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Abstentionism, Blank Vote and Invalid Ballot Papers

Evidences from Brazil and E.U.

Adriano Gianturco Gulisano*

Isadora Brasileiro Darwich**

* Adriano Gianturco Gulisano is Professor of Political Science at IBMEC University, Belo

Horizonte, Brazil. He is PhD in Political and Economic Theory at University of Genova, Italy.

Address: Rua Rio Grande do Norte 300, Belo Horizonte, 30130130, Brazil. He published

scientific articles on Abstentionism, on Bruno Leoni and on Israel Kirzner. He is author of the

book "L´imprenditorialitá di Israel Kirzner", Rubbettino, 2012.

+55(31) 3247 5768; Fax +55(31) 3247 5777

adriano.gianturco@gmail.com

** Isadora Brasileiro Darwich is graduating in International Relations at IBMEC University, Belo

Horizonte, Brazil.

Address: Rua Rio Grande do Norte 300, Belo Horizonte, 30130130, Brazil.

+55(31) 3247 5757; Fax +55(31) 3247 5777

isadarwich@gmail.com

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Abstract

Abstentionism, blank vote and invalid ballots are electoral phenomena that are statistically

growing in many Countries but don´t receive much attention and when they do, they are usually

treated with a strong negative bias. This article explore this issue and it is divided in three part:

In the first part we analyze how the literature currently defines and treats abstentionism, blank

vote and invalid ballot. We find out they are usually treated as a single and unique “non-vote

area” and we propose a different approach based in a more detailed view, combining

methodological individualism and imperfect rationality. In the second part we show the empirical

relevance of this three types of electoral outcomes in EU parliamentary elections and in

Brazilian presidential ones. In the last part, we notice a negative bias toward these electoral

behaviors to which we oppose a different point of view. In this line, at the end, we propose some

possible changes in electoral systems in order to better intercept voters will.

Keywords: Abstentionism; Blank Vote; Invalid Ballot Papers; None of the above, Brazilian

election; European Election.

JEL Z00

What if a large amount of people, let's say 15-40% of people, did not show up to sign the

Social Contract? Well, that is what usually happens in general elections all around the

democratic world. In many Countries, voting is compulsory and even in this case, abstentionism,

blank vote and invalid ballot papers are common. Many authors affirm abstentionism should be

fought. In any way, all around the world, the large amount of abstentionism, blank vote and

invalid ballot papers is simply ignored. Elections are still considered valid and all this area is not

represented. In the scientific literature, three different types of electoral behaviour are putted all

together in the set called “non vote area” or “unexpressed vote”. For a better understanding of

the subject it is useful to have the concept of all three variables well-defined. Abstentionism is

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usually perceived and shown as an exception. Not only and not limited to a statistical exception,

since usually in West, most people go to vote; but more in a logical level, rising the idea that

voting is natural, that people anthropologically tend to be interested in politics and voting,

imagining a sort of homo electoralis. From this point of view, abstentionism seems to appear as

a logical exception1. It is the “mystic of participation” (Ferrarotti 1989, pp, XX), that sees

electoral abstentionism as “alienation”, "disaffection”, “apathy”, “pure abstentionist” (Tuorto

2006, p. 62), “abstentionism by detachment" (Tuorto 2006, p. 106), “abnormal behavior” (Tuorto

2006, p. 65), “electoral pathology”, “go” towards the private and so on.

Moreover, from a logical point of view, another undiscussed hypothesis is that people

are self-oriented, interested in their business, and only after having solved more personal

issues, would turn their attention to the public sphere and in a third stage towards the political

one. In this mindset, electoral participation is a countercurrent force that needs some incentive

to put down roots. This other perspective also helps answering the central “voting paradox”:

why do some people vote even if based on a cost\benefit analysis they shouldn't? The decision

to, and the act of voting is a particularly aspect of the general law of human action. A sort of

syllogism between action-decision-preference. Every action always implies a previous decision,

a choice, at least between performing the action or not; we choose as a result of preferring an

alternative to another. Therefore every time we act in a certain way it is because we rather

doing that than doing something else.

Abstentionism has been studied through distinctive perspectives and diverse schools of

thought: the functionalist theory of “social integration”; the “socio-determined voter” view (with

some internal differentiation: model of resource, mobilization, social capital and party

identification); and by the Individual Rationality theory, with the Rational Choice and the

Cognitive Mobilization.

