A Crucible of Conflict: Third Generation Gang Studies Revisited

A Crucible of Conflict:Third Generation Gang Studies Revisited

by

John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker

This essry briegy recounrs iltlitfl,"" of the gangs that occttpy failedcommunities and states, further discasses and updates lhe model of thirdgeneration street gangs discassed in an earlier Journal ofGang Research article-typically desuibed simply as third generation gangs (3 GEN Gongs), and suggestsstrategies for coping with and mitigating this evolved form of gang violence. Ofnote is the lack o/ impact 3GEN Gangs studies have had on domestically focusedU.S. academic gang reseorch while, at the same time, becoming a dominant modelin use by defense analysts and scholars focrsing on increasingly politicized non-state threat groups ineluding heavily armed Lqtin American gang.

Gangs have existed in a variety of forms throughout history. Most of the,. \-.time, gangs are d endemic crime and disorder issue aptly handled by communitypolice. On occasion, Emgactivity flared to present acute, localized, high intensitycriminal challenfes managed by intense local law enforcement and socialprograms. At other, more rare occasions, gangs as a form of non-state armedactor Eanscend the criminal realm and occupy a comer at the intersection betweencrime and war. This essay looks at the potential for high intensity gang violenceto challenge state structures and stability as a potential threat to national stability.

Traditionally, gangs have been viewed as purely criminal enterprises ofvarying degrees of sophistication and reach. In most cases, that view holds. Inothers, gangs are evolving or morphing into potentiallymore dangerous actors. Thevenues for this transition are the slums ofthe global city. In many cities and mega-cities, no-go zones, effectively 'criminal enclaves' or'lawless zones' dominated bygangs and organized crime, are linked with global criminal circuits, fuelingtransnational organized crime and challenging weak states. "At a neighborhoodlevel, political and operational comrption can diminish public safety, placingresidents at risk to endemic violence and inter-gang conflict, essentially resulting ina 'failed community,' a virtual analog of a'failed state"'(Sullivan and Bunker, 2002).

Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012

It is in these'failedcommunities' or'feral cities' (Norton, 2003 &2010), where civilgovernance, traditional security structures, and the community of social bonds haveeroded, that gangs thrive.

This essay briefly recounts the evolution of the gangs that occupy thisoperational space, further discusses and updates the model of third generation streetgangs discussed in a Journal of Gang Research article (Sullivan and Bunker, 2007)-typically described simply as third generation gangs (3 GEN Gangs), and suggestsstrategies for coping with and mitigating this evolved form of gang violence. Of noteis the lack of impact 3GEN Gangs studies have had on domestically focused U.S.academic gang research, while at the same time, becoming a dominant model in useby defense analysts and scholars focusing on non-state threat groups, includingheavily armed Latin American gangs, gangs linked to the Mexican cartels, mercenaryunits, such as the early Los Zetas organization, and some of the politicized Islamicgangs that have arisen in Iraq.

Unstable and Failed CommunitiesThe rise ofgangs in the United States follows pattems ofincre4fing urbanization

and immigration and has spread westwards from New York to Chicago and then toLos Angeles. As a result gangs have a long history in the United States (Howell andMoore, 2010). Serious street gangs-that is gangs with multi-year histories, largemembership, organizational structure, and criminal activities appear to haveemerged in the early 19ft Century (Sante, 1991). New York was home to thenotorious Five Points gmgs, including the "Dead Rabbits" and "Pug Uglies." TheFive Points gangs became important minor leagues for organized crime. One such

notorious alumnus was Alphonse Capone who later migrated to Chicago and formeda significant criminal syndicate (Howell and Moore, 2010). Modem gangs ofconsequence in New York include 6migr6s from other regions (Crips, Bloods fromLos Angeles; Latin Kings from Chicago, frleta from Puerto Rico, and the Trinitarioswith Dominican roots).

