A Widow's Revenge: Willy Brandt'sOstpolitik, Neo-Conservatism and the

German Federal Election of 1994

KLAUS LARRES

In the course of the 1994 election campaign, Willy Brandt'sOstpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s became an issue.Brandt's widow Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt attempted to rewrite thehistory of Ostpolitik and Brandt's role in German politics from aneo-conservative point of view. She suggested that Herbert Wehner,the SPD 's former parliamentary leader, had been instrumental inforcing her husband's resignation in 1974, and, above all, mayhave been a spy. Seebacher-Brandt alleged that Wehner activelycollaborated with the East in shaping Ostpolitik. If this was so,Ostpolitik may have delayed German unification instead ofcontributing to it. Brandt's widow attempted to take revenge on thegeneration of 1968; the generation now largely in charge of theSPD. She accused them of still believing in their leftish anti-national ideas and lacking enthusiasm for German unification. Shehas also never forgiven the SPD for not integrating her as 'one ofus' when she married Willy Brandt. Wishing to rescue Brandt'sreputation from her demolition of Ostpolitik she has attempted todepict him as a politician who was thinking along patriotic andnational lines when he embarked upon Ostpolitik whiledownplaying his long-standing left-wing credentials.

Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik of the early 1970s is generally thought to have beenan important step on the way to unification. This is the consensus in academiccircles outside Germany.1 Within the Federal Republic, however, this is acontroversial view. It is often argued that the process of detente was counterproductive. Its intention was to change the status quo between the twoGermanies. The idea was to achieve this through a rapprochement with East

Klaus Larres, Queen's University, Belfast

German Politics, Vol.4, No.l (April 1995) pp.42-63PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 43

Berlin. This is often regarded as naive. A policy of strength, similar to the onepursued by Ronald Reagan during the 1980s, might have brought a quickerend to the Cold War and hastened German unification. Ostpolitik, it isclaimed, only prolonged the division of Germany.2 Normally this argumentwould not have made the national news. It would not have been necessary torepeat the battles which dominated German political life in the 1970s. In1994, however, things were different.

The federal election was due on 16 October 1994. In addition there weresixteen forthcoming regional and local elections, not to mention the electionsto the European parliament in June. There was no shortage of serious topicsto debate. The neo-Nazis, industrial inertia, and the continuing problems ofintegrating the new Lander were important issues.3 Yet neither the Kohlgovernment nor the population as a whole showed any interest in discussingthe hard facts of life in today's Germany. Rather, one could detect a severeidentity crisis. There was a feeling in the air of having lost one's way. Theresult of this was that many people were ignoring both the present and thefuture. Frustration with politics was widespread. This did not make it anyeasier for the opposition Social Democrats (SPD) to focus people's attentionon current problems or exploit them for their own advantage.4 ChancellorKohl's coalition government, on the other hand, was desperately seeking todistract people from these issues. The disintegration of the Soviet Unionrendered this difficult. After all, with no external threat the political Right inthe Western world has been facing a dilemma.3 What better reason to divertattention to the past? Ostpolitik and its contribution to the East-West detenteof the 1970s is generally regarded as the prime achievement of the SPDgovernments from 1969 to 1982. It was therefore a particularly convenientissue to address in an election year.

What was most surprising, however, was that the initiative in this matterdid not come from Chancellor Kohl or his party. Instead Brandt's widow —Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt - was the source. Moreover, the woman WillyBrandt spent the last 14 years of his life with is herself a card-carryingmember of the SPD!6 Ostpolitik and the circumstances of Chancellor Brandt'sdramatic resignation in May 1974 were once again a political issue. WasOstpolitik a patriotic policy? Was it an attempt to achieve unification by a lessdirect route? Or was it merely a policy of 'appeasement'? Above all, was it inessence the de facto acceptance of the permanent division of Germany? Thiswould have implied that unification was regarded as undesirable. Early in1994 the debate was deflecting people's attention from the very real problemsin contemporary Germany. Much to the delight of the political Right it largelyconcentrated on the issue of whether or not Ostpolitik had really been in thebest interests of the German people.

44 GERMAN POLITICS

HERBERT WEHNER AND OSTPOLITIK

Initially at the centre of the controversy was the SPD's former parliamentaryleader Herbert Wehner who died in 1990. Brandt's widow alleged that thehighly influential ex-cabinet minister and deputy chairman of the partyactively collaborated with the East Germans in the early 1970s. Dr Seebacher-Brandt, an historian by profession, blamed Wehner for her late husband'ssudden resignation in 1974.7 She claimed that Wehner had in fact been a spy.At the beginning of an important election year this hit German politics - andparticularly the SPD - like a bombshell. At first sight these accusationsseemed credible. After all, it has been well known that until 1944/45 HerbertWehner had been a communist by conviction.

In the late 1930s, while Stalin's purges were in full swing, Wehner spentseveral years in Moscow working for the Comintern.8 According todocuments which have recently been found in Russian archives, during thisperiod he seems to have been busy denouncing acquaintances who hadstrayed from the 'true' communist path. Indeed, it is now known that inFebruary 1937, shortly after the spectacular Trotskyist trials in Moscowwhich resulted in death sentences for most of the accused, and in December1937 Wehner was interrogated several times by the NKVD (the forerunner ofthe KGB). He was accused of being a Trotskyist himself and of havingcollaborated with Hitler's secret police. In an atmosphere of heavy mutualdistrust and recrimination his life hung by a thread.' In the course of theinterrogation Wehner handed over typewritten reports and denouncedindividual fellow-members as dangerous Trotskyism or agents of the Gestapo.Although most of these people lived abroad, Wehner helpfully pointed outfriends and family members of the accused who happened to reside inMoscow. He also analysed the activities of alleged supporters of Trotsky inseveral European cities. Moreover, he invented some other anti-Sovietconspiracies and promised to obtain more information about people who hadattracted the attention of his interrogators.10

It is quite clear that Wehner bought his own survival by denouncingfellow-communists. Wehner delivered information which contributed to thearrest and subsequent death of many innocent and quite dedicated communistparty members." Still, unlike most of his fellow-communists who survivedthe purges for similar reasons, in later life Wehner was genuinely remorsefuland tried to learn from his experience. He did break with Communism whilehe languished in several Swedish prisons and internment camps after hisdeparture from Moscow in January 1941.12 After the Second World War,Wehner contributed greatly to making West Germany into a stable anddemocratic state. After his return to Germany in 1946 he, joined the re-established SPD and became a trusted associate of Kurt Schumacher, the

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLIT1K 45

party's charismatic first post-war chairman. He was known to be fiercely anti-communist. Because of rumours about Wehner's communist past the decisionto accept him into the party had not been taken lightly by the SPD leader.Schumacher had thoroughly perused Wehner's lengthy 'notes', consisting ofover 200 pages of typed text and written in a very personal way with whichWehner hoped to come to terms with the guilt which he would carry with himall his life." On the insistence of Schumacher Wehner stood for parliament.With an impressive 48 per cent of the vote he was elected to the first WestGerman Bundestag for his Hamburg constituency. Almost immediately hebecame chairman of the important parliamentary committee for all-Germanquestions.14 Subsequently, Wehner was often involved in helping to overcomehumanitarian problems with the GDR government behind the scenes (forexample, persuading East Berlin to agree to the legal emigration of EastGermans to the Federal Republic).15 Initially Wehner was not in favour ofOstpolitik as designed by Brandt and his close adviser Egon Bahr. In fact inthe early 1960s he was quite sceptical. Based on his own terrible experiencesand the failure of the SPD's Deutschland Plan in 1959, he did not believe thatone could do business with the Soviets."1

In early 1994, however, these points were entirely ignored in the mediaspectacle that was the Wehner affair. Following new revelations in DerSpiegel in early 1993 people began to harbour suspicions about Wehner'spolitical activities in the 1930s.17 They were largely confirmed when ReinhardMiiller's book Die Akte Wehner was published in April 1993. It included 51documents the author had discovered in Russian archives.18 Then, on 10January 1994, the conservative daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) aswell as the weekly Der Spiegel published detailed articles about Wehner'sactivities in Moscow. There was also a dramatic television broadcast by theconservative Munich based programme Report. Using Soviet documentsrecently discovered in the archives of the former East German security police(Stasi),19 all three produced evidence of Wehner denouncing fellow-communists in order to save his own skin.20

