A Field Experiment on the Internet's Effect in an African Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected...

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effectin an African Election: Savvier Citizens,Disaffected Voters, or Both?Catie Snow Bailard

School of Media and Public Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA

This study contributes to the research on the Internet’s effect on political behavior andorganization by examining how the Internet influences the types of evaluations thatmay motivate individuals to organize politically. This study employs a randomized fieldexperiment to determine whether the Internet influenced individuals’ perception of thefairness of the 2010 Tanzanian presidential election. It provides a direct causal test of theInternet’s effect on political evaluations, and the findings reveal that the Internet negativelyinfluenced individuals’ perception of the fairness of the election and recount. However, thefindings also reveal that the impact of the Internet on political life may not always enrichdemocratic values. In this case, more critical Internet users also became less likely to vote.

doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01632.x

Recent events emerging from locations as diverse as London, Wall Street, the MiddleEast, and Northern Africa convincingly demonstrate the Internet’s capacity to serve asa tool for organization once citizens are moved to action. However, researchers havegiven less attention the Internet’s role in the stages leading up to such movements—interms of fomenting or, at least, focusing the discontent that eventually fuels suchprotests. From a scientific perspective, this question may be impossible to answerdefinitively. There are no counterfactuals. That is, we cannot compare the level ofdiscontent and protest accompanying the Internet to the level of discontent andprotest that would have occurred in a world without the Internet.

So, what does the existing body of research tell us about the political effects ofInternet use more generally? One set of literature substantiates the Internet’s capacityto encourage political behaviors by individuals (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003; Johnson& Kaye, 2003; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003; Xenos & Moy, 2007), as well as facilitate andstreamline organization by institutions and political groups (Bimber, 2003; Shirky,2008). Anecdotes and case studies also abound, illustrating instances in which the

Corresponding author: Catie S. Bailard; [email protected]

330 Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 330–344 © 2012 International Communication Association

C. S. Bailard The Internet’s Effect in African Elections

Internet was harnessed to effect democratic ends (Chan, 2005; Froehling, 1997;Russell, 2001a, 2001b). However, it is also the case that several studies have revealeda null effect of Internet use on the political behavior of individuals (Bimber, 2003;Kroh & Neiss, 2009; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2010).It is also apparent that, in some instances, authoritarian governments can effectivelycontrol or leverage the Internet to discourage and suppress, rather than promote,political activity (Kalathil & Boas, 2001, 2003; Morozov, 2011; Rodan, 1998).

This article makes two unique contributions to the literature surrounding thepolitical effects of the Internet. As discussed above, rather than focus on the moretangible components of the Internet’s influence once people are already moved to actand organize, I test the Internet’s effect at a more antecedent and foundational stageof political behavior. Specifically, I test whether the Internet influences the sort ofevaluations that can motivate individuals to organize in the first place. Specifically,based on the results of a field experiment conducted in Tanzania in the monthsleading up to the 2010 presidential election, I test whether the Internet influencedindividuals’ perception of the fairness of their election and subsequent recount.The history of protests, riots, and revolts precipitated by contested electoral resultsin democratizing nations render this an important consideration of the Internet’scapacity to alter the sort of evaluations that can motivate individuals to organize.

Less immediately, studying how the Internet changes the information and criteriathat individuals use to evaluate their government’s performance will also contributeto a better understanding of the more long-term, subtle political effects of theInternet. In support of this, Marc Lynch (2011) writes, ‘‘A final area where statecontrol might be fundamentally challenged is in its ability to control and dominatethe public sphere. Here, longer-term shifts in individual competencies and in thebroad information environment—rather than the more immediate ‘tools’ of politicalcombat—matter most’’ (p. 306).

By conducting a randomized quasi-experiment in the field, the second primarycontribution that this article makes to the field is methodological. Field experimentsare a novel and important contribution to the study of the Internet’s political effects,primarily because this method enables direct causal tests. This fills an important gap inthe extant literature, which remains nearly devoid of actual causal tests. Additionally,field experiments complement the current set of methodological approaches byoffering unique advantages in terms of internal and, to some degree, even externalvalidity. Thus, this study makes a case for the value of adding field experiments to themethodological toolbox employed by Internet researchers.

In the following sections, I introduce the theoretical framework guiding thisanalysis, particularly the concept of mirror-holding —one of the primary mechanismsdriving the Internet’s capacity to influence citizens’ evaluations of their governments’performance. I then present the results from the field experiment conducted inTanzania in the months before their 2010 presidential election. The findings revealthat the Internet negatively influenced individuals’ perception of the fairness of boththe election and the subsequent recount. This substantiates the Internet’s capacity

Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 330–344 © 2012 International Communication Association 331

The Internet’s Effect in African Elections C. S. Bailard

to provide information that depresses citizens’ evaluations of sub par governmentsprocesses—the very evaluations that are central components of the cost-benefitcalculus that, in some instances, will motivate individuals to act and organize toeffect political change. However, the results of this experiment demonstrate that onedemocratic gain does not set off an automatic chain of entirely prodemocratic gains.In this case, individuals that became more critical of the integrity of the election alsobecame less likely to vote.

