that what fundamentally warrants moral treatment are only individual

animals or organisms. ‘Holism’, by contrast, regards groups or wholes, such as species,

ecosystems, and the biosphere as objects of direct moral consideration. The basic difference here

19

lies is in what sorts of entities are taken as morally considerable. In individualist positions, what

is valued is singular animals or organisms, usually by virtue of some property inherently

possessed, for instance: sentience, reason, or possessing a life. Holists, in contrast, value groups

or wholes, such as species, ecosystems, biomes and the entire biosphere, often prioritising these

wholes over individual entities. Individualists will defend species and ecosystems too, but mainly

because of their instrumental value to the individuals that constitute these wholes (Brennan & Lo,

2008: Section 2).

1.4.9 Biocentrism and Eco-centrism

Once again, different authors use these terms differently. Mostly, biocentrism is associated with

individualist theories, where all biological lives are regarded as morally considerable, and eco-

centrism is associated with holist theories, in which wholes such as species, habitats, ecosystems

and the whole biosphere are regarded as morally considerable. However, Deep Ecology, which

adopts a clearly holist position defends as one of its two basic principles a notion of ‘biocentric

equality’ in which all life is seen as having equal moral life. Included in this notion of life are

rivers, ecosystems and even landscapes (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 2003: 259). This is just one

example of how these terms are not used consistently in the literature.

For the sake of clarity, in my own writing, I will follow the convention of using ‘biocentric’ to

refer to individualist theories where all and only biological life is seen as morally considerable. I

will use ‘eco-centric’ to denote holist theories in which the biosphere, species, and possibly even

inanimate natural entities such as rivers and mountains might be included within the ambit of

moral considerabilty.

20

1.5 Overview of Chapters

After this introduction, in Chapter 2 ‘Overview and Taxonomy of Western Environmental

Ethics’, I provide a brief introduction to the field of environmental ethics in the English language

in the Western tradition. This is to provide a background against which to discuss what

contribution African philosophy, thought and practice can make to the field. First, I give a very

brief historical overview of the development of the sub-discipline. Thereafter, I provide a more

detailed account of the two most important value theoretical debates that have dominated the field

and are essential as a backdrop against which to develop my thesis, namely, the anthropocentrism

v. non-anthropocentrism and the individualism v. holism debates.

In Chapter 3 ‘African Thought and Harmonious Relationships with Nature’, I challenge a

widely-held conception that African thought is inherently anthropocentric. I point out that a

strong theme exists in which the interconnectedness or interdependence of everything in nature is

asserted. I argue that this is often taken to ground a requirement that all of nature should be

treated with respect, and that harmonious relationships between ourselves and nature ought to be

promoted. I provide an initial characterisation of such harmonious relationships, suggesting that

they entail a shared sense of identity, solidarity and caring. I argue that such a harmony-prizing

ethic is able to embrace the salient features of both individualist and holist environmental ethics,

because of its foundation in African communitarian ideas and its essentially relational nature. I

name my developing African-inspired environmental ethic ‘African Relational

Environmentalism’. Finally, I propose an initial formulation of a theory of right action for this

approach: right acts are those that demonstrate respect for nature and natural entities

(individuals and groups) by promoting harmonious relationships between persons and persons,

and between persons and nature.

21

Having argued that African Relational Environmentalism seeks to promote harmonious

relationships between persons and nature, in Chapter 4 ‘African Thought and Moral

Considerability’, I address the question of what entities should be included in such harmonious

relationships. Based on my definition of moral considerability as a notion that does not admit of

degrees, and establishes only that entities should be taken into account morally, for their own

sake, I consider a number of African conceptions that suggest that various entities might be

morally considerable. Based on these I argue that on African Relational Environmentalism all

things that are part of the interconnected web of life are morally considerable. This includes all

individual living things, groups such as families, communities, species, and ecosystems, as well

as inanimate natural entities such as rivers, mountains and forests. This allows me to revise my

initial formulation of a theory of right action to: right actions are those that demonstrate respect

for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships between persons and

persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web.

In Chapter 5 ‘The Moral Considerability of Future Generations in African Thought, I make

the claim that on many accounts African thought assumes that we have a moral obligation to

future generations, of both persons and other parts of the web of life, to ensure that we pass on to

them a healthy environment capable of sustaining their lives and well-being. I argue that based

on the notion that the environment is something the present shares with past and future

generations, it is reasonable to think that we have an obligation to preserve nature for future

generations. I also appeal to a second African notion that we have an indirect duty to posterity

grounded in a virtue of gratitude developed in response to the fact that our predecessors sought to

preserve the natural environment for our good, and we should do the same for our descendants.

22

On African Relational Environmentalism future generations are morally considerable, because the

moral circle (the web of life) transcends generations. I argue that it is reasonable to see the moral

circle in this way, and defend the claim that future generations are morally considerable, too.

Having claimed that all parts of the web of life, including future generations, are morally

considerable, in Chapter 6 ‘Weighing Competing Moral Obligations’, I turn my attention to

searching for some principles that are able to assist in weighing up competing obligations

between morally considerable entities. I argue that although all morally considerable things need

to be taken into account, this should not be taken to mean that they have equal moral status. I

then consider African conceptions grounded in the notion of life force or vitality that suggest a

sense of final value, instrumental value, well-being and partiality in African thought. I show how

these ideas provide us with a set of other important considerations to take into account when

making moral choices.

In Chapter 7: ‘African Relational Environmentalism: Towards a Theory’, I attempt to bring

all of the strands of my view together. Here I seek to clarify more clearly what an environmental

ethic that emphasizes promoting harmonious relationships consists in. Firstly, I explain why

harmonious relationships should be promoted in the first place. In doing so I make the claim that

this ethic is essentially a virtue or perfectionist ethic, but, as a result of its focus on harmony and

relationality, it is able to entail both the moral requirement to treat other morally considerable

entities with respect as well as to acknowledge the importance of their well-being or flourishing.

This enables me to refine African Relational Environmentalism’s theory of right action one final

time to a person should become virtuous, and do so by acting in ways that demonstrate respect

for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships between persons and

23

persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web. I then build on my initial

characterisation of harmonious relationships outlined in chapter 3, establishing that they are

essentially relationships of caring, solidarity and identification, as well as ones that avoid

disrupting the balance of nature. Finally, in summary form, I describe the salient features of

African Relational Environmentalism.

Chapter 8 ‘Applications’ is devoted to demonstrating how African Relational Environmentalism

might be applied to practical environmental issues. I consider how it would be applied to elephant

over-population in South Africa, as well as to the problem of global climate change. I also show

that it fares no worse than other dominant environmental ethical approaches in terms of

accounting for our environmental moral obligations, and, in some ways, may even fare better.

24

2 OVERVIEW AND TAXONOMY OF WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

2.1 Introduction

In order to be able to able to reflect on the contribution that African thought can make to

environmental ethics, I first need to give a brief account of some of the salient features of the body

of scholarly work commonly referred to as ‘environmental philosophy’ or ‘environmental ethics’. I

focus only on the literature available in English, and primarily on that subset of the literature that

many would denote as being ‘Western’. Since one important goal of this thesis is to dispute the

notion that African thought has nothing of value to contribute to global environmental philosophy, I

deliberately do not try to draw parallels between African ideas and other non-Western traditions.

That similarities exist, I do not doubt. But it is not my intention to claim that African notions with

respect to the environment are unique. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, Western

environmental philosophers have already given not insubstantial attention to Native American,

Asian, Australian Aboriginal and other non-Western traditions. By contrast, African traditions are

under-represented in this discussion. My goal is to go some way towards redressing this lack of

attention to African ideas in the field of environmental ethics. In the brief overview that follows,

then, I attempt to give an account of some of the more important moral questions addressed by

Western environmental ethicists, in order to be able to demonstrate how salient African conceptions

are able to enrich and enhance our philosophical enquiry with respect to the environment.

In the following section I provide a very brief historical sketch of the development of the sub-

discipline of environmental ethics in the Western tradition, in order to provide some historical

context. In the rest of the chapter, I focus on two key areas of philosophical discourse that have

25

characterised the discipline and that are of special importance to my discussion of African

environmental ethical concepts.

2.2 Western Environmental Ethics: A Brief Historical Overview

Environmental ethics is a sub-discipline of philosophy concerned with the moral relationship

between human beings and their natural environment. It attempts to provide a systematic account

of human moral obligation towards non-human aspects of nature, of interpersonal moral obligation

with respect to nature, as well as of the values that underlie such obligations. Philosophical enquiry

into human moral responsibility towards nature clearly has a long history. Stretching back as far as

Descartes, Aquinas and even Plato, philosophers in literate cultures have considered questions

related to nature, and proposed theories which have had an impact on how people have viewed the

natural world. Thomas Robert Malthus, Ralph Waldo Emerson (Attfield, 2003: 37), Jeremy

Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Albert Schweitzer are just some theorists whose work has

contributed to the ethical consideration of non-human nature.

It was not until the early 1970s that environmental ethics came to be regarded as a distinct branch of

philosophy, however. The first conference that focussed specifically on environmental philosophy

took place in 1971 at the University of Georgia, and the first journal dedicated to this area of

enquiry, Environmental Ethics, began publication only in 1979 (Palmer, 2003: 15-16). These two

milestones attest both to the relative youth of the sub-discipline, as well as to the sudden and rapid

growth of interest in environmental issues at the time. By the mid-1980s environmental ethics had

made sufficient ground as a distinct area of philosophical enquiry to be regarded as a sub-discipline

in its own right.

26

Robin Attfield points out that the historical context of the 1960s contributed significantly to a

growing awareness of ecological problems. He mentions the nuclear arms race, weapons testing

and the defoliation practices of the Vietnam war as some of the factors that gave rise to a growing

consciousness that human behaviour could do significant damage to the natural environment

(Attfield, 2003: 37). In 1962 Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, in which she warned of the

potentially grave consequences of the continued use of pesticides in commercial farming. She

showed how these pesticides were able to spread throughout the food chain, causing damage to non-

human organisms and potentially to human health, too (Carson, 1962). Carson’s work fed into a

growing concern that the world might be facing what could be called an ‘ecological crisis’, and

gave impetus to the development of the environmentalist movement. The publication of the

ecologist Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb in 1968 raised the spectre of significant damage to

many of nature’s life-support systems as a result of exponential human population growth (Ehrlich,

1968). Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, concern about a serious and potentially catastrophic

environmental crisis had grown significantly.

It was against this backdrop that philosophers began to reconsider whether and how traditional

ethical theories might be able to account for human moral obligation towards nature and, in

particular, our obligations towards a planet potentially deeply threatened by human activity. One

very significant claim that was expressed more and more frequently was that the root causes of the

perceived ecological crisis were philosophical in nature. A growing number of voices began to

suggest that the way humans viewed or valued nature needed to change drastically, for there to be

any hope of avoiding ecological catastrophe. The historian Lynn White Jnr. published an essay in

which he claimed that the historical roots of the environmental crisis lay in a dominant strand in

Judaeo-Christian thought in which nature was regarded as existing for the use and benefit of

humans. Since, on this view, human beings alone have moral status, nature may be used and its

27

resources consumed at will. White maintained that such a view of nature easily leads to

overexploitation and irresponsible consumption, resulting ultimately in the degradation of nature.

He also suggested that an alternative, although less mainstream strand of Judaeo-Christian thought,

held potential as the basis for a more promising environmentally sound approach to nature (White,

1967). White’s paper has been the subject of much debate ever since its publication, and many

have disagreed with his central thesis. However, it provided the impetus for further philosophical

reflection on how deeply entrenched values about nature needed to be re-considered in the light of

the ecological crisis.

In 1973 Richard Routley presented a paper entitled ‘Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental

Ethic?’ In it he claimed that most extant Western ethical theories were not able to provide an

adequate account of human moral responsibility towards nature in cases where human interests

were either fairly insignificant or not relevant. He argued that it would seem intuitively wrong if a

hypothetical last human being were to destroy all other parts of nature (both living and non-living)

before his/her own demise, even though this could clearly not cause any harm to humanity.

Anthropocentric values cannot easily account for this intuition, leading Routley to claim that natural

objects must have final value. He suggested that a whole new ethic was required, an environmental

ethic, not based on anthropocentric assumptions, that could provide grounds for valuing nature

morally, for its own sake, and not just for the sake of humans (Routley, 1973).

Routley’s paper made reference to the earlier work of Aldo Leopold, a forester and conservationist

who, in 1949, had published a pioneering work, A Sand Country Almanac, which has become the

inspiration for many of the subsequent developments in environmental philosophy. Leopold

contended that there was a need to develop a ‘Land Ethic’ in which the land, or biosphere, needed

to be valued for its own sake. ‘That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that

28

land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics’ (Leopold, 1949: vii-ix). Leopold’s work

led to many theorists beginning to claim that we have moral obligations towards ‘wholes’ such as

ecosystems and species. Something of a re-discovery of his work some decades after it was first

published spurred on new thinking in environmental ethics. In a paper published in 1975 Holmes

Rolston III took up some of Leopold’s thinking, arguing strongly for the need for species and

ecosystems to be valued (Rolston, 1975). However, it was Callicott who was possibly to become

the most ardent proponent of a ‘land ethic’ à la Leopold, rejecting anthopocentrism, and strongly

defending both holism and ethical monism (Callicott, 1989). Christopher Stone, a law professor,

furthered the debate about the value of natural objects by arguing that trees and other objects in

nature should be accorded a legal standing similar to that of corporations (Stone, 2003).

There were, of course, those who opposed the trend towards arguing that ethical thought needed to

be radically reviewed and re-expressed to account for human responsibility towards nature. John

Passmore agreed with White that hitherto the Judaeo-Christian tradition may have been dominated

by the view that humans had dominion over nature and were free to treat it as they chose. However,

he argued against attempts to develop a new ethic, believing that existing traditions of thought could

provide sufficient resources for an ethics promoting the protection of the environment, and that

drawing on traditional themes might be more effective in encouraging change in human behaviour

(Passmore, 1980). Joel Feinberg countered Stone and others who argued in favour of according

legal or moral standing to natural objects such as trees, rocks, rivers, etc. claiming that something

can be said to have legal or moral standing only if it can reasonably be said to have interests.

Feinberg held that in a law court or in a debate, only interests can be represented. So, only those

things with interests can have moral standing. He did acknowledge that some animals might have

interests in this way, but denied that this could be true for most other living and inanimate natural

objects (Feinberg, 1974).

29

The question of moral responsibility towards individual animals lay at the heart of a related

developing area of ethical debate that also began gaining significant momentum in the 1970s. It is

often referred to as the ‘animal rights’ debate. Philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan

argued for a moral status for some animals similar to that of humans. Singer’s preference utilitarian

position grounded this moral status in the well-being of individual sentient beings (Singer, 1975),

whereas Regan adopted a deontological, rights-based position that it is morally impermissible to

harm other creatures, which, like humans, are a ‘subject of a life’ and that have a right to maintain

the qualities that make up that life, including its continuance (Regan, 1983). Kenneth Goodpaster’s

paper on moral considerability also sought to provide philosophical grounds for extending direct

moral obligation beyond the human species (Goodpaster, 2003). In contrast, others such as R.G.

Frey (1980) and Michael Leahy (1994) challenged the extension of direct moral obligations such as

rights to include other animals.

One distinguishing characteristic of those who sought to extend moral status to other animals was

their emphasis on the interests, preferences or rights of individual animals. This placed them in a

rival camp to the holists who followed in Leopold’s footsteps. Indeed, the friends of animal

liberation can be said to have all but parted company with those who adopted a more holist

approach (Light, 2002: 430-431) creating a somewhat troubling gulf between animal liberationists

and environmental ethicists.

Deep Ecology is another movement that has its roots in the mid-1970s, but is regarded as having

taken a somewhat divergent path from that of mainstream environmental ethics. In 1973 Arne

Naess wrote a paper in which he distinguished between what he called the ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’

ecology movements. Deep Ecologists rejected what they dubbed ‘shallow’ ecology as concerned

for the environment only to the extent to which it supports the privileged lifestyle of people in

30

prosperous Western nations. They proposed an egalitarian view of all living things, respecting what

they regarded as the intrinsic value of all life (Naess, 1973). They also strayed into contested

metaphysical territory, claiming that humans needed to identify with the rest of nature in a way

which enabled them to see themselves (that is, that which they regard as the ‘self’) as somehow

extending beyond their own body and traditionally conceived self-awareness, and as encompassing

the natural environment, as well. The leaders of the movement eventually settled on adopting eight

fundamental theses, intended to describe common grounds upon which concerned environmentalists

from a variety of philosophical and religious backgrounds could agree. A cursory look at just some

of these eight fundamental points is enough to show how radically different Deep Ecology was

from mainstream environmental ethics: ‘The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible

with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller

population’ (Naess, 2003: 264) and ‘[t]he ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating

life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher

standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and

greatness’ (Naess, 2003: 264). That the position of Deep Ecology suggested more radical and far-

reaching social and political changes than that of mainstream environmental ethics is obvious.

The more radical, political and socially aware environmentalism of the deep ecologists was in some

ways mirrored by so-called ‘eco-feminism’. Feminist philosophers argued that the domination of

nature is linked to the domination of women in society, that these two kinds of oppression can be

seen as ‘twinned’, and that they are equally morally unacceptable. Furthermore, eco-feminists

suggested that environmental philosophical discourse had been dominated by men, which meant

that it was very often pre-occupied with the quest for an abstract, theoretical, universalist approach

to the subject. Some feminists argued for the need to escape this focus on rationality only, and

31

describe ethical responsibility towards nature in terms of caring between people and their

environment (Palmer, 2003: 31).

Some more recent developments in the field have included the debate between ethical monists and

pluralists, and debates about the moral desirability of preserving wilderness, and of restoring areas

of land to their natural state. So-called weak anthropocentrists have questioned the seemingly

absolute rejection of anthropocentric reasons for environmental concern in the earlier phase of the

history of the discipline, and a school of thinkers dubbed ‘environmental pragmatists’ have argued

for developing an environmental ethics more suited to engaging with and influencing policy making

and environmental activism (Palmer, 2003: 32-33).

Whilst environmental ethics has addressed significant metaethical and value theoretical questions, it

has also given attention to a wide range of practical or applied ethical issues with respect to the

environment. These include factory farming, meat consumption, vivisection and the culling of

invasive and alien species. Sustainability, climate change, the human ‘population explosion’,

preserving biodiversity, wilderness preservation and genetically modified crops have all fallen

under the spotlight of environmental ethicists, as have ethical appraisals of various kinds of

environmental activism and issues of public policy and environmental law1.

What is obvious is that by the mid 1980s environmental ethics had become a fertile ground of

robust academic debate regarding human responsibility for nature. Some of the first full length

1 My focus in this thesis is on values and principles, but I do apply some of the theory I propose to some practical cases

in the concluding chapter.

32

books on the subject had begun to be published, and universities started offering courses in the

subject: a new sub-discipline had been born. Since then it has grown significantly as a specialised

field of enquiry.

2.3 Two Central Debates

I turn now to a discussion of two central debates that have dominated the field of environmental

ethics, and that will be of particular relevance to my thesis. These two debates lie at the core of the

value theoretical enquiry that environmental philosophers have undertaken in their quest for a truly

environmental ethic. Given the essential importance of these debates in the field, it is worthwhile to

consider them in some detail.

2.3.1 Anthropocentrism v. Non-anthropocentrism in Western Environmental Ethics

In an historical context of ever-increasing awareness of an impending ecological crisis, some

philosophers reflecting on human moral responsibility towards nature became convinced that

traditional (Western) moral theories were inadequate to the task of providing a robust, systematic

account of such responsibility. Almost all existing ethical perspectives assumed that ethics had to

do with moral relationships between human beings. Apart from a few notable exceptions, prior to

the 1960s few moral philosophers had seriously addressed the idea that humans have direct moral

duties with respect to other non-human objects in nature. Where philosophers had argued that

people ought to act in certain morally correct ways towards other creatures, this was typically

justified on the grounds of the possible indirect harm that could be caused to humans by not doing

so.

33

For the most part, then, it is fair to claim that Western moral theories had been predominantly

anthropocentric. They conceived of the sphere of morality as essentially only embracing persons.

Deontologists often argued that all human beings possessed final value, as ends in themselves,

warranting respect or the recognition and safe-guarding of specific human rights.

Consequentialists sought to maximise utility, but not all thought to include non-humans in their

calculation of total utility. Perspectives such as that of White (1967) (who claimed that the roots of

the ecological crisis could be traced to a dominant position in the Judaeo-Christian tradition which

taught that the natural world existed only for the use of humankind, and could be used and exploited

at will), encouraged many philosophers to come to the conclusion that any ethic of environmental

responsibility would have to challenge such anthropocentric assumptions. Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’

(1949) had also suggested that the fundamental causes of the environmental crisis were

philosophical in nature, and that what needed to change was how human beings valued the natural

world. He envisaged an ethical system in which the locus of moral concern would be extended to

include the whole biosphere and non-human objects in nature. Inspired by Leopold, Routley

famously gave his paper claiming that dominant Western moral perspectives represented a kind of

species chauvinism, and a new sort of ethic was needed, one which could be called an

‘environmental ethic’, one which would respect a final value in natural objects, a value not based on

the object’s usefulness to humans (Routley, 1973).

These were the early beginnings of a powerful trend in the newly emerging discipline to argue that

for an ethic to be truly capable of being an environmental ethic, it would need to reject

anthropocentrism, deny human superiority and recognise a final value in nature, aside from its

instrumental value to humans. So, what would a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic look

like? This was a central question that dominated the discipline for much of its early history.

34

In the first instance, non-anthropocentrism would have to attribute moral considerability to more

than just human beings. Attfield explains that ‘…moral standing belongs to things that ought to be

taken into consideration when action is in prospect, and that thus warrant respect’ (Attfield, 2003:

11). A rejection of anthopocentrism is a rejection of the idea that only human beings, human

interests or human well-being are morally considerable. Different theories extend the scope of what

counts morally to include, variously, sentient beings, all living things, ecosystems, and the entire

biosphere.

Typically consequentialists ascribe final value not to beings or entities themselves, but to their

wellbeing, happiness, preferences, etc. Consequentialist non-anthropocentric approaches include

that of Singer, an advocate of preference utilitarianism, who rejects what he sees as the ‘speciesism’

inherent in anthropocentrism, extends final value to the well-being of all individual sentient beings,

and grants a special moral status to self-conscious beings, whose preference to continue living their

lives needs to be considered. For Singer all creatures who are able to feel pain or pleasure have an

interest in maximising their pleasure and minimising their pain. It is this capacity that makes them

morally considerable. Final value, however, adheres in well-being, not in the organisms themselves

(Singer, 1975). Along with Singer, Donald VanDeVeer sees final value in maximising pleasure

over pain, extending moral considerability to all sentient beings. Additionally, he addresses the

issue of how to manage conflicts of interests, and to do this proposes the application of two sets of

prioritised principles relating to complexity of the organisms and the importance of their interests

(VanDeVeer, 2003). Gary Varner, from a similar position on what constitutes final value, also

attempts to devise a process by which conflicts of interests can be resolved. In his case he uses the

distinctions of organisms capable of desire and organisms capable of having ‘ground projects’, to

establish a hierarchy in which the latter are prioritised over the former, and both are prioritised over

organisms the only interests of which are biological (Palmer, 2003: 20). These consequentialist

35

views are sometimes termed ‘sentientist’ – moral considerability is ascribed to all sentient beings.

Sentientism, as I am using the term in this context, does not view sentience as the only morally

significant condition to be taken into account, but it is a fundamental consideration, and all sentient

creatures are regarded as morally considerable, even if other attributes may also need to be

considered (Palmer, 2003: 19-20).

Regan, a deontologist, extends moral considerability to include adult mammals, arguing that they

have rights, and that humans have corresponding obligations towards them. He asserts that

individual mammals2, as well as humans, have final value since

…we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an

individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We

want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these

dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering,

our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence and our untimely death – all

make a difference to our quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as

individuals. (Regan, 2003: 148).

For Regan sentience is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being morally considerable, as

he lists other factors he also regards as necessary to being a ‘subject of a life’. As a deontologist, he

does not accord final value to the welfare of individual animals, but to the animals themselves.

Animals have value because their welfare, the experienced quality of their lives, and their interest in

the continuation of their lives are important to them. Thus, while his grounds for doing so are

2 It is often assumed that Regan’s notion of being an ‘experiencing subject of a life’ only applies to mammals, but a

case can be made that it applies to birds and some fish species, too. Whilst that is a matter of debate, there is little doubt

that it would apply to most adult mammals.

36

different from those of consequentialist sentientists, he also extends moral considerability beyond

humans to include certain classes of animals.

There are non-anthropocentric consequentialist views that, unlike those discussed above, extend

moral considerability beyond only sentient beings. For example, for Attfield, all organisms that are

able to flourish, to fulfil their capabilities as members of their particular species, count morally,

because of their capacity to flourish. Even plants can be said to be ‘better or worse off’, to ‘flourish’

or to ‘founder’. Thus, the ability to experience pain and pleasure is no longer the single

distinguishing factor with respect to moral considerability. Just as clearly, this broadens the scope

of moral considerability beyond sentient animals and includes all living things, including plants.

Only inorganic objects are not capable of flourishing, after all (Attfield, 2003). However, as Claire

Palmer reminds us, for Attfield, as a consequentialist, ‘…it is the state of affairs of flourishing

which is valuable, rather than the organism itself…’ (Palmer, 2003: 20). Attfield’s inclusion of

non-sentient living organisms into the field of moral considerability identifies his position as

‘biocentrist’. Like sentienism, biocentrism also rejects anthropocentrism, but extends the scope of

moral standing to include not just sentient beings, but all living organisms.

Biocentric challenges to anthropocentrism have also been posed by deontologists. Paul Taylor

argues that every living organism is a ‘teleological centre of a life’, and, as such, possesses

‘inherent worth’. He thus extends moral considerability to include all living things, even the non-

sentient, such as plants, but sees final value in the organisms themselves. It is they that have worth

or final value, not their happiness or well-being. Taylor’s account is generally seen as quite

sophisticated; he goes beyond merely justifying his position that all living things have final value,

by providing additional principles by which to rank the interests of living things, and resolve

conflicts between them (Taylor, 1986).

37

Anthropocentrism has also been challenged by eco-centrism. Eco-centrists place very significant

moral priority on maintaining a healthy balance in nature to ensure the survival of ecosystems and

species. Eco-centrists are holist in their perspective, focussing less on individual organisms and

entities and more on systems and groups: ecosystems, species and the whole of the biosphere. Eco-

centrist approaches are most often consequentialist. Whilst moral considerability is broadened to

include the ‘interests’ of groups, such as species, final value is usually ascribed to the well-being of

such aggregated entities, not to the entities themselves. Leopold’s Land Ethic locates the good in

the preservation of the ‘integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community’ (Leopold, 1949:

204). Callicott refines Leopold’s ideas, proposing that human beings are part of a biospheric

community, and that our primary moral responsibility is to ensure the well-being of the community.

In earlier work Callicott embraces the implication that the welfare of individuals may sometimes

need to be sacrificed for the good of the whole – a threatened species may be saved by culling

individuals of another more successful species. Since, on the face of things, this could imply that

humans should be sacrificed for the good of the rest of nature, Callicott’s position has been attacked

as misanthropic. In more recent work he has attempted to overcome this objection by claiming that

final value should be attributed to both groups and individuals (Brennan and Lo, 2008: Section 4).

A similar position is taken by Rolston, whose position seems to straddle biocentrism and eco-

centrism. He see final value in all living things, which have a good of their own, but he also argues

for according additional value to organisms that are sentient and self-conscious. He further

suggests that species and ecosystems have final value, as these provide the processes and systems

that allow for organisms to develop (Rolston, 1988). Other more politically-oriented eco-centrist

positions have been advanced by so-called Deep Ecologists such as Arne Naess (2003) and

Warwick Fox (1985).

38

In more recent times, a number of scholars referred to as ‘environmental pragmatists’ have made it

a major concern of their work to search for theories that are most likely to find easy acceptance

amongst policy makers, activists and the general public. They maintain that when environmental

ethics becomes too bogged down in debates over anthropocentrism and loci of final value, it fails to

achieve one of its main aims, which is to influence thought and policy about the environment

towards the successful protection of the environment. These pragmatists often embrace a kind of

pluralism, prioritising making a practical contribution to resolving environmental problems over

theoretical debates about final value. Andrew Light (2002) is a well-known proponent of these

views.

Anthropocentrism has been challenged by deontologists and consequentialists, by sentientists,

biocentrists and eco-centrists. But, despite the fact that non-anthropocentric theories have

dominated the field, there have been some who have questioned the need to completely disregard

anthropocentric values. Public debate and policy aimed at environmental protection is generally

driven by anthropocentric values – the environment needs to be protected for the sake of human

beings, presently living and future generations. Some philosophers have also adopted

anthropocentric positions. As pointed out above, Passmore questions the necessity for a new,

environmental ethic, suggesting that existing ethical theories are capable of being extended,

developed and refined in such a way as to cover ecological issues. He does not believe that it is

possible to provide a solid theoretical basis for arguing that non-humans can have final value, and

proposes that positions such as the ’stewardship’ tradition which seek to preserve nature, even if

ultimately for the good of humankind, are quite capable of underpinning an environmentally

responsible ethic (Passmore, 1980). Others have joined Passmore in questioning the extension of

moral considerability to non-humans. Arguing that animals lack the capacity for language, moral

agency and self-consciousness, Leahy claims they cannot be the subjects of direct moral

39

responsibility (Leahy: 1994). Frey tackles the question of animal rights and interests with the

intention of refuting moral arguments for vegetarianism. He argues strongly that animals cannot be

said to have either interests or moral rights (Frey, 1980: 166-167).

Some theorists propose versions of what they call ‘weak anthropocentrism’. Weak

anthropocentrism does not completely deny moral considerability to non-human entities, but it does

claim that human beings usually have greater moral status. Brian Norton believes that an

environmentally sound ethic can be grounded in weak anthropocentrism, as long as there is a focus

on ensuring that resources are conserved and protected over indefinite time (Norton, 1991). The

needs of future generations of humans are thus also taken into account. Eugene Hargrove similarly

defends a weak anthropocentrism (Hargrove, 2003).

The debate between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in environmental ethics rages on.

The idea that anthropocentric value systems need to be completely replaced in order for moral

theories to be able to address ecological issues continues to be very influential. However, more

nuanced views including weak anthropocentrism, pragmatism and moral pluralism have begun to

challenge the dominance of the non-anthropocentrists in environmental ethics.

I agree with the view that a strong form of anthropocentrism, in which only humans are morally

considerable, is a poor basis upon which to build an environmental ethic. If we do not learn to see

value in nature, and regard it merely as a resource for our use, humankind is unlikely to treat it with

sufficient respect to ensure its protection. However, this does not imply that we should not

recognise that there are, rather weak anthropocentric reasons for caring for nature, such as ensuring

that future generations of humans are able to live sustainable lives. Acknowledging these is

pragmatically prudent, and in no way makes those who hold such views irredeemably

40

anthropocentric. The African notions I explore in later parts of this thesis tend to support such an

approach.

2.3.2 Individualism v. Holism in Western Environmental Ethics

It has already become clear in the discussion above that a fairly significant divide in environmental

ethics has arisen around whether final value is located in individual animals or organisms, or

whether it is located in groups, such as species, ecosystems or even the whole biosphere. Whilst

anthropocentric individualism exists, I set it aside in this discussion, and focus on the kinds of

individualism that extend moral considerability beyond just members of the human species – since

these would be of particular interest to environmental ethics. Amongst those who believe that

moral considerability needs to be extended to include non-human entities there are some who regard

it as sufficient to include only individual natural objects, and others who hold that an ethical system

that can truly address environmental problems must include groups or wholes such as species within

the ambit of the morally considerable.

Sentientists obviously find themselves in the individualist camp. If what qualifies one for moral

considerability is the ability to feel pain and pleasure, then it follows that only individual animate

beings can be morally considerable, since only they can experience pleasure or pain. On this view,

if harm is caused to a species or ecosystem, it is the individual creatures who make up that species

or ecosystem that are directly harmed. I have already pointed out that for the consequentialists who

regard sentience as a primary condition for moral considerability, it is the welfare of sentient beings

that has final value – the right is maximised utility. On Regan’s deontological approach, sentient

beings ought not to endure unnecessary suffering, and those who are what he calls the ‘experiencing

subject of a life’, have a right to life, too (Regan, 1983). It is unsurprising that those who hold

41

broadly individualist views (consequentialists and deontologists) have found themselves working

co-operatively, despite their differences. Regan and Singer have even published together (Regan &

Singer, 1989). . It is also unsurprising that individualists often advocate a vegetarian way of life and

are generally opposed to vivisection. Where the welfare or assumed rights of individual animals are

given such prominence, and where welfare is taken to include a creature’s interest in the

continuation of its own life, it follows that the deliberate taking of an animal’s life should usually be

prohibited. Together, these two individualist perspectives might be described as ‘animal

liberationist’ views.

Many environmental ethicists question how the extension of moral considerability by animal

liberationists to sentient life or the ‘experiencing subject(s) of a life’ is able to resolve specifically

environmental moral problems. How can biodiversity be protected on this basis? If individuals of a

highly endangered species are to be treated equally with individuals of a very prolific species, the

result would be that many endangered species could become extinct. The science of ecology has

made it clear that it may sometimes be necessary to curtail the numbers of certain species in order to

protect more vulnerable species. But, as Joseph Desjardins points out, on Singer’s view, ‘Given the

amount of suffering that can take place with intensive farming techniques, any one of literally

millions of chickens might have a stronger moral claim against us (to relieve its suffering), than

would the last remaining pair of elephants (assuming that they are left alone to die of old age)’

(Desjardins: 1993: 132). Regan’s approach implies even more concerning conclusions. If only the

interests of beings who are the ‘subjects of a life’ count, then the welfare of any individuals of the

most over-abundant mammalian species would trump the survival of, for instance, any highly

endangered bird species. Again Desjardins expresses this well: ‘The last remaining pair of bald

eagles or spotted owls have less moral claim on us than does a single whitetail deer’ (Desjardins:

1993: 132) despite the fact that ‘…the population of these deer often overwhelms the carrying

42

capacity of their habitat… [and] wreak[s] havoc on the many species of plants that make up that

habitat’ (Desjardins: 1993: 132). Given the fact that human settlements, agriculture, industry,

pollution, etc have resulted in many ecosystems being so out of balance that only deliberate,

planned intervention is able to protect some species, it seems unlikely that this can be achieved if

the lives and welfare of individual animals are all to be treated equally. Many environmental

ethicists believe that the animal liberationist individualistic approach is woefully unable to provide

a moral framework that can truly protect the natural environment.

Is the biocentrist approach able to fare any better regarding these problems? I have already shown

that biocentrists reject sentience as the fundamental basis for establishing moral considerability. If

only sentient creatures are morally considerable, then all other animate objects in nature are only

morally significant to the extent to which they are instrumentally important for the well-being of

sentient life. There would then be no reason for humans not to destroy at will any other natural

entities where such destruction would not affect the well-being of sentient creatures. Biocentrists

reject this, claiming that all living things ought to be seen as morally considerable. Schweitzer’s

‘reverence for life’ requires that all life be treated with respect (Schweitzer, 1923); Taylor’s ethic

requires ‘respect for nature’ and the recognition that living things have a good of their own that

deserves respect (Taylor, 1986), and Attfield’s biocentric consequentialism requires promoting the

thriving of living entities (Attfield, 2003). These views all expand the boundaries of moral

considerability to include non-sentient life. This does at least allow for the interests of plants and

insects, etc. to be taken into account. Although the locus of moral considerability remains

individualistic for biocentrists, their approach does at least give greater significance to the realities

of an ecologically interdependent natural world than animal welfarists typically have done. The

complex inter-relationships and dependencies of various life forms with others, and the need for

balance in ecosystems, etc. are factors which are understood to impact upon the good of all living

43

things. Respecting nature and promoting the flourishing of living things are both predicated on an

understanding of the complexities of the existence of biological entities. Biocentrism does not

overlook the fact that the welfare of species is interdependent and that ecosystems require balance.

It does try to account for the need to protect threatened species, since the welfare of the individuals

that make up that species cannot be protected if the species itself is unable to survive in an

ecosystem that is no longer able to support it.

But, biocentrism is still individualist. Final value is located in individual living things or their

welfare, not in ecosystems or species. Even where complex and sophisticated prioritised duties and

principles for resolving competing claims between the interests are suggested (as in Taylor’s

approach), it remains difficult to explain why harmful bacteria and certain viruses that have

‘inherent worth’ can be eradicated for the sake of the health of other organisms, or why much

greater priority can be given to the preservation of a very threatened species at the expense of

individuals of other species. Palmer suggests that in biocentrism ‘Diversity is of no value: a field of

wheat and a field of wildflowers are of equal worth, since what is important is the telos or will-to-

live of each plant, and not the biological context’ (Palmer, 2003: 23)3. She also quotes Callicott that

such ‘…individualist environmental ethics are ‘fundamentally life-denying’, failing to accept as

good the vital evolutionary process of predation and death, by suggesting that all dying is an evil’

(Palmer, 2003: 23).

Rejecting the individualism of both biocentrist and sentientist positions, holists claim that a sound

environmental ethics needs to recognise final value in wholes. Holists are also often referred to as

‘eco-centrists’ (a term I used to describe their position in the previous section), but some holists

3 It should be noted, however, that there have been biocentric arguments for biodiversity preservation.

44

might resist this title. Since the focus of this section is on individualist approaches and challenges

to those, I shall use the broader, more generic term ‘holism’ here.

Holist environmental ethicists often appeal to ecological science and evolutionary theory as a

fundamental basis of their position. Holists emphasise the scientific reality that all life on earth

exists in a complex interrelated web. The food chain is evidence enough of the fact that different

species rely on the existence of others for their survival. Many plants need insects or birds to

enable them to breed. Herbivores rely, in turn, on plants for nutrition. Predators feed on smaller

species, etc. The death and decomposition of living things recycles minerals and micro-organisms

into the system. Ecosystems rely on the interaction between climatic conditions, soil types,

vegetation, animals, insects, birds, geological formations, water systems, etc. to provide an

environment which is able to sustain life. Even viruses and bacteria are necessary to the survival of

living things. Imbalances in ecosystems, whether caused naturally or by human activity, can

severely disrupt delicate interdependencies and threaten not just individual organisms but entire

species. For holists, environmental ethics needs to take this systemic reality into account. Many

holists see the whole biosphere as a kind of mega-ecosystem, the health and integrity of which is a

requirement for the survival of all life.

From this starting point, holists argue that environmental ethics cannot hope to provide theoretical

grounds for the sustainability of the whole environment unless it recognises the moral

considerability of species, ecosystems and even the whole biosphere. Biodiversity is not to be

valued solely for aesthetic reasons. It needs protection in order to maintain the balance of the entire

life-supporting system. On the view of holists, anthropocentric values are insufficient to save the

planet from ecological disaster, and non-anthropocentric individualist approaches simply do not

take the ecological facts sufficiently into account.

45

From its early beginnings in Leopold’s Land Ethic (1949), holist environmental ethics has

challenged conventional moral systems by claiming that the land or biosphere and the community

of life itself needs to be valued, not just the individuals who constitute the community. Leopold

famously claims that ‘A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of

the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Leopold, 1949: 224). Callicott has

spent a career refining Leopold’s claim. For both, the biotic community itself is morally

considerable, and its integrity is a moral good. Both Leopold and Callicott see our understanding of

moral responsibility as an evolving process. As human knowledge has expanded and communities

have become less isolated, so the scope of human moral concern has widened from family to clan to

nation to eventually embracing the whole of humankind. They argue that a further expansion is

required, to include the entire biospheric community within the ambit of direct moral obligation.

This requires that species and ecosystems also be accorded final value (Callicott, 1989).

Rolston has argued that humans, sentient beings, living organisms, species, ecosystems and the

whole of nature all need to be valued morally (even if in different ways). He starts from a position

similar to that of biocentrists, claiming that a basic value resides in the good of all organisms. To

that he adds additional types of moral value based in sentience, consciousness etc. He also defends

the notion that since species provide the blueprint for other individuals of their type, and because

species strive to ensure the survival of their own kind, they too have value. Ecosystems, providing

the conditions and processes for life to be sustained have a systemic value that needs to be

recognised (Rolston, 1975).

46

Holist theories do provide solid grounds for seeing final value in species, and defending valuing

endangered species more than others in certain contexts. They also take the science of ecology into

account, and recognise the systemic interrelatedness of all natural things. They are thus able to

provide a convincing account of the need to value ecosystems, and the whole biospheric system.

One of the persistent challenges facing holists, however, is that its consequences seem to be

unavoidably misanthropic. If the needs of the biosphere are more important than those of people, it

is hard to see why we should not then cull people to save the earth. This has led critics, such as

Regan, to accuse holism of ‘environmental fascism’ (Palmer, 2003: 25).

It seems to me that both individualist and holist perspectives need to be taken into account in an

environmental ethic that is going to be able to account for our moral obligations towards other

persons and nature, in general. I shall make a case in the following chapter that an African-inspired

environmental ethic is able to do exactly that, and that this constitutes one of its greatest strengths.

47

3 AFRICAN THOUGHT AND HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIPS WITH

NATURE

3.1 Introduction

Environmental ethics as a sub-field of ethics has been characterised by a quest not merely to apply

ethical theory to environmental issues, but also to articulate a truly environmental ethic, a

comprehensive ethical theory able to account for our moral obligations not just to other persons, but

to nature more generally as well. It is my aim in this thesis to draw on themes and conceptions in

African thought and philosophy that are able to contribute to this on-going quest, providing

distinctive perspectives that can inform and enlighten the continuing project of constructing an

environmental ethic. My overarching objective with this project is to develop an environmental

ethic strongly informed by African thought. In commencing my own search for an African-inspired

environmental ethic, I set out in this chapter to argue that there are certain fundamental African

notions that strongly suggest that such an ethic is not only plausible, but that at the level of basic

ethical theory, this ethic holds a great deal of promise as an alternative to existing predominantly

Western approaches.

