The status of laws of nature in Nietzsche's thought. On the relation between philosophy and science

INSTITUUT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE, UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN

Bachelor thesis

The status of laws of nature in Nietzsche’s thought

On the relation between philosophy and science

Irene van de Beld

Student nr: 0739758

Supervisor: Herman Siemens

Number of words (incl. notes and bibliography): 8440

September 17, 2012


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4

2 Nietzsche’s critique of laws of nature .............................................................................. 5

2.1 The difference between text and interpretation ..................................................... 5

2.2 Laws of nature as a problematic interpretation ....................................................... 6

2.3 Nietzsche’s own interpretation: the will to power................................................... 7

2.4 The non-scientific presuppositions of laws of nature .............................................. 8

2.5 Another strategy: laws of nature as a sign language ............................................... 9

2.6 Psychological reinterpretation: the need for regularity ......................................... 11

3 The relation between scientists and philosophers......................................................... 12

3.1 The problem with the scientist ............................................................................... 12

3.2 The task of the philosopher .................................................................................... 13

3.3 The philosopher’s need for science ........................................................................ 14

3.4 The contrast between the past and the future ...................................................... 15

4 Science as a matter of taste ........................................................................................... 17

4.1 The standards of philosophy .................................................................................. 17

4.2 The role of ‘Geschmack’ ......................................................................................... 18

4.3 Why would Nietzsche’s interpretation be better? ................................................. 20

5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 21

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 23

Introduction

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1 INTRODUCTION

Laws of nature could be considered as the most outstanding results of modern science.

Within many natural sciences, like chemistry, biology and especially physics, they serve as an

underlying principle that describes many phenomena observed in nature. Laws of nature do not

only represent one of the highest achievable scientific results, they also serve as icons within

society. The mathematical formulae by means of which they are formulated, can be found on

posters, T-shirts, mugs and on many other gadgets.

Since laws of nature are such an important characteristic of science, they also provide an ac-

cess for raising philosophical questions about the practice of science. In the first instance, sci-

ence, with its practice of formulating laws of nature, seems to be self-explanatory, self-

sustaining and autonomous. It works the way it is, it works the way that seems the best, and the

success of laws of nature seems to reinforce this intuition. However, is it as self-explanatory as it

would seem at first, that a discipline that wants to study nature looks for principles or laws lying

‘behind’ the actually perceived phenomena in nature? It seems as if in the practice of science

certain presuppositions are embedded about how science works or should work. Could it be that

even science, with its practice of formulating laws of nature, is based upon certain non-scientific,

possibly hidden, presuppositions? And what then can we say of the relation between science

and other disciplines, like philosophy, art or the humanities, with respect to these presupposi-

tions?

In this essay I will argue that Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) would subscribe to the view-

point that science is based upon certain non-scientific presuppositions or interpretations. Being

known as the ‘philosopher with the hammer’, Friedrich Nietzsche does not spare laws of nature

from his radical criticisms. However, as I will show this critique opens up the thought that any

approach to nature involves certain philosophical interpretations that also contain an aesthetic

moment. Philosophy, I will argue, has for Nietzsche a creative, critical and complementary task

in relation to science.

The work of Nietzsche is extensive, while his views on science are dispersed across his work

and subject to changes and reformulations. For the purpose of this essay I therefore restrict

myself to Nietzsche’s writings on laws of nature and the connection to philosophy in Jenseits von

Gut und Böse (from now on: JGB) and his Nachlass of the same period (1884-1887).

This essay will start in chapter 2 with a study of Nietzsche’s critique of laws of nature and the

alternative ‘interpretations’ he comes up with. Here I will argue that his critique is first and

foremost directed toward hidden non-scientific presuppositions of laws of nature, which can

only be identified by means of a philosophical critique. What then is the role of the philosopher

in relation to these presuppositions of science? And why would Nietzsche, being a philosopher,

consider himself to be justified to come up with alternatives for laws of nature? To answer these

questions, the relation between science and philosophy will be worked out in chapter 3. Howev-

er, criticizing the existing account of laws of nature and establishing an alternative ultimately

depends on a certain standard of evaluation. In chapter 4 I will argue that this standard of evalu-

ation is a matter of ‘taste’, whereby taste has both a cognitive and an aesthetic aspect. In con-

trast to scientific laws, such a standard cannot be formulated, and yet claims universal validity.

To conclude with, chapter 5 discusses the plausibility and the potential of Nietzsche’s insights.


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2 NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE OF LAWS OF NATURE

One of the aphorisms in which Nietzsche offers an extensive critique on laws of nature is JGB

22.1 What is immediately striking here is that Nietzsche proposes the idea of abolishing laws of

nature. As an alternative he sketches his account of the Wille zur Macht (Will to Power). What is

Nietzsche aiming at here? In this chapter I will examine Nietzsche’s critique of laws of nature,

taking JGB 22 as a starting point. In this way I will indicate what non-scientific presuppositions

are hidden at the basis of laws of nature, and what problems with these presuppositions Nie-

tzsche observes.

2.1 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TEXT AND INTERPRETATION

In the first few lines of JGB 22 Nietzsche – being the ‘old philologist’ – makes a distinction

between text and interpretation. Physicists, he assures us, think of laws of nature as facts (That-

bestande) or as a ‘Text’, to put it in philological terms. However, ‘Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur’ is

only an interpretation, and even a bad one. The last lines of the aphorism show that the alterna-

tive of the Wille zur Macht is also an interpretation, and apparently a better one. Therefore to

get a handle on Nietzsche’s critique of laws of nature and his strategy for replacing them, we

have to ask: what is meant by this philologically-inspired distinction between text and interpre-

tation?

The meaning of Thatbestand in JGB and the Nachlass of the same period is not unambigu-

ous. In some texts Thatbestand or Thatsache is related to a ‘Ding an sich.’2 This An-sich seems to

be taken as a reality in the Kantian sense, existing independently from us and unconditioned by

us (Unbedingtes). Nietzsche denies the existence of this An-sich univocally: knowing always has a

relation to us, it is always a ‘sich-irgend-wozu-in-Bedingung-setzen,’3 and therefore it doesn’t

make sense to speak of something that has no relation to us. 4 However, Thatbestand also seems

to mean a ‘fact’ in relation to us, a phenomenon as it appears to us (Erscheinung5). It is in this

sense that Nietzsche links up Thatbestand and Text in JGB 22 and other aphorisms of JGB.6 For

something to be a fact in relation to us, a certain sense or meaning has to be put in first (‘ein

Sinn muss immer erst hineingelegt werden,’7 an ‘ansetzen’8). Just as a text has to be written first

before it can be interpreted, a fact requires that a certain meaning was first ‘hineingelegt.’

On the other hand interpretation is described as ‘Ausdeutung’ or ‘Hineindeutung.‘9 But if

both ‘facts’ and interpretations are hineingelegt or hineingedeutet, how can we distinguish be-

tween them? A philologist who studies classical texts first needs to establish what the (best) text

is by subtracting all the interpretations that have been imposed on the text throughout the cen-

1 See JGB:22/5.37. Page references are given for the KSA (Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden), as

follows: JGB:22/5.37 = Jenseits von Gut und Böse aphorism 22 in KSA vol. 5, p.37). References to the Nachlass, also from the KSA, follow the notation therein (e.g. 2[149]/12.140 = note 2[149], KSA vol. 12, p.140). 2 2[149]/12.140;7[60]/12.315.

3 2[154]/12.142-143.

4 2[149]/12.140;7[60]/12.315;9[91]/12.384;Abel p.22.

5 36[25] /11.561, compare gleichen Erscheinungen in JGB:22.

6 JGB:38/5.56;JGB:47/5.68.

7 2[149]/12.140.

8 36[25]/11.561-562.

9 JGB:22/5.37;JGB:47/5.67;cf.JGB:14/5.28;JGB:230/5.169;40[55]/11.655.

Nietzsche’s critique of laws of nature

6

turies. The text is what is left after criticizing these interpretations. Only then the philologist can

make a start with ‘understanding’ the text, by means of an interpretation of his own. Physicists,

Nietzsche argues, are unable to make the distinction between text and interpretation.

This distinction can also be discerned in the position Nietzsche himself adopts. For him, ex-

isting interpretations are bound up with certain moral values and emotions.10 The text consists

of nature itself, stripped of moral motivations. 11 Therefore Nietzsche’s project of criticizing pre-

vailing interpretations is described as a Zurückübersetzen in die Natur.12 In JGB 22 the ‘text’ that

stays the same (gleichen Natur, gleichen Erscheinungen) for both the physicist’s and Nietzsche’s

interpretation is the ‘necessity’ and ‘calculability’ of nature. Both interpretations should be able

to ‘understand’ these appearances in nature. In the next section we will examine the physicist’s

‘bad’ interpretation of laws of nature, and see what unwanted projections, i.e. problematic mor-

al values Nietzsche discerns in them.

2.2 LAWS OF NATURE AS A PROBLEMATIC INTERPRETATION

Why does Nietzsche consider the ‘interpretation’ of laws of nature a bad one? In JGB 22 laws

of nature are blamed for being ‘nur eine naiv-humanitäre Zurechtmachung und Sinnverdrehung.‘

This could be understood in two ways. The first meaning reflects the remark that was made in

section 2.1: all knowledge is always in relation to us and is actively projected or ‘hineingelegt’ by

us. Secondly it could mean that nature is interpreted as if it behaves humanely: just like us, na-

ture has to follow the laws. According to some texts nature is interpreted as if it obeys (ge-

horchen) its laws out of a free will.13 Other texts claim that nature is imagined as being coerced

(Zwang) to follow laws of nature, thus having an unfree will and being subjected to determin-

ism.14 Since both accounts put moral motivations in nature, marked by an opposition between

free will and determinism, laws of nature have a ‘moral aftertaste’ (moralischen

Beigeschmack).15

This opposition between free will and determinism is connected to Nietzsche’s critique of

causality. The charge is that physicists separate cause and effect falsely from the process of cau-

sality itself: ‘Man soll nicht „Ursache“ und „Wirkung“ fehlerhaft verdinglichen, wie es die

Naturforscher thun,’16 In this way the actor (‘Thater’) is distinguished from the act (‘Thun’) it-

self.17 Processes in nature are reified into ‘things’, like substances, bodies, atoms, causes and

effects. Nature is then represented as if it follows the law analogous to the manner in which

human subjects ought to obey moral laws.18 What is exactly the problem with this? ‘So treiben

wir es noch einmal, wie wir es immer getrieben haben, nämlich mythologisch.‘19 By reifying na-

ture into things, we abstract certain fixed, static things from the very dynamics of the ever-

10

JGB:38/5.56;JGB:47/5.68. 11

26[432]/11.266. 12

JGB:230/5.169;cf.9[86]/12.380. 13

7[14]/12.299;9[144]/12.417;14[79]/13.257. 14

JGB:21/5.35;9[91]/12.383;14[79]/13.257;1[114]/12.37. 15

36[18]/11.559;Mittasch, p.98. 16

JGB:21/5.35. 17

2[139]/12.136;7[34]/12.306;9[91]/12.383;9[144]/12.417;14[79]/13.258. 18

2[142]/12.137. 19

JGB:21/5.36.