At the same time as the reporting of Wehner's unfortunate activities in the1930s, rumours spread that the East German Stasi had attempted to usematerial from Soviet archives to blackmail Wehner in the late 1960s.21

Without doubt, the GDR would have gained considerably had they succeededin obtaining the co-operation of the SPD's political strategist. Wehner wasbecoming increasingly important as one of the party's leading policy-makersand behind-the-scenes movers. He impressed his superiors as a very thoroughand incisive thinker who was able to outline persuasively the consequences ofpolitical decisions. In October 1966 Wehner was appointed Minister for Intra-German Affairs' in the Grand Coalition led by Chancellor Kiesinger andForeign Minister Brandt. Three years later he became the SPD's

46 GERMAN POLITICS

parliamentary leader and the party's deputy chairman. Not surprisingly,questions have arisen in the minds of many people in the newly unitedGermany as to whether the communists were able to influence Ostpolitikduring the 1960s and early 1970s. Assuming Wehner had collaborated withEast Berlin, it appeared obvious that the GDR had been successful in makingWilly Brandt's eastern policy more amenable to both East Berlin andMoscow.22

After all, at first sight the Basic Treaty of 1972 between the two Germanstates offered more to the East than to the West.23 The status quo became aninstitution. Bonn, for example, recognised the Oder-NeiBe line as Germany'seastern border, thus de facto (though not de jure) giving up any claim to theterritory lost to Poland and the Soviet Union as a result of the Second WorldWar. West Germany began to view the GDR as a sovereign state within theGerman nation.24 This did not mean that it recognised the government in EastBerlin, though the Brandt and the subsequent Schmidt administrations cameclose. After all it agreed to give up West Germany's claim to be the solerepresentative of the German people. From now on the Bonn governmentwould not only co-operate increasingly with East Berlin economically butalso include the GDR in the unfolding of an international process of ditente.The new relationship between Bonn and East Berlin was symbolised by theadmission of both German states to the United Nations in September 1973.Much to the satisfaction of East German leader Erich Honecker - an oldacquaintance of Wehner's from their communist days in the 1930s -Ostpolitik certainly led to a much higher international profile and much widerrecognition of the GDR as an independent state.25 Maybe the Federal Republichad been taken for a ride. Perhaps the allegations that Ostpolitik was playinginto the hands of the GDR - as claimed by the opposition CDU/CSU at thetime - were true after all.26 If this policy had been shaped in the Kremlin thenit could not have been a strategy designed to bring about unification in thelong run. Ostpolitik may even have delayed the achievement of this ultimategoal. At least, this was the line of thought followed by the conservative mediain Germany, especially the FAZ, in mid-January 1994.27

Germany's best-selling daily newspaper, the tabloid Bild was quick tosubscribe to this. It reported that shortly before his death in November 1992,Brandt received some highly confidential information. The source was ex-Soviet Ambassador Valentin Falin, who now lives in Hamburg. Falin told himthat Karl Wienand, the former parliamentary manager of the SPD and a closeadviser and trusted friend of Wehner's, had worked for the KGB from the late1960s. Bild implied that Wehner may well have known of this and may evenhave been employed by the Soviet secret service himself.28 The newlyreleased documents on Wehner's activities in Moscow in' the 1930s, theGDR's alleged attempts to blackmail him in the 1960s, and the stories about

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 47

Wienand's co-operation with the KGB made the accusations seem more likelyto be true. It certainly motivated Brandt's widow - according to her ownaccount - to re-examine her late husband's papers.29 Within a few days thiswould result in even more dramatic allegations which soon began to dominatethe unfolding election campaigns.

THE 'MYSTERY' OF WILLY BRANDT'S RESIGNATION IN MAY 1974

A week after the FAZ and Der Spiegel had revealed Wehner's activities inMoscow in the late 1930s, the FAZ published another dramatic article abouthim. This time it concerned his political role in the post-war era - particularlyhis involvement in the circumstances of Chancellor Brandt's resignation. Thesame journalist who had written about the Wehner documents from the 1930snow reported that Brandt's widow had shown him excerpts of 43 pages ofhandwritten notes composed by her late husband a few months after hisresignation as Chancellor. According to the FAZ these notes confirmed thatBrandt had had serious doubts about Wehner's political loyalty.'0 His secretnotes seemed to complement his frank comments about his difficultrelationship with Wehner published in his memoirs of 1989."

By the time of Brandt's resignation in early May 1974 Wehner had beentrying to replace Brandt with Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt for sometime.32 Although Brandt and Wehner had never particularly liked each other,from 1971/72 onwards things got much worse.33 Ever since Brandt's hugeelection victory in November 1972, Wehner as well as Schmidt had becomeincreasingly unhappy with Brandt's lack of leadership and politicalinefficiency.34 Since winning the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize Brandt had becomeincreasingly aloof. He had concentrated on the 'vision thing' and neglecteddetailed policy making. Brandt had also developed a 'bunker mentality'which was not helped by the tendency of both Wehner and heir-apparentHelmut Schmidt to isolate him from trusted associates like Horst Ehmke andEgon Bahr. Nor by their attempts to sideline Brandt and dominate thegovernment's decision-making process. In addition, the left within the SPDbecame increasingly vocal and expressed their displeasure with the way theparty was developing.35 After the election victory of 1972 Brandt wasexhausted and suffering from stress. He also had severe marital problemswhich he tried to compensate for with numerous affairs and heavy drinking.This affected his performance as Chancellor and did not endear him to thepuritanical Wehner. Brandt suspected that Wehner and Schmidt were enviousof his enormous popularity as reflected in his election victory.36

Scholars agree in general that by 1972 most of the major foreign policyinitiatives as well as the considerable domestic reform programme of theBrandt-Scheel government had been achieved.37 Despite further important

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political successes, including the conclusion of Ostpolitik's series of treatieswith the Eastern European nations, 1973 developed into a year of crisis. InOctober the Yom-Kippur war erupted which led to the first oil crisis. This inturn exacerbated the economic recession with which the Federal Republic hadbeen grappling for some time. The general atmosphere of crisis andhelplessness in the government was reinforced when a prolonged period ofwork-to-rule by air-traffic control staff at German airports could not beresolved. Instead it lasted for five months. There were also several verydisruptive, wild-cat strikes by metal workers and refuse collectors in Augustand September.58 Furthermore, in June the so-called Steiner-Wienand affairhad erupted. Well-founded allegations were made that the Brandtgovernment's survival in the vote of confidence in the Bundestag inSeptember 1972 had been due to financial corruption. Supported by Wehner,Karl Wienand, the SPD's parliamentary manager, had bought the agreementof possibly two or more opposition MPs not to vote against Brandt.3' Soonmore details about high-level corruption began to surface. Although itemerged that the opposition CDU/CSU had used similar practices, it was thegovernment and particularly Brandt himself whose credibility suffered themost.40

In the course of 1973 Wehner's ever increasing lack of respect for Brandtbecame clear for all to see. During a visit to Moscow in September Wehnerstrongly criticised the government for not vigorously proceeding withOstpolitik. Above all, he targeted Brandt personally for lack of leadership anddecisiveness.41 The Chancellor was so enraged that he broke off a state visit tothe United States and returned to Bonn. Although pressed by advisers to sackWehner - something which Wehner himself expected - Brandt did not do so.When talking to him alone a few days later Brandt weakly accepted Wehner'smumbled apologies and agreed to continue working with him. However, theepisode proved to be a decisive break in the relationship between the twomen. Wehner lost all his respect while Brandt had lost what was left of hisremaining faith and trust in his colleague. A difficult relationship haddeveloped into something close to mutual hate.42