The Functionalist paradigm of Gosnell, Merriam and Lipset, started with the “Michigan

model” where the “dependent voter” was determined by external information, society, family,

socio-cultural aspects. In the 70's this strong matrix was attenuated and the dependent voter

became the “responsive voter”2. It remains the vision of abstentionism as “constant in time and

rarely modifiable, depending on a choice that, even if voluntary, can be considered passive - to

use a terminology proposed by Jean Blondel (1981) - since it refers to objective conditions of

1 Authors generally speak of abstentionism for “alienation” or for “apathy”. Abstentionism for a simple not

interest is never considered. 2 See Pomper G. M., 1975; and Nie N.H., Verba S., Petrocik J.R., 1976.

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the citizen and not to subjective choices, actively performed”3. In this perspective, abstentionism

is not an intentional action but a rebound effect of external causes, it is depoliticized and

liquidated as consequence of imperfect political socialization and\or of cross pressure

processes. The Rational Choice approach to this issue is usually splitted in two lines. The

mainstream view is the “instrumental” one, that sees voting as the revelation of the preference

on all different possible electoral outcomes, similarly to market choices. The second view is the

“expressivism”, that sees the act of voting as an expression of identification and as the support

of a certain party/candidate, the same way one supports a football team4. But epistemologically

this divergence seems actually groundless. It seems that instrumentalism sees individuals as

perfectly rational human beings that make a cost\benefit analysis (CBA) on a hypothetical

expected utility. Behind this interpretation are implied the ideas of perfect information; perfect or

strong rationality; a materialistic concept of CBA and utility.

Actually Anthony Downs holds that “every rational individual decides voting in the same

way he decides about other issues: if benefits overcome costs, he will vote, otherwise he will

abstain” (1988, p. 260). As Schuessler has correctly noted, Downs himself notes that “voters´

choices of political candidates could be motivated by factors other than the desire to determine

the outcome of an election. Downs was exceptionally careful to stress that such alternative

motivations were not inherently 'irrational' [...]” The very act of voting could serve purposes other

than to elect a preferred candidate, and these included the voter´s desire to express his or her

political preference5. It seems that the expressivism current supports that people decide to vote,

not only based in a CBA, but also to manifest and express something, for identifying themselves

with an ideology and/or a party, for a sense of duty, for a sense of belonging to a community, to

appear to be good citizens, to support the democratic procedures6. According to this

perspective, those reasons (to vote) are immaterial and not related to the economic logic of

utility, benefit and profit. The expressivism current is more appreciated among the non-Rational

Choice community because by itself it does not imply a view of strong rationality and

furthermore because it carries a more enchanted vision, a broader consensus on electoral

democratic process, in addition to an acceptance of civic values.

As a matter of fact, from an epistemological (and not psychological) point of view, there

is no difference between voting to support a candidate, to approve a bill, or on the pretext to be

a virtuous citizen. In the act of voting, as in every other action, there is always a reason and a

3 Fruncillo D., 2004, p. 91.

4 Brennan G. and Hamlin A., 1998.

5 Schuessler A., 2000, p. 87.

6 Riker and Ordeshook (1968), get a bit close to utilitarianism and psychologism.

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goal. The act of voting, the choice to vote or not, and what/whom to vote is domain of the

psychology and not social science. Motives as ideological identity, strategy, expected utility,

sense of duty etc. are just subjective reasons, all incomparable among them, since they are

qualitative and cannot be judged scientifically7. If it is an instrumental or an expressive vote, and

if the goal is material or immaterial it is all irrelevant for social sciences. The risk involved is an

epistemological sterile and fragile psychologism that does not refers to the sciences of the “man

who lives in society”8. Once the probability that an individual affects the electoral outcome is

extremely low, it seems that voting is irrational, but the paradox of voting shows that still many

people do it. Actually there is no paradox at all. It is the confusion between perfect-strong-

objective and limited-subjective rationality. The Austrian School already solved this dilemma

showing that perceptions are always subjective, information is always imperfect and despite

that, individuals immersed in this structure choose to (and how to) act. The concept of rationality

does not apply to subjective ends, but on the means used to try to reach personal and different

goals.

Another rational choice hypothesis is the one elaborated by Ferejohn and Fiorina about

the so called "regret calculation". For these authors there are two kinds of voters: “maximizers of

expected utility” the ones who decide “under risk” and “minimax regret decision makers” that

decide “under uncertainty” and calculating possible regrets in a min-max scheme. Maximizers

go vote only calculating the probability that their vote can influence the result, while minimizers

decide intending not having future regrets over the possibility of the defeat of their favorite

candidate for a single vote, their own. This simple logical possibility, even if is unlikely to

happen, statistically speaking, is enough to persuade them to vote. Like the Pascal's wager

model, where the probability is low, but the individual cost of acting is small and the possible

gain is very big. Actually the two hypotheses (maximizers and minimizers voters) are not

different and there is no difference between them and others Rational Choice perspectives.