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changing natural processes themselves. This is mythological20 or miraculous (‘Wunder’21), in the

sense that a humanized substance outside or above the natural processes themselves is kept

responsible for their course.

Besides, JGB 22 links the problem of projecting nature as a humanized subject to a ‘demo-

cratic instinct’ of the modern physicists, that claims ‘Überall Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz – die Na-

tur hat es darin nicht anders und nicht besser als wir.’ On the one hand this appeals to the idea

already seen: just like us, nature has to follow laws. On the other hand, this refers to a

‘pöbelmännische Feindschaft gegen alles Bevorrechtete und Selbstherrliche;’ to a hatred of

something higher that commands and rules. This hatred, disguised as a ‘feinerer Atheismus,‘ is

directed against anything, let it be God or a (human) master („Ni dieu, ni maître“), that could

violate the equality among people.

2.3 NIETZSCHE’S OWN INTERPRETATION: THE WILL TO POWER

After making clear his objections to laws of nature as an interpretation, the burden is on Nie-

tzsche to put forward his alternative. In JGB 22 he comes up with his Wille zur Macht doctrine, as

a ‘Durchsetzung von Machtansprüchen‘. In this interpretation the tyrannical (tyrannisch), incon-

siderate (rücksichtenlos), relentless (unerbitterlich), exceptionless (Ausnahmelos), unconditional

(Unbedingt), brutal character of powers is stressed.

Both interpretations should ‘understand’ the ‘text’, consisting of the calculability and neces-

sity of nature. The suggestion is that physicists do this by assuming that nature is determined

(freely or forced) to follow the law, such that events in nature couldn’t have been otherwise

(necessity) and thus are calculable. However, in some texts on mechanics, Nietzsche complains

that it cannot satisfactorily interpret motion and mobility (Bewegung) in nature.22 By reifying

‘cause’ and ‘effect’ into things, physicists cannot account for the causal processes that actually

happen. Thus they cannot get rid of a certain ‘actio in distance’.23 How can Nietzsche ‘under-

stand’ calculability and necessity of nature in a better way?

Nietzsche seems to have given many different but related ways of understanding necessity

and calculability, which cannot all be discussed here. In JGB 22 we find the puzzling statement

that ‘jede Macht in jedem Augenblicke ihre letzte Consequenz zieht.‘ In other texts, especially on

mechanism this is linked to a ‘Feststellung der Machtsverhältnissen,’24 as a complex of power

relations that are fixed and as such registered by us.25 Relevant hereby is the degree of re-

sistance and the degree of superiority among the power relations.26 Also encountered is the

claim that a certain power cannot be something else as well, it can only be ‘so und so

beschaffen’.27 Apparently, events in nature exhibit a ‘necessity’, because the powers at work

20

2[139]/12.136;7[14]/12.299. 21

JGB:47/5.68-69. 22

Mittasch, p.85. 23

36[34]/11.564;36[31]/11.563;43[2] 11.701. 24

40[55]/11.655;39[13]/11.623;36[18]/11.559;cf.9[91]/12.385. 25

‘Feststellung’ both in the sense of a fixing (e.g. of the relations among the powers, also a Festset-zen) and a registering (e.g. of the relations among the powers by us), see Siemens, “The Problem of Law and Life”, p.200-201. 26

14[79]/13.257;9[91]/12.386. 27

2[142]/12.137.


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cannot be otherwise than they are.28 Those powers are tied to the resistances and constraints

exerted by other powers at each instance in each concrete situation. Thus every event occurs in

and through a struggle of differentiated power relations that make everything what it is at every

moment. On the basis of the same notion of relations between powers, necessity is sometimes

reduced to regularity in the sense of constant relations29 that are calculable. However, these are

just a few of Nietzsche’s approaches on necessity,30 while in other texts the notion of necessity is

radically denied.31 Also it is questionable whether Nietzsche’s ‘interpretation’ is satisfactory,

since being ‘tied to this concrete situation’ excludes the idea of counterfactuals and other possi-

ble worlds.32

How then can this interpretation avoid the problems embedded in the concept of laws of

nature? It is important to notice that Nietzsche speaks of forces and powers not as ‘things’ but

as ‘dynamische Quanta.’33 A power can express itself only according to its own strength and ef-

fect itself in that way.34 We can see here Nietzsche freeing up his Wille zur Macht-interpretation

from the reification into things and from the opposition between free will and coercion. Next to

that, laws are embedded in this concrete situation, ‘im Sein.’35 In the Wille zur Macht-

interpretation there are no mediators or middle terms (mezzo termine36), no mythological sub-

jects that keep nature in its course. Here we see that Nietzsche’s Wille zur Macht-interpretation

has a radically immanent character. The Wille zur Macht-interpretation should be seen as a way

to think of nature as ruled by dynamical processes embedded in the very course of nature itself

(innerlichen Geschehens37).

2.4 THE NON-SCIENTIFIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF LAWS OF NATURE

In JGB 22, as we have seen, Nietzsche intends to replace laws of nature as an interpretation

with the Wille zur Macht. However, it seems as if Nietzsche doesn’t simply want to overrule the

work of scientists, as one might think at a first impression. Nietzsche does not object to the prac-

tice of making nature calculable, which could be seen as the main task for a physicist. His objec-

tions seem to be more directed toward certain presuppositions, non-scientific in nature, which

can be summed up as follows:

1) Laws of nature are based upon the moral concept of a free will, in relation to the

concept of causality.

2) There is a fixed ‘thing’ standing outside the very dynamics of nature itself that keeps

it in its course.

3) Hatred of privilege and equality: no-one is allowed to stand above the law and to

command over us.

28

9[91]/12.386; Abel, p.18. 29

25[314]/11.93. 30

See Siemens, “Nietzsche’s Concept of ‘Necessity’” for an elaborate study on the meaning of neces-sity in Nietzsche’s writings. 31

34[52]/11.436;9[91]/12.383;14[79]/13.257. 32

See Siemens, “Nietzsche’s Concept of ‘Necessity’”, pp.15. 33

14[79]/13.259. 34

Djurić, p.142. 35

25[314]/11.93. 36

14[79]/13.258. 37

36[31]/11.563;cf.1[30]/12.18;26[36]/11.157;40[53]/11.654.


9

4) The same principles are present in nature and in human being.

Nietzsche’s own move by means of the Wille zur Macht is:

- 1 and 2 are rejected. As an alternative Nietzsche emphasizes the immanent charac-

ter of an interpretation of nature.

- 3 is rejected. Instead nature is what it is because of the superiority of certain powers

in relation to others.

- 4 is affirmed and radicalized: whereas interpretations always stand in a relation to

us, the Wille zur Macht-interpretation is formulated by analogy with inner processes

in us, like desires and drives.38

The claim that Nietzsche’s critique is only directed toward presuppositions implicitly embed-

ded in laws of nature, and not to scientific results or practices as such, is reinforced by a second

strategy that can be found throughout Nietzsche’s writings. In many texts Nietzsche doesn’t

simply replace the laws of nature by the Wille zur Macht, but tries to hold on to them by reinter-

preting and supplementing them. It remains unclear which strategy Nietzsche thought to be

most plausible,39 and it might be possible that he never solved it to his own satisfaction. In the

next section I will briefly consider this strategy. It will also open up our view toward a 5th presup-

position that is criticized by Nietzsche. However, it must be said that also within this second

strategy innumerable moves are made, such that only the broad lines can be sketched.

2.5 ANOTHER STRATEGY: LAWS OF NATURE AS A SIGN LANGUAGE

In the texts where Nietzsche still holds on to laws of nature, they are often reinterpreted as

a Beschreibung. Laws of nature are reduced to a description of certain regularities or constant

relations in nature. They only consist of signs (Zeichensprache), formulae (Formel) or abbrevia-

tion (Abkürzung) that express (Ausdrücksmittel) a perceived regularity.40 In this way laws of na-

ture are only valuable because they serve a pragmatic goal. The sign language in which the laws

are drawn up makes nature berechenbar, for the sake of overpowering and mastery (Überwalti-

gung) and control (Beherschbarkeit) over nature.41

In these texts, any epistemic value seems to be denied: laws of nature are a ‘Beschreibung,

nicht Erklärung,’42 they do not allow for an Erkennen, Begreifen, Verstehen, for gaining Einsicht.43

Two reasons can be given for this. First, laws of nature, as a sign language, devoid of any moral

or metaphysical content, are only superficial:44 formulating a law of nature is just posing a ques-

tion: ‘ich habe (…) die Frage aufgestellt, woher es kommt, daß hier Etwas sich wiederholt.’45 Sec-

38

36[31]/11.563;25[371]/11.109;JGB:36/5.54. 39

Djurić, p.141. 40

26[227]/11.209;2[142]/12.137;5[10]/12.187;7[14]/12.299;14[79]/13.258. 41

26[170]/11.194;26[227]/11.209;26[229]/11.209;26[448]/11.269 ;27[36]/11.284;cf.25[308]/11.91. 42

27[67]/11.291. 43

25[314]/11.93;43[2]/11.701;5[16]/12.190;11[255]/9.538. 44

5[16]/12.190;cf.7[34]/12.306. 45

7[14]/12.299.