Wehner was aware that Brandt's weak leadership was largely responsiblefor the increasing disarray and poor public image of the government. The SPDwas under ever-more hostile attacks from the media, and German publicopinion which had once been so well-disposed towards them was beginningto turn. If this continued it was easy to foresee that the SPD would lose thegeneral election in 1976 and with it the trust of the electorate.43 With somejustification, Wehner regarded himself as one of the main architects of theSPD's electoral successes since 1966. This had taken almost two decades inopposition to achieve. In early 1974, in the midst of the Federal Republic'sfirst serious economic crisis, Brandt's image as a visionary politician was

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 49

increasingly becoming a liability. In order to consolidate the achievements ofthe last few years and to convince the public of the smooth and efficientfunctioning of the SPD-led government, what was needed was practicaldecision-making and solid managerial qualities - not the day-dreaming thatBrandt had been embarking upon lately. Wehner regarded the internationallywell-respected finance and defence expert Helmut Schmidt as being muchmore reliable and more efficient than the charismatic Chancellor.44 LaterBrandt blamed himself for not having had the courage to fire Wehner in lateSeptember/early October 1973. However, the Chancellor did not have thestrength for a decisive fight and instead he allowed himself to be pushed aboutby Wehner.45

With hindsight Brandt accused Wehner and secret service chief GiinterNollau of hiding vital information from him about the discovery of the spy,Gunter Guillaume, in 1973 and early 1974. Brandt believed that Wehner andNollau had led him into a trap and he blamed himself for not having realisedthis.46 After all, as early as 29 May 1973 Nollau had told Wehner and InteriorMinister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that Gunter Guillaume was suspected ofespionage. But he was only arrested a year later, on 19 April 1974. It had beendifficult to prove the allegations against him.47 Although Brandt had beeninformed of the charges, neither Nollau nor Genscher took any precautions toprotect his position. Instead, Guillaume was allowed to continue workingclose to Brandt. The Chancellor was in fact used to trap the spy into givinghimself away. Guillaume accompanied Brandt on a holiday to Norway wherehe was responsible for receiving top secret material. He also accompaniedhim on a visit to the South of France in the autumn. In both cases the Germansecret service failed to watch Guillaume. Brandt had assumed that Guillaumewas being observed closely though he did not believe that he was still undersuspicion. Nobody had bothered to tell him otherwise. As allegations ofspying for the GDR were often made in connection with former East Germancitizens and as no further action seemed to have been taken, Brandt assumedeverything had been sorted out. Guillaume was a man in the background andnot a particularly important person. Thus Brandt never enquired about him inother than a passing way. He also neglected to tell his closest friends andadvisers about the suspicions.48

When returning from a trip abroad on 24 April 1974 Brandt learned thatGuillaume had been arrested. He was shocked but did not believe he wouldbe personally implicated. After all, he had no reason to blame himself foranything. However, in the course of investigating the extent of Guillaume'saccess to secret material it became clear that he had also obtained informationabout much of Brandt's personal life. The Chancellor was sinking. SoonBrandt was under increasing political and personal pressure as the crisisrapidly engulfed him. He became more desperate and at one stage even

50 GERMAN POLITICS

showed signs of being suicidal.49 He began to contemplate his resignation.50

During the night of 4-5 May Brandt had a long conversation with Wehner inthe course of a conference organised by the SPD's Friedrich-Ebert foundationin Bad Miinstereifel. In this conveniently located little town near Bonn thefoundation possessed its own 'hideaway', ideal for convening politicalseminars. Wehner confronted the Chancellor with more compromisingmaterial which he had obtained from Nollau about Brandt's extra-marital lifeduring the election campaign of 1972. It was obvious that Giinter Guillaumehad been privy to Brandt's affairs and had passed this information on to theHonecker government. Moreover, Guillaume even seemed to have been usedby Brandt to facilitate contacts with women who he then led to Brandt's room.He may even have tape-recorded the ensuing activities for the benefit of hisemployers in East Berlin.51 Not for the first time Wehner asked whether all thisinformation in the hands of the GDR would leave the Chancellor open toblackmail.52 Brandt announced his resignation the day after. On 7 May hepublicly repudiated the rumours which had quickly spread that Wehner hadforced this decision upon him.53 Later, however, Brandt retracted this andimplied that Wehner had been responsible for his downfall.54 His resignationalways remained a traumatic experience for him. For the rest of his life,Brandt believed that Wehner had exploited his weakness and insecurity, madeworse through general exhaustion and a minor illness, and had deviouslypressurised him into retirement.55 According to Wehner, he did not push theChancellor out of office, but left the decision entirely to Brandt himself anddid not persuade him to resign. Wehner, however, did not ask him to remaineither.56

Wehner certainly did not regret Brandt's resignation and he at leastindirectly contributed to the Chancellor's collapse in the face of immensepressure. The Guillaume affair was merely a good opportunity to get rid ofBrandt. In other circumstances Brandt would not have had to resign thoughmany in the SPD were aware that Brandt's departure was desirable.57 Even theGDR government appears to have realised that under Brandt's leadership thedays of the government would be numbered. In February 1994 it was revealedthat, like Wehner, East Berlin had been in favour of replacing Brandt withSchmidt. It might have been expected that Schmidt would have been moredifficult to deal with than Brandt. However, a CDU/CSU government mighthave attempted to reverse the rapprochement between East and West;something Schmidt would certainly not have been inclined to do.5S

The conservative media in Germany did not hesitate to exploit thisagreement in thinking between GDR leader Honecker and Wehner. It gavethem further evidence for the claim that Wehner could more or less beconsidered an East German spy.59 According to the FAZ, Brandt's handwrittennotes confirmed that the former Chancellor had all along been deeply

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 51

mistrustful of Wehner in this respect. Brandt believed that Wehner had hadsecret contacts with GDR politicians which he did not report to him. Forexample, when Wehner and the FDP politician Wolfgang Mischnick metHonecker in the GDR in 1973, Brandt alleged he only learned of the eventwhen watching the evening news on television. Moreover, he claimed, lettersand information which arrived in Bonn shortly before his resignation had notbeen passed on to him by Wehner. One of these 'communications', Brandtwrote, was already addressed to Helmut Schmidt, his most likely successor.In both cases, however, Brandt was mistaken.60 In his memoirs Brandt doesnot say whether he saw a direct connection between Wehner's GDR contactsand his downfall as Chancellor but according to the FAZ that is what Brandtimplied in his notes.61 This is also exactly what his widow claimed in severalnewspaper articles and television interviews in early 1994. She alleged thatBrandt concluded with hindsight that even after Guillaume's arrest, EastBerlin seemed to have been well-informed about events in Bonn. He believedthat Wehner had been an informer, and had collaborated with Honecker inforcing his resignation. Thus, Wehner was being accused of something closeto high treason.62 As Brandt could not prove his suspicions, it was said, hekept them quiet and did not make his notes public. However, when inNovember 1991 a political friend (assumed to be former SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel) allegedly told him that he had confirmation that Wehner hadalso worked in the interests of 'the other side' Brandt reacted calmly. Hiswidow claimed that when asked whether he was surprised Brandt answeredwith a simple 'no'.63

Thus, early in 1994, at the beginning of a difficult election campaign forChancellor Kohl's Conservative party and in the face of very unfavourableopinion polls, the FAZ and Seebacher-Brandt succeeded for a few weeks increating the impression that Wehner had been a GDR spy. Supported by thestories of Wehner's activities in the 1930s it looked as if he had always beena communist. Brandt's suspicions that Wehner had been responsible forpushing him into resigning - a machiavellian but entirely legal manoeuvre -had been taken a step further. Both the FAZ and Brandt's widow attempted todiscredit Wehner and with him the SPD's foreign policy achievements duringthe 1960s and 1970s.

However, these dramatic revelations were not quite as revealing as theyfirst seemed to be. Most of the information has been well known for aconsiderable time. Even the accusations against Wehner were not new; theyhad already been voiced a few days after Brandt's resignation in May 1974."When, after much public discussion, the FAZ eventually decided to publishBrandt's notes in full it became clear that most of the material had alreadybeen used by Brandt in his memoirs.6' Moreover, Brandt had read almost allof his notes to the German historian Arnulf Baring who had then incorporated

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the information in his book, Machtwechsel, published in 1982. The authorGerhard Scholz had also been able to make use of some of Brandt's notes forhis 1986 biography of Herbert Wehner." Thus the dramatic interpretation ofthe notes by the original FAZ article of 17 January and by Brandt's widow,was exposed as a great exaggeration. It was almost exclusively speculation.Wehner's widow Grete (who was also his step-daughter), ex-SovietAmbassador Falin as well as former SPD leader Vogel all repudiated thestories and interpretations put forward by Seebacher-Brandt, the FAZ andother conservative media outlets."

