A Philosophical Investigation: Interrogating Practices and
Beliefs about Disability
by Christine Wieseler
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Abstract
Sometimes beliefs that are shared are treated as if they are knowledge
in spite of a lack of evidence or even in the face of evidence to the
contrary. Beliefs informed by prejudices and ignorance about people
with disabilities are often treated as certain and reinforced by
social practices. In this paper, I distinguish between knowledge
claims and beliefs that are treated as if they are true. I use
Wittgenstein’s account of the connection between epistemic and other
social practices in On Certainty to consider how it is possible to
change beliefs about disability. I draw on Naomi Scheman’s “Forms of
life: Mapping the rough ground” to consider political applications of
Wittgenstein’s thought. I use a Wittgensteinian framework to critique
Peter Singer’s claims regarding the lives of disabilities in Practical
Ethics. I draw attention to the ways in which unjustified beliefs about
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disability can inform and be reified through social practices.
Likewise, changes in social practices can dislodge common ableist
beliefs about disability.
Introduction
In this paper, I am concerned with beliefs about disability that
are presented as knowledge claims but do not have the justification
that knowledge requires. Some of these beliefs purport to be “natural”
ways of understanding disability rather than the result of social
construction and ossification. The ways that a given societyi treats
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people with disabilities proceed as if these beliefs are true, and
practices have the potential to hold these beliefs about disability in
place.ii In addition to the epistemological implications, there are
significant ethical consequences of the propositions we treat as
certain. What a society treats as “common sense” need not be the best
way of making sense of and responding to the world; rather, it is
simply a way of understanding that holds shared beliefs in place as
certain. It is only within a particular framework that what is taken
for granted is treated as certain. I maintain that we need to turn our
attention to the ways in which some epistemic and other social
practices reify propositions about disability that are not empirically
supported. I will utilize Wittgenstein’s account of knowledge to show
that changing practices can shift ableist beliefs from being regarded
as certain to ceasing to serve a function.iii
Wittgenstein makes clear that alterations in practices have the
capacity to change the beliefs that most members of a given society
take for granted. Though Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss ways
to intentionally change commonly held beliefs, he provides important
conceptual tools that can be used to develop strategies for large-
scale shifts in beliefs about disability by targeting social
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practices. I will consider how it is possible, on a Wittgensteinian
account, to critique practices without appealing to practice-
transcendent ideals. The work of Naomi Scheman is a productive
starting point for examining how changes in social practices can shift
which beliefs about disability are treated as certain. While she
acknowledges that philosophy is insufficient for social change, she
contends that a Wittgensteinian framework can inform attempts to
engage in political action to create change. Turning to the work of
Peter Singer, I will examine his discussion of disability in order to
show that he appeals to a conceptualization of disability often
treated as “common sense” rather than knowledge. He claims that the
lives of people with disabilitiesiv have less value than the lives of
people without disabilities. Singer presents this and related claims
as if they are factual statements, but I contend that they are the
groundless grounds of ableist thinking and practices. I will draw
attention to the limitations of challenging the beliefs of
individuals, which is insufficient because, even if individuals do
change their beliefs, ableist physical and conceptual structures
within society remain in place.
Wittgenstein’s Account of Knowledge, Doubt, and Hinge Propositions
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In On Certainty, Wittgenstein’s approach to epistemological
questions differs from many of his philosophical predecessors insofar
as he privileges the way we make knowledge claims in everyday life
over abstract theoretical models of knowing. In contrast to
philosophers such as Descartes, who attempts to build a foundation for
knowledge by starting from the solitary knower, Wittgenstein examines
the integral connections between knowledge, doubt, language, and
practices, which he characterizes as inherently communal.
Wittgenstein’s methodology in his later work involves asking, “is
the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its
original home?”v He criticizes philosophers who distort the ways that
a word is used by removing it from its use and meaning in everyday
life and looking for a transcendent meaning, i.e., a meaning that
transcends the particularity of contexts. In On Certainty Wittgenstein
targets G.E. Moore, who attempts to refute the radical skeptic.vi
As an example of the radical skeptic’s methodology, Descartes
maintains in the “First Meditation” that he does not know he has hands,
etc.vii In direct opposition to the skeptic, Moore simply states that
he does know he has two hands because he sees them. According to Moore,
it follows from this premise that two physical objects exist. He
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concludes that if two physical objects exist, then the physical world
exists.
Wittgenstein refers to Moore’s argument in the following, “If you
do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest [my
emphasis].”viii He calls into question the status of Moore’s claim that
he knows he has hands. In the attempt to make a claim that is
independent of knowledge practices, Moore fails to express knowledge.
Wittgenstein denies that this proposition is a knowledge claim because
it is not in a context in which it makes sense as such. He asserts, “
‘I know’ is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the
sense of a proposition (like ‘I believe’) but between me and a
fact.”ix There must be the possibility of evidence counting for and
against a proposition for it to be a knowledge claim.
