A Philosophical Investigation: Interrogating Practices and

Beliefs about Disability

by Christine Wieseler

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Abstract

Sometimes beliefs that are shared are treated as if they are knowledge

in spite of a lack of evidence or even in the face of evidence to the

contrary. Beliefs informed by prejudices and ignorance about people

with disabilities are often treated as certain and reinforced by

social practices. In this paper, I distinguish between knowledge

claims and beliefs that are treated as if they are true. I use

Wittgenstein’s account of the connection between epistemic and other

social practices in On Certainty to consider how it is possible to

change beliefs about disability. I draw on Naomi Scheman’s “Forms of

life: Mapping the rough ground” to consider political applications of

Wittgenstein’s thought. I use a Wittgensteinian framework to critique

Peter Singer’s claims regarding the lives of disabilities in Practical

Ethics. I draw attention to the ways in which unjustified beliefs about

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disability can inform and be reified through social practices.

Likewise, changes in social practices can dislodge common ableist

beliefs about disability.

Introduction

In this paper, I am concerned with beliefs about disability that

are presented as knowledge claims but do not have the justification

that knowledge requires. Some of these beliefs purport to be “natural”

ways of understanding disability rather than the result of social

construction and ossification. The ways that a given societyi treats

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people with disabilities proceed as if these beliefs are true, and

practices have the potential to hold these beliefs about disability in

place.ii In addition to the epistemological implications, there are

significant ethical consequences of the propositions we treat as

certain. What a society treats as “common sense” need not be the best

way of making sense of and responding to the world; rather, it is

simply a way of understanding that holds shared beliefs in place as

certain. It is only within a particular framework that what is taken

for granted is treated as certain. I maintain that we need to turn our

attention to the ways in which some epistemic and other social

practices reify propositions about disability that are not empirically

supported. I will utilize Wittgenstein’s account of knowledge to show

that changing practices can shift ableist beliefs from being regarded

as certain to ceasing to serve a function.iii

Wittgenstein makes clear that alterations in practices have the

capacity to change the beliefs that most members of a given society

take for granted. Though Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss ways

to intentionally change commonly held beliefs, he provides important

conceptual tools that can be used to develop strategies for large-

scale shifts in beliefs about disability by targeting social

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practices. I will consider how it is possible, on a Wittgensteinian

account, to critique practices without appealing to practice-

transcendent ideals. The work of Naomi Scheman is a productive

starting point for examining how changes in social practices can shift

which beliefs about disability are treated as certain. While she

acknowledges that philosophy is insufficient for social change, she

contends that a Wittgensteinian framework can inform attempts to

engage in political action to create change. Turning to the work of

Peter Singer, I will examine his discussion of disability in order to

show that he appeals to a conceptualization of disability often

treated as “common sense” rather than knowledge. He claims that the

lives of people with disabilitiesiv have less value than the lives of

people without disabilities. Singer presents this and related claims

as if they are factual statements, but I contend that they are the

groundless grounds of ableist thinking and practices. I will draw

attention to the limitations of challenging the beliefs of

individuals, which is insufficient because, even if individuals do

change their beliefs, ableist physical and conceptual structures

within society remain in place.

Wittgenstein’s Account of Knowledge, Doubt, and Hinge Propositions

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In On Certainty, Wittgenstein’s approach to epistemological

questions differs from many of his philosophical predecessors insofar

as he privileges the way we make knowledge claims in everyday life

over abstract theoretical models of knowing. In contrast to

philosophers such as Descartes, who attempts to build a foundation for

knowledge by starting from the solitary knower, Wittgenstein examines

the integral connections between knowledge, doubt, language, and

practices, which he characterizes as inherently communal.

Wittgenstein’s methodology in his later work involves asking, “is

the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its

original home?”v He criticizes philosophers who distort the ways that

a word is used by removing it from its use and meaning in everyday

life and looking for a transcendent meaning, i.e., a meaning that

transcends the particularity of contexts. In On Certainty Wittgenstein

targets G.E. Moore, who attempts to refute the radical skeptic.vi

As an example of the radical skeptic’s methodology, Descartes

maintains in the “First Meditation” that he does not know he has hands,

etc.vii In direct opposition to the skeptic, Moore simply states that

he does know he has two hands because he sees them. According to Moore,

it follows from this premise that two physical objects exist. He

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concludes that if two physical objects exist, then the physical world

exists.

Wittgenstein refers to Moore’s argument in the following, “If you

do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest [my

emphasis].”viii He calls into question the status of Moore’s claim that

he knows he has hands. In the attempt to make a claim that is

independent of knowledge practices, Moore fails to express knowledge.

Wittgenstein denies that this proposition is a knowledge claim because

it is not in a context in which it makes sense as such. He asserts, “

‘I know’ is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the

sense of a proposition (like ‘I believe’) but between me and a

fact.”ix There must be the possibility of evidence counting for and

against a proposition for it to be a knowledge claim.