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ondly and more radically, laws of nature, as describing a regularity, are perceived as a untruth: it

is not only a Bezeichnen, but also a Verzeichnen,46 a Zurechtlegen47 and Zurechtmache.48

How can we understand this last notion? As we saw already implicitly in the previous sec-

tions, Nietzsche thinks of reality as a dynamic, ever-changing plurality in which there are no

fixed, stable or constant ‘things’ or ‘facts’. So it is on the side of the human, by means of a

Hineinlegen,49 that an identity or regularity is noticed. This is done by a simplification (Verein-

fachen),50 by means of a comparing (Vergleichen) certain events and underlining (Unterstrei-

chen) and accentuating (Herausheben) of what is similar, while neglecting and making more

rough (Vergröbern) what is different.51 Sometimes Nietzsche asserts that already the senses

make that the world appears to us as the same every time,52 but most often he stresses that the

‘Zurechtbilden zu identischen Fällen’53 is done by the understanding.54 Knowing, according to

Nietzsche, is a process of Aneignen55 and Einverleiben,56 of tracing back something alien to

something that is already known.57 Ultimately, this is done on the basis of the bodily drives58

that are working in us and are therefore most intimately known.59

Why is it then that the senses and the understanding work in this way? According to Nie-

tzsche, we are in need of something fixed, lasting and regular for the sake of life.60 Here we see

the pragmatic value of laws again. This is linked to the Wille zur Macht, as a will not only for the

preservation (Erhaltung) of life,61 but also for its growth (Wachstum).62 The need for discerning a

regularity is explained by the Wille zur Macht 1) as a psychological need for life, as a feeling of

security (Sicherheit63) and calmness (Beruhigung) in a world that is so fearful (Furchtsam) other-

wise;64 2) as making things calculable for the mastery and overpowering of the surroundings;65 3)

as an Einverleiben of new things by assimilating them to already known structures, such that we

‘grow’ in the sense of extending our knowledge and capacities;66 4) as demarcating power dif-

ferences between us and rivaling powers.67 However, Nietzsche also emphasizes that the extent

46

2[139]/12.135. 47

38[2]/11.597. 48

9[144]/12.418;9[106]/12.395-396. 49

7[60]/12.315;9[144]/12.418;25[445]/11.131. 50

38[2]/11.597. 51

9[144]/12.418;40[17]/11.636. 52

9[144]/12.418;cf.25[371]/11.109;26[448]/11.269 ;7[54]/12.312;9[91]/12.383;14[79]/13.259;Djurić p.29-30. 53

10[159]/12.550. 54

25[371]/11.109;26[448]/11.269;34[55]/11.437;38[2]/11.597;7[54]/12.312;9[106]/12.395;14[79]/ 13.259;Djurić, p.29-30;Abel, p.10. 55

JGB:230/5.167. 56

26[448]/11.269. 57

34[249]/11.505;38[2]/11.597;5[10]/12.187. 58

25[427]/11.125;7[60]/12.315;JGB:36/5.54-55. 59

25[445]/11.131;14[79]/13.259. 60

9[89]/12.382. 61

25[470]/11.138;43[1] 11.699. 62

JGB:230/5.167;9[91]/12.385;2[148]/139-140;JGB:44/5.61. 63

9[91]/12.387;JGB:210/5.142. 64

5[10]/12.187. 65

25[427]/11.124;26[448]/11.269. 66

JGB:230/5.167;Abel, p.10. 67

2[148]/12.139.


11

to which we need fixed regularities or laws differs from individual to individual, depending upon

one’s powers.68

2.6 PSYCHOLOGICAL REINTERPRETATION: THE NEED FOR REGULARITY

What then does this second strategy tell us about the presuppositions of laws of nature? For

Nietzsche, this reinterpretation of laws of nature as being a superficial sign language is in need

of the supplement of the Wille zur Macht as a ‘Verinnerlichung.’69 This supplement is an ‘inter-

pretation’ of the observed regularity (the ‘text’). Regularities could be interpreted either as the

‘effect’70 of ‘Machtverhältnisse’ as seen in the previous chapter, or as the consequence of the

way our senses and understanding work. The emphasis on the ‘inner’ signifies both the imma-

nence of the interpretations (as against presupposition 2) and the fact that all interpretations

are drawn up by analogy with us (presupposition 4). Besides, on another level the Wille zur

Macht-interpretation is a ‘Verinnerlichung’ because it explains the motives for our search for

regularities that we formulate in laws of nature.

This brings us to a 5th presupposition hidden in laws of nature. Scientists, who project static

laws of nature as ‘text’ onto the phenomena or reality as such, assume that:

5) Nature is something static and regular and can therefore be expressed in fixed laws

of nature;

This point reinforces Nietzsche’s remark that mechanics cannot fully account for mobility

(Bewegung) in nature. Instead, Nietzsche’s position is:

- 5 is denied as a characteristic of reality and shifted to the psychological and biologi-

cal sphere as the need to formulate laws of nature (in texts where they are not de-

nied) or - more in general - the need to formulate an interpretation.

This leads to the conclusion that laws of nature, for Nietzsche, are only an interpretation of

nature with certain, inherent problematic presuppositions. By means of a philologically-inspired

philosophical critique these presuppositions can be identified and rejected or reinterpreted by

means of a new interpretation, which is exactly what Nietzsche does. However, he does not

simply reject the work of the scientists, since the calculability of events in nature together with

the regularity and/or necessity that the laws expresses still remain. Besides, the existing hidden

presuppositions in laws of nature are non-scientific in nature, as is the task of criticizing these

presuppositions while putting a new interpretation in place. This last task seems to be attributed

to the philosophers. The role of the philosophers – as instantiated by Nietzsche himself – in rela-

tion to the scientists and to interpretations of nature will be more worked out in the next chap-

ter.

68

25[371]/11.109;9[91]/12.385;cf.34[246]/11.502. 69

Mittasch, p.85. 70

43[2]/11.702;14[79]/13.258. Nietzsche uses here ‘Wirkung’, despite his critique of causality.

The relation between scientists and philosophers

12

3 THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENTISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS

In this chapter we will ask what relation philosophers have with scientists and interpreta-

tions of nature. The question of the relation between scientists and philosophers is taken up

explicitly in the chapter ‘Wir Gelehrten’ (aphorisms 204-213) in JGB. I will take those aphorisms

as a guiding thread, with a special focus on JGB 211.

3.1 THE PROBLEM WITH THE SCIENTIST

Immediately at the beginning of aphorism 211 Nietzsche makes clear that the philosophical

workers and scientists (‘die philosophischen Arbeiter und überhaupt die wissenschaftlichen

Menschen’) shouldn’t be mistaken for the philosophers.71 The philosophical workers and scien-

tists use existing values: their task is to register (‘Feststellen’) these values, which have already

become unquestioned ‘Thatbestande’, and to press them into formulae for the practical sake of

making things übersichtlich, überdenkbar, faßbar, handlich.72 Here we recognize some character-

istics of laws of nature seen in the previous chapter.

Opposed to this, the philosophers are the ‘lawgivers’ (Gesetzgeber73), linked to the

hineinlegen or hineinstecken of interpretations of nature. This will be explained in more detail in

the next chapter. In JGB 204 Nietzsche blames the scientists for failing to recognize the differ-

ence with philosophy by showing contempt for it and trying to take its place.74 Apparently, the

task of the philosophers cannot be taken over by science. Why not? Here three problems with

science will be worked out in order to clarify the distinction with philosophy and its tasks.

The first problem was already implicitly encountered in JGB 22. As pointed out in the previ-

ous chapter, scientists don’t see the difference between ‘text’ and interpretation. They project

laws of nature onto the observed phenomena (as ‘facts´ or even as reality as such (‘an-sich’)).

Scientists are blind to the hineinlegen, involved in laws of nature. This point is worked out fur-

ther in JGB 204. Although scientists show contempt for philosophy, they are unaware that they

do this on the basis of hidden philosophical presuppositions: ’Am häufigsten endlich fand ich bei

jungen Gelehrten hinter der hochmüthigen Geringschätzung der Philosophie die schlimme Na-

chwirkung eines Philosophen selbst.‘75 Also scientists, as we saw in the previous chapter, incor-

porate (‘einverleiben‘) something strange under something known in order to observe a regulari-

ty. However, by making it look familiar, they feel a security (Sicherheit) which stops them from

questioning their results.76 Nietzsche suggests that scientists are insufficiently self-critical. They

do interrogate nature, but they don’t interrogate their own practices and presuppositions. 77

A second problem concerns the so-called nihilistic consequence of science.78 Nihilism is

described by Nietzsche as ‘die radikale Ablehnung von Werth, Sinn, Wünschbarkeit.‘79 According

71

JGB:211/5.144;cf.26[407]/11.258-259;JGB:205/5.133;JGB:207/5.136. 72

26[407]/KSA 11. 73

JGB:211/5.145. 74

JGB:204/5.129f. 75

JGB:204/5.130. 76

5[10]/12.188. 77

Cf.35[44]11.530: ‘daß sie [the scientists] nicht über sich selber hinaus sehen können‘. 78

2[131]/12.130. 79

2[127]/12.125.


13

to Nietzsche, the ‘Sinn der Wahrhaftigkeit’ cultivated by Christian morality turns against the

perceived untruth of the Christian world-interpretation80 and culminates in ‘scientific con-

science.’81 In its search for truth and Sicherheit, science in turn undermines the moral world-

order, 82 including existing interpretations and values.83 As Abel writes: ‘Am Ende eines absoluten

Wahrheitsstrebens steht nicht eine reine Gegebenheit einer interpretations-losen Welt, sondern

(…) das Nichts.‘84 Nihilism is perceived by Nietzsche as an enormous problem. A world without

any meaning or interpretation is, as we already saw, a cruel and contradictory (grausam, wid-

ersprüchlich) plurality, in which we cannot make a living.85 Instead, Nietzsche aims for an over-

powering, a ‘zum Sieg kommen’ over this dark and uncomfortable world. For this, new interpre-

tations and new ‘truths’ have to be put in place, even when they consist of ‘lies’.86

The third problem of science is its inability to create these new values and new interpreta-

tions. This is because 1) science is blind toward the hineinlegen-part of interpretations and the

nihilistic consequences of it. Scientists can only obey and follow what is hineingelegt, and are

unable to command.87 This is reinforced by their hatred of everything that stands higher and

commands (Selbstherrliche, Herrschaftlichkeit88). 2) Laws of nature are projected as something

static in nature itself (presupposition 5). This not only denies the dynamical character of nature,

but even worse: the rigid character of those laws hides the possibility of coming up with a new

and better interpretation of nature, 89 which could overcome the devastating effects of nihilism.