From a perusal of Brandt's notes, the account given in his memoirs and inthe above mentioned books, it can now safely be said that Brandt did notpossess any evidence that Wehner had been working on behalf of the GDR orthe Soviet Union. Nor did he assume that this was so, as both the FAZ and hiswidow led the German public to believe. In the meantime it has become clear,however, that Karl Wienand, the SPD's former parliamentary manager and aclose confidant of Wehner's, did work for the East German Stasi from about1970 until the late 1980s.68 But no information has been found that Wehnerwas aware of this or that he was a spy himself. Despite his Comintern past andhis denunciations, and in spite of his strained relationship with Brandt, hispolitical intriguing and deviousness, Wehner was not working on behalf ofEast German leader Erich Honecker. This is, of course, also indirectlyconfirmed by the GDR's vicious media campaign against him between 1964and 1973.''' Willy Brandt knew that Wehner was not 'working for the otherside' and accordingly never claimed anything to the contrary. In spite of hisgeneral contempt for Wehner which was strong enough to ensure that he didnot attend Wehner's funeral in late 1990, Brandt never believed that Wehnerhad been a GDR spy as claimed by his widow and the FAZ. However, theformer Chancellor did believe (correctly) that to a large degree Wehner wasresponsible for his resignation and that he would not have had to resign ifWehner had supported him. But this has been common knowledge for aconsiderable period of time.

THE MOTIVATION

It is not unusual for the media to take sides during an election campaign. Thata conservative paper like the FAZ should exaggerate negative informationabout Herbert Wehner is to be expected. It is much more surprising that it wasBrandt's widow who started the debate by interpreting her late husband'snotes in the same vein. After all, discrediting the SPD and Ostpolitik mustunavoidably reflect badly on Brandt. The question arises therefore as towhether his widow has been fighting a serious academic battle aboutOstpolitik and the circumstances of Chancellor Brandt's resignation or

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 53

whether she is merely indulging in a political and maybe personal vendettaagainst the SPD and various individuals within the party.

Seebacher-Brandt's exaggerated claims about the content of her latehusband's notes suggest that it is highly unlikely that she is interested in agenuine, historical re-analysis of Ostpolitik and Brandt's resignation. Bild andthe FAZ seem hardly the right outlets for a cool, detached, scholarlydiscussion. It is, however, well known that despite her SPD party membershipSeebacher-Brandt has become increasingly critical of the left in Germanpolitics and has all but joined the conservative camp and subscribed to theirfashionable neo-nationalist ideas.70 Ever since German unification andparticularly since her husband's death she has regularly attended gatherings ofconservative associations and action groups. She is also a regular free-lancecontributor to the FAZ and the conservative Bavarian state radio. Furthermore,she is preparing a television film to be called 'Germany united fatherland' .71

Her doctoral thesis was supervised by Ernst Nolte, one of Germany'sforemost 'revisionist' historians. He is still busily 'revising' the country'sNazi past - a past which led to Willy Brandt's enforced emigration toScandinavia and to Herbert Wehner's stay in Moscow.72

Seebacher-Brandt believes that the events of 1989/90 exposed thefalseness of the social-democratic ideas of the intellectuals and students whobrought about the 1968 student revolution and whose support was crucial toBrandt's decisive election victories in 1969 and 1972. Brandt's widow hascome to the conclusion that the ageing revolutionaries of that generation -today's up-and-coming politicians of the left - have not been able to liberatethemselves from their old-fashioned ideals. They have not recognised that theworld has changed. Despite unification, they still refuse to endorse theresurrected National idea.73 It is therefore not surprising that Seebacher-Brandt is so critical of the new generation of the SPD's leadership. Both forits alleged lack of national pride and its lack of enthusiasm for Germanunification. She is particularly critical of politicians like the regional primeministers and the former candidates for Chancellor, Oskar Lafontaine andJohannes Rau, as lacking in patriotism. She accuses them of having been quiteprepared to give in to the demands of the GDR in the 1980s; of recognisingits sovereignty as an independent state and renouncing the idea of a unitedGerman nation.74 At the same time she attempts to picture her husband as astatesman who was thinking along national lines all along while down-playing if not ignoring his long-standing, left-wing past. Above all she likesto forget his left-wing internationalism as exemplified by Brandt's respectedchairmanship of the Socialist International from 1976 until shortly before hisdeath in October 1992." There does not seem to be any doubt that Seebacher-Brandt is attempting to rewrite the history of Ostpolitik and Brandt's role inGerman politics from a neo-conservative point of view.76

54 GERMAN POLITICS

With eyes firmly fixed on the unfolding election campaigns in the FederalRepublic the CDU/CSU gratefully supported the widow when the Wehneraffair first erupted. In the midst of disastrous opinion polls which mercilesslydemonstrated that the German public had lost all faith in the Kohlgovernment's leadership in general and its economic competence inparticular, Seebacher-Brandt enabled the CDU/CSU to point an accusingfinger at the SPD. Johannes Gerster, deputy chairman of the CDU'sparliamentary party, expressed his full support for the widow's allegations andcalled on the SPD to clarify the situation.77 Finance minister, Theo Waigel,expressed the same opinion while his CSU colleague Michael Glos called fora special select committee which would ensure that the affair would be talkedabout in the media for weeks and months to come.78 Chancellor Kohlannounced on German television that it was becoming clear that many SPDpoliticians had, intellectually, gone to the other side in the past decades. Heparticularly targeted Johannes Rau, at the time the SPD's popular candidatefor the Federal Presidency, and SPD leader Rudolf Scharping. The SPD wasnot slow to retaliate with accusations about leading CDU politicians.7*

Politics, however, does not entirely explain Seebacher-Brandt's campaignagainst Ostpolitik and the SPD. It appears that Brandt's widow was seekingrevenge. She certainly tried to ensure that Willy Brandt is left alone on thepedestal reserved for real statesmen.80 She can barely tolerate the mention ofHelmut Schmidt in the same breath as Willy Brandt. That the formercommunist Herbert Wehner, partly responsible for Brandt's resignation in1974, should be regarded as one of the 'Big Three' of the highly influentialSPD era of the 1960s and 1970s is utterly repugnant to her.81 The newchairman of the SPD, the relatively young Rudolf Scharping, is not liked bySeebacher-Brandt either. In an article written as late as December 1993 hedared to put Brandt, Schmidt and Wehner on the same level and, like HelmutSchmidt shortly afterwards, wrote a few respectful sentences about Wehner.82

As far as the 'national question' is concerned Seebacher-Brandt regardsScharping as almost as much of a 'traitor' as Rau and Lafontaine. Moreover,she accused him of ignoring her hints about Karl Wienand's collaborationwith the Stasi in the summer of 1993." Above all, it was Scharping whoconsistently refused to accept her claim that Brandt's testament has entrustedall his possessions including his political and personal papers to her.Seebacher-Brandt insisted on the establishment of a special 'independent'Willy Brandt foundation, similar to the Presidential Libraries in the UnitedStates. This was highly unusual and led to severe disagreements between theSPD and Seebacher-Brandt over Willy Brandt's documents. The SPD claimedthat Brandt's papers rightly belong to the party and should therefore be givento the political archive of its Friedrich-Ebert foundation. This would makethem accessible to the public in due course. Brandt's early papers have in any