Wittgenstein claims that doubt is only possible within a

language-game, defined as “the whole consisting of language and the

actions into which it is woven.”x He coins this term in order to

emphasize “the fact that the speaking of language is part of an

activity, or of a life-form [Lebensform].xixii A form of life is the

cultural or social context including “patterns of behaviour” xiii in

which language-games are embedded. Particular ways of understanding

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the world make sense within a form of life. Outside of such a context,

doubt ceases to have a point or even make sense.xiv This is true of

knowledge as well. There can be neither groundless knowledge nor

groundless doubt. Consequently, Wittgenstein maintains that the best

response to the radical skeptic is to show the lack of grounds for

doubt.

Insofar as Moore attempts to make an absolute claim, he fails to

express knowledge. Wittgenstein states, “To say of man, in Moore’s

sense, that he knows something; that what he says is therefore

unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me, (…) it is an unmoving

foundation of his language-game.”xv Here Wittgenstein suggests that if

one treats a proposition as unconditionally true,xvi the statement

lacks the contingency of an empirical proposition, which is capable of

being true or false; rather it is treated as certain regardless of the

state of affairs. Such a proposition is held in place by language and

practices with which it is intertwined.

According to Wittgenstein, some propositions that appear to be

empirical. i.e., knowledge claims, are not. Moore’s claim to know

falls into this category. Rather than expressing knowledge, such

propositions have a peculiar role as hinge propositions, meaning that they

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are treated as certain in what we do and function as the ungrounded

ground for judgments.xvii In other words, they are the conditions for

the possibility of truth and falsity. Wittgenstein provides an

illustration to clarify the role of such propositions, “the questions

we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are

exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.”xviii

In order for either doubt or knowledge to be possible, there must be

some propositions we hold in place as certain. The sense of our

language-games comes from hinge propositions insofar as what we say

and do makes sense in relation to what we treat as certain. In

addition, our practices hold hinge propositions in place.

There must, at any time, be some hinge propositions that hold in

order for us to make sense of the world, but the particular

propositions that serve as hinges can change. In other words, the

propositions that hold fast do so contingently. A proposition may

function as a hinge in one case but as an empirical proposition in

another. Wittgenstein asserts, “the same proposition may get treated

at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule

of testing.”xix When we assume a proposition or belief and use it to

ground subsequent claims and actions, we do not question it. While it

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does make sense to question some propositions serving as hinges, there

are others for which there are not ample grounds for calling them into

question. However, if, in the future, there are grounds for doubting a

particular proposition serving as a hinge, then it can be questioned.

In other words, even if there are not currently grounds for bringing a

hinge proposition into question, the possibility remains that the

status of a hinge proposition may shift.

Let’s consider an example in order to further clarify the notion

of a hinge proposition. On a Wittgensteinian account, a proposition

that asserts “the physical world exists” serves as a hinge

proposition, not a knowledge claim. We do not doubt that material

reality exists when we formulate empirical questions and make

knowledge claims about the world. In addition, it is unclear what it

would mean to be wrong about the existence of the physical world.

There is nothing we could use to test whether or not physical reality

exists since all instruments presuppose its existence and are material

themselves. It is both uncertain what would count as evidence that the

external world does not exist and what reasonable grounds for doubting

the external world would be.

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Wittgenstein gives the example of his not being able to doubt

that he has not been on the moon. “When I say, ‘Nothing speaks for,

everything against it,’ this presupposes a principle of speaking for

and against. That is, I must be able to say what would speak for it.”xx

However, if he had both adequate grounds for doubt and a means for

testing, he could call the proposition that he had not been to the

moon into question. Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s reference to the

proposition that no one has ever been to the moon provides an example

of a proposition that contingently served as a hinge.xxi Now that

practices and facts have changed there are both grounds for doubt and

means for testing that doubt, this proposition has been shown to be

false. This means its status changed from a hinge to an empirical

proposition. Whereas it was formerly considered certain that it is

impossible for humans to go to the moon, now it is considered to be

common sense that it is possible to do so. Our practices hold this

proposition in place as a hinge. If someone claims otherwise, i.e.,

that humans cannot go to the moon, we can provide evidence that his or

her claim is false. When a proposition transitions from serving as a

hinge proposition to an empirical proposition, it changes from being

treated as unconditionally true to conditionally true or false.

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Both in day-to-day life and in the practice of philosophy, we

sometimes fail to distinguish hinge propositions and knowledge claims.

When we are unaware that we are treating hinge propositions as

knowledge claims and lack understanding of the ways in which social

practices hold them in place, we unquestioningly hold them in place.