Wittgenstein claims that doubt is only possible within a
language-game, defined as “the whole consisting of language and the
actions into which it is woven.”x He coins this term in order to
emphasize “the fact that the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or of a life-form [Lebensform].xixii A form of life is the
cultural or social context including “patterns of behaviour” xiii in
which language-games are embedded. Particular ways of understanding
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the world make sense within a form of life. Outside of such a context,
doubt ceases to have a point or even make sense.xiv This is true of
knowledge as well. There can be neither groundless knowledge nor
groundless doubt. Consequently, Wittgenstein maintains that the best
response to the radical skeptic is to show the lack of grounds for
doubt.
Insofar as Moore attempts to make an absolute claim, he fails to
express knowledge. Wittgenstein states, “To say of man, in Moore’s
sense, that he knows something; that what he says is therefore
unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me, (…) it is an unmoving
foundation of his language-game.”xv Here Wittgenstein suggests that if
one treats a proposition as unconditionally true,xvi the statement
lacks the contingency of an empirical proposition, which is capable of
being true or false; rather it is treated as certain regardless of the
state of affairs. Such a proposition is held in place by language and
practices with which it is intertwined.
According to Wittgenstein, some propositions that appear to be
empirical. i.e., knowledge claims, are not. Moore’s claim to know
falls into this category. Rather than expressing knowledge, such
propositions have a peculiar role as hinge propositions, meaning that they
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are treated as certain in what we do and function as the ungrounded
ground for judgments.xvii In other words, they are the conditions for
the possibility of truth and falsity. Wittgenstein provides an
illustration to clarify the role of such propositions, “the questions
we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.”xviii
In order for either doubt or knowledge to be possible, there must be
some propositions we hold in place as certain. The sense of our
language-games comes from hinge propositions insofar as what we say
and do makes sense in relation to what we treat as certain. In
addition, our practices hold hinge propositions in place.
There must, at any time, be some hinge propositions that hold in
order for us to make sense of the world, but the particular
propositions that serve as hinges can change. In other words, the
propositions that hold fast do so contingently. A proposition may
function as a hinge in one case but as an empirical proposition in
another. Wittgenstein asserts, “the same proposition may get treated
at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule
of testing.”xix When we assume a proposition or belief and use it to
ground subsequent claims and actions, we do not question it. While it
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does make sense to question some propositions serving as hinges, there
are others for which there are not ample grounds for calling them into
question. However, if, in the future, there are grounds for doubting a
particular proposition serving as a hinge, then it can be questioned.
In other words, even if there are not currently grounds for bringing a
hinge proposition into question, the possibility remains that the
status of a hinge proposition may shift.
Let’s consider an example in order to further clarify the notion
of a hinge proposition. On a Wittgensteinian account, a proposition
that asserts “the physical world exists” serves as a hinge
proposition, not a knowledge claim. We do not doubt that material
reality exists when we formulate empirical questions and make
knowledge claims about the world. In addition, it is unclear what it
would mean to be wrong about the existence of the physical world.
There is nothing we could use to test whether or not physical reality
exists since all instruments presuppose its existence and are material
themselves. It is both uncertain what would count as evidence that the
external world does not exist and what reasonable grounds for doubting
the external world would be.
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Wittgenstein gives the example of his not being able to doubt
that he has not been on the moon. “When I say, ‘Nothing speaks for,
everything against it,’ this presupposes a principle of speaking for
and against. That is, I must be able to say what would speak for it.”xx
However, if he had both adequate grounds for doubt and a means for
testing, he could call the proposition that he had not been to the
moon into question. Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s reference to the
proposition that no one has ever been to the moon provides an example
of a proposition that contingently served as a hinge.xxi Now that
practices and facts have changed there are both grounds for doubt and
means for testing that doubt, this proposition has been shown to be
false. This means its status changed from a hinge to an empirical
proposition. Whereas it was formerly considered certain that it is
impossible for humans to go to the moon, now it is considered to be
common sense that it is possible to do so. Our practices hold this
proposition in place as a hinge. If someone claims otherwise, i.e.,
that humans cannot go to the moon, we can provide evidence that his or
her claim is false. When a proposition transitions from serving as a
hinge proposition to an empirical proposition, it changes from being
treated as unconditionally true to conditionally true or false.
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Both in day-to-day life and in the practice of philosophy, we
sometimes fail to distinguish hinge propositions and knowledge claims.
When we are unaware that we are treating hinge propositions as
knowledge claims and lack understanding of the ways in which social
practices hold them in place, we unquestioningly hold them in place.