They both follow the CBA model or more precisely the subjective system of preferences.

Also Whiteley and Seyd (1996, 2002) aim to reformulate the rational choice theory in a

softer version, maintaining that individuals vote because they are influenced by “general

incentives” that comes from the participation itself: individual incentives (similar to the “direct

utility” theorized by Riker and Ordeshook), group incentives, systemic incentives and expressive

incentives. There is nothing new here if we consider the Methodological Individualism that

7 F. Hayek (1997) affirms “outside of private sphere, good and evil have no sense”. See also B. Leoni,

(1957), now in Leoni B., 1997. 8 With this definition, Leoni (1952) distinguishes between social but not human sciences (like ethology)

and human but not social ones (like psychology), now in Leoni B., 1997.

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always considers individuals as the only agent yet always imbued in in social interactions.

Furthermore, following Lipset (1960) and Burnham (1980) we can consider the “satisfied

abstentionist” who tacitly agree with the status quo, and stop reading the phenomenon in a

problematic way. In this sense, abstentionism can be seen as consensus, a sort of electoral

silent consent9. From this point of view we can read differently the systematic higher

abstentionism of United States of America (compared to the old continent). In a system where

government is less pervasive, subtracts, and forces to redistribute less resources, it is

understandable that people have less incentives to vote, or that they perceive a need to vote.

Where the life depends less on state intervention, it is likely that less people shall vote. In this

case, it is not a protest, nor alienation, nor apathy, since people don't go to private, they stay in

the private sphere, they don't stay far away from politics, it is politics that stay far apart from

them. Participation is correlated with dependence from the government10.

After this necessary general framework, we can analyze abstentionism in the narrow

sense. Causes and correlations are many and quite often are misunderstood11. Someone

cannot and someone don´t want to vote. The “forced abstentionism” is described as the

situation in which someone cannot vote due to illness, transport restriction and so on, but none

specify that restrictions are a normal feature of life and that, in this case, coercion is not

exercised by others. Even this kind of abstentionism should be included in the normal category

of those people who, after all, decide not to vote. It is also true that part of abstentionism is

apathy and part is protest. Usually abstentionism is included in the category of “non vote”,

together with blank vote, and invalid ballot papers. Actually these three phenomena are very

different. Let's analyze them.

1. Invalid ballot papers and blank votes: “non-vote” or vote no?

Voters can cast an invalid ballot papers intentionally or not. We do not consider the

second possibility since it is not conscious, since there is not a political intention and it has little

statistical relevance. The intentional invalid ballot paper is a vote, it is an intentional and action

active, it is loaded in the ballot box, it has an aim. It definitely cannot be considered a “non

vote”, it is a vote no. Sometimes called “unexpressed vote”, despite been well expressed, it has

9 But both authors use this theory to affirm that, basically, abstentionism lacks an element of protest and

that it is a physiological and residual phenomenon. 10

Crozier M.J., Hungtinghton S., Watanuki J., 1975 show how high political participation can also create

some problems as shown by the “overload theory”. See also Di Palma G., 1970. 11

Rosenstone S.J., 1982, sees a positive correlation between abstentionism and economic crises.

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a declared intention sent to the addressee. It is an intentional and disclosed vote, with a specific

purpose, that is not considered by politics and its legal code. Indeed invalid ballot papers and

blank vote have an expressive value stronger than abstentionism since the individual entitled to

vote decide to be a voter, he goes to the polls bearing its costs, to send a message.

Distinguishing between the two kinds of invalid ballot papers (intentional or not) it´s not

easy, but it doesn't justify any conceptual compression. Even because the challenge depends

only on the means used to calculate and categorize the votes, as established by the legislation.

Actually, it would be very simple organizing two different statistical categories. Such a clear

distinction would be useful for epistemological and scientific purposes and to send clear signals

to the political authority. Blank votes are not “active abstentionism”12, simply because they are

not abstentionism at all. Therefore it is self-evident that blank votes are to be included in the

vote no category.

At this point it is important to analyze some empirical data.