Theoretical frameworkAs a result of making information and communication activities more efficient, theInternet’s potential political effects hinge on its capacity to alter the cost-benefitcalculus of political behavior. As has already been widely noted, this is a result of thetechnological features that differentiate the Internet from other media. In brief, therelative absence of geographic and time constraints enables the Internet to transmitmore information—in the form of written words, images, video, and sound—morequickly, across greater distances. The unlimited space, nonlinearity, and multipoint-to-multipoint configuration mean that the Internet offers an informational landscapethat is more robust and multifaceted than that provided by other medias, such as tele-vision and newspapers. Finally, the Internet’s multifunctionality means that individu-als can utilize this single technology for myriad activities, from watching their favoriteTV show, to reading a blog, to paying their phone bill, to video chatting with friendsoverseas, often simultaneously. Each of these features enables the Internet to facilitatemore efficient communication, information retrieval, and information disper-sion—thus having the capacity to alter the cost-benefit calculus of political behavior.

This cost-benefit calculus of political behavior derives from rational choicetheory—a prominent paradigm in political science and microeconomics—whichposits that individuals will act politically when the expected benefits to be gainedexceed the perceived costs associated with doing so. Therefore, an ‘‘instrumental view’’posits that, by making information and communication activities more efficient, theInternet should reduce the cost of political behavior, because the majority of politicalbehaviors depend on some combination of these activities (Bimber, 2003). As a result,this should increase individuals’ propensity to engage in political behavior.

This does not guarantee, however, that Internet use will always reset the thresholdat which the expected benefits of political participation will exceed the costs associated,so as to produce behavior that would not have otherwise occurred. Instead, theInternet effects are likely to vary across types of civic acts, across political contexts, andacross individuals. Nor is it guaranteed that such Internet-motivated behavior, when itdoes occur, will always result in actual political change or, at least, a disparate politicaloutcome from that which would have otherwise occurred. The outcome will alsohinge on a number of additional conditioning factors—particularly, the actions of anumber of additional strategic actors with their own preferences and competing goals.

While the burgeoning literature has already begun the important task of tryingto understand and predict when the Internet will (or will fail to) generate political



behaviors and organization, there is one component of the Internet’s capacityto alter the cost-benefit calculus of political behavior that has yet to gain muchscholarly attention. This is the potential for the Internet to facilitate information andcommunication activities that alter the expectations and evaluations that citizens haveof their government. This is an important component of the Internet’s capacity toencourage political behavior and organization since, the more critical the evaluationsof a government’s performance and the more dissatisfied citizens become, the greaterthe perceived benefits to be gained from political action to effect political change.

Mirror-holding and window-openingThe Internet’s capacity to influence citizens’ evaluations of their governmentsprimarily travels through two specific avenues—the Internet’s mirror-holding andwindow-opening functions. In brief, by providing a broader and more extensivearray of information, the Internet holds up a mirror for users to better discern andreflect on how their government is actually performing. Second, the global nature ofthe Internet also opens more panoramic windows that better enable individuals toview how governments function in other countries, particularly the high-functioningdemocracies that tend to be most visible on the Internet. This provides userswith a more realistic and globally consistent scale by which to make comparativeevaluations about their own government’s performance. Accordingly, the Internetallows citizens to evaluate the performance of their government hinges on both itscapacity to provide a larger and more diverse set of information upon which to basean evaluation—a process of mirror-holding. Internet-using citizens may also alterthe criteria and expectations that they consider in the course of arriving at thoseevaluations—a process of window-opening.

Although the Internet has the capacity to serve both as a way citizens can reflecton their political lives and as a way to expand or alter their political expectations,this article focuses specifically on the Internet’s mirror-holding function. Censorship,poverty, and cognitive limitations that prevent individuals from consuming the webin its entirety preclude the Internet from imbuing citizens with a complete and perfectmirror image of their government. However, as a result of the distinguishing featuresof the Internet discussed above, it will relay a superior reflection, both in terms ofsize and depth, than that which traditional media can typically provide.

In brief review, the Internet’s unlimited space enables the Internet to relay(and archive) a larger set of information than traditional media. The lack oftime and geographic constraints mean that this information can be shared moreefficiently, more quickly, over greater distances, than was previously possible.The multipoint-to-multipoint configuration means that individuals can contributetheir own perspectives, stories, and pictures to the informational landscape, thusincreasing the range and diversity of perspectives available for public consumption.Additionally, the decentralized nature of the Internet means that censorship of theInternet will be less tenable for governments than censorship of the traditionalmedia.