For Nietzsche, even laws are embedded in the dynamics of life, 90 so they cannot be everlasting

concepts that are there to stay. Instead, he opens up the possibility of a new interpretation or

law, if that is beneficial of the flourishing of life.91 3) Science is characterized by a division and

specialization.92 For commanding, an overview over the whole ‘Umkreis menschlicher Werthe

und Werth-Gefühle’93 is needed. From this position one can come up with a thought or value

that in its scope is not restricted to the different specializations in science.

3.2 THE TASK OF THE PHILOSOPHER

The philosopher’s task is to make good the deficits of the scientists. From the previous chap-

ter, we can discern three main tasks. Also there is a self-referential aspect in Nietzsche here:

while describing these tasks in JGB, we see him doing them himself as well.

80

2[127]/ 12.125. 81

GM3:27/5.409. 82

2[127]/ 12.125. 83

35[44]/11.530-531. 84

Abel, p.25. 85

11[415]/13.193. 86

11[415]/13.193. 87

9[144]/12.417. 88

JGB:212/5.147;JGB:206/5.134. 89

26[432]/11.266: laws as a ‘vorläufige Regulative der Forschung.‘ 90

9[89] /12.382. 91

JGB:44/5.61-62;35[37]/11.527; see also Siemens, “The Problem of Law and Life”, p.191-192. 92

JGB:212/5.146;JGB:205/5.132, also seen in JGB:211/5.144 by the many specializations that are summed up. 93

JGB:211/5.144;cf.JGB:212/5.146;26[170]/11.194.


14

1) The philosopher should create new values and give the direction and the goal (‘das

Wohin? und Wozu?’94) to science. He is a lawgiver, who does the hineinlegen of in-

terpretations into nature.95 Nietzsche does this when he comes up with his Wille zur

Macht interpretation.

2) The philosopher should criticize science and limit its pretentions. Otherwise the un-

self-critical attitude inherent in science hides its own philosophical foundation and

threatens to dissolve all value and meaning. Nietzsche criticizes the hidden presup-

positions in the interpretation of laws of nature. He also attempts to limit this inter-

pretation, by reinterpreting it as a ‘Zeichensprache.’

3) The philosopher should complement science, such that we can ‘understand’ or ‘in-

terpret’ the ‘fact’ that nature is regular and calculable. Nietzsche does this especially

in his strategy of supplementing laws of nature with the Wille zur Macht.

The role of the philosopher can be fulfilled by the hermit (Einsiedler96) and the privileged

(Bevorrechtigten97) who is able to rule himself (Selbstherrlich98). Paradoxically, Nietzsche always

refers to the ‘philosophers of the future’ in the plural,99 which shows that such an individual is

linked with a collective as well. Besides, in many texts these tasks of creating and interpreting,

for the sake of overcoming nihilism, are not limited to philosophy: ‘das Wiederfinden heißt sich

Wissenschaft, das Hineinstecken – Kunst, Religion, Liebe, Stolz.’100 Among the several disciplines,

art is often mentioned. 101 At the end of this essay I will argue that a certain aesthetic aspect is

also indispensable for philosophy.

3.3 THE PHILOSOPHER’S NEED FOR SCIENCE

From the previous chapter it can be concluded that philosophy is valuable for science, but it

remains unclear what value science has for philosophy. Three ways can be distinguished in

which philosophy also needs science and its interpretations.

1) According to JGB 211, the activities of scientific workers can be used as steps (‘Stufe’)

towards a higher viewpoint with a wider view.102 You need to live through their per-

spectives or interpretations, such that you can ‘einverleiben’ all human values, before

you can go beyond and create alternative values. According to JGB 204 you need to

know something about science before you have the right for ‘Mitreden’, before you

can form a well-informed opinion about the ‘höhere Frage.’103

2) Existing laws of nature can serve as a means (Mittel) and a tool (Werkzeug) for creat-

ing new interpretations.104 This is exemplified by the way Nietzsche uses concepts like

94

JGB:211/5.145. 95

2[174]/12.153;cf.9[91]/12.385. 96

JGB:230/5.169;JGB:204/5.131. 97

JGB:212/5.147. 98

JGB:62 5.82. 99

JGB:211/5.144;JGB:212/5.145;JGB:213/5.147;JGB:204/5.130;JGB:47/5.68;JGB:44/5.60; JGB:62/5.81. 100

2[174]/12.153. 101

11[415]/13.194;25[470]/11.138. 102

JGB:211/5.144. 103

JGB:204/5.129. 104

JGB:211/5.145;26[170]/11.194;JGB:207/5.135.


15

‘force’ and ‘power’ from existing laws of nature for his own interpretation. However,

the use of existing laws of nature should not close off the possibility to come up with

a new interpretation.

3) In his philosophical project, Nietzsche gratefully uses the trend in the natural sciences

to destroy morality and metaphysics.105 He lets this trend turn toward science itself,

by taking morality out of the interpretation of nature. Science, if it can be stripped of

its moral presuppositions, is also of use for Nietzsche’s project of translating moral

judgements back into nature (‘Zurückübersetzen in die Natur’).106

Also Nietzsche assures us that he doesn’t think too little of science: it is no child’s play.107 For

both the ‘Hineinstecken’ of interpretations and the ‘Wiederfinden’ by science good courage (gu-

ter Muth) is needed. This good courage can be understood as the opposite of the weakening of

the will (Willensschwäche 108), characteristic of nihilism, which includes the demolition of the will

for overpowering of the world by means of science.

3.4 THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

There is one important difference between philosophers and scientists/philosophical work-

ers present in the chapter ‘Wir Gelehrten’ in JGB that hasn’t been mentioned so far. While the

scientists and the philosophical workers are connected to the past and the present, the philoso-

phers are linked to the future. This can even be found in the subtitle of JGB: ‘Vorspiel einer Phi-

losophie der Zukunft.’109 What should we make of this difference?

First, this difference between the past and the future can be found in tasks and goals. The

philosophical workers are the Überwältiger der Vergangenheit:110 they study the past, such that

existing values (by means of the ‘Wiederfinden’) are registered and fixed (two meanings of ‘fest-

gestellt’) in the domains of logic, politics, morality, art. On the contrary, philosophers create

something new, something that is non-existent in the present: ’Sie greifen mit schöpferischer

Hand nach der Zukunft.‘111 The philosopher must even contradict the present and its ideals (after

first having used these ideals as ‘Stufe’ for attaining a sufficient understanding): ‘sein Feind war

jedes Mal das Ideal von Heute.‘112

Secondly, this difference can be seen as a difference in the age in which the philosophers

and the scientists/philosophical workers live. Examples of philosophical workers are known from

the past and the present; Nietzsche mentions Kant and Hegel.113 However, the philosophers, as

the figures that can overcome nihilism, are yet to come. Nietzsche’s own time, with the con-

105

Abel, p.11-12. 106

JGB:230/5.169;9[86]/12.380, Siemens, “Nietzsche’s Concept of ‘Necessity’”, p.2. 107

2[174]/12.153-154. 108

JGB:212/5.146;JGB:21/5.36;JGB:208/5.138. 109

Cf.JGB:44/5.60;26[407]/11.258;JGB:210/5.142. 110

JGB:211/5.145. 111

JGB:211/5.144-145. 112

JGB:212/5.145. 113

JGB:211/5.144.


16

ceived weakening of the will, lacks the sources to raise such philosophers.‘114 Nietzsche thinks of

himself as only a forerunner.115

This chapter has shown that the philosophers, as figures yet to come, have a creative, limit-

ing and supplementing task in relation to science. In this way the nihilistic consequences of the

existing interpretation of laws of nature, elaborated by the scientists and the philosophical

workers, can be overcome. In chapter 2 we saw that Nietzsche tries to fulfill the philosopher’s

tasks (or anticipate on them as a forerunner) by coming up with a few interpretations of his own,

based on the Wille zur Macht. But why would the Wille zur Macht interpretation be better than

another interpretation, like the scientist’s interpretations of laws of nature? One reason was

already encountered: the Wille zur Macht is supposed to overcome the threat of nihilism. But

we can still ask: what kinds of principles are to guide the philosophical creation of new interpre-

tations, if they are to be more than random whims? This question will be the topic of the next

chapter.

114

JGB:212/5.146;JGB:204/5.131-132;JGB:205/5.132. 115

JGB:44/5.60.


17

4 SCIENCE AS A MATTER OF TASTE

How can we judge that a certain interpretation is better than another one? On what basis

can we decide what is kept as ‘text’ and what is criticized as ‘interpretation’? We’ve seen Nie-

tzsche objecting to putting moral motivations in nature and establishing a demoralized interpre-

tation instead. However, in JGB 188 Nietzsche admits that the judgment that a demoralized in-

terpretation is better is also based upon moral values.116 At stake here is the standard for evalu-

ating different interpretations. In this chapter I will argue that the question ‘which interpretation

is the best?’ is a matter of taste, within the overall goal of perfection of life. Hereby taste should

not be understood as a something irrational or mere personal preference.

4.1 THE STANDARDS OF PHILOSOPHY

How could a philosopher carry out philosophy’s creative, limiting and supplementing func-

tions in relation to science by means of interpretations? With what criteria should such an inter-

pretation comply? Some clues can be found in the chapter ‘Wir Gelehrten’ in JGB.