It is unnecessary to learn which propositions serve as hinges in our

language-games for them to function. In fact, most of the time we

don’t. Instead, we learn practices that hold these propositions in

place. Wittgenstein states, “I do not explicitly learn the

propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently

like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in

the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it

determines its immobility.”xxii According to Wittgenstein, we hold

multiple propositions in place. Hinge propositions or hinge beliefsxxiii

function in everyday life regardless of our identification of them.

Unless we have grounds for doubt, which often arise from experiences of

the world from a particular social location that shows the falsity of

what our practices hold in place as certain,xxiv we are likely to take

the status quo to be “natural” or the only way of thinking about and

acting within the world. Wittgenstein recognizes the epistemic value

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of taking other people’s experience into account, stating, “it isn’t

just my experience, but other people’s that I get knowledge from.”xxv

The experiences of others may confirm what we already think we know or

it may lead us to call into question what we have been treating as

certain.

Drawing attention to particular hinge propositions can be a step

towards dislodging them; some hinge propositions can be “unhinged”

through treatment as empirical propositions. Instead of treating a

particular proposition as certain, it may then be possible to test it

and show that it is false and/or formulated in such a way that it

leads to misunderstanding rather than understanding. This unhinging

changes how we make sense of the world. This is possible on an

individual level, but is much more effective at the institutional

level. Since societal practices hold hinge propositions in place, if

practices change, then new propositions will be held in place as

certain. Changing practices allows for hinge beliefs to be unhinged,

rendering beliefs that were treated as certain and the language-games

given sense by them obsolete.

In this section, I have articulated Wittgenstein’s account of

knowledge in which both knowledge and doubt must be contingent and

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have grounds within the context of a language-game. On this

understanding, commonly held beliefs and social practices including

knowledge production are inextricably connected. I emphasized the

distinction Wittgenstein makes between hinge beliefs and knowledge

claims. If, as Wittgenstein asserts, doubt only makes sense in a

language-game within a form of life, we are left with the question of

how it is possible to argue for or against practices from within a

form of life. It will be my task to provide a Wittgensteinian response

to this difficulty, using Naomi Scheman’s “Forms of Life: Mapping the

Rough Ground”xxvi as a starting point for thinking about changes in

epistemic and other practices regarding disability.

Strategies for Change informed by Wittgensteinian Notions

While Wittgenstein acknowledges that propositions can change in status

from hinge to empirical, it is not his intent to provide strategies

for enacting this shift. For Wittgenstein, philosophy “leaves

everything as it is.”xxvii “I naturally do not want to say that men

should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.”xxviii

He emphasizes description rather than prescription in his analysis of

practices. Though Wittgenstein doesn’t consider the possibility of

changing practices in order to shift dominant frameworks for knowing,

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his thought provides a picture of how knowledge, doubt, beliefs, and

practices function in relation to each other. Thus, his account can be

used to develop effective strategies for social change.

Wittgenstein suggests that we can evaluate different systems of

knowing. He states:

We say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let

them be never so sure of their belief-they are wrong and we know

it. If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs

is evidently the poorer one by far.xxix

We must treat some beliefs as certain in order to make sense of the

world at all, i.e., to develop a system of knowledge. However, some

hinge beliefs lead to systems of knowledge that fail to explain

reality well. As Wittgenstein points out, sureness does not contribute

to the merit of a system of knowledge. Even if the majority of people

within a society participate in the practices that treat a proposition

or set of propositions as hinges, this should not increase our

confidence in the reliability of their claims that purport to be

knowledge.

Scheman argues that we must avoid falling into the trap of the

“Manichean” xxx interpretation of Wittgenstein, which understands forms

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of life to be “internally homogenous” where “one is either inside or

outside of a language game, (…) and, if inside, one just does what

‘we’ do; if outside, one is clueless-not a participant, certainly not

an intelligible critic [emphasis added].”xxxi This type of

interpretation is likely to lead one to have the desire to appeal to a

practice-transcendent ideal because of the mistaken equation of

contingency with “uncritical relativism.”xxxii In other words, one may

seek an unchanging foundation upon which to base practices. Yet, this

is exactly what Wittgenstein urges the reader to forfeit. Scheman

acknowledges that we are liable to be tempted to relapse into the

Manichean reading as long as we do not move from the idea that we can

occupy a vantage point outside of our practices to acknowledgement

that the position from which one knows is located within a form of

life. This move recognizes knowledge as inherently politicized and

involves “a shift from the philosophical to the political.”xxxiii That

is the point at which we go beyond Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the

development of a Wittgensteinian politics. I will focus on

Wittgenstein’s thought in order to show the former can lead to the

latter and inform strategies for change.