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 55

case already been deposited in the archive for more than 20 years.84

In addition there have also been long-standing personal difficultiesbetween Seebacher-Brandt and most of the more prominent SPD politicians.While Rut Brandt, Brandt's first wife, was (and still is) highly popular withinthe SPD - one suspects, not least because she was content with the traditionalrole of a politician's wife85 - the outspoken, much younger and highly politicalSeebacher-Brandt never integrated once she had married the formerChancellor.86 From the beginning she monopolised her husband, kept himaway from his friends and colleagues and gradually influenced his politicalopinions to some degree as well. She was accused, therefore, of contributingto the ever growing emotional and political distance between Brandt and thenew generation.87 This became particularly obvious in 1989/90. While Brandtwas jubilant about the opening of the Berlin Wall and the subsequentunification of the two German states, most SPD leaders were never more thanlukewarm about the new developments. Referring to the financial andeconomic cost unification would impose on the Germans the prospectivecandidate for Chancellor, Lafontaine, publicly warned against proceeding tooquickly with unification. He advised caution and lost the general election.88

By then the gulf between Brandt and the up-and-coming SPD politicians hadbecome very wide indeed. The SPD blamed Brandt's 'right-wing' wife to aconsiderable degree. Even in the last weeks of Brandt's life Seebacher-Brandtallegedly made sure that the dying statesman was never alone with his friendsand former colleagues. She was always at his bedside. When the SPD madesuggestions about how to organise Brandt's funeral they were informed thatSeebacher-Brandt had already arranged a state funeral with one of ChancellorKohl's representatives. This only confirmed the SPD's mistrust of her. She wasnever regarded as 'one of us'. Instead she was accused of having stolen Brandtfrom the SPD and of trying to remould his image according to her own design.8*

CONCLUSION

Based on a deep conviction that the traditional history of the early years of thesocial-liberal coalition and particularly of Willy Brandt's resignation is wrongand needs to be re-written, Brandt's widow attempted to take her revenge in1994. It was her view that it was not Brandt's personal weakness that wasresponsible for his resignation. Rather it was Wehner's deviousness andcollaboration with the GDR. The implication was of course that, had she beenBrandt's wife in 1974, he would not have resigned since she would havepointed the dangers out to him and strengthened his morale.90 Furthermore,according to Seebacher-Brandt's interpretation, her husband was much lessleft-wing than generally assumed. He was a man whose Ostpolitik wasentirely misunderstood by the German left. Instead, he should rightly be

56 GERMAN POLITICS

regarded as having been part of the patriotic wing of the SPD. Accordingly,Brandt was a real patriot. While most members of the party mistakenlyregarded Ostpolitik as the acceptance of the division of Germany for a longtime to come, Brandt was really working for unification." It is questionable,however, whether Seebacher-Brandt has succeeded with this quiteunhistorical reconstruction of the past. The German weekly Die Zeitsuccinctly summarised the outcome of her campaign as well as the drivingforce behind Seebacher-Brandt's motives:

What she does sounds almost as if she was on the war path. Everything isbeing turned into an accusation against the generation of 1968, thenagainst those who were allegedly opposed to German unification, andeventually against Wehner. In the meantime she has already damagedBrandt's image. She wants to utter the truth; her truth. Also the truthabout Ostpolitik which was regarded by him [Brandt] as the success storyof his life. But she regarded this policy as not sufficiently anti-communist, not enough pro-German. This must be shouted out althoughit buries Brandt for a second time.92

EPILOGUE

From the summer of 1994 interest in the Wehner affair and in Willy Brandt'sOstpolitik as well as in Seebacher-Brandt's attacks has subsided. Despite theelection campaigns, the German media has paid hardly any more attention tothem. After all, Seebacher-Brandt's reputation as a journalist has sufferedtremendously. The beginning of the end for her credibility was, ironically, thepublication of Brandt's notes by the FAZ on 26 January 1994.93 This led to thegeneral realisation that they contained no new information at all and that allher claims had been based on Brandt's assumptions and suspicions writtenonly a few months after his resignation. A time when he was still deeply hurtand had not yet recovered from his deep-seated bitterness against Wehner andfrom the emotional upheaval of the spy scandal. Kohl's CDU/CSU alsoquickly realised the exaggerated nature of Seebacher-Brandt's initial claimsand stopped trying to turn the Wehner affair into an issue. After all, it wasobvious that Wehner had never been an East German or Soviet spy.94

However, there was another reason why the Conservative party lost allinterest in the matter. In pre-unification Germany all political parties hadhidden channels of communication with the leaders in East Germany. Not justWehner, Brandt or Schmidt, but also Kohl and his advisers wereconfidentially talking to the men in East Berlin. If the Wehner affair hadcontinued to be discussed in the media it could have been expected that anincreasing number of secret documents would gradually have surfaced. This

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 57

would almost certainly have included information about the well-developedcontacts of the CDU/CSU with East Berlin. In the process, highlyembarrassing material might have come to light. After all, prominentCDU/CSU politicians like Lothar Späth, Walter Leisler Kiep and, above all,Franz Josef Strauß had nurtured intensive contacts with the SED." It is, forexample, also well known that Richard von Weizsäcker, the respected formerfederal President, regularly met with East German officials in the early 1980swhen he was governing mayor of West Berlin. During some of these talks hedid not hesitate to reveal his low opinion of the political talents of ChancellorKohl.*6 It is not surprising therefore that there were no further demands for thesetting up of select committees and for the release of the SPD's documentsabout its contacts with GDR politicians. This could have easily backfired anddamaged the election campaigns of all the parties which had been involved inGerman politics in the 1960s/70s. Above all, instead of wooing voters awayfrom the SPD and the right-wing Republicans it would have revealed theCDU's eastern contacts. This might have led voters to the conclusion thatKohl's CDU did not really believe in the possibility of unification either andhad accepted the division of Germany for the foreseeable future - probablylike the majority of the West German people in the 1960s/70s. ErichHonecker's state visit to Chancellor Kohl in Bonn in 1987 is public testimonyto this assumption. The Wehner affair has therefore been quietly buried.Seebacher-Brandt, however, is still waging her battle for a 'neo-conservative'reinterpretation of Ostpolitik and for Willy Brandt's correct patriotic place inGerman history. But she does so from an ever more isolated position. At leastfor the time being.

NOTES

1. Both Konrad Adenauer's Westpolitik as well as Brandt's Ostpolitik are usually seen asimportant steps to unification. See, for example, Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Germany fromPartition to Reunification (New Haven/London, 1992), pp. 258-9: Gordon A. Craig, 'DidOstpolitik Work? The Path to German Reunification', in Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.l(1994), pp. 162-67.

2. See, for example, Die Wochenpost. No.2/94 (5.1.1994); Focus, No.6/94 (7 Feb. 1994),interview with Seebacher-Brandt [M.Jach/D.Kop/U.Reity] p.37. For a very different viewsee Helmut Schmidt, 'Wider die Legende von Verrat und Königsmord', Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No.5 (28 Jan. 1994), p. 3 [whenever a newspaper or magazine article is not written anonymouslythe author is added in square brackets; scholars or politicians writing in these publicationsare quoted as in the case of an academic article].

3. See Financial Times, 25 Oct. 1993, Survey Germany.4. See, for example, the leading articles in Die Zeit, Vol. 48: No. 44 (29 Oct. 1993) [Wilfried

Herz], No. 45 (5 Nov. 1993) [Robert Leicht], No. 49 (3 Dec. 1993) [Leicht]; Vol. 49: No. 2(7 Jan. 1994) [Leicht], No. 6 (4 Feb. 1994) [Hertz], No. 9 (25 Feb. 1994) [Leicht].

5. See Henry W. Brands, The Devil We Know: Americans and the Cold War (New York/Oxford,1993), pp. 206-7.

6. See Peter Koch, Willy Brandt: Eine politische Biographie (Bergisch-Gladbach, 1992), pp.564-5.

58 GERMAN POLITICS

7. For a detailed analysis see the section "The "Mystery" of Willy Brandt's Resignation in May1974' below.

8. For this episode see above all Wayne C. Thompson, The Political Odyssey of HerbertWehner (Boulder/Oxford, 1993), pp. 57ff; Reinhard Müller, Die Akte Wehner: Moskau 1937bis 1941 (Berlin, 1993) pp. 88ff.; Hartmut Soell, Der junge Wehner: Zwischenrevolutionärem Mythos und praktischer Vernunft (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 202 ff., 309 ff.Between 1935 and 1940 19 million people were arrested 'as enemies of the people' ; 7 millionwere executed and most of the others died in internment camps. See Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 8(18 Feb. 1994), interview with Alexander Slavinas [Karl-Heinz Janßen], p. 12; see alsoMüller, ibid., p. 107. See in general on this episode in Soviet history Robert Conquest, TheGreat Terror: A Reassessment (London, 1990).