It is unnecessary to learn which propositions serve as hinges in our
language-games for them to function. In fact, most of the time we
don’t. Instead, we learn practices that hold these propositions in
place. Wittgenstein states, “I do not explicitly learn the
propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently
like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in
the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it
determines its immobility.”xxii According to Wittgenstein, we hold
multiple propositions in place. Hinge propositions or hinge beliefsxxiii
function in everyday life regardless of our identification of them.
Unless we have grounds for doubt, which often arise from experiences of
the world from a particular social location that shows the falsity of
what our practices hold in place as certain,xxiv we are likely to take
the status quo to be “natural” or the only way of thinking about and
acting within the world. Wittgenstein recognizes the epistemic value
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of taking other people’s experience into account, stating, “it isn’t
just my experience, but other people’s that I get knowledge from.”xxv
The experiences of others may confirm what we already think we know or
it may lead us to call into question what we have been treating as
certain.
Drawing attention to particular hinge propositions can be a step
towards dislodging them; some hinge propositions can be “unhinged”
through treatment as empirical propositions. Instead of treating a
particular proposition as certain, it may then be possible to test it
and show that it is false and/or formulated in such a way that it
leads to misunderstanding rather than understanding. This unhinging
changes how we make sense of the world. This is possible on an
individual level, but is much more effective at the institutional
level. Since societal practices hold hinge propositions in place, if
practices change, then new propositions will be held in place as
certain. Changing practices allows for hinge beliefs to be unhinged,
rendering beliefs that were treated as certain and the language-games
given sense by them obsolete.
In this section, I have articulated Wittgenstein’s account of
knowledge in which both knowledge and doubt must be contingent and
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have grounds within the context of a language-game. On this
understanding, commonly held beliefs and social practices including
knowledge production are inextricably connected. I emphasized the
distinction Wittgenstein makes between hinge beliefs and knowledge
claims. If, as Wittgenstein asserts, doubt only makes sense in a
language-game within a form of life, we are left with the question of
how it is possible to argue for or against practices from within a
form of life. It will be my task to provide a Wittgensteinian response
to this difficulty, using Naomi Scheman’s “Forms of Life: Mapping the
Rough Ground”xxvi as a starting point for thinking about changes in
epistemic and other practices regarding disability.
Strategies for Change informed by Wittgensteinian Notions
While Wittgenstein acknowledges that propositions can change in status
from hinge to empirical, it is not his intent to provide strategies
for enacting this shift. For Wittgenstein, philosophy “leaves
everything as it is.”xxvii “I naturally do not want to say that men
should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.”xxviii
He emphasizes description rather than prescription in his analysis of
practices. Though Wittgenstein doesn’t consider the possibility of
changing practices in order to shift dominant frameworks for knowing,
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his thought provides a picture of how knowledge, doubt, beliefs, and
practices function in relation to each other. Thus, his account can be
used to develop effective strategies for social change.
Wittgenstein suggests that we can evaluate different systems of
knowing. He states:
We say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let
them be never so sure of their belief-they are wrong and we know
it. If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs
is evidently the poorer one by far.xxix
We must treat some beliefs as certain in order to make sense of the
world at all, i.e., to develop a system of knowledge. However, some
hinge beliefs lead to systems of knowledge that fail to explain
reality well. As Wittgenstein points out, sureness does not contribute
to the merit of a system of knowledge. Even if the majority of people
within a society participate in the practices that treat a proposition
or set of propositions as hinges, this should not increase our
confidence in the reliability of their claims that purport to be
knowledge.
Scheman argues that we must avoid falling into the trap of the
“Manichean” xxx interpretation of Wittgenstein, which understands forms
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of life to be “internally homogenous” where “one is either inside or
outside of a language game, (…) and, if inside, one just does what
‘we’ do; if outside, one is clueless-not a participant, certainly not
an intelligible critic [emphasis added].”xxxi This type of
interpretation is likely to lead one to have the desire to appeal to a
practice-transcendent ideal because of the mistaken equation of
contingency with “uncritical relativism.”xxxii In other words, one may
seek an unchanging foundation upon which to base practices. Yet, this
is exactly what Wittgenstein urges the reader to forfeit. Scheman
acknowledges that we are liable to be tempted to relapse into the
Manichean reading as long as we do not move from the idea that we can
occupy a vantage point outside of our practices to acknowledgement
that the position from which one knows is located within a form of
life. This move recognizes knowledge as inherently politicized and
involves “a shift from the philosophical to the political.”xxxiii That
is the point at which we go beyond Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the
development of a Wittgensteinian politics. I will focus on
Wittgenstein’s thought in order to show the former can lead to the
latter and inform strategies for change.