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How are we to understand heterogeneity and homogeneity within

forms of life? In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor

queries, “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true

and what is false?”xxxiv This seems to be a common misunderstanding of

Wittgenstein, so I want to emphasize that this is not his position. He

responds by stating that people make assertions that are true and

false, but their opinions need not be the same. Likewise, our

perspectives on how things are differ. Our shared language allows us

to articulate these perspectives and to agree or disagree. We follow

the same rules in our language-games, which are within a form of life.

Therefore, following the rules of a language, which are subject to

change, is a condition for participating in the conversation in a way

that is intelligible to others within a form of life. However, this is

not equivalent to homogeneity of perspectives. Instead it is the

condition for the possibility of heterogenous viewpoints.

On a Wittgensteinian account, we are “tragically misled if we

attempt to step outside of the practices in which we are engaged in

order to provide a justification of them, or worse, to argue for their

reform.”xxxv There is nothing that transcends our practices to which we

can appeal, but this does not mean that we cannot make judgments about

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which practices are better or worse in a particular regard. For

instance, it is possible to make the judgment that practices excluding

people with disabilities from participating in society in meaningful

ways are worse than those that include them. Adopting a

Wittgensteinian approach that rejects the traditional notion of

objectivity as a view from nowhere does not relegate us to making

judgments arbitrarily.

How can we make critical judgments from within a form of life

with nothing outside of our practices to which we can appeal? For

those whose experience does not indicate practices and the hinge

propositions held in place by them to be problematic, the question of

whether or not a hinge proposition is suitable is unlikely to assert

itself since there are no grounds for raising it as long as it

functions without interruption. Experience is integrally related to

social location and can play an important role in leading one to

recognize the propositions that are held in place as certain as well

as the conflation of hinge propositions and knowledge claims.xxxvi We

check a knowledge claim against our own experience and the experiences

of other people. Wittgenstein illustrates this in the following: “And

it isn’t for example just my experience, but other people’s that I get

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knowledge from. (…) But what experience makes me believe that the

anatomy and physiology books don’t contain what is false? Though it is

true that this trust is backed up by my own experience.”xxxvii The case

Wittgenstein presents here is one in which knowledge claims are in

accord with his experience. I am concerned with cases in which the

experiences of a segment of the population, in this case, people with

disabilities, differ from what is presented as knowledge. Because

there is heterogeneity within any given form of life, one may

understand and be a within a form of life, yet have experiences that

contradict some of the propositions that are treated as certain by

that form of life. People with disabilities are an example of those

“who for the widest range of reasons, within and beyond their own

choosing, live somewhere other than at the centers of the forms of

life they inhabit.”xxxviii The perspectives and lives of people with

disabilities are marginalized not by their bodies but by the ways that

society structures the environments in which humans exist as well as

dominant understandings which often treat prejudices about disability

as knowledge.

Scheman’s account provides a starting point to think about how it

is possible to challenge practices and the beliefs held in place by

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them, from within a form of life. She states, “I want to argue, that

is, that the epistemic resources of variously marginal subject

positions provide the ground for a critique of “what we do” that

rejects both the possibility of transcending human practice and the

fatalism of being determined by it (…).”xxxix Importantly, Scheman

claims that being within a human practice allows for the possibility

of criticizing it from within; nothing beyond or outside of our

practices is required. She is focused on those who are marginalized

yet have the possibility of being heard in the discussion. The

epistemic resources of those who are marginalized are derived from

their social locations. Some aspects of reality are apparent from a

marginalized perspective that are less (or not) noticeable from a

privileged perspective. The latter is often treated as objective or

universal. Since there are heterogenous perspectives within a form of

life, some people are in better positions than others, partly due to

their experiences, to criticize current practices and the hinge

propositions around which they turn. Those who do not have a

privileged social location are more likely than those who do to

recognize that the so-called view from nowhere is actually a view from

somewhere, and, thus, they have a greater likelihood of showing that

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there are grounds for doubting hinge propositions that have a role in

making oppressive practices make sense.

Scheman suggests that acknowledging the diversity of knowers’

locations and what they know can lead us “to a clearer sense of how

more responsibly to live in the forms of life we-variously-inhabit.”xl

I want to stress that she is not claiming that there are

epistemological chasms whereby people who are differently located are

unable to attain or understand each other’s knowledge, since this

would fall back into the Manichean reading of Wittgenstein that she

rejects. Rather, she suggests that we have much to learn about the

effects of our practices from each other. Paying attention to

perspectives of those who are marginalized can help us to have a more

complete picture of how things are and can show us the ways that we

are not living up to the ideals we hold as a society.xli Instead of

understanding differences such as disabilities to be the source of the

exclusion of people with disabilities, we can come to see that ableist

beliefs and practices that treat people with disabilities as inferior

members of society are the sources of exclusion. This can lead us to

change our practices, thereby unhinging ableist hinge propositions and

replacing them with non-ableist ones.