9. See FAZ, 10 Jan. 1994 [Reuth], p.3; Der Spiegel, Vol.48, No.2 (10 Jan. 1994), p.61; Müller,ibid., pp. 105 ff.; Thompson, ibid., pp. 57-69; Ruth von Mayenburg, Hotel Lux (Munich,1978), pp. 36 ff.; Günther Scholz, Herbert Wehner (Düsseldorf, 1986), p. 283; Gerhard Jahn(ed.), Herbert Wehner: Zeugnis (Cologne, 1982), pp. 178-79.

10. For Wehner's activities in Moscow see above all Müller, ibid., pp. 88 ff.; Soell, Der jungeWehner, pp. 408 ff.; Thompson, ibid.: Der Spiegel, Vol. 47. Nos. 12 and 13 (22 and 29 March1993) [Fritjof Meyer], pp. 188 ff.; Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 2 (10 Jan. 1994), pp. 58-64;Harmut Soell, 'Das Grauen der Erinnerung', in Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 3 (14 Jan. 1994), p. 8;FAZ, 10 Jan. 1994 [Reuth], p. 3.

11. Ibid. See particularly Thompson, ibid., pp. 43, 53; and very detailed Müller, ibid., pp. 165 ff.Not the individual denunciations by Wehner and other German émigré communists but thesystemic and selective persecution by the NKVD, the Communist party of the Soviet Unionand, of course, Stalin himself was responsible for the purges of so many people. Even thevery critical Reinhard Müller concludes in 'Schnelle Urteile', in Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 3 (14Jan. 1994), p. 8: 'Ursache für deren Verhaftung und Liquidierung ist nicht die einzelneDenunziation etwa Wehners, sondern die inquisitorisch und arbeitsteilig durchgeführtepolitische Vorverurteilung durch die politischen "Instanzen". Das vereinfachende Urteil überden "Verräter Wehner" verkennt den ... Systemcharakter der "Säuberungen".' See also Soell,Der junge Wehner, pp. 417-18.

12. See Jahn (ed.). Wehner: Zeugnis, pp. 296-98; Thompson, ibid., pp. 86-90; also Soell, ibid.,pp. 455 ff.

13. These 'notes', written in early 1946 in prison in Uppsala, of course did not mention all ofWehner's activities. Wehner glossed over most of them. His 'notes' were published in 1982by Gerhard Jahn. See Jahn (ed.), ibid. Wehner's 'Notizen' had been his second attempt tocope with his awful experiences. He had written a first draft in 1942/43 which has onlyrecently been published. See Herbert Wehner, Selbstbesinnung und Selbstkritik: Erfahrungenund Gedanken eines Deutschen (Cologne, 1994).

14. See Scholz, Wehner, pp. 71-83. Since he was elected to the Bundestag Wehner becameincreasingly close to his chairman. See the statistics about Schumacher's contacts with keyparty associates in Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and PoliticalBehavior (Stanford/London, 1965), p. 319.

15. See Hermann Weber, 'Die Täter-Opfer Problematik: Dokumente und Meinungen zu HerbertWehner', Deutschland-Archiv [hereafter: DA], Vol. 26, No. 8 (1993), pp. 958-61; also DieZeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2 Jan. 1994) [Robert Leicht], p. 1; for Wehner's humanitarian efforts seein detail, for example, Thompson, Political Odyssey, pp. 280 ff.; See also SüddeutscheZeitung [hereafter: SZ], 28 Jan. 1994 [Martin E. Süskind], p. 11.

16. See Die Zeit, ibid.; Der Spiegel, Vol. 48. No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), p. 26; Scholz, Wehner, pp. 96ff. See also the interviews with Wehner in Knut Terjung (ed.), Der Onkel: Herbert Wehnerin Gesprächen und Interviews (Hamburg, 1986), pp. 183 ff.

17. See Der Spiegel, Vol. 47, Nos. 12 and 13 (22 and 29 March 1993) [Fritjof Meyer], pp. 188ff.

18. See Note 8; and the excellent review article by Weber, 'Täter-Opfer Problematik', pp.955-61.

19. Since unification the Stasi archive has been administered by the so-called Gauck Office in

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 59

Berlin. For details see the law passed by the Bundestag in December 1991 as published inDA, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1992), pp. 203 ff.; and the interview with Joachim Gauck in ibid, No. 4(1994), pp. 437-40.

20. See FAZ, 10 Jan. 1994 [Reuth], p. 3; Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 2 (10 Jan. 1994), pp. 58-64.See also the brief articles by Soell, Müller, and Klaus Harpprecht in Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 3(14 Jan. 1994), p. 8.

21. See FAZ, ibid. Ever since Wehner became a prominent West German politician in the early1960s there had been attempts to blackmail him with his past by both the West and EastGerman secret service. Although in March 1967 material from Wehner's file was leaked toa West German daily paper there were never any serious attempts by the GDR governmentto make use of the documents. While East Berlin was busily collecting material aboutWehner's activities in the 1930s, adding new information to his voluminous file, makingveiled threats about exposing his activities in Moscow, and waging an intensive media-campaign against him, the GDR leadership did not dare to publish his file. This would havebackfired. After all, several leading GDR politicians had denounced just as many people asWehner. A revelation of this fact would certainly have been very embarrassing to the GDRand its self-proclaimed higher moral standards. See August H. Leugers-Scherzberg, 'DieAkten Wehner's, in Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 8 (18 Feb. 1994), p. 12; also Der Spiegel, Vol. 48,No. 2 (10 Jan. 1994), p. 60; Müller, Akte Wehner, p. 15; Jochen Staad, 'Die SED-Kampagnegegen Herbert Wehner: Neue historische Quellen und der Umgang mit ihnen', in DA, Vol.27, No. 4 (1994), pp. 347-48; Soell, 'Das Grauen', p. 8; SZ, 25 Jan. 1994, pp. 1,2.

22. See FAZ, 25 Jan. 1994, pp. 1, 2.23. There is a considerable amount of literature on Ostpolitik. Good overviews are given in:

Arnulf Baring mit Manfred Görtemaker, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart,1982), pp. 197 ff.; Horst Ehmke, Mittendrin: Von der Großen Koalition zur DeutschenEinheit (Berlin, 1994), pp. 53 ff., 125 ff. (Regarding Ehmke's memoirs see also Der Spiegel,Vol. 48, No. 11 (14 March 1994), pp. 54-61); Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt/M.,1989), pp. 168ff.; Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years, 1960-1975 (London, 1978),pp. 166 ff.; Terence Prittie, Willy Brandt: Portrait of a Statesman (London, 1974), pp. 197ff.; Peter Borowsky, Deutschland 1970-76 (4th edition, Hannover, 1983), pp. 13 ff.; PeterBender, Neue Ostpolitik: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag (2nd ed., Munich, 1989),esp. pp. 115 ff.; also Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the DividedContinent (London, 1993), pp. 28 ff.

24. This was reflected in academic writing. See above all one of the main advocates of thisthesis: Gerhard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy: the Domestic Setting (New York,1984). Like many academics at the time the author regarded West Germany almost as anation-state in its own right. He believed that the West Germans had developed a separatenational identity. See for a more balanced view William E. Paterson, 'The Ostpolitik andRegime Stability in West Germany', in Roger Tilford, The Ostpolitik and Political Changein Germany (Farnborough, Hants., 1975), pp. 23-44, esp. 34 ff.

25. This development climaxed more than a decade later when Chancellor Kohl receivedHonecker in the course of the latter's first and only official state visit to Bonn in 1987. See,for example. Turner, Germany, pp. 214-17. For Honecker's account of his relationship withWehner see Reinhold Andert and Wolfgang Herzberg, Der Sturz: Erich Honecker imKreuzvehör (3rd ed., Berlin, 1991), pp. 344-51; Erich Honecker, Ausmeinem Leben (14thed., Berlin (East), I989), pp. 77, 81.