At first sight Nietzsche’s clues seem confusing. In JGB 213 we read: ‘Was ein Philosoph ist,

das ist deshalb schlecht zu lernen, weil es nicht zu lehren ist: man muss es "wissen", aus Erfah-

rung.‘117 Apparently, what a philosopher is, can be known, but only by experience. Nietzsche

cannot come up with any well-defined prescriptions. Since it can only be acquired by experience,

we find in other texts a great emphasis on cultivation (Erziehung) of the virtues (‘jede seiner Tu-

genden muss einzeln erworben, gepflegt, fortgeerbt, einverleibt worden sein’)118 by means of

discipline (Zucht).119

The idea that the philosophers know of something that is not yet existent, is expressed more

often: ‘verriethen sie [the philosophers] was ihr eignes Geheimniss war: um eine neue Grösse des

Menschen zu wissen, um einen neuen ungegangenen Weg zu seiner Vergrösserung;‘120 ‘Ihr „Er-

kennen“ ist Schaffen, ihr Schaffen ist eine Gesetzgebung.’121 Apparently, we cannot say what kind

of laws or interpretations a philosopher should come up with, since these standards have yet to

be created. In JGB 188 Nietzsche speaks of an artist following laws (tausendfältigen Gesetzen)

that cannot be conceptually formulated, because they are too precise (‘die aller Formulirung

durch Begriffe gerade auf Grund ihrer Härte und Bestimmtheit spotten’ 122).

Although no pre-defined standards can be given, the philosophical ‘Gesetzgebung’ should ul-

timately aim at a growth and expansion of human life (see use of ‘Vergrösserung’ in the quote in

the previous paragraph), as an antidote to the threat of nihilism. Although Nietzsche keeps open

what specific interpretations philosophers can come up with, the overall goal should be the

growth and enhancement - in short: the open-ended perfection - of human life.123

116

JGB:188/5.108. 117

JGB:213/5.147. 118

JGB:213/5.148. 119

JGB:188/5.109;JGB:230/5.168;JGB:213/5.148;JGB:207/5.136. 120

JGB:212/5.145-146. 121

JGB:211/5.145. 122

JGB:188/5.108. 123

Siemens, “The Problem of Law and Life”, p.191.

Science as a matter of taste

18

In JGB 230 we see that the philosopher (as the ‘courageous thinker‘) also needs a certain

taste: ‘als eine Art Grausamkeit des intellektuellen Gewissens und Geschmacks, welche jeder

tapfere Denker bei sich anerkennen wird, gesetzt dass er, wie sich gebührt, sein Auge für sich

selbst lange genug gehärtet und gespitzt hat und an strenge Zucht, auch an strenge Worte ge-

wöhnt ist.‘124 ‘Geschmack’ is often used in a negative sense, whereby scientists, Christian virtues

and cultures with which Nietzsche disagrees are blamed for having a bad taste (e.g. demo-

kratischen Geschmacks, Zeitgeschmack125) or are assigned an ironically meant “gutes Ges-

chmack.”126 Not only does Nietzsche speak of ‘Geschmack’ but also of a ‘Feinheit’ and of a fine

sense of smell (‘feinere Witterung’).127 This is also often correlated with an (intellektuelle) Gewis-

sen.128

Another characteristic of philosophical thinking is that it is fast (presto läuft), light-footed

(Leichtes), high-spirited and exalted (ausgelassenen Geistigkeit), divine (Göttliches), like a dance

(Tanze). On the contrary, thinking for scholars and scientists is slow, painful, hesitating, heavy,

troublesome and serious (‘peinliches Folgen-müssen,’ ‘Langsames, Zögerndes, beinahe als eine

Mühsal,’ ‘eine Sache "ernst nehmen"’ 129). The mention of dance in particular points toward an

aesthetic moment in the philosophical task.

4.2 THE ROLE OF ‘GESCHMACK’

What should we make of these clues about the criteria for the fulfillment of the task of phi-

losophy? In his early work ‘Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen‘ Nietzsche links the

wisdom (‘Weisheit‘) of a philosopher explicitly to a fine taste (‘schärfsten Geschmacks’).130 Nie-

tzsche seems to hint at the same idea in JGB, although here it is more implicit. By pointing out a

few characteristics in the tradition of ‘Geschmack’131 I will argue that for Nietzsche the standard

for challenging and coming up with new laws or interpretations in science is based upon the

same notion.

‘Geschmack’ nowadays designates, next to one of the five senses, a certain capacity for art

and beauty. However, it is important to note that in the tradition before Kant, ‘Geschmack’ was

not restricted to the aesthetic sphere, but also linked to a form of knowledge (and a form of

morality, but that is outside the scope of this essay). As signifying a cognitive capacity as well, we

can point out the following characteristics of taste:

1) Taste names an inner, animal sense that is bound up with an immediate judgement:

a joyful reception or a rejection out of disgust.132 This presupposes a mental capacity

to discriminate. Gadamer notices that it is especially the negative phenomenon that

we encounter: the immediate rejection of something as being disgusting or distaste-

124

JGB:230/5.168;cf.JGB:270/5.226. 125

JGB:44/5.61;JGB:212/5.146;cf.JGB:14/5.28;JGB:210/5.142f;JGB:224/5.157;JGB:253/5.197. 126

JGB:21/5.36;cf.JGB:283/5.231;JGB:208/5.138. 127

JGB:213/5.148. 128

JGB:44/5.61;JGB:188/5.108;JGB:191/5.112;JGB:204/5.131;JGB:205/5.132;JGB:211/5.144; JGB:212/5.145;JGB:230/5.168;26[407]/11.258. 129

JGB:213/5.147-148. 130

PHG:3/1.816. 131

I’m depending here on Schümmer, Gadamer and Siemens: “Agonal Communities of Taste”. 132

Gadamer, p.32; also seen in JGB:224/5.158: ‘Das sehr bestimmte Ja und Nein ihres Gaumens.‘


19

ful.133 The capacity to discriminate can be seen in Nietzsche both in the distinction

between text and interpretation and in the rejection of the scientists’ demo-

kratischer Geschmack.

2) Although we can disagree about taste, we cannot give arguments or prove the right-

ness of our taste. This is probably the most important characteristic that distin-

guishes it from science. Whereas science formulates laws for making things calcula-

ble, judgements of taste lack any conceptual standards.134 Also in the previous sec-

tion we saw that standards according to which interpretations should be created,

lack any conceptual description.

3) Paradoxically, although lacking any conceptual standards, a ‘Geschmacksurteil’ is not

a merely private approval or rejection, but claims a universal validity. We try to con-

vince others of the rightness our taste. Whereas ‘fashion’ is the imitation of rules

within an existing community, by means of taste we can create our own rules and

demand the agreement of a community yet to be formed.135 Nietzsche’s interpreta-

tion does not only claim a universal validity, he also appeals to a favorable reception

of his work by ‘philosophers of the future’. This could also be understood as the

community yet to come.

4) How can we convince others of the rightness of our taste when conceptual stand-

ards are missing? It can be an indicated and pointed out: ‘this food/music/literature

etc. is good’. We can acquire it by experiencing examples of good taste. Therefore,

as in Nietzsche, a lot of emphasis is put on cultivation and training of the faculty of

taste.136

5) Taste names a general form of knowledge that is not dry, laborious or difficult. It is

therefore accessible for a broad public, that can ‘get a taste’ of it.137 It represents the

‘bigger picture’. 138 For Nietzsche, philosophical thinking is fast and light-footed,

while scientific thinking is more laboured. Besides, the philosopher needs to attain

an overview over science and its interpretations, without sticking to the several sci-

entific specializations, before he can go beyond.

6) In the medieval use of the word, Meister Eckhart’s ‘gesmecken gotes’ and Lyly’s

‘taste of heauenly things’ indicate a relation to ‘the highest, worthiest objects of

thought that cannot be adequately grasped through the power of ratio.’ 139 This is

exactly what Nietzsche appeals to when he speaks of a thinking that is ‘high-spirited,

exalted, divine.’ For this sort of thought, reality or nature possesses an enormous

richness and plurality, which is inherently lost by formulating it into concepts. This

plurality is reflected in the ‘tausendfältigen Gesetzen’: so specific, unique and situa-

tion-bound, that concepts are too general to express them. Since we need to formu-

late these thoughts nevertheless (because we cannot live within a dynamic plurali-

ty), it forms a hidden basis from which all conceptual knowledge stems. A concept or

133

Gadamer, p.33-34. 134

Gadamer, p.33; also seen in 43[2]/11.701: ‘Die „Berechenbarkeit“ der Welt, ob wünschenswerth? damit wäre auch der schöpferische Akt „berechenbar“?‘ 135

Gadamer, p.33-34. 136

Gadamer, p.32-33. 137

Schümmer, p.135-137. 138

Gadamer, p.34. 139

Siemens, “Agonal Communities of Taste”, p.94; Schümmer, p.122-124.

Science as a matter of taste

20

interpretation is formulated by an emphasizing and accentuating (Herausheben) of

certain features within this plurality, while neglecting others (see section 2.5). Any

concept is therefore necessarily to a certain extent false. This highest form of

knowledge must therefore not be understood as a flight from reason, but as an ex-

tension and improvement of reason beyond mere calculability.140

4.3 WHY WOULD NIETZSCHE’S INTERPRETATION BE BETTER?

To finish with: by what standards of evaluation can we judge that a certain interpretation,

like Nietzsche’s Wille zur Macht, is better than another, say the scientist’s account of laws of

nature? On the one hand a philosopher’s interpretation should stimulate the growth and en-

hancement of human life. According to Djurić, Nietzsche rejects the standard of truth (of the

scientists) in favour of the standard of life.141 On the other hand, the ‘standard of life’ as a stand-

ard of evaluation is very much kept open, and can be linked to the notion of taste. The ‘philoso-

phers of the future’ are challenged not only to come up with a new interpretation, but also to

indicate why exactly their interpretation is so good. In other words: the standards and rules are

partly fixed during the game (of life) itself.

We could ask to what extent Nietzsche keeps open the standard of evaluation, when he

holds that it should be for the perfection of life. Isn’t the goal of enhancement and growth of life

a conceptual standard as such?142 Also unclear so far is why the Wille zur Macht interpretation

satisfies the ‘standard of life’ more than other interpretations like laws of nature. Besides, the

question is whether the Wille zur Macht should be seen as a plausible interpretation of science,

or only as a ‘hypothesis’, an attempt to show the mere possibility of an alternative to the scien-

tist’s interpretation?143 Could this distinction even be sharply made?