As a result, relative to a world without the Internet, the Internet providesdecidedly more information to citizens, from a broader range of perspectives, thanwould otherwise be the case—thus improving the capacity of citizens to make moreinformed evaluations of their governments. For example, among Muslim countries,Howard (2010) finds that high levels of censorship of traditional media tend to driveup online news consumption and produce vibrant political blogospheres, whichenable ‘‘news and cultural content production from unofficial sources within thesecountries, resulting in multiple perspectives on contemporary events’’ (p. 74).

Additionally, consider that, in nations with weak or nonexistent democraticpractices, the information that does slip through the cracks will be substantially morelikely to reflect negatively rather than positively on those governments. Essentially,as these governments are, in fact, often repressing political behavior, entrenched incorruption, and violating human rights, it is logical to assume that the informationthat does slip through the cracks will reflect some element of this reality. This issupported by the number of anecdotes highlighting instances in which ‘‘politicallysensitive’’ information slipped through the cracks in countries with even the mostsuccessful of Internet regulatory policies.

The significance of individuals being able to bypass traditional censors to docu-ment their own experiences with government abuse or malfeasance online is that itenables the Internet to serve as powerful public forum for the visual aggregation andcentralization of information regarding the extent and magnitude of governmentfailure. Of course, this is not to say that citizens in these countries are not otherwiseaware of instances of malfeasance, brutality, and corruption perpetrated by theirgovernments. There is a difference, however, between awareness of the experiencessuffered by yourself, those close to you, and those instances that you happen to catchwind of suffered by individuals outside of your immediate circle, and the manner inwhich the Internet visibly aggregates these experiences through mirror-holding. Byproviding a venue to publicly document government failure or abuses, often coupledwith pictures and videos, individuals more readily link their personal experiences toa much larger, pervasive, and entrenched national trend.

Kinder and Kiewiet’s (1981) seminal study of voting behavior revealed thatvoters were more likely to take into account the nation’s overall economic health,as opposed to their own personal economic well-being, when deciding how to vote.This ran contrary to the prevailing scholarly view and they explained the findingby arguing that ‘‘People ’morselize’ their private experience: the events and detailsof daily life are typically not interpreted as instances of broader themes, political orotherwise. . . information about national conditions is typically conveyed at a levelof abstraction appropriate to nationally-oriented political judgments’’ (p. 158). Incontrast, by serving as a public venue to catalogue and graphically illustrate theextent of government malfeasance across the nation, the Internet makes individualsless likely to compartmentalize these personal experiences and, instead, more likelyto relate their own experiences to a larger national trend, thus shaping individuals’evaluations of their governments’ performance accordingly.



I therefore contend that the Internet will provide a different and more robust setof information regarding the integrity of the Tanzanian election compared to thatprovided by the traditional media. Although Tanzania’s traditional press is relativelymore unfettered than most African countries, according to widely accepted measuresof press freedom, there is still ample room for improvement. Reporters WithoutBorders (2010) ranks Tanzania’s degree of press freedom as 41st out of 178 countriesas of 2010. Moreover, Freedom House (2010) still designates Tanzania as a PartlyFree (as opposed to Free) country. Thus, this different and more critical range ofinformation and perspectives regarding the election provided by the Internet willshape participants’ evaluations of the integrity of the election accordingly.

The 2010 Tanzanian electionDespite featuring the most competitive electoral race in many years—including a5-day recount demanded by the opposition after initial results were contested inlight of voters’ names being excluded at polling stations and insufficient votingmaterials—incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete ultimately won a second term withnearly 62% of the vote. According to the official report published by the TanzaniaElection Monitoring Commission (TEMCO), the 2010 election included relativelypeaceful campaigns, thanks in part to both restraint showed by supporters, politicalparties that endeavored to curb the enthusiasm of their supporters, as well as thepresence of police officers that effectively further helped keep the peace.

Nevertheless, there were also reports of physical conflict between supporters ofdifferent parties, nonadherence to campaign timetables, and inequitable campaignspending and leveraging of other advantages, such as using state resources forcampaign purposes, on behalf of the incumbent. The subsequent recount lasted for5 days, during which time the country experienced minor, dispersed rioting. Whilegovernment officials pointed to unfamiliarity with recount guidelines and ‘‘the lackof mastery’’ of the new computerized counting system, these delays stoked voters’fears that the recount was rigged, which in some cases led to violent skirmishesbetween police officers and protestors (TEMCO, 2010). In summary, although a vastimprovement over previous elections, the 2010 election still fell decidedly short ofthe threshold required to be deemed a fully free and fair election.