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How are we to understand heterogeneity and homogeneity within
forms of life? In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor
queries, “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true
and what is false?”xxxiv This seems to be a common misunderstanding of
Wittgenstein, so I want to emphasize that this is not his position. He
responds by stating that people make assertions that are true and
false, but their opinions need not be the same. Likewise, our
perspectives on how things are differ. Our shared language allows us
to articulate these perspectives and to agree or disagree. We follow
the same rules in our language-games, which are within a form of life.
Therefore, following the rules of a language, which are subject to
change, is a condition for participating in the conversation in a way
that is intelligible to others within a form of life. However, this is
not equivalent to homogeneity of perspectives. Instead it is the
condition for the possibility of heterogenous viewpoints.
On a Wittgensteinian account, we are “tragically misled if we
attempt to step outside of the practices in which we are engaged in
order to provide a justification of them, or worse, to argue for their
reform.”xxxv There is nothing that transcends our practices to which we
can appeal, but this does not mean that we cannot make judgments about
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which practices are better or worse in a particular regard. For
instance, it is possible to make the judgment that practices excluding
people with disabilities from participating in society in meaningful
ways are worse than those that include them. Adopting a
Wittgensteinian approach that rejects the traditional notion of
objectivity as a view from nowhere does not relegate us to making
judgments arbitrarily.
How can we make critical judgments from within a form of life
with nothing outside of our practices to which we can appeal? For
those whose experience does not indicate practices and the hinge
propositions held in place by them to be problematic, the question of
whether or not a hinge proposition is suitable is unlikely to assert
itself since there are no grounds for raising it as long as it
functions without interruption. Experience is integrally related to
social location and can play an important role in leading one to
recognize the propositions that are held in place as certain as well
as the conflation of hinge propositions and knowledge claims.xxxvi We
check a knowledge claim against our own experience and the experiences
of other people. Wittgenstein illustrates this in the following: “And
it isn’t for example just my experience, but other people’s that I get
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knowledge from. (…) But what experience makes me believe that the
anatomy and physiology books don’t contain what is false? Though it is
true that this trust is backed up by my own experience.”xxxvii The case
Wittgenstein presents here is one in which knowledge claims are in
accord with his experience. I am concerned with cases in which the
experiences of a segment of the population, in this case, people with
disabilities, differ from what is presented as knowledge. Because
there is heterogeneity within any given form of life, one may
understand and be a within a form of life, yet have experiences that
contradict some of the propositions that are treated as certain by
that form of life. People with disabilities are an example of those
“who for the widest range of reasons, within and beyond their own
choosing, live somewhere other than at the centers of the forms of
life they inhabit.”xxxviii The perspectives and lives of people with
disabilities are marginalized not by their bodies but by the ways that
society structures the environments in which humans exist as well as
dominant understandings which often treat prejudices about disability
as knowledge.
Scheman’s account provides a starting point to think about how it
is possible to challenge practices and the beliefs held in place by
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them, from within a form of life. She states, “I want to argue, that
is, that the epistemic resources of variously marginal subject
positions provide the ground for a critique of “what we do” that
rejects both the possibility of transcending human practice and the
fatalism of being determined by it (…).”xxxix Importantly, Scheman
claims that being within a human practice allows for the possibility
of criticizing it from within; nothing beyond or outside of our
practices is required. She is focused on those who are marginalized
yet have the possibility of being heard in the discussion. The
epistemic resources of those who are marginalized are derived from
their social locations. Some aspects of reality are apparent from a
marginalized perspective that are less (or not) noticeable from a
privileged perspective. The latter is often treated as objective or
universal. Since there are heterogenous perspectives within a form of
life, some people are in better positions than others, partly due to
their experiences, to criticize current practices and the hinge
propositions around which they turn. Those who do not have a
privileged social location are more likely than those who do to
recognize that the so-called view from nowhere is actually a view from
somewhere, and, thus, they have a greater likelihood of showing that
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there are grounds for doubting hinge propositions that have a role in
making oppressive practices make sense.
Scheman suggests that acknowledging the diversity of knowers’
locations and what they know can lead us “to a clearer sense of how
more responsibly to live in the forms of life we-variously-inhabit.”xl
I want to stress that she is not claiming that there are
epistemological chasms whereby people who are differently located are
unable to attain or understand each other’s knowledge, since this
would fall back into the Manichean reading of Wittgenstein that she
rejects. Rather, she suggests that we have much to learn about the
effects of our practices from each other. Paying attention to
perspectives of those who are marginalized can help us to have a more
complete picture of how things are and can show us the ways that we
are not living up to the ideals we hold as a society.xli Instead of
understanding differences such as disabilities to be the source of the
exclusion of people with disabilities, we can come to see that ableist
beliefs and practices that treat people with disabilities as inferior
members of society are the sources of exclusion. This can lead us to
change our practices, thereby unhinging ableist hinge propositions and
replacing them with non-ableist ones.