2. Outlook of the elections for the Parliament of the European Union

In this kind of election abstention rate is very high. In the four past elections the number

of voters is less than 50%. The trend is continuous and clear since 1979. There are no

exceptions nor oscillations, not even with the admission of new member states.

In particular, there has been a big gap between the 1994 and the 1999 elections, when voters

diminished of 7,16 percentage points, with for the first time, a total of less than 50% of voters.

The trend continues in successive elections even if it was expected a stronger enthusiasm from

new Members Countries.

During the last elections of may 2014 we still notice a decrease in the number of

participants, but is not very significant reduction, from 43.1% to 42.54%. Possibly the major

campaign sponsored by the European Commission (EC) in 2013 stressing the importance and

relevance of the vote of each European citizen, had an influence on this result. The EC had a

clear goal of increasing voter participation. This has been done through the dissemination of

electoral platforms, showing the affiliation of European parties with national ones (in an attempt

to bring private interests to the Community level), as well as the involvement of groups that have

12

Schepis G., “Analisi statistica dei risultati”, in Spreafico A., La Palombara J., (acura di ) Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia, Edizioni di comunitá, 1963.

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lower voter turnout, such as young people13.

Another relevant aspect regarding the attendance to the polls is the compulsory vote

system, possibly this causes distortions in the real numbers of abstention. Currently 31

countries in the world adopt this system, in the European Union (EU) the members that have or

use to have a compulsory system14 are: Belgium since 1919 (for men and since 1949 for

women), Cyprus since 1960, in France it was introduced in 1950' or 60' nowadays remains only

for the Senate, Greece has abolished it fully in 2000 and it was used since 1926, Italy used it

from 1945 to 1993 only, Luxembourg still adopts this system, Spain practiced it from 1907 to

1923 and finally Schaffhausen one of Switzerland's cantons still endorse (since 1904) it while all

others have practiced the compulsory voting from 1904 to 197415.

Graphic n° 1 Voters at the European Union Parliament elections

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Pammet J. H. and Leduc L., The nature of European electorate: who votes and who doesn´t,

http://carleton.ca/ces/wp-content/uploads/Nature-of-European-Electorate-Pammett-Leduc.pdf

14 FRANK, E. (2005, 4 July). Compulsory voting around the world. The Guardian. Avaliable at:

<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/04/voterapathy.uk>. Access in 30th october 2014. 15

Compulsory Voting. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Avaliable at: <http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm> . Access in 30th October, 2014.

9

Source: TNS opinion in collaboration with PE

3. Presidential Elections in Brazil

Brazil is a recent democracy of major proportions legally divided as a federation, yet the

power is de facto quite centralized. Presidential elections are an extremely relevant event.

We've analyzed elections between 1998 and 2014. Voting is compulsory for brazilians citizens,

and facultative for those under 18 and over 16, over 70 or illiterate16. Likely, if people were not

force to vote, there would be different effects on abstentionism, blank vote and invalid ballot.

Abstentionism, blank vote and invalid ballot suffered reductions until 2006, but lately, in

the past (2010) and present (2014) elections, the phenomena started growing, as it is displayed

in the chart below.

16

B.R. Const. art. 14 § 1º, cl. 1 and 2

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Graphic n° 2 Abstentionism, invalid ballot papers and blank votes at the Brazilian

presidential elections 1st round

Source: TSE - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Superior Electoral Court of Brazil).

It should also be noticed that the percentage of abstentionism increases from the 1st to

the 2nd round, as blank votes and invalid ballot papers reduces. This could occur due to the fact

that electors whose favorite candidate is no longer running, feel less motivated to attend the

polls what elevates the rate of abstentionism, meanwhile those who decide to attend, 1) believe

their vote could mean more (once there are less candidates running for the position) and

calculate that rather than voting no (blank or invalidating the ballot) would better to choose the

least worst candidate; 2) have now less chance to err and to cast an invalid ballot

unintentionally.

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Graphic n° 3 Abstentionism, invalid ballot papers and blank votes at the Brazilian

presidential elections 2nd round.

Source: TSE - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Superior Electoral Court of Brazil).

The voting system is electronic and at the moment of casting the vote the elector that

wants to vote blank, has the option of pressing a blank button, and this support the idea, that

who casts a blank vote (as much as an intentional invalid ballot paper) is actively voting no.