It is also relevant to note that Uchaguzi deployed 2,000 official monitors,30,000 trusted sources, and solicited reports from average citizens in order to aid inmonitoring this election. Uchaguzi is an online platform through which text messagesand E-mails sent from the field, often from average citizens, are used to map andaggregate information about events—from wildfires, to hate speech to incite violence,to electoral abuses. This information is aggregated and displayed online in real time.

In the case of the Tanzanian election, Uchaguzi provided a centralized platformfor creating a visual map (i.e., a mirror) of actual instances of electoral abuses reportedthroughout the country—a service that allowed citizens to reflect on the performanceof their election administration system. A review of the posts made to Uchaguzi duringthe election mirror and multiply the offenses noted in the TEMCO report. Examples



of these posts include ‘‘Campaign intimidation of female candidates,’’ ‘‘Voters’ namesmissing from voter register,’’ ‘‘Purchasing of voters cards,’’ and ‘‘Media biased inreporting election campais [sic].’’ This means that voters had access to concrete, real-time information through the Internet regarding the election in the days leading up toand following Election Day. However, by allowing citizens to reflect on the behavior oftheir government, the Internet also provides election-specific information and discus-sion outside of such centralized platforms; for example, by traveling through less for-mal networks and Web sites, such as blogs and Facebook. Given this, it is reasonable tohypothesize that if individuals included in the field experiment use the Internet, thenthey will evaluate the fairness and impartiality of the Tanzanian presidential electionand the subsequent recount more critically than members of the control group (H1).

Why a Field Experiment?By employing random assignment, this experiment provides a test of the causalrelationship shared by Internet use and political evaluations. The current literaturetypically focuses on associations between Internet use and various political attitudesand behaviors in survey data. While such studies are instructive and provide a solidfoundation for Internet research, they suffer from concerns regarding weak casualinference and limited internal validity. Experiments stand out as an important com-plement to the existing literature. Random assignment of individuals to the treatmentor control groups evenly distributes other potentially meaningful differences, suchas demographic characteristics, across groups prior to the treatment and enablesto control the temporal ordering of the variables. As a result, experiments offeradvantages in terms of internal validity and direct causal tests.

External validity is further enhanced by conducting this experiment in the field,in a developing democracy, in the months leading up to an actual election. Incontrast to traditional laboratory settings, field settings afford greater insight into theactual mechanisms driving the linkage between political behavior and internet use ina specific situation. Laboratory studies are often, though not always, limited by theirreliance on hypothetical candidates or election scenarios as well.

Although a field experiment may not allow the same level of monitoring andparsing of effects that can be obtained in the laboratory, these limitations are offsetby large gains in external validity. Specifically, gains are made in terms of revealinghow actual individuals, left to their own devices, will choose to use the Internet insitu. Additionally this approach reveals how this nonartificial and nondirected useof the Internet shapes political evaluations about actual events and processes, whichhave real-world and immediate significance to the participants.

Methods

In late 2010, subjects were recruited in person at several congregation pointsthroughout the community of Morogoro, a town of more than 200,000, which liesabout 120 miles west of Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania. These



congregation points included professional and trade schools, secondary schools, themain bus station, hair salons, and markets. Over a period of 7 days, we collected morethan 200 names and mobile phone numbers from interested individuals. (Althoughthere was a high degree of mobile phone penetration in the community, individualswithout phones could still sign-up using the phone number of a friend, familymember, or neighbor.) We then used a random number generator to randomlyassign 70 individuals to the experimental group of Internet users, 70 individuals tothe control group, with the remainder assigned to serve as alternates when membersselected for the experimental or control groups could not be reached or no longerwished to participate.

After random assignment, we called members of both groups and asked them tomeet us at one of the two Internet cafes enlisted to serve as sites for this experiment:Valentine’s Internet Cafe and Daus Internet Cafe. After being consented, participantswere asked to fill out presurveys, for which they were paid 3,000 TZS (equivalentto 2 USD). These presurveys were relatively brief and contained only one questionpertaining specifically to satisfaction with the Tanzanian government. In addition,the presurvey contained a range of questions on other topics intended to mask thetrue focus of the study, including questions about Tanzanian hip-hop music andthe national football team. After completing the presurveys, the participants in theInternet group were set up with accounts at their assigned Internet cafe, where I hadprepaid for each individual to receive 75 hours of Internet time to be used over thenext 2 months. I also hired two additional assistants to offer participants in-depthtutorials on Internet use, including how to navigate from one page to another,conduct searches, and set up E-mail accounts. Participants in the control group werenot given Internet access at this time, but they were informed that they would becontacted again in 2 months, at which point they would receive an equitable amountof free Internet use.

Over the next 2 months, we made no effort to direct how the participants usedthe Internet. Nor did we electronically monitor their Internet use. We avoided suchoversight in order to maximize external validity and to avoid infringing on privacyboundaries. As noted previously, I wanted participants to use the Internet as theywould naturally, without outside influence or guidance. Any attempt to externallydirect their Internet use or monitor it electronically would have compromisedexternal validity by possibly encouraging individuals to use the Internet differentlythan they were naturally and organically inclined.