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In the following section, I will critique an argument Singer

makes regarding the lives of people with disabilities. I will use a

Wittgensteinian framework to show that Singer equivocates between

hinge beliefs and knowledge claims, treating beliefs as if they

constitute knowledge.

Singer’s Claim to Know About The Reality of Disability

In order to provide the background for Singer’s remarks on

disability, I will begin with a few remarks on conceptualizing

disability. There is not one stable, uniform, and uncontentious

definition of disability. How disability is defined depends upon who

is defining it and for what purpose. Some examples of purposes for

which disability is defined include: eligibility for a disabled

parking permit, Social Security Disability Insurance, special

education, and healthcare purposes. As Susan Wendell notes, disability

is determined in relation to what abilities are considered “normal” or

necessary for functioning in a particular location; thus, the same

biological condition may be considered a disability in one context but

not another.xlii In addition, Ron Amundson argues that there is a range

of abilities rather than a sharp distinction between normal and

abnormal function.xliii

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There are two models that serve as frameworks for thinking about

disability. The first is the Medical Model, which maintains that,

“disadvantages are natural and inevitable outcomes of simply

biomedical facts. Reduction of these natural disadvantages can be

accomplished only by individual cures (…).”xliv In other words,

disability is a problem stemming from the individual’s bodily

condition, and the only way to alleviate disadvantages faced by people

with disabilities is through medical intervention. This model was

introduced first and remains dominant within our society generally

and, more specifically, within biomedical ethics. xlvThe Social Model

views disability as an outcome of the interaction of people with

impairments and the socially constructed environment. This model

acknowledges that individuals have biomedical conditions, but places

emphasis on socially created disadvantages, which are contingent and

changeable. Singer acknowledges that social conditions make the lives

of people with disabilities more difficult than they need to be.

However, his position is aligned much more closely with the Medical

Model than the Social Model. Singer adopts the ethical framework of

preference utilitarianism, and an understanding of this position will

help to situate his discussion of disability.

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Singer maintains that the goal of our actions should be to

maximize the satisfaction of preferences. In Practical Ethics, he

explains, “It [preference utilitarianism] differs from classical

utilitarianism in that ‘best consequences’ is understood as meaning

what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected, rather

than merely what increases pleasure and reduces pain.”xlvi He defines

interests as, “what, on balance and after reflection on all of the

relevant facts, a person prefers [my emphasis].”xlvii So, rather than

calculating what will maximize pleasure, he advocates weighing

interests “impartially.” Singer calls this “the principle of equal

consideration of interests”xlviiixlix

Singer holds that the principle of equal consideration will give

the needs that are central to the lives of people with disabilities

more weight than peripheral needs of others. One might think that

determining the relevant facts would be an empirical undertaking

involving the people, in this case people with disabilities, whose

interests and preferences one seeks to identify. Instead, Singer

asserts, “By giving equal consideration to the interests of those with

disabilities, and empathetically imagining ourselves in their situation, we

can, in principle, reach the right answer [my emphasis].”l What does

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Singer mean by, “empathetically imagining ourselves in their

situation”? I assume that this involves an attempt to identify with

people with disabilities by imagining their experiences as if taking

on their perspective. I will further assume that the person imagining

does not have a disability, since if he did, he would not need to

imagine his own preferences. In what follows, I will focus on some of

the problematic aspects of this approach.

Singer does not consider the vast differences in perspectives

likely to exist between people with and without disabilities as a

result of social positions. As American society is currently

constructed, able-bodied people occupy a privileged position in

relation to people with disabilities. The able-body is privileged as

the universal or standard, and many social practices reflect this by

only taking the needs and preferences of people without disabilities

into consideration while purporting to be neutral. Those identified as

having disabilities are considered exceptional or abnormal.

Stereotypical representations of people with disabilities, which tend

to portray people with disabilities as either heroic or tragic victims

that the viewer ought to pity, are prevalent in films and television

shows.li When an able-bodied person tries to take on the perspective

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of a person with a disability independent of consultation with people

with disabilities, her main “resources” for doing so will likely be

stereotypes of disability and her own fears. Iris Marion Young warns,

“The perspective of the other can too easily be represented as the

self’s other represented to itself-fantasies, desires, and fears.”lii

This is exactly what research has repeatedly found when people without

disabilities are asked to evaluate the quality of the lives of people

with disabilities.

On the basis of preference utilitarianism, Singer argues that it

is not wrong to abort fetuses or kill infants on the basis of

disability if the parents would prefer a child without a disability

since a “normal,” i.e. non-disabled, child will be likely to

experience greater happiness than one with a disability. In my

criticism of Singer’s argument, I will focus on his underlying belief

about the quality of the lives of people with disabilities. Singer

states:

It may still be objected that to replace either a fetus or a

newborn infant is wrong because it suggests to disabled people

living today that their lives are less worth living than the lives of

people who are not disabled. Yet it is surely flying in the face of reality to deny

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that, on average, this is so. That is the only way to make sense of

actions that we all take for granted [my emphasis].liii

Singer does not distinguish between propositions that are empirical

and those that serve as hinges, which are held in place by practices.