For this project to get off the ground, I must first address certain presumptions about African thought

that are prevalent in the literature: namely, that it is essentially anthropocentric, and, mainly as a

consequence thereof, has nothing of real value to contribute to environmental ethics. So, this chapter

begins with an appraisal of these presumptions, which I ultimately refute. I acknowledge the

existence of strong human-centred values in African ethical thinking, but argue that this apparent

anthropocentrism does not fully represent African worldviews. I identify a very strong emphasis on

the interrelatedness and interdependence of everything in nature, a pervasive and recurring theme

48

endorsed even by many of those African authors who also emphasize human-centred values. I

acknowledge that it is plausible that such talk of the interrelatedness of nature could amount to no

more than valuing nature instrumentally, in terms of its usefulness to humans, but claim that an

additional recurrent theme that nature should be treated respectfully suggests otherwise. I conclude

the first part of the chapter by considering some of the reasons why these non-anthropocentric

conceptions in African thought have been largely overlooked or ignored in the literature to date.

Having argued that African thought is not inherently anthropocentric, but that one major strand of it

can be said to entail respect for nature, based on the strong sense of interrelatedness in the natural

world, in the second part of the chapter I begin to unpack what such respect for nature might consist

in. I look for clues for how nature should be respected in the way that many African accounts ground

moral concern for humans, namely in valuing harmonious relationships. I show that at least some

African theorists are best interpreted as holding that an ethically sound approach to nature similarly

implies prizing harmonious relationships with other living beings. I point out that a related theme in

African thought, that human relationships are best understood as analogous with family relationships,

gives content to the basic claim that harmonious relationships with nature should be nurtured.

In the final section of the chapter I argue that an African environmental ethic, which is essentially

relational, grounded in interdependences and that prizes harmonious relationships with nature, is

most appealing because it is able to embrace the salient features of both holist and individualist

theories. I begin by highlighting a strong rejection of dualistic ‘either/or’ categories in African

thought, generally, claiming that, on this basis it is not unexpected to find that the Western

holist/individualist debate is simply not mirrored in African literature. Turning to holist conceptions,

I show that the ethic I describe shares similar characteristics with holism in conception, language and

analogy, but is nonetheless distinct. I claim that this distinctness lies in a refusal to firmly prioritise

49

either the interests of individuals or those of communities, and in the understanding that individuals

are fully realised only through community relationships. It is this strongly relational emphasis in

African thought on the environment that distinguishes it from other alternatives. At this point, I give

a name to this developing approach, calling it ‘African Relational Environmentalism’. I continue by

addressing some examples of what might appear on the surface as being clearly individualist

positions, in contradiction to my claims thus far. I show that whilst individualist notions are evident,

they are generally understood within a relational or communitarian context. I conclude the section

with the claim that it is precisely because African Relational Environmentalism is able to embrace

both individualist and holist notions that it can offer an attractive alternative to most Western

conceptions about the environment.

I conclude by bringing the content of this chapter together, and proposing a theory of right action

consistent with the conceptions so far identified as being key to my developing African Relational

Environmentalism.

3.2 Anthropocentrism in African Thought

3.2.1 A Presumption of Anthropocentrism

In his study of African thought as a potential source for an environmental ethic, Callicott identifies a

puzzling and somewhat disturbing paradox. He remarks that

…tropical Africa is the richest place on earth for what conservationists call

‘charismatic megafauna.’ Indeed the mere mention of Africa conjures images in

the mind’s eye of wildebeests, springboks, hippopotami, rhinoceroses, zebras,

giraffes, elephants, ostriches, flamingos, crocodiles, lions, leopards, cheetahs,

monkeys, baboons, gorillas, chimpanzees, and many other kinds of animals. On

50

the other hand, mention of African culture evokes no thoughts of indigenous

environmental ethics. Nor have contemporary scholars looked to African

intellectual thought, as they have to Zen Buddhism, Taoism, and American Indian

thought, when casting about for conceptual resources from which to construct an

exotic environmental philosophy (Callicott, 1994: 156).

It would indeed seem strange and even incredible that in a part of the world in which the amazing

diversity and richness of nature is so immediately obvious there would not be found some

philosophical tradition that entails respect for nature. Kelbessa echoes Callicott’s observation that

African thought has been ignored or neglected by scholars searching for traditions outside of Western

culture that might enrich environmental philosophy (Kelbessa, 2005: 19-20). Why this might be so is

a question to which I shall return, but, there can be little doubt that the weight of scholarly opinion

has, until fairly recently, regarded African thought as having little of value to contribute to

environmental ethics. I hasten to add that African theorists have historically not done much better

than Western scholars in terms of articulating African conceptions that would promote environmental

concerns. Nonetheless, this predominant view has persisted and has at its foundation a very strong

presumption that African thought is inherently and unambiguously anthropocentric. I have already

referred to Callicott’s conclusion that African thought is essentially anthropocentric: ‘African

thought orbits, seemingly, around human interests’ (Callicott, 1994: 157 - 158). It is not difficult to

understand that this presumption exists, because most work in African ethics has indeed been centred

around human interests. In what follows, I address the apparently anthropocentric nature of African

thought, explaining why it is easily assumed, but also ultimately rejecting it as not fully reflecting

African conceptions of nature.

51

The dictum ‘a person is a person through other persons’ is often used to encapsulate the essence of

African morality (Shutte, 1993: 23; Ramose, 1999: 52; Tutu, 1999: 35; Horsthemke, n.d.: 5-6), and at

face value it is easy to understand why this leads to the presumption that African thought is

fundamentally anthropocentric. The dictum implies that one can become a complete, authentic, or

virtuous person only through and in relationships with other persons. Michael Eze explains this as

follows:

…the understanding of a person [is] located in a community where being a person

is to be in a dialogical relationship in this community. Accordingly, a person’s

humanity is dependent on the appreciation, preservation and affirmation of other

persons’ humanity. To deny another’s humanity is to depreciate my own

humanity (Eze, 2008: 387).

This dictum refers only to persons, and how they attain full, authentic personhood through their

relationship with other persons. If this is construed to comprehensively define African ethics, then

African thought must be anthropocentric. Kai Horsthemke, an animal rights theorist influential in

South Africa, who is critical of African philosophy’s ability to embrace concern for non-human

nature, argues that suggestions that Ubuntu requires respect for the environment are fundamentally

flawed, since Ubuntu is anthropocentric by definition. Since he assumes that Ubuntu is fully

captured by the dictum ‘a person is a person through other persons’, his conclusion seems plausible.

And clearly, then, any attempt to expand Ubuntu to embrace respect for the environment would have

to ground concern for nature in terms of its usefulness to humans (Horsthemke, n.d.: 5-6).

More significantly, some prominent theorists from throughout Africa make claims that appear to be

explicitly anthropocentric. John Mbiti, writing about African religion, asserts:

Because man thinks of himself as being at the centre, he consequently sees the

universe from that perspective. It is as if the whole world exists for man’s sake.

52

Therefore African people look for the usefulness (or otherwise) of the universe to

man. This means both what the world can do for man, and how man can use the

world for his own good. (Mbiti, 1975: 38)

Similarly, Bénézet Bujo, explicitly claims that ‘…African ethics is primarily anthropocentric’ (Bujo,

1998: 25), and argues that human life is the fundamental concern of African ethics. Godfrey Onah

locates human life at the centre of morality in African traditional religions:

Traditional Africans believe in the existence of God, the divinities, other lesser

spirits and the ancestors. Below these beings are humans, animals, plants and

other inanimate objects. All these realities are believed to exist in a hierarchical

order established by God who is the Source of all. In this order, the human being

is at the centre. Two things can therefore be said of the traditional world-view of

the Africans, namely, that it is permeated by the spirit and that it is

anthropocentric... It is anthropocentric because the actions of God and the other

spiritual beings are generally directed towards humans for their sustenance and

well-being; and intra-human realities are thought to be ordered towards the

promotion of human life (Onah, n.d.: Section 1).

Explicit anthropocentrism is also expressed by Ifeanyi Menkiti, who, in describing the meaning of

personhood in African thought, seeks to establish that rights implied by duties of justice can be

applied only to human persons, ruling out

…some dangerous tendencies currently fashionable… of ascribing rights to

animals. The danger I see in it is that such an extension of moral language to the

domain of animals is bound to undermine, sooner or later, the clearness of our

conception of what it means to be a person…. For if there is legitimacy in

ascribing rights to animals the human beings could come to be compelled to share

53

resources with them. In such a situation… programs designed to eradicate

poverty… could come under fire… with the claim being seriously lodged that

everything was being done for the poor, but not enough for the equally deserving

cats and dogs (Menkiti, 1984: 177).

So, too, Mfuniselwa John Bhengu writes, ‘African scholars agree that the African

Weltanschauung is the interdependence of persons for the exercise, development and fulfilment

of their potential to be both individuals and community’ (Bhengu, 1996: 12). It appears,

therefore, that a strong anthropocentric strand in African ethics can hardly be denied.

3.2.2 Beyond Anthropocentricism: The Interrelatedness and Interdependence of Nature

However, this trend does not fully represent African moral worldviews. Indeed, often enough,

the same authors who place such strong emphasis on the interests of the human community also

speak of an essential interdependence or interrelationship between humans and the rest of nature,

and claim that this grounds a moral obligation to treat nature with respect and circumspection.

Since the seemingly anthropocentric nature of African values is well-documented, I turn my

attention to conceptions that suggest otherwise. Bujo also asserts: ‘The African is convinced that

all things in the cosmos are interconnected. All natural forces depend on each other, so that

human beings can live in harmony only in and with the whole of nature’ (Bujo, 1998: 22-23).

Munyaradzi Felix Murove speaks of the ‘…interdependence of individuals within the larger

society to which they belong and to the environment on which they all depend’ and describes

‘…an ethical outlook that suggests that human well-being is indispensable from our dependence

on and interdependence with all that exists, and particularly with the immediate environment on

which all humanity depends’ (Murove, 2004: 195 - 196). Harvey Sindima describes an African

54

cosmology that ‘…stresses the bondedness, the interconnectedness, of all living beings’

(Sindima, 1990: 137). Godfrey Tangwa writes: ‘The pre-colonial traditional African

metaphysical outlook… impl[ies] recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful

coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans’ (Tangwa, 2004: 389) 1.

These ideas seem, at the very least, to require some kind of circumspective treatment of non-

human nature. However, the question that remains is how best we might understand this strong

emphasis on the interconnectedness of nature. All of this talk of interconnectedness, wholeness,

interdependence, harmony etc. could still prove to be essentially grounded in human interests.

This is not implausible. It is quite possible to acknowledge the essential interdependence of

nature and still to value it only instrumentally, based on the observation that if we fail to

recognise some necessary balance in nature, human life or well-being may be threatened. Given

the strong presumption of anthropocentricism in African thought, I need to consider this very

plausible possibility first.

An obvious implication of any position that holds that everything in nature is interdependent is

that the well-being and continued survival of human beings is dependent on the health of the

environment. And one good reason to preserve the environment is to ensure the interests of

humans in the present and in future generations. Some African writers do indeed suggest this.

Bujo writes: ‘By seriously considering [the] sacred, cosmic and inter-human relationship, people

should become aware of the fragile nature of their human existence…. [H]uman existence could

break down if the cosmos is neglected’ (Bujo, 1998: 212). Murove argues that the African belief

1 See also Bujo, 1998: 208; Ramose, 1999: 155; Oruka & Juma, 1994: 117.

55

in the necessity to maintain good relationships with the ancestors implies a need to ‘…promote

harmonious existence in between the past, present and future’ (Murove, 2004: 200) and claims

that ‘…traditional African ethics in general recognised the intimate bond between men and their

environment, the debt that the members of any generation owe to their forebears, and their

consequent responsibility to posterity’ (Murove, 2004: 195).

However, such ultimately person-centred considerations simply do not exhaust the implications

of the sense of interconnectedness of nature in African thought. In addition to such seemingly

instrumental positions, African writers often suggest that nature, apart from its usefulness,

warrants respect from human beings. Writing about African traditional religion, Kofi Opoku

says: ‘There is community with nature since man is part of nature and is expected to cooperate

with it; and this sense of community with nature is often expressed in terms of identity and

kinship, friendliness and respect’ (Opoku, 1993: 77). And in apparent contrast to

anthropocentric remarks above, Bujo claims ‘…the African understanding of nature… regard[s]

the human person as a microcosm within the macrocosm. This microcosm, however, has the task

of showing respect for creation and liberating it from slavery and “corruptibility”’ (Bujo, 1998:

214). Kelbessa writes of the moral code of the Oromo people of Ethiopia that it

...does not allow irresponsible and unlimited exploitation of resources and human

beings… It reflects deep respect and balance between various things. The Oromo

do not simply consider justice, integrity and respect as human virtues applicable

to human beings but they extend them to nonhuman species and mother Earth

(Kelbessa, 2005: 24).

What is significant here is that the language implies having an attitude of respect towards nature

as a non-instrumental good, not just preserving nature for the good of humans. This kind of

respect is not the same as respecting the ‘processes’ of nature, where nature can be valued purely

56

instrumentally, since playing by nature’s rules is no more than an acknowledgment of mutual

dependence as a reality, and a strategy for ensuring human well-being. It would appear that for

these African authors the sense of the interrelatedness of everything in nature is taken as a non-

anthropocentric basis for a requirement to treat nature with respect. Interestingly, this still does

not necessarily imply valuing nature for its own sake. Indeed some African writers suggest that

nature should be respected because it belongs to God or the ancestors (Kelbessa, 2001: 21-22).

But, what is significant is the requirement that nature (not just its processes) should be treated

with respect, and not only because of its instrumental value to human beings.

However pervasive the presumption that African thought is essentially anthropocentric may be,

there are themes in traditional African thought and in the work of African theorists that suggest

that it would be erroneous to make such a presumption. At the least, it would seem that in

addition to anthropocentric traditions, there are other traditions that entail a respect for nature

based on a belief that everything in nature is interrelated and interdependent. It remains

something of puzzle, however, why these non-anthropocentric themes have received so little

attention. I turn to explaining this in the section that follows.

3.2.3 Why Has this African Non-Anthropocentric Respect for Nature Been Overlooked in

the Literature?

Callicott’s perceived paradox that there is little evidence of an African environmentalism on a

continent that is home to such superlative natural diversity is more complex than it at first

appears, because it is now apparent that the basis for an African indigenous environmental ethic

not only exists, but has existed all along. How, then, do we account for how it has been missed,

ignored or simply not recognised? Apparently, African thought might, after all, not be hopelessly

57

anthropocentric, and might at least include some traditions requiring respect for non-human

nature and a valuing of all life. So, how do we explain how this has been overlooked?

The most obvious explanation is grounded in the historical reality that prior to European

settlement in sub-Saharan Africa, the cultures of the region were pre-literate, and cultural

thought was preserved only by means of oral tradition. Clearly, then, traditional indigenous

thought only began to be recorded in a written form fairly recently. For the most part, we are

dependent upon the written accounts of African culture by early missionaries, anthropologists

and other European voices. We ought to expect that these accounts would be incomplete, at best.

However, the same could be said of Native American traditional cultures, and yet, much of the

environmental philosophy of these communities has been included in the written record, and

taken into account by Western environmental ethicists. It, therefore, remains puzzling why

African thought about the environment has been largely neglected.

One explanation would be that this can simply be put down to inattention. Callicott

acknowledges that the apparent lack of an African environmental ethics may be attributable to

the fact that ‘…scholars… have simply neglected African ecophilosophy’. (Callicott, 1994:

156). However, Kelbessa claims that something more sinister than basic neglect might explain

this:

It is extremely important to understand the fact of a kind of 21st-century racism

that is undermining the development of our knowledge of environmental ethics

and other fields of enquiry. Any intellectual, no matter how liberal or

enlightened, who either explicitly or implicitly suggests that there is nothing to be

learned from Africa is terribly ignorant of Africa, and is, in my opinion, suffering

from this phenomenon. Even today, many writers still do not expect the ‘Dark

58

Continent’ – as ‘traditionally’ portrayed by the Enlightenment thinkers and

colonial anthropologists – to be the source of environmental ideas that can help

the contemporary world solve environmental problems. In current discourse

‘Africa’ still appears, even if only in its absence, as some kind of black hole of

evil (Kelbessa, 2005: 21).

Similarly, G.W. Burnett and Kamuyu wa Kang’ethe point to an ignorance about African

thought, claiming that it is ‘...likely based on Western contempt for African philosophy and

religion generally’ (Burnett & wa Kang’ethe 1994: 146). In even stronger language Magobe

Ramose writes:

More often than not the term [African philosophy] tends to revive apparently

innate skepticism on the one hand and to stimulate ingrained condescension on the

other. The skeptic, unswervingly committed to the will to remain ignorant is

simply dismissive of any possibility, let alone the probability of African

philosophy. Impelled by the will to dominate, the condescendor is often ready to

entertain the probability of African philosophy provided the judgement pertaining

to the experience, knowledge and truth about African philosophy is recognised as

the sole and exclusive right of the condescendor (Ramose, 1999: 2).

Geoffrey Parrinder, as far back as 1954, lamented the poor quality of earlier accounts of African

thought, particularly with respect to religion:

It is probably true to say that African religion has been more misunderstood, and

has suffered more at the hands of the early writers, than any other part of African

life. Unhappily, old misconceptions linger with us still. It is not so much that the

old writers were all of them bad observers. Indeed some of them did make good

use of the unique opportunities they had of seeing rites that have now practically

59

disappeared. But the rather depreciatory language which they often used… has

infected succeeding generations (Parrinder, 1954: 13).

After providing some examples, he concludes, ‘…these specimens will suggest how hard it has

been for Europeans to treat African religious beliefs seriously, and how vague and misleading

terminology has been in the past’ (Parrinder, 1954: 14-15).

Such apparently damning claims might not be easily heard by those non-African scholars who

harbour no such blatant racist or condescending attitudes to Africa. However, there can be little

doubt that the history of Western scholarship about African culture and thought has often been

guilty of blindness based on ignorance. Early ethnographic studies undoubtedly often rested on

the assumption that the people of Africa were primitive and lacked rationality (Ramose, 1999:

1-2). It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that many aspects of African thought might

not have received any attention, or found their way into the record.

The presumption of anthropocentrism in African thought might also have another historical

explanation. Early missionary accounts of African thought often assumed that Africans lacked

a real religious or spiritual nature, apart from mere superstition. This was not only because

those who wrote these accounts assumed Africans to be primitive in the first place, but also

because, despite their strong monotheism, African peoples, generally, did not practice any kind

of overt worship of God. Early commentators, in their ignorance of African spirituality,

assumed that this implied that Africans had no religion (Parrinder, 1954: 214). They readily

allowed their prejudice that Africans were primitive to lead them to the conclusion that, apart

from their assumed ‘animist’ tendencies, Africans were basically godless. So, it was often

claimed that African thought was essentially anthropocentric. It is important to bear in mind

60

that the term ‘anthropocentric’ in this context was meant as the opposite of ‘theocentric’2. The

claim was that the African worldview centred around human interests, as opposed to obedience

to God. At the time, no thought was given to the use of ‘anthropocentric’ as an opposing

concept to ‘biocentric’ or ‘eco-centric’. Such conceptions had not yet even been seriously

contemplated in Western philosophy. Even though these early accounts have been shown to be

erroneous, and despite the fact that few now doubt a basic monotheism in African traditional

religion, the label of ‘anthropocentrism’ seems to have stuck. When I earlier quoted Bujo and

Mbiti (both theologians) as examples of explicit anthropocentrism, it ought to be borne in mind

that their acceptance of the label was based on their understanding that the term implied the

opposite of theocentrism. What they were trying to show was how, in African thought, God

might not be worshipped, but that the honouring of God was to be achieved by means of living

harmoniously within the community. African thought was said to be anthropocentric in this

sense, not in the sense that it is used in environmental philosophy today.

Another possible factor is raised by Burnett and wa Kang’ethe. They claim that ‘…wilderness

preservation, manifested most obviously by national parks, as they have evolved from

America’s frontier experience, is rooted in American romanticism and transcendentalism’

(Burnett & wa Kang’ethe 1994: 145), and that a conservation ethic based on these conceptions

does not appeal to the African mind. Their study is tightly focussed on the thought of the Bantu

people of Highland Kenya, and should not necessarily be taken as generally applicable to

Africa. However, they make some interesting observations. They set out to describe a Bantu

philosophy of wilderness, as one more likely to appeal to indigenous people, than that of the

2 Bujo makes this distinction clear in the following: ‘Because African ethics is primarily anthropocentric,

its theocentric dimension has not been sufficiently considered’ (Bujo, 1998: 25).

61

West. Two of their claims are particularly insightful. The first is that in Africa wilderness is

seen as an extension of human space and is not ‘a source of spiritual self-realization or

inspiration’ (Burnett & wa Kang’ethe 1994: 159). What is significant here is that Western

observers, looking for an African ecophilosophy, start their search with the expectation that they

will find a romantic and transcendental awe for wilderness, akin to their own. Since such a way

of thinking is absent, they might too readily conclude that African thought has no sense of an

environmental consciousness. Secondly, they claim that wildlife is understood as ‘…an

objective manifestation of a wider variety of unnatural or supernatural beings that inhabit

wilderness and compete with humankind for control of wilderness’ (Burnett & wa Kang’ethe

1994: 159). This is not a claim that is pervasive in the literature. However, it does suggest that

wilderness and wildlife during pre-colonial times could easily have been construed as

something frightening and perilous to people with simple weaponry moving in small bands, in

an environment shared with many dangerous creatures. A sense of wonder or awe at the

magnificence of some aspects of nature might easily have been superseded by fearfulness. So,

it is perhaps true that Westeners have often not identified ecophilosophical thought in Africa

because they have been searching for the wrong things.

Whatever the reasons, themes in African thought that might undergird an environmental ethic

have been overlooked or ignored by many commentators. One important aim of this thesis is to

correct this, and to highlight African conceptions that are able to form the basis for an African

environmental philosophy. Having defended my claim that an African emphasis on the

interdependence of all natural things requires respect for nature, I now need to describe what

this respect might entail, or what kind of relationship persons need to develop with nature.

62

3.3 Harmonious Relationships with Nature

3.3.1 African Moral Concern for Persons as the Key to Understanding Moral Concern

for Nature

In the preceding I claimed that a presumption of anthropocentrism in African thought regarding

nature does not tell the full story, and that there are themes in African thought, particularly those

emphasising the interdependence or interrelatedness of all natural things that are said to require a

respect for nature. But how are we to construe this non-instrumental respect for nature? If some

African thought can be understood to extend the scope of moral concern beyond human beings, it

is likely that the key to understanding how nature is valued morally lies in understanding how

humans are valued morally. Whilst some kind of ethical pluralism, proposing one kind of ethic for

persons and another for the rest of nature is a plausible possibility, I explore the more probable

alternative, namely that one can expect to find some similarity between African moral concern for

persons and for nature. I therefore turn to a brief characterisation of African morality with respect

to human beings, in the expectation that it will provide clues as to how nature should be treated

morally.

It is widely acknowledged that much African thought can be described as ‘communitarian’.

Unlike many Western moral theories that place a strong emphasis on respecting individual

autonomy, or promoting utility for individuals, Africans place a high value on the group: the

family, the clan, the community. Morality is often understood essentially in terms of relationality.

For some representative claims, consider that Desmond Tutu writes ‘[Ubuntu] speaks to the very

essence of being human…. It … means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in

theirs. We belong in a bundle of life…. Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods.

Social harmony is for us… the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought

63

after good is to be avoided like the plague’ (Tutu, 1999: 34-35). Murove states: ‘Ubuntu implies

the inherent African appreciation of relationality… This appreciation carries with it the exhibition

in the individual’s behavior those socially condoned moral qualities or virtues that make the

individual’s behavior acceptable to and supportive of the community’ (Murove, 2004: 203-4).

Thaddeus Metz, who has recently published widely on developing Ubuntu into a fully-fledged

moral theory, suggests that for many of those ‘… who have reflected on African ethics,

harmonious or communal relationships are valued for their own sake, not merely as a means to

some other basic moral value such as pleasure’ (Metz, 2010: 51).

It seems to me that the emphasis on the interrelatedness of everything in nature I have highlighted

is best understood in similar terms. Murove speaks of ‘…an indissoluble solidarity between

humanity and the natural environment’ (Murove, 2004: 202). Opoku speaks of ‘…remaining on

harmonious terms with nature instead of living in isolation from nature or treating nature as a mere

object of exploitation for the satisfaction of human needs. Remaining in harmony with nature also

means preserving nature’ (Opoku, 1993: 77). Kelbessa writes ‘…that human beings should live

in harmony with all other creatures in the natural environment’ and speaks of the ‘…positive

relation between individuals, humans and the natural environment’ (Kelbessa, 2005: 25).

It is clearly implied that interdependence grounds the moral requirement to foster harmonious

relationships between ourselves and nature. It is not easy to give an account of quite how the

acknowledgment of interdependence entails a normative requirement to foster a certain kind of

relationship3. However, this correlation is assumed in many African accounts. Interdependence

3 In the following chapter I directly address how the ‘is’ of interconnectedness might be said to entail the ‘ought’ of

promoting harmonious relationships.

64

is understood as an incontrovertible reality, and this reality implies that human beings are bound

up in a kind of community with other living beings in nature. Belonging to a community in turn

means that one ought to behave in particular ways, most notably it entails seeking to promote

harmonious relationships within the community. Because we are interdependent and

interrelated, we belong to a community of life, and being in a community entails that we need to

behave as members of a genuine community, namely, to promote harmonious relationships.

The notion that harmonious relationships are prized and ought to be promoted should not be

construed as an ethic that seeks to maximise harmony. It is not a kind of consequentialist theory,

in which our aim should be to achieve the highest aggregate of harmony possible in the world.

Rather, the focus is on ensuring that the right kind of relationships of caring and ‘friendliness’

are maintained and developed between ourselves and other entities. It is concerned mainly with

the quality of each of our relationships, rather than exclusively with the total amount of harmony

in the world.

A central concern in some African ethical thought is that harmonious relationships be fostered and

maintained. And for at least some writers this applies both to relationships within the human

community and to relationships between humans and their natural environment. In order to shed

further light on what harmonious relationships might entail I now explore a related theme often

encountered in African moral thought, namely that harmonious relationships are analogous with

family relationships.

65

3.3.2 Analogy with Family Relationships

The sense of the importance of promoting harmonious relationships between persons and between

humans and nature is often likened to family relationships. Augustine Shutte writes: ‘Perhaps the

best model for human community as understood in African thought is the family. The family has

no function outside of itself. It is a means of growth for its members, and the interaction, the

companionship and conversation, between the growing and fully grown members is also an end in

itself’ (Shutte, 1993: 50). Kwasi Wiredu states: ‘African societies are founded on kinship

relations…’ (Wiredu, 2008: 333). H. Odera Oruka and Calestus Juma propose what they call a

‘Parental Earth Ethics’, extending the idea of family or community relationships to nature. ‘We

hope it is clear that the earth or the world is a kind of family unit in which the members have kith

and kin relationship with one another’ (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 125-126).

One might construe this use of family analogies as a distinct theme in some African thought on

morality. Such a reading could imply that some writers place an emphasis on harmonious

relationships, whereas others, differently, emphasise family-like relationships – and it could then

turn out that there are subtle differences in what is entailed by these two views. However, the

language used is almost always the language of analogy, and, in any event, it is philosophically

attractive to conceive of harmonious relationships in terms of familial ones. Shutte speaks of

family as a ‘model’ for relationships (Shutte, 1993: 50), Oruka and Juma describe the natural

world as a ‘kind of family unit’ (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 125-126), Metz speaks of the community

as being ‘akin to a family’ (Metz, 2010: 51). Since the language of analogy is so prevalent, and

prima facie plausible, the best way to interpret this talk of family is to understand it as an analogy

that enables us to understand and give content to the notion of fostering harmonious relationships.

This does not constitute an alternative type of morality. Rather, the analogies with family

66

relationships are, or at least reasonably could be, used to illustrate the more fundamental claim that

what counts morally is that harmonious relationships between humans and nature be maintained.

3.3.3 Towards A Characterisation of Harmonious Relationships

If harmonious relationships are the central concern in these African perspectives on morality, and

if they are understood in terms of a family, how exactly should these relationships be construed?

In common perception, what characterises family relationships of a wholesome kind is a sense that

the nurturing of and the caring for other members of the family, sometimes even at personal cost,

are goods to be pursued. Typically, family members seek to look out for one another’s welfare,

care for one another, and seek the common good of the family. Metz describes this in terms of the

combination of ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’, identifying with others within one’s group, co-operating

to achieve common ends, helping one another, and reacting emotionally to the good of one

another. He concludes that this could best be described as a relationship most of us would identify

as ‘friendship’ or ‘love’ (Metz, 2007: 337). What is to be promoted in ethical relationships is

harmony, which amounts to: friendly, caring, mutually supportive and nurturing relationships.

This emphasis on friendship and identity has a normative thrust, where certain duties towards

others are required. Wiredu suggests that maintaining harmonious relationships begins with

affective bonds, that in turn lead to a developing sense of moral responsibilities to others: ‘In

terms of feeling and sentiment, people are brought up to develop a sense of bonding with large

groups of relatives at home and outside it from very early childhood. This evolving sense of

bonding is a learning process in which the individual comes more and more to see herself as the

center of obligations and rights’ (Wiredu: 2008: 333).

67

In describing their ‘Parental Earth Ethics’ Oruka and Juma also attempt to cash out the analogy

with family relationships. They speak of two opposing principles, the ‘parental debt principle’

and the ‘individual luck principle’. For them, the parental debt principle involves

acknowledging that the security and welfare of all members of a family is bound up with that of

the rest. Even those who might for periods of time believe themselves to be self-sufficient may

find that a change of fortunes eventually requires them to rely on the others for their security or

welfare. This principle also implies that the ‘…life conditions of any member of the family

affect all the others materially and emotionally, so no member can be proud of his or her

situation however ‘happy’, if any member of the family tree lives in squalor’ (Oruka & Juma,

1994: 124). This allows for those who are in need to expect the help of those who are better off

and even for the family to ‘…repossess underdeveloped possessions of …idle relatives’ (Oruka

& Juma, 1994: 124) for the benefit of others. They then contrast this with the individual luck

principle, which emphasises that what is obtained through personal achievement belongs to the

individual, and it is the individual’s right to choose what to do with his or her possessions, short

of contravening the rights of anyone else in the family (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 124-125). For

Oruka and Juma

The parental debt principle takes precedence over the individual luck principle,

in case of a conflict between the two. And this is as it should be. Why, for

example, would we not see it as senseless that an individual member of a family

would want to do anything she wishes with her possessions, while a member of

her kith and kin may be in desperate need of help? (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 125).

Being part of a family, for Oruka and Juma, implies not just acknowledging an interdependence,

but also an obligation to ensure the security and welfare (material and emotional) of others in the

family, even at personal cost. What this suggests is that harmonious relationships are defined

68

neither just in terms of avoiding enmity, nor by a simple emotive ‘feeling’ of love for others.

Harmony cannot be obtained unless the welfare of others is ensured, materially and emotionally.

Ramose states ‘… to refrain from sharing whatever we have with those in greater need than

ourselves is contrary to botho [Ubuntu]’ (Ramose, 1999: 150). Ideally, familial relationships

require more than simply respecting the individual rights of others, and include taking

responsibility for their welfare, where possible.

They may even entail a broader scope of responsibilities than those required by a utility-

maximizing approach, as one might be expected to promote some aspect of the welfare of

another, at a personal cost that outweighs the happiness the other is bound to derive from one’s

sacrifice on the other’s behalf. In many families, it is not difficult to conceive of situations in

which one might be prepared to sacrifice more than the expected good another family member

may experience as a result of the sacrifice – because she is family. So, too, in the kind of

African morality I am describing, one might be expected to offer forgiveness to someone who

has wronged one, without first expecting an expression of remorse on his part, in order to try to

restore him to a wholesome, harmonious relationship with the community. That he might never

feel any remorse, nor care about being restored to the community, and even continue to wrong

others, does not change the fact that one would still be expected to forgive. The foreseeable

costs to the one who has been wronged could easily outweigh the benefits to an offender, who

has no interest in making right with those he has harmed, or his community. And yet, this

African sense of morality, grounded in nurturing harmonious relationships, would often

recommend that the offended forgive, anyway 4.

4 Forgiveness, understood from the perspective of Ubuntu, is discussed in Tutu (1999: 34-35).

69

In sum, caring and harmonious relationships in African thought extend beyond simply an

affective response, have a normative thrust described by Wiredu in terms of reciprocal rights and

responsibilities, and necessarily include ensuring the physical welfare of others, wherever

feasible, possibly beyond what an individual rights or even a utilitarian perspective would

prescribe.

It appears that for many of the African voices I have referred to above, this concept of promoting

harmonious relationships and caring for the welfare of others extends analogously beyond the

family and even the human community, to embrace other natural entities, too. It is not easy to

explain in what sense, if any, it is possible to be in a harmonious relationship with, say, a

mountain, or a river5, but it is surely possible to conceptualise acting in ways which promote the

welfare of other living things, such as animals or plants. Such things are able to be objects of

human concern, since they are capable of being better or worse off. Forests, ecosystems and

rivers may not be capable of being objects of human concern in quite the same way, but their

protection, integrity and health may be instrumentally important for the well-being of many

living things, including human beings – and since all life is interconnected and interdependent,

this provides ample grounds for their protection, where possible6. I leave it to later chapters to

further characterise what harmonious relationships with nature might look like, as there are other

salient themes and conceptions in African thought I still need to consider that will assist in this

exercise. For now, it suffices to make the claim that an African relational ethic, in which

harmonious relationships are prized, and identity and solidarity with others is promoted by

5 I consider this question in Chapter 4.

6 Many of these questions will be addressed in chapter 4 in which I consider what entities might be morally

considerable in African thought.

70

means of sharing a way of life, caring for one another and seeking the well-being of one another,

can apply not just to relationships between persons, but to relationships between persons and

nature, too.

Given that the ethic I am describing is essentially relational in nature, it remains for me in this

chapter to consider how such a relational ethic relates to the more typical individualist or holist

environmental ethics that predominate in Western philosophy. Distinguishing between this

relational approach and individualism and holism will help to explain this ethic more fully, as

well as highlight its chief strengths. This is my focus in the following section.

3.4 African Environmental Ethics: Embracing Both Individualism and Holism

3.4.1 A Rejection of Some Dualistic Thinking

No discussion of individualism and holism in African thought can get off the ground without

first taking account of a fairly fundamental rejection of some ‘dualistic’ thinking by African

theorists. For instance, Tangwa writes: ‘Within [the African] world-view the distinction

between plants, animals, and inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and

spirit, the communal and the individual, is a slim and flexible one ‘ (Tangwa, 2004: 389).

Murove claims ‘…the distinction between humanity and nature, the living and the dead, the

divine and the human is blurred to such an extent that human existence becomes continuous with

the natural world’ (Murove, 2004: 185). Wiredu raises a concern about

…the uncritical use of foreign categories in the exposition of African thought,

[here] one is thinking of such categories of thought as are embodied in the

distinctions between the spiritual and the physical, the natural and the

supernatural, the religious and the secular, the mystical and the non-mystical, or,

71

by way of substantives, between substance and attribute, mind and matter, truth

and fact, etc. (Wiredu, 2006: 11).

These ideas suggest that many distinctions of a clear ‘either/or’ type are rejected by Africans.

For example, dualistic distinctions between individuals and the community as well as humans

and nature are not commonly made7. Richard Peterson expresses this as follows:

… human beings and nature are related in a ‘both/and’ dialectical manner rather

than in a manner characterized by an ‘either/or dualism’. Such dialectical

perspectives also characterize … social thought, particularly in the regard to the

relationship between the individual and society. (…I use the term ‘dialectical’ not

in its formal Hegelian sense but in a more informal sense of connoting ‘both/and’

rather than ‘either/or’ thinking. ‘Both/and’ thinking consists of delving into the

creative tension inherent in synthesizing what are seemingly opposite

characteristics, propositions or processes.) These two sets of relations are

themselves inextricably linked: that is, the relationship between the individual and

the community holds very real implications for the human/environment relationship,

and for the environment itself. …African thought can help to correct prevalent

perspectives in the West regarding the relationship between the individual and the

community, and that between humans and the environment (Peterson 2004: 168)8.

7 It should be noted that this does not entail that no dualistic distinctions are recognised in African

thought. Philosophical discourse would be almost impossible if all distinctions were rejected.

8 Peterson writes specifically about east African peoples, but his observations seem to be confirmed by other authors

writing about sub-Saharan ideas more generally.

72

It should come as no surprise, then, that the rigorous debate between individualists and holists in

Western environmental ethics is not mirrored in African literature. In what follows, I show that

although communitarian values are cherished in African ethical thought regarding inter-personal

obligations, this does not imply that individuals and their needs are not taken into account.

There is rather an attempt to maintain a balance between individual interests and those of the

community. Extending this to embrace responsibility towards nature, it appears that the same

principle applies: both natural individuals and groups are valued and part of treating nature with

respect entails respecting both, and taking cognisance of the need to keep the interests of both

balanced. In African environmental thought, then, one should not expect to find an individualist

camp and a holist camp. Individualist and holist values are both embraced.

3.4.2 Holism and ‘African Relational Environmentalism’.

It is not uncommon to hear commentators describe African thought on the environment as holist.

Oruka, and Juma speak of ‘… a holistic outlook in which everything is related to everything

else. This interrelatedness requires a corresponding philosophical approach that looks at nature in

its totality…’ (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 117). Opoku writes ‘…in the African perspective, the

community and its members as well as its environment constitute a complex whole…’ (Opoku,

1993: 78). Peterson describes the relationship between humans and nature as ‘complex, holistic

and dialectical’ (Peterson, 2004:171). Kelbessa goes so far as describe the worldview of the

Oromo people, the subject of his study, thus: ‘To some degree, Oromo ethics is close to

Leopold’s land ethic…’ (Kelbessa, 2005: 23). Given the fundamental communitarianism of

African ethics, it is hardly surprising to discover similarities with Western holist perspectives.

After all, an ethic that values harmonious relationships between humans and other, particularly,

living aspects of nature, based in the belief that everything in nature is interdependent and

73

interrelated, is bound to share some characteristics of holist environmental ethics. Both reject

anthropocentricism, and both emphasise a fundamental interdependence in nature, and they also

often seem to share a common language, and employ similar analogies.

One example of how Western holists use similar analogies to those used in African thought is

Aldo Leopold’s famous claim that right actions are those tending to protect ‘the integrity,

stability and beauty of the biotic community’ (Leopold, 1949: 224-225). The use of the phrase

‘biotic community’ is clearly reminiscent of African conceptions of nature as a community or

family. Callicott points out that much holistic thought regarding the environment is predicated

on the modern scientific understanding of nature and ecology, and uses similar language in

doing so: ‘Now the general world view of the modern life sciences represents all forms of life

on planet Earth both as kin and as fellow members of a social unit – the biotic community’

(Callicott, 1986: 364). African worldviews seem, then, to employ similar analogies to those

used by holists. When nature is understood as a community or family, value is attributed to the

community itself as well as to the individuals making up a community. Furthermore, it is

pertinent to note that Western holistic conceptions are strongly grounded in the findings of

ecological science, that organisms and species exist in ecosystems and are mutually

interdependent, where damage to one part of the system can severely affect other parts of the

system, and so forth. In a pre-scientific way, African indigenous thought recognises a similar

interrelatedness in nature, albeit in more metaphysical terms, such as sharing a life force.

Given these similarities in conception, language and analogy, it might seem prima facie

appropriate to describe this trend in African environmentalism as holist. Despite the similarities,

I now show that the African emphasis on relationality is, in fact, distinct from holism, and that it

is the distinguishing characteristics that offer the most promise for environmental ethics. In

74

making this distinction, I begin to articulate an African-inspired environmental ethic, a

relational, harmony-prizing ethic, which I shall name ‘African Relational Environmentalism’.

One of the most striking things about much African thought regarding moral obligation is its

refusal to firmly prioritise either the interests of individuals or the interests of communities. Eze

writes: ‘The relationship between the individual and community is dialogical for the identity of

the individual and the community and is dependent on this constitutive formation. The

individual is not prior to the community and neither is the community prior to the individual’

(Eze, 2008: 386). The individual is fully realised only within the community. In terms of

personhood, true humanity is achieved only through harmonious relationships with others,

which, as I have explained, are characterised mainly by solidarity, friendship, care and seeking

the common good. Since the interdependence of everything in nature is acknowledged, this

community is understood to extend beyond human beings, and to encompass all natural entities.

Humans cannot be fully realised without recognition of their belonging to the community of

nature, and behaving accordingly, demonstrating respect for nature through promoting

harmonious relationships in this natural community9. Interdependence is a fact, and harmonious

relationships with not merely persons, but a variety of natural beings, as well, are to be sought as

the way to self-realisation.

9 This notion of morality being related to attaining authentic or full personhood is more fully characterised as a

‘perfectionist’ view in Chapter 7.

75

Despite his seemingly low estimation of traditional African values as a source for a promising

environmental ethic10, Callicott did recognise the potential of this strand of African thought:

…far more vividly than in the modern Western worldview, individuality is not

only counterbalanced by community identity but one’s unique individuality is

defined in part by one’s social relationships and expressed through social

interaction…. In this notion of embedded individuality – of individuality as a

nexus of communal relationships – we may have the germ of an African

environmental ethic. Add to the intense sense of social embeddedness an equally

vivid sense of embeddedness in the biotic community, and anthropocentric

African communitarianism might then be transformed into a non-anthropocentric

African environmentalism (Callicott, 1994: 166-167).

I submit that Callicott somehow missed a ‘…vivid sense of embeddedness in the biotic

community’ (Callicott, 1994: 167) in at least some African thought. I have shown that this

exists, that African communitarianism can embrace all of nature, and thus provide a promising

African environmentalism, based on respect for nature, individual objects in nature, and the

nurturing of harmonious relationships and solidarity with other natural things.

It is the sense of ‘embedded individualism’ within communitarianism that sets African

Relational Environmentalism apart from Western expressions of holism. Leopold’s and

Callicott’s ‘Land Ethic’ places final value in the community of nature, or the ‘land’, understood

10 ‘…Africa looms as a big blank spot on the world map of indigenous environmental ethics for a very

good reason. African thought orbits, seemingly, around human interests’. (Callicott, 1994: 158).