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In the following section, I will critique an argument Singer
makes regarding the lives of people with disabilities. I will use a
Wittgensteinian framework to show that Singer equivocates between
hinge beliefs and knowledge claims, treating beliefs as if they
constitute knowledge.
Singer’s Claim to Know About The Reality of Disability
In order to provide the background for Singer’s remarks on
disability, I will begin with a few remarks on conceptualizing
disability. There is not one stable, uniform, and uncontentious
definition of disability. How disability is defined depends upon who
is defining it and for what purpose. Some examples of purposes for
which disability is defined include: eligibility for a disabled
parking permit, Social Security Disability Insurance, special
education, and healthcare purposes. As Susan Wendell notes, disability
is determined in relation to what abilities are considered “normal” or
necessary for functioning in a particular location; thus, the same
biological condition may be considered a disability in one context but
not another.xlii In addition, Ron Amundson argues that there is a range
of abilities rather than a sharp distinction between normal and
abnormal function.xliii
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There are two models that serve as frameworks for thinking about
disability. The first is the Medical Model, which maintains that,
“disadvantages are natural and inevitable outcomes of simply
biomedical facts. Reduction of these natural disadvantages can be
accomplished only by individual cures (…).”xliv In other words,
disability is a problem stemming from the individual’s bodily
condition, and the only way to alleviate disadvantages faced by people
with disabilities is through medical intervention. This model was
introduced first and remains dominant within our society generally
and, more specifically, within biomedical ethics. xlvThe Social Model
views disability as an outcome of the interaction of people with
impairments and the socially constructed environment. This model
acknowledges that individuals have biomedical conditions, but places
emphasis on socially created disadvantages, which are contingent and
changeable. Singer acknowledges that social conditions make the lives
of people with disabilities more difficult than they need to be.
However, his position is aligned much more closely with the Medical
Model than the Social Model. Singer adopts the ethical framework of
preference utilitarianism, and an understanding of this position will
help to situate his discussion of disability.
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Singer maintains that the goal of our actions should be to
maximize the satisfaction of preferences. In Practical Ethics, he
explains, “It [preference utilitarianism] differs from classical
utilitarianism in that ‘best consequences’ is understood as meaning
what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected, rather
than merely what increases pleasure and reduces pain.”xlvi He defines
interests as, “what, on balance and after reflection on all of the
relevant facts, a person prefers [my emphasis].”xlvii So, rather than
calculating what will maximize pleasure, he advocates weighing
interests “impartially.” Singer calls this “the principle of equal
consideration of interests”xlviiixlix
Singer holds that the principle of equal consideration will give
the needs that are central to the lives of people with disabilities
more weight than peripheral needs of others. One might think that
determining the relevant facts would be an empirical undertaking
involving the people, in this case people with disabilities, whose
interests and preferences one seeks to identify. Instead, Singer
asserts, “By giving equal consideration to the interests of those with
disabilities, and empathetically imagining ourselves in their situation, we
can, in principle, reach the right answer [my emphasis].”l What does
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Singer mean by, “empathetically imagining ourselves in their
situation”? I assume that this involves an attempt to identify with
people with disabilities by imagining their experiences as if taking
on their perspective. I will further assume that the person imagining
does not have a disability, since if he did, he would not need to
imagine his own preferences. In what follows, I will focus on some of
the problematic aspects of this approach.
Singer does not consider the vast differences in perspectives
likely to exist between people with and without disabilities as a
result of social positions. As American society is currently
constructed, able-bodied people occupy a privileged position in
relation to people with disabilities. The able-body is privileged as
the universal or standard, and many social practices reflect this by
only taking the needs and preferences of people without disabilities
into consideration while purporting to be neutral. Those identified as
having disabilities are considered exceptional or abnormal.
Stereotypical representations of people with disabilities, which tend
to portray people with disabilities as either heroic or tragic victims
that the viewer ought to pity, are prevalent in films and television
shows.li When an able-bodied person tries to take on the perspective
25
of a person with a disability independent of consultation with people
with disabilities, her main “resources” for doing so will likely be
stereotypes of disability and her own fears. Iris Marion Young warns,
“The perspective of the other can too easily be represented as the
self’s other represented to itself-fantasies, desires, and fears.”lii
This is exactly what research has repeatedly found when people without
disabilities are asked to evaluate the quality of the lives of people
with disabilities.
On the basis of preference utilitarianism, Singer argues that it
is not wrong to abort fetuses or kill infants on the basis of
disability if the parents would prefer a child without a disability
since a “normal,” i.e. non-disabled, child will be likely to
experience greater happiness than one with a disability. In my
criticism of Singer’s argument, I will focus on his underlying belief
about the quality of the lives of people with disabilities. Singer
states:
It may still be objected that to replace either a fetus or a
newborn infant is wrong because it suggests to disabled people
living today that their lives are less worth living than the lives of
people who are not disabled. Yet it is surely flying in the face of reality to deny
26
that, on average, this is so. That is the only way to make sense of
actions that we all take for granted [my emphasis].liii
Singer does not distinguish between propositions that are empirical
and those that serve as hinges, which are held in place by practices.