4. Negative and positive biases

According to a research conducted by the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE) "voter

abstention (non-attendance to the polls) causes financial losses to the Country", considering

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the expenses for holding the first and second round in the 2010 elections17. This statement is a

fallacy for various logical and self-evident reasons. First, if someone forces you to finance an

event (ie. the elections), you pay but you don´t go, don´t go participate, don´t legitimate, how

could you possible be the responsible for the cost? The responsible is who decide to organize

such event, who decide its magnitude, how to allocate concretely the money and not the

individual who abstains from participating; Second the "Country" is a collective, abstract, vague

and political concept and it is not a unit of scientific analysis; Finally the TSE calculation ignores

the costs to go to the polls and those they’ve afforded prior to the polls, as if elections had no

cost.

The report concludes stating that besides the financial losses mentioned there is also a

non-compliance of a civic duty, once according to the president of the TSE "society often feels

like a victim of the bad politicians, but that is actually the perpetrator, since it decides who wins

the elections"18. While it is not even considered the possibility that who cannot complain is who

vote since he legitimized and supported the political electoral system, as once famously stated

Herbert Spencer in Social Statics: Let´s say a man votes for a candidate who wins. The voter is

then “understood to have assented” to the acts of his representative. But what if he voted for

another guy? Well, then, the argument goes, “by taking part in such an election, he tacitly

agreed to abide by the decision of the majority.” And what if he abstained? “Why then he cannot

justly complain [...] seeing that he made no protest.” Spencer concludes: “Curiously enough, it

seems that he gave his consent in whatever way he acted—whether he said yes, whether he

said no, or whether he remained neuter! A rather awkward doctrine this.” Jason Brennan in The

ethics of voting shares the same opinion.

Declarations like the ones coming from TSE seem to represent a general negative bias

toward abstentionism that exist in the literature. Fruncillo admits that abstentionism “is a

phenomenon imbued with value judgments and neutrality is impossible” and about voters, he

states “the presence and the role of political forces could be decisive [...] if from one side they

succeed at giving them such a quantity of information to improve their political competence and

to improve their sense of effectiveness, and from the other side give them a principle of

17

Reported by the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil TSE. Available at: <http://www.tse.jus.br/noticias-tse/2014/Maio/tse-abstencao-dos-eleitores-causa-prejuizo-ao-contribuinte>. Access in 31th October 2014.

18

Affirmed by the TSE president Marco Aurélio, as reported by the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil it self. Available at: <http://www.tse.jus.br/noticias-tse/2014/Maio/tse-abstencao-dos-eleitores-causa-prejuizo-ao-contribuinte>. Access in 31th October 2014.

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identification to let them perceive the duty to participate in the elections beyond their own so

called personal conveniences”19. The author doesn't give a definition of which identification

principle should be given, nor who should give it, nor how it should be decided these issues, but

maybe we can assume he automatically means the State (politicians and bureaucrats) should

do that. Yet, he seems to forget that information are never neutral, they always bring a specific

meaning, a bias, an orientation in one sense and not in another one, that in this case seems to

be the politicians´ one to persuade individuals, abstentionists and voters and not vice versa.

Fruncillo, then, defines “supposed” personal conveniences, supposing himself that some

individuals (politicians and bureaucrats?) could suppose better conveniences for others

individuals, better than themselves. Beyond this, Fruncillo, Lijphart (1997), Feeley (1974) and

Wertheimer (1975) consider that abstentionism is a form of free riding. They are logically wrong

since it should be shown that abstentionists don´t pay elections costs that are usually paid by

general taxation. On the contrary, it is likely that free riders be people who vote, when they try

and\or succeed at redistribute money and resources in their favor, through the electoral support

of some party\candidate. In general, the scientific literature seems to have a negative bias

toward abstentionism, blank vote and invalid ballots, it´s maybe true that axiological neutrality is

difficult or impossible, therefore being transparent, instead of an empty attempt of being neutral,

is a good choice. In this line, Fruncillo explicitly states that “when abstentionism comes from the

refusal of politics [...] and coincides with the action of so called free riders, - we cannot disagree

with Lijphart (1997) - it has to be contrasted since it is morally unacceptable”20. On the contrary,

thinking that morality is outside of the scientific realm, we explicit that we don't see any political

or moral problem in these electoral behaviors. Especially for those who are in favor of basic

individual liberties, civil liberties, those who believe democracy is and should be a process of

delegation and representation, abstentionism, blank vote, and invalid ballot should be analyzed

as possible, free and subjective individual choices, nothing more, nothing less.

5. Conclusions

Statistically, abstentionism, blank votes and invalid ballot papers constitute a relevant

phenomenon, it has been under a gradual increase and it should receive more attention, a more

accurate scientific description and more political respect.