76

broadly as the biospheric community. One of the persistent challenges to holism is that if one

accords ecosystems and nature final value, respect for humans becomes secondary to the needs

of the biosphere. Could this not imply a moral imperative, for instance, to cull human beings in

the interests of the survival of the earth? Such conclusions are very counter-intuitive. Callicott

has made various attempts to counter this objection, claiming that morality itself has developed

in an evolutionary way, gradually extending the boundaries of the ‘community’ of moral

considerability from family to clan, to tribe, to nation, to all persons, and ultimately to nature.

Callicott seems to suggest that as these boundaries expand, moral intuitions developed earlier are

not replaced, but others are merely added (Callicott, 2000: 133-136). But, as long as holists give

primacy to the interests of the biosphere, it is hard to see how they can overcome the problem

that their view might be said to be misanthropic.

Where African Relational Environmentalism differs is that it does not prioritise the biotic

community over members of the community, or vice versa. Right actions are not those that tend

to promote the integrity and stability of the land, they are those that promote harmonious

relationships between us and other members of the community of nature. One cannot promote

harmonious relationships and completely ignore the interests of the individuals involved in the

relationships. Wiredu writes: ‘To adjust the interests of the individual to those of the

community is not to subjugate one to the other. The relationship is purely … symmetrical. We

could just as easily have described it as the adjustment of the interests of the community to those

of the individual’ (Wiredu, 2008: 334). Returning to Oruka and Juma’s ‘Parental Earth Ethics’

(Oruka & Juma, 1994) - whilst the interests of the ‘family’ of nature may sometimes need to

take precedence over the interests of some individuals, this does not imply an unconditional

primacy of the biotic community over individual interests. Sometimes humans may be morally

obliged to give priority to, say, the preservation of an endangered species, perhaps by not using

77

part of its habitat for agriculture, but this does not imply that human interests must always defer

to those of the biosphere. An African sense of relationality respects both the interests of

individuals and those of the community of nature, giving ultimate primacy to neither, a

controversial claim that deserves to be taken seriously.

3.4.3 Individualism and ‘African Relational Environmentalism’

I have already stated my case in the preceding section that African Relational Environmentalism

is distinguished by recognising individualist, as well as holist perspectives, and prioritising

neither. However, I have not, yet, directly addressed the extent to which individualist

conceptions are to be found in African thought. In what follows, I review African sources for

indications of similarities with Western human-centred, sentience-based and biocentric

individualist positions, in turn. I show that the values underlying these positions can all be

embraced in African thought, but that they are also always understood within a relational or

communitarian context. This provides further support for my claim that African Relational

Environmentalism can embrace both holist and individualist notions.

3.4.3.1 Anthropocentric Individualism

There is evidence in the African literature of what might appear to be individualist stances

regarding humans. As an example, Ramose writes:

The individual human being is an object of intrinsic value in its own right. If this

were not so it would be senseless to base affirmation of one’s humanness on the

recognition of the same in the other and respect thereof. It is meaningful to state

that to denigrate and disrespect the other human being is in the first place to

78

denigrate and disrespect oneself only if it is accepted that oneself is an object

worthy of dignity and respect (Ramose, 1999:138).

This could easily be interpreted as an expression of anthropocentric individualism. But, that

would be to misread Ramose. He goes on to claim:

[Another] principle is that motho, (a human being) is truly human only in the

context of actual relations with other human beings. This is not to be construed to

mean that relations with nature or the overall environment are unimportant.

…motho is never a finished product in the sense that the relational context always

conceals and reveals the potentiality of the individual (Ramose, 1999: 138-139).

Ramose does affirm the final value of the individual human being, but this does not constitute a

claim that only individual human beings can have value. In virtually the same breath he affirms

the critical importance of the relational context individuals find themselves in, and includes

nature as well as other humans in this context. Other seeming expressions of anthropocentric

individualism in the African literature are most likely also no more than a claim that individual

humans count morally, not that they alone count morally. After all, the commitment to

communitarianism that is so pervasive in African thought seems to preclude any individualist

conception of final value from the start.

3.4.3.2 Sentientist Individualism

Western individualist approaches that reject anthropocentrism are predominantly either

sentientist or biocentrist. Many animal liberationist positions propose that all sentient creatures

have moral standing. Biocentrists typically extend such moral standing to all living organisms.

Of course, this is a gross over-simplification of the field, but these are the two most obvious

79

positions. I turn my attention now to whether there are any parallel or similar conceptions in

African thought.

There is little in the African literature that specifically identifies sentience as the ethically

significant property as regards final value – with respect to people, or other animals. Oruka and

Juma do recognise sentience as of significance in the following passage:

There are basically two main reasons in the need for the sustenance of

biodiversity: One is that all sentient beings have intrinsic value, and the other is

that human life on earth is doomed to perish if we destroy biodiversity. Although

the first reason is still too remote for most people to grasp, the second reason is

and should be today common knowledge among reasonable adult human beings

(Oruka & Juma, 1994:128).

They suggest above that they (as African philosophers) regard sentience as a relevant property in

moral discourse, but that this conception is not one that will be readily accepted, generally, at

this point in history.

A number of authors highlight a traditional prohibition of the maltreatment of domestic animals.

Kelbessa claims that amongst the Oromo people (the subject of his study) there is a ‘…belief that

domestic animals ought to be treated without cruelty’. (Kelbessa, 2005: 26). Mbiti notes that the

keeping of domestic livestock is widespread in Africa, and that these animals are greatly valued.

He also points to certain African communities in which cattle are held in especially high regard:

In some places such as Kenya, Tanzania, and the Sudan, there are people who

value their cattle as much as, and often more than, their fellow human beings.

They would even choose to die in the process of protecting or rescuing their

cattle. They give personal names to their cattle, they sing to them, they talk to

80

them, they take infinite care over them. Their whole life is occupied with the

welfare of their animals (Mbiti, 1975: 131).

At the very least these views seem to entail some sort of recognition of sentience in other

animals, even if only domestic animals are singled out. However, these claims are hardly

evidence of a theoretical assertion of sentience as the fundamental basis of final value as one

finds amongst some Western animal welfarists.

Sentience-based arguments for moral considerability may initially appear to be explicitly

rejected by some African theorists. In a passage in which he comments on the theologian G.

Pazig’s view that sentience is what is morally significant in human treatment of animals, Bujo

writes:

If Pazig gives as the reason for a duty towards animals ‘sensitivity to pain’, then –

from an African perspective – he reduces the complex relationship between the

human person and nature to a minimum, which does not do justice to a holistic

understanding. According to this understanding, which is basic to the African

community spirit, the human being is conceivable only in cosmic interwovenness

(Bujo, 1998: 224).

It should be noted that Bujo does not reject sentience on the grounds that it is irrelevant, but

rather suggests that it entails only a minimalist understanding of moral responsibility towards

other beings. It does not go far enough – humans share more than just sentience with other

creatures, and this more holistic approach needs to be taken. Fainos Mangena rejects both

reason and sentience based approaches to moral status, adopting something more like a

biocentrist egalitarian approach based on living things being in a ‘state of creation’. Again,

though, he rejects sentience not on the grounds that it is irrelevant to moral discourse, but that it

81

is unable to provide a comprehensive account of our moral obligations to other creatures

(Mangena, 2009).

Based on the discussion above, one might hastily conclude that sentience is not regarded as

particularly relevant in African moral thought. However, I doubt that would be the correct

conclusion to draw. It is true that the ability to feel pain or pleasure is not singled out for special

attention, but this does not imply that it is not regarded as relevant. One plausible explanation

for the seeming dearth of discussion about sentience is that it is assumed to be so obviously part

of the experience of living things that it requires no specific mention. Living in harmony and

solidarity with others entails the recognition that one of the things that defines the welfare of

animate entities, generally, is that pain is something we prefer to avoid, and pleasure is

something we prefer to experience. Until fairly recently, in Western intellectual history, there

has been a strong and predominant tradition that regarded all non-human animals as mere things.

Lacking the ability to reason and to be moral agents, animals were accorded no final value of

their own. Environmental ethics has questioned these assumptions, hence the early rejection of

anthropocentrism in the field, generally. In order to defend the notion that animals other than

human beings do have a moral status requiring attention, one of the claims made by revisionist

environmentalist philosophers has been that, since other animals are also sentient, they are not

merely things. That pain and pleasure is significant to them, in varying degrees, implies that we,

as moral agents, cannot completely ignore their interests. Given the strong tradition in the West

in which non-human animals were generally excluded from direct moral consideration, at all, it

has been necessary for ethicists to try to correct this, by pointing out that sentient animals, at

least, have an interest in avoiding pain, which imposes a direct duty on us not to cause them

unnecessary harm. African thought has traditionally not excluded other animals, or other living

things, for that matter, from moral consideration. An integral part of respecting other natural

82

things, and living in harmony with nature, is to acknowledge that one of the qualities many other

living things share with humans is that pain is harmful and distressing, and that pleasure is

desirable. Western thought has had to be reminded of this. African thought has not. It is not

unexpected, therefore, that African perspectives have not placed any special emphasis on a

reality always believed to be true.

3.4.3.3 Biocentric Individualism

I have already claimed that African Relational Environmentalism rests on a view that everything

in nature is interrelated and interdependent, that natural things should be respected, and that

harmony between humanity and the natural world should be prized and promoted. This African

emphasis on respect for life and nature does bring to mind Taylor’s ethic of ‘Respect for Nature’

(1986). He proposes a biocentric approach to the environment, also using the analogy of a

natural ‘community’. However, deliberately rejecting holism, he bases his sense of respect for

nature on the assertion that all living things have a good of their own, where this good implies

that they have ‘inherent worth’. There are clear similarities here with African thought, as both

certainly regard at least all living organisms as having value that is morally significant. That the

value of individual humans and other living organisms is affirmed by African Relational

Environmentalism is not in doubt. But, African thought does not only value individuals. Given

that African communitarian ideas are so dominant, it would seem almost impossible to adopt a

position in which groups, such as families, clans, communities, species, and ecosystems, amongst

others, are not also valued. This claim clearly requires further elaboration and justification,

83

which I will provide in the following chapter11. Nonetheless, at a level of fundamental notions in

African thought, an African environmental ethic is able to encompass the salient features of both

individualist and holist positions in a single relational theory in which harmonious relationships

with nature are prized. It is precisely because African Relational Environmentalism is able to

embrace both individualist and holist notions that it can offer an attractive alternative to most

Western conceptions about the environment12.

3.5 Conclusion: An African Relational Theory of Right Action

I have challenged the claim that African thought is so inherently anthropocentric as to be unable

to ground an environmental ethic. Pointing to a widely held view that all of nature is

interrelated, I have suggested that this notion is often accompanied by a moral requirement to

treat nature with respect. Treating nature respectfully, just like treating persons respectfully,

entails promoting harmonious relationships. These relationships are characterized by a sense of

solidarity and a shared identity, by a sense of sharing a life and promoting the well-being of one

another, by family-like relationships. Taken together with a strong emphasis on communitarian

values in African societies, the prized harmonious relationships between persons and nature

cannot be conceived solely in individualist or in holist terms - both individuals and groups must

be taken into account when exhibiting an harmonious relationship between oneself and natural

11 In the following chapter, I address moral considerability from this African perspective. In doing so, I also address

the differences between African Relational Environmentalism and biocentrism in greater depth than I have done

here.

12 I do not claim that this African notion is uniquely able to embrace both individualist and holist positions. Many

Western theorists attempt to do so, too. Nonetheless, it seems to me to be a strength for an environmental ethic to be

capable of this.

84

objects. Drawing all of this together, the African Relational Environmentalism that I am

beginning to describe might be said to define right acts as those that demonstrate respect for

nature and natural entities (individuals and groups) by promoting harmonious relationships

between persons and persons, and between persons and nature13.

I have argued that African Relational Environmentalism requires respect for nature and natural

entities, and seeks to promote harmonious relationships with nature. But, I have not yet clearly

established what kinds of things we could meaningfully include in these harmonious

relationships. I address this in the following chapter in which I consider moral considerability in

African thought.

13 This is an initial definition of right action on an African Relational Environmentalism. I will refine it as I develop

my theory through the thesis.

85

4 AFRICAN THOUGHT AND MORAL CONSIDERABILITY

4.1 Introduction

One of the greatest philosophical challenges environmental ethics has brought into focus is the

question of how to establish exactly what sorts of entities count morally. The perceived

environmental crisis has given rise to the realisation that we cannot continue to regard only persons

as morally considerable, and regard everything else in nature as not being of any direct moral

concern. As a result, many environmental philosophers have argued for extending moral

considerability beyond just human beings, including, variously, other sentient beings, all other

living organisms, and even groups such as species, ecosystems and the whole biosphere. In this

chapter, I am concerned with establishing a plausible account of how African Relational

Environmentalism might define what is morally considerable.

In the previous chapter I addressed the concern that African thought is often characterised as

anthropocentric. I granted that there can be little doubt that human interests figure prominently in

accounts of traditional African values and in the work of many African philosophers. However, I

also claimed that such seeming anthopocentrism does not fully reflect African views of the world.

Contrary to anthropocentric ideas, there is a strong emphasis on the interrelatedness or

interconnectedness of human beings and the rest of nature that is also evident in African thought,

providing a basis for a promising African environmentalism. According to many African theorists,

this belief in the interdependence of natural entities underlies a requirement that people should

86

respect and live in harmony with the community of nature1. The robustly communitarian character

of much African ethics informs this moral requirement to live in harmony. Individual members of

the community of nature can be fulfilled only in and through their relationships with others. These

relationships are often characterised in familial terms, emphasising the need for mutual support,

solidarity, care and nurturing. I suggested that this approach to the environment holds promise for

environmental ethics because of its relational focus. I called this perspective ‘African Relational

Environmentalism’ and claimed that, on this relational approach, the good is to be promoted by

maintaining harmonious relationships that prioritise neither the individual nor the community,

whilst respecting both, as a characteristic of an ideal family. Since the interests and needs of both

individuals and groups always count and always need to be kept in balance, this approach is able to

avoid the extremes of both individualism and holism.

In developing this non-anthropocentric African Relational Environmentalism further, I now seek to

establish what kinds of things might plausibly be considered to be part of the ‘community’ of nature

and capable of being included in these familial or communal relationships. Since, on this African

approach, harmonious relationships with other natural entities ought to be nurtured, which entities

are we talking about? Is it meaningful to talk about forming a harmonious relationship with an

insect or a rock? Would African Relational Environmentalism most plausibly take such things into

account, morally, or would it limit its basic moral concern only to sentient beings? How would

such an ethic compare to Western approaches to moral considerability entailed by biocentrism or

eco-centrism? Essentially, I ask which entities ought to count morally, or be granted moral

consideration.

1 See Murove, 2004: 202; Opoku, 1993: 77; Kelbessa, 2005: 25

87

After briefly explaining the concept of moral considerability in Section 2, I identify some of the

entities different African conceptions imply are morally considerable in Section 3. I then seek a

single criterion that is able to account for how these entities might be included within the ambit of

moral considerability, as well as undergird an approach to the environment in which harmonious

relationships with nature are prized, in Section 4. In Section 5, I show why this conception of moral

considerability is plausible. And finally, I compare this approach to other more conventional

Western perspectives, and suggest that some of the distinguishing features of this African approach

are not just worthy of consideration, but are also worthy of serious consideration and represent a

promising, comprehensive and theoretically appealing perspective.

4.2 What is Moral Considerability?

In my introductory chapter I indicated that I would use the phrase ‘moral considerability’ to denote

something an entity either qualifies for or not. On this definition, moral considerability is

something that does not admit of degrees, and merely establishes that an entity is something that

ought to be taken into account morally. I distinguished this notion from ‘moral status’, defining this

as a notion that does admit of degrees, so that one morally considerable entity might be said to have

more or less moral status than another. Before considering moral considerability from an African

perspective, I need to further clarify what is included in the concept. In most of the literature on

environmental ethics, moral considerability is grounded either in some intrinsic characteristic, or in

some relational quality, shared by entities that are regarded as considerable. On this standard

account, for an entity to be morally considerable, it must be capable of being regarded as making

some kind of morally significant claim against a moral agent or agents. In turn, moral agents must,

in some sense, be said to have some kind of basic moral obligation towards such an entity. This

implies that we should have a direct moral obligation towards entities that are morally considerable.

88

It is possible to have indirect moral obligations with respect to almost anything. Based on city by-

laws, I have a legal and moral obligation not to damage the benches and other picnic facilities in my

local park. But my obligation is not towards the benches or tables, but to the local authorities, and

perhaps my fellow burghers. I have merely an indirect moral responsibility regarding the benches,

in that the benches do not themselves have a moral claim on me. Moral considerability is accorded

to entities towards which we are able to have a non-derivative moral obligation.

A number of different single necessary and sufficient criteria have been proposed by different

theorists to establish the moral considerability of things. Goodpaster claims that having life is that

criterion, and rejects the more limited criteria of moral agency (rationality), sentience, or having

interests as candidates. The aforementioned criteria are all properties intrinsic to individual entities

(Goodpaster, 2003: 183-188). Mary Anne Warren points out that there are also moral theories that

base moral considerability on a single type of (social or eco-systemic) relational property between

entities (Warren, 2003: 439-440).

It must be noted that to claim that something is morally considerable is not the same as to claim that

it has final value or should always be treated as an end in itself. Y.S. Lo distinguishes between

these concepts as follows:

In the literature of environmental philosophy, the notion moral considerability is

quite often used interchangeably with the notion of moral value. But the two notions

are not exactly the same. Moral value is something that ought to be protected and/or

promoted. But to say that something has moral considerability is to say that its

existence, well-being, interest, preference, and/or some other aspect of it ought to be

directly (rather than derivatively) given positive weight in our moral deliberation

89

about actions that are likely to affect it. Hence, while things of moral value are

morally considerable, it is not necessarily the other way round (Lo, 2001: 355).

Having defined the notion of ‘moral considerability’, I will now consider this notion from the

perspective of African thought.

4.3 What Kinds of Things Are Morally Considerable in African Thought?

I begin by trying to establish what sorts of things are morally considerable on the basis of a number

of different African conceptions. In this section, I am concerned to derive from the work of African

writers a list of entities that their views might regard as, or suggest to be, morally considerable.

Initially, I am concerned to identify these entities that count morally and then to find a single

criterion for moral considerability that is able to encompass those that are at all plausible.

African writers make a variety of claims about African worldviews or cosmologies that imply that

not only human beings are morally considerable. Some of these claims are based in metaphysical

or even overtly religious conceptions; others might be regarded as more philosophical. A number

of themes recur and are repeated by different voices from vastly different geographical locations on

the sub-continent. In my quest for a single criterion for moral considerability, I first consider some

of these themes and their implications for what African thought, in general, might regard as falling

within the ambit of moral considerability.

Before proceeding, I need to make the point that phrases such as ‘moral considerability’, ‘moral

standing’, and even ‘moral agent’ or ‘direct moral duties’ are not part of the vocabulary of moral

discourse in traditional African thought. However, that does not imply that such ideas cannot be

90

recognised in indigenous conceptions, nor that professional African philosophers do not employ

such notions. It is not difficult to perceive that a Christian belief that human beings are created in

the image of God and possess an eternal soul may be interpreted as a religious conviction that, when

secularised, seems to be analogous with the idea that persons have a dignity that requires respect, or

that persons are morally considerable. So, too, we find beliefs in African thought that are analogous

to that of moral considerability, and however metaphysical their origin, imply that certain entities

ought to be taken into account morally. Certainly, it is appropriate to assume that any view that

entails that persons ought to treat another entity with respect is likely to be something akin to a

conception that such an entity is morally considerable.

4.3.1 Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by Interrelatedness

I have already identified a strong emphasis in some African thought on the interrelatedness or

interconnectedness of nature, and I consider this theme first. This belief is often understood as

providing the basis for ethics, both between persons and between persons and the rest of the nature.

It also provides the foundation for strong communitarian values. Furthermore, it appears to be

fundamental to many claims that human beings have a moral obligation to live in harmony with the

rest of the family of nature, and to respect natural objects. One of the strong claims made about this

worldview is that it differs from that of some traditional Western exploitative and instrumental

views of nature in that it does not separate humanity from the rest of nature. As part of an

interrelated community of nature, humans do not stand outside of it, but are integrally a part of it.

Oruka & Juma write:

The Judaeo-Christian view of nature which has permeated Western philosophical

thought has nurtured a form of possessive individualism which is disrupting the

complex web of being in which humans are a part. The Judaeo-Christian ethic has

91

placed humans apart from nature, a fact that has contributed to global environmental

degradation. There is a need for a shift towards a new epistemological outlook in

which humankind is viewed as part of a complex and systematic totality of nature…

an ecophilosophical approach which recognizes the totality of (spatial, temporal and

other) interlinkages in nature (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 115).

Sindima contrasts African cosmology with that of the Western world, describing the perspective of

the West as mechanistic and only concerned about the instrumental value of natural entities. He

claims that the African alternative way of understanding the world is ‘…a life-centred way, since it

stresses the bondedness, the interconnectedness, of all living beings’ (Sindima, 1990: 137). Richard

B. Peterson makes similar claims, arguing that in African thought people are regarded as

intrinsically part of nature, whereas Western dualism entails a disconnection from the environment

(Peterson, 2004: 173).

The claim being made here is that an important implication of understanding all of nature as

interconnected, is that it requires a worldview in which humans cannot be perceived to be separate

from the rest of nature. Such alienation from nature is a foreign idea, as is thinking of other parts of

nature as having no value of their own, but existing purely for their instrumental value to people.

This perspective on nature was inconceivable to the African worldview in pre-colonial times. A

belief that all natural things are interconnected and that humans are part of, rather than set apart

from, nature provides a sound foundation for treating other entities with respect, and for valuing

other natural objects as morally considerable entities.

92

In trying to understand this conception, we must remember that this same belief in

interconnectedness and bondedness is often proffered as the foundation of the unshakable

commitment to communitarianism in African ethics that I have already identified. Tangwa

describes this outlook as

…eco-bio-communitarian, implying recognition and acceptance of interdependence

and peaceful co-existence between earth, plants, animals and humans. This contrasts

with the Western outlook which might be described as anthropocentric and

individualistic. Within the African traditional outlook, human beings tend to be

more cosmically humble and therefore not only more respectful of other people but

also more cautious in their attitude to plants, animals, and inanimate things, and to

the various invisible forces of the world (Tangwa, 2004: 389).

As much as being part of nature implies that other individual natural entities are morally

considerable, the community, the tribe, the clan, the family count morally, too. In fact, it is only

through co-participation with others in promoting harmony and welfare in the group that the

individual is able to become a genuine person and to reach moral maturity2. The suggestion of

political scientist, Claude Ake, that African thought requires a concept of group rights, is just one

example of how African communitarianism is often seen to entail moral considerability for social

groups: ‘It is necessary to extend the idea of human rights to include collective human rights for

corporate social groups such as the family, the lineage, the ethnic group. Our people still think

largely in terms of collective rights and express their commitment to it constantly in their

behaviour’ (Ake, 1998). Whilst some Western theorists might have difficulty conceptualising a

direct moral duty to a group, such as a community or a species, or wondering in what sense a moral

2 I cash out this ‘perfectionist’ notion of morality in more detail in Chapter 8.

93

agent could harm or benefit such groups (in any way other than through the combined benefit or

harm done to the collection of individuals comprising the group), African communitarianism would

find these concepts intuitively understandable and even appealing.

4.3.2 Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by Life Force

Another recurrent theme in African thought is the conception that all beings possess some kind of

life force or vital energy. Bujo approvingly quotes the famous theologian Placide Tempels: ‘All

beings in the universe possess vital force of their own: human, animal, vegetable, or inanimate’

(Bujo, 1998: 209). Bujo asserts: ‘All beings, organic and inorganic, living and inanimate, personal

and impersonal, visible and invisible, act together to manifest the universal solidarity of creation…’

(Bujo, 1998: 210). He also establishes a connection between life force and health: ‘… it is the task

of the human person to study the cosmos to identify plants, animals and minerals possessing that

force that can liberate one from physical and psychic suffering. One can actually remain healthy in

a holistic sense, only by living in harmony with the whole of creation’ (Bujo, 1998: 211). Similar

ideas are expressed by Shutte:

The African conception of life includes both the physical and the spiritual. And it

applies to everything. Stones are alive as well as animals. The difference is that

animals have more life-force than stones, and we have more than animals… So the

universe can be seen as a graded system of life-force, emanating from the source of

all force, God, and then going from the strongest, the ancestors who have died and

the heads of clans and families, to the weakest, animals and material objects (Shutte,

1993: 22).

94

Some of these concepts (especially that of believing that ancestors who have already died continue

to possess a ‘life force’) are difficult for the non-African mind to accept. But, it is clear that a belief

in a shared life force inhabiting living persons, human ancestors, animals, plants, stones, minerals,

rivers, plants, etc. suggests respect for more than just human beings, and a conception akin to moral

considerability which embraces not just persons, and other living things, but even inanimate and

‘spiritual’ or supernatural entities.

4.3.3 Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by Totemism, Inhabiting Spirits and Folklore3

Another recurring idea in African thought or religious belief that has implications for an African

understanding of moral considerability is the widespread practice of totemism. In some African

groups, specific animals are associated with the tribe or its people symbolically. It is forbidden to

harm these totemic animals. Murove writes of the baPedi people that ‘Totemism shows well one

characteristic of the bantu mind: the strong tendency to give a human soul to animals, to plants, to

nature as such, a tendency which is at the very root of the most beautiful blossoms of poetry, a

feeling that there is community of substance between the various forms of life’ (Murove 2004: 201-

202).

In a similar way, rivers, rocks, trees and forests may be venerated and understood, alternately, as

being inhabited by some sort of spirit, or an ancestor. Ancestor spirits may inhabit the bodies of

other living things, or take up residence in inanimate objects. Tangwa writes:

3 Collectively these notions have often been described as ‘animism’. This characterisation has been rejected by many

African theorists, and is even objectionable to some. On these grounds, I have chosen not to use this term.

95

Within [the African] world-view the distinction between plants, animals, and

inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the

communal and the individual, is a slim and flexible one. For instance, the belief that

humans, in certain circumstances can transform into animals and plants, or into

plants and forces, such as the wind, is very prevalent within this system and has very

significant implications for the way nature is approached (Tangwa, 2004: 389).

Murove points out that the moral teaching of Africa is often contained in folklore, and claims that

nature often plays a central role in tales or fables. Other animals come to the aid of humans,

intervene in human affairs, often exhibiting remarkable wisdom. ‘Human existence was only

meaningful when seen in a continuum with all that exists. Such a widened sense of Ukama

[relationality] enriched human experience through the inclusion of animals as co-partners in the

moral palaver’ (Murove, 2004: 206-7).

Once again, the ideas imply a respect for and valuing of other natural objects, living things,

inanimate things and even ancestors who have died, in a way that confers on them moral

considerability. Certainly, when contrasted with Judaeo-Christian or Islamic beliefs, that usually

see only human beings as being spiritual or possessing a soul, this world-view appears to be better

able to include non-humans within the ambit of the morally considerable.

4.3.4 The Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosystems

I have claimed that African thought attributes moral considerability not only to individual entities,

but also to wholes or groups of things, such as families, tribes, species and ecosystems. All I

claimed with respect to species and ecosystems essentially was that since groups of humans clearly

96

count morally, based on African communitarianism, it seems theoretically plausible that groups of

other morally considerable entities, such as species, could be just as plausibly said to count morally

too. I have merely argued for the plausibility of the idea that species and ecosystems are morally

considerable in African thought. I now develop this argument further, firstly with respect to

species, and then with respect to ecosystems.

The notion of species plays an important role in environmental ethical discourse. One of the most

pressing concerns expressed by environmentalists regards the threat to natural diversity. Human

activity has led to the loss of many natural habitats and wilderness areas, and together with

pollution and the exploitation of natural resources, has resulted in increasing numbers of species

becoming threatened or endangered. So, one of the central tasks of environmental ethicists has

consisted in defending the idea that we have a moral obligation to try to preserve species, as

species. This task has proven to be quite difficult, theoretically. How do we account for a moral

obligation towards a species, rather than simply towards the individual members of a species? As

Rolston expresses it: ‘A species lacks moral agency, reflective self-awareness, or organic

individuality…. A species has no self. It is not a bounded singular. There is no analogue to the

nervous hook-ups or circulatory flows that characterise the organism’ (Rolston 2003: 477). What is

more, as the thinking of biologists changes, the way in which they classify various species changes,

too. The distinction between different species is often at best rather fuzzy. This presents a

significant challenge to environmentalists keen to argue in favour of the preservation of species.

Rolston, nevertheless, takes on this challenge and claims:

…having a biological identity reasserted genetically over time is as true of the

species as it is of the individual. Identity need not attach solely to the centered

organism; it can persist as a discrete pattern over time. From this it follows that the

life that the individual has is something passing through the individual as much as

97

something it intrinsically possesses. The individual is subordinate to the species, not

the other way around. The genetic set, in which is coded the telos, is as evidently the

property of the species as of the individual through which it passes…. The species

line is the vital living system, the whole, of which individual organisms are the

essential parts. The species too has its integrity, its individuality, its right to life…;

and it is more important to protect this vitality than to protect individual integrity

(Rolston 2003: 477-478).

It is sufficient for my purposes in this chapter simply to establish that it is theoretically plausible to

regard species as morally considerable, and together with Rolston, holist Western environmental

ethicists have defended this claim successfully enough for it to be unnecessary for me to need to

strongly defend it here. But, apart from simply inferring from African communitarian thinking that

a species could plausibly be a whole of a kind that African thought might regard as morally

considerable, I have not shown that there are strong grounds for thinking that African thought might

see species qua species as counting morally. I turn my attention to this now.

There is evidence that Africans recognise distinctions between humans, animals, plants and

inanimate natural objects4, but these represent fairly intuitively obvious classes of entities, and the

distinction of these classes is not the same kind of distinction as that of species. The question I need

to answer, first off, is whether there exists in African thought some conception of species as species

at all? And, if so, is there reason to believe that species would be seen as morally considerable as

species? It is not as though any kind of grouping of individuals that are morally considerable is

necessarily also morally considerable. For instance, we may assert that all human beings count

morally, and that certain groups of individuals are morally considerable as groups (for example, a

4 See, for instance, Parrinder, 1954: 23 and Bujo, 1998: 209.

98

racial or cultural group), but this does not mean that the group of all people with blue eyes should

be morally considerable, as a distinct group. The two questions raised here both need to be

addressed.

Firstly, then, does African thought recognise the concept of species at all? I now seek to show that

this category is recognised in traditional African thought. I have already referred to the widespread

belief in totemism amongst African people in the context of establishing that all living things might

be regarded as having moral considerability. A totem is typically identified as a particular species.

Murove writes:

…kinship constitutes the reason behind the Shona notion of totemic ancestorhood

whereby the individual’s historical origins and identity are traced to other species

such as eland, kudu, fish, zebra, lion, crocodile, just to mention a few (Murove,

2004:185).

Kelbessa also mentions species (including plant species) with respect to the beliefs of the Oromo

people:

The Oromo do not merely focus on creatures that have economic importance but they

also pay attention to other species as valuable in and of themselves. Sacred groves

have symbolic meanings. Similarly, certain wild animals are looked upon as

symbols of unity and have religious significance….The important principle arising

from Oromo wildlife management is that it is morally wrong to totally destroy a

species and that humans should live in harmony with other creatures (Kelbessa,

2005: 24).

Not only is it clear that the concept of species is recognised, it is also implied (by Kelbessa at least)

that species count morally, and that the destruction of a species is morally prohibited.

99

These ideas are confirmed by the early observations of Tempels:

After the category of human forces come the other forces, animal, vegetable and

mineral. But within each of these categories is found a hierarchy based on vital

power, rank and primogeniture. From that it follows that an analogy can be found

between a human and a lower group (e.g. in the animal class), an analogy based on

the relative place of these groups in relation to its own class. Such would be an

analogy founded on primogeniture or upon a pre-determined order of subordination.

A human group and an animal species can occupy in their respective classes a rank

relatively equal or relatively different. Their vital rank can be parallel or different

(Tempels, 1959: 63-64).

Tempels’ observation not only seems to confirm that African traditional thought acknowledged

species as species, it also suggests that species qua species are recognized because they are

analogous to human groups. It appears that he hints at some reason for recognising the moral

considerability of species, namely, that Africans see a species as analogous to their own social

groupings of clan and tribe, etc. Just as humans share some sense of a common identity with others

in their social formations, so perhaps members of other species are recognized as sharing an identity

with one another. A sense of solidarity with others entails recognizing that where they have

interests similar to ours, those interests must be taken into account. I identify in a special way with

my clan. I want to protect and care for others in my clan, and ensure the continued survival of my

clan. Surely the same is true for other species. Just as in Darwinian terms, members of a species

are hardwired to perpetuate their own kind, in order to ensure its survival, so, in African thought,

humans recognize their own interests in perpetuating their family or clan, and recognize the

corresponding interests of member of other species to do the same.

100

This ought to suffice to defend my argument that recognising the moral considerability of species is

not only plausible based on an African sense of communitarianism, it is in fact supported by at least

some African theorists. If species are morally considerable, then their interests as species are

morally significant, and some sense of a requirement of inter-specific justice is implied. Humans

have moral obligations to other species, and as Kelbessa claims Africans ‘…consider justice,

integrity and respect as human virtues applicable to human beings but they extend them to

nonhuman species and mother Earth’ (Kelbessa, 2005: 24).

Defending the idea that ecosystems are a kind of entity that can be morally considerable is possibly

even more difficult than arguing that species count morally. An ecosystem is even less of what

Rolston calls a ‘bounded singular’ (Rolston, 2003: 477). It has neither interests of its own, nor a

genetic blueprint shared by all of its members. It is a far more loosely constructed ‘community’ of

interdependent entities than a species. But it is this sense of interdependence that seems to be key

to understanding the importance of an ecosystem. It is not difficult to conceive of how individual

organisms and species that are parts of an ecosystem are dependent upon a certain balance and

systemic integrity in the ecosystem to thrive and even to survive. So, at least it can be claimed that

ecosystems are systemically, instrumentally vital to the well-being of many organisms. Later in this

chapter I will argue that it is reasonable to regard as morally considerable natural entities (such as

rivers, lakes, forests, etc.) that play a very significant role in enabling the life of organisms. Such

natural, inanimate entities are included within the circle of the morally considerable on many

African accounts. And some of them (for example, a mangrove wetland forest) fairly closely

resemble what modern ecologists call an ‘ecosystem’. If a forest, or wetland, or mountain range

can be thought of as having a life force of its own, or as being the host of a spirit or ancestor, it

would seem not unreasonable to think that African thought might regard an ecosystem as something

101

that ought to be respected, as something that is morally considerable. I leave it to later in this

chapter to defend this claim more fully.

4.3.5 The Moral Considerability of Artefacts

The entities identified so far as being morally considerable on the basis of African ideas have all

been either natural or supernatural things, or groups of natural and/or supernatural things. In all of

the expressions of the belief in the interconnectedness or interrelatedness of entities that I have

come across, it is only natural or supernatural entities that are described as being fundamentally

interrelated. It is asserted that humans are ‘related’ to other living things, and even to natural

inanimate entities, such as mountains, forests, rivers, rocks and minerals, as well as to supernatural

entities. However, persons are not ordinarily said to be interconnected with huts, tools, machines,

and other such entities manufactured by human ingenuity. Generally, then, only natural or

supernatural things would appear to be regarded as morally considerable.

Nonetheless, some artefacts are regarded as sacred, or as having some kind of spiritual power

associated with them. It is not only natural objects such as bones, stones, feathers or plants that are

used in healing or rituals. An object such as a spear, a gourd, a beaded amulet or an artwork might

similarly be regarded as having supernatural properties or purpose. And places, including human

constructions such as huts or large structures like those at Great Zimbabwe, may be regarded as

sacred, too. But, this is not to say that every spear or gourd or hut or building is viewed in this

way. An artefact or building might be treated as sacred, but only because it has been set aside for

use as a sacred object or place, and usually because of some association with the sacred or spiritual

nature of other entities. So, a piece of jewellery that belonged to an ancestor might be included in

her shrine, perhaps because it is meant to represent her in some way, or perhaps because some of

102

her life force or essence is believed to now reside in the piece. A burial site is treated as sacred, not

for its own sake, but because of the human remains and the spirits of the ancestors who reside there.

A site such as Great Zimbabwe may also be regarded as sacred because an oracle is believed to

operate there – indeed the believed presence of the oracle might explain why the structure was

erected at this particular site in the first place.

This might possibly imply that artefacts and human-made structures which have been set aside for

spiritual purposes in this way should be taken to be morally considerable, in African thought.

However, these unnatural entities seem to fall into the category of the supernatural, rather than

simply the unnatural, because of their spiritual or religious meaning or purpose. Ordinary artefacts,

tools, buildings and works of art are not seen as sharing in our interconnectedness with nature, and

would not be morally considerable.

4.3.6 Summary: Morally Considerable Entities Entailed by African Thought

Thus far I have claimed that African thought on the environment is not absolutely anthropocentric,

and have shown that an emphasis on the interconnectedness of all nature provides an apparent

foundation for a requirement to treat nature and other natural entities with respect. This emphasis is

also at the root of communitarian conceptions that are so central to African thought, implying that

not only are animate individuals other than humans able to be morally considerable, so are groups

such as clans, families, ecosystems and species. I have considered a number of themes that suggest

that African worldviews regard a wide variety of objects as being morally considerable. These

include other natural living things: humans, animals and plants, natural inanimate objects such as

rocks, forests, rivers, the wind, and even minerals, as well as supernatural entities such as the dead

(in the form of ancestors), spirits and human-made artefacts and constructions set aside for sacred

103

purposes. To the non-African, the claim that inanimate objects or dead ancestors may have a life

force or be inhabited by spirits may appear strange and difficult to accept. It ought, however, to be

acknowledged that the consequence of believing that all of these objects have some ‘spiritual’ value

grants them a status at least akin to morally considerability. Whilst some mindsets have difficulty

with a belief in spirits, intangible life forces and the continued participation of dead ancestors in the

affairs of the living, it can still be appreciated that these African views do require a certain respect

for the environment, and especially all living things and natural things, which is largely absent from

the historically dominant anthropocentric and exploitative worldview of the West5.

4.4 Interconnectedness in the Web of Life as the Basis for Moral Considerability

Having identified entities to which African conceptions typically seem to grant moral

considerability, I now search for a single unifying criterion that is plausibly able to ground the

moral considerability of these identified entities. Believing in an interconnectedness of everything

in nature might well imply a healthier perspective on humanity’s position vis-à-vis the rest of

nature, than that entailed by traditional Western anthropocentric views. But, how does a claim that

everything in nature is interconnected provide a theoretical basis for thinking that all of these things

are morally considerable? Of the themes considered in the previous section, the one I find most

promising as providing the key to a plausible, single conceptual framework able to embrace the

implications of the others, is the notion of the interrelatedness of nature. Implicit in this notion is a

sense that natural objects share some basic ontological characteristic that entitles them to moral

considerability. This common characteristic is variously described as a life force, or an inhabiting

5 I return to a discussion of which of these entities I think can plausibly be taken to be morally considerable in section

4.5 below.

104

spirit or ancestor. But, however it is understood, what is important is that all these entities are

regarded as being interrelated. Clearly, the more metaphysical or spiritual accounts of a common

characteristic will not be readily accepted by people who do not hold believe the underlying

religious convictions. With this in mind, I now seek to articulate a more appealing conception of a

shared ontology, grounded in these traditional African ideas.

Sindima uses a construct more familiar to non-Africans to explain this worldview. He claims:

…the African understanding of the world is life-centred. For the African, life is the

primary category for self-understanding and provides the basic framework for any

interpretation of the world, persons, nature or divinity…. Part of the very process of

life involves a tendency toward self-transcendence, which itself aims for umunthu, or

the fullness of life. In the human sphere the process of life achieves fullness when

humans are richly connected to other people, other creatures and to the earth itself.

Humans realize their own fullness by realizing the bondedness of life (Sindima,

1990: 143).

What are we to make of the claim that this view is life-centred? As I have shown above, for many

Africans this worldview includes within the compass of the morally considerable not just living

human beings, but also other living animals and plants, spirits and the recently-dead (ancestors),

and ‘inanimate’ objects such as plants, rocks, rivers, etc. It also claims that fullness of life is

achieved only in connection, community, the bondedness of all life. The flourishing of individual

lives is almost inconceivable without strong communal bonds. So, groups such as species and

families and communities must also be morally considerable. But, in what sense can all of these

morally considerable entities be entailed by a ‘life-centredness’? How exactly can the term ‘life’

itself be understood in a way that could conceivably encompass all of these things? From a

105

Western biocentrist perspective, life is a biological thing, and each individual organism possesses

life, or has a life of its own, until it dies, physically. Such an understanding of a life-centred ethic

could certainly not account for regarding as morally considerable: inanimate objects, ancestors or

spirits (although, it might be able to make a case for the moral consideration of groups of living

organisms). If most of these entities can be morally considerable on an African conception of life-

centredness, the very concept of ‘life’ must need to be reconceptualised. Sindima might well

suggest this when he explains the ‘African vision of interrelatedness and bondedness with nature’

(Sindima, 1990: 143) as follows: ‘…nature and persons are one, woven by creation into one texture

or fabric of life, a fabric or web characterized by an interdependence between all creatures’

(Sindima, 1990: 143). Similarly, Oruka and Juma ‘…postulate pan-organism as the basic truth

underlying all nature… [This] means that all aspects of nature are interconnected, so that the

ecological activities are a network. So a break or imbalance in one aspect has serious consequences

in other aspects of the domain’ (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 122).

Life is not merely something possessed by individual organisms, it is conceived of as a ‘…woven…

texture or fabric of life, a fabric or web characterized by interdependence’ (Sindima, 1990: 143).