His claim that the lives of disabled people are less worth living than
the lives of people who are not disabled purports to be knowledge.
Attempting to support this claim, Singer maintains that actions “we
all take for granted” only make sense because the truth of this claim
is shown by reality. However, if we utilize Wittgenstein’s notion of a
hinge proposition, it becomes clear that it is unnecessary for the
claim to be true in order for actions related to disability to make
sense; it is only necessary that this belief be treated as certain. Though
Singer’s statement that the lives of disabled people are less worth
living is presented as an empirical proposition, we can see that it is
actually functioning as a hinge proposition. It is not grounded by
empirical evidence; rather, it simultaneously gives practices sense
and is held in place by them. Singer’s claim can function because his
assertion that the lives of disabled people are less worth living is a
common belief. Ableism maintains that the lives of people with
disabilities are inferior to the lives of the non-disabled in spite of
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evidence to the contrary, and ableist practices hold this belief in
place. Rather than going along with this belief, we can focus on the
prevalent devaluation of the lives of people with disabilities within
society against which Singer’s claims make sense.
Singer contends that it is not prejudice that leads people to
think that the lives of people with disabilities are, on average, less
happy and less worth living than the lives of people without
disabilities. Singer anticipates that he may be perceived as
contradicting himself by both recognizing the “unjustifiable
discrimination” disabled people are subjected to and condoning
abortion and infanticide on the basis of disability in the following:
these arguments presuppose that life is better without a
disability than with one; and is this not itself a form a
prejudice, held by people without disabilities, and parallel to
the prejudice that it is better to be a member of the European
race, or a man, than to be of African descent, or a woman?liv
He hypothesizes that most people who use wheelchairs would prefer to
“have full use of their legs” and cites this as evidence that the
claim that the lives of people with disabilities are inferior to the
lives of those without disabilities is not a mere prejudice.lv
28
In the preceding claims and elsewhere, Singer tends to conflate
preference, well-being/happiness, and value of living. Parsing out the
differences between these notions is important for understanding the
implicit assumptions at play in his discussion of the quality of life
of people with disabilities. Singer’s arguments require that we assume
that people with disabilities tend to be less happy than people
without disabilities, and this leads them to devalue their own lives
independent of any social factors. If a person who uses a wheelchair
prefers to be able to walk, does that really mean that her life is
less happy than or inferior to the life of a person who doesn’t use a
wheelchair? Erik Nord recognizes the need to distinguish these notions
when discussing quality of life. Nord states, “Desire for cure is
strongly related to expected gain in subjective well-being. But
expected well-being is not the same as actual gain.”lvi Actual cure
might not increase happiness. In addition, a person who uses a
wheelchair may be just as happy as a person who doesn’t, but she may
still prefer to be able to walk because of the prejudices and socially
constructed obstacles she faces.
When Singer’s claim that people with disabilities are less happy
than those without disabilities has been subject to empirical
29
verification, many studies have provided evidence that this claim is
false. As Amundson notes, “when asked about the quality of their own
lives, disabled people report a quality only slightly lower than that
reported by nondisabled people, and much higher than that projected by
nondisabled people.”lvii Singer responds to these studies by suggesting
that there are reasons we should not take the results “at face
value.”lviii In fact, he goes so far as to agree with the assertion that
people with severe disabilities “ ‘adjust their expectations’ or
‘lower their expectations in life’ ”lixlx For Singer, if people with
disabilities report similar levels of happiness to people without
disabilities, the definition of happiness must differ and not measure
up to that of people without disabilities. Singer’s move to discredit
the reports of people with disabilities fits into a larger pattern of
practices in which the perspective of an able-bodied person is taken
to be objective. As Amundson notes, “The testimony of disabled people
about their lives has been dismissed in favor of that of nondisabled
‘experts’ for a very long time, as historians have documented.”lxi
Singer is unwilling to admit what people with disabilities say about
their lives as evidence because he treats as certain the proposition
that the lives of people with disabilities are less worth living. It
30
looks as though there is nothing that he would count as evidence
against this claim because it is of an absolute form, and, in this
sense, similar to Moore’s claim that failed to express knowledge.
Singer asserts, “If serious disability has no tendency to make
one’s life worse, there would be no reason to fund research into
preventing or overcoming disability.”lxii Here Singer implies a false
dilemma. His statement suggests that we must choose between
maintaining that the lives of people with disabilities are worse than
people without disabilities and continue research related to
impairments or we deny that the lives of people with disabilities are
worse and discontinue all research related to impairments. However,
the preference utilitarianism he endorses weighs interests of
individuals, not the value that other people assign to that person’s
life or the level of happiness experienced by that person. Within this
framework, it is the interest of each person with a disability that is
relevant. If people with disabilities express the preference for
amelioration of symptoms or access to improved technology that would
increase their functionality, these preferences ought to have weight
regardless of their current level of happiness. We need not make the
choice Singer proposes.