The owners of the Internet cafes did record the amount of Internet time that eachindividual used. After the 2-month period concluded, my assistant and I contactedindividuals in both the experimental and control groups by telephone and offered3,000 TZS (2 USD) to complete the posttreatment survey. Of the 140 originalparticipants, 63 members of the Internet group and 64 members of the control groupwere successfully reached and then completed the posttreatment survey.

According to the cafe owner’s records, members of the Internet group spent anaverage of 42 hours on the Internet during the treatment period, with a standard



deviation of 33 hours.1 Self-reports gathered through the posttreatment surveypaint a picture of how these individuals used the Internet. Totally 95% of theparticipants reported that they had an E-mail address, 64% reported that they had aFacebook account, and 64% reported reading blogs while online. Sixty-one percentof participants reported that they ‘‘mostly’’ used the media to look for informationand news; 32% reported that they ‘‘mostly’’ used the Internet for social media, such asFacebook, Twitter, or Myspace; and 13% stated that they ‘‘mostly’’ used the Internetfor entertainment (e.g., to watch videos on YouTube, to listen to music, etc.). Finally,15% of participants stated that they followed election information regularly on theInternet, 22% stated they followed election information sometimes.

Turning to whether participants mostly visited Tanzania-specific, Africa-specific,or Western Web sites, the majority of participants preferred to traverse Web sitesfrom a wide range of sources. Only 17% of the participants reported that theymostly frequented Tanzania Web sites and 23% indicated that they mostly visitednon-Tanzanian sites, with the remaining 60% stating that they preferred to visitboth Tanzanian and non-Tanzanian Web sites. Moreover, only 14% of individualsreported that they preferred to exclusively frequent Western-based Web sites and18% reported a strong preference for African-based Web sites, while 65% indicatedthat their Internet diet regularly consisted of both Western and African Web sites.

The fact that over one-third of the participants specifically sought out informationabout the election online, and nearly two-thirds reported mostly using the Internetto gather news and information, assuages doubts regarding individuals’ desire to seekout information about their own governments while online. Research suggests thatInternet users often encounter political information casually, as they often ‘‘bumpinto’’ news after going online for another purpose (Horrigan, 2006).

Thus, classic studies of traditional media, which confirmed the tendency forpolitical information to piggy-back on entertainment-oriented use of media (Baum,2003), may also apply to the Internet. For example, one of our participants, a youngwoman clad in a full burka (i.e., buibui), spent over an hour scouring a Web site ofWestern women’s apparel, a site that would likely have exposed her to a broad rangeof politically relevant images regarding the roles and freedoms of women.

Results

Commensurate with the expectations of random assignment, members of theInternet group and control groups did not differ significantly from one anotherin demographic terms. The average age of the participants in the experiment was25 years old (SD = 10 years); their education was completed, on average, at the ageof 21, which is approximate to completing some secondary school or professionaltraining (SD = 3 years); 21% reported some form of current part-time or full-time employment, 73% were current students, and 67% were male. Clearly, thedemographic profile of participants in this experiment tended to be younger, moremale, and more educated than the Tanzanian population at large. However, these



Table 1 Two-Sample t Test of the Difference in the Percentage of Individuals Believing theElection Was Conducted Fairly and Impartially

Number ofObservations

Percent Who BelievedElection Fair SE SD

95% ConfidenceInterval

Control group 65 57 6.2 5 45 to 69Internet group 60 42 6.4 5 29 to 55Difference 15∗∗ −2 to 33

Note: Probability (Internet group < control group) = 96%.∗∗p = .05.

demographics are highly reflective of the actual demographic profile of ‘‘early users’’in developing nations (Christensen & Levinson, 2003), thus promoting the externalvalidity of this study by sharing the same demographic profile as actual early Internetusers in developing nations.

Table 1 reveals important differences in the percentage of individuals in eachgroup who believed that the election was conducted fairly and impartially. Using a ttest, members of the Internet group were on average approximately 15% less likelyto believe that the election was conducted fairly and impartially (p < .05). However,this does not necessarily mean that they were more likely to state definitively thatthe election was conducted unfairly. Rather, individuals in the Internet group whowere not willing to state that the election was fair were roughly equally likely toanswer ‘‘Don’t Know’’ (33%) as state that the election was actually unfair (25%).Nevertheless, it is clear that members of the Internet group were less certain of thefairness and the impartiality of the election compared to their peers in the controlgroup.