Life, on this account, is not merely something each individual living organism possesses, it is a

complex network of which any individual living thing is only a part. Furthermore, living things

fully have life only because of their interconnectedness with other things. It is as though life is

something one ‘plugs into’, rather than possesses. We share life, rather than own it. A river may

not have a good of its own, or interests in its own right, but its health and integrity provide the

medium that can sustain so much other life. So, it forms part of the web of life, even though it is

not, itself, alive. An ancestor may be physically dead, but her moral teachings, her example, and

perhaps her wisdom, still influence her human descendants, perhaps even affect their choices. So,

in this sense, an ancestor can be part of this web of life. Clearly all animals, organisms and plants

106

are part of life’s fabric. And groups, such as species or families or communities or ecosystems, are

subsets of the web of life.

If one understands life not merely as being possessed by individual things but as existing in an

interconnected web, a shared ‘fabric’ of life, then this African view may well be described as life-

centred. To distinguish it from more conventional biocentric or life-centred approaches, I refer to

this view as ‘web of life centred’. What grants moral considerability to an entity is not merely that

it has an individual life or telos of its own, but that it is part of the shared web or fabric of life. And

then on this view, all things that are part of this web of life, that themselves share or enable this life,

are morally considerable. Since everything that forms part of the web is in some way

interconnected or interdependent with other parts of the web, all of these entities need to be taken

into account morally. It seems to me, then, that the most plausible interpretation of the various

overlapping conceptions of moral considerability I have identified in African thought, is that they

ground moral considerability in being part of the interconnected web of life6.

My objective in this chapter is to identify a criterion of moral considerability based in African ideas

that is able to complement what I have called ‘African Relational Environmentalism’. That is to

say, that I seek to describe a plausible conception of moral considerability that is consistent with a

general ethical outlook in which natural individuals, communities and groups (including nature

itself) are respected by means of promoting harmonious relationships between them. This web of

life centred approach to moral considerability is able to do that. Sharing in the interconnected web

or fabric of life is what qualifies natural and even supernatural entities as morally considerable and

6 This web of life approach is reminiscent of Albert Schweitzer’s biocentrism. There are also parallels with some of the

fundamental characteristics of Deep Ecology.

107

worthy of respect. And because entities that form part of the web of life are morally considerable,

and they are all interrelated, harmonious relationships between persons and other parts of the web of

life are maintained. As Peterson claims

… [African] lifecentredness is oriented less toward individual entities (rocks vs. trees

vs. animals vs. people) and more toward the relations between them. More attention

is paid to processes and the flow of forces between entities than the entities

themselves. Emphasis falls on relating rather than existing since it is the quality and

nature of the relationship that determines whether the whole will sink or swim. The

relationship between any two entities affects all of the rest of life since all of life is

bonded (Peterson, 2004: 172).

No doubt, Western philosophers might be quick to object, fundamentally, to the notion that the ‘is’

of interconnectedness can imply the ‘ought’ of a moral requirement to maintain harmonious

relationships in nature. I acknowledge that this is a logical problem that cannot be ignored.

However, on many African accounts it is clear that the fact of interrelatedness is understood as

almost obviously providing grounds for an obligation to maintain harmonious relationships. Is this

simply another example of how easily people fall into the trap of assuming that an ‘ought’ is

implied by an ‘is’? I doubt it. The assuredness with which so many African voices claim that the

fact that we are interconnected entails that we are morally responsible for one another suggests to

me that something else may be at work here. Rolston provides insight that is helpful:

Ecological description [the “is”] finds unity, harmony, interdependence, stability, etc,

and these are valuationally endorsed [the “ought”]…. Still, the ecological description

does not merely confirm these values, it informs them; and we find that the character,

the empirical content of order, harmony and stability is drawn from, no less than

brought to nature…. What is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage and

108

mutual transformation of ecological description and evaluation here is that an

“ought” is not so much derived from an “is” as is discovered simultaneously with

it…. [I]t is difficult to say where the natural facts leave off and where the natural

values appear. For some observers, at least, the sharp is/ought dichotomy is gone;

the values seem to be there as soon as the facts are fully in, and both alike are

properties of the system (Rolston, 1989: 19-20).

Clearly, Rolston’s claims are predicated on the findings of ecological science, which are based in a

naturalistic sense of interdependence in nature, ecosystems and the biosphere. But, such views are

not all that far removed from the more metaphysical claims of interconnectedness in African

thought. And, in much the same way as Rolston suggests, the moral requirement to promote

harmonious relationships and the recognition that all things in the web of life are interconnected

seem to originate, or be discovered, together in African thought. The ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ come

about together, in some kind of symbiotic way.

4.5 The Plausibility of a Web of Life Criterion of Moral Considerability

So far I have mainly been concerned with simply describing a theory of moral considerability based

in African thought. I now turn to attempting to show that this approach is plausible. A web of life

centred theory of moral considerability might well be able to undergird African Relational

Environmentalism that prizes harmonious relationships between ourselves and nature. It might also

be able to account for how African thought can regard humans, other living things, animals and

plants, individuals and communities (including species and ecosystems) as morally considerable.

Generally, there is controversy about the moral considerabilty of all of the entities even in this list.

However, many respected philosophers have, in their work, defended the extension of moral

109

considerability to all of these things, and it is within the mainstream of environmental philosophy to

be able to conceive of such entities as being morally considerable. So, I will be bold enough to

defend the inclusion of all living organisms as well as groups of organisms as morally considerable

entities, without further argument. Far more controversial are the claims that inanimate natural

objects such as rocks, rivers or mountains might be morally considerable. And most controversial,

obviously, is the idea of including ancestors and spirits or religious artefacts or structures within the

scope of the morally considerable. I turn now to considering these two more controversial claims.

4.5.1 The Moral Considerability of Inanimate Natural Entities

The reason that the idea that inanimate objects can be said to be morally considerable is so

controversial is primarily that it is difficult to understand how it is possible to regard as morally

considerable entities that cannot be directly harmed. How can an agent have a moral duty to

something that has no good or even interests of its own? Nonetheless, there is something

philosophically attractive about the notion that inanimate natural objects that play a very important

role in holding the web of life together ought to be understood as being morally considerable. If we

consider a river, it does not matter to a river whether it is clear and pristine or polluted and toxic.

But, it does matter to the many other things that rely on the river for survival. Since a river is such a

life-supporting thing (or, in African terms, part of the web of life), surely we must take the river into

account in our ethical thinking. Perhaps even more pertinently, in these days of global warming and

climate change, although we may not ordinarily think of an ocean current as something to which we

can owe a direct moral duty, we must take into account the devastating repercussions on global

climate of significant changes in the flow of, say, the Gulf Stream. Thus, it seems that conceiving

of such entities as morally considerable might be attractive on the pragmatic grounds that, should

110

they be treated as being morally considerable, it might turn out to be for the good of many other

organisms, including humans.

Conceiving of inanimate natural objects as morally considerable flies in the face of the standard

definition of morally considerability that requires that we have direct and non-derivative moral

duties towards entities. But, despite this, we often use language that suggests that we do, in fact,

fairly routinely think about at least some inanimate natural things as though they are things that can

themselves be harmed or benefitted. It is not unusual for people to claim that effluent will ‘harm’ a

river, that a mining operation will ‘scar’ a landscape, or that pollution might ‘damage’ the

atmosphere. Of course, this could be put down to little more than imprecise or possibly allegorical

use of language. But, I surmise there may be more to it than just that. It seems that, implicit in such

expressions, is some sense in which we are inclined to regard certain inanimate natural things as

quasi-organisms. We are inclined to talk about specifically those natural inanimate entities that

seem to play a very significant role in sustaining the life of many other entities, such as natural

habitats like watercourses or forests or mountains, as though they have a good of their own.

Despite the theoretical concerns about this, there does seem to be something appealing about

thinking in this way, at least from the perspective of environmental ethics. Since a severely

polluted river is capable of doing enormous damage to all kinds of organisms and species,

conceiving of a river as having a good to be protected is at least pragmatically attractive if we hope

to protect the natural environment. In what follows I show that conceiving of such inanimate

natural entities as morally considerable is theoretically defensible, too.

The kind of entities I am focussing on in this section are natural things that play a systemically

important role in sustaining the flourishing of other living things. Essentially, they are

instrumentally important to life. I seek here to defend the idea that such entities can be morally

111

considerable. In a challenging article dealing with various kinds of moral value, Shelly Kagan

makes the claim that it is possible for things to be valued as ends, or to be ‘…worth having “for

their own sake’’’ (Kagan, 1998: 283) based on relational properties, and even on instrumentally

valuable properties. So, he suggests that the pen used by Abraham Lincoln when signing the

Emancipation Proclamation might be construed to be valuable for its own sake, exactly because of

its historically deeply significant instrumental value. Similarly, he claims that rare or uniquely

beautiful objects might be valued as ends, even though their value is grounded in a relational

property, namely, their rarity (Kagan, 1998: 282-287). If this view is at all plausible, then it is no

less conceivable that inanimate natural objects could be thought of as being morally considerable

because of their vital systemic contribution to the web of life. Their important instrumentality to

other life is a relational property that allows us to consider them (directly) worthy of being taken

into account morally. Their moral considerability is grounded in their instrumental and relational

value. Whether one accepts Kagan’s claims or not, if there is a case to be made that a river could be

thought to have final value because of its relational qualities, it is surely conceivable that the far less

radical claim that a river can be morally considerable might be plausible.

To press this claim further, I return to Lo’s distinction between moral considerability and moral

value that I cited earlier in this chapter. On his account, in contrast to moral value, moral

considerability is not something that we necessarily seek to promote or secure. It is used, rather, to

denote a category of entities whose ‘…existence, well-being, interest, preference, and/or some other

aspect of it ought to be directly (rather than derivatively) given positive weight in our moral

deliberation about actions that are likely to affect it’ (Lo, 2001: 355). It is true that rivers and the

like might not really have a well-being of their own, preferences or even interests. But, they can be

said have an existence which we would want to positively take into account in our moral

considerations. Now, if all that is required for moral considerability is that an entity can be said to

112

have an existence, then almost anything would be morally considerable, and there would appear to

be little point to the category at all. It is clear that Lo does not intend for us to make this inference,

so, she must be suggesting that there are at least some kinds of entities, whose mere existence is

something we ought to take into account morally. Just as Kagan thinks that very rare or historically

significant things could be thought to have value as ends in themselves, perhaps systemically

crucial inanimate natural objects can be said to be morally considerable simply for the sake of their

continued existence. One reason for this is precisely because of their important instrumental

systemic role in facilitating the thriving of other living things. But, taken on its own, this criterion

of instrumentally enabling the lives of other organisms could equally entail that a human-made

artificial fertiliser is morally considerable – an idea that seems neither theoretically attractive, nor

something entailed by African conceptions. What is still needed, then, is some way of accounting

for why the property of naturalness of an entity that contributes to the flourishing of many other

living things is what makes it morally considerable. Political scientist Robert E Goodin provides

just such an account. In writing about the values endorsed by the so-called ‘green’ political

movement, he describes what he calls the ‘green theory of value’. He claims that on this theory

What it is that makes natural resources valuable is their very naturalness. That is to

say, what imparts value to them is not any physical attributes or properties that they

might display. Rather it is the history and process of their creation. What is crucial

in making things valuable, on the green theory of value, is the fact that they have a

history of having been created by natural processes rather than by artificial ones

(Goodin, 1992: 27).

This should not be taken as a claim that only natural things can have final value. But, it does go

some way towards suggesting what it is about natural things, even inanimate natural things, that

makes their mere existence something that we ought to take into consideration. This idea resonates

113

with the ‘web of life’ criterion for moral considerability I have suggested. Rivers, forests, oceans,

lakes and possibly even certain geological formations are part of the web of life on the basis of their

history and the natural process of their coming into existence. They are morally considerable

because they have been forged by the natural processes of the earth alongside and inextricably

interconnected with the natural processes that continue to create and sustain life. They may not

have a good or interests of their own, but their existence is important enough for us to take them

into consideration.

Since the ethic I have proposed is one that requires us to demonstrate respect towards other morally

considerable entities by promoting harmonious relationships with them, an obvious question is how

it can be meaningful to conceive of having a harmonious relationship with a river or a forest. The

notion that such natural entities have a life force of their own perhaps suggests that they are

regarded as quasi organisms. Because their states so profoundly affect the well-being of other

organisms, we can think of them as though they are living themselves. On this basis, a river can be

said to be ‘sick’, if its condition causes the many things that depend upon it to not be well. The

good of the river is a function of its ability to promote the good of other things. A harmonious

relationship with a river entails treating it as though it is a living thing, and ensuring that our actions

do not cause it to no longer be able to support the life of other entities, as it should.

An objection to this view that inanimate natural objects are morally considerable lies in the fact that

it is sometimes difficult to make a clear distinction between what is natural and what is not; and if

this is so, appealing to ‘naturalness’ as a property that helps to establish moral considerability is

wrong-headed. In response to this objection, it must be acknowledged, from the outset, that there

are cases in which it is difficult to make a clear distinction between natural and unnatural entities.

One example is that of a lake created by the construction of a dam wall. When we construct such a

114

wall across a river, our human ingenuity and enterprise significantly changes the natural

environment both upstream and downstream from the wall. The human-made lake created

upstream will likely have dislocated human communities, and destroyed many plants and other

organisms, local habitats, and significantly changed the ecosystem. Similar changes would occur

downstream. The flow of water beyond the wall is now controlled, and seasonal conditions that

persisted for centuries no longer follow their historically normal patterns. However, the lake

created by the wall creates new opportunities for nature, for new habitats to flourish, and for

different species of living organisms to thrive. The natural world has been altered by human

activity, but, in a sense, although to some extent created by people, the lake has many of the

properties of a natural lake, and supports many life forms and ecosystems, the naturalness of which

is not reduced simply because human intervention has played a part in moulding the environment

that now supports them7. To this extent, such a lake may still be said to be part of the web of life.

To cause this new lake to become overgrown with algae, or polluted by toxic effluent, would

constitute damage to the web of life. Nature has been rapidly transformed, but it adapts, and a new

kind of natural world is brought into existence. Be this as it may, however, the fact that it may not

always be easy to distinguish natural entities from unnatural ones does not render the distinction

invalid. There will be cases where it is difficult, possibly even impossible, to make the distinction,

but, in the vast majority of cases, distinguishing natural entities from unnatural ones is neither

difficult nor particularly controversial. The distinction is, thus, valid.

7 The dam building activities of beavers similarly alter natural watercourses and change or, even, create ecosystems. Of

course, the effects of their activities are much smaller in scale than those resulting from human dam construction.

Nonetheless, if the environments changed by the activity of beavers can still be thought of as natural, so too can those

created by human activity.

115

4.5.2 The Moral Considerability of Supernatural Entities

Even more problematic than granting inanimate objects moral considerability are the more

metaphysical ideas that ancestors, spirits and objects (natural and unnatural, that have been chosen

and set apart for spiritual purposes) are morally considerable, because many people simply do not

share a belief in the possible existence of such spiritual entities. As with all spiritual or

metaphysical beliefs, one either accepts the metaphysics or one does not. It is therefore inadvisable

to include such contested conceptions in any theory of moral considerability that one hopes might

be plausible to a broad multi-cultural audience. For these reasons, I will not attempt to defend or

justify the moral considerability of such supernatural entities. Similarly, I would not try to justify

moral considerability grounded in the belief in an immortal human soul, in re-incarnation or the

principle of karma or any other similar metaphysical beliefs held only by some.

Nonetheless, I claim that there may be lessons to learn from such supernatural conceptions in

African thought. Firstly, the belief in ancestors implies a continuity and interdependence between

generations. However much Western philosophers may have agonised and debated whether we can

have moral obligations to future generations, it is almost a non-question in African thought. Inter-

generational moral accountability is intrinsic to the African world view. There is no possibility of

imagining that we do not owe it to future generations of living things that they inherit a world

capable of sustaining their lives8. Secondly, this should serve to remind us that in ethical decision

making one cannot simply ignore the spiritual or religious and even cultural ideas that people hold,

and that are often very important to them. The deeply held spiritual beliefs of people are an

important part of their sense of identity and solidarity with others, as well as their well-being, and

this is something we ought not to ignore when making ethical decisions.

8 I deal with the moral considerabilty of future generations in the next chapter.

116

4.6 The Promise of a Web of Life Approach to Moral Considerability

I now seek to compare this African perspective on moral considerability to more conventional

Western approaches and consider its potential as an alternative. How does a web of life theory of

moral considerability compare with other approaches? Clearly one would expect to find some

commonality with other life-centred or biocentric views, since they also entail that all living things

(at least) are morally considerable. However, this strand of African thought differs from biocentric

positions in two important respects.

Firstly, biocentrism is usually characterised as an individualist position, locating final value in

particular properties of individual organisms or in maximising utility for such individuals. The

African Relational Environmentalism I have been describing is strongly grounded in a

communitarian value system. I have claimed that the most promising aspect of this approach is its

refusal to prioritise individuals over the community or family of nature, or vice versa. As much as

some African thought apparently accord morals considerability to all individual living organisms, it

would seem to fly in the face of a fundamental communitarianism in African thought to imagine

that it would not also accord moral considerability to wholes such as species, ecosystems and the

biosphere.

Now, just as this view is distinct from biocentrism, it is also distinct from eco-centrism, or holist

conceptions in which the biosphere, species and/or ecosystems are accorded final value. One of the

persistent challenges facing holists is that its consequences appear to be unavoidably misanthropic.

If the needs of the biosphere always trump those of individual people or organisms, it is hard to see

why we should not then cull people to save the earth. Thus, holism been described by critics as

117

amounting to ‘environmental fascism’ (Palmer, 2003: 25). Can African thought, with its focus on

communitarianism escape these problems?

As I have said before, one of the greatest strengths of this African perspective is that it does not

prioritise individuals over groups or communities or vice versa. Grounding moral considerability in

belonging to a web of life entails promoting harmonious relationships between ourselves and other

parts of the web of life. Such a position is essentially communitarian, and yet individuals matter,

too. African Relational Environmentalism is neither biocentric, nor eco-centric, neither

individualist nor holist. It is relational, and it must therefore take into account the relationships and

connectedness of everything in nature. It seeks harmony, solidarity, respect and mutual co-

operation between persons, and between persons and other natural things.

4.7 Conclusion

An African emphasis on the interrelatedness or interconnectedness of everything in nature is the

foundation for a morality that prizes relationships that are harmonious between people and other

natural things. On this approach, anything natural that forms part of this complex web of life is

morally considerable. Such a view enables us to include within the scope of our moral

consideration criteria proposed by holists, eco-centrists, sentientists, and biocentrist individualists9.

In fact, it is able to expand this sphere even further by taking into account inanimate natural objects.

Perhaps the most apt description of this view is Tangwa’s claim that it is ‘eco-bio-communitarian’

(Tangwa, 2004: 389): essentially communitarian and relational, and thus able to embrace the most

9 I have only addressed the issue of moral considerability in this chapter. I will discuss the more nuanced notion of

moral status in Chapter 7.

118

useful aspects of both individualist biocentrism and holist eco-centrism, whilst avoiding their

extremes.

I am now also able to revise the definition I originally proffered for right action on African

Relational Environmentalism, to take into account what I have argued in this chapter: right actions

are those that demonstrate respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious

relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web.

119

5 THE MORAL CONSIDERABILITY OF FUTURE GENERATIONS IN

AFRICAN THOUGHT

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I considered what kinds of entities are morally considerable based on some

African notions and themes. I claimed that all entities that are part of the interconnected web of

life, that is all living things, groups of living things (species, ecosystems) as well as many inanimate

natural things (rivers, forests) warrant moral consideration. I did not address the temporal issue of

whether future entities are morally considerable, too. In the light of the importance of this question

for environmental ethics, I deal with this question now.

The prospect of the alarming possible consequences of inaction with respect to the issue of global

climate change has caused philosophers to pay increasing attention to the question of what moral

obligations we have towards future generations. A recent issue of the newsletter of the International

Society for Environmental Ethics speaks of an ‘astonishing growth of climate ethics and future

ethics’, pointing out that more than forty academic works have been published dealing with climate

change and responsibilities towards future generations since the previous issue of the newsletter

(Grove-Fanning, 2011: 2). The association between concerns about climate change and future

ethics is fairly obvious, and the increasing sense of urgency about the need for global action to

curtail anthropogenic global warming explains the dominance of these issues in recent

environmental ethical discourse. It also, however, highlights the fact that many environmental

problems in their very nature require moral agents to take account of longer term implications that

cross generations – in some cases, many generations. From the earliest days of the environmentalist

movement it has been clear that concerns about pollution, the depletion of non-renewable resources,

120

human population growth, and the loss of habitats and species are essentially concerns that will

affect not just the current generation, but future people, too.

It is by no means obvious that moral obligations towards posterity should be limited to future

generations of persons only. Indeed, a strong case can be made for taking future generations of all

morally considerable entities into account. However, if we are unable to coherently account for

moral duties to future persons, it is highly unlikely that we will be able to do so for other entities.

Furthermore, environmental pragmatists have already argued quite convincingly that a weakly

anthropocentric value system, coupled with taking a long-term, intergenerational view, is probably

enough to ensure the protection of the natural environment into the future. On these grounds, I

confine myself in most of this chapter to the question of obligations to future persons. I will turn to

the question of future generations of other species only once I have made a case for our duties to

future persons.

In this chapter I defend a thesis that there are two related African notions, both grounded in a

prominent belief that ancestors who have died, but continue to have a presence, are entitled to

respect, that are very promising in terms of grounding a claim that we do have moral obligations to

future generations. The first of these notions is the traditional African understanding that land is

not something that can be individually owned. It belongs to the community. Since the ancestors are

the guardians of the community, it is often said that the land belongs to them. The land, broadly

understood to mean the environment, is consequently not something we can treat in any way we

choose. This entails a direct obligation to future persons, since the land is a resource that must be

shared with others, including posterity. The second notion is a conception that entails an indirect

moral obligation towards future people, based on an obligation to predecessors: that the living need

to demonstrate gratitude to their ancestors by following their example and ensuring that their

121

descendants also inherit an environment capable of providing for their basic needs1. It is these two

African conceptions, that the environment is a resource shared by the clan as a whole, and that

gratitude to our predecessors obligates us to preserve the environment for posterity, that provide the

most promising contribution to the ongoing discourse about moral obligation towards future

generations. Together they work to establish future generations as morally considerable, too.

Indeed, I will show that it makes sense to conceptualise the web of life as something that transcends

generations, implying that future entities are morally considerable also by virtue of being parts of

the web of life. In the rest of this chapter I endeavour to show how this is so.

In order to demonstrate that these African conceptions have a valuable contribution to make to the

issue of inter-generational moral obligation, I first need to give a brief overview of the issue as it

has been dealt with in the dominant environmental ethical discourse of Western philosophy. It is

against this backdrop that I will be able to make a case that African thought might be capable of

providing promising alternative notions that help resolve some seemingly stubborn theoretical

concerns with respect to plausibly defending the idea that we have moral obligations to posterity.

On this basis, in the section that follows I turn to a discussion of Western philosophy’s on-going

debate about inter-generational moral obligation.

1 Even if it is generally agreed that the living ought to be grateful to their predecessors for preserving the environment

on their behalf, it is not immediately obvious how this might be thought to do the work of imposing a moral obligation

on the living to do the same for their descendants. I will initially simply describe this African notion, but will go on to

demonstrate how gratitude might be understood to impose moral duties to posterity on the living.

122

5.2 Western Philosophy and Inter-generational Moral Obligation

Ernest Partridge, who in 1976 wrote the first ever doctoral dissertation on the subject of moral

obligations to future generations, points out that the notions of future generations and posterity are

frequently used in journalism, political discourse, the popular media and literature, and that they are

matters of great interest to the public (Partridge, 2003: 428). Notwithstanding this observation, he

also highlights that, at the time he was writing, very little direct attention had been given by

philosophers to moral obligations towards posterity. He also draws attention to the obvious

association between concerns for the environment and future ethics. He rightly observes that it was

the growing realisation, in the nascent environmentalist movement, that human ingenuity and

dominance of nature implied that humanity had become capable of doing damage to the

environment on a scale never before possible - damage that would be permanent in some instances,

and have effects for many generations in others - that made it necessary for ethicists to begin to

seriously address our moral responsibilities towards the future (Partridge, 2003: 428-429). And,

indeed, no sound environmental ethic can now ignore the question of what (if anything) we owe to

posterity.

Partridge also correctly points out that when we begin to seriously consider our obligations to future

generations, it soon becomes clear that it is not as simple a matter as just extending our moral duties

towards contemporary persons to those who will exist in the future. There are, in fact many

theoretical problems that we encounter. Some of these are the following2:

1. Is it meaningful to talk about having responsibilities towards future beings? Future people

don’t actually exist yet. In what sense can we owe obligations to entities that don’t exist?

2 I am indebted to Partridge (Partridge, 2003: 429-432) for his discussion of many of the problems identified in this

section, but have liberally added some of my own observations and interpretations.

123

2. The very existence of future persons is contingent upon our actions in the present. Exactly

who will be born in the future will be determined by our choices now. For instance, any

decision taken by current persons to curtail human population growth, by having fewer

children than they might have had, will have the consequence of not bringing into being

whole possible future lineages of persons. How can we be said to have responsibilities to

future persons who will owe their very existence to our decisions in the present?

3. Many of our ethical obligations are expressed in terms of respect for persons as autonomous

individuals. But, we do not know who these future individuals will be. Can we still

meaningfully speak of respecting those whom we cannot actually know as individuals?

4. Moral obligations are often predicated on reciprocity. We take others into account at least

partly because we can expect them to do the same for us. This clearly cannot apply to future

generations, as they are simply not capable of reciprocating our provision for them. Are we,

then, morally obliged to take into account the needs of those who cannot return the favour?

5. Contractualist moral theories are typically unable to account for duties to future generations

because future people cannot participate in the negotiating of a social contract3.

6. Not only do we not know who future people will be, we also do not know what their actual

needs and interests will be. People a few generations from now might have discovered a

new source of renewable energy, rendering attempts on our behalf to conserve non-

renewables such as oil and coal for their sake unnecessary. Furthermore, the development

needs of the current generation might have been unfairly compromised by our conservation

3 John Rawls and Edith Weiss have attempted to broadly account for some kind of obligation to posterity in their

contractualist theories, however (Partridge, 2003: 430-432).

124

efforts. How can we make provision for the future without knowing what their needs will

be?

7. All of the above combine to create a significant motivational problem. Even if we are

convinced that we do have moral responsibilities to future persons, the fact that future

people do not actually exist, are contingent, cannot be known by us as individuals, cannot

reciprocate our provision for them, and will have interests and needs we cannot now know,

make it very difficult for us to find the motivation to make provision on their behalf.

Furthermore, many actions taken on behalf of posterity now could be very personally costly

for the current generation. Motivating living persons to voluntarily impose limitations on

their own prosperity for the sake of indefinite future people is obviously a difficult task,

especially since posterity is not able to reward or punish us, or hold us in any way

accountable for our actions4.

8. Assuming we do have moral responsibilities towards the future, we still need to ask how far

into the future those obligations extend. If, for instance, we are obliged to conserve

resources for the use of posterity, would that not imply that we need to forbear using almost

anything for ourselves, since any use now would deprive some distant generation of goods

they might otherwise have had? Does such a notion not impose an intolerable moral burden

on current persons? Some suggest that perhaps, then, we ought to ‘discount’ our moral

obligations to posterity is a similar way to the economists discounting the future value of

assets. This would entail a diminishing of our degree of responsibility the further into the

4 Some might wonder whether the issue of motivation to act is properly a concern of ethics. However, given the serious

potential consequences of the current generation not taking action to try to ensure a habitable environment for the

future, if motivational considerations might seriously hamper our ability to make the correct moral choices, it seems to

me that addressing these issues becomes a matter ethicists are required to consider.

125

future generations are from us. But, do we have a right to deprive distant generations of the

possibility of a decent life simply because they are so far from us in temporal terms? And,

are there not some environmental goods that simply cannot be discounted in this sort of

manner?

9. Any notion of moral obligations towards future persons fairly obviously invites questions of

whether future persons have corresponding rights. The plausibility of such rights has been

questioned by many theorists, on many of the grounds mentioned above.

These theoretical concerns and related issues have been the subject of much philosophical enquiry

in the last few decades, and continue to occupy the minds of many philosophers. I will not attempt

to give a comprehensive account of the literature in the field, here. Rather, I will turn my attention

to African thought in an effort to identify any pertinent African moral conceptions that have a

bearing on some of these issues, and explore how they are able to contribute to the ongoing

discussion.

5.3 Moral Obligations to Future Generations in African Thought

When considering obligations to future generations in African thought, one key factor is the

pervasive belief that the ancestors continue to exert an influence over the lives of their living

descendants, guiding their behaviour, and, on some accounts, even punishing and rewarding them.

These beliefs continue to play an important role in African life, across all strata of society. The

ancestors are to be treated with respect, and this necessarily entails that the living owe certain

obligations towards them. Thus, Wiredu writes:

Of all the duties owed to the ancestors none is more imperious than that of

husbanding the resources of the land so as to leave it in good shape for posterity. In

this moral scheme the rights of the unborn play such a cardinal role that any

126

traditional African would be nonplussed by the debate in Western philosophy as to

the existence of such rights. In upshot there is a two-sided concept of stewardship in

the management of the environment involving obligations to both ancestors and

descendants which motivates environmental carefulness, all things being equal

(Wiredu, 1994: 46).

According to Wiredu, it is inconceivable in African thought that the present generation does not

have moral obligations towards future generations. Whilst the notion that we owe something

morally to unborn generations has been the subject of much contestation in Western philosophy, it

is taken as almost obvious by Africans. Wiredu suggests that the present generation has a dual

moral responsibility to previous and future generations. To past generations of ancestors, Africans

owe both respect and gratitude, since, among other things, it was their responsible stewardship of

the environment (or ‘the resources of the land’) that left nature in a condition that was beneficial to

the current generation. Gratitude towards the ancestors is realised by continuing to care for nature

in the present, and emulating the example of previous generations, by ensuring that the next

generation also inherits an environment ‘in good shape’. This implies a sense of direct moral

obligation towards future generations in terms of ensuring that the natural world they inherit is able

to continue sustaining their lives. This is essentially a claim that distributive justice applies across

generations: a claim of inter-generational justice (Wiredu, 1994: 46). As expressed by Wiredu, this

is a sense of anthropocentric inter-generational justice. Succeeding generations of human beings

have a moral responsibility to the generations of people to come.

Other African writers make similar claims. Bujo confirms this association between duties to

ancestors and an obligation to future generations, claiming that the African ‘ethical community’

extends beyond the living and includes the ancestors. They play a role in guiding the moral life of

the community, one which continues after their bodily death, and involves ensuring the continued

127

strength of their descendants (Bujo: 1998: 27). Murove, writing about Ukama (a word for

‘relationality’ used by many in Zimbabwe) suggests that this ethic entails moral responsibility for

the well-being of future persons and that maintaining harmonious relationships in the present

represents a promise to ensure similar relationships with the future. Current well-being is also seen

as having been contributed to by the past. Murove associates what he calls the ‘immortality of

values’ (Murove, 2004: 18) with the pervasive belief in ancestors:

The ethical aspiration of doing good beyond the grave is an explicit expression of

immortality of values. In the same vein, this ethical ideal can be discerned in the

Shona notion of ancestorhood – a notion that is mainly based on the conviction that

there is solidarity between the past, present and the future. Those who are still living

re-enact their relatedness with the past through rituals of remembrance, the living

(the present) enter into communion or fellowship with their ancestors (Murove 2004:

184).

He refers to Bujo’s description of a sense of community between the present and their ancestors as

‘anamnestic solidarity’. The living maintain the memory of those who have come before, sharing

their lives with their ancestors in order to ensure harmony into the future. The life experience of

the current generation is understood as being grounded in the past, and ‘…the present will

contribute to its own existence into the future when it has become the past. Through anamnestic

solidarity, the communal life of the living (the present) and that of the ancestors (the past) is re-

enacted as a gift to be shared and passed on to posterity’ (Murove 2004: 184). Pointing in particular

to concerns about energy use and population policy, Amuluche Nnamani claims that as current

concerns for the environment grow more pressing, we find ourselves needing to broaden our sense

of the scope of our moral obligations, to include future generations within the ambit of our moral

duties, and to grant moral standing to future persons (Nnamani, 2005: 396).

128

Clearly, then, there is a strong ethical tradition in African thought that might be said to include

future generations in the web of life. This is often expressed in terms of including not just the

living, but also ancestors and descendants in the ethical or moral community. Given the strong

sense of communitarianism in African thought, it is not unexpected that the term ‘community’ is

used in this way. However, to avoid the confusion that could arise as a consequence of using the

word ‘community’ in too many distinct senses, I will speak instead of a ‘moral circle’. By this I

mean the set of entities that are morally considerable. Whereas ‘moral community’ might easily be

thought to imply a grouping with reciprocal moral obligations towards one another, ‘moral circle’

does not suggest such reciprocity. This seems more appropriate for a notion that is meant to include

contingent, future beings that do not yet exist, within the set of morally considerable entities.

In African thought, then, future and past generations are included in the moral circle. They are also

part of the web of life. The life force that all entities share is not shared just with those entities that

are currently alive, but also with those that have come before, and those that are yet to be. The

interconnectedness of the parts of the web of life transcends generations. Thus, future generations

are part of the web of life, even if they are not currently actually alive, and on African Relational

Environmentalism, they are also ex hypothesi morally considerable. So, harmonious relationships

need to be promoted, through solidarity, sharing and mutual support, not just amongst the living,

but in a trans-generational sense, too. Clearly future people cannot reciprocate the efforts made by

the present on their behalf, but this does not free the living from moral responsibilities towards the

yet to be born, not on this African view, at least.

129

5.4 How Reasonable is The View that Future Generations are Part of the Web of Life?

African thought may well regard the moral circle as being trans-generational, and see future

generations as part of the interconnected web of life, and, therefore, morally considerable.

However, just because Africans might think in this way does not mean that it is reasonable or

justified. Most people simply do not conceive of future generations as sharing in an interconnected

web of life, in the first place. To base moral considerability of posterity on this belief is

problematic for those who do not share the belief. Thus, I need to argue that this notion is

reasonable. Rather than trying to argue for the claim that it is reasonable to believe in an

interconnected trans-generational web of life of which we in the present are merely a part, I tackle

this from the other direction. I seek to defend the claim that it is reasonable to think that we have

moral obligations towards future generations. If we have moral duties to them, then, by definition,

it is reasonable to describe them as morally considerable. I do not need to convince others to

believe in a trans-generational interconnected web of life; I only need to convince them that it is

reasonable to hold that future generations are morally considerable. And, to do that, I start with the

African claim that we have some kind of moral obligation to them. I need to explain what this

obligation is, as well as show why it is, in fact, an obligation.

In part, this obligation might be explained in terms of Murove’s notion of an ‘immortality of

values’: communal or cultural moral values are passed on from each generation to the next. One of

these inherited values is that the environment should be protected for the sake of posterity. So,

succeeding generations simply learn to take future generations into account. However, whilst this

may be useful in an explanatory sense, it is not philosophically satisfying to ground moral

obligation in nothing more than values that are passed down through generations. This does little to

validate or justify such values as morally sound. It seems, therefore, that I will need to make more

130

of the conception that gratitude towards preceding generations somehow grounds some kind of

indirect moral obligation towards future persons. This I will seek to do in a later section, but before

turning to that, I need first to consider the other, possibly more fundamental, African conception

that is also of relevance to understanding an African sense of inter-generational moral obligation:

an understanding of the environment as a shared resource, based on an African sense of land

ownership. This conception accounts for a direct obligation to posterity.

5.4.1 Ownership of Land and Moral Obligation to the Future

It is common to distinguish a traditional African sense of ownership or property from the Western

notion of individual or personal ownership. Despite a history of many generations in which

Western views of land ownership have prevailed, many Africans still prefer to understand the land

as a communal rather than an individual asset. This is frequently expressed in terms of the land

belonging to the ancestors, rather than the currently living. Part of the role of the ancestors is to act

as guardians of the land, ensuring that it remains available to the community through indefinite

time. So it might be thought that the land belongs to a community, but the community is something

conceived of as existing over many generations, including past and future members. The land, then

is a resource to be shared, even with other generations. This notion of land may also be understood

in a Leopold-like sense, as representing more than just a geographically definable piece of earth,

and embracing the environment more broadly. Communal environmental goods are to be shared.

Thus, Matthew Izibili appeals to the notion of a mortgage that future people hold over the present

with respect to the environment. On his account natural goods cannot be understood as actually

belonging to any person or community, and each successive generation ought to regard the

environment as something it has received on loan. Each generation ought to return the environment

in at least as good or better a condition as it was when it first ‘borrowed’ it. On these grounds he

131

goes on to affirm the claim that an important duty of public authorities and governments is to

promote the conservation of the ‘environmental common good’ (Izibili, 2005: 383).

The notion of land being something that is communally owned is contentious, and might be rejected

by those who regard private ownership as a fundamental aspect of an orderly society. However, I

am by no means making an argument here for the desirability, or otherwise, of private land

ownership. In the context of the question being addressed, what is important is the attitude we have

towards the environment. If we regard it as something we share across generations, as something

that is given to us to use for our benefit, but that needs to be handed on to future generations for

their use, we are more likely not to abuse it, than if our attitude is that it is ours to do with as we

will. If we are convinced that we should regard the environment as a common good, shared

between generations, something more on loan to the current generation, rather than owned by it,

then it is easy enough to argue that future generations are morally considerable since we currently

have the use of goods (the environment) that we ultimately share with them. If we overuse, abuse

or damage the environment we rob future generations of part of their inheritance. We have a direct

moral obligation towards them with respect to how we treat our shared inheritance, the

environment.

5.4.2 Gratitude and Moral Obligation to the Future

The second African notion that I have identified that holds promise for accounting for why we have

obligations to posterity, and why future generations are morally considerable, is the idea that out of

gratitude to our predecessors we have an indirect moral duty to posterity to use the environment

responsibly and treat it with circumspection. In this section I will try to show how gratitude is able

ground a moral obligation to the posterity, as well as explain what that obligation consists in.

132

I have pointed out that many Africans think that since they have inherited the environment from

their predecessors in a state which enables their continued livelihood, they ought to show respect

and gratitude to their ancestors by emulating the example of their predecessors, and by preserving

the environment for posterity. By including past and future generations in the moral circle, they are

understood as part of the web of life, and harmony and solidarity with them is also morally

required. What remains unclear, however, is exactly how being grateful to predecessors is able to

entail some kind of indirect moral duty towards posterity.

A noteworthy aspect of an African sense of moral obligations towards the future lies in the close

association between duties to ancestors and duties to descendants. Here we have a sense in which it

is understood that, at least in part, what we do to ensure the well-being of future people is an

indirect duty towards them - one derived from a direct duty to our forebears. Clearly, taken

literally, the idea that we can have on-going duties to the dead that extend beyond commonly held

duties of respect for their memory, posthumous wishes and bodily remains, and entail duties to

future persons is not particularly easy to come to terms with theoretically. This is especially so,

since the moral obligation thought to be imposed by gratitude to the ancestors is directed not

towards them, but to another object altogether. Even more debatable is the idea that the dead can

continue to influence the living by punishing and rewarding them. So, it might seem as if this

notion is of little relevance except to those who hold the highly contested metaphysical beliefs that

undergird it. It might then be easy to write the idea off as a notion of quaint anthropological interest

and little more. Some might be inclined to disregard this conception on the grounds that the belief

that the dead continue to influence lives in the present is irrational, rendering any moral obligations

grounded in this belief questionable. However, what does the real work of imposing duties towards

future generations on the present is not necessarily the belief that ancestors can influence those

133

living in the present. What is significant, here, is a sense that each generation should demonstrate

gratitude to those who have come before, for doing what they could to ensure their well-being.

This, in turn, is understood to impose an obligation on each generation to treat future generations in

like fashion.

For a notion of gratitude to entail moral obligation towards a party other than the one to whom we

are grateful, it would need to be construed as something more than an affective response, less an

emotion, and more a general attitude or predisposition to see the world in a certain way. A.D.M.

Walker distinguishes between ‘gratitude’ and ‘gratefulness’, preferring the latter term as a better

descriptor of an attitude than the former. He argues that gratefulness does not always require an

object: someone or something towards which it is directed. We may be grateful for good weather

on a picnic day without being grateful to anyone or anything in particular for the suitable weather.

Walker defines grateful people as those who respond to the good favour that others and life has

bestowed upon them by developing a character that is disposed to gratefulness (Walker, 1980-81:

45-51). I do not see any pertinent reason for following Walker’s linguistic distinction between

gratitude and gratefulness. But, his distinction between gratitude as an emotional response and as

attitude of mind is helpful. When one thinks about gratitude more as an attitude, than as an

emotional response, it seems to take on the nature of what we typically describe as a virtue. It is

prima facie plausible that a person who is predisposed to gratitude, who has cultivated the virtue of

gratefulness, might well feel compelled to show favour or benevolence towards another to whom

she does not directly owe gratitude. To explain how this might work a little more clearly, I turn to

Michael McCullough’s psychological treatment of the notion of gratitude. He claims that

Like hope, one of the key psychological processes governing gratitude may be a

mindful awareness – specifically, awareness of how one’s life is held together

through the benevolent actions of other people. Grateful people, on recalling a

134

positive outcome in their lives, are mindful of the causal agents … who have acted in

ways that benefitted them…. [G]rateful people… pay attention to the ways in which

their lives are connected to other events and activities occurring in the social, natural,

and (for some people) supernatural world (McCullough, 2002: 303).

This brings us rather nicely back to an African sense of moral obligation grounded in

interconnectedness, to the idea of a web of life. We could not have experienced the good benefits

of a natural world capable of sustaining our lives had our predecessors not sought to preserve the

environment on our behalf. We should be mindful insofar that others have made these benefits

possible, and as a result, we should cultivate a virtue of gratitude, which may include a general

disposition to show favour to others, even if we have no reason to be grateful to them directly.

It still remains to me to make a case that developing a character of gratefulness might be capable of

establishing some kind of actual obligation towards others. A grateful person might be inclined to

bestow favour on others, but this would not necessarily impose a duty of benevolence on her.