140

Cf. Abel, p.21: ‘dass die Möglichkeiten des Erkennens (…) bei weitem nicht auf den begrifflichen, diskursiven und urteilsgrammatischen Bereich des Verstandesdenkens im engeren Sinne einge-schränkt werden können.‘ 141

Djurić, p.197. 142

A similar objection was made by Kant about the German tradition of the aesthetics of perfection (Vollkommenheitsästhetik) in e.g. Baumgarten, see Kritik der Urteilskraft, B45-47. 143

See also the use of ‘Gesetzt’ in the meaning of ‘suppose that’ in e.g. JGB:22/5.37;JGB:21/5.35; JBG:36/5.54-55;JGB:210/5.142;2[149]/ 12.140.


21

5 CONCLUSION

In this essay I’ve shown how, according to Nietzsche, philosophy serves as a hidden basis for

science. Philosophy should create interpretations that enable us to ‘understand’ the calculable

results of science and give meaning and value to it. In this way philosophy also limits and com-

plements science. Philosophy can do this on the basis of a certain ‘taste’ that provides access to

a rich form of knowledge (as a kind of ‘inspiration’144), from which all conceptual knowledge

flows. Hereby ‘taste’ contains both an aesthetic and a cognitive moment. However, what should

we make of this claim when it comes to the relation between science and philosophy? How

plausible is Nietzsche’s account?

As already pointed out in the previous section, there are some notions embedded in Nie-

tzsche’s thinking that are questionable. To mention a few more: is it really so that scientists think

of nature as if it either freely obeys laws or is coerced to do so? It is even questionable whether

Nietzsche’s key problem of nihilism is actually there, and where we should place the expectation

of the philosophers of the future. However, instead of raising all these questions I would like to

indicate the strength and potential of Nietzsche’s account on the relation between philosophy

and science in a fourfold way. However, it must be said that pointing out some examples of the

relation between science and philosophy on the basis of the notion of taste possibly doesn’t do

justice to the idea of the philosophers ‘of the future’.

1) In my view what is most plausible in Nietzsche’s critique of laws of nature is the idea

that depicting nature as static and regular (presupposition 5) is an inherent non-

scientific presupposition in science. Every time that in a scientific experiment ‘regular’

behavior is observed, we are in fact dealing with a completely different situation. This

not only presupposes a selection of ‘relevant’ similarities and ‘irrelevant’ differences. It

is also based upon the hineingelegte idea that science is what it is only if it accounts for

the behavior of nature in the form of descriptions of a certain perceived regularity.

2) At first sight Nietzsche’s view that interpretations like laws of nature can be rejected in

favour of a new ones, seems rather odd. But when we think about it for a moment, in

the history of science many so-perceived laws have been rejected and replaced by new

interpretations. Some philosophers of science have already pointed out the lack of

common standards for evaluating these interpretations,145 and have even appealed to

the role of aesthetics.146

3) Some physicists have pointed out that it is essential for physical research, next to solving

a problem by means of tedious mathematical manipulations (the ‘Arbeiten’ of the scien-

tists), to obtain a more ‘intuitive’ picture of that problem. To quote the physicist and

Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman (1918-1988): ’I spent a few years trying to invent

mathematical things that would permit me to solve the equations, but I didn’t get any-

where, and then I decided that in order to do that I must first understand more or less

how the answer probably looks. It’s hard to explain this very well, but I had to get a qual-

itative idea of how the phenomenon works before I could get a good quantitative

144

Cf. JGB:188/5.108. 145

Abel mentions Goodman, p.16: often an accepted theory ‘vastly outreaches its evidential basis if that theory promises to exhibit an underlying order.’ We could also think of Feyerabend or Kuhn. 146

See McAllister, J.W. Beauty and revolution in science, Cornell University Press, 1999.

Conclusion

22

idea.’147 From this less mathematically specialized bigger picture (characteristic 5 in the

notion of taste) scientists can see the direction in which their research, being neverthe-

less mathematical in nature, should go and evaluate its results.

4) Finally, what I consider the widest potential of the notion of taste for science is that it of-

fers a basis for rethinking the societal role of art and philosophy in relation to science.

With reference to the notion of taste it could be understood how societal, non-scientific,

factors also have their share in the evaluation of science and the determination of its di-

rections. This is both by the cultivation of taste in the existing community and by appeal-

ing to the agreement of a community yet to come. In this way evaluation of science is

not done according to certain pre-fixed standards, but by ongoing debates and contro-

versies, embedded in and fed by broader social concerns. This idea needs further elabo-

ration in order to come up with examples from the scientific practice.

147

‘The pleasure of finding things out’, edited transcript of an interview with Feynman made for the BBC television program Horizon, 1981, p.18, URL= http://www.scribd.com/doc/23587979/Transcript-The-Pleasure-of-Finding-Things-Out-R-Feynman.


23

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abel, G. “Wissenschaft und Kunst.” In Kunst und Wissenschaft bei Nietzsche, by M. Djurić, J.

Simon and G. Abel, 9-25. Würzburg: K nigshausen, Neumann, 1986.

Djurić, M. Nietzsche und die Metaphysik. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985.

Mittasch, A. Friedrich Nietzsche als Naturphilosoph. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1952.

Nietzsche, F. Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden. Edited by G. Colli and M.

Montinari. München, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980.

Schümmer, Fr. “Die Entwicklung des Geschmacksbegriffs in der Philosophie des 17. und 18.

Jahrhunderts.” In Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 120-141. Bonn: Bouvier, 1955.

Siemens, H.W. “Agonal Communities of Taste: Law and Community in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of

Transvaluation.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 24 (2002): 83-112.

Siemens, H.W. “Nietzsche’s Concept of ‘Necessity’ and its Relation to ‘Laws of Nature’.” n.d.: 1-

20.

Siemens, H.W. “Nietzsche's attitude to the law.” n.d.: 1-8.

Siemens, H.W. “The Problem of Law and Life in Nietzsche’s Thought.” The New Centennial

Review 10, no. 3 (2011): 189–216.

Appendix

Important aphorisms from Jenseits von Gut und Böse

Including KSA-numbering and English translation


3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JGB 22 ............................................................................................................................................... 4

German text .............................................................................................................................. 4

English translation .................................................................................................................... 4

JGB 211 ............................................................................................................................................. 6

German text .............................................................................................................................. 6


JGB 212 ............................................................................................................................................. 8

German text .............................................................................................................................. 8


JGB 213 ........................................................................................................................................... 11

German text ............................................................................................................................ 11

English translation .................................................................................................................. 12

English translations are taken from:

Nietzsche, F. “Beyond Good and Evil”, in: The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1909-

1913), translated by Zimmern, H. E-text from The Project Gutenberg, 2009. URL =

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm#2HCH0006

JGB 22

4

JGB 22

GERMAN TEXT

Aphorism id='JGB-Text-22' kgw='VI-2.31' ksa='5.37'

002 Man vergebe es mir als einem alten Philologen, der von der

003 Bosheit nicht lassen kann, auf schlechte Interpretations-Künste

004 den Finger zu legen: aber jene „Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur“, von

005 der ihr Physiker so stolz redet, wie als ob – – besteht nur Dank

006 eurer Ausdeutung und schlechten „Philologie“, – sie ist kein

007 Thatbestand, kein „Text“, vielmehr nur eine naiv-humanitäre

008 Zurechtmachung und Sinnverdrehung, mit der ihr den demokra-

009 tischen Instinkten der modernen Seele sattsam entgegenkommt!

010 „Überall Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, – die Natur hat es darin

011 nicht anders und nicht besser als wir“: ein artiger Hintergedanke,

012 in dem noch einmal die pöbelmännische Feindschaft gegen alles

013 Bevorrechtete und Selbstherrliche, insgleichen ein zweiter und

014 feinerer Atheismus verkleidet liegt. „Ni dieu, ni maître“ – so

015 wollt auch ihr’s: und darum „hoch das Naturgesetz“! – nicht

016 wahr? Aber, wie gesagt, das ist Interpretation, nicht Text; und es

017 könnte Jemand kommen, der, mit der entgegengesetzten Absicht

018 und Interpretationskunst, aus der gleichen Natur und im Hin-

019 blick auf die gleichen Erscheinungen, gerade die tyrannisch-rück-

020 sichtenlose und unerbittliche Durchsetzung von Machtansprüchen

021 herauszulesen verstünde, – ein Interpret, der die Ausnahms-

022 losigkeit und Unbedingtheit in allem „Willen zur Macht“ der-

023 maassen euch vor Augen stellte, dass fast jedes Wort und selbst

024 das Wort „Tyrannei“ schliesslich unbrauchbar oder schon als

025 schwächende und mildernde Metapher – als zu menschlich – er-

026 schiene; und der dennoch damit endete, das Gleiche von dieser

027 Welt zu behaupten, was ihr behauptet, nämlich dass sie einen

028 „nothwendigen“ und „berechenbaren“ Verlauf habe, aber

029 nicht, weil Gesetze in ihr herrschen, sondern weil absolut die

030 Gesetze fehlen, und jede Macht in jedem Augenblicke ihre

031 letzte Consequenz zieht. Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur Interpreta-

032 tion ist – und ihr werdet eifrig genug sein, dies einzuwenden?

033 – nun, um so besser. –

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist from the mischief of putting his

finger on bad modes of interpretation, but "Nature's conformity to law," of which you physicists

talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad "philology."