Table 2 reveals that there were also differences in the percentage of individuals ineach group who believed that the recount was not conducted fairly and impartially.Members of the Internet group were significantly more likely to believe that therecount was conducted unfairly when compared to the control group, by approxi-mately 12 percentage points (p < .10). In addition, attitudes about the fairness of the

Table 2 Two-Sample t Test of the Difference in the Percentage of Individuals Believing theRecount Was NOT Conducted Fairly and Impartially

Number ofObservations

Percent Who BelievedRecount NOT Fair SE SD

95% ConfidenceInterval

Control group 65 15 4.5 3.6 6 to 24Internet group 59 27 5.8 4.5 15 to 39Difference −12∗ −26 to 3

Note: Probability (Internet group < control group) = 94%.∗p = .1.



recount were associated with Facebook use. Facebook users were 19% more likely tobelieve that the recount was not conducted fairly and impartially compared to non-Facebook users in the Internet group (p < .01). However, they were also 24% morelikely to declare that the recount was fair (p < .05). In other words, Facebook userswere much more likely to have a concrete opinion in either direction, and thereforeless likely to answer ‘‘Don’t Know’’ compared to non-Facebook users—specifically,43% less likely (p < .01).

Returning to perceptions of the election itself, the difference between Facebookusers and non-Facebook users traveled in only one direction—individuals withFacebook accounts were more likely to believe the election was conducted unfairlycompared to non-Facebook users, by 15 percentage points (p < .10). It is clear thatthere are demographic and attitudinal characteristics that likely influenced whichindividuals in the experiment’s Internet group created a Facebook account. Thus,these characteristics may condition the Internet’s influence on perceptions of theelection and recount—as opposed to Facebook use alone. However, the fact thatperceptions of the fairness of the recount were polarized, while attitudes regardingthe election were not, raises interesting questions regarding the unique space thatFacebook may occupy in online communication.

For example, consider the timing of the follow-up questionnaire as one potentialexplanation for the divergent evaluations of the fairness of the recount and electionamong Facebook users. The collection of the posttreatment surveys took approxi-mately 1 week and began the day after the recount concluded and Kikwete was officiallydeclared the winner. Perhaps online information and discussion regarding the recountwas still in flux due to the shorter timeframe, and therefore had yet to coalesce arounda specific perspective. Alternatively, consider that the election was a foregone conclu-sion at this point. The actual decision of who would win the office no longer hingedon voters but rather on the officials conducting the recount. Thus, the recency and thesaliency of the recount, and the discontent and agitation that it was still prompting,may have rendered Facebook the appropriate venue for online discussion and airingof doubts and anger from supporters of the respective parties and candidates.

Finally, also consider the effect of the Internet on closely related attitudes. Forexample, Internet use may have highlighted the deficit of available informationthrough traditional news outlets. This conjecture is supported by the finding thatmembers of the Internet group were slightly (9%) less likely to indicate that theytrusted the Tanzanian news media (p < .10). It does not appear, however, that distrustof the traditional news media necessarily extended to government institutions. Therewas no significant difference between the Internet and control groups in terms ofhow much political parties and the government generally were trusted.

Surprisingly, members of the Internet group were significantly more likely (12%)to trust the Tanzanian police force (p < .10). The police force played a central andvisible role during both the election and recount. They helped ensure that the electionwas conducted fairly by arresting individuals caught with multiple vote cards, butthey also helped quell the violent protests in the days before and after the election.



Finally, on a relatively less optimistic note, compared to the control group, mem-bers of the Internet group were 11% less likely to vote (p < .10). Taking into accountthat they were also less likely to believe the election was conducted fairly and impar-tially, perhaps suggesting that, although the Internet may have equipped individualswith more robust information upon which to base their evaluations of the integrity ofthe election, greater access to information did not necessarily confer universal demo-cratic benefits. The effects are small, but in this case, Internet users who became moreaware of electoral abuses also may have become less likely to believe that their votemattered as a consequence. After all, the belief that an election is not being conductedfairly can produce two very divergent responses—while some people may respond byprotesting and taking to the streets, others may simply throw up their hands and stayhome. Perhaps, then, both Internet cynics and enthusiasts have it partially right, andthe Internet will prove a double-edged sword for democracy and democratization.

Discussion

In summary, the results of this study indicate that Internet use diminished indi-viduals’ perception of the fairness and impartiality of both the election and thesubsequent recount in the 2010 Tanzanian General Election. This study illustratesthe need to look beyond the more visible aspects of political activity to explore themore subtle pathways through which Internet use may have a meaningful politicalimpact. Specifically, this study reveals that the Internet can alter the cost-benefitcalculus of political behavior by expanding the range of information individuals haveregarding their government’s actual performance. In those instances in which theInternet encourages citizens to develop more critical evaluations of poor-performinggovernments, it is these very evaluations that can motivate citizens to act and organizeto effect political change in their countries.