Walker provides examples of obligations of gratitude within social institutions. He correctly claims

that we find it perfectly reasonable to think that children are under some obligation to demonstrate

gratitude by caring for their aging parents, and that hospitality ought to be reciprocated. For

Walker, such obligations are grounded in considerations of fairness: ‘…it is unfair to profit from the

efforts of others within a set of institutional arrangements and not reciprocate ourselves when the

principles of the institution require this’ (Walker, 1980-81: 40). What is most significant, here, is

that in co-operative social institutions, reciprocating the good others do in our behalf, seems right

because it would be fair. Now, this idea of fairness may well account for a duty of gratitude

expressed in caring for aging parents (in essence, reciprocating the care parents bestowed on their

children in the first place) and a duty of gratitude to those who have acted hospitably towards us by

demonstrating hospitality to them in return (again, a matter of reciprocity), but is it able to explain

135

how we may be obliged to preserve the environment for future generations as part of a debt of

gratitude we owe our predecessors? The problem of course, is that we cannot actually reciprocate

what our predecessors have done for us with respect to leaving us a healthy environment. We

cannot repay them in kind, because what we do to the environment will not affect them. That said,

though, if we have developed the virtue of gratitude, this virtue would seem very shallow if it did

not cause us to reflect on the fact that although we cannot reciprocate in kind to our predecessors,

we can reciprocate, indirectly, by doing the same for our descendants. Perhaps, if we are able to

recognise that our current well-being is owed to what our forebears did for us, it is not too much of

a push for us to think that we ought to reciprocate in some way, and the only and most virtuous way

of doing this would be to accept a moral obligation to treat our descendants as our predecessors

have treated us.

It may yet be objected that there is something just not quite right about the idea that our gratitude to

those who have benefitted us ought to be demonstrated in treating others (who have not benefitted

us) favourably. The idea that gratitude to one object can impose an obligation on us to treat some

other object in a particular way may still seem indefensible to some. To defend this notion any

further, I appeal to some basic moral intuitions. In her treatment of gratitude and obligation,

Claudia Card notes that with respect to responsibilities of gratitude, ‘Some responsibilities are

naturally carried out in relation to still other persons: a hitchhiker may pick up future hitchhikers,

for example, or a student give help and encouragement to newer students’ (Card: 1988: 120). A

hitchhiker, kindly offered a ride by a stranger has little to offer his benefactor other than an

expression of thanks. However, it does not seem at all strange that should the hitchhiker one day be

in a position to provide a ride to another person who needs it, he may feel that his gratitude for past

kindness would be best expressed in now helping a completely different stranger. A paradigmatic

example of demonstrating gratitude by extending favour to someone other than the person who has

136

treated us well is that of mentorship. Many in the academic world have been fortunate enough to be

taught and advised by individuals who have taken it upon themselves to go far beyond the call of

duty in taking a personal interest in developing their academic skills and careers. They realise that

they can never repay the favour to their mentors. But often, out of a sense of gratitude, they see it

as incumbent upon themselves to emulate the example of their mentors, by similarly investing in the

development of their own students in the future. So, too, might we come to think that gratitude to

our predecessors might best be expressed in ensuring that future generations inherit an environment

equally able to sustain their lives.

What is required on an African notion of trans-generational moral obligation is developing an

attitude of gratitude, a cultivated habitual response of gratefulness grounded in acknowledging

those who have provided for us in the past. Such a virtue of gratitude would be hollow and

meaningless without a corresponding commitment to treat future generations equally as kindly as

we had been treated. Thus, it is reasonable to think that we can have such an indirect duty towards

future generations. It is likely that this backward-looking notion of duties to posterity is one of the

most significant contributions African thought can make to our conception of moral obligations to

the future. I do not claim that this African perspective is unique, as I suspect that similar notions

undergird a general moral intuition shared by many other non-Western cultures. Nonetheless, it

does seem able to offer helpful insights to the theoretical discourse on inter-generational moral

obligation that has engaged Western philosophy for some decades now. Interestingly, some

Western philosophers at least are able to offer further support to these conceptions, as I hope to

show in the following section.

137

5.5 Western Philosophical Support for Duties to Posterity Based on Gratitude

Whilst Western philosophers have primarily concerned themselves with inter-generational

obligations only with respect to the future, some Western writers have also suggested that a

backward-looking sense of moral duty is of relevance. Daniel Callahan argues that we should

conceive of society as a partnership between past, present and future generations (Callahan, 1981:

76-7).

That we exist at all puts us in debt to those who conceived us – our parents – and in

debt to the society in which we were born, without which we might have been

conceived but could not have survived (for our parents were not sufficient unto

themselves). We could not exist had not someone and some society taken some

responsibility for our welfare (Callahan, 1980: 77).

According to Callahan, if we in any way value our lives, then we ought to value and recognise an

obligation towards those who made our lives possible, not only our own parents, but also the society

that contributed to our ability to survive. This obligation of gratitude to the past further entails

obligations to future generations: to ensure that they are provided with at least as much as we were,

and even to ‘…an amelioration of those conditions which, in our own life… lessened our

possibilities for living a full human life’ (Callahan, 1980: 77). He points out that in addition to an

obvious biological association between generations, current generations exist only because of the

provision of their predecessors. He claims that this is most obvious when considering succeeding

generations, but applies to generations separated by greater periods of time, too. He concludes with

a statement very reminiscent of some of the claims of African scholars above: ‘To live at all is to

be linked in an inextricable way to the past, and to be a determinant of future generations’

(Callahan, 1980: 77).

138

In discussing Western treatments of inter-generational obligation, John O’Neill describes a

…temporal myopia that infects modern society. The question of obligations to future

generations is posed in terms of abstract obligations to possible future people who

are strangers to us. The argument is premised on the lack of a sense of continuity of

the present with both the past and the future (O’Neill, 1993: 46).

He claims that succeeding generations of people in the past acknowledged moral obligations to

posterity. He argues that modern Western thinking has lost a conception of being part of a family

or community with a sense of identity that spans generations. In times when land was perceived as

a communal possession of groups or families over an extended period of time, each generation saw

itself as members of a ‘collective’ that existed over many generations. Such a sense of continuity

has been lost by modern society, with its strongly individualist bent and its notion of individual

private ownership (O’Neill, 1993: 47). O’Neill’s insights closely echo the African conceptions of

an inter-generational moral circle and of nature as being a shared resource, which are the focus of

this chapter. It is interesting to note that on O’Neill’s account it is modern Western thought that

seems out of synch with a basic intuition that we have moral obligations to future generations,

because it (seemingly alone) is a worldview which fails to understand the moral circle as one that

transcends generations, including past, present and future persons in a collective. Indeed a sense of

temporal continuity of the moral circle is not a salient feature of either utilitarian or respect-based

moral theories.

The African notion of a continuity between generations insists that we have an obligation to respect

our ancestors, and that this respect should be realized in an attitude of gratitude. The idea that we

can have obligations to past people, persons who have already died, has also been defended by

Western philosophers. In a paper dealing broadly with the concept of obligations to the dead,

Antoon de Baets acknowledges that whilst the dead cannot have rights or responsibilities, this does

139

not imply that the living have no responsibilities to the dead. At the very least, he postulates, the

dead deserve respect. Indeed, he goes on to argue, the dead have a dignity as ‘former human

beings’, a ‘posthumous dignity’ (de Baets, 2004: 136). He clarifies that this is not the same as the

human dignity of the currently living, but holds that is a related form of dignity, nonetheless. On

this basis, he argues for a number of specific responsibilities the living have towards the dead. He

defends his claims in a number of ways which are not particularly pertinent for this discussion. But,

he points to a fundamental reality that lies at bottom of his main claim, namely that all societies

seek to treat their dead with some degree of dignity. He does not link respect for the dead with

providing fairly for future generations, but his idea provides some theoretical grounding for a notion

that we might be said to have obligations, such as gratitude and promise keeping to those who are

already dead (de Baets, 2004: 136-137).

O’Neill interestingly argues that there are ways in which future persons can even be said to harm or

benefit persons in the present and past. Rejecting a subjectivist conception of well-being, according

to which only that which can be felt or experienced as good promotes well-being, he claims that

notions of honour and reputation rely on the objective recognition of others deemed competent to

judge our achievements. On such objectivist grounds it makes sense to speak of posthumous

honour, and there is some sense in which the reputation of those who have died can be harmed or

promoted by future people. It is on these grounds that he argues that our obligations to future

generations cannot be theoretically supported unless modern people overcome their ‘temporal

myopia’ and begin to see generations not in isolation, but as sharing in a collective that spans

generations. Only then can we rightly (on his account) consider our current projects in the light of

their impact on the future (O’Neill, 1993: 46).

140

5.6 African Communitarianism as a Crucial Aspect of Inter-generational Justice

I return now to the other African conception that I have claimed offers promise for our

understanding of moral obligation to posterity: the notion that the environment is a shared or

common good. This idea is able to rescue inter-generational obligation from a narrow partialism in

which succeeding generations do little more than try to ensure the well-being of future members of

their own families – what Furio Cerutti refers to as ‘generational nepotism’ (Cerutti, 2010: 497).

Since the kinds of environmental concerns that require us to take future generations into account

(depletion of resources, climate change, etc.) are of a global nature, they will not be adequately

addressed by each person merely being concerned for her own children and grandchildren. What is

needed is a notion that requires the current generation as a whole to take into account the needs of

whole future generations, extending far further than just the next few and encompassing future

people who are not directly related to us.

An African sense of intergenerational justice must be understood in communitarian terms. At its

most basic level it surely entails parents caring for their own offspring. But, it necessarily extends

moral obligation beyond just immediate family, and includes the whole community. A communal

sense of identity and solidarity lies at the heart of African ethics. This is key to African relational

ethics. Coupled with a sense that the natural environment is not something that can be individually

owned, but is rather shared and taken on loan, as it were, whole generations, as a collective, might

be said to have an obligation to preserve the natural environment for future generations, also as

collectives. O’ Neill argues that the modern notion of individual ownership of land lies at the root

of a loss of a sense of identity with past and future generations, collectively. Many of the

theoretical problems associated with moral obligations to posterity arise precisely because the issue

is framed in individualist, rather than communal terms (O’Neill, 1993: 47). It is true that we cannot

141

know the individuals who will exist in the future as individuals, we cannot respect their individual

dignity, nor can we ascribe individual rights to them. However, in a paper dealing specifically with

establishing rights for future persons, Edith Weiss claims that some of the theoretical concerns

about such rights might be overcome if we re-cast our notion of rights in terms of group, rather than

individual rights. She maintains that generational rights are best conceived as group, or communal

rights. ‘Generations hold these rights as groups in relation to other generations – past, present and

future’ (Weiss, 1996: 611-612). We do not need to know who the individuals are who will make up

a future generation as a group to conceive of that generation as having moral claims upon our

generation. This resonates strongly with African thought, in which the importance of solidarity and

identity is stressed. And, it is possible that ethicists might find it less difficult to make a case for

future rights if they cast them in a communal rather than a typically Western individualist mould.

Whether it is desirable or necessary to frame moral obligations to posterity in terms of rights held

by future generations is not particularly germane to the case I am trying to make here. What is

important is that an African sense of our moral circle crosses generations, and establishes an

obligation to treat the natural environment as a shared inheritance with past and future generations,

not only of our own family, but of the community as a whole.

Some might still wonder, however, whether there is not an essential parochialism to an African

notion of moral obligation towards future generations. If the notion is rooted in a sense of

continuity between predecessors and descendants, perhaps the scope of the inter-generational moral

circle extends little further than one’s own clan, tribe or people. And, indeed it would be foolhardy

not to acknowledge this is a real possibility. However, in writing about the rights of future persons,

Nnamani describes the moral community in global terms:

142

What is the basis for granting rights to people who do not yet exist? One may ask.

The answer would come: because they are part of our ‘moral community’5. What is

a moral community? We can see it as the community of all those who have the world

as their common patrimony, with duties to preserve it and rights to be sustained by it.

It is a community of predecessors and successors in the one world in which we live.

We may liken this to the traditional understanding of community, which includes the

ancestors (the living and the dead), the living, and the unborn, as bonded together

with duties and rights in the mother earth6 (Nnamani, 2005: 396).

Nonetheless, whether a more traditional African ethos of inter-generational moral obligation was

parochial in its scope or not, in our modern globalised context, armed with an ecological

understanding of the inter-dependencies between ecosystems, and the global reach of the

consequences of some of our actions, it is easy to now recognise that the scope of the moral circle is

indeed global.

An African sense of a moral circle that is trans-generational also helps us to address the temporal

concern that a notion of moral obligation to posterity might fail to entail a strong enough duty

towards generations further away in time than just a few generations. Many environmental

problems are characterised by the fact that actions in the present are capable of causing harms into

the quite distant future – nuclear waste storage and the continued reliance on fuel sources that

produce greenhouse gasses are cases in point. It appears, then, that a truly sound environmental

ethic must be able to account for duties towards distant future generations. Partridge argues that if

5 Once again, the notion of a ‘moral community’ is appealed to. Whilst this is Nnamani’s preferred term, it can be taken

to mean the same thing as the ‘moral circle’ I employ.

6 I deal directly with a sense of partiality in African thought in Section 6.7

143

we see our obligations to the future in terms of a chain of succeeding obligations in which each

generation is concerned for its own children and grandchildren, and the generations of which they

are part, this

presents a ‘discounting’ problem even more severe than that of the economists, for a

parent’s love and concern for a child is generally greater than for a grandchild, and

so on, diminishing to insignificance within a very few generations (Partridge, 2003:

433).

Passmore is more optimistic about the possible effectiveness of a chain of generations each looking

out for the interests of the generation or two ahead. He speaks about the love that parents have for

children, grandchildren, etc. And he points out that even though it might be stretching a point to

conceive of a person actually loving their grandchildren’s grandchildren, this does not preclude

them from being concerned for these distant relatives. In loving one’s own grandchildren one

anticipates that they will love their grandchildren in the same way, making it impossible to simply

ignore the needs of more distant generations. He quotes Macfarlane Burnett as saying: ‘I want to

spare my grand-children from chaos and to hope that they will see their grand-children getting

ready to bring a stable ecosystem into being’ (Passmore, 1981: 54). Cerutti rescues this notion from

a seemingly too parochial conception by claiming that

…we cannot possibly allow ourselves to break this trans-generational chain of

elementary solidarity and fairness that has given and is supposed to give every

generation of parents a chance to take care of their children in an Earth that is still in

an acceptable state. Until recently this chain was matter-of-fact, but now it should

become conscious, since it is no longer a given that each generation will leave the

earth and atmosphere in a state in which parents can implement the fundamental

relationship of trust with their children… For me this chain argument has a better

144

chance of motivating us to feel responsible for future humanity and thus to act with a

sense of benevolence towards them (Cerruti, 2010: 498).

Given an African perspective on trans-generational obligation that is strongly communitarian in

nature, stressing communal solidarity across generations, it is plausible that such a conception of

obligation to posterity would not limit our moral duties to only the next generation or two,

particularly when a fundamental aspect of such duties is a duty to allow succeeding generations the

possibility to care for their own descendants. It matters little how far into the future our focus needs

to be, future people have a claim to a natural environment, as a shared common good, that is able to

sustain their lives.

As with all matters of distributional justice, inter-generational justice can only be a lofty goal,

difficult to clearly define and to realise. Many competing interests, rights and claims all need to be

taken into consideration, and it is unlikely that a simple formula can be found to justly weigh up all

of these. Whether any discounting of future interests is justifiable or morally desirable is not settled

on the basis of the African conception of moral obligations to future generations I have described in

this chapter. Nor does this conception answer the objection that taking future generations too far

into the future into account places an unacceptably heavy burden on moral agents in the present. It

is of concern that taking the interests of many, many future generations into account might leave the

present generation wondering if they have any right to provide for themselves. These are matters of

on-going debate and it is likely that this will continue to be the case for some time. An African

sense of inter-generational justice might not be able to settle all of the theoretical problems

associated with the question of our moral obligation to future people, but it does go some way to

settling many of them, as I plan to make more explicit in what follows.

145

5.7 Strengths of this African Notion of Moral Obligation to Future Generations

A notion of transgenerational obligation grounded in African thought is characterised by an

emphasis on the continuity of a shared identity of persons through generations. Individuals

perceive of themselves as belonging to a communal lineage comprising ancestors, the living and the

yet to be born. As generation gives way to generation this chain is perpetuated. Because a sense of

solidarity with one’s communal lineage is an important aspect of one’s identity and personhood,

solidarity between generations is regarded as a moral obligation in much the same way as with

one’s contemporaries. Since one’s ancestors made provision on one’s behalf, ensuring that the

environment (social, natural and built) was able to sustain one’s own life, one owes a debt of

gratitude to the ancestors. This debt not only entails honouring their memory, it requires respect

and the nurturing of a virtue of gratitude. This virtue, in turn, leads to a moral willingness to honour

those who have come before by seeking to ensure that one’s descendants are equally provided for.

A number of African writers specifically identify the natural environment, or the land as a common

inheritance that needs to be preserved as part of this duty to posterity. Furthermore, this duty goes

beyond mere generational nepotism, caring only for one’s own descendants in the following two or

three generations, and it can plausibly be extended to include the global community, as well as

generations much further from the present in time. My concept of an ‘African Relational

Environmentalism’ can thus be extended to include these ideas. A relational harmony-prizing ethic

in which all things that are part of the web of life are morally considerable is now extended to

encompass past and future generations of, at least, persons too.

The strength of such an African-inspired approach lies in its ability to overcome, at least to some

extent, some of the theoretical concerns about moral obligations to the future Western philosophers

have identified (and I described at the beginning of this chapter). The communitarian emphasis in

146

African thought directs us away from conceiving of duties to posterity or the rights of future

persons in individualist terms. Generations themselves are communities (the community of the

currently living), and so are preceding and succeeding generations. It is these generational

communities as groups who owe duties to the generations who have come before, and those who

are yet to be born. Conceived in this collectivist sense, trans-generational responsibilities appear

less bedevilled by theoretical philosophical problems. We do not need to know who exactly future

individual persons will be to know that, short of a major cataclysm, future generations of persons

will most likely exist. Since our obligation is one owed by our generation as a whole to future

generations, as wholes, exactly which future people come into existence is of little relevance, as is

any concern that different future people might come into existence, based on this generation’s

choices. Similarly, since we are not conceiving of our duties to posterity in terms of respecting

future autonomous individual persons, it is again of little relevance who these future persons are.

Our generation owes a duty to preserve the environment for future generations, who are likely to be

more similar to us than different, and to have very similar basic needs. So, whilst it is true that we

cannot be expected to know exactly what all of the specific needs of future generations will be, or

how best to ensure that we leave them a world capable of providing those needs, we can know that

they are most likely to need certain basic life sustaining goods such as clean water and air, food and

shelter. No generation could ask of its predecessors more than that they should anticipate these

basic needs, and try to ensure that they can be fulfilled into the indefinite future. That they might

make mistakes based on their ignorance of what future generations might actually need most is no

reason for the present generation not to seek to ensure the welfare of future generations, not when

the basis of our ethical code includes a sense of solidarity and shared identity with future

generations. Parents might take out a financial policy to provide for their newborn’s education in

the future, only to discover when the young adult is ready for university that the financial provision

is woefully inadequate. Their child would be uncharitable not to acknowledge and be grateful for

147

his parents’ attempt to provide for his future merely on the grounds that they were not able to

anticipate quite how expensive a university education would be twenty years later. What is

important is that each generation should try to ensure the well-being of those who will follow.

The theoretical concern about the inability of future generations to reciprocate the current

generation’s provision on their behalf also becomes less problematic when a sense of solidarity

between past, present and future people exists. In a sense a kind of reciprocity can be said to

operate, as each generation honours its predecessors by reciprocating in terms of making provision

for the future in the same way as was done for itself.

The motivational problem identified by many theorists may prove somewhat more intransigent.

Regarding climate change issues Stephen Gardiner has shown just how many factors combine to

make it very difficult for us to make some of the hard but right choices that need to be made on

behalf of future generations. The very nature of the effects of climate change being spatially and

temporally dispersed make it difficult for the global community to put in place institutions capable

of making it irrational for individual countries not to co-operate towards the goal of a more stable

climate (Gardiner, 2006: passim) . Other environmental issues are similarly affected. Nonetheless,

if Western value systems were adapted to acknowledge a fundamental sense in which generations

share a sense of identity over time, and are joint custodians of the earth, this might go some way

towards overcoming some of this motivational paralysis.

I have confined myself, so far, in this chapter to a consideration of moral obligation towards future

generations of persons only. In the following section, I will briefly argue that some strands of

African thought entail that we have moral obligations to future generations of other living things

that form part of the web of life, too.

148

5.8 Moral Obligations Towards Future Generations of Other Species

I have already argued that African Relational Environmentalism embraces (amongst other things)

all living organisms as morally considerable. It also seeks to promote harmonious relationships in

nature since all things that form part of the web of life are interrelated. Given these views, it seems

clear that an African sense of moral obligation to future generations cannot be completely

anthropocentric, in the strong sense of the term that only humans count morally. At most, it might

be argued that it is weakly anthropocentric, inasmuch as human interests might sometimes be

prioritised over those of other living things, and the interests of future humans are taken to provide

reasons for the conservation of the environment. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that we

have moral obligations only to future humans, and not to future non-human morally considerable

entities, as well. If some sense of the continuity of lived experience between generations entails an

obligation to future generations, it makes sense to conceive of these duties as being of the same sort

that moral agents have to their contemporaries. If current non-human organisms are objects of

moral consideration, it seems rather arbitrary to deny future generations of such entities moral

considerability, given that future generations of humans are clearly regarded as counting morally.

The passages I quoted in the previous section which supported a notion of inter-generational justice

in no way implied that we only owe duties to future generations of human beings. These authors

may not always have made it explicit that other morally considerable future entities are also owed

obligations. Nonetheless, it is far more likely that they assume this to be understood, than that they

are suggesting that when it comes to future generations the morally considerable are arbitrarily

constrained only to human beings. Since, in African thought, all of nature is interrelated, and

succeeding generations are interconnected and interdependent, it is simply disingenuous to think

anything other than that current humans have moral obligations towards all future morally

149

considerable entities. The web of life transcends generations, and, so, if what makes entities

morally considerable is that they are part of this web, they are morally considerable whatever

generation they belong to.

Furthermore, I argued in the previous chapter that species are morally considerable, qua species on

some African accounts. I quoted Kelbessa’s claim that justice, integrity and respect are owed to

other species, and that the worst kind of wrong would be to destroy a whole species (Kelbessa,

2005: 24). The good of a species can hardly be conceived of in terms other than those that take

cognisance of trans-generationality. For a species to survive, it needs to pass its genetic blueprint

on through succeeding generations. If species count morally, at all, then given the kind of thing a

species is, it is nonsensical to exclude future generations of species from moral considerability.

5.9 Conclusion

African Relational Environmentalism does not limit moral considerabilty to only the current

generation. It conceives of the web of life as transcending generations, and of the environment as a

resource shared by different generations. It recognises moral obligations to future generations not

just of persons, but of other morally considerable entities, too. It regards it as our duty to try to

ensure that our descendants inherit an environment able to sustain their lives.

150

6 WEIGHING UP COMPETING MORAL OBLIGATIONS

6.1 Introduction

In my quest for an African-inspired environmental ethic, I began by challenging the claim that

African thought is so inherently anthropocentric that it is incapable of being able to undergird a

truly environmental ethic. I countered that there are themes in African traditional thought and

religion, as well as in the work of African philosophers, that are promising in terms of their being

able to entail an ethic that would protect the environment. Furthermore, I argued that there are

African conceptions that are able to enrich our environmental philosophy and possibly offer

alternative perspectives that assist in the ongoing project of trying to articulate an environmental

ethic. Having identified a strong theme in African thought that emphasises a fundamental

interrelatedness of all natural (and supernatural) entities, I claimed that this interdependence is often

taken to ground a requirement to treat nature with respect. Pointing to a dominant African

communitarianism, I classified a promising African ethic as relational, and as prizing harmonious

relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and other parts of the web of life.

I described these harmonious relationships as being analogous to family relationships, and

consisting in a sense of solidarity, shared identity and caring. This necessarily entails taking others

into consideration, and seeking the good of others. I argued that African thought does not prioritise

either individuals or groups/communities, but takes both into account, allowing an African

environmental ethic to encompass the salient features of both individualist and holist positions. I

named my developing African-inspired environmental ethic ‘African Relational

Environmentalism’, and proposed that on this ethic, right acts are those that demonstrate respect

for nature and natural entities (individuals and groups) by promoting harmonious relationships

between persons and persons, and between persons and nature.

151

I then turned my attention to the kinds of entities with which we might be required to have

harmonious relationships, looking to African themes that suggest which kinds of entities are

morally considerable, rather than inconsiderable. I concluded that the most promising way of

describing a criterion of moral considerability in African thought is to characterise it in terms of

entities that are part of the web of life. On this account, all living organisms are morally

considerable, as are certain kinds of groups of such organisms, such as families, communities,

species and ecosystems. Other inorganic natural entities, such as rivers, forests, and lakes are also

morally considerable. Some of these entities are considerable at least partially because of their vital

systemic importance to the thriving or survival of living things (for example, rivers and forests) and

because they are natural things. It is their very naturalness, their genesis as entities created over

time as natural entities, and their ecosystem contribution, that makes them part of the web of life

Acknowledging that, for the most part, including supernatural entities within the ambit of the

morally considerable (although asserted on many African accounts) requires metaphysical beliefs

many would reject, I set these sorts of ideas aside, apart from pointing out that the spiritual or

religious beliefs of people cannot be completely ignored in moral discourse.

Even so, one African religious notion – that of the belief in ancestors, the continuing participation

of the recently dead in the lives of the living – has interesting implications for environmental ethical

discourse. I have shown how this conception is understood by many Africans as requiring that we

need to take the interests of future generations into account in our moral deliberations. Since many

environmental problems have implications not just for the currently living, but for posterity, too, I

explored this African sense of inter-generational justice. Initially keeping the focus only on moral

duties towards future persons, I discussed some of the theoretical difficulties Western philosophers

have identified with respect to defending the notion that we can have duties to future generations. I

then sought to investigate some ways in which African conceptions might assist in overcoming at

152

least some of these difficulties. I pointed to two conceptions that are able to ground duties to future

persons. The first African notion I appealed to was that of a belief that the land (broadly construed

as the natural environment) is not regarded as something that is owned by the current generation,

but rather as a resource that is shared between generations. The second is the African notion that

we have an indirect duty to future persons to leave them a natural environment capable of sustaining

their lives, based on a sense of gratitude to our predecessors (or ancestors). I argued that

developing an attitude of gratitude to those who have come before for ensuring that we inherited a

healthy environment, is able to entail a sense of belonging to an interconnected, cross-generational

moral circle, in which we ‘repay’ our predecessors by treating our descendants in a similar fashion.

Based on these ideas I concluded that it is possible to conceive of future persons (and indeed past

persons) as belonging together with present people in a moral circle that transcends generations. On

such a view, it emerges that the web of life is best understood as embracing past, present and future

generations of persons, too. On this account, then, future generations of people (understood as the

group of those who will exist in the future) are also morally considerable because they are part of

the web of life. Finally, I argued that on this same fundamental basis, future generations of other

species can conceivably be included in the moral circle, and be morally considerable.

Having thus more clearly defined the sorts of entities that African Relational Environmentalism

regards as morally considerable, I was able to revise the theory of right action I initially proposed

for this African-inspired environmental ethic. I refined my initial definition, now delineating right

actions as those that demonstrate respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious

relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and other parts of the web. On this

view persons, all other organisms, groups of persons (such as families, clans, and communities),

groups of other organisms (such as species and ecosystems), as well as inorganic natural entities

(such as rivers, rocks, minerals and forests) are all morally considerable. Not only does the current

153

generation of such entities count morally, so do future generations. All of these entities should be

taken into account in our moral reasoning. This enables African Relational Environmentalism to

avoid strong anthropocentrism. Indeed, since a central concern of environmental philosophers has

been to challenge a way of thinking about nature in which only human interests count, African

Relational Environmentalism fulfills a basic requirement for any sound environmental ethic by at

least asserting that all parts of the web of life count morally. With this as a fundamental value

informing how we understand the environment, our sense of responsibility towards nature can only

be an improvement over the traditionally anthropocentric and exploitative attitudes to nature

exemplified by many Western communities until fairly recently. African Relational

Environmentalism does, therefore, for a number of reasons, offer a great deal of promise for

environmental ethics.

Primarily, what I have described so far entails a different fundamental attitude towards other parts

of the web of life. It requires us to regard ourselves not as above or outside of nature, but merely as

a part of nature. It tells us that our good is constitutively and not merely instrumentally bound up

with the good of other parts of the web of life. It emphasises our interconnectedness, and prizes

harmonious relationships. So, the most basic requirements of an environmental ethic have been

fulfilled, and I hope that I have successfully achieved my aim of showing that African thought has

something to contribute to the field of environmental ethics. However, in order to come closer to a

truly useful African Relational Environmentalism, I need to move beyond these fundamental

conceptions, and begin to articulate some second-order philosophical principles that are able to

assist in reaching decisions about specific applied moral questions in environmental ethics1. Having

1 Since I claim that this is an ethic that prizes harmonious relationships in the web of life, I will need to more clearly

express what this notion of harmony means and how it might be realized. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

154

argued that all parts of the web of life are morally considerable, I claimed only that all such entities

count morally. I have not made an egalitarian claim that all morally considerable entities have

equal moral status, but have rather left open the possibility that whilst they all count morally, there

might be other considerations that entail the prioritizing of some morally considerable entities over

others. With this in mind, in this chapter, I now turn to trying to provide an extended account of

African Relational Environmentalism that enables us to deal with competing moral interests.

A persistent problem in environmental ethics lies in dealing with competing interests or moral

obligations. The farther we extend moral considerability beyond just human beings, including ever

more additional entities, the more opposing moral interests need to be considered, and the more

complex moral choices become. How ought we to decide whether to donate money to a charity that

feeds starving children, or to a fund that supports efforts to save a rare species of fern? Ought we to

reconsider human reproductive rights (perhaps by legally prohibiting more than one child per

family) in order to preserve the earth? Would it be more ethical to test medicines on severely brain

damaged human beings than on healthy, normal primates? In order to make such moral choices, we

need principles that enable us to prioritise our many moral obligations to many different entities.

Having argued in the previous chapter that African Relational Environmentalism would extend

moral considerability to anything that is part of the web of life – living things, natural things, and

those entities that hold the web of life together – I now need to address the essential issue of

whether there is anything in African thought that might assist in weighing up the competing claims

of different morally considerable entities. If it is true that so many things (people, animals, plants,

inanimate natural objects, families, clans, species, ecosystems, etc) are morally considerable, how

much consideration do we need to give each entity? How do we weigh them up against each other?

I have proposed that African Relational Environmentalism is able to account for the moral

considerability of entities on the basis of a single criterion (being part of the web of life), but other

155

criteria or principles are necessary to weigh the claims of competing morally considerable entities

against each other.

6.2 Conceptions in African Thought of Relevance to Weighing Competing Moral Claims

Once again I turn to the literature on African thought for themes or conceptions that might prove

valuable to environmental ethical discourse, this time searching for ideas that provide some kind of

basis for deciding between competing moral claims. From the outset, this presents at least two

strong challenges, which I now address. The first is that many of the conceptions that are of

relevance are rooted in religious beliefs, many of which would not gain easy acceptance by a wide

audience. As is often the case, however, for the most part, these conceptions can be freed from their

metaphysical moorings, and understood in more accessible, secularized terms. I attempt to mine

these themes for helpful and attractive principles that are able to contribute to environmental

philosophy, even where their religious foundations are not accepted. To this end, I will often set

aside some of the more obviously religious claims relating to supernatural entities such as spirits,

ancestors and god/s, and focus on those claims that deal with natural entities. The second challenge

is that the literature presents one with a mishmash of themes and conceptions, often overlapping,

and seemingly representing different attempts to explain similar concepts or beliefs using a variety

of explanatory constructs. For instance, the idea of life force or vital force is often closely

associated with African conceptions of personhood, as well as with communitarian values. Some

writers might describe an African conception of personhood without reference to life force, but link

an individuals’ growth in virtue (or, as a person) to the embededness of her ethical life within a

community. Others explain the requirement to live harmoniously within a community in terms of

protecting or increasing the life force of the community. A number of seemingly overlapping

conceptions are found, and it is quite a challenge to distil from the confusion some clear basic

156

principles that seem to be entailed by these conceptions2. Despite the confusion, I seek in the rest

of this chapter, to derive from African thought some basic principles that are of relevance to

weighing up competing moral obligations.

In the first instance, I consider the fundamental question of whether African thought supports the

notion that moral status is something that admits of degrees. I argue that it does, and that the

relative moral status of entities is a function of the degree of richness, complexity and

sophistication of the experience of life their essential nature makes them capable of. Having

established a fundamental basis upon which to argue for differentiated moral status, I then identify

from the related and overlapping African conceptions I have mentioned above, four ‘senses’ in

which they seem to be put to use. I consider notions that suggest a sense of final value,

instrumental value, well-being and partiality in African thought, in turn. In each case, I also give an

account of what it means for African Relational Environmentalism to take these senses into

account, and how these ideas can assist in weighing up the competing moral claims of different

morally considerable entities.

6.3 Degrees of Moral Status in African Thought

When I introduced the notion of moral considerability, earlier, I chose to define the concept as an

attribute that an entity can either have or not have, one that does not admit of degrees. I

distinguished between this notion and ‘moral status’, preferring to use this latter phrase to refer to a

2 Given the fact that for the most part sub-Saharan African thought was not recorded in written form until fairly recently

in history, it is unsurprising that ideas that were preserved in oral traditions, folklore, religious and cultural practices,

etc. lack the sort of systematised expression philosophers find attractive. Only in recent decades have African theorists

begun to try to describe these conceptions more systematically.

157

more graduated sense of moral standing, one that does admit of degrees. On my definition, then,

entities are either morally considerable or they are not. Those that are morally considerable should

all be taken into account, however, there might be other attributes of these entities that entail that

they have more or less moral status relative to each other. Thus, a person and an insect are both

morally considerable, but persons have more moral status or standing than insects. This is able to

account for why we regard the killing of persons as a far more serious wrong than the killing of

insects. I have argued that African Relational Environmentalism sees all things that are part of the

web of life as morally considerable. This does not entail moral egalitarianism with respect to all

morally considerable entities, however. In what follows, I show that despite regarding everything

in the web of life as counting morally, African thought does also recognise a more graduated

conception of moral status or standing that admits of degrees.

A number of sources indicate that some kind of hierarchy of beings is assumed in African thought.

Nhlanhla Mkhize writes: ‘…in African mythology, God does not exist in complete isolation from

the rest of creation. Rather, a hierarchy of beings is postulated, with God at the apex, and then at

different levels, the living-dead (ancestors) as God’s intermediaries, then human beings and the rest

of creation)’ (Mkhize, 2008: 36). Shutte claims that an African understanding of life embraces

both material and spiritual entities, and many different kinds of entities are seen as possessing life.

Stones are alive as well as animals…. One can visualize this world-view as a

spherical universe of life-force. At the centre of the sphere, the continual source of

all life force, is God. As one moves from the centre to the circumference one passes

through ever-wider concentric spheres of life force, from ancestors and chiefs,

through ordinary people, until one reaches animals, rivers and the things of nature in

the outermost sphere (Shutte, 1993: 22).

158

Parrinder similarly writes:

Animals and plants have spiritual forces akin to those of men, but generally they are

of a lower grade than man’s. Father Tempels says of the Bantu, ‘After the class of

human forces come other forces, those of animals, those of vegetables, and those of

minerals. But in the midst of each of these classes is to be found a hierarchy

according to the vital power, the rank, or the primogeniture…’ (Parrinder, 1954: 23).

Bujo speaks of a ‘hierarchy of forces’ (Bujo, 1998: 209) and also quotes Tempels approvingly:

‘…According to the African understanding, “all beings in the universe have life force of their own:

human, animal, vegetable, or inanimate. Each being has been endowed by God with a certain

force...”’ (Bujo, 1998: 209).

What is immediately apparent is that the key concept underlying an African notion of a graduated

sense of moral status is that of life force. Any hierarchy of moral standing is explained in terms of

different degrees of this force. Once again, this is a metaphysical or even spiritual notion that non-

Africans may have some difficulty comprehending. Basically, many Africans believe that entities

in the physical world are permeated by an invisible, spiritual energy. This is variously described as

a life force, vital force or vital energy. Different entities are thought to have varying degrees of this

force or energy. For many of us, grounding a moral theory in a belief in some kind of invisible

spiritual energy is problematic. However, it is possible to interpret this notion of life force in less

spiritual terms. It is the life or vitality of entities that is of crucial significance here. It is not

necessary to conceive of this vitality as a spiritual energy to be able to accept that entities may have

different degrees of moral status based on how much vitality they possess. Metz explains this as a

‘...physicalist, energy orientated conception of vitality…’ described in terms of ‘liveliness’, and

‘creative power’ (Metz, 2011a). On this phyicalist interpretation, varying degrees of life force track

varying capacities for liveliness or vitality. More sophisticated entities are capable of more

159

complex life experiences. Those that are capable of greater movement, creativity, self-awareness,

and purposefulness, for instance, may be construed to have a greater vitality or liveliness, than those

entities less capable or incapable of such things. I shall similarly interpret life force in such a

physicalist sense, as opposed to a spiritual sense.

I shall return to clarifying this naturalist sense of life force below. But, first I need to give a fuller

account of how some African theorists suggest a sense of graduated moral status, based on degrees

of life force. The pattern that emerges is this: that although everything that is part of the web of life

is morally considerable, there is a belief in a kind of cosmic hierarchy, in which God is at the top,

followed by spirits and ancestors, followed by people, then animals, plants and, finally, inanimate

natural things. There is a belief in something of a general ranking in which (setting aside the

spiritual entities) humans outrank animals, animals outrank plants, and plants outrank inanimate

natural objects. Interestingly, this does seem to confirm some of our most basic moral intuitions.

As Metz expresses it, ‘Suppose, for example, that you are driving a bus and have no alternative but

to run over either a mouse or a normal, adult human being. The right thing to do would be to run

over the mouse, which seems best explained by the idea that its moral status is not as great’ (Metz,

2011b).

Even committed holists and egalitarian biocentrists will usually agree with these intuitions, broadly,

despite the fact that their moral theories might have difficulty accounting for them. Setting aside

the religious foundations of this African approach that grounds degrees of moral status in how much

life force entities possess, one possible strength is that it might well accommodate these intuitions.

Since this is theoretically appealing, I now investigate this possibility further. The literature

suggests that different classes of entities inherently have different degrees of life force. Typically,

excluding spiritual beings, four classes are identified: humans, animals, plants and inanimate

160

objects, and these are ranked in the order given. However, such a four-tiered ranking, on its own,

still fails to account for our intuitions, since we generally think that given the choice between saving

the life of a goat or a mosquito, we ought to save the goat, even though goats and mosquitoes both

fall into the class of animals. Similarly most of us would likely save a thousand year old baobab

tree before a clump of weeds, despite both being plants. But, the African view under consideration

allows for gradations of life force within each of the classes, as well. So, the four-tier system is

more sophisticated than just a belief in four distinct classes of entities with different degrees of life

force. There are also degrees of difference between individuals within each class. Intuitively, we

ought to save the life of a goat before that of a mosquito, and many Africans would likely explain

this in terms of goats generally having more life force than mosquitoes.

An illuminating account of the relationship between life force and a hierarchy of beings is provided

by Tempels:

When we [Westerners] say that “beings” are differentiated by their essence or nature,

Bantu say that “forces” are differentiated by their essence or nature. They hold that

there is the divine force, essential or terrestrial forces, human forces, animal forces,

vegetable and even material or mineral forces (Tempels, 1959: 52).

This distinction between ‘beings’ and ‘forces’ is subtle, however, since just as Westerners might

differentiate between beings based on differences in their ‘essence or nature’, Africans, according to

Tempels, also differentiate between types of forces - ‘divine’, ‘essential’, ‘human’, ‘animal’,

‘vegetable’, ‘material’ and ‘mineral’- also on the grounds of their essential nature (Tempels, 1959:

52). Generally beings or entities have the degree of life force typical of the kind of entity they are.

A person has the life force of a human, a mosquito the life force of a mosquito, and so on. When it

comes to making moral choices, there are factors related to the essence or nature of entities (or in

161

African terms, the essence or nature of their correlated ‘forces’) that entail some prioritising of

certain entities over others.

I pointed out above that a spiritual interpretation of life force is theoretically unappealing, but that

the notion can also be understood in a more promising physicalist sense in terms of liveliness or

vitality. On such an interpretation, the types of ‘forces’ identified by Tempels may be correlated

with differing capacities that various entities have for liveliness or vitality, for a richer and fuller, or

more simple and minimal experience of life. Some Western theorists make similar claims. Warren

points out that some philosophers regard a number of properties as important for establishing moral

status, including moral agency, sentience, self-awareness and mental capability (Warren, 2003:

442). VanDeVeer argues that the psychological capacities of entities need to be considered in

establishing their relative moral status (VanDeVeer, 2003: 154-5). Singer distinguishes between

conscious and self-conscious entities, claiming that those capable of self-consciousness have

different interests based on this capability that need to be taken into account (Singer, 1975).

Lombardi claims that the specific capacities of organisms augment the basic inherent worth they

have by virtue of simply being living things (Palmer 2003: 23). These ideas have merit. Surely, a

sentient and self-conscious being such as a dog might be thought of as being capable of a more

sophisticated experience of life than a plant, and that this warrants consideration. Surely, also, it is

likely that creatures with much more sophisticated nervous systems, such as apes, are more likely to

acutely experience pain than more simple creatures such as insects. On a physicalist interpretation

of life force as vitality or liveliness, African thought can be interpreted as granting greater moral

status to entities with enhanced and more complex capabilities for experiencing life.