Chicago occupies a key niche in U.S. gang evolution and studies. Like NewYork, it was heavily influenced by Irish and Italian immigration. Frederic Thrasher'sseminal study of 1,313 Chicago gangs is a landmark in both criminology andsociology Thrasher, 1927). Early gangs of importance included the "42 Gaig,""Taylor Street Crew," and "Circus gangs," as well as the "Outfit" now viewedthrough the lens of organized crime. "Indeed, early Chicago gangs had a politicaldimension and were heavily influenced by organized crime. Indeed, these dynamicsunderlie John Hagedorn's conceptualization of "institutionalized" gangs andimportant efforts to "bring the state back into gangs research" (Hagedom, 2009). Inmore recent times, Chicago brought us the Gangster Disciples, Latin Disciples, ViceLords; Latin Kings, the El Rukns, Black P-Stone Nation, and Blackstone Rangers,(all influenced in varying degrees by Jeff Fort and shaped by cross-fertilization

Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict

resulting from the influence of Chicago-Los Angeles migration) as well as gang

alliances known as "People" and o'Folk" nations. These alliances are currently weak;yet yield an influence on gang antagonisms throughout the Midwest (Howell and

Moore,20l0).Drawing from Thrasher (1927), Howell and Moore note that the gangs that

flourished in early 20s Century Chicago grew out of the same immigrant experienceseen in 19tr' Century New York. Thrasher (the father of sociological gang studies)observed that gangs thrived in the turmoil of immigrant communities that werefacing the challenges of integration into the broader community, the "economic,moral, and cultural frontier.. . [or a] zone in transition" (Thrasher, 1927). MalcolmKlein documented the spread of gangs to at least 800 U.S. cities. In his importantresearch (see Klein, 1995) he also distinguished between street gangs and drug

Bmgs, forming the foundation for understanding potential gang differentiation and

evolution.Los Angeles is home to a wide range of gangs with broad reach. These

include the Black gangs or cliques associated with the "Crips" and "Bloods" as wellas a larger number of Hispanic or Surefio gangs affrliated with the Eme (or MexicanMafia), including the transnational Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and l8n Street. In thepaper "The Disaster Within Us: Urban Conflict and Street Gang Violence in LosAngeles" (Sullivan and Silverstein, 1995) ten years of street gang violence in LosAngeles was examined. This paper demonstrated that street gang activity is a chronicform of co*flict disaster. In addition, building from Klein's distinctions, it started toarticulateihe foundation for third generationgangs. Typical sheet gangs viewed asturf or 'first generation" gangs, and drug gangs as market or "second generation"gangs. This paper also illustrated the potential for epidemic levels of violence in acommunity. From that starting point, questions about the ability of gangs to furthermetastasize and form the vanguard for paramilitary groups were raised in Robert J.

Bunker's "Street Gangs-Future Paramilitary Groups?" (l 996).

Defining Third Generation Street GangsThe potential for chronic gang violence to evolve was satisfied-at least for

some gangs-with the potential reach offered by new technologies (such as theInternet and mobile digital communication). These technologies allowed the gangsto move beyond their traditional turf and later drugs-market orientations to engage inmore sophisticated activities. Some gangs appeared ready to move into a thirdgeneration. [n a series of papers starting with the article "Third Generation StreetGangs: Turfl Cartels, and Netwarriors," (Sullivan, 1997 a),the three generation streetgang typology was described and defined. The details of the first article wereexpanded and refined in further papers, "Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf,Cartels, and Net Warriors," (Sullivan, 1997b), and "Urban Gangs Evolving as

Criminal Netwar Actors," (Sullivan, 2000).

4 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012

The examination of urban street gangs in those papers revealed that somegangs evolved through three generations-transitioning from traditional turf gangs

to market-oriented drug gangs to a third generation that mixes political andmercenary elements. Three factors were identified: politicization,intemationalization,and sophistication that determined the evolutionary potential of these criminalactors. When describing the 'third generation' gmg, it became clear that 3 GENGangs possessed many of the organizational and operational attributes found withnet-based triads, cartels, and terrorist entities. The three generations of gangs can bebriefly summarized as follows:

. First Generation Gangs are traditional street gangs with a turf orientation.Operating at the lower end of extreme societal violence, they have loose leadershipand focus their attention on turf protection and gang loyalty within their immediateenvirons (often a few blocks or a neighborhood). When they engage in criminalenterprise, it is largely opportunistic and local in scope. These turf gangs are limitedin political scope and sophistication. ;.. Second Generation Gangs are engaged in business. They are enfrepreneurialand drug-centered. They protect their markets and use violence to control theircompetition. They have a broader, market-focused, and sometimes overtly politicalagenda and operate in a broader spatial or geographic area. Their operations mayinvolve multi-state and even international areas. Their tendency for centralizedleadership and sophisticated operations for market protection places them in thecenter of the range of politicization, internationalizationand sophistication.

. Third Generation Gangs have evolved political aims. They operate-oraspire to operate-at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication togarnerpower, aid financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities. Todate, most 3 GEN Gangs have been primarily mercenary in orientation yet, in somecases, they have sought to further their own political and social objectives.