But the finding that members of the disaffected Internet group were also less likelyto vote, reminds us that the Internet does not automatically encourage prodemocraticbehavior. One democratic gain, such as more critical evaluations of poor-performinggovernments, may be offset by reductions in other attitudes and behaviors essential todemocracy. Ultimately the Internet’s influence is a complex, contextually dependentprocess that in some instances will prove a double-edged sword for democracyand democratization. In Lynch’s words, ‘‘A new public sphere will fundamentallychange the conditions of political possibility, but the direction of that change remainsuncertain’’ (2011, p. 307).

Consider, for example, whether—as suggested by the Egyptian revolution—inorder for critical evaluations and dissatisfaction derived from Internet use to translateinto actual democratic gains offline, this depends on the presence of actors willingto marshal, organize, and lead that mounting unrest in the preceding months. Or,on the other hand, perhaps there is a threshold that these more negative evaluationsof poor-performing governments must exceed, or some specific catalyst that mustoccur, before this Internet-enhanced dissatisfaction will prompt actual political



behavior offline. The Internet may be a necessary but not sufficient conditionfor democratization. As Howard (2010, p. 12) observed, ‘‘Technology alone doesnot cause political change. . . But it does provide new capacities and impose newconstraints on political actors.’’

As future research probes the demographic and individual differences, it may bepossible to identify characteristics that may mediate or make individuals particularlysusceptible to information found online. In this study, for example, males in theInternet group were substantially more likely to believe that the election and recountwere unfair compared to their female counterparts, by differentials of 25 and 27%(p < .05 and p < .01, respectively). In the control group, men were also more likelythan women to doubt the integrity of the election and recount, although by muchsmaller (12 and 15%) and nonsignificant margins.

Interestingly, 20% more men than women in the Internet group reported fol-lowing news about the election online and 26% more reported using the Internetprimarily to gather news and information. Thus, additional research is necessaryto delineate whether the political impact of the Internet varies with specific demo-graphic characteristics (the mediating effects of which also likely vary across nationalcontexts), such as gender. In light of this, it is imperative that researchers to continueto uncover and test the factors that determine when, where, and how the Internet willalter citizens’ evaluations of their governments’ performance. Doing so will betterposition the discipline to predict when and where these more critical evaluationswill result in actual political behavior and organization to effect political change.Or, on the other hand, when these more informed and critical evaluations of poor-performing governments—a seeming democratic boon—will carry unintended and,perhaps, even undemocratic effects on related behaviors. In the longer term, this willalso provide a stronger foundation for predicting the effects of the Internet on theinformational relationship shared by citizens and their governments, and the politicalimplications of this changing relationship.

Finally, this study also makes a contribution to the field of Internet research bydemonstrating the value that field experiments add to the discipline’s methodologicaltoolbox. This method is presently underutilized in the discipline. Admittedly, fieldexperiments can be relatively costly to implement—in terms of time, labor, andmoney. However, as information technologies continue to diffuse, even into regionswith few other media, there will be more opportunities to explore how technologiesinfluence political evaluations, behaviors, and outcomes. Field experiments affordunique opportunities for studying the consequences of the proliferation of newinformation technologies.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks many colleagues who provided helpful feedback, advice, andsupport in regard to this study. This list includes, but is not limited to: Matt Baum,Tim Groeling, Jeffrey Isaac, Steve Livingston, John Sides, and particularly Kim Gross.



Successfully implementing experiments in the field, particularly overseas, is not aneasy endeavor. Thus, I would like to give special thanks to those who providedme with research assistance, both at home and in the field. This list includes: CaraBumgardner, Enisa Dugic, Jake Miller, Sarah Scott, and particularly Fulgence andFlora Mishili.

Note

1 Self-reports confirm that the median level of Internet use among members of the controlgroup was no Internet use at all during this same period. There were a minority ofindividuals in the control group that did report getting online; however, the average levelof Internet use for members of the control group was ‘‘less than once a month.’’Members of the Internet group, on the other hand, self-reported using the Internet 3 to4 days per week, on average. Although ideally members of the control group would nothave used the Internet at all, this is an unrealistic expectation. Moreover, the fact that theInternet group’s exposure to the Internet was at least 1,200% greater than that of thecontrol group means that the differential in Internet exposure between these two groupsis large enough to permit meaningful comparison.

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网络在非洲大选中作用的田野实验：更理性的民众？不满的选举人？抑或两者的结合？

Catie Snow Bailard

乔治华盛顿大学

【摘要：】

本研究探讨互联网如何影响个人政治组织活动的决定，希望有助于互联网对政治行

为和组织的研究。本研究采用随机田野试验的方法以确定互联网是否影响人们对 2010

年坦桑尼亚总统选举的公正性的看法，和对互联网对政治评价的影响进行了直接的因

果测试。结果显示，互联网负面影响人们对选举的公正性和验票的看法。然而互联网对

政治生活的影响并不总能丰富民主价值观。在这种情况下，越具有批判性的网民越不太

可能进行表决。

Une expérience sur le terrain explorant l’impact des effets de l’Internet sur une élection

africaine : citoyens plus futés, électeurs mécontents, ou les deux à la fois?