5

It is no matter of fact, no "text," but rather just a naively humanitarian adjustment and

perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to the democratic instincts

of the modern soul! "Everywhere equality before the law—Nature is not different in that

respect, nor better than we": a fine instance of secret motive, in which the vulgar antagonism to

everything privileged and autocratic—likewise a second and more refined atheism—is once

more disguised. "Ni dieu, ni maitre"—that, also, is what you want; and therefore "Cheers for

natural law!"—is it not so? But, as has been said, that is interpretation, not text; and somebody

might come along, who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of

the same "Nature," and with regard to the same phenomena, just the tyrannically inconsiderate

and relentless enforcement of the claims of power—an interpreter who should so place the

unexceptionalness and unconditionalness of all "Will to Power" before your eyes, that almost

every word, and the word "tyranny" itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or like a

weakening and softening metaphor—as being too human; and who should, nevertheless, end by

asserting the same about this world as you do, namely, that it has a "necessary" and "calculable"

course, NOT, however, because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely LACKING, and

every power effects its ultimate consequences every moment. Granted that this also is only

interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the

better. —

JGB 211

6

JGB 211

GERMAN TEXT


009 Ich bestehe darauf, dass man endlich aufhöre, die philoso-

010 phischen Arbeiter und überhaupt die wissenschaftlichen Menschen

011 mit den Philosophen zu verwechseln, – dass man gerade hier

012 mit Strenge „Jedem das Seine“ und Jenen nicht zu Viel, Diesen

013 nicht viel zu Wenig gebe. Es mag zur Erziehung des wirklichen

014 Philosophen nöthig sein, dass er selbst auch auf allen diesen Stufen

015 einmal gestanden hat, auf welchen seine Diener, die wissenschaft-

016 lichen Arbeiter der Philosophie, stehen bleiben, – stehen bleiben

017 müssen; er muss selbst vielleicht Kritiker und Skeptiker und

018 Dogmatiker und Historiker und überdies Dichter und Sammler

019 und Reisender und Räthselrather und Moralist und Seher und

020 „freier Geist“ und beinahe Alles gewesen sein, um den Umkreis

021 menschlicher Werthe und Werth-Gefühle zu durchlaufen und mit

022 vielerlei Augen und Gewissen, von der Höhe in jede Ferne, von

023 der Tiefe in jede Höhe, von der Ecke in jede Weite, blicken zu

024 können. Aber dies Alles sind nur Vorbedingungen seiner Auf-

025 gabe: diese Aufgabe selbst will etwas Anderes, – sie verlangt,

026 dass er Werthe schaffe. Jene philosophischen Arbeiter

027 nach dem edlen Muster Kant’s und Hegel’s haben irgend einen

028 grossen Thatbestand von Werthschätzungen – das heisst ehe-

029 maliger Werth setzungen, Werthschöpfungen, welche herr-

030 schend geworden sind und eine Zeit lang „Wahrheiten“ genannt

031 werden – festzustellen und in Formeln zu drängen, sei es im

032 Reiche des Logischen oder des Politischen (Moralischen)

Page Break id='JGB' KGW='VI-2.149' KSA='5.145'

001 oder des Künstlerischen. Diesen Forschern liegt es ob, [*10]

002 alles bisher Geschehene und Geschätzte übersichtlich, überdenk-

003 bar, fasslich, handlich zu machen, alles Lange, ja „die Zeit“

004 selbst, abzukürzen und die ganze Vergangenheit zu überwäl-

005 tigen: eine ungeheure und wundervolle Aufgabe, in deren

006 Dienst sich sicherlich jeder feine Stolz, jeder zähe Wille befriedi-

007 gen kann. Die eigentlichen Philosophen aber

008 sind Befehlende und Gesetzgeber: sie sagen „so

009 soll es sein!“, sie bestimmen erst das Wohin? und Wozu? des

010 Menschen und verfügen dabei über die Vorarbeit aller philoso-

011 phischen Arbeiter, aller Überwältiger der Vergangenheit, – sie

012 greifen mit schöpferischer Hand nach der Zukunft, und Alles,

013 was ist und war, wird ihnen dabei zum Mittel, zum Werkzeug,

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014 zum Hammer. Ihr „Erkennen“ ist Schaffen, ihr Schaffen

015 ist eine Gesetzgebung, ihr Wille zur Wahrheit ist – Wille

016 zur Macht. – Giebt es heute solche Philosophen? Gab es

017 schon solche Philosophen? Muss es nicht solche Philosophen

018 geben? ...

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

I insist upon it that people finally cease confounding philosophical workers, and in general

scientific men, with philosophers—that precisely here one should strictly give "each his own,"

and not give those far too much, these far too little. It may be necessary for the education of the

real philosopher that he himself should have once stood upon all those steps upon which his

servants, the scientific workers of philosophy, remain standing, and MUST remain standing he

himself must perhaps have been critic, and dogmatist, and historian, and besides, poet, and

collector, and traveler, and riddle-reader, and moralist, and seer, and "free spirit," and almost

everything, in order to traverse the whole range of human values and estimations, and that he

may BE ABLE with a variety of eyes and consciences to look from a height to any distance, from a

depth up to any height, from a nook into any expanse. But all these are only preliminary

conditions for his task; this task itself demands something else—it requires him TO CREATE

VALUES. The philosophical workers, after the excellent pattern of Kant and Hegel, have to fix and

formalize some great existing body of valuations—that is to say, former DETERMINATIONS OF

VALUE, creations of value, which have become prevalent, and are for a time called "truths"—

whether in the domain of the LOGICAL, the POLITICAL (moral), or the ARTISTIC. It is for these

investigators to make whatever has happened and been esteemed hitherto, conspicuous,

conceivable, intelligible, and manageable, to shorten everything long, even "time" itself, and to

SUBJUGATE the entire past: an immense and wonderful task, in the carrying out of which all

refined pride, all tenacious will, can surely find satisfaction. THE REAL PHILOSOPHERS,

HOWEVER, ARE COMMANDERS AND LAW-GIVERS; they say: "Thus SHALL it be!" They determine

first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby set aside the previous labour of all

philosophical workers, and all subjugators of the past—they grasp at the future with a creative

hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument, and a

hammer. Their "knowing" is CREATING, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is—WILL

TO POWER.—Are there at present such philosophers? Have there ever been such philosophers?

MUST there not be such philosophers some day? ...

JGB 212

8

JGB 212

GERMAN TEXT


020 Es will mir immer mehr so scheinen, dass der Philosoph als

021 ein nothwendiger Mensch des Morgens und Übermorgens

022 sich jederzeit mit seinem Heute in Widerspruch befunden hat

023 und befinden musste: sein Feind war jedes Mal das Ideal

024 von Heute. Bisher haben alle diese ausserordentlichen Förderer

025 des Menschen, welche man Philosophen nennt, und die sich selbst

026 selten als Freunde der Weisheit, sondern eher als unangenehme

027 Narren und gefährliche Fragezeichen fühlten –, ihre Aufgabe,

028 ihre harte, ungewollte, unabweisliche Aufgabe, endlich aber die

029 Grösse ihrer Aufgabe darin gefunden, das böse Gewissen ihrer

030 Zeit zu sein. Indem sie gerade den Tugenden der Zeit

031 das Messer vivisektorisch auf die Brust setzten, verriethen sie,

032 was ihr eignes Geheimniss war: um eine neue Grösse des


001 Menschen zu wissen, um einen neuen ungegangenen Weg zu sei-

002 ner Vergrösserung. Jedes Mal deckten sie auf, wie viel Heuche-

003 lei, Bequemlichkeit, Sich-gehen-lassen und Sich-fallen lassen, wie

004 viel Lüge unter dem bestgeehrten Typus ihrer zeitgenössischen

005 Moralität versteckt, wie viel Tugend überlebt sei; jedes

006 Mal sagten sie: „wir müssen dorthin, dorthinaus, wo ihr

007 heute am wenigsten zu Hause seid.“ Angesichts einer Welt der

008 „modernen Ideen“, welche Jedermann in eine Ecke und „Spe-

009 zialität“ bannen möchte, würde ein Philosoph, falls es heute

010 Philosophen geben könnte, gezwungen sein, die Grösse des

011 Menschen, den Begriff „Grösse“ gerade in seine Umfänglichkeit

012 und Vielfältigkeit, in seine Ganzheit im Vielen zu setzen: er

013 würde sogar den Werth und Rang darnach bestimmen, wie viel

014 und vielerlei Einer tragen und auf sich nehmen, wie weit

015 Einer seine Verantwortlichkeit spannen könnte. Heute schwächt

016 und verdünnt der Zeitgeschmack und die Zeittugend den Wil-

017 len, Nichts ist so sehr zeitgemäss als Willensschwäche: also

018 muss, im Ideale des Philosophen, gerade Stärke des Willens,

019 Härte und Fähigkeit zu langen Entschliessungen in den Begriff

020 „Grösse“ hineingehören; mit so gutem Rechte als die umgekehrte

021 Lehre und das Ideal einer blöden entsagenden demüthigen selbst-

022 losen Menschlichkeit einem umgekehrten Zeitalter angemessen

023 war, einem solchen, das gleich dem sechszehnten Jahrhundert an

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024 seiner aufgestauten Energie des Willens und den wildesten Wäs-

025 sern und Sturmfluthen der Selbstsucht litt. Zur Zeit des Sokrates,

026 unter lauter Menschen des ermüdeten Instinktes, unter conser-

027 vativen Altathenern, welche sich gehen liessen – „zum Glück“,

028 wie sie sagten, zum Vergnügen, wie sie thaten – und die dabei

029 immer noch die alten prunkvollen Worte in den Mund nahmen,

030 auf die ihnen ihr Leben längst kein Recht mehr gab, war viel-

031 leicht Ironie zur Grösse der Seele nöthig, jene sokratische

032 boshafte Sicherheit des alten Arztes und Pöbelmanns, welcher

033 schonungslos in’s eigne Fleisch schnitt, wie in’s Fleisch und Herz

034 des „Vornehmen“, mit einem Blick, welcher verständlich genug


001 sprach: „verstellt euch vor mir nicht! Hier – sind wir gleich!“

002 Heute umgekehrt, wo in Europa das Heerdenthier allein zu

003 Ehren kommt und Ehren vertheilt, wo die „Gleichheit der

004 Rechte“ allzuleicht sich in die Gleichheit im Unrechte umwan-

005 deln könnte: ich will sagen in gemeinsame Bekriegung alles Sel-

006 tenen, Fremden, Bevorrechtigten, des höheren Menschen, der

007 höheren Seele, der höheren Pflicht, der höheren Verantwortlich-

008 keit, der schöpferischen Machtfülle und Herrschaftlichkeit –

009 heute gehört das Vornehm-sein, das Für-sich-sein-wollen, das

010 Anders-sein-können, das Allein-stehn und auf-eigne-Faust-

011 leben-müssen zum Begriff „Grösse“; und der Philosoph wird

012 Etwas von seinem eignen Ideal verrathen, wenn er aufstellt:

013 „der soll der Grösste sein, der der Einsamste sein kann, der Ver-

014 borgenste, der Abweichendste, der Mensch jenseits von Gut und

015 Böse, der Herr seiner Tugenden, der Überreiche des Willens; dies

016 eben soll Grösse heissen: ebenso vielfach als ganz, ebenso

017 weit als voll sein können.“ Und nochmals gefragt: ist heute – [*11]

018 Grösse möglich?

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

It is always more obvious to me that the philosopher, as a man INDISPENSABLE for the morrow

and the day after the morrow, has ever found himself, and HAS BEEN OBLIGED to find himself, in

contradiction to the day in which he lives; his enemy has always been the ideal of his day.