26. See, for example, Franz-Josef Strauß, Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1989), pp. 497-508[paperback edition].

27. See above all FAZ, 17 Jan. 1994 [Reuth], p. 3.28. See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), pp. 21, 27-29; Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21

Jan. 1994), [Gunter Hofmann], p. 3.29. See Der Spiegel, ibid., p. 21.30. See FAZ, 17 Jan. 1994 [Reuth], p. 3. Brandt entitled his notes 'Anmerkungen zum Fall G.'

[Guillaume, the East German spy].31. Brandt, Erinnerungen, pp. 308 ff. (this section in his memoirs is entitled 'a victory falls

6 0 GERMAN POLITICS

apart').32. See for example. Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 5 (31 Jan. 1994), interview with the historian

Arnulf Baring [Joachim Preuß/Gerhard Spörl], p. 28.33. The following is based on above all Baring, Machtwechsel, pp. 509 ff., esp. pp. 594 ff.; Koch,

Brandt, pp. 487 ff.; Thompson, Political Odyssey pp. 327 ff.; David Binder, The OtherGerman: Willy Brandt's Life and Times (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 307 ff.; Scholz,Wehner, pp. 179; Barbara Marshall, Willy Brandt (London. 1990), pp. 99-103.

34. See Schmidt, 'Wider die Legende', pp. 3-4; also Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 5 (31 Jan. 1994),interview with Baring [Preuß/Spörl], p. 25.

35. See particularly Ehmke, Mittendrin, pp. 221 ff.; Brandt, Erinnerungen, pp. 305 ff.; Baring,Machtwechsel, pp. 511 ff.; 520 ff.; and William E. Paterson, 'The SPD after Brandt's Fall -Change or Continuity?' in Government and Opposition. Vol. 10, No. 2 (1975), pp. 171-76.

36. Brandt, ibid., pp. 304, 310. Schmidt has denied this. See Schmidt. 'Wider die Legende', p.3.

37. For a good overview of the 'policy of inner reforms' see for example Borowsky,Deutschland, pp. 64 ff.; also Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany,Vol. 2: Democracy and its Discontents 1963-1988 (Oxford/Cambridge, Ma., 1989), pp. 224ff.

38. See Turner, Germany, pp. 163-67; Baring, Machtwechsel, pp. 573 ff., esp. pp. 589 ff., 687ff.; Bark/Gress, ibid., pp. 259 ff.

39. However, the vote of CDU MP Julius Steiner was not bought by the SPD - as was allegedat the time - but by the East German Stasi. Whether Wienand was involved in this as wellhas not yet been revealed. See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), p. 28; Baring, ibid.,pp. 580-89; Scholz, Wehner, pp. 175-78.

40. See Baring, ibid., pp. 588-89.41. See Brandt, Erinnerungen, pp. 308-9; Baring, ibid., pp. 601 ff.; and the literature listed in

Note 34.42. Ibid.; also Scholz, Wehner, pp. 184-87; and Der Spiegel, Vol. 48. No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), p. 25.43. See Schmidt, 'Wider die Legende', pp. 3-4. Public support fell to 34 per cent (the SPD had

achieved 45.8 per cent in the general election of 1972) and increased to 52 per cent (from44.9) for the CDU/CSU opposition in the spring of 1974. On 4 March, in the Hamburgregional election, the SPD's vote declined from 55.3 to 44.9 per cent. See Bark/Gress,History, pp. 253, 262.

44. See Baring, Machtwechsel. pp. 691 ff.45. In his memoirs, however, he attempts to deny this. See Brandt, Erinnerungen, p. 308.46. Brandt, ibid., pp. 328-29:332-39. Nollau, who died in 1991, was the president of the office

for the protection of the constitution [Verfassungsschutz] - the West German equivalent toBritain's M15.

47. For detailed accounts of the spy scandal see Brandt, ibid., pp. 315 ff.; Günther Nollau, DasAmt: 50 Jahre Zeuge der Geschichte (Munich. 1978), pp. 254 ff., esp. pp. 265-69; Ehmke,Mittendrin, pp. 238 ff.; Baring, Machtwchsel, pp. 722 ff., 739 ff.; Koch, Brandt, pp. 527 ff.

48. Ibid.49. See Baring, Machtwechsel, p. 746; Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 5 (31 Jan. 1994), interview with

Baring [Preuß/Spörl], pp. 24-25.50. See Baring, ibid., pp. 733 ff.51. See the German weekly Focus, No. 7/94 (14 Feb 1994), pp. 18-22. According to the news

magazine the juicy stories were collected by the President of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA),Horst Herold, and then passed on to Nollau, Genscher and eventually Wehner and Brandt.

52. If Guillaume were to mention these details in court the government would find itself in ahighly embarrassing situation. If he kept them quiet East Berlin might use the information toput pressure on any future SPD government. See Nollau, Das Amt, p. 268; Baring,Machtwechsel, pp. 748 ff.; see also Thompson, Political Odyssey, pp. 350-51; Brandt,Erinnerungen, p. 323.

53. Brandt, ibid., p. 326.54. Brandt, ibid., pp. 326-29. See also a summary of Brandt's subsequent comments on the issue

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 61

in Thompson, Political Odyssey, pp. 352-55; and less detailed in Der Spiegel. Vol. 48. No.4 (24 Jan. 1994), pp. 23-26.

55. See Brandt, ibid., pp. 315 ff., esp. 322 ff. Brandt believed that 'in my physical andpsychological condition in later years, I would not have stepped down, but would have tidiedup where it was necessary to do so'. Ibid., p. 326, see also p. 314. See also Paterson, TheSPD, pp. 176-77.

56. See Scholz, Wehner, p. 190; Thompson, ibid.; television interview with Wehner conductedby Jürgen Kellermeier, 5 Jan. 1980, in Terjung (ed.), Der Onkel, pp. 170-72.

57. See the television interview with Wehner conducted by Kellermeier on 5 Jan. 1980, inTerjung (ed.), Der Onkel, pp. 171-2. Brandt, quite naturally, denied the correctness of suchan interpretation in his memoirs. See Brandt, Erinnerungen, p. 314. It can be assumed thatWehner's strong personal dislike for Brandt was a contributing factor which should not beunderestimated.

58. See FAZ, 3 Feb. 1994, p. 1.59. See FAZ, 17 Jan. 1994 [Reuth], p. 3; ibid., 21 Jan. 1994 [Zastrow], p. 1; ibid., 29 Jan. 1994,

p. 10.60. Ibid.; see also Brandt, Erinnerungen, p. 329. Wehner had indeed told Brandt about his

forthcoming meeting with Honecker and Schmidt never received any 'communication' fromEast Berlin during these crucial days. See Schmidt, 'Wider die Legende', pp. 3-4. ForWehner's visit to the GDR in late May 1973 (including the publication of some East Germandocuments) see Klaus Wiegrefe and Carsten Tessmer, 'Deutschlandpolitik in der Krise:Herbert Wehners Besuch in der DDR 1973', in DA, Vol. 27, No. 6 (1994), pp. 600-27.

61. Ibid.62. No effort was made to explain why the GDR government should have wished to embark on

such a course. It was by no means certain that Schmidt would be able to win the next electionand thus keep the social-liberal coalition in office. However, there would have been a highrisk involved that any collaboration between Honecker and Wehner would not remain secret.A discovery of the alleged co-operation might have had quite serious consequences for thecontinuation of Ostpolitik. While for Wehner personal factors and for Schmidt careerambitions played a great role, the GDR did not have similar pressing reasons for replacingBrandt.

63. See the accounts in Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), pp. 21 ff.; Die Zeit, Vol. 49,No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3.

64. See, for example, Nollau, Das Amt, pp. 272-73. See also Wigrefe/Tessmer, 'Herbert WehnersBesuch', pp. 600-1.

65. FAZ, 26 Jan. 1994, pp. 6-7. See also the analysis and comment by Timothy Garton Ash inibid., p. 29; SZ, 25 Jan. 1994, pp. 1, 2; ibid., 26 Jan 1994, p. 11 [Albrecht Hinze]; 27 Jan.1994, pp. 1, 4 [Jürgen Busche]; ibid., 28 Jan. 1994, p. 11 [Süskind]; Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No.5 (31 Jan. 1994), interview with Baring [Preuß/Spörl], pp. 24 ff.; Brandt, Erinnerungen, p.329.