His claim that the lives of disabled people are less worth living than

the lives of people who are not disabled purports to be knowledge.

Attempting to support this claim, Singer maintains that actions “we

all take for granted” only make sense because the truth of this claim

is shown by reality. However, if we utilize Wittgenstein’s notion of a

hinge proposition, it becomes clear that it is unnecessary for the

claim to be true in order for actions related to disability to make

sense; it is only necessary that this belief be treated as certain. Though

Singer’s statement that the lives of disabled people are less worth

living is presented as an empirical proposition, we can see that it is

actually functioning as a hinge proposition. It is not grounded by

empirical evidence; rather, it simultaneously gives practices sense

and is held in place by them. Singer’s claim can function because his

assertion that the lives of disabled people are less worth living is a

common belief. Ableism maintains that the lives of people with

disabilities are inferior to the lives of the non-disabled in spite of

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evidence to the contrary, and ableist practices hold this belief in

place. Rather than going along with this belief, we can focus on the

prevalent devaluation of the lives of people with disabilities within

society against which Singer’s claims make sense.

Singer contends that it is not prejudice that leads people to

think that the lives of people with disabilities are, on average, less

happy and less worth living than the lives of people without

disabilities. Singer anticipates that he may be perceived as

contradicting himself by both recognizing the “unjustifiable

discrimination” disabled people are subjected to and condoning

abortion and infanticide on the basis of disability in the following:

these arguments presuppose that life is better without a

disability than with one; and is this not itself a form a

prejudice, held by people without disabilities, and parallel to

the prejudice that it is better to be a member of the European

race, or a man, than to be of African descent, or a woman?liv

He hypothesizes that most people who use wheelchairs would prefer to

“have full use of their legs” and cites this as evidence that the

claim that the lives of people with disabilities are inferior to the

lives of those without disabilities is not a mere prejudice.lv

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In the preceding claims and elsewhere, Singer tends to conflate

preference, well-being/happiness, and value of living. Parsing out the

differences between these notions is important for understanding the

implicit assumptions at play in his discussion of the quality of life

of people with disabilities. Singer’s arguments require that we assume

that people with disabilities tend to be less happy than people

without disabilities, and this leads them to devalue their own lives

independent of any social factors. If a person who uses a wheelchair

prefers to be able to walk, does that really mean that her life is

less happy than or inferior to the life of a person who doesn’t use a

wheelchair? Erik Nord recognizes the need to distinguish these notions

when discussing quality of life. Nord states, “Desire for cure is

strongly related to expected gain in subjective well-being. But

expected well-being is not the same as actual gain.”lvi Actual cure

might not increase happiness. In addition, a person who uses a

wheelchair may be just as happy as a person who doesn’t, but she may

still prefer to be able to walk because of the prejudices and socially

constructed obstacles she faces.

When Singer’s claim that people with disabilities are less happy

than those without disabilities has been subject to empirical

29

verification, many studies have provided evidence that this claim is

false. As Amundson notes, “when asked about the quality of their own

lives, disabled people report a quality only slightly lower than that

reported by nondisabled people, and much higher than that projected by

nondisabled people.”lvii Singer responds to these studies by suggesting

that there are reasons we should not take the results “at face

value.”lviii In fact, he goes so far as to agree with the assertion that

people with severe disabilities “ ‘adjust their expectations’ or

‘lower their expectations in life’ ”lixlx For Singer, if people with

disabilities report similar levels of happiness to people without

disabilities, the definition of happiness must differ and not measure

up to that of people without disabilities. Singer’s move to discredit

the reports of people with disabilities fits into a larger pattern of

practices in which the perspective of an able-bodied person is taken

to be objective. As Amundson notes, “The testimony of disabled people

about their lives has been dismissed in favor of that of nondisabled

‘experts’ for a very long time, as historians have documented.”lxi

Singer is unwilling to admit what people with disabilities say about

their lives as evidence because he treats as certain the proposition

that the lives of people with disabilities are less worth living. It

30

looks as though there is nothing that he would count as evidence

against this claim because it is of an absolute form, and, in this

sense, similar to Moore’s claim that failed to express knowledge.