Catie Snow Bailard

Cette étude contribue à la recherche sur l’effet de l’Internet sur le comportement et l’organisation

politiques en examinant comment l’Internet influence les décisions personnelles à propos de

l’organisation politique. L’étude s’appuie sur une expérience aléatoire sur le terrain pour

déterminer si l’Internet avait influencé la perception qu’ont les individus de l’impartialité de

l’élection présidentielle tanzanienne de 2010. Elle offre un test causal direct de l’effet de

l’Internet sur les évaluations politiques, et les résultats révèlent que l’Internet influençait

négativement la perception qu’ont les individus de l’impartialité de l’élection et du recomptage.

Toutefois, les résultats révèlent aussi que l’impact de l’Internet sur la vie politique pourrait ne pas

toujours enrichir les valeurs démocratiques. Dans ce cas-ci, les internautes plus critiques

devenaient aussi moins susceptibles d’aller voter.

Mots clés : Internet, Tanzanie, Afrique, élections, scrutin, formation de l’opinion publique,

méthodes quasi-expérimentales

Ein Feldexperiment zum Einfluss des Internets in einer afrikanischen Wahl: Klügere Bürger, entfremdete Wähler oder beides? Die Studie ergänzt die Forschungsarbeiten zur Wirkung des Internets auf politisches Verhalten und Organisation, indem untersucht wird, wie das Internet die persönliche Entscheidung beeinflusst, wie man sich politisch organisiert. Die Studie nutzt ein randomisiertes Feldexperiment um herauszufinden, ob das Internet die individuelle Wahrnehmung dahingehend beeinflusst, ob die Präsidentschaftswahlen 2010 in Tansania fair abgelaufen sind. Es bietet einen direkten Kausaltest der Wirkung des Internets auf politische Bewertungen, wobei die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Internet die individuelle Wahrnehmung fairer Wahlen und Neuauszählungen negativ beeinflusst. Damit zeigen die Ergebnisse eindrücklich, dass der Einfluss des Internets auf das politische Leben nicht immer demokratische Werte bereichert, da in diesem Fall auch eher kritische Internetnutzer weniger gewillt waren, wählen zu gehen. Schlüsselbegriffe: Internet, Tansania, Afrika, Wahlen, Wählen, öffentliche Meinungsbildung, quasi-experimentelle Methoden

아프리카 선거에서의 인터넷의 효과에 관한 현장 실험: 똑똑해진 시민들, 영향받지 않은

투표자들, 또는 양자 모두

Catie Snow Bailard

요약

본 연구는 인터넷이 어떻게 정치적 조직화에 관한 개인적인 결정에 영향을 주는가를

연구하는 것에 의해 인터넷의 정치적 행위와 조직에 미치는 영향에 대해서 분석하였다. 본

연구는 2010년 탄자니아 대통령 선거의 공정성에 대한 개인들의 개념에 인터넷이 영향을

미친 정도를 결정하기 위한 현장탐방 실험을 단행하였다. 본 논문은 정치적 평가에 대한

인터넷의 효과의 직접적인 원인을 제공하였으며, 발견들은 인터넷이 선거와 재검표의

공정성이라는 측면에서의 개인적 개념에 부정적으로 영향을 주었음을 보여주고 있다.

그러나 발견들은 또한 개인적 생활에서의 인터넷의 영향은 항상 민주적 가치를

증진시키는 것이 아니라는 것도 보여주고 있다. 이경우 비판적 인터넷 사용자들은 투표에

참여할 가능성이 더욱 낮은 것으로 나타났다.

Un Experimento de Campo sobre el Impacto del Efecto del Internet en una Elección en África:

Ciudadanos más Inteligentes, Votantes Insatisfechos, o Ambos?

Catie Snow Bailard The George Washington University

Resumen

Este estudio contribuye a la investigación de los efectos del Internet sobre el comportamiento político y la organización mediante la examinación de cómo el Internet influencia las decisiones personales sobre la organización política. Este estudio emplea un experimento de campo al azar para determinar si el Internet influenció las percepciones de los individuos sobre la justicia de las elecciones presidenciales de Tanzania del 2010. Provee de una prueba causal directa del efecto del Internet sobre las evaluaciones políticas, y los hallazgos revelan que el Internet influencia negativamente la percepción de justicia de los individuos en la elección y el recuento. Sin embargo, los hallazgos revelaron también que el impacto del Internet sobre la vida política no siempre puede enriquecer los valores democráticos. En este caso, los usuarios del Internet más críticos fueron menos proclives a votar.

A Field Experiment on the Internet's Effect in an African Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected...

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