Examples of gangs moving into the third generation include the Chicago-based "El-Rukn" gang, San Diego's "Calle Trienta," and Cape area gangs or vigilantes in SouthAfrica including o'Hard Livings" and "Pagad." For example, five members of the ElRukn's were convicted for conspiring to conduct terrorist activity as a mercenaryproxy for Libya; and Calle Trienta was used as a proxy by the Arellano-Feiix drugcartel as seen in the 1993 assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo inGuadalajara. In South Africa, both Hard Livings and Pagad (an Islamist vigilantegroup), respectively radicalized by civil war and jihadists, engaged in bombings andassassinations, as well as conventional political activity. Endemic high-intensitygang violence in Brazil's favelas and prisons demonstrates third generationpotential


in Rio de Janeiro and 56o Paulo.

The characteristics differentiating the tluee generations of street gangs are

summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Characteristics of Street Gang Generations

limited Politicization evolved

local Internationalization global

1't Generation

turf gang

turf protection

proto-netwarrior

2nd Generation

drug gang

market protection

emerging netwarrior

3'd generation

mercenily gangpower/fi nancial acquisition

netwarrior

--.

less sophisticated Sophisitieation

(Source: Sullivan, l997aand 1997b)

more sophisticated

While analyzing these generations, it became apparent that the evolution wasparalleling the development of 'netwar' actors as described by RAND analysts JohnArquilla and David Ronfeldt in their many works of netwar and information-ageconflict. As a result, the three gang generations are also described in light of theirability to engage in netwar. Thus, a first-generation gangster is a proto-netwarrior,a second-generation gangster is an emerging netwarrior, and a third-generationgangster is a fully realized netwarior. The culmination of this analysis andarticulation is found in "Gangs, Hooligans, and Anarchists-The Vanguard ofNetwar in the Streets," published as a chapter in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt'sessential RAND volume Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, andMilitancy in the Streets (Sullivan, 2001). In short, third generation gangs are in astate of transition from street gang to sophisticated, networked criminal enterprises.Typically, third generation gangs are the result of gangs maturing due to exposure to

fournal of Gang Researclt Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012

more sophisticated criminal enterprises combined with access to an opportunityspace conducive to enhanced sophistication and expanded reach.

The Networked Frontier: Transnational Gangs, War, and Insurgency

In "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords" Robert J. Bunker and John P.

Sullivan (2003) observed that the nature of crime and conflict has changed andcontinues to evolve. Tfie human and spatial terrain of gangs and theircounterparts in examined in "Terrorism, Crime, and Private Armies," (Sullivan,2005). In that paper, organized crime and gangs are examined in light of theirpotential to foment.'criminal free-states.' Criminal free-states are the ultimateexpression of failed states and their local analog'failed communities.' Gangsexploit weak state capacity and fragile governance to secure a base of operations.As such, gangs don't cause state failure at macro or micro levels but acceleratethe process of diminishing state capacity, fueling instability andtrigh intensitycrime.

A broad range of criminal gangs operate in these fragile zond seeking profitand at times waging war amongst themselves and increasingly against the state.

As a result, high intensity criminal violence, enabled by comrption and weakstate institutions, yields contested or'temporary autonomous" zones where thelegitimacy of the state is severely challenged. These criminal enclaves coverterritory ranging from individual neighborhoods- favelas or colonias- toentire cities-such as Ciudad Juardz, from large segments of exurban terrain inGuatemala's Pet6n province, and sparsely policed rural areas on the Atlantic

' Coast of Nicaragua.

Transnational Gangs

Transnational gangs challenge the state at multiple levels. They challengeneighborhoods and individual polities, but also cross-borders to challengemultiple states and their capacity to control crime and effectively govem. Theyare a concern throughout Latin America and, indeed, the entire WesternHemisphere. Such gangs-known as maras-are no longer just street gangs.

They have morphed across three generations through interactions with othergangs and transnational organized crime organizations (e.g. narcotics cartels/drug trafficking organizations). Current transnational gang activity is a concemin several Central American States and Mexico (where they inter-operate withcartels).Transnational gangs can be defined as having one or more of the followingcharacteristics (Franco, 2008):


Criminally active and operational in more than one country;

b. Criminal operations committed by gangsters in one country are

planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country;

c. They are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations; and

d. Their activities are sophisticated and transcend borders.