31
Societal practices that only make sense in relation to ableist
beliefs play a much more significant role in hindering people with
disabilities than their bodies do by groundlessly preventing people
with disabilities from having the ability to engage in activities
basic to human life by means of attitudinal and architectural
barriers. Treating most disadvantages faced by people with
disabilities as if they are the inevitable result of impairment
prevents acknowledgement that society has a role in creating some
disadvantages and allows unjust practices to continue while escaping
identification as such. Rather than simply describing the reality of
the lives of people with disabilities, Singer engages in practices
that hold beliefs in place and, for those who have no reason to doubt
the truth of these claims, precludes actual knowledge of the lives of
people with disabilities.
When one judges that one already “knows” about the experience of
disability, there is no impetus to learn about actual subjective
experiences of people with disabilities. As long as one’s beliefs
regarding disability continue to function, one has no grounds to call
them into question. However, when they do doubt their hinge beliefs,
able-bodied people can gain knowledge regarding the preferences of
32
disabled people through respectful and open dialogue with people with
disabilities. Identifying propositions held in place (in distinction
from knowledge) through practices is one step towards delegitimizing
them. In Singer’s argument, we saw an example of how ableist
propositions are treated as hinge propositions. Like the proposition
that no one has ever been to the moon, there are grounds for doubt in
regard to these propositions. Shifting the hinge propositions that
individuals such as Singer hold certain would take what Wittgenstein
calls a “conversion”; they would “be brought to look at the world in a
different way.”lxiii
My examination of Singer’s argument shows the limitations of the
strategy of challenging a proposition that an individual treats as a
hinge, particularly when predominant practices revolve around it.
Though there may be circumstances in which the strategy of targeting
the ableist beliefs of individuals is beneficial insofar as it may
lead to improvements in a particular situation, ableism will continue
to make sense on a larger scale. In other words, even if isolated
individuals adopt non-ableist ways of understanding, their
interpretations of the world will not be recognized as making sense
until there are larger structural changes within society. However,
33
individuals do have the ability to impact these structures by helping
to enact changes in social practices so that different beliefs or
propositions are held in place. Large-scale change in
conceptualization of disability can occur through shifts in social
practices regarding people with disabilities.
Conclusion
I used Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge propositions to articulate
the difference between empirical propositions and propositions we
treat as certain. In particular, I focused on ableist beliefs that are
treated as knowledge. While we, as a society, need hinge beliefs in
order to make sense of the world, some of the beliefs, such as ableist
beliefs that we treat as hinges are contingent. I used Scheman’s work
to think through ways it is possible, on a Wittgensteinian account, to
bring about changes in epistemic and other social practices that can
shift the beliefs that are held in place as certain. Heterogeneity
within a form of life is important for the possibility of social
change. Those who are marginalized within a society, in this case,
people with disabilities, have a greater potentiality to recognize
particular contingent ableist hinge propositions as problematic than
those within dominant positions.
34
Behaving as if ableist beliefs are necessary or natural ways of
understanding is problematic both ethically and epistemologically. I
used a Wittgensteinian framework to show that that Singer’s claim that
the lives of people with disabilities are less worth living than the
lives of people without disabilities is unjustified. Singer conflates
preferences, happiness, and value of life as well as beliefs and
knowledge regarding disability in ways that hinder knowledge of the
lives of people with disabilities. Singer purports to be simply
describing the disadvantages people with disabilities face; however,
he is actually engaging in and advocating practices that hold ableist
beliefs in place as certain within our society. Recognition of the
ableist beliefs that are often treated as common sense within our
society is important insofar as it allows them to be called into
question. I have shown that applying Wittgensteinian notions to
conceptualizations and practices regarding disability is a promising
approach both in regard to a clear articulation of the problem of
ableism and as a means for developing effective strategies to dislodge
hinge propositions that are currently held in place by social
practices.