162

It is not necessary to postulate a full list of possible interests or capabilities that need to be

considered when making moral choices. African Relational Environmentalism would simply

require that all morally relevant characteristics of an entity, as grounded in its vitality, be taken into

account. Since humans have far more capabilities than many other organisms, there will be more

factors that contribute to their moral status. Some other species of animals, with fairly sophisticated

mental capacities, highly developed nervous systems, strong bonds of affection and social

structures, also have a higher moral status than far less sophisticated animals. Of course, we do not

have a full scientific understanding of the capacities of other species, and we know even less about

the inner life of other creatures. So, our moral choices have to be made based on the best available

knowledge. Nonetheless, an environmental ethic that allows us to take account of consciousness,

self-consciousness, sentience, moral agency, mental sophistication, family-like bonds, rationality,

and other relevant factors, is more attractive than one that does not. It is also able to provide

reasons for some of our most fundamental moral intuitions, such as why we ought to save the life of

a human being before that of a cat. Whilst this approach does not provide a nice, incontestable,

simple system for prioritising the relative moral claims of morally considerable entities, it does

allow us to take into consideration many different factors that ought to have a bearing on ethical

reasoning.

It could be objected that this approach might be successful in entailing different degrees of moral

status for various kinds of living entities, but it is difficult to understand what it might mean with

respect to inanimate natural entities, such as rivers, forests, mountains and rocks. On many African

accounts, these sorts of entities are also said to possess some degree of life force. It seems

reasonable to object that on my preferred physicalist interpretation of life force, the criteria of

liveliness and vitality cannot easily be applied to inanimate entities. However, as I argued in

section 4.5.1 above, inanimate natural entities are still regarded as morally considerable on African

163

Relational Environmentalism, as they are part of the web of life. The very naturalness of the

processes of their coming into existence, together with the extent to which they are instrumentally

crucial for the thriving of other living entities, make them morally considerable, on their own. If

they can be thought of as morally considerable, they have some degree of moral status, miminal as

it would obviously be, given that their moral status is a function of their instrumental value3.

I have argued that, in one of the ways in which the notion of life force is appealed to by some

African writers, I discern something that can be likened to differing degrees of moral status among

the class of entities that are morally considerable at all. Generally the degree and kind of life force

an entity has is a function of the essence or nature of the kind of entity it is. If one interprets the

notion of life force not as an invisible spiritual energy, but rather in physicalist terms as liveliness or

vitality, then African thought offers a very promising perspective on moral status, one that is able to

take into account a variety of capabilities of entities, related to their essential nature. On African

Relational Environmentalism, then, moral status is enhanced by characteristics that enable entities

to have a fuller and richer life experience.

3 On the basis of the vitality/liveliness criterion, rivers , mountains and forests would all have a similarly minimal moral

status. In Section 6.5.1 below I discuss a sense of instrumental value in African thought. On the basis argued there, a

river, which is instrumental in sustaining the lives of many other living things would count more in our moral

deliberations than, say a rock, because of its more significant ecosystemic instrumental value.

164

6.4 Final Value

6.4.1 A Sense of Final Value in African Thought

Having established that, fundamentally, moral status is something that can be thought of as

admitting of degrees in African Relational Environmentalism, I now consider four other ‘senses’ in

which African thought on moral status can be understood, based on different ways in which the

notion of life force or vitality is employed. The first of these is the idea that some African notions

suggest a ‘sense’ of final value for morally considerable entities.

Earlier in this thesis I suggested that a secularised understanding of a Christian belief that persons

have souls could easily be regarded as a claim that persons have final value, and it is interesting to

note that some theorists explicitly link the African notion of life force with what they call ‘intrinsic

value’ or ‘worth’4. Deogratias Bikopo and Louis-Jacques van Bogaert claim, ‘In the case of Bantu

philosophy, the ontological base is the concept of energy, strength and vital force. It is what gives

beings their intrinsic value’ [my italics] (Bikopo & van Bogaert, 2010: 44). Similarly, Eleanor

Ross discusses the beliefs of African traditional healers and claims that they ‘…have strong ethical

principles and believe that it is their duty to develop life in all its forms and alleviate suffering.

They also believe that nature’s laws must be obeyed in order to avoid human decline and

destruction to the environment. The natural environment and the people who inhabit the

environment are believed to have intrinsic worth’ [my italics] (Ross, 2010: 47). And, indeed it

makes sense that a claim that entities are imbued with a degree of life force by virtue of the kind of

thing they are, or the essence of the kind of force that is typically possessed by such entities, implies

4 I strongly suspect that these authors use ‘intrinsic’ value generally to mean some kind of final value, where entities are

valued as ends in themselves, and not necessarily as meaning the opposite of ‘extrinsic value’. See my discussion of

these notions in Chapter 1. I take the liberty of using ‘final value’ to convey their meaning.

165

a sense in which some kind of final value is inherently attributed to these beings. I find it attractive

to think that what is implied here is that morally considerable entities (entities that are part of the

web of life), are understood as being endowed with a degree or kind of life force appropriate to the

type of entity they are. This amount of life force entitles its possessor to some final value,

value that is due to them merely because of what they are.

This does, of course, imply that humans have more of this final value than other animals and plants.

It also implies that some animals have more final value than others, and so on. Perhaps, though, as

pointed out in the previous section, a very promising aspect of this approach is, that it does not only

take into account the basic moral considerability of an entity, it also requires that other factors such

as rationality, sentience, self-consciousness, consciousness, and so forth, be taken into consideration

as well – since these and other factors can affect the relative degree of life force an entity has.

6.4.2 Taking Account of Degrees of Final Value

I claimed above that in overlapping themes in African thought one is able to distinguish a sense in

which entities are regarded as having final value (to some degree or other). I distinguished ‘moral

considerability’, which is something an entity either has or does not, from ‘moral status’, which

admits of degrees. I also pointed out that one is able to distinguish classes of entities that have

varying degrees of moral status. Humans have more than animals, who have more than plants, who

have more than inanimate natural objects. Furthermore, certain kinds of animals are thought to

have more final value than others (chimpanzees more than mosquitoes, etc). I argued that generally

these ideas seem to support some of our most fundamental moral intuitions, and are therefore worth

exploring further.

166

The correlation drawn between differing degrees or types of life force of entities and different

degrees of final value is theoretically appealing because it suggests grounds for respecting all

morally considerable entities as ends in themselves. The way in which this respect is manifested

depends on the entity, itself, but each morally considerable thing is owed the kind of respect

appropriate for the kind of thing it is. From the outset my idea of African Relational

Environmentalism has rested on a claim that all aspects of interrelated nature should be treated with

respect as parts of the web of life. The harmonious relationships that are so prized by Africans are

achieved when entities are respected appropriately for what they are, and the right kinds of

relationships between them are maintained. This suggests that there is at least a sense in which my

African Relational Environmentalism could be said to bear similarities with other more familiar

respect-based deontological moral theories.

6.5 Instrumental Value

6.5.1 A Sense of Instrumental Value in African Thought

I turn now to considering how some African themes suggest that the instrumental value of entities is

also recognised and taken into consideration. Mbiti expresses this sense of instrumentality by noting

that Africans categorise animals and plants in terms of those that can be eaten, used for medicinal

purposes, or used as building materials, or as fuel. ‘Certain things have physical uses; some have

religious uses (for ceremonies, rituals, and symbols); and other things are used for medicinal and

magical purposes’ (Mbiti, 1975: 38-39). The obvious instrumental value of entities in terms of their

providing food, shelter, clothing, water for drinking and cleaning, medicines, and so on, is

augmented by the belief that entities can also be instrumentally valuable in spiritual or religious

ways. Healing in African thought is conceived of holistically as including physical, psychological,

social and spiritual elements. What is more, many things can be instrumentally valuable to persons

167

and the community in terms of the way in which they are believed to bring about healing, the

restoration of accord and balance, the reconciliation of disrupted relationships, etc. Bujo speaks of

a:

…therapeutic aspect within the framework of the tension between life and death. In

this tense relationship, it is the task of the human person to study the cosmos in order

to identify plants, animals, and minerals possessing that force which can liberate one

from physical and psychic suffering. One can actually remain healthy in a holistic

sense only by living in harmony with the whole of creation. Therefore, if healing

within the African context is conducted in a communitarian manner, respectively

socio-and theo-psychosomatic, it is at the same time cosmic. Hence, the traditional

healer in Africa does not only include the community of the living and the dead into

his healing practices, he also uses natural elements like minerals, plants, pieces of

wood, animal bones, teeth and hair, etc., in order to emphasize that effective healing

is only possible where reconciliation with the entire cosmos has taken place (Bujo:

1998: 211).

His description of healing as ‘socio and theo-psychosomatic’ nicely embraces the physical,

psychological, communal and spiritual dimensions. Again he uses the construct of life force to

explain how healing occurs. Mkhize supports these conceptions: ‘…health does not simply mean

the absence of disease, it incorporates balance and harmony between the individual and his/her

social surroundings, including harmony with the self. Disease results from the breakdown in

relatedness, including disharmony between the individual and the rest of the universe’ (Mkhize,

2008: 39). In this very holistic sense, then, many entities are valued instrumentally, because they

are believed to be able to assist in promoting individual, communal and cosmic well-being, and

healing. Furthermore, the concern for well-being embraces individuals, communities, and

essentially all of nature.

168

This does not imply that the instrumental value of entities to humans is not given prominence. In a

passage I quoted earlier that is seemingly very anthropocentric, Mbiti suggests that humans regard

themselves as being at the centre of the universe, and understand reality from that perspective. It is

as though everything in the world exists for the sake of people. Thus Africans think about the world

in terms of what it can do for them or how they can make use of it (Mbiti, 1975: 38). This

anthropocentric instrumental valuing of entities is such that Mbiti even claims that certain spirits are

sometimes abandoned or no longer recognized by communities, when their usefulness is in doubt:

‘People are not obliged to acknowledge any particular spirits all the time; they may abandon the

idea of a particular spirit if it does not look sensible or necessary. The spirits are, therefore, largely

at the mercy of the people…’ (Mbiti, 1975: 70).

This is supported by Bikopo and van Bogaert who consider an interesting practice of the Ntomba

people, whose tradition requires the community to assist in ‘hastening’ the death of their chief,

before he dies of natural causes. They write:

The concept of energy or vital force is central in African ontology; energy is being,

and being is energy. The Supreme Being channels his energy through the clan’s

Chief to human and non-human living beings. Energy can wax and wane. Death

comes when resources in energy decline to nil. Essential to the world and life view is

the fact that the tribal Chief is chosen for his unusually high levels of vital force, and

that waning of his energy is incompatible with the exercise of his functions. When

that happens, the Chief must die. He knows and accepts it, as it was a precondition

upon his installation as the Chief (Bikopo & van Bogaert, 2010: 42).

The clan’s collective life force would be feared to be compromised if the chief were to die of

natural causes. So, when it seems his death is approaching, select members of the clan will put him

169

to death privately and without the spilling of blood, according to custom (Bikopo & van Bogaert,

2010: 46). Again, this seems to suggest that for these people, at least, even a Chief, chosen for

having a special amount of life force in the first place, is valued instrumentally, in terms of the

promotion of the good of the clan. When he is no longer able to do this, he needs to make way for a

new chief who is able to.

Once again, the notion of life force, applied in this way to suggest a recognition of the instrumental

value of entities can be interpreted in a physicalist, rather than spiritual way. One does not have to

believe in an invisible, spiritual energy permeating entities for the notion to make sense. Rather,

one can again understand this in terms of liveliness and vitality. The vitality of living entities is

dependent upon their being able to access the basic goods necessary for their on-going existence

and thriving. It makes sense for us to instrumentally value the oxygen we breathe, the food we eat,

the water we drink, even if we do not regard them as morally considerable. This sense of

instrumental value found in African thought resonates with common sense. We all value other

persons and entities in terms of their usefulness to us, at least some of the time. And, there is

nothing morally untoward about this. We value rivers for the life sustaining water they provide,

animals and plants for providing food, other people for helping us to achieve our aims, our

communities for giving us a sense of belonging, our religions for spiritual support, medicines for

health, and so on.

Furthermore, it seems plausible that one can value an entity as having final value, whilst also

valuing it instrumentally. Since everything that is part of the web of life is also accorded some

degree of final value, African Relational Environmentalism takes into account not only the degree

of final value of entities, discussed in the previous section, but also their instrumental value, not

only to humans, but to other natural entities, too. An example will serve to illustrate the

170

attractiveness of this conception. Generally bees would be accorded less final value than humans in

African thought, but given their vital importance in terms of pollinating plants and crops, ensuring

human food supplies and the sustenance of so many other species, an African approach would

easily be able to see the sense in dedicating significant resources to efforts to try to protect bee

species, that are currently under enormous threat, for the sake of nature, generally, as well as future

food security for humans. It might, therefore, prioritise the protecting of species of bees, even at the

expense of other human needs. Given that even spirits may be ‘discarded’ when they lose their

value for the community, it seems that the instrumental value of entities is given quite a degree of

prominence in African thought.

I am unable to conclude this section without addressing what could appear to be a very strong

anthropocentricism in this strain of African thought. I quoted Mbiti earlier in a passage in which he

appears to claim that humans regard themselves as the centre of the universe, and that, for this

reason other entities are valued in terms of their usefulness to people (Mbiti, 1978: 38). He is not,

however, making a normative claim, here. It is simply a statement of what humans’ perspective on

the world is. On the very next page he elaborates:

Man is not the master of the universe; he is only the centre, the friend, the

beneficiary, the user. For that reason he has to live in harmony with the universe,

obeying the laws of natural, moral and mystical order. If these are unduly disturbed,

it is man who suffers most. African peoples have come to these conclusions through

long experience, observation and reflection (Mbiti, 1978: 39).

Since many African theorists view all of nature as interconnected, and since they believe that they

ought to live in harmony with the rest of nature, his point seems to be little more than the

observation that we are inclined to value things in terms of their usefulness to persons, because,

171

from our perspective this is important. Valuing other entities instrumentally is not incompatible

with also respecting their final value.

6.5.2 Taking Account of Instrumental Value

I have claimed that African Relational Environmentalism also embraces a sense of the instrumental

value of entities. If spiritual beings can be discarded when they are no longer of value, and chiefs

be helped to their death when they are no longer able to fulfil their role, then it is clear that

instrumentality is regarded as morally very significant in African thought. Of course, it is only one

kind of consideration, and needs to be taken into account together with others, such as the final

value that entities have. In discussing this sense of instrumental value, I observed that entities can

be valued instrumentally not only in terms of providing sustenance, protection, shelter, healing, etc.,

they are also valued in terms of their contribution to restoring accord and balance, reconciling

disrupted relationships and so on. This notion associates the key moral imperative to promote

harmonious relationships in African thought with an African conception of instrumentality. The

kind of instrumental value that is morally significant (that is, that provides reasons for prioritising

one moral claim against another) is that which promotes life, and a healthy balance in nature. So,

the instrumental value of something that provides the basic necessities of life for living organisms is

morally significant, but the instrumental value of possessing luxury goods is not. Harmonious

relationships are not promoted by such instrumental goods.

What this view does entail, though, is that the ecosystemic importance of natural entities is highly

valued. African Relational Environmentalism, then, is easily able to justify giving priority to the

protection of a species whose contribution to the survival and well-being of other living things is of

172

particular importance5. Similarly, it is able to account for why we ought to preserve and protect

specific kinds of natural habitats that sustain the lives of so many living things, including rivers,

forests, etc. It also provides grounds for the eradication of invasive alien species – since they are

harmful to ecosystems, and might be thought of as of having negative instrumental value. The same

reasoning would apply to curtailing the numbers of any species whose breeding success represents a

threat to other more vulnerable species.

6.6 Well-being

6.6.1 A Sense of Well-being in African Thought

I now turn my attention to a third ‘sense’ in which the notion of life force is employed in African

thought, a sense that suggests that the well-being of morally considerable entities is also of moral

significance. To link the notion of life force with a sense of well-being I need to begin by pointing

out that life force is often spoken about by Africans as something that can increase or decrease.

Life force is not just something of which entities have a specific degree, depending on their nature

as entities. It is also something that can wax and wane for various reasons. It is difficult to make

sense of this, since life force seems to be both something a degree of which is possessed by each

entity from its creation, and something that can increase or decrease based on life events. The best

way I am able to explain this is to suggest that in one sense life force is used in a way that is

analogous with entities having a degree of final value, and in another sense, it is used analogously

5 I argued in section 4.3.4 that species qua species are morally considerable. The vital systemic contribution of a

particular species would be an additional consideration respecting its crucial instrumental value that would justify

prioritising such a species over others that do not play such an important ecosystemic role.

173

with the notion of an entity’s well-being. In what follows, I seek to clarify this sense of well-being

in African thought.

In much African thought life force is understood as something that can be decreased as a result of

illness, unhappiness, hardship, community strife, and other sorts of threats to well-being. Tempels

writes:

Supreme happiness, the only kind of blessing, is to the Bantu, to possess the greatest

vital force: the worst misfortune and, in very truth, the only misfortune, is, he thinks,

the diminution of this power. Every illness, wound or disappointment, all suffering or

fatigue, every injustice and every failure; all of these are held to be, and are spoken

of by the Bantu as, diminution of vital force (Tempels, 1959: 46).

Accordingly, healing and reconciliation are often understood, holistically, as a restoration of life

force (Bujo, 1998: 211). This frequently entails some sort of ritual or the use of medicines in which

the life force of another entity (an animal, plant, feather, rock and so on) is thought to be taken from

its source into the life of the person or community seeking healing, raising their life force, once

again. And healing (physical and social) is understood as correcting the balance of life force by

means of ritually drawing on the life force of other entities. Again Tempels writes ‘Used

negatively, the same idea is expressed when the Bantu say: we act thus to be protected from

misfortune, or from diminution of life or of being, or in order to protect ourselves from those

influences which annihilate or diminish us’ (Tempels, 1959:45).

The spiritual grounds for these beliefs are, once again, contentious. However, it is also possible to

understand this sense of life force in more physicalist than spiritual ways. If we interpret life force

not as an invisible, spiritual energy, but rather in terms of vitality, the ideas expressed above are not

all that foreign or inaccessible. After all, in everyday language, we often speak about our lives as

174

being ‘fantastic’ or ‘terrible’ or ‘better than ever’, ‘happy’ or ‘miserable’. Of course, what we mean

in such cases is that our experience of life, as individual experiencing beings, is relatively better or

worse. Effectively in these cases we use the phrase ‘my life’ to mean ‘my well-being’. So, we are

talking about the perceived quality of our lives, not just the fact of being alive. And, in this sense,

our ‘life’ is diminished when our well-being is diminished. This is true in another sense, too:

typically, people who are extremely ill find that their whole life experience seems to become

focused around their illness, cutting them off from other experiences that would entail a greater

sense of well-being. Furthermore, the loss of capabilities as a result of illness (physical or mental),

or accident resulting in disability, also seem to diminish our liveliness or vitality. An amputee

needs to adapt to a new life in which the functionality of some part of his body has been lost. It

makes sense, therefore, to recognize that the potential to increase or decrease well-being is a

morally significant factor that ought to be taken into account. Life force or vitality, employed in

this sense, is simply another expression for the term ‘well-being’. Since African Relational

Environmentalism extends moral considerability to all entities that are part of the web of life, it

would also acknowledge that the well-being of all such morally considerable entities is relevant,

even if not necessarily equally so.

Of course, there are questions regarding the extent to which it is coherent to speak about the well-

being of a mosquito, a tree, or of a river, or even a fish, let alone an amoeba. I will seek to address

this in the following section in which I consider how the well-being of entities might be taken into

account in our moral reasoning. For now, it is enough to recognize a sense in African thought in

which the well-being of morally considerable entities is taken to be of significance.

175

6.6.2 Taking Account of the Valuing of Well-being

The sense of ‘well-being’ in African thought is a holistic, rounded notion. Whilst avoiding pain and

seeking pleasure are constituent aspects of well-being (at least for sentient entities), an African

understanding of the non-moral good goes far beyond a hedonistic calculus. I have referred to

Bujo’s description of healing as ‘socio and theo-psychosomatic’ (Bujo: 1998: 211), embracing the

spiritual, psychological and social aspects of human life. It is possible for people not to be ‘well’

even when they are physically healthy, if things are not well with them mentally or if their

relationships are in any way disrupted, as these would all traditionally be understood as diminishing

life force or vitality. Well-being, then, involves not just an individual’s experience of her life as

more pleasant than unpleasant. It is also predicated on her self-realization via harmonious

relationships within the family and community. Indeed some African thought might be said to

understand illness as a kind of imbalance within the body. Often, the root cause of illness or

calamity is thought to be a kind of imbalance brought about by moral failure or the intervention of

others by means of magic. Well-being might plausibly be best described as integrity and health of

body, as well as of mind and spirit in a context of wholesome well-directed communal

relationships. It might even be said that the agent who acts in immoral ways damages his or her

own well-being, by disrupting the balance or accord of his/her social relationships, or diminishing

life force.

Such a notion of well-being necessarily takes account of all of the factors that make our lives better

or worse. Hunger and poverty threaten our well-being, as do pain and illness, depression and

heartache. Unhealthy relationships, dysfunctional families, social injustice and anti-social

behaviour also decrease our well-being (individually and as social groups). Immoral behaviour

harms the person who acts immorally, those who are directly affected by the behaviour, as well as

the fabric of a community or society.

176

Since African Relational Environmentalism extends moral considerability to all living things (and

relevant groups of living things), and other natural entities, seeking to promote harmonious

relationships between them and us, it must be concerned for ensuring the well-being of these

entities, to the extent that they are capable of being regarded as having a well-being (or a non-moral

good) of their own. Clearly, not all morally considerable entities are capable of having a good that

is as complex as that of human beings, embracing physical, social and mental well-being. A tree

might be said to have its well-being or good reduced if we starve it of nutrients or poison its water

supply. But, it is not likely to experience any pain or suffering as a result. A leopard will

experience pain, if wounded by gunshot, but arguably experiences a less acute degree of mental

post-traumatic stress than a human who has been shot in a violent attack. Leopards, being solitary

creatures, without strong social bonds with others, might be less harmed by being moved to a

completely different location than elephants, who have been shown to have strong social and family

bonds. Fish seemingly feel no loss when their offspring are removed from their environment,

whereas ape mothers show signs of mourning the loss of their off-spring, when these are taken

away. A family can be said to have its well-being threatened by poverty, or the illness of one of its

members. The well-being of a community is diminished by the presence of a serial killer,

corruption, gangsterism or hooliganism. The well-being of a species is threatened when its natural

habitat is so depleted that its continued existence is under threat. The well-being of a natural habitat

or ecosystem might be threatened in much the same way as that of a family or clan.

I have argued that African Relational Environmentalism requires that harmonious relationships

need to be promoted, and that harmony is achieved when we identify with others, co-operate to

achieve common ends, help others and seek the development and well-being of others and ourselves

(of course, ‘others’ is here taken to include all other morally considerable entities, not just people).

177

So, if we ought to promote harmonious relationships by seeking the well-being of others, we need

to consider what that well-being is. That will be different for different morally considerable

entities. Our task is to identify with other morally considerable things and to consider how their

reality is affected by our choices and behaviour. We exist in an interrelated web of life, we share a

common interdependency, and we ought to acknowledge that by taking into consideration the good

or well-being of other entities, whatever that might be. Clearly, it is not the same for all morally

considerable entities. The well-being of a virus is the possession of what is good for a virus. The

well-being of a community is the possession of what is good for a community. The well-being of a

person is what is good for a person. A relational ethic that promotes harmonious relationships

entails taking into consideration that which promotes the well-being of other morally considerable

entities, in whichever specific senses they might be said to have a well-being.

If another being is sentient, I ought to take account of its sentience, if I am identifying with it as an

interrelated being. If a being’s survival is dependent on specific nutrients and conditions, I should

take into account that those needs are important for the well-being of that being, even if it cannot

experience pain. If the disruption of family bonds and the social trauma caused to elephants by,

say, the culling of many of their compatriots before their eyes, threatens their well-being, we ought

to identify with the various kinds of harm they experience, and take them into account. If another

species’ very existence is threatened, we should identify with it, in the sense that we understand

what it is to be naturally driven to perpetuate our own species. All of this implies that African

Relational Environmentalism needs to consider such things as the degree to which other beings are

sentient, conscious, self-conscious, rational, capable of moral agency, and interested in their own

well-being.

178

This insight, that solidarity or identification with other beings entails taking into account the kinds

of things that promote their well-being is reminiscent of the eudemonistic environmental ethical

theories that have been popular in recent years. Central to these approaches is the idea that what

counts morally is that morally considerable beings should be able to thrive. And, indeed it is no

stretch to claim that the African sense of well-being I have been describing (based on a physicalist

interpretation of life force as vitality) might easily be expressed in terms of the thriving of different

types of entities. A plant can thrive if it has access to the right kinds of nutrients, enough moisture,

and is left undisturbed. A young male elephant cannot thrive if it is removed from its maternal herd

at too young an age, and might display aggressive and destructive behaviour as a result of the loss

of it social network. A recognition of a differentiated sense of thriving or well-being for each type

of entity is required on a harmony-prizing ethic. Identifying with others entails taking account of

what promotes their own kind of good.

This general conception that moral agents ought to take into account the well-being or thriving of

other morally considerable entities according to their type, is able to go some way towards

explaining some of our more fundamental intuitions. Why, when I am forced to choose between

saving the life of an elephant or a tree, do I think I normally ought to save the life of the elephant?

Perhaps it is because an elephant has more moral status, because its well-being requires more than

just the availability of nutrients, moisture and atmospheric gasses. An elephant is also a conscious

being, possibly even a self-conscious being, and to some extent, a social being. Of course, this

would not entail that elephants’ interests always take precedence over trees. Should the tree

involved happen to be one of the last remaining individuals of a highly endangered species of tree,

there are other moral considerations at work, and it might turn out that I ought to choose to save the

tree in such a case. This may, however, help to understand why we feel less concern about using

179

poison to rid our home of an infestation of fleas than we do about an elephant over-population

policy that involves mass culling.

If African Relational Environmentalism takes into account the well-being of other morally

considerable entities, dependent upon their type, it might be able to provide grounds for generally

prioritising the interests of more complex beings over less complex beings. But, that would seem to

entail that human interests will always outweigh those of all other entities, leading us straight back

to a strong anthropocentrism. It does not seem right that the most trivial of human interests should

trump other more basic interests of other beings. The taking of the lives of many minks to make a

coat that satisfies someone’s interest in feeling good about their status or wealth hardly seems

justified. The mass slaughter of dolphins, in a cruel manner, to satisfy the desires of some diners

for exotic meals also seems unacceptable. Surely, we need to somehow differentiate between types

of interests to establish some kind of general hierarchy.

One attempt to do this is found in VanDeVeer’s ‘Two Factor Egalitarianism’. He proposes that

there are two factors that need to be taken into account when the interests of different species come

into conflict: the ‘…level of importance of interests to each being in a conflict of interests, and …

the psychological capacities of the parties whose interests conflict’ (VanDeVeer, 2003: 157). He

distinguishes between basic and peripheral interests. Clearly such a distinction is unlikely to be

easily applied in all situations, but it is relatively easily applied in quite a number of cases: an

interest in nourishment is obviously a basic interest, whereas an interest in enjoying a pleasurable

evening at the theatre is clearly a peripheral interest. VanDeVeer argues that where the interests of

humans and the interests of members of another species come into conflict, and a sacrifice needs to

be made, the principle to apply should be ‘…that there is a presumption in favour of maximising

utility or at least choosing an alternative that will minimize net disutility’ (VanDeVeer, 2003: 157).

180

He claims that on this basis, basic interests trump peripheral interests. Furthermore, he suggests a

‘Weighting Principle’ that ‘…the interests of beings with more complex psychological capacities

deserve greater weight than those with lesser capacities – up to a point.’ (VanDeVeer, 2003: 158).

He therefore proposes that in situations where interests conflict, basic human interests should

normally outweigh basic animal interest, basic human interests should always outweigh peripheral

animal interests, basic animal interests should outweigh peripheral human interests, and peripheral

human interests might be said to outweigh peripheral animal interests (VanDeVeer, 2003: 157).

This approach is not without its theoretical difficulties, but the basic principles seem helpful when

trying to make ethical choices. Recognising a difference between basic and peripheral interests is a

helpful construct. So is the acknowledgment that different entities have different interests, different

‘goods’, that their well-being or thriving is something we ought to take into account. It is

interesting to note that whereas I pointed to obvious parallels between respect-based deontological

theories and the sense of final value I described in African thought, here, there are also clearly

parallels with utilitarian theories that seek to maximise the good, and this sense of well-being.

6.7 Partiality

6.7.1 A Sense of Partiality in African Thought

I turn now to a fourth ‘sense’ one finds in African thought that is of relevance in weighing up the

competing claims of morally considerable entities, namely, a sense of partiality. This conception is

markedly different from the others that I have discussed in this chapter thus far, inasmuch as it is

not derived from some understanding of the notion of life force. It is, in fact, an altogether different

kind of consideration than those I have discussed above. Rather than being based on some

conception of life force, an African sense of partiality is grounded in the notion of relationality. I

have already argued that relationality is central to African thought. This relationality is expressed in

181

terms of a requirement to live harmoniously with others. I have also claimed that the idea of living

in harmony is typically described analogously in terms of familial relationships. As members of a

healthy and functional human family identify with, respect, cooperate with, and promote the good

of one another (as most of us think family members should), so all of our other relationships with

other people and nature follow suit, at least to some extent. The use of family relationships as the

paradigm for all other relationships makes sense in a worldview in which all natural entities are

regarded as interrelated. After all, ecological science acknowledges a relatedness in the sense of

mutual interdependency between natural entities, too. The strong sense of being related that is

based on sharing a common ancestry in a human family, lends itself quite easily to being extended

to relationships with other organisms, too; in a sense, entities that are part of the web of life are

related to a greater or lesser degree.

The idea that all of our moral obligations are grounded in some sense of being related is supported

by sociobiology, which has provided several useful insights into how a sense of morality probably

developed in human beings through the process of evolution. At its simplest, it seems that early

humans learned that they were more likely to be successful by collaborating within social

structures, than by merely selfishly pursuing their own interests. Co-operative humans were better

adapted for the purposes of the survival of the species, and natural selection therefore began to

prefer genes that encouraged co-operation in the human evolutionary line (de Waal, 2003: 123-

125). Frans de Waal has highlighted what he calls ‘succorant’ behaviour in a number of non-human

species. This is behaviour that indicates that some individuals will help, nurture or protect others in

need, who are not their own progeny, sometimes even across species lines. It is also behaviour that

is associated with species in which some sense of attachment and bonding outside of the parent-

child relationship is evident. He suggests that the roots of such behaviour are to be found in one of

the most basic of instincts, the caring parents provide for their own offspring:

182

…with the evolution of parental care in birds and mammals came feeding, warming,

cleaning, alleviation of distress, and grooming of the young, which in turn led to the

development of infantile appeals to trigger these activities. Once tender exchanges

between parent and offspring had evolved – with the one asking for and the other

providing care – they could easily be extended to all sorts of other relationships (de

Waal, 2003: 130).

That parents have a special moral obligation to ensure that their own children are cared for is a

strong moral intuition. And, it seems likely that this, our most obvious moral obligation, lies at the

bottom of all of our other perceived moral obligations. Indeed, it might be said that every act of

moral concern for another is an extension of this most basic moral sense. I do not intend to make a

very strong case for this theory here. I raise it to clarify the strong belief in African thought that all

moral responsibilities are analogous to family relationships.

In African thought the extension of the relationship between parent and child to other members of

the family is taken as obvious and foundational. It is worthwhile to refer again to Oruka and Juma’s

account of their so-called ‘parental debt principle’ that I referred to in Chapter 3. They claim that it

is obvious that the life condition of members of any family depend on, or are at least affected by,

others in the family. At least partly, our parents and their history are responsible for the conditions

of our lives. Whether we are rich or poor, for instance, is often partially dependent on the relative

affluence of our parents. There is a natural inter-dependence amongst family members. ‘Hence,

within the family no one alone is fully responsible for his affluence nor for his misfortune….’

(Oruka & Juma, 1994: 124-125). Based on this interdependence, Oruka & Juma claim that family

members are morally required to care for one another. Just as we are indebted to our parents for

their contribution to our well-being, so are we indebted to others in our family, because our well-

being is so intrinsically bound up with theirs. For this reason we should use whatever spare

183

resources we have to provide for members of our family who are in need, rather than thinking we

are entitled to keep them just for ourselves (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 124-125). What is suggested here

is that the basic moral obligation that parents have for their offspring is extended to the family as a

whole. And just as parents are often called upon to make sacrifices of their own interests for the

sake of their children, so other family members are required to do the same for their family: parents,

siblings, grandparents, etc.

It needs to be noted that, traditionally, the African family is construed as a much broader social

grouping than that of the so-called nuclear family in Western culture. Mbiti writes:

…the concept of family covers a wide range of members, including children, parents,

grandparents, uncles, aunts, various relatives on both the father’s and mother’s side,

and the departed. Kinship is very important in all aspects of African life. Those who

belong to one people (tribe) have a common origin and many other things held in

common. The family is the most basic unit of life which represents in miniature the

life of the entire people (Mbiti, 1975: 176).

Mbiti discusses morality within the family as going beyond the basic concern for the physical and

emotional well-beings of its members. He claims that morality in the context of a family also

entails order of the kind that can regulate relationships in a way that ensures the welfare of the

family.

In all African families, there is a hierarchy based on age and degree of kinship. The

oldest members have a higher status than the youngest. Within that hierarchy there

are duties, obligations, rights and privileges dictated by the moral sense of society

(Mbiti, 1975: 177).

184

Thus, he claims, parents have obligations to their children, not just concerning their physical

and psychological welfare, but also in terms of disciplining them, and teaching them to how to

behave well, and take their place as responsible members of their society. Children are

required to be obedient to their parents, follow instruction and to contribute to the family’s

welfare by means of their labour. They are also required to be respectful of their elders,

humble in their relations with the elderly, and eventually to care for their own parents in their

old age.

If parents fail in their duties towards their children, the wider community may punish

them through pouring shame on them, ostracizing them, or even taking more serious

steps. If children fail in their duties, they may often be beaten, or have something

taken away from them. At home it is expected that children will learn to tell the truth,

to help other people, to be honest, generous, considerate, hardworking, friendly with

one another, hospitable, and so on. These are fundamental moral duties which begin

to be taught and practised at home (Mbiti, 1975: 177).

Accordingly, the family is not just the supreme exemplar of all moral relationships, it is also the

place in which fundamental moral obligations and reciprocal responsibilities are learnt, and then

extended to the wider community.

What is also obvious is that familial relationships and moral obligations are accorded a basic

priority. All other relationships are explained on the basis of this most basic and obvious of

relationships. So, it almost goes without saying that the priority of such relationships is taken as a

given. Some sense of partiality with respect to the members of one’s own family is not only

justifiable, it is often prescribed in African thought. How will a child learn to be a morally

responsible member of the community, if that child is not raised with the security that his/her

closest family members will promote his/her most important interests? The entire basis of a

185

developing moral sense is predicated on the foundation that parents care for their children, and so

on. There is no sense of discomfort about admitting to some sense of partiality with respect to the

needs of one’s own family.

Lest this be misunderstood as some kind of all-overriding partiality with respect to the family, it

must be remembered that family relationships are extended analogously to the clan, tribe and

beyond (and on African Relational Environmentalism they are extended beyond the human species,

too). Familial partiality is recognised and even affirmed, but only within certain boundaries. No-

one would expect a parent to allow her child to starve at the expense of her neighbour’s child. But,

since her neighbour’s child is also ‘related’, she would be expected to help feed the child in times of

hardship, before indulging her own child’s less basic desires for unnecessary luxuries. Similarly,

caring for the basic needs of other members of one’s clan or tribe before those of a stranger would

not be regarded as morally wrong. But, this needs to be balanced against a very strong emphasis on

a duty to provide hospitality to strangers passing through which is found in most African

communities.

Partiality is not necessarily applied only with respect to other persons. Justifiably, or not, many

people extend such partiality to non-human members of their household. Many families will ensure

that their companion animals have their dietary and medical needs attended to before they would

give money to a charitable cause. There may be very sound moral grounds for doing so, other than

those related to partiality6, but it is interesting how naturally we assume that we do have a moral

obligation to feed our pets and our livestock, and to keep them generally comfortable. There is very

6 For instance, since we have caused these animals to be completely dependent on us for their survival, we have a

special obligation to care for them.

186

little in the African literature that I have been able to find that deals with animals that are part of a

mixed social community with humans. But, I think it is reasonable to assume that Africans would

also grant some priority to the welfare of their hunting dogs or their livestock, on the basis that they

are part of their local community or family. I earlier cited Kelbessa’s claim that domestic animals

should not be treated cruelly (Kelbessa, 2005: 26). Mbiti speaks of the fact that African

communities greatly value their livestock:

The keeping of cattle, sheep and goats is widespread in Africa. There are many

societies that live more or less on that alone. Livestock plays a very important role in

the lives of the people, not only for food but also for social and economic purposes.

These animals are valued greatly everywhere, and there is a whole culture revolving

around stock-keeping (Mbiti, 1975: 131).

He also claims that in some communities livestock are sometimes valued even more than other

people, and they are given personal names, and treated with great care, almost as members of the

family (Mbiti, 1975: 131). It is not necessary to pursue this idea much farther. For now, it will

suffice to suggest that an African worldview might be open to the idea of extending some kind of

limited partiality to the animals that form part of mixed communities with humans.

Be that as it may, partiality in the sense that some priority is given to one’s own family, then one’s

local community, and then one’s clan, followed by one’s tribe, and so forth is an established

principle in African thought. Whilst providing a full philosophically robust defence of this position

is not my intention, I again suggest that these ideas seem to be consistent with some of our most

basic moral intuitions. Whether it is consistent with our preferred ethical theories or not, most of us

still give some priority to our own family when it comes to moral choices. We ensure that the basic

needs (and, often even non-basic needs) of our children are met before we consider giving any of

our surplus resources to the needs of other children. Children learn to be concerned for others and

187

to develop a moral sense from being recipients of parental care and nurture. These lessons enable

them to become co-operative members of society, and of the entire moral circle (or the web of life).

It seems plausible, therefore, that society should endorse some partiality within the family, for the

sake of creating a society of well-socialised, mutually supportive individuals. Such partiality is also

universalisable, as it is reasonable to accept that others will practise some partiality with respect to

their own family members, just as we will. This is not unjust, because it is expected that members

of all families will take a special interest in ensuring the well-being of one another.

Whilst such a partialist perspective exists in African thought, it needs to be reiterated that it is not

conceived of as a rigidly over-riding constraint. Under specific conditions, other competing moral

obligations (for example, the security of the community) might take precedence. Many nations and

communities expect families to send some of their members into life-threatening situations in times

of war, for example. So, in a similar way, partiality in African thought is contingent on other

obligations.

6.7.2 Taking Account of a Sense of Partiality in African Thought

On the basis of my reasoning in the preceding section, some degree of partiality towards those

closer to us in terms of familial relationships, as well as other intimate social relationships is

morally permissible. As long as such partialist considerations are not regarded as completely

overriding in determining moral obligations, they seem morally defensible. It is within the context

of family relationships that we acquire a sense of morality in the first place. The mutual co-

operation, identification and caring that is learnt within (relatively wholesome) families lies at the

root of all other co-operative relationships. The care we receive from our families teaches us to care

for others, in return. Without the very basic experience of being cared for by our immediate family,

188

we would not as a species have developed into a co-operative, moral species at all. Healthy family

relationships are a model for all other relationships, and on this basis, giving some moral priority to

these relationships helps to ensure that individuals learn to become members of a moral

community7. On these grounds it can be argued that some partiality in family relationships is good

for society. I have claimed that such partiality lends itself easily to universalizability, so that it is

not necessarily unjust.

Applying this sense of partiality in contexts of competing moral obligations would allow for moral

agents to give some priority to their duties to members of their own families and to others with

whom they have closer rather than very distant relational bonds. It would also allow for persons to

give extra weight to their obligations to their own communities and nation. I have suggested that it

also allows for us to prioritise the interests of animals who form part of mixed communities with

humans, namely companion animals and livestock. Again, these are merely factors that ought to be

taken into account, and such partiality should never be taken as automatically justifiable. It might

be best to see these as pro tanto obligations to treat those nearest to us with some degree of special

consideration. This special consideration can be outweighed by other more pressing moral duties,

however. In terms of African Relational Environmentalism, it could be argued that harmony is

often promoted when, for instance, all parents treat their own children with a fair degree of

partiality. However, this would not justify blatant spoiling of children or unbridled nepotism, as

such actions would easily lead to discord in a community.

7 This is my own claim, based on sociobiological insights, rather than on sub-Saharan accounts of partiality.

189

6.8 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore notions in African thought that might assist in

weighing up competing moral obligations. On my African Relational Environmentalism all current

and future persons, other living things, individuals and groups (such as families, communities

species and ecosystems), as well as many inorganic natural entities (such as rivers, minerals and

forests), - in other words all parts of the web of life - are morally considerable. They all need to be

taken into account morally, and the right moral actions are those that promote harmony between us

and these morally considerable entities. Despite my definition of moral considerability as

something an entity either has or does not, I have not argued for a moral egalitarianism, where all

morally considerable entities should be treated as having equal moral status. I have rather claimed

that there are other factors that African Relational Environmentalism considers when making moral

choices, factors that might entail that we give more weight to the interests of some entities than

others.

Based primarily on different African uses of the notion of life force, I identified a number of

conceptions that are of relevance with respect to weighing up competing moral obligations. I chose

to interpret life force in physicalist, rather than spiritual terms, focusing on the idea that it can be

understood as vitality or liveliness. My discussion of the various ways Africans apply the idea of

life force resulted in the following proposals:

1. Fundamentally, African Relational Environmentalism supports the idea that moral status is

something that admits of degrees. Different entities have different degrees of life force

/vitality, or different capacities in terms of their ability to experience life. The richness,

complexity and sophistication of entities is morally relevant and determines their relative

degree of moral status. This resonates with some of our most basic moral intuitions that

190

seem to require us to recognise that the moral status of different classes of morally

considerable entities varies, according to the nature or essence of the entity itself. Living

things should generally be prioritised over animate natural things. Sentient beings should be

prioritised over non-sentient beings. Self-conscious beings have additional moral status, as

do beings with stronger mental faculties. In general, then, it is justifiable to think that we

should save persons from starvation before other animals. However, these claims should not

be taken to imply that human interests always outweigh those of other beings, or the

interests of animals always outweigh those of other plants. These represent just one set of

moral values that ought to be considered as we weigh up competing moral claims.