Singer asserts, “If serious disability has no tendency to make

one’s life worse, there would be no reason to fund research into

preventing or overcoming disability.”lxii Here Singer implies a false

dilemma. His statement suggests that we must choose between

maintaining that the lives of people with disabilities are worse than

people without disabilities and continue research related to

impairments or we deny that the lives of people with disabilities are

worse and discontinue all research related to impairments. However,

the preference utilitarianism he endorses weighs interests of

individuals, not the value that other people assign to that person’s

life or the level of happiness experienced by that person. Within this

framework, it is the interest of each person with a disability that is

relevant. If people with disabilities express the preference for

amelioration of symptoms or access to improved technology that would

increase their functionality, these preferences ought to have weight

regardless of their current level of happiness. We need not make the

choice Singer proposes.

31

Societal practices that only make sense in relation to ableist

beliefs play a much more significant role in hindering people with

disabilities than their bodies do by groundlessly preventing people

with disabilities from having the ability to engage in activities

basic to human life by means of attitudinal and architectural

barriers. Treating most disadvantages faced by people with

disabilities as if they are the inevitable result of impairment

prevents acknowledgement that society has a role in creating some

disadvantages and allows unjust practices to continue while escaping

identification as such. Rather than simply describing the reality of

the lives of people with disabilities, Singer engages in practices

that hold beliefs in place and, for those who have no reason to doubt

the truth of these claims, precludes actual knowledge of the lives of

people with disabilities.

When one judges that one already “knows” about the experience of

disability, there is no impetus to learn about actual subjective

experiences of people with disabilities. As long as one’s beliefs

regarding disability continue to function, one has no grounds to call

them into question. However, when they do doubt their hinge beliefs,

able-bodied people can gain knowledge regarding the preferences of

32

disabled people through respectful and open dialogue with people with

disabilities. Identifying propositions held in place (in distinction

from knowledge) through practices is one step towards delegitimizing

them. In Singer’s argument, we saw an example of how ableist

propositions are treated as hinge propositions. Like the proposition

that no one has ever been to the moon, there are grounds for doubt in

regard to these propositions. Shifting the hinge propositions that

individuals such as Singer hold certain would take what Wittgenstein

calls a “conversion”; they would “be brought to look at the world in a

different way.”lxiii

My examination of Singer’s argument shows the limitations of the

strategy of challenging a proposition that an individual treats as a

hinge, particularly when predominant practices revolve around it.

Though there may be circumstances in which the strategy of targeting

the ableist beliefs of individuals is beneficial insofar as it may

lead to improvements in a particular situation, ableism will continue

to make sense on a larger scale. In other words, even if isolated

individuals adopt non-ableist ways of understanding, their

interpretations of the world will not be recognized as making sense

until there are larger structural changes within society. However,

33

individuals do have the ability to impact these structures by helping

to enact changes in social practices so that different beliefs or

propositions are held in place. Large-scale change in

conceptualization of disability can occur through shifts in social

practices regarding people with disabilities.

Conclusion

I used Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge propositions to articulate

the difference between empirical propositions and propositions we

treat as certain. In particular, I focused on ableist beliefs that are

treated as knowledge. While we, as a society, need hinge beliefs in

order to make sense of the world, some of the beliefs, such as ableist

beliefs that we treat as hinges are contingent. I used Scheman’s work

to think through ways it is possible, on a Wittgensteinian account, to

bring about changes in epistemic and other social practices that can

shift the beliefs that are held in place as certain. Heterogeneity

within a form of life is important for the possibility of social

change. Those who are marginalized within a society, in this case,

people with disabilities, have a greater potentiality to recognize

particular contingent ableist hinge propositions as problematic than

those within dominant positions.

34

Behaving as if ableist beliefs are necessary or natural ways of

understanding is problematic both ethically and epistemologically. I

used a Wittgensteinian framework to show that that Singer’s claim that

the lives of people with disabilities are less worth living than the

lives of people without disabilities is unjustified. Singer conflates

preferences, happiness, and value of life as well as beliefs and

knowledge regarding disability in ways that hinder knowledge of the

lives of people with disabilities. Singer purports to be simply

describing the disadvantages people with disabilities face; however,

he is actually engaging in and advocating practices that hold ableist

beliefs in place as certain within our society. Recognition of the

ableist beliefs that are often treated as common sense within our

society is important insofar as it allows them to be called into

question. I have shown that applying Wittgensteinian notions to

conceptualizations and practices regarding disability is a promising

approach both in regard to a clear articulation of the problem of

ableism and as a means for developing effective strategies to dislodge

hinge propositions that are currently held in place by social

practices.