19

Fruncillo, p. 194. 20

Tanasso E., (2006), affirms that “if the vote is an expression of will, thinking that it exist only when expresses a consensus, creating a physical representation, isn't it maybe a diminutio of voter´s democratic power of judgment?”, p. 4.

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Scientifically, we can suppose that abstentionism, blank votes and invalid ballot papers

are due to 1) apathy; 2) protest; 3) satisfaction21. All these three hypotheses are difficult to

refute, since we should investigate personal motives that are always subjective and obscure.

We remain on the field of social science22. The “pretense of knowledge”23 can bring to the peril

of psychologism24. Through methodological individualism what we can state is that every action

imply always a choice, at least, between to do and not to do, and we choose because we prefer

an alternative to the other. Therefore every time we act, it is because we prefer that action

rather than any other action. All this refers, of course, to the descriptive\positive aim to analyze

the phenomenon and area of abstentionism, blank votes and invalid ballot and not to a

prescriptive\normative attempt. We believe it is better to keep separated this two function and to

be prescriptive only at the of the chapter. Some scholar mix them, as we can notice in the use of

term such as “unexpressed vote”, “no vote”, “physiological phenomenon”, “anomaly”. We

discussed this bias and we expressed our descriptive position, it´s now time to turn to the

prescriptive part. We make three proposals:

1) Listing a specific space to mark (or press) for blank vote.

2) Subtracting the percentage of abstentionism, blank votes and invalid ballots to the

campaign fund and to public subsidies to parties.

3) Leaving empty seats in the Assembly in correspondence to the percentage of

abstentionism, blank votes and invalid ballots.

Let´s see in detail.

Similar systems already exist in Brazil, Nevada, India25, Greece, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Spain,

Colombia and Canada. Russia had it until 2006, Pakistan kept it just for an election in 2013.

Names can varies: “blank vote”, “none of the above” (NOTA), "against all" or a "scratch" vote,

“empty seat”, “blank seat”, but the concept is the same. When this procedure is permitted there

are different possible consequences: a) the seat can remain vacant; b) re-opening nominations

or holding another election; c) or it may have no effect whatsoever, as in Brazil, Greece, India

and Nevada, where the next highest total wins regardless.

21

As for the Lipset (1960) and Burnham (1980) hypothesis of “satisfied abstentionist”. 22

Leoni B., speaks about “science of man living in society” distinguishing between human but not social sciences (like ethology) and social but not human science (like ethology), Il problema metodologico nelle scienze sociali, “Il Politico”, nº 3, 1952, pp. 350-358. 23

Hayek F. V., 1988. 24

Infantino L., 2008. 25

In the 2014 Indian general election, NOTA polled 1.1% of the votes, counting to over 6 million.

15

In 1992, some Italian politician propose to give empty seats to abstentionism and n 2006,

Tanasso made a similar proposal26.

We suggest to keep empty seats for legislative bodies (locals and nationals). This wouldn´t

prevent the assembly to work, but when a qualified majority is required, politicians would have

more difficulties. This aim is usually sought by many little parties that run under names as

“NOTA” in UK, Serbia, Ukraine, Tennessee, Australia that run for elections with the commitment

to leave the seat empty. As consequences, we can attempt to forecast that 1) abstentionism

would decrease since who doesn't vote for protest now would have the incentive to protest by

marking NOTA. Some of abstentionism for protest would become NOTA, we still would have

abstentionism for apathy; 2) Blank vote would increase; 3) Media and politician could give more

attention to this phenomenon, to this form of protest. They could try to understand people

reasons and desires. 4) Politicians could try to better attend these demands and inputs. It

creates a new market for unsatisfied demands, new politicians, new parties, etc. 5) For these

same reasons we are perfectly conscious politicians would oppose this reform.

In the words of Sathasivam (judge of the Indian Supreme Court) that approved such a measure,

it "would lead to a systemic change in polls and political parties will be forced to project clean

candidates". "Democracy is all about choices and voters will be empowered by this right of

negative voting"27.

26

Pierluigi Storti, Gianfranco Ciaurro, Gianfranco Viglietta, TIna Loagostena Bassi, Aldo Carotenuto and others created an association to propose a referendum on this issue. Tanasso E. wrote the short article “La rilevanza delle schede bianche nel computo elettorale: il valore del dissenso”, in Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, 2006. 27

Affirmed by Chief Justice P Sathasivam, as reported by BBC, 2013.

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