66. See Der Spiegel, ibid.67. See SZ, 21 Jan. 1994, p. 1; ibid., 26 Jan. 1994, p. 2; Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan.

1994), pp. 20 ff.;FAZ, 21 Jan I994, p. 5. Vogel denied the allegation that he should have beenthe person who told Brandt about the suspicions against Wehner in late 1991.

68. He seems to have received considerable sums of money in return. See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48,No. 18 (2 May 1994), pp. 24-26; FAZ, 2 May 1994, p. 4; ibid., 7 May 1994, p. 1. See alsoDer Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 3 (17 Jan. 1994), pp. 24-25; and ibid., No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), p. 21,27-29; Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Gunter Hofmann], p. 3. Seebacher-Brandt'soriginal accusation that Wienand had worked for the Soviet KGB was wrong. She might havemisunderstood her husband. A confidant of Brandt's has remembered that the formerChancellor mumbled something about a connection between Wienand and the Stasi in 1992.See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 18 (2 May 1994), p. 26.

69. See Staad, 'SED-Kampagne', pp. 353-54. Moreover, throughout his political career in WestGermany Wehner never became tired of emphasising his belief in the ultimate failure of theGDR. In a television interview in January 1964 he said, for example: 'Es wird fürchterlich

62 GERMAN POLITICS

enden, mit einem moralischen Katzenjammer und einer sittlichen Vernichtung derer, dieeinmal aus ehrlichen Absichten kommunistische oder sozialistische Vorstellungen ... zurealisieren versucht haben.' Quoted in Jahn (ed.), Wehner: Zeugnis, p. 315.

70. See Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, Die Linke und die Einheit (Berlin, 1991); Focus, No. 6794 (7Feb. 1994), interview with Seebacher-Brandt [Jach/Kopf/Reity], pp. 36-38.

71. See Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3.72. See ibid. For Nolte's revisionist views in the context of the so-called 'Historikerstreit' which

started because of a controversial speech/article by Nolte in 1986 see Forever in the Shadowof Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy concerning thesingularity of the Holocaust, transl. by James Knowlton and Truett Cates (New Jersey, 1993),pp. 1 ff.; 18 ff.; 56-57, 149 ff., 243, 263; see also Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Entsorgung derdeutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum Historikerstreit (Munich, I988), pp.13 ff., 38 ff. 147 ff. For a brief portrait of Nolte see 'Der doppelte Außenseiter', in DerSpiegel. Vol. 48, No. 22 (30 May 1994) [Jürgen Leinemann], pp. 30-33.

73. See Seebacher-Brandt, Die Linke, pp. 59 ff.; Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994)[Hofmann], p. 3; Focus, No. 6/94 (7 Feb. 1994), interview with Seebacher-Brandt[Jach/Kopf/Reity], pp. 36-38. For a good analysis of the reaction of the so-called '1968generation' to German unification see Andrei S. Markovits, 'The West German 68-ersEncounter the Events of 1989', in German Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992), pp. 13-30.

74. See Seebacher-Brandt, ibid., pp. 47 ff.; Die Zeit, ibid., pp. 3, 1; Focus, ibid., pp. 37-38; DerSpiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), pp. 22 ff.

75. See Der Spiegel, ibid. Brandt was Deputy President of the SI from 1966 to 1976.76. See also her piece in defence of some young neo-conservative German writers who

question united Germany's close links with the western world. It is entitled 'Strudel imMeinungsstrom', FAZ, 18 April 1994, p. 31.

77. See SZ, 27 Jan. 1994.78. See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), p. 20. The SPD strongly opposed the

necessity of such a committee. See SZ, 20 Jan. 1994, p. 1.79. Der Spiegel spoke of a 'Schlammschlacht' (slanging match). See Vol. 48, No. 8 (21 Feb.

1994), pp. 22-25; see also ibid.. No. 6 (7 Feb. 1994), pp. 27-28; FAZ, 7 Feb. 1994, p. 4.80. Although dealing with this issue involves some speculation there is enough information

available to justify the attempt. It is above all based on the accounts and sober interpretationsin Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3; and Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4(24 Jan. 1994), pp. 22 ff. See also more generally Seebacher-Brandt, Die Linke.

81. Ibid.82. See Rudolf Scharping, 'So soll es wieder sein'. Die Zei, Vol. 48, No. 51 (17 Dec. 1993), p.48; Schmidt, 'Wider die Legende', p. 3-4.83. See Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3.84. See ibid.; SZ, 24 Jan. 1994, p. 1 ; ibid., 25 Jan. 1994, p. 2. In mid-1994 a compromise solution

was worked out. The archive of the Friedrich-Ebert foundation will obtain all of Brandt'spolitical papers including some which are in Seebacher-Brandt's possession. The archive hasacknowledged the widow's rights over these papers as expressed by Brandt in his testament.In addition a 'Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung' will be established in Berlin to remindpeople of Willy Brandt's political achievements. Seebacher-Brandt as well as Brandt's sonPeter, the Friedrich-Ebert foundation, the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Presidencywill have seats on the committee overseeing both the Brandt papers in the archive and thefoundation in Berlin. See dpa news agency reports 4009 and 4093 (May, 1994).

85. See Rut Brandt, Freundesland: Erinnerungen (7th ed., Hamburg, 1992).86. Before her marriage to Brandt she had been an insider, however, and was very well known

within SPD circles. Brigitte Seebacher joined the SPD in 1965, became editor of the SPDnewspaper 'Berliner Stimme' in 1975 at the age of 29 (a position Brandt had occupied 20years previously) and was recommended to Brandt as a speechwriter in the summer of 1977due to her journalistic talents and political interests. See Koch, Brandt, pp. 564-65.

87. See Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3; and Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4(24 Jan. 1994), pp. 22 ff.; Focus, No. 6/94 (7 Feb. 1994), interview with Seebacher-Brandt

WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK 63

[Jach/Kopf/Reity], pp. 36-38.88. See Seebacher-Brandt, Die Linke, pp. 19-25; also Gordon Smith et al (eds.), Developments

in German Politics (Basingstoke/London, 1992), pp. 87-88, 210.89. See Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3; and Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4

(24 Jan. 1994), pp. 22 ff. Brandt's relationships did not only play a role in his resignation asChancellor and his estrangement from the SPD. The Greek political scientist MargaritaMathiopoulos, a friend of his, indirectly led to his resignation as party chairman in 1987.When Brandt suggested appointing the woman to fill the important post of SPD presssecretary, this created an outcry. Mathiopoulos was not a member of the SPD, did not hold aGerman passport, and above all did not seem to have enough knowledge about the SPD tobe able to represent the party. When even trusted associates publicly criticised Brandt'schoice, the former Chancellor resigned in a huff. See, Koch, Brandt, pp. 593-94.

90. See der Spiegel, ibid., p. 22.91. See Focus, NO. 6/94 (7 Feb. 1994), interview with Seebacher-Brandt [Jach/Kopf/Reity], pp.

36-38.92. Die Zeit, Vol. 49, No. 4 (21 Jan. 1994) [Hofmann], p. 3.93. The historian Baring concluded: 'I regard Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt as one of the most

talented journalists who have appeared in the last few years ... But in the Wehner story sheapparently regarded that assumptions - which Brandt himself did not make public as theywere only mere assumptions - as evidence.' See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 5 (31 Jan,. 1994),interview with Baring [Preuß/Spörl], p. 28.

94. This is, of course, also confirmed by the anti-Wehner campaign waged by the GDR between1964 and 1973. See Staad, 'SED-Kampagne', pp. 353-54; also Notes 21 and 69. Seebacher-Brandt, however, is unable to accept this; she sticks to her claims. See Focus, No. 6/94 (7Feb. 1994), interview with Seebacher-Brandt [Jach/Kopf/Reity], pp. 36-38.

95. Regarding Strauß's contacts see his not very revealing Die Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1989), pp.521 ff.

96. See Der Spiegel, Vol. 48, No. 4 (24 Jan. 1994), p. 26.