2. The notion of life force is also often used to suggest a sense in which moral considerable

entities are accorded final value. The degree of final value entities have is also a function of

the kind of entities they are, or of their degree of moral status. What is most important, is

that this final value provides grounds for treating moral considerable entities with respect,

the kind of respect due to the kind of entity they are.

3. On some African accounts, life force seems to suggest a sense of instrumental value. The

vitality of entities depends on their being able to make instrumental use of other aspects of

the natural world for their sustenance, health and survival. Thus, the instrumental value of

entities is also of relevance to ethical choices. Bearing in mind that many natural things are

instrumentally valuable to a variety of other morally considerable entities, we need to take

into account the instrumental value of entities not only with respect to human interests.

Recognising instrumental value allows for us to give priority to natural entities that are

systemically important in ecological terms. The protection of certain threatened species that

play a critical role ecologically in the survival of other living things can, thus, be prioritised.

Similarly, curtailing the number of species that threaten the existence of other things can be

justified in terms of preserving a necessary balance in nature or an ecosystem.

191

4. The notion of life force is sometimes used in a way in which it seems to mean the well-being

of entities. Life force is seen to increase or decrease as a function of whether entities are

thriving or not. Natural entities have a good of their own, thrive in their own ways, even if

they are not aware of their well-being or able to deliberately seek it. What constitutes well-

being for entities correlates with their specific nature and capabilities. An ethic based in

solidarity, sharing, identity and care requires moral agents to consider the good or ability to

thrive of each morally considerable entity. Living in harmony with plants in my garden

entails recognising that they need water to thrive. Living in harmony with elephants

requires us to take account of their very tight family-like social structures. They need their

relationships with the other members of their herd to thrive. Harmonious relationships with

other species also entail recognising that species have a well-being qua species, and that is

promoted by their being able to perpetuate their kind over time.

5. Given the difficulty of weighing up the competing interests of entities with such different

‘goods’ of their own, some principles are required to guide such choices. VanDeVeer’s two

factor egalitarianism is both helpful as well as consistent with the notion of differing degrees

of final value of entities discussed in point 1 of this summary. Firstly, primary interests

should be distinguished from peripheral ones, and given priority. Secondly, the interests of

beings that are more complex psychologically should be given some priority over those that

are less complex. These principles also resonate with our basic intuitions.

6. Finally, based on a fundamental notion of relationality in African thought, I argued that

some degree of partiality towards members of one’s own family, community, nation, etc. is

justifiable, and may be said to promote the good of society generally. Harmony can be

respected by allowing some degree of prioritising the interests of those closest to us over the

interests of others. This should not be regarded as an over-riding principle or trump card.

192

Such partiality can also be extended to animals that are part of mixed communities with

persons.

Clearly, I have not provided a set of neat, easy to apply principles that constitute a basic formula for

making moral decisions where there are competing moral obligations. However, I have articulated

some considerations, derived from African notions, that ought to be taken into account. In the final

chapter of this thesis I will address a number of specific environmental ethical questions, and

suggest how some of these considerations might come into play. Before moving on to applications,

however, I endeavour in the following chapter to bring the whole of my argument together, and give

a coherent account of African Relational Environmentalism.

193

7 AFRICAN RELATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: TOWARDS A THEORY

7.1 Introduction

I have endeavoured to describe an environmental ethic inspired by ideas and themes in African

thought. At the base of this ethic is a notion that all things that are part of the web of life are

interdependent. Although this sense of interdependence is rooted in metaphysical ontological

beliefs in African thought, it echoes and can be justified by similar ideas about the

interconnectedness of nature held by ecologists. I also pointed out that to Africans, this

interdependence provides grounds for us to regard all parts of the web of life as morally

considerable, and to treat them with respect. This respect is realized by promoting harmonious

relationships within the web of life. Taken together with a strongly communitarian ethic, it is clear

that the ethic I describe is robustly relational in nature. I have chosen, therefore, to call this ethic

‘African Relational Environmentalism’. I identified a theory of right action for this approach as:

an act is right when it demonstrates respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious

relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web. I

argued that a single criterion is able to define which entities should be morally considerable, namely

that they are parts of the web of life. I then identified persons, animals, plants, inorganic natural

entities, families, communities, species and ecosystems as morally considerable. I also claimed that

the web of life transcends generations, so that future generations are morally considerable, too.

Finally, I suggested that there are other African conceptions, mainly based in different uses of the

notion of life force, that are able to assist us in establishing principles to weigh up competing moral

claims between morally considerable things. I identified some of these principles, and discussed

how they might be included in our moral reasoning.

194

Before looking at some applications in the final chapter of this thesis, what remains for me to do in

this chapter, is to flesh out more precisely the nature of promoting harmonious relationships. I

considered this briefly in Chapter 3, but my rather cursory treatment of it there needs further

elucidation. I return to fleshing out the meaning of harmonious relationships only now, because I

first needed to clarify the notions of moral considerability and moral status in African thought, in

the intervening chapters, in order to be in a position to fully characterize such harmonious

relationships. In the first part of the chapter, I give a fuller account of the association between the

assertion that everything in the web of life is interdependent and a moral requirement for us act in

ways that promote harmonious relationships between persons and other parts of the web of life.

This discussion is intended to explain why we ought to promote harmonious relationships in the

first place. In the second part of the chapter, I seek to give further content to the notion of

harmonious relationships, drawing together some of the threads of my theory so far. Finally, I

outline African Relational Environmentalism in summary form.

7.2 How does Interdependence Entail a Moral Duty to Promote Harmonious Relationships?

According to many African theorists we are required to promote harmonious relationships between

ourselves and other morally considerable entities, because we are interconnected with all parts of the

web of life. For the most part, this claim is taken as a fact that needs no justification. It is

understood as almost obvious that interrelatedness simply entails that we ought to promote healthy

relationships with other aspects of nature. In Chapter 4, I acknowledged that claims of this type are

subject to significant theoretical challenge. Hume famously pointed out that facts cannot on their

own entail moral obligations. An ‘is’ cannot imply an ‘ought’. ‘Oughts’ always rely on some moral

value, and values cannot be derived from facts (Hume, 2007). I countered this by turning to

Rolston, who argues that we observe that there is ‘unity, harmony, interdependence, stability, etc.’

195

in nature, and that at the same time we assert that these are goods that ought to be preserved or

promoted:

What is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage and mutual transformation

of ecological description and evaluation here is that an “ought” is not so much

derived from an “is” as is discovered simultaneously with it…. [I]t is difficult to say

where the natural facts leave off and where the natural values appear. For some

observers, at least, the sharp is/ought dichotomy is gone; the values seem to be there

as soon as the facts are fully in, and both alike are properties of the system (Rolston,

1989: 19-20).

I claimed that a similar relationship exists between how Africans assert the ‘fact’ of interdependence

in nature, and believe that this entails a moral requirement to promote harmonious relationships.

The two seem to become evident to us simultaneously. Regardless of whether or not this is

successful in justifying how moral obligations can be grounded in an observation about the essential

interdependent nature of things, this close association is implied in African thought, and it is worth

exploring a little further. This exploration will shed some light on why right action is defined in

terms of promoting harmonious relationships.

In the previous chapter I pointed out that there are senses in which African thought recognises both

that morally considerable entities have final value, warranting respect, as well as that they have a

good or well-being of their own that ought to be taken into account. I hinted at the time that these

notions were reminiscent, in turn, of duty-based and utilitarian moral theories. All I claimed was

that some similarities with these two prominent Western moral theories could be discerned. What I

shall argue in what follows is that whilst African relational ethics can be said to share characteristics

with both respect-based and utilitarian theories, the key to understanding this ethic in fact lies in its

similarities with another type of influential Western ethical theory: perfectionist or virtue ethics. I

196

begin by showing why African relational ethics is best described as ‘perfectionist’. I then briefly

show how, despite the fact that virtue is what does the work in explaining a moral obligation to

promote harmonious relationships, respect and well-being are still important considerations to be

taken into account on this ethic.

7.2.1 A Perfectionist or Virtue Ethics Account of Morality

African philosophers seem most inclined to give an account of ethics that brings to mind what

Western philosophy denotes as ‘perfectionism’. On these accounts persons should seek to develop

a good or virtuous nature in order to become true or fully moral persons. In this section I shall cite

a number of examples of this perfectionist notion in African thought, to demonstrate its prominence

in the literature.

Once again, this perfectionist or virtue ethics perspective is typically expressed in terms of life

force. In a passage discussing the interaction between the living and ancestors, Bujo claims:

The goal of this interaction is the increase of vitality within the clan. No one is

allowed to keep this vitality for oneself; everyone has to share it with other members

of the family and clan. This means that every member has to behave in such a way

that all that is done contributes towards the development of life. An individual’s

failure reduces the vitality of the community, whereas good behavior ensures the

growth of life among all. This is not just a biological, but an ontological causal force

(Bujo, 1998: 16).

197

On many accounts, life force is seen to be diminished in individuals who offend the values of their

community, break taboos, are disrespectful, fail to carry out necessary rituals, or act immorally.

The life force of a person or her personhood can be reduced or increased on the basis of moral

character. Consequently, individuals who behave in morally admirable ways, and fulfil their role in

their community are said to grow in personhood, or increase in life force. Shutte explains that a

person’s life is conceived of as a process; personhood is something that is developed over time; our

personhood is the subject of continuous construction. This is described in terms of growth (and,

sometimes, diminution) of our life force. Whether our life force increases or decreases is a function

of our moral character and behaviour. To the extent that persons exhibit Ubuntu (or seek to

promote harmonious relationships), their life force or personhood is enhanced or reduced. ‘A

person who is generous and hospitable, who welcomes strangers to her house and table and cares

for the needy increases in vital force. She builds up an identity that is enduring, that will not

disintegrate…’ (Shutte, 1993: 25). People are seen to increase in life force (and personhood) as

they mature into better, more moral people. Menkiti also famously describes personhood in

African thought as a process: ‘…full personhood is not perceived as simply given at the very

beginning of one’s life, but is attained after one is well along in society…’ (Menkiti, 1984: 173).

On this view, children are not born with a full degree of personhood, and people can fail at

becoming full persons (Menkiti, 1984: 173). Whilst Menkiti’s expression of these concepts is not

accepted by all African philosophers, the basic idea that the persons can grow (or shrink) in moral

stature is held by many theorists. Setting aside the metaphysics entailed by a belief in life force or

vital force, the underlying conception here seems to be similar to a virtue ethics perspective.

Humans, as moral agents, grow in virtue as they act in morally appropriate ways, and that should be

their foremost aim.

198

This African sense of virtue or perfectionism is inextricably linked with communitarianism. Bujo

stresses this:

There is a large consensus that the strengthening and growth of life are fundamental

criteria also in the realm of ethics. The members of a clan share the obligation to the

growth of life of the whole community by their moral action. Usually only that kind

of behavior which leads to the building up of the community is morally good.... It is

obvious how, in such a perspective, every action must be considered evil which

prevents the fulfilment of the common, and also the individual life (Bujo, 1998: 27).

On this view, the community itself is seen as having a life force that is contributed to by its

members. When individuals act immorally the community’s life force is reduced. Acts that cause

disharmony within the community are thus damaging to the community. The well-being of the

community depends on the behaviour of its members. It is for this reason that African thought

places so much emphasis on interdependence. Because the well-being of individuals is so closely

tied up with the well-being of others, and the well-being of the community as a whole,

interdependence is taken to provide the grounds for the notion that moral acts are those that promote

harmonious relationships within the community. Just as a ‘good’ member of a family recognises

her dependence upon others in the family, and therefore seeks to promote the good of her whole

family, community members should seek to be good members of society by seeking to promote

harmonious relationships in society.

Given what I have claimed about the moral considerability of all parts of the web of life, it ought to

be clear that the moral circle can be understood as embracing not just persons, but also the rest of

nature. Bujo confirms this, describing the whole cosmos as part of an interdependent network of

life force:

199

It should be observed that the whole cosmos is part of this network. According to the

African people’s belief, not only human beings influence each other, but all forces

possess a causal and ontological interdependence. Accordingly, natural forces can

influence men and women ontologically and vice versa (Bujo, 1998: 16).

Individual good behaviour does not only increase the virtue of the actor, it also affects the whole

community and its well-being. Bujo adds that in this context, the community includes the whole

cosmos, or all of nature (Bujo, 1998: 16). Given the very strong emphasis on the interrelatedness of

all objects in the web of life, and that all things that are part of the web of life are morally

considerable, it makes sense that an African ethic would link virtue to a taking into account of the

effect that one’s behaviour has on others in the web of life.

The association between interdependence and a moral duty to promote harmonious relationships

lies in the understanding that moral agents who recognise their interdependence with others in the

web of life (or the natural community) are morally good or virtuous to the extent that they seek to

promote the well-being of the whole natural community. The good of all is achievable only when

individuals seek to co-operate with one another. Thus, acts that promote harmonious relationships

based on cooperation, identification, solidarity and care are right, and those that do not are wrong.

A person becomes a better person, or a more virtuous person by promoting harmonious

relationships in the web of life. Shutte sums up this perfectionist approach as follows: ‘Our deepest

moral obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply

into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded’

(Shutte, 2001: 30).

200

The association of the notion of life force with virtue or perfectionism is yet another example of

how this notion is used in a variety of ways in African thought. In this case, life force is taken to be

a measure of one’s virtue. Again, it is not necessary to conceive of life force, used in this way, as a

spiritual energy. It is also not related to a physicalist understanding of life force as vitality or

liveliness. I shall take it simply as being employed to denote the degree to which moral agents

exhibit those attitudes and behaviours that reveal them to be good, moral or virtuous persons1. Our

primary moral obligation is to seek to be authentic persons, and we grow in personhood to the

extent that we act in virtuous ways. Understood in this way, it is clear that African Relational

Ethics is at bottom a perfectionist theory, and equally as plausible as other more familiar

perfectionist approaches.

It is this perfectionist notion that is key to understanding an African relational ethic in which

harmonious relationships are to be promoted. However, as I hope to show in the two sections that

follow, virtue on this African relational view is able to take account of both the notions of respect

and well-being.

7.2.2 The Relationship Between Respect and Virtue

In the previous chapter I argued that there is a sense in which the notion of life force is appealed to

that suggests that all morally considerable entities possess some degree of final value, a value that

entitles them to be treated as ends in themselves, a value that makes them entities worthy of a basic

respect. I also claimed that the degree of final value entities have varies according to degree of life

1 This is likely a thinner understanding of how the notion of life force is traditionally associated with perfectionism in

African thought. However, this simplistic interpretation is sufficient for my purposes, here.

201

force they possess, or the type of entity they are. This allows for an understanding of moral status

as something that admits of degrees: broadly, persons have more status than animals, who have

more than plants, who have more than inanimate natural objects. Furthermore, the degree of moral

status an entity possesses is related to its characteristics or essential nature, so that capacities such

as rationality, moral agency, self-consciousness, sentience, and so on, have an influence on what it

is about entities that warrants respect. Respecting a rock formation, respecting a person, respecting

a species and respecting a river are very different, but a fundamental respect is nonetheless required

for all entities according to the kind of entities they are.

Since what I seek to address in this section of the chapter is how a fundamental sense of

interrelatedness is related to an obligation to promote harmonious relationships within the web of

life, I now seek to clarify how this notion of respect plays a role in explaining this correlation.

Given the belief that life force is something shared by all parts of the web of life, interrelatedness

implies a sense of being related to one another, of being ‘kin’. On this account, one aspect of

interrelatedness is a sense of shared identity between parts of the web of life: they all share the

quality of having a degree of life force, or some final value. This is where the key to understanding

morality comes into play: virtuous people, people who are truly, fully persons, are those who are

inclined to recognise and acknowledge the essential characteristics we have in common with other

parts of the web of life. Virtuous people are inclined to be respectful of other parts of the natural

community. Just as persons respect other persons because they recognise that they share common

needs and interests, so should moral agents respect other sentient entities because they have needs

and interests in common, and so should we respect other conscious beings because of their capacity

for consciousness, and even all other natural things, because they too share the characteristic of

being the product of historical natural processes.

202

One might still be left wondering how respect and a requirement to promote harmonious

relationships are related. I already hinted at this relationship when I expressed a theory of right

action for African Relational Environmentalism namely, that an act is right when it demonstrates

respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships between persons and

persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web. The respect that a virtuous person has

for other entities is realized or demonstrated when we develop harmonious relationships. Once we

grant entities the respect due to them for being what they are, it ought to be obvious that such

respect entails promoting harmonious relationships with them. Harmonious relationships are

preserved when we respect other parts of the web of life, because respect requires us to take them

and their particular interests into account. Respecting the fundamental nature of other natural

entities requires acting in ways that promote goodwill towards them, within the constraints imposed

by co-existing in the natural world. As I have claimed before, this does not mean that we can never

use other natural things instrumentally for our own good – that is an absurd notion. But, respect

requires that when we do things that have an impact on other natural objects, we are mindful of the

effect that it has on them. Harmonious relationships are facilitated by our having an attitude of

respect towards other morally considerable entities. In the light of this, my definition of right action

for African Relational Environmentalism can do with one further minor adjustment, an adjustment

that gives greater expression to the key role that virtue plays in African ethics: a person should

become virtuous, and do so by acting in ways that demonstrate respect for all parts of the web of

life by promoting harmonious relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and

the other parts of the web.

203

7.2.3 The Relationship Between Well-Being and Virtue

In the previous chapter I also argued that there is a sense in which the African notion of life force

can be understood as being related to well-being. Broadly construed, I claimed that it is coherent to

speak about a well-being of all things that are part of the web of life. If it is understood that all

natural entities, including groups of natural entities, have a good of their own, and are capable of

thriving or languishing, then we can speak of their well-being in the sense of their thriving. Of

course, what constitutes thriving differs according to the specific nature of entities. For very simple

life forms, thriving consists in merely having access to what is needed to survive. For more

complex life forms, it may extend to include not experiencing significant pain and being part of a

well-adjusted social structure. Families, communities, and species can also be said to have a well-

being. And it is not incoherent to regard even some inanimate natural entities such as rivers or

forests as being capable of thriving.

This notion of well-being is related to a belief in the fundamental interrelatedness of all natural

things by virtue of the fact that, by definition, interdependence implies that the well-being of

different entities is affected by other entities. Fish and plants cannot thrive in a highly toxic river;

persons cannot thrive in a context of enormous social conflict or war; and the well-being of species

whose habitat has been all but destroyed by human encroachment is severely threatened. I have

claimed that the key to understanding the correlation between interdependence and an obligation to

promote harmonious relationships is the perfectionist notion that persons grow in virtue to the

degree that they promote relationships of solidarity, co-operation and caring between themselves

and the interdependent parts of the web of life. Virtuous persons, then, identify with other entities

that also have a well-being, acknowledging that just as our thriving is important to us, thriving is

important to other entities, too. Solidarity, identification and caring require us to take account of

the well-being of other morally considerable things.

204

7.2.4 Summary: Why Should We Promote Harmonious Relationships?

My goal in this section has been to explore the association between the assertion that everything in

the web of life is interdependent and a moral requirement for us to seek harmony within the web.

The intention of this was to show why we should seek to promote harmonious relationships, in the

first place. I argued that the pervasive explanation in African thought rested on something of a

perfectionist notion of ethics: moral agents grow in virtue to the extent that they promote

harmonious relationships. Claiming that this notion of virtue is the key, I also argued that it,

nonetheless, takes account both of respect and well-being. To summarise, then, I have contended

that African Relational Environmentalism is an ethic that recognises a fundamental interdependence

between all things that are part of the web of life. Virtuous moral agents are conscious of this

interdependence, they recognise that other natural entities also have well-being and seek to thrive,

and they acknowledge that they have a final value that requires respect. This respect is

demonstrated by seeking to promote harmonious relationships in the web of life. Harmonious

relationships are not possible when others are treated disrespectfully, and when their well-being is

not taken into account. Thus, to be virtuous people, or authentic persons, we ought to promote

harmonious relationships because they entail respect for others as well as take account of the well-

being of others, who together with us constitute an interdependent community or web of life. Just

as good or virtuous family members are those who act as ‘true’ family by identifying with others in

their family, sharing a way of life, looking after one another and promoting one another’s good, so

should virtuous members of the family or web of life seek to maintain harmonious relationships

within the web. Interestingly, just as I claimed that African Relational Environmentalism was able

to embrace the salient features of both individualist and holist environmental ethics, I have now

suggested that it is also capable of entailing some of the most promising aspects of virtue ethics,

respect-based and utilitarian ethics. The strength of this African relational approach lies exactly in

205

its ability to embrace, in a single harmony-prizing account of morality some of the important ethical

principles entailed by three of the most prominent Western ethical theories.

7.3 How can Harmonious Relationships with Nature be Characterised?

I have given an account of why we ought to promote harmonious relationships. But, I have yet to

finally characterise such relationships. What does it mean for persons to respect other parts of the

web of life by ensuring harmonious relationships with them? It is to this question that I turn my

attention now.

7.3.1 Harmonious Relationships as Caring Relationships

In Chapter 3 I claimed that the key to understanding African ethics lies in taking account of its

essential relationality. Our moral obligations arise out of a sense of community, of belonging

together in an interdependent collective. This relational ethic is often described as being analogous

to family relationships. In families, because our well-being and interests are so inextricably linked

with those of the other members of our family, we ordinarily seek to act as genuine family members

by caring for one another. Given that I have also claimed that an African relational ethic is

essentially perfectionist, persons become true persons or virtuous persons when they seek the good

of not only themselves, but of their community, too. I argued that on at least some African accounts

similar relationships between ourselves and other parts of the web of life should also be fostered.

These relationships, I suggested, are best described in terms of promoting harmony between persons

and persons, and between persons and other parts of the web of life. I cited Metz’s characterisation

of harmonious relationships as consisting in identification and solidarity. As we conceive of

ourselves as sharing some common identity with others and expressing this in solidarity, we seek

206

the good of others, and acknowledge that caring for others is an essential part of being part of a

community (Metz, 2007: 337). I further claimed, with Metz, that this goes beyond a mere sense of

having affective bonds with one another, and includes taking on some responsibility for the security

and emotional and material welfare of others. As Metz argues, harmonious relationships are

essentially relationships of friendliness towards one another (Metz, 2007: 337).

Since I have argued that on African Relational Environmentalism all parts of the web of life

(including future generations) are morally considerable, my basic contention is that we ought to

promote harmonious relationships with all parts of the web. This is grounded in an attitude towards

other natural things that recognises our interdependence with them. I have also argued that it entails

recognising the final value that all parts of the web of life have, in varying degrees, and treating

them with respect. Necessarily this respect needs to take into account the well-being of other parts

of the web of life. Bringing everything together, virtuous moral agents are those who respect nature

and natural entities, acknowledge that they all seek to thrive in their own ways, and take their well-

being into account. It does not imply that we are not able to use other natural entities for our own

ends, but rather that in doing so we consider the impact our actions have upon them. We are

justified in using nature, but we are not justified in harming it for trivial reasons. Thus, we ought to

promote harmonious relationships between ourselves and other parts of the web of life2.

2 As I have pointed out before, this notion should be distinguished from a harmony-maximising view. It is concerned

with ensuring that the right kind of relationships are maintained and developed between ourselves and other entities,

rather than exclusively with the total amount of harmony in the world.

207

7.3.2 Harmonious Relationships and Balance in Nature

Throughout this thesis, I have emphasized the need to promote harmonious relationships between

persons and persons, and between persons and other parts of the web of life. I have deliberately

avoided language that suggests that we ought to promote harmony in nature. This is a very

important distinction, as it makes it clear that I do not propose that we have a moral obligation to

ensure harmonious relationships between other parts of the web of life, excluding ourselves as

persons. Some might, in fact, claim that an environmental ethic should entail promoting harmony

in nature. However, I do not believe this is entailed by African Relational Environmentalism, nor

do I think that it is apt to think along these lines.

One important reason for this is that to suggest that we ought to promote harmony between other

parts of the web of life is untenable, since nature often seems to be cruel and uncaring, and anything

but harmonious. Callicott points out that ‘A central, stark fact lies at the heart of ecological

processes: Energy, the currency of the economy of nature, passes from one organism to another…

from stomach to stomach. Eating and being eaten, living and dying are what make the biotic

community hum’ (Callicott 2000: 223). A Darwinian understanding of natural life as characterised

by a struggle in which only the fittest survive appears heartless, if not cruel. In many ways, life is a

struggle for resources, and some naturally prosper only at the expense of others. As Callicott

rightly points out the food chain is evidence enough that many living things thrive only because

they prey on other living things. Thus, it is reasonable to question how harmony could be promoted

in a natural world that seems so inherently cruel and harsh.

208

Thus, although African Relational Environmentalism takes into account that the well-being of other

sentient entities includes their preference to avoid suffering, it does not seek to maximise pleasure

and minimise pain, as a certain kind of utilitarianism would. We are required to promote

harmonious relationships between ourselves and other morally considerable entities, but not to seek

to maximize harmony in the web of life. As a result we can avoid the absurd implications of a

suffering-minimizing approach in which it might seem that persons have a moral obligation to

prevent a crocodile from attacking a young wildebeest. Predation is a part of the natural order. It is

part of the balance and equilibrium of the web of life. As I pointed out earlier, human beings are

part of nature and not set apart from it. This means that we are just as entitled to take from nature

what we need for our survival as are any other living things. It is perhaps for this reason that there

does not seem to be any strong tradition of vegetarianism in traditional African thought: the eating

of meat by humans is taken to be as entirely natural as the killing of the young wildebeest by the

crocodile. We are under no obligation to try to prevent the natural realities of suffering, predation

and the fact that entities sometimes thrive only at the expense of other entities3.

African Relational Environmentalism seeks to promote harmonious relationships between persons

and persons, and between persons and other parts of the web of life, but it does not seek to promote

harmony in nature, itself. However, although it seems inappropriate to talk in terms of promoting

harmony in nature, it is not inappropriate to claim that one of the ways in which we are required to

promote harmonious relationships between ourselves and other parts of the web of life is to

recognise the importance of avoiding acting in ways that seriously disrupt the balance or

3 This would not necessarily preclude us from, for instance, giving medical attention to a young wildebeest that had

been wounded by a crocodile, but managed to escape. On an ethic that seeks to promote caring relationships, we might

well seem compelled to do this.

209

homeostasis of ecosystems and the natural environment generally, at least so far as this is possible.

Since African Relational Environmentalism is predicated on a belief in the fundamental

interdependence of all things in the web of life, it must take into account that our actions often have

an impact on other morally considerable entities. One of the very significant ways in which we can

act unvirtuously is for us to so disrupt natural balances, as to cause significant harm to other parts of

the web of life. Destroying or severely compromising sensitive habitats and ecosystems is a moral

wrong, because by disrupting nature’s balance, we fail to promote harmonious relationships

between ourselves and the rest of nature.

Of course, African Relational Environmentalism is not exceptional in entailing that we have a moral

obligation not to disrupt natural balances when doing so would cause harm to other parts of the web

of life. Most approaches to environmental ethics make the same claim. Where African relational

thought is able to make an interesting contribution to our moral thinking about balance in nature, is

in its strong focus on the importance of restoring disrupted relationships. One of the distinguishing

characteristics of sub-Saharan moral thought (at least with respect to social relationships), is that it

places a great deal of emphasis on the restoration of disrupted relationships. This is

characteristically expressed in a preference for restorative rather than retributive justice. Metz

highlights this preference in African thought by pointing out that a backward looking notion of

punishment as retribution for past wrongs is often rejected in favour of a forward-looking

reconciliatory approach: ‘… many African communities believe it appropriate to respond to crime

with the expectation of a good result of some sort, whether to appease angry ancestors and thereby

protect the community from their wrath, or to mend a broken relationship between the offender, his

victim and the community’ (Metz, 2007: 325). He cites the South African Truth and Reconciliation

Commission as an example of this preference being applied. Rather than seeking retribution for the

past wrongs of Apartheid, the Commission sought to apply the philosophy of Ubuntu in a way that

210

sought restorative and reconciliatory justice (Metz, 2007: 325). A.M. Anderson similarly highlights

a restorative element to Ubuntu: ‘Restorative justice is a specific type of response to crime. Ubuntu

is much more than that – but both focus on restoring an imbalance created by someone’s conduct

and on building peace within communities. Both achieve this through co-operative efforts’

(Anderson, 2003: 11). The important thing here is that for many Africans, it is important to restore

relationships that have been compromised or disrupted in any way, particularly when we are

responsible. This is significant for environmental ethics in that it suggests that where we have

damaged our relationship with other parts of the web of life through causing a fundamental

imbalance in nature, we are obliged to make amends, to restore the relationship, to seek to do what

we can to mend the harm that we have caused. We would ordinarily not be obliged to protect one

non-human species from another. However, where it is our actions in disrupting the balance of

nature that created a situation in which some species are now threatened by others, we are morally

obliged to take responsibility and do what we can correct to the damage our actions have caused in

the first place.

This is particularly significant when dealing with a class of environmental issues in which human

actions have caused harm to other parts of the web of life, but humans are not themselves

significantly or directly affected as a consequence. For instance, invasive alien species introduced

into ecosystems by humans have been shown to sometimes cause enormous damage to those

ecosystems, and threaten indigenous species. Some might claim that we ought to leave nature to

her own devices, and not interfere any further. However, on an African Relational ethic, we are

obliged to do what we can to redress the harm that we have caused in the first place, in order to

restore our harmonious relationships with other parts of the web of life. This does not necessarily

imply that we have to restore the balance of nature in such cases. Indeed more often than not, once

the balance has been disrupted it might be all but impossible to completely restore it. But, we must

211

do what we can to restore our relationship with the other parts of the web of life we have harmed.

This entails, where possible, taking responsibility for our actions, and seeking to protect those

natural entities which are under threat because of our actions in the first place. On this basis, for

instance, we ought to eradicate invasive foreign species that are damaging to ecosystems where we

have introduced them to the detriment of native life forms.

7.4 African Relational Environmentalism: A Summary

As I draw towards the conclusion of this thesis, I now seek to bring together the salient

characteristics of the African Relational Environmentalism I have been seeking to construct. In my

attempt to describe an African-inspired environmental ethic in the preceding, I made a number of

claims that I now summarise:

I began, in Chapter 3, by arguing that although anthropocentric conceptions are expressed in

African thought, these do not fully represent an African worldview. In addition to these ideas, there

is a strong emphasis on the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of all things in nature. This

sense of interrelatedness is accompanied by a strong claim that everything in nature ought to be

treated with respect, for its own sake, and not merely because of its usefulness to humans. I further

argued that a key concept in African moral discourse is that harmonious relationships should be

promoted. Harmonious relationships are prized, and therefore, we ought to seek to ensure that our

relationships are harmonious in character. This applies not only to relationships between people,

but also to relationships between humanity and the rest of nature. However, it does not entail

seeking to maximise harmony. Harmony is achieved when we identify with others, co-operate to

achieve common ends, help others and seek the well-being of others and ourselves. The

paradigmatic exemplar for such harmonious relationships is the family. Just as family members

212

seek to be friendly, caring, nurturing and mutually supportive, so we ought to act in such ways

towards other members of the natural family.

Also in Chapter 3, I argued that one of the more distinguishing characteristics of African morality is

its refusal to prioritise individual or communal interests. Harmonious relationships entail seeking to

balance individual needs with communal needs by realising oneself through others, a conception

Callicott describes as ‘embedded individuality’ (Callicott, 1994: 167). This applies both to human

individuals and social structures, as well as to other natural individuals and groupings. In essence,

then, African Relational Environmentalism cannot be described as individualist or holist, but

embraces both of these types of considerations. I contended that this is one of its most promising

contributions to environmental ethics. I concluded the chapter by proposing an initial formulation

of a theory of right action for African Relational Environmentalism as: right actions are those that

demonstrate respect for nature and natural entities (individuals and groups) by promoting

harmonious relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and nature.

In Chapter 4, I considered which sorts of entities might be morally considerable, arguing that

African Relational Environmentalism is able to embrace individualist anthropocentric perspectives,

biocentric perspectives, sentientist perspectives and holist perspectives, within a single theory of

moral considerability. Setting aside African notions of the moral considerability of supernatural

entities, I argued that all living things, and relevant groups of such living things (families, clans,

species, ecosystems, etc.) are taken as being morally considerable. In addition, all natural entities

that make a significant contribution, systemically, to enabling and preserving the life of living

things are morally considerable. Whilst artefacts are not normally morally considerable, all natural

entities are (including rivers, rocks, forests, mountains, etc). I identified a single criterion for

establishing moral considerability, namely that everything that is part of the interrelated web of life,

213

or shares in life force (living things and things that promote the life of living things) is morally

considerable. On this basis I revised my theory of right action to: right actions are those that

demonstrate respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships between

persons and persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web.

In Chapter 5, I turned my attention to the issue of the moral considerability of future generations.

Arguing that African thought regards moral obligations towards future generations as fundamental

duties, I defended this claim by pointing to two African notions: that the land or biosphere is a

shared resource, rather than a personal possession, and that gratitude towards those who have come

before us is expressed by means of ensuring that future generations also inherit a world capable of

sustaining their lives, just as we did from our predecessors. I claimed that these two perspectives

entail a duty to preserve nature for future generations. I also argued that this duty applies not only

to future generations of persons, but to future parts of the web of life, and that the moral circle

transcends generational boundaries. Thus, future members of the web of life are also morally

considerable.

I then acknowledged, in Chapter 6, that having claimed that all things that are part of the web of life

are morall considerable, I still needed to consider how to weigh up the competing claims of morally

considerable things. I argued that although entities may all be morally considerable, this does not

imply that they have equal moral status. Accordingly, I once again turned to African conceptions or

themes that might assist in explaining differences in the moral status of entities. I argued that based

on the notion of different degrees of life force, Africans recognise a hierarchy of natural entities in

which, broadly, persons have more moral status than animals, who have more than plants, who have

more than inanimate natural entities. I argued that differences in status between entities in these

four broad categories are also recognised. Linking this status to a sense of final value, I claimed

214

that morally considerable entities have a degree of final value commensurate with the type of entity

they are. I contended that the specific nature or essence of entities needs to be taken into account,

so that sentience, moral agency, mental capacity, self-consciousness and other attributes of entities

needs to figure in our treatment of them. I also argued that one of the ways that the notion of life

force is employed suggests that it is appropriate to value entities instrumentally, and, on this view,

the systemic importance of species and inanimate natural objects such as rivers and forests might

sometimes need to be given prominence over the interests of individual natural entities. I identified

another sense in which the notion of life force is employed that suggests a need to recognise the

importance of the well-being of all parts of the web of life, claiming that all such entities have a

good of their own, and thrive in their own ways, and that this ought to be taken into account

morally. Finally, I pointed out that African thought allows for some prioritisation of the interests or

well-being of those closer to us relationally: that some sense of partiality is acceptable. Arguing

that this resonates with our basic moral intuitions, I concluded that as long as this was not taken as

an overriding consideration, there were sound moral grounds for defending this notion, at least to

some extent. Taken together, I argued that these considerations provided some basic principles that

could be used as a basis to weigh up competing moral claims between entities.

Finally, in this chapter, I have attempted to flesh out in greater detail what it means to promote

harmonious relationships within the web of life. I began by trying to establish why we should

promote harmonious relationships in the first place. I noted that it was necessary to give some kind

of coherent account of the fundamental basis upon which the belief that all of nature is

interdependent or interrelated could be said to ground a requirement to promote harmonious

relationships. I argued that the key was to be found in a perfectionist ethic; that virtuous persons

are those who promote harmony between persons and other aspects of the web of life. I also

pointed out this notion of virtue was able to embrace the need to treat other natural entities with a

215

basic respect, as well as to take into account their own kind of well-being and thriving. African

Relational Environmentalism then, though fundamentally grounded in a virtue ethics approach is

also able to embrace some of the important moral considerations entailed by respect based and

utilitarian moral theories. This enabled me to revise a theory of right action for African Relational

Environmentalism one last time, to: a person should become virtuous, and do so by acting in ways

that demonstrate respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships

between persons and persons, and between persons and the other parts of the web.

Having provided a theoretical grounding for why we should promote harmonious relationships in

the first place, I pointed out once more that harmonious relationships are characterised by

identification and solidarity, and that they entail caring for others in the community of life, taking

account of their interests and needs, giving due consideration to them, all in the pursuit of

promoting harmonious relationships between ourselves and other parts of the web of life. I made a

clear distinction between this requirement to promote harmonious relationships between persons

and others aspects of the web of life, and a requirement to promote harmony in nature, or to

maximise harmony. I claimed that African Relational Environmentalism, along with other

environmental ethical views does, however, impose a duty on us to avoid acting in ways which

cause harm to other parts of the web of life by seriously disrupting the balance of nature.

Furthermore, I argued that, because of its emphasis on a requirement to restore disrupted

relationships, this African relational ethic also imposes a moral obligation upon us to take

responsibility for our actions, where we have caused harm by disrupting nature’s balance, and to

restore our relationships with other parts of the web of life, by doing what we can to correct the

harm we have caused.

216

8 APPLICATIONS

8.1 Introduction

I now seek to apply African Relational Environmentalism (ARE) to two practical environmental

ethical problems, in order to demonstrate how it would be able to provide a theoretical framework

for considering issues of a practical nature. It is not my intention to comprehensively address these

moral issues, but rather to use them as a basis for clarifying the theory I have proposed. I intend not

only to illustrate how ARE can be applied to practical issues, but also to show that it fares no worse

than other dominant environmental ethical approaches in terms of accounting for our environmental

moral obligations, and, in some ways, may even fare better.

First, I consider the problem of elephant over-population in South Africa, and then I turn my

attention to the issue of Global Climate Change (GCC).

8.2 Elephant Over-population in South Africa

Despite being listed as a near threatened species, African elephants have thrived in many of the

protected wildlife areas of South Africa1. Confined to relatively small pockets of land in enclosed

parks, they are no longer able to roam freely across the country as they once could. However, their

restriction within these designated areas enables them to enjoy a relatively significant degree of

protection from poaching and other threats. Furthermore, within these protected areas they are

1 Problems with over-population of elephants are not unique to South Africa. Other countries in the region, such as

Zimbabwe (see Tom, 2002: 76 ), have had to face similar issues. But, in order to keep the discussion focussed, I will

only be considering the specifics of this problem in the South African context.

217

often provided with supplementary food and water in seasons of drought, so that elephants have

been remarkably successful2, breeding at such a rate as to become a serious concern for wildlife

managers. Elephants are herbivores, and their vast mass requires that they consume enormous

quantities of vegetation daily to supply their nutritional needs. In the process of foraging they are

also notoriously destructive, pushing over trees, tearing off bark, and trampling smaller plants

underfoot. Left to roam freely across the entire sub-continent of southern Africa, this would pose

little of a problem ecologically. But, confined as they are to such small areas, and breeding so

successfully, they have begun to become a threat to biodiversity and to other species in their

ecosystem. Most wildlife management experts maintain that unless their numbers are curtailed,

elephants are capable of doing substantial and even irreparable damage to the ecosystems they

currently inhabit. The impact of their feeding behaviour, in the limited areas they are confined to,

has had the effect of reducing woodland areas to grasslands, thus causing major ecological

disruption. Of course, as with most empirical claims of this nature, there are those who dispute the

extent of the negative impact of elephants on their habitats and other species in wildlife reserves

(Lötter 2006: 56). Since the consensus amongst wildlife managers seems to be strongly weighted in

favour of the claim that elephants do cause significant environmental damage, I will assume, for the

sake of this discussion, that this is the case, and set aside the need to evaluate the scientific

controversy. It is sufficient for my purposes in this chapter to work on the hypothesis that elephant

over-population constitutes a significant threat to ecosystems and other species.

2 Lötter claims that the typical population growth rate of elephants in these conditions is around 5 - 7 % per annum

(2006: 56)

218

Until 1995, wildlife management authorities in South Africa regularly undertook periodic planned

culling campaigns to keep elephant numbers under control. In that year it was decided to impose a

moratorium on the culling of elephants in the country, a policy that remained in place until May

2008 (Blandy, 2008). During this period, elephant populations grew significantly. Having been

contained to between 6000 and 8000 individuals by means of culling prior to 1995, elephant

numbers in the Kruger National Park had soared to 12000 by 2006. Ecologists put the carrying

capacity of the Kruger Park at around 7000 (Lötter, 2006: 56). On the basis of concerns about this

increase in elephant numbers, and claiming that the over-population problem was becoming too

critical to leave unaddressed, authorities lifted the moratorium in order to make provision for

limited culling, where deemed necessary, as part of a multi-pronged solution.

As is to be expected, the culling of elephants has its strong detractors. Environmentally conscious

members of the public are often appalled by the idea, and animal liberationists oppose it as cruel

and a violation of the rights of individual elephants. The situation has created a moral dilemma. On

the one hand, leaving elephants to continue breeding and causing damage to the ecosystem

threatens the well-being of other animals and plants, possibly even endangering other species. On

the other hand, deliberately taking the lives of individuals belonging to a species already under

pressure because of human activity seems intuitively wrong, especially since elephants find

themselves in this position only because we humans have so reduced the space available to them.

Having reduced wildlife to the confines of protected areas, we as a species have thrown natural

processes out of balance, and artificially created a situation in which the fate of elephants now lies

in our hands. We are now forced to make a choice either to do nothing, and allow elephants to do

further damage to the ecosystem, or to act in some way to reduce elephant numbers. Some might

claim that we should not interfere, and let nature take its course. But, in a case such as this, a

decision not to act is as morally significant as a choice to actively do something (Lötter, Henley,

219

Fakir and Pickover, 2008: 403). Failing to curtail elephant numbers could have significant

consequences for the environment. So, we face having to weigh up our moral obligations to

elephants against our obligations to the ecosystem and to other natural entities whose well-being is

threatened by the elephants.