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iNotes:

In this paper, my primary focus is on the United States.ii I consider knowledge practices and other practices that treat prejudices as facts to be unjust, and this is my starting assumption rather than something for which I will argue.iii Ableism is the term used to refer to discrimination against people with disabilities. Ableists hold that people with disabilities are inferior to thosewithout disabilities and tend to focus solely upon individual bodies as sourcesof any difficulties that people with disabilities may encounter rather than societal obstacles. Ableism need not be intentionally malicious, but even well-intentioned actions informed by what we might refer to as “benevolent” ableism have harmful consequences.iv Some disability activists use the phrase “disabled people” in order to highlight the significance of society in preventing people from functioning as well as they are able. This terminology is most often used in England. In the U.S., the phrase “people with disabilities” tends to be favored because it emphasizes personhood over disability.v Wittgenstein, L. (2001) Philosophical Investigations. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,§116.vi Moore, G.E. (1959). “Proof of an External World” and “A Defense of Common Sense” in Philosophical papers. London, Great Britain: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.vii Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., and Murdoch, D. (Ed.). (1984). The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.viii Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. New York, NY: Harper & Row, §1.ix Ibid., §90.x Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §7.xi In Philosophical Investigations, Lebensform is sometimes translated as life-form and other times as form of life. I will use the later expression for the remainder of the paper.xii Ibid., §23xiii Glock, H. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 125.xiv For elaboration of this point, see: Hymers, M. (2010). Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy. New York, NY: Broadview Press. pp. 178-180.xv Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §403.xvi In On Certainty, Wittgenstein most often refers to treating something as “unconditionally the truth” as treating it as certain. Throughout this paper, Iuse the language of certainty in an attempt to avert conflation of true and unconditionally true.xvii Ibid., §253.

xviii Ibid., §341.xix Ibid., §98.xx Ibid., §117.xxi He wrote this in 1951.xxii Ibid., §152.xxiii I use the terms “hinge propositions” and “hinge beliefs” interchangeably. Wittgenstein suggests that beliefs can either stand fast or shift in the same way that hinge propositions do (OC, §144).xxiv We can also attain this insight through dialogue with those who are in suchlocations.xxv Ibid., §275.xxvi Scheman, N. (1996). “Forms of life: Mapping the rough ground” in Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.xxvii Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §124.xxviii Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §284.xxix Ibid., §286.xxx Manichean” refers to a dichotomous understanding in which we are limited to two options, which are mutually exclusive. This is Stanley Cavell’s term, usedin Cavell, S. (1969) Must we mean what we say?: A book of essays. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.xxxi Scheman, “Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” 386.xxxii Ibid., 397.xxxiii Ibid., 387.xxxiv Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §241.xxxv Scheman, “Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” 385.xxxvi It is important to note that marginalization does not ensure that one will have insight into the societal structures that perpetuate such conditions.xxxvii Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §275.xxxviii Scheman, “Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” 403.xxxix Ibid., 387-388.xl Ibid., 391.xli I do not mean to suggest that there is no value to paying attention to the perspectives of those who are privileged. However, it is likely that these perspectives are already being taken into account within society. Furthermore, they are less likely to yield new and productive insights into oppressive practices and beliefs.xlii Wendell, S. (1996). The Rejected Body: Feminist Reflections on Disability.New York: NY: Routledge., 14-17.xliii Amundson, R. (2005). “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life” in Quality ofLife and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability. Ed: Bickenbach, J., Wasserman, D., and Wachbroit, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107.

xliv Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life,” 101-102.xlv Ibid., 104.xlvi Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 14.xlvii Ibid., 94.xlviii Ibid., 22.xlix It is important to note that he is only concerned here with “persons,” since, on his definition, they are the only ones capable of having interests orpreferences. He defines a person as “a rational and self-conscious being” (87).l Ibid., 53.li Please see Nelson, J. (1994). The Disabled, the Media, and the Information Age. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. as well as Riley, C. (2005). Disability and the Media: Prescriptions for Change. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.lii Young, I.M. (1997). “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, andEnlarged Thought” in Constellations. Vol. 3 (3). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 347.liii Singer, Practical Ethics, 188-189.liv Ibid., 53-54.lv I think it is important to note that this is insufficient evidence against the possibility that people with disabilities have internalized culturally prevalent biases against themselves. Singer notes that in the cases of racial and sexual inequality is pernicious, in part, because it can influence members of oppressed groups to feel hopeless (44). Thus, a member of a stigmatized group (including people with disabilities) may internalize messages that they are inferior and this may influence one’s preferences.lvi Nord, E. (2005). “Values for Health States in QALYs and DALYs” in Quality of Lifeand Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability. Ed: Bickenbach, J., Wasserman, D., and Wachbroit, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 126.lvii Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life”, 103.lviii Singer, P. (2009) Peter Singer under fire: The moral iconoclast faces his critics. Ed. Schaler, J. Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing Company., 207.lix Economist Tyler Cowen makes this statement in Peter Singer under fire: The moral iconoclast faces his critics. Singer doesn’t note that Cowen also states that in many cases people who develop disabilities that result in a stable condition report that they regain their previous level of happiness.lx Ibid., 208.lxi Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life”, 112.lxii Singer, P. (2005). “Ethics and Disability: A Response to Koch” in Journal of Disability Policy Studies. Vol. 16 (2).,133.lxiii Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §92.