Hitherto all those extraordinary furtherers of humanity whom one calls philosophers—who

rarely regarded themselves as lovers of wisdom, but rather as disagreeable fools and dangerous

interrogators—have found their mission, their hard, involuntary, imperative mission (in the end,

however, the greatness of their mission), in being the bad conscience of their age. In putting the

vivisector's knife to the breast of the very VIRTUES OF THEIR AGE, they have betrayed their own

secret; it has been for the sake of a NEW greatness of man, a new untrodden path to his


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JGB 212

10

aggrandizement. They have always disclosed how much hypocrisy, indolence, self-indulgence,

and self-neglect, how much falsehood was concealed under the most venerated types of

contemporary morality, how much virtue was OUTLIVED, they have always said "We must

remove hence to where YOU are least at home" In the face of a world of "modern ideas," which

would like to confine every one in a corner, in a "specialty," a philosopher, if there could be

philosophers nowadays, would be compelled to place the greatness of man, the conception of

"greatness," precisely in his comprehensiveness and multifariousness, in his all-roundness, he

would even determine worth and rank according to the amount and variety of that which a man

could bear and take upon himself, according to the EXTENT to which a man could stretch his

responsibility Nowadays the taste and virtue of the age weaken and attenuate the will, nothing

is so adapted to the spirit of the age as weakness of will consequently, in the ideal of the

philosopher, strength of will, sternness, and capacity for prolonged resolution, must specially be

included in the conception of "greatness", with as good a right as the opposite doctrine, with its

ideal of a silly, renouncing, humble, selfless humanity, was suited to an opposite age—such as

the sixteenth century, which suffered from its accumulated energy of will, and from the wildest

torrents and floods of selfishness In the time of Socrates, among men only of worn-out instincts,

old conservative Athenians who let themselves go—"for the sake of happiness," as they said, for

the sake of pleasure, as their conduct indicated—and who had continually on their lips the old

pompous words to which they had long forfeited the right by the life they led, IRONY was

perhaps necessary for greatness of soul, the wicked Socratic assurance of the old physician and

plebeian, who cut ruthlessly into his own flesh, as into the flesh and heart of the "noble," with a

look that said plainly enough "Do not dissemble before me! here—we are equal!" At present, on

the contrary, when throughout Europe the herding-animal alone attains to honours, and

dispenses honours, when "equality of right" can too readily be transformed into equality in

wrong—I mean to say into general war against everything rare, strange, and privileged, against

the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, the creative

plenipotence and lordliness—at present it belongs to the conception of "greatness" to be noble,

to wish to be apart, to be capable of being different, to stand alone, to have to live by personal

initiative, and the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he asserts "He shall

be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man

beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, and of super-abundance of will; precisely this

shall be called GREATNESS: as diversified as can be entire, as ample as can be full." And to ask

once more the question: Is greatness POSSIBLE—nowadays?


11

JGB 213

GERMAN TEXT


020 Was ein Philosoph ist, das ist deshalb schlecht zu lernen,

021 weil es nicht zu lehren ist: man muss es „wissen“, aus Erfah-

022 rung, – oder man soll den Stolz haben, es nicht zu wissen.

023 Dass aber heutzutage alle Welt von Dingen redet, in Bezug auf

024 welche sie keine Erfahrung haben kann, gilt am meisten und

025 schlimmsten vom Philosophen und den philosophischen Zustän-

026 den: – die Wenigsten kennen sie, dürfen sie kennen, und alle po-

027 pulären Meinungen über sie sind falsch. So ist zum Beispiel jenes

028 ächt philosophische Beieinander einer kühnen ausgelassenen

029 Geistigkeit, welche presto läuft, und einer dialektischen Strenge

030 und Nothwendigkeit, die keinen Fehltritt thut, den meisten

031 Denkern und Gelehrten von ihrer Erfahrung her unbekannt

032 und darum, falls Jemand davon vor ihnen reden wollte, un-


001 glaubwürdig. Sie stellen sich jede Nothwendigkeit als Noth, als

002 peinliches Folgen-müssen und Gezwungen-werden vor; und das

003 Denken selbst gilt ihnen als etwas Langsames, Zögerndes, bei-

004 nahe als eine Mühsal und oft genug als „des Schweisses

005 der Edlen werth“ – aber ganz und gar nicht als etwas Leichtes,

006 Göttliches und dem Tanze, dem Übermuthe, Nächst-Ver-

007 wandtes! „Denken“ und eine Sache „ernst nehmen“, „schwer

008 nehmen“ – das gehört bei ihnen zu einander: so allein haben

009 sie es „erlebt“ –. Die Künstler mögen hier schon eine feinere

010 Witterung haben: sie, die nur zu gut wissen, dass gerade dann,

011 wo sie Nichts mehr „willkürlich“ und Alles nothwendig ma-

012 chen, ihr Gefühl von Freiheit, Feinheit, Vollmacht, von schöpfe-

013 rischem Setzen, Verfügen, Gestalten auf seine Höhe kommt, –

014 kurz, dass Nothwendigkeit und „Freiheit des Willens“ dann bei

015 ihnen Eins sind. Es giebt zuletzt eine Rangordnung seelischer

016 Zustände, welcher die Rangordnung der Probleme gemäss ist;

017 und die höchsten Probleme stossen ohne Gnade Jeden zurück,

018 der ihnen zu nahen wagt, ohne durch Höhe und Macht seiner

019 Geistigkeit zu ihrer Lösung vorherbestimmt zu sein. Was hilft

020 es, wenn gelenkige Allerwelts-Köpfe oder ungelenke brave Me-

021 chaniker und Empiriker sich, wie es heute so vielfach geschieht,

022 mit ihrem Plebejer-Ehrgeize in ihre Nähe und gleichsam an die-

023 sen „Hof der Höfe“ drängen! Aber auf solche Teppiche dür-

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024 fen grobe Füsse nimmermehr treten: dafür ist im Urgesetz der

025 Dinge schon gesorgt; die Thüren bleiben diesen Zudringlichen

026 geschlossen, mögen sie sich auch die Köpfe daran stossen und

027 zerstossen! Für jede hohe Welt muss man geboren sein; deut-

028 licher gesagt, man muss für sie gezüchtet sein: ein Recht

029 auf Philosophie – das Wort im grossen Sinne genommen – hat

030 man nur Dank seiner Abkunft, die Vorfahren, das „Geblüt“

031 entscheidet auch hier. Viele Geschlechter müssen der Entstehung

032 des Philosophen vorgearbeitet haben; jede seiner Tugenden muss

033 einzeln erworben, gepflegt, fortgeerbt, einverleibt worden sein,

034 und nicht nur der kühne leichte zarte Gang und Lauf seiner


001 Gedanken, sondern vor Allem die Bereitwilligkeit zu grossen

002 Verantwortungen, die Hoheit herrschender Blicke und Nieder-

003 blicke, das Sich-Abgetrennt-Fühlen von der Menge und ihren

004 Pflichten und Tugenden, das leutselige Beschützen und Verthei-

005 digen dessen, was missverstanden und verleumdet wird, sei es

006 Gott, sei es Teufel, die Lust und Übung in der grossen Gerechtig-

007 keit, die Kunst des Befehlens, die Weite des Willens, das lang-

008 same Auge, welches selten bewundert, selten hinauf blickt, sel-

009 ten liebt ...

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

It is difficult to learn what a philosopher is, because it cannot be taught: one must "know" it by

experience—or one should have the pride NOT to know it. The fact that at present people all

talk of things of which they CANNOT have any experience, is true more especially and

unfortunately as concerns the philosopher and philosophical matters:—the very few know them,

are permitted to know them, and all popular ideas about them are false. Thus, for instance, the

truly philosophical combination of a bold, exuberant spirituality which runs at presto pace, and a

dialectic rigour and necessity which makes no false step, is unknown to most thinkers and

scholars from their own experience, and therefore, should any one speak of it in their presence,

it is incredible to them. They conceive of every necessity as troublesome, as a painful

compulsory obedience and state of constraint; thinking itself is regarded by them as something

slow and hesitating, almost as a trouble, and often enough as "worthy of the SWEAT of the

noble"—but not at all as something easy and divine, closely related to dancing and exuberance!

"To think" and to take a matter "seriously," "arduously"—that is one and the same thing to

them; such only has been their "experience."—Artists have here perhaps a finer intuition; they

who know only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything "arbitrarily," and

everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, of subtlety, of power, of creatively fixing,

disposing, and shaping, reaches its climax—in short, that necessity and "freedom of will" are

then the same thing with them. There is, in fine, a gradation of rank in psychical states, to which


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the gradation of rank in the problems corresponds; and the highest problems repel ruthlessly

every one who ventures too near them, without being predestined for their solution by the

loftiness and power of his spirituality. Of what use is it for nimble, everyday intellects, or clumsy,

honest mechanics and empiricists to press, in their plebeian ambition, close to such problems,

and as it were into this "holy of holies"—as so often happens nowadays! But coarse feet must

never tread upon such carpets: this is provided for in the primary law of things; the doors remain

closed to those intruders, though they may dash and break their heads thereon. People have

always to be born to a high station, or, more definitely, they have to be BRED for it: a person has

only a right to philosophy—taking the word in its higher significance—in virtue of his descent;

the ancestors, the "blood," decide here also. Many generations must have prepared the way for

the coming of the philosopher; each of his virtues must have been separately acquired,

nurtured, transmitted, and embodied; not only the bold, easy, delicate course and current of his

thoughts, but above all the readiness for great responsibilities, the majesty of ruling glance and

contemning look, the feeling of separation from the multitude with their duties and virtues, the

kindly patronage and defense of whatever is misunderstood and calumniated, be it God or devil,

the delight and practice of supreme justice, the art of commanding, the amplitude of will, the

lingering eye which rarely admires, rarely looks up, rarely loves....

The status of laws of nature in Nietzsche's thought. On the relation between philosophy and science

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Transcript of The status of laws of nature in Nietzsche's thought. On the relation between philosophy and science