35
iNotes:
In this paper, my primary focus is on the United States.ii I consider knowledge practices and other practices that treat prejudices as facts to be unjust, and this is my starting assumption rather than something for which I will argue.iii Ableism is the term used to refer to discrimination against people with disabilities. Ableists hold that people with disabilities are inferior to thosewithout disabilities and tend to focus solely upon individual bodies as sourcesof any difficulties that people with disabilities may encounter rather than societal obstacles. Ableism need not be intentionally malicious, but even well-intentioned actions informed by what we might refer to as “benevolent” ableism have harmful consequences.iv Some disability activists use the phrase “disabled people” in order to highlight the significance of society in preventing people from functioning as well as they are able. This terminology is most often used in England. In the U.S., the phrase “people with disabilities” tends to be favored because it emphasizes personhood over disability.v Wittgenstein, L. (2001) Philosophical Investigations. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,§116.vi Moore, G.E. (1959). “Proof of an External World” and “A Defense of Common Sense” in Philosophical papers. London, Great Britain: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.vii Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., and Murdoch, D. (Ed.). (1984). The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.viii Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. New York, NY: Harper & Row, §1.ix Ibid., §90.x Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §7.xi In Philosophical Investigations, Lebensform is sometimes translated as life-form and other times as form of life. I will use the later expression for the remainder of the paper.xii Ibid., §23xiii Glock, H. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 125.xiv For elaboration of this point, see: Hymers, M. (2010). Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy. New York, NY: Broadview Press. pp. 178-180.xv Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §403.xvi In On Certainty, Wittgenstein most often refers to treating something as “unconditionally the truth” as treating it as certain. Throughout this paper, Iuse the language of certainty in an attempt to avert conflation of true and unconditionally true.xvii Ibid., §253.
xviii Ibid., §341.xix Ibid., §98.xx Ibid., §117.xxi He wrote this in 1951.xxii Ibid., §152.xxiii I use the terms “hinge propositions” and “hinge beliefs” interchangeably. Wittgenstein suggests that beliefs can either stand fast or shift in the same way that hinge propositions do (OC, §144).xxiv We can also attain this insight through dialogue with those who are in suchlocations.xxv Ibid., §275.xxvi Scheman, N. (1996). “Forms of life: Mapping the rough ground” in Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.xxvii Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §124.xxviii Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §284.xxix Ibid., §286.xxx Manichean” refers to a dichotomous understanding in which we are limited to two options, which are mutually exclusive. This is Stanley Cavell’s term, usedin Cavell, S. (1969) Must we mean what we say?: A book of essays. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.xxxi Scheman, “Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” 386.xxxii Ibid., 397.xxxiii Ibid., 387.xxxiv Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §241.xxxv Scheman, “Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” 385.xxxvi It is important to note that marginalization does not ensure that one will have insight into the societal structures that perpetuate such conditions.xxxvii Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §275.xxxviii Scheman, “Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” 403.xxxix Ibid., 387-388.xl Ibid., 391.xli I do not mean to suggest that there is no value to paying attention to the perspectives of those who are privileged. However, it is likely that these perspectives are already being taken into account within society. Furthermore, they are less likely to yield new and productive insights into oppressive practices and beliefs.xlii Wendell, S. (1996). The Rejected Body: Feminist Reflections on Disability.New York: NY: Routledge., 14-17.xliii Amundson, R. (2005). “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life” in Quality ofLife and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability. Ed: Bickenbach, J., Wasserman, D., and Wachbroit, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107.
xliv Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life,” 101-102.xlv Ibid., 104.xlvi Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 14.xlvii Ibid., 94.xlviii Ibid., 22.xlix It is important to note that he is only concerned here with “persons,” since, on his definition, they are the only ones capable of having interests orpreferences. He defines a person as “a rational and self-conscious being” (87).l Ibid., 53.li Please see Nelson, J. (1994). The Disabled, the Media, and the Information Age. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. as well as Riley, C. (2005). Disability and the Media: Prescriptions for Change. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.lii Young, I.M. (1997). “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, andEnlarged Thought” in Constellations. Vol. 3 (3). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 347.liii Singer, Practical Ethics, 188-189.liv Ibid., 53-54.lv I think it is important to note that this is insufficient evidence against the possibility that people with disabilities have internalized culturally prevalent biases against themselves. Singer notes that in the cases of racial and sexual inequality is pernicious, in part, because it can influence members of oppressed groups to feel hopeless (44). Thus, a member of a stigmatized group (including people with disabilities) may internalize messages that they are inferior and this may influence one’s preferences.lvi Nord, E. (2005). “Values for Health States in QALYs and DALYs” in Quality of Lifeand Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability. Ed: Bickenbach, J., Wasserman, D., and Wachbroit, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 126.lvii Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life”, 103.lviii Singer, P. (2009) Peter Singer under fire: The moral iconoclast faces his critics. Ed. Schaler, J. Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing Company., 207.lix Economist Tyler Cowen makes this statement in Peter Singer under fire: The moral iconoclast faces his critics. Singer doesn’t note that Cowen also states that in many cases people who develop disabilities that result in a stable condition report that they regain their previous level of happiness.lx Ibid., 208.lxi Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life”, 112.lxii Singer, P. (2005). “Ethics and Disability: A Response to Koch” in Journal of Disability Policy Studies. Vol. 16 (2).,133.lxiii Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §92.
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