Given that the ecological problem is essentially one of over-population of one particular species in

confined areas, it is clear that that there could be other possible and better solutions to the problem

than simply culling. And, indeed alternatives do exist. Translocating elephants to other parts of the

country or continent where they are no longer found, or where their numbers are not of concern is

one. Others include contraception, limited commercial hunting, and keeping elephants in semi-

captivity for ecotourism purposes3. Thus, the moral dilemma is more complex than simply a choice

between culling and leaving elephant numbers to grow to the detriment of the ecosystem.

Nonetheless, we are faced with the need to make some kind of decision about what we ought to do

to address elephant over-population.

Since my aim in this section is to apply African Relational Environmentalism to actual

environmental ethical problems, I now seek to show how ARE might approach this moral dilemma

and point out how it would differ from other more familiar Western environmental theories in

approach. Recalling my definition of right action, on ARE a person should become virtuous, and

do so by acting in ways that demonstrate respect for all parts of the web of life by promoting

harmonious relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and the other parts of

the web. As I claimed in the previous chapter, on an ethic in which we seek to respect other parts of

3 How successful these alternative strategies would be is a matter of on-going debate. I briefly discuss their merits later

in the chapter.

220

the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships with them, we are morally obliged to avoid

acting in ways that seriously disrupt the balance or homeostasis of ecosystems, to the detriment of

other morally considerable entities, at least as far as this is possible. If we are to identify with and

exhibit solidarity towards other parts of the web of life, we need to consider the effects of our

actions on their well-being, or ability to thrive (traditionally described in terms of preserving their

life force). Disrupting the balance of an ecosystem is, thus, a moral wrong. In the first instance,

then, on ARE we as a species would need to acknowledge our moral responsibility for having been

the cause of creating the moral dilemma of elephant over-population, in the first place.

In addition to this, virtue on ARE entails not simply trying to maintain harmonious relationships

with others, it also requires us to do what we can to restore relationships once they have been

disrupted. Our species has acted unvirtuously by reducing elephant habitats to a fraction of what

they were and confining them to small pockets of protected wilderness. It is our actions that have

disrupted the natural balance of ecosystems, and created conflicting interests between elephants and

other species. We have caused the moral dilemma. And, in the process we have disrupted our

relationships with elephants, other species and the ecosystem. Simply leaving nature to her own

devices, now, and not intervening, is not an option. We are obliged to do what we can to make

amends, to restore our relationships with other natural entities, and at least try to mitigate the effects

of the harm we have caused. Whilst on some other ethical theories it might be possible to argue that

since the elephant over-population problem does not significantly impact on human beings, we have

no moral obligation to take any action whatsoever, on ARE we are obliged to consider what action

we ought to take to restore the relationships we have disrupted, and to limit the further harm our

prior actions could cause to other parts of the web of life.

221

Furthermore, on ARE, individual elephants are morally considerable, as are all other animate

entities in the ecosystem affected by elephants, the species of elephant is morally considerable as a

species, as are other affected species, both as individuals and as species. The ecosystem itself is

morally considerable, too. All of these entities need to be taken into account, as they are all parts of

the web of life. Seeking to promote harmonious relationships between ourselves and other parts of

the web of life also entails seeking to maintain a balance between individual and communal or

group needs. Not only do the individuals of the species involved need to be considered, so do the

species as species, as well as the affected ecosystems or biomes. In striving to respect other parts of

the web of life, and promote harmonious relationships with them, we face a complex moral

dilemma. We now need to weigh up our competing moral obligations towards other species and the

ecosystem against our moral obligations towards elephants, both as individuals and as a species.

With respect to the species that are threatened by elephants, it needs to be borne in mind that ARE

does entail that species as species are significant, and that it would be morally wrong to cause

species extinction, where we could reasonably avoid it. Furthermore, because ARE also recognizes

that the individuals of all species have a good of their own, their well-being or thriving needs to be

taken into account, too. Since elephants threaten the well-being of many other species of animals

and plants, and since our actions have caused this imbalance in the first place, we are morally

obliged to consider our duties to these other species, as individuals and as species, as well as to the

ecosystem as a whole.

Since ARE needs to take account both of individuals and of groups, it cannot take either a simplistic

individualist or crude holist position. A basic individualist ethic would require respect for

individual elephants and their well-being and lives. It simply would not countenance culling as a

possible measure to reduce elephant over-population. It would, in fact, need to proscribe any

222

measures that could be said to be harmful to individual elephants. Certain animal liberationists do,

indeed argue along these lines. Whilst harm to individual elephants is something ARE would need

to take into account, it would also be required to consider the health of the ecosystem, as well as the

well-being of the species being harmed by elephant over-population, and thus, could not take a

simple individualist approach. But, ARE could also not take a crude holist position, in which the

good of the ecosystem and of other endangered species would automatically trump the interests of

individual elephants. Such an approach would quite easily defend measures that reduce elephant

numbers, for the good of the whole ecosystem. Even as drastic a measure as culling would seem to

be morally required if it would protect the stability and integrity of the natural system. ARE would

need to consider these claims, but it would also need to consider the well-being of individual

elephants.

On ARE, therefore, neither individualist nor holist theories are capable, on their own, of providing

us with a basis for deciding how we ought to manage the problem of elephant over-population.

Since we cannot simply prioritise the ecosystem over the individuals or the other way around, a

relational ethic that seeks to promote harmonious relationships between ourselves and other parts of

the web needs to take cognizance of a wider range of ethical considerations than either crude

individualist or holist theories would. It cannot ignore our moral obligations with respect to the

ecosystem and other species any more than it can ignore our moral obligations towards individual

elephants.

On ARE, taking our moral obligations towards individual elephants into account requires us to

consider the good of elephants, as elephants. It requires us to take account of the kind of beings

elephants are, of their specific qualities and capabilities. As I have claimed before, harmony cannot

be promoted if we fail to consider the well-being of other parts of the web of life, and identify with

223

them in terms of acknowledging the different elements that constitute their good. The life force or

vitality of other entities, as the type of entities they are must be respected. Although ARE asserts

that all parts of the web of life are morally considerable, and entitled to some final value, it also

allows for varying degrees of moral status, depending on the kind of entity we are dealing with.

This makes it necessary for us to specifically consider what sorts of beings elephants are. We

cannot promote harmonious relationships between ourselves and elephants unless we identify with

elephants and acknowledge the kinds of things that are important to them. We are thus obliged to

take into account that elephants are sentient beings, and that we should avoid causing them to

suffer. We are also obliged to take account of the fact that elephants have fairly sophisticated

cognitive capacities, are capable of complex communication with one another, and form seemingly

strong bonds with their own kin4. Evidence suggests that elephants experience some kind of

emotional distress when family members die, and show signs of what seems to be mourning, even

remembering the geological locations where their kin have died. Elephant social structure is also

significant. They usually move in herds consisting of closely related relatives, mainly females and

their off-spring. A single female assumes the role of leader or matriarch, and all of the adult

females in the group take some degree of collective responsibility for the young. Mothers do take

special care of their own calves, but other adult females will look after and even protect other young

elephants when necessary. Older adult males eventually leave their family groups, and lead a

somewhat solitary existence, unless they are accepted into a herd as the alpha male. But, for the

most part, elephants live in what seem to be very closely-knit family groups, sharing a tight bond

with their kin. Furthermore, these elephant social groups or extended families appear to provide

some kind of structure in which young elephants learn appropriate social behaviour. Given the

4 For a comprehensive description of elephant behaviour and cognitive capabilities, see Bradshaw, 2009.

224

closeness of these family groups, it is unsurprising that some claim that elephants can become

deeply disturbed and even traumatised when they are removed from their family group, or when

other members of their group experience trauma.

These are all factors that ARE needs to consider. Promoting harmonious relationships with

elephants means recognizing their interests, their good, the things that contribute to their well-being.

Furthermore, because ARE refers to human family relationships as its paradigm for harmonious

relationships, it would be difficult for it not to recognize the importance of their family structure to

elephants. If harmonious relationships are characterized as caring relationships in which we

identify with others, we need to show empathy towards elephants, and recognize the emotional

harm our actions can cause them. Identifying with elephants entails taking account of their familial

bonds. It requires us to recognize the emotional harm they too are capable of experiencing when

their kin are harmed. All of these identifying characteristics of elephants need to be considered

when trying to decide how we ought to respond to the challenge of elephant over-population.

In Chapter 6, I cited VanDeVeer’s notion of ‘two factor egalitarianism’ (VanDeVeer, 2003: 157).

as a helpful construct when trying to weigh up competing interests of different species, suggesting

that it resonates with some African moral intuitions that require us to take the vitality or the

richness, complexity and sophistication of the capacity of entities to experience life into account.

On this view, we need to consider a species’ psychological capacities, giving some additional

weight to creatures with more sophisticated mental capacities, as well as giving additional weight to

basic interests over peripheral interests. Thus, elephants deserve to be taken very seriously in our

ethical thinking because of their strong cognitive abilities, emotional capacity and social structure.

Furthermore, their most basic interests, such as an interest in continuing to live and being able to

sustain themselves should weigh heavily in our deliberations. It ought to be clear that this view

225

implies that there are good reasons for us to think that we should not take elephant lives, or cause

them emotional or physical suffering without very good reasons. In a sense, it would be right for us

to regard the trees and less sophisticated animals that elephants damage or destroy as having less

moral standing than the elephants, themselves, but only up to a point. This would not, however,

free us from an obligation to consider the basic interests of other species. And certainly, if any

species were threatened with possible extinction, their lesser psychological capacities might be

considered less significant in the light of the threat to their very existence as a species, on the

grounds that their basic interests carry most weight in this situation.

Nonetheless, elephants do possess cognitive and psychological capacities that require our special

attention, and we should not lightly consider actions that lead to harming them or to their deaths.

With this in mind, ARE needs to consider the impact on elephants of each of the possible measures

that could be taken to reduce elephant numbers. Since culling is a very drastic intervention, leading

to the death of individual elephants, and possibly causing emotional trauma to the elephants left

behind, including disruption of their social structures, this option ought to be avoided as far as

possible. On an ethic that seeks to promote harmonious relationships, we would want to be sure

that all other less harmful strategies had been investigated or tried, and had been found to be

inadequate or inappropriate, before resorting to culling. Unlike on a simplistic holism, where the

good of the ecosystem is prioritised, and culling could be easily justified, ARE also needs to

consider the good of individual elephants, and could only justify culling if less harmful options had

been exhausted. Culling cannot be an ethically acceptable measure to take, unless we have

investigated whether the other options available cannot viably achieve the same result of

overcoming the problems caused by elephant over-population in restricted areas. Translocation is a

possible alternative, but it is doubtful that enough elephants can be relocated, given limitations on

the finances available for such operations and the amount of suitable land for relocation.

226

Furthermore, translocation needs to be undertaken very scientifically and planned well, as it is

necessary to move whole family groups in order to maintain the critical social structure of

elephants. An experiment in moving groups of young male elephants to the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi

park had unintended and disastrous consequences, when adolescent males, without the calming

influence of their matriarchal guardians exhibited unusually violent behaviour, uncharacteristically

attacking and killing rhinos (Elephants Kill Endangered Rhinos, 2000). So, even if translocation

could help alleviate the problem, it still needs to be undertaken in a way that takes account of

elephant well-being. Contraception is another less drastic measure than culling that ought to be

considered. Clearly, if this method could achieve the desired results of limiting elephant population

growth without causing significant harm, it would be preferable to culling. This measure is also not

unproblematic, however. We simply do not yet have enough scientific data to establish what the

effect of mass contraception would be on elephant social behaviour, or how it would affect the

general health of female elephants, and their long-term reproductive health. Keeping elephants in

captivity in much smaller areas has the advantage of being able to attract money from ecotourists,

making it a self-sustainable solution. But this comes at the cost of depriving elephants of their

liberty and a natural existence. This flies in the face of respecting the life force of elephants, or

acknowledging their vitality, their capacity for experiencing life and their well-being. Furthermore,

it is very unlikely that the captivity/ecotourism option would be able to absorb sufficient numbers of

elephants to constitute a real solution to the underlying problem of over-population.

I am unable in this brief discussion to thoroughly investigate the relative viability, sustainability,

harms and benefits of the various options available to wildlife managers with respect to reducing

elephant over-population. However, as I have already stated, ARE would need to consider all of

these, and it could only begin to consider culling as an option where the other less drastic choices

had proven not to be able to solve the problem. Hypothetically, if it were shown that the other

227

options could not reduce elephant numbers effectively or in a less harmful manner, ARE would then

need to weigh up the moral interests of other species and the ecosystem against the moral interests

of elephants not to be killed and harmed in culling campaigns. Since it is an ethic that seeks to

promote harmonious relationships, and to restore disrupted relationships, ARE might well end up

concluding that it is necessary to resort to culling for the sake of biodiversity and restoring balance.

This would constitute a moral justification of culling, but would not justify just any kind of cull.

Since individual elephant lives are morally significant, the numbers to be culled would need to be

limited to what is required to bring the population growth under control. Furthermore, methods of

killing would need to be as humane as possible, minimizing physical suffering. And, due regard

would need to be given to the methodology employed. Where possible, it would be better to cull

whole family groups, in order to avoid significant emotional trauma to elephants having to witness

the mass deaths of their kin. Maintaining the right balance between genders and age groups would

also be an important consideration.

In conclusion, then, ARE would require moral agents to take account of a broad spectrum of moral

considerations before hastily deciding on the best moral choice with respect to this issue of elephant

over-population. It would embrace both holist and individualist concerns, and take account of the

interests of all of the affected species. It would need to take into account the well-being of

individual entities, as well as the stability and integrity of the ecosystem. In order to promote

harmony, it would require a very careful weighing up of the many moral issues inherent in such a

complex ethical dilemma.

228

8.3 Global Climate Change

Global Climate Change (GCC) and its possible consequences has become one of the most topical

environmental ethical issues of our time. There are growing concerns about the effects of continued

increases in global temperature over the next few decades. Climate models suggest that even a

moderate further increase in temperature could have catastrophic results for humankind as well as

other aspects of nature. Rising sea levels, de-glaciation and the melting of polar ice caps, changes

in rainfall patterns, temperature distribution and in sea current flows, combine to paint a very

frightening picture of a radically changed world. Unless temperatures can be kept from rising

beyond just a few degrees, humankind faces massive displacements of human settlements, food and

fresh water shortages, and resulting conflict, war, disease, malnutrition and starvation. The effects

on the rest of life on earth could be even more alarming: species extinctions could increase, habitats

and ecosystems could be lost, and many other living things could experience hardships and

suffering as a result of a vastly changing environment. Some suggest that serious climatic events

such as tornadoes, hurricanes, droughts and floods could increase in both intensity and frequency

(National Academy of Sciences, 2003: 620-622). That GCC is an environmental issue of huge

significance cannot be doubted.

Whilst the fact of an increase in the earth’s temperature over the last century and a half is not

disputed, the cause of this increase is. Some claim that the increase in temperature is nothing more

than a natural phenomenon, and simply part of the natural long term cycle of increasing and

decreasing temperatures on earth. If this is so, then it would seem that there is little we can do that

would make much difference, anyway. There would also be little reason to regard GCC as an

229

ethical issue, either5. If, on the other hand, the change in temperature is anthropogenic, and our

actions in the following decades could significantly affect how much the earth’s temperature rises,

then GCC is a critical ethical issue, for then it seems that it lies in humankind’s hands to determine

how significantly climate change will impact on human life, as well as all of the rest of nature.

Clearly, the dispute over the scientific facts with respect to changes in the earth’s temperature is not

one that environmentalists can simply ignore. If human behaviour is a significant cause of the

increase in global temperature, then we may face some difficult choices in the next few decades,

choices that would impact on the lifestyles of millions of people, and possibly be very costly

indeed.

I do not intend to undertake a detailed study and analysis of climate science in this chapter, or to

robustly argue that GCC is anthropogenic. Instead, I will proceed on the basis that it is most likely

that human behaviour is a significant cause of the current warming of the earth, and that the effects

of further increases in temperature would be as serious as the models provided by leading scientists

suggest. I will assume that the climate skeptics have got it mostly wrong, and that the majority

consensus view has got it mostly right. This does not constitute a simple bracketing of the issue for

the sake of argument. I am persuaded that there are reasonable grounds for assuming that GCC is

mainly being caused by humans, that the effects of not taking action now will be catastrophic, and

that the window of opportunity to make changes that could avert the worst of the possible

consequences is rapidly closing. My reasons for this are that by far the majority of scientists

working in the area agree that global warming is anthropogenic (National Academy of Sciences,

5 If the warming being experienced is a completely natural phenomenon, and if it were shown that human activity is not

contributing to it at all, a case could still be made that we ought to consider whatever measures we could take to

mitigate its damaging effects, anyway. This would be a very different kind of ethical issue, though.

230

2003: 621), and that the fundamental scientific basis for this claim, the so-called ‘greenhouse effect’

is not seriously disputed. Given the seriousness of the possible consequences of not acting on the

basis that human activity is causing warming in the global temperature, it is both rational and

prudent not to ignore an overwhelming scientific consensus, on the grounds of the objections of a

tiny, but vociferous group of dissenters. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that a group of gases,

now known as greenhouses gases, do build up in the atmosphere, creating something of ‘blanket’

effect, that causes heat to be trapped in the atmosphere (VanDeVeeer & Pierce, 2003: 590). These

gases can remain in the atmosphere for very significant periods of time. Taken together with the

fact that the burning of fossil fuels is known to release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and

the enormous and rapid increase over the last century in the use of fossil fuels for energy creation, it

also seems clear that the argument that humans are causing the increase in global temperatures

seems plausible enough to make it rational to assume that human activity is driving the increase in

the earth’s temperature. On the basis of these considerations, I think it is appropriate to assume that

the release of large amounts of greenhouse gas into the atmosphere, as a result of human activity is

a significant contributor to global warming. And, on the basis of this assumption, it is clear that a

serious ethical problem faces humankind.

An important characteristic of the GCC problem lies in the fact that many of the most serious

consequences of our actions now will only be realized decades and even longer into the future.

Gardiner describes GCC as a ‘severely lagged phenomenon’ (Gardiner 2006: 398). This presents a

significant challenge, as those who are most vulnerable to the effects of our choices now are future

generations and not ourselves and our contemporaries. This makes it necessary for us to consider

whether we can be said to have moral obligations towards future generations, which, as I pointed

out in chapter 5 is not altogether uncontested. As I have argued, however, ARE strongly asserts that

we do have moral obligations towards posterity. Future generations are part of the web of life,

231

which transcends generations, and as such, they are morally considerable. We would be acting in a

morally unacceptable way if we failed to demonstrate gratitude to our forebears by seeking to

ensure that our descendants inherited a healthy planet. Since ARE understands the environment as

something we share with future generations rather than being our possession, we are obliged to

consider our environmental legacy and its effect on posterity. On ARE, at least, there is no need to

argue for the moral considerability of future persons and other parts of the web of life. It is also not

relevant that we cannot know exactly which individuals will make up future generations, as our

duties towards them need not be conceived of as duties to specific individuals, but to whole

generations.

Based on this fundamental assertion of moral obligations towards posterity, it is clear that ARE is

able to circumvent some of the significant theoretical concerns that have bedeviled many traditional

Western philosophical approaches regarding this issue. The starting point for ARE is that the moral

considerability of future generations is clearly established. Furthermore, on ARE’s definition of

right action a person should become virtuous, and do so by acting in ways that demonstrate respect

for all parts of the web of life by promoting harmonious relationships between persons and persons,

and between persons and the other parts of the web. It is difficult to imagine any act more

unvirtuous than that of humans polluting the atmosphere to an extent that will cause massive

changes in climate, with the resulting seriously harmful consequences for all life on earth. We can

hardly be thought to be respecting other parts of the web of life, or promoting harmonious

relationships between ourselves and other morally considerable entities, if we continue to act in

ways that threaten the life supporting systems of the biosphere to this degree. In African traditional

terms, we are seriously threatening the life force or vitality of other beings. In fact, we could be

said to harming the web of life, itself. That we are now causing imbalances that could have

catastrophic effects long into the future seems to be the worst kind of example of a moral wrong.

232

On ARE, it is wrong for us to continue to act in ways that cause harm, even if only in the future,

because the web of life transcends generations. Furthermore, it is fundamental to ARE that where

we have disrupted our relationships with other parts of the web, by causing them harm, we are

obliged to seek to redress the harm that we have caused, and restore our relationships, as far as

possible. On ARE then, we have a very clear moral obligation to seek to reduce our greenhouse gas

emissions to levels that will not lead to global warming of such a degree as to wreak havoc on

future generations of persons and other parts of the web of life.

Another very significant aspect of the GCC problem is that the effects of our actions are not only

subject to lagging over time, they are also geographically dispersed. Greenhouse gas emissions on

one continent can have disastrous effects in the future all over the globe. Our actions will not only

affect those close to us geographically, but people and life across the whole world. Thus, GCC is a

truly global problem, and as such, it is a problem that can only be solved by massive co-operation

globally. To curtail greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to avert the potential crisis will require

that all nations make a contribution to this effort. Just a few countries acting together will not be

able to solve the problem. The moral issue is further complicated by the fact that world’s leading

industrial nations are the biggest polluters, when arguably some of the poorest and least developed

nations, already struggling to provide the basic needs of their own people, will be hardest hit by the

worst effects of GCC. International institutions have already recognized this, and it is generally

agreed that the countries most responsible for having caused the problem ought to be the ones to

shoulder the greatest responsibility for mitigation (Michaels, 2003: 611). ARE would support this

principle. Those who cause disrupted relationships between ourselves and others in the web of life

are required to seek ways of restoring those relationships, and mitigating the resulting harms. So,

those most responsible for causing GCC bear the greatest moral obligation to take steps to contain

it. ARE would then support the view that the industrialised nations need to reduce their emissions

233

most drastically, as well as the view that they should shoulder some of the financial burden that

would be imposed on poorer nations seeking to effect costly technological changes in order to fulfill

their international commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These principles have

already been accepted by the international community as a whole, and they would have the full

support of ARE.

Possibly the most concerning aspect of the GCC problem lies precisely in the fact that it will require

massive global co-operation for there to be any hope of a solution. The failure of the international

community to agree to enforceable goals for reductions in emissions is a matter of grave concern.

The refusal by the United States of America to commit itself to significant reductions in their

energy use and pollution has all but strangled hope for a global accord. Gardiner has argued that

the particular nature of GCC as a problem makes it exceptionally difficult for us both to make the

right, difficult decisions, as well as to find the will and commitment to effect these decisions

(Gardiner, 2006: 397). As long as there are some countries willing to be free-riders and not take

responsibility for their contribution to the problem, it becomes very difficult to convince other

nations to make sacrifices in order to fulfill their obligations. It is easy to despair at this situation,

as it seems as if, until certain nations agree to co-operate, there is almost no hope even of a start

towards mitigating GCC. And that seems rational, so long as we continue to think that the

commitments of other nations are dependent upon the buy-in of powerful countries like the USA.

Getting the USA to fully co-operate is not something that is likely to be easily achieved. But, does

that necessarily need to entail that other countries won’t begin to co-operate and work towards the

solution? It is already clear that there are nations, in Europe, for instance, who are taking their

responsibility to reduce emissions very seriously, and they are making the necessary changes

without waiting for the United States to follow suit. Surely, if more nations could be convinced to

press ahead with emissions reductions, irrespective of whether the USA joins or not, it would be

234

better for the world than if they used the non-co-operation of the United States as an excuse for not

making their contribution to change.

As I have pointed out, where relationships have been disrupted, ARE seeks to restore those

relationships. What is interesting is that this is not only expressed in terms of a moral obligation on

those who have caused the problem to seek to resolve it. There is also a sense in which the

community also takes some responsibility for bringing about the restoration of relationships. Thus,

the community sees it as partly its own responsibility to persuade or encourage those who have

caused harm or done wrong, to rectify the situation. I have already pointed out that, on African

relational thinking, retribution is often rejected in favour of restitution and reconciliation. The

ultimate goal is the restoration of harmonious relationships, not apportioning punishment or

claiming revenge. This might explain why forgiveness is often understood as something that should

be offered to an offender, even before the offender has acknowledged his guilt or sought to make

amends. It is hoped that such gratuitous forgiveness will encourage the offender to seek to make

right. This offers intriguing promise regarding the concern about global buy-in to solutions for

GCC. Firstly, on ARE the free-riding option simply does not exist as a choice for individual

countries. To the extent that we have caused or are causing disrupted and inharmonious

relationships between ourselves and other parts of the web of life, we are morally obliged to do

what we can to rectify the situation. We cannot claim that our nation is morally permitted to side-

step its commitments to reductions in emissions because any other nation is not fulfilling its

obligations. Moral duties to seek to restore harmonious relationships are not ones we can escape

simply because others are not doing the same. It seems to me that it could only be good for the

world if nations would adopt that attitude, as some nations already seem to have done. The more

countries who agree to co-operate, the better. Furthermore, perhaps the African notion of the

community seeking to promote harmonious relationships by acting in ways which might convince

235

those who have disrupted them in the first place to make redress can be of value here. If a large

number of countries commit to reducing their emissions despite the reluctance of the USA to do so,

this would place America in an increasingly isolated position internationally, and might eventually

persuade them of the need for them to make their fair contribution to efforts aimed at alleviating the

worst effects of GCC.

When I discussed African thought and inter-generational moral obligation, I pointed out that the

notion of such obligations was so strong that many theorists did not shirk from using the language

of ‘rights’ of future generations. So certain is an African conviction that we have duties to

posterity, that these duties are often also correlated with rights for future generations. Western

theorists have found it very difficult to makes sense of a notion of rights for those who do not yet

exist, and yet this scepticism is likely not shared by ordinary citizens in the West, or, indeed by

most of the world’s peoples. Perhaps, then, the idea of a global accord on generational rights might

not be altogether unattainable, and it certainly would have the support of ARE. Provisions in a

number of existing international agreements already acknowledge rights of future generations in

limited contexts (Weiss, 1996: 611-612). But, giving such rights the full backing of

acknowledgement in an international accord would have the potential to significantly affect policy

and the actions of governments. It is outside the scope of this chapter to clearly define generational

rights, but clearly these would need to include some provision for ensuring that future generations

inherit an environment capable of sustaining their lives and that has not been too severely damaged.

Statements of rights tend to act as a ‘conscience’, a constant reminder of the standards we need to

aspire to. In my country, South Africa, the Bill of Rights of our post-democracy constitution has

become both a matter of extreme national pride, as well as the standard against which behaviour is

constantly judged, not just by experts and the media, but by the general populace. If the notion of

duties to future generations is grounded in gratitude to past generations, the moral force of this

236

virtue would be strengthened by the existence of an international statement establishing the rights of

posterity, able to conscientise the current generation to their duties to those in the future. This

might go some way to overcoming the motivation problem commonly associated with duties to

posterity, as the present could face sanctions, imposed by international agreement, for not

respecting duties to the future. Future generations cannot hold us accountable, but international

institutions could hold us to an accord.

This does not overcome all of the theoretical problems associated with the notion of future rights,

many of which are by no means trivial. However, I have already cited Weiss’ argument that many

of these problems can be overcome if we conceive of inter-generational rights as group rights for

whole generations, rather than in terms of individual rights (Weiss, 1996: 611-612). I suspect that

the notion of rights for future generations might find easier acceptability globally than many might

think, since it appears to be supported by a strong shared intuition. It would be naïve, however, to

think that the idea of rights for future generations of other species would as easily be acknowledged

in an international accord. However, in terms of policy, as I have noted with broad agreement

before, environmental pragmatists have already argued quite convincingly that a weakly

anthropocentric value system, coupled with taking a long-term, intergenerational view, is probably

enough to ensure the protection of the natural environment into the future. Guaranteeing

interspecific intergenerational rights by means of an international accord is likely a long way off.

However, if, as in the South African Bill of Rights, a right is established ‘…to have the environment

protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other

measures that - prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure

ecologically sustainable development’ (Bill of Rights), that should suffice to protect current and

future generations of other species, too.

237

Finally, an international accord on generational rights, once agreed, has the potential to strongly

impact on future global negotiations and agreements regarding environmental protection, with

respect to pollution, climate change, maintaining biodiversity, and the many other pressing concerns

relating to preserving the earth for posterity. Nations who are currently subverting the process of

global co-operation in these matters would find themselves increasingly under moral and political

pressure to abide by the accord. ARE would seek to see such an accord agreed to by the global

community in the interests of promoting harmonious relationships between ourselves and other

parts of the web of life.

8.4 Conclusion

What most distinguishes African Relational Environmentalism from many other views is its

essentially relational character. It recognises the moral considerability of individual natural entities,

ecosystems, species, families and the biosphere as a whole, as well as future generations. It

emphasises harmonious relationships between persons and persons, and between persons and other

parts of the web of life. It entails respecting other morally considerable things, as well as seeking

their well-being or thriving. It requires us to identify with other parts of the web of life, and to act

in ways that express our solidarity with them, caring for them in a familial manner. On this

approach we need to take responsibility for the effect that our actions have on other parts of the web

of life, and restore harmonious relationships where our actions have disrupted them. Overall, it

requires us to take account of more morally relevant factors with respect to the natural environment

than a crude holism or individualism would. As such, it fares no worse than other dominant

environmental ethical approaches in terms of accounting for our environmental moral obligations,

and, in some ways, may even fare better. What is clear, is that African thought, philosophy and

238

practice has a significant and valuable contribution to make to environmental ethics, and that this

contribution is worthy of being explored further.

239

Referenced Works

Ake, C. (1998). The African Context of Human Rights. In Applied Ethics: A Multicultural

Approach. Edited by May, L. et al. Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Anderson, A. (2003). Restorative Justice, the African Philosophy of Ubuntu and the Diversion of

Criminal Prosecution. Pretoria: University of South Africa School of Law. Available from

http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Anderson.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2011).

Attfield, R. (2003). Environmental Ethics. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bhengu, M. (1996). Ubuntu: The Essence of Democracy. Cape Town: Novalis Press.

Bikopo, D. and van Bogaert, J. (2010). Reflection on Euthanasia: Western and African Ntomba

Perspectives on the Death of a Chief. Developing World Bioethics, 10: 42-48.

Bill of Rights. Available from: http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm.

(Accessed 15 April 2011).

Birch, C. et al. (Editors). (1990). Liberating Life. Maryknoll: Orbis.

Blackstone, W. (Editor). (1974). Philosophy and Environmental Crisis. Athens: University of

Georgia Press.

Blandy, F. (2008). SA to Lift Ban on Elephant Culling. Available from:

http://mg.co.za/article/2008-04-30-sa-to-lift-ban-on-elephant-culling (Accessed 12 September

2011).

Bradshaw, G.A. (2009). Elephants on the Edge. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Brennan, A and Lo, Y. (2008). Environmental Ethics. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Spring 2008 Edition). Edited by Zalta, E. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-

environmental/ (Accessed 1 May 2009).

Bujo, B. (1998). The Ethical Dimension of Community. Nairobi: Paulines Publications.

240

Burnett, G. and waKang’ethe, K. (1994). Wilderness and the Bantu Mind. Environmental Ethics,

16: 145-160.

Callahan, D. (1981). What Obligation do We have to Future Generations? In Responsibilities to

Future Generations. Edited by Partridge, E. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Callicott, J. (1986). The Search for an Environmental Ethic. In Matters of Life and Death: New

Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy. Edited by Regan, T. New York: Random.

Callicott, J. (1989). In Defense of the Land Ethic. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. (1994). Earth’s Insights. A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin

to the Australian Outback. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Callicott, J. (2000). The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic. In Environmental Ethics:

Readings in Theory and Application. Edited by Pojman, L. Belmont: Wadsworth.

Card, C. (1988). Gratitude and Obligation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 25: 115-127.

Carson, R. (1962). Silent Spring. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Cerutti, F. (2010). Defining Risk, Motivating Responsibility and Rethinking Global Warming.

Science and Engineering Ethics, 16: 489-499.

Coetzee, P and Roux, A. (Editors). (1998). The African Philosophy Reader. London: Routledge.

De Baets, A. (2004). A Declaration of the Responsibilities of Present Generations Toward Past

Generations. History and Theory, 43:130-164.

Desjardins, J. (1993). Environmental Ethics. Belmont: Wadsworth.

De Waal, F. (2003). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other

Animals. In The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. Edited by VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce,

C. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Ehrlich, P. (1968). The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine Books.

Elephants Kill Endangered Rhinos. (2000). Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/642731.stm

(Accessed 29 September 2011).

241

Eze, M. (2008). What is African Communitarianism? South African Journal of Philosophy, 27: 386-

399.

Feinberg, J. (1974). The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations. In Philosophy and

Environmental Crisis. Edited by Blackstone, W. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Fox, W. (1985). An Overview of My Response to Richard Sylvan’s Critique of Deep Ecology. The

Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy, 2: 17-20.

Frey, R. (1980). Interests and Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Frey, R. and Wellman, C. (2003). (Editors). A Companion to Applied Ethics. Malden: Blackwell.

Gardiner, S. (2006). A Perfect Moral Storm. Environmental Values, 15: 397-413.

Goodin, R. (1992). Green Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Goodpaster, K. (2003). On Being Morally Considerable. In The Environmental Ethics and Policy

Book. Edited by VanDeVeer, D and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Gottlieb, R. (2004). This Sacred Earth. Routledge: New York.

Grove-Fanning, W. (2011). General Announcements. International Society for Environmental

Ethics Newsletter. 22: 1-79.

Hargrove, E. (2003). Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value. In Environmental Ethics. Edited by

Light, A and Rolston, H. Malden: Blackwell.

Horsthemke, K. (n.d.). Animals, Ubuntu and Environmental Justice in South Africa. Unpublished

paper.

Hume, D. (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Norton, D and Norton, N. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Iroegbu, P. and Echekwube, A. (Editors). (2005). Kpim of Morality Ethics. Ibadan: Heinemann

Educational Books.

Izibili, M. (2005). Environmental Ethics: An Urgent Imperative. In Kpim of Morality Ethics. Edited

by Iroegbu, P. and Echekwube, A. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

242

Kagan, S. (1998). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. The Journal of Ethics, 2: 277-297.

Kaphagawani, D. (1998). African Conceptions of Personhood and Intellectual Identities. In The

African Philosophy Reader. Edited by Coetzee, P. and Roux, A. London: Routledge.

Katz, E. (2003). The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature. In Environmental Ethics. Edited by

Light, A. and Rolston, H. Malden: Blackwell.

Kelbessa, W. (2001). Indigenous and Modern Environmental Ethics: A Study of the Indigenous

Oromo Environmental Ethic and Oromo Environmental Ethics in the Light of Modern Issues of

Environment and Development. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Wales.

Kelbessa, W. (2005). The Rehabilitation of Indigenous Environmental Ethics in Africa. Diogenes,

52: 17-34.

Korsgaard. C. (1983). Two Distinctions in Goodness. The Philosophical Review, 92: 169-195.

Leahy, M. (1994). Against Liberation. Putting Animals into Perspective. New York: Routledge.

Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand County Almanac. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Light, A. (2002). Contemporary Environmental Ethics. Metaphilosophy, 33: 426-448.

Light, A. and Rolston, H. (Editors). (2003). Environmental Ethics. Malden: Blackwell.

Lo, Y. (2001). The Land Ethic and Callicott’s Ethical System (1980–2001): An Overview and

Critique. Inquiry, 44: 331-358.

Lötter, H. (2006). The Ethics of Managing Elephants. Acta Academica, 2006: 55-90.

Lötter, H., Henley, M., Fakir, S. and Pickover, M. (2008). Ethical Considerations in Elephant

Management. In Elephant Management: A Scientific Assessment for South Africa. Edited by

Scholes, R. and Mennell, K. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Mangena, F. (2009). Dismantling “Reason-based Moral Status” in Environmental Ethics. Available

from: http://ir.uz.ac.zw/jspui/handle/10646/619 (Accessed 18 September 2010).

Mbiti, J. (1975). Introduction to African Religion. London: Heinemann.

243

McCullough, M. (2002). Savoring Life, Past and Present: Explaining What Hope and Gratitude

Share in Common. Psychological Inquiry, 13: 302-304.

Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy,

An Introduction. Edited by Wright, R. Lanham: University Press of America.

Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African Moral Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 15: 321-

341.

Metz, T. (2010). African and Western Moral Theories in a Bioethical Context. Developing World

Bioethics, 10: 49-58.

Metz, T. (2011a). African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground

of Human Rights. Human Rights Review, 9: 19-37.

Metz, T. (2011b). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism

and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7.

Michaels, P. (2003). The Climate-Change Debacle: The Perils of Politicizing Science. In The

Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. Edited by VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. Belmont:

Wadsworth.

Mkhize, N. (2008). Ubuntu and Harmony. In Persons in Community. Edited by Nicolson, R.

Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Murove, M. (2004). An African Commitment to Ecological Conservation: The Shona Concepts of

Ukama and Ubuntu. Mankind Quarterly, XLV: 195-215.

Naess, A. (1973). The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary.

Inquiry, 16: 95-100.

Naess, A. (2003). The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects. In Environmental

Ethics. Edited by Light, A. and Rolston, H. Malden: Blackwell.

National Academy of Sciences, The. (2003). Climate Change Science. In The Environmental Ethics

and Policy Book. Edited by VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth.

244

Nicolson, R. (Editor). (2008). Persons in Community. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal

Press.

Nnamani, A. (2005). Ethics of the Environment. In Kpim of Morality Ethics. Edited by Iroegbu, P.

and Echekwube, A. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Norton, B. (1991). Toward Unity among Environmentalists. New York and Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Olupona, J. and Nyang, S. (Editors). (1993). Religious Plurality in Africa. Berlin: Mouton de

Gruyter.

Onah, G. (n.d.). The Meaning of Peace in African Traditional Religion and Culture. Available from

http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/goddionah.htm (Accessed 12 April 2009).

O’Neill, J. (1993). Future Generations: Present Harms. Philosophy, 68: 35-51.

Opoku, K. (1993). African Traditional Religion: An Enduring Heritage. In Religious Plurality in

Africa. Edited by Olupona, J. and Nyang, S. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Oruka, H. (1994). Philosophy, Humanity and Ecology. Nairobi: ACTS Press.

Oruka, H. (1998). Sage Philosophy. In The African Philosophy Reader. Edited by Coetzee, P. and

Roux, A. London: Routledge.

Oruka, H. and Juma, C. (1994). Ecophilosophy and Parental Earth Ethics. In Philosophy, Humanity

and Ecology. Edited by Oruka, H. Nairobi: ACTS Press.

Palmer, C. (2003). An Overview of Environmental Ethics. In Environmental Ethics. Edited by

Light, A. and Rolston, H. Malden: Blackwell.

Parrinder, G. (1954). African Traditional Religion. London: Hutchinson’s University Library.

Partridge. E. (Editor). (1981). Responsibilities to Future Generations. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Partridge, E. (2003). Future Generations. In The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. Edited by

VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth.

Passmore, J. (1980). Man’s Responsibility for Nature. London: Duckworth.

245

Passmore, J. (1981). Conservation. In Responsibilities to Future Generations. Edited by Partridge,

E. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Peterson, R. (2004). Central African Voices on the Human-Environment Relationship. In This

Sacred Earth. Edited by Gottlieb, R. Routledge: New York.

Pojman, L. (Editor). (2000). Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont:

Wadsworth.

Ramose, M. (1999). African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Press.

Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Regan, T. (Editor). (1986). Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral

Philosophy. New York: Random.

Regan, T. (2003). The Case for Animal Rights. In The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book.

Edited by VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Regan, T. and Singer, P. (Editors). (1989). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Englewood

Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Rolston, H. (1975). Is There an Ecological Ethic? Ethics, 85: 93-109.

Rolston, H. (1988). Environmental Ethics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Rolston, H. (1989). Philosophy Gone Wild. New York: Prometheus Books.

Rolston, H. (2003). Why Species Matter. In The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. Edited by

VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T and Zimmerman, M. (Editors). (2005). Recent Work on Intrinsic Value.

Dordrecht: Springer.

Ross, E. (2010). African Spirituality, Ethics and Traditional Healing. South African Journal of

Bioethics and Law, 3: 44-51.

Routley, R. (1973). Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic? In Proceedings of the 15th

World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 1. Sophia: Sophia Press.

246

Scholes, R. and Mennell, K. (Editors). (2008). Elephant Management: A Scientific Assessment for

South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Schweitzer, A. (1923). Philosophy of Civilisation. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Shutte, A. (1993). Philosophy for Africa. Rondebosch: UCT Press.

Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu. Cape Town: Cluster.

Sindima, H. (1990). Community of Life. In Liberating Life. Edited by Birch, C. et al. Maryknoll:

Orbis.

Singer, P. (1975). Animal Liberation. New York: Random House.

Stone, C. (2003). Should Trees Have Standing? In The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book.

Edited by VanDeVeer, D and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Tangwa, G. (2004). Some African Reflections on Biomedical and Environmental Ethics. In A

Companion to African Philosophy. Edited by Wiredu, K. Malden: Blackwell.

Taylor, P. (1986). Respect for Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tempels, P. (1959). Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine.

Tom, P. (2002). The Debate Over Elephant Killing. Zambezia, XXIX: 76-81.

Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House.

VanDeVeer, D. (2003). Interspecific Justice. In The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. Edited

by VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. (Editors). (2003). The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book.

Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Walker, A. (1980). Gratefulness and Gratitude. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New

Series, 81: 39-53.

Warren, M. (2003). Moral Status. In A Companion to Applied Ethics. Edited by Frey, R. and

Wellman, C. Malden: Blackwell.

247

Weiss, E. (1996). Intergenerational Equity and Rights of Future Generation. In The Modern World

of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal. Available from:

http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/5/2043/32.pdf (Accessed 2 May 2011).

White, L, Jr. (1967). The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis. Science, 155: 1203-1207.

Wiredu, K. (1994). Philosophy, Humankind and the Environment. In Philosophy, Humanity and

Ecology. Edited by Oruka, O. Nairobi: ACTS Press.

Wiredu. K. (Editor). (2006). A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.

Wiredu. K. (2006). Introduction: African Philosophy in Our Time. In A Companion to African

Philosophy. Edited by Wiredu, K. Malden: Blackwell.

Wiredu, K. (2008). Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy,

27: 332-339.

Wright, R. (Editor). (1984). African Philosophy, An Introduction. Lanham: University Press of

America.