The gangs (maras) most frequently mentioned in this context are MaraSalvatrucha (MS-l3) and Eighteenth Street (M-18), both originating in thebarrios of Los Angeles. While these gangs started in Los Angeles, they have

expanded their reach through migration across the United States anddeportations to Mexico and Central America. As a result, loosely affrliatedcliques operate through out the hemisphere. Their activities are largely Iocalbut their networks of influence and alliances with prison gangs and drugcartels provide avenues to expand their reach and range of activities.

Prisons as a Catalyst

Transnational maras increasingly inter-operate with drug cartels. ForexamplSMS-l3 is believed to have links to theZ,etas in Mexico, serving as sub-contractors for violence and facilitators for human trafficking. The result is an

intricate and covert networked capacity reaching from Los Angeles to San

Salvador to Northern Virginia (known as the "Bloody Triangle") where MS-13cliques coordinate activities, often by leveraging their influence from jail orprison, and using instrumental violence to enforce their will.

This process, known as the "luz verde" or grden light, occurs when gangleaders in prison authorize the green light (or use of violence) on rivals or non-compliant gangsters. Since all gangsters eventually go to jail or prison, they aresubject to the overt and coercive effects of this enforcement tactic. Thisviolent-and often clandestine--enforcement mechanism is the core of the"feudal" relationship betweenprison gangs like Eme and Mexikanemi and streetgangs. As a result, networks of influence can operate with a minimal externalsignature.

MS-l3's rurme itself is demonstrative of the influence prison gangs haveover the broader gang milieu. The number I 3, which corresponds to the letter 'm'or 'eme' "is a nod to their allegiance to the Mexican Mafia. Prisons serve as

important sources of gang socialization by inculcating underworld moressolidifuing group identity and reinforcing gang culture. From the 'safe haven' ofjail or prison, gangs have the ability to extend their reach into the streets,

Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summe\2012

orchestrating gang action beyond prison walls.Law enforcement offrcials in Los Angeles and El Salvador have

encountered telephonic interaction between prisoners and gang members in bothjurisdictions. As a result, gang "leadership has no boundaries: MS-I3 memberswho are incarcerated after deportation have managed to turn Central Americanprisons into bases of power. Gang leaders in the Ciudad Barrios and

Quetzaltepque prisons in El Salvador still influence gang activities in the U.S.,green-lighting hits and other operations by cell phone" (Quirk, 2008). Suchtransactions are likely reciprocal and undoubtedly reinforce transnational bondsand promise to accelerate gang evolution across jurisdictions (Sullivan, 2008).

Transnational gangs (by definition, operating at the second or third generation) are

potential challengers to'state legitimacy and capacity, posing complex security andpublic safety threats. U.S. Army War College analyst Max Manwaring aptlydescribes these challenges to state solvency: o'When linked with or working fortransnational criminal organizations, insurgents, drug barons, orwarlords, the gangs'

activities further reduce police and military authorities' abilities to mai-ntain stabilityand, in doing so, challenge the sovereignty-of the states within and between whichthey move" (Manwaring,2007). As Sullivan noted in "TransnationallSangs' (2008):

Gangs reign when instruments of social control are weak or nonexistent.Historically, while transnational organized crime groups exploited the seams

between states, they benefited from the existence of a stable state. Traditionalcriminal enterprises, including gmgs, did not seek to challenge the state; ratherthey exploited comrption and political influence to further their activities. Thisappears to be changing as a new range oftransnational gangsters exploit shadow

' economies, the absence of effective states, and endemic com:ption.

Thomas C. Bruneau, a scholar at the Naval Postgraduate School assessedthe impact of maras in "The Maras and National Security in Central America"(2005). Bruneau described five (multi) national security threats or challengesassociated with transnational maras. These are paraphrased below:

*'r* They strain govemment capacity by overwhelming police and legalsystems through sheer audacity, violence, and numbers.*** They challenge state legitimacy, particularly in regions where the cultureof democracy is challenged by comrption and reinforced by the inability ofpolitical systems to function well enough to provide public goods andservices.*** They act as surrogate or alternate govemments extracting to<es onindividuals and businesses.*t"t They dominate the informal economic sector, establishing small


businesses and using violence and coercion to unfairly compete withlegitimate businesses while avoiding taxes and co-opting government

regulators.

"** They infiltrate police and non-governmental organizations to furthertheir goals and, in doing so, demonstrate latent political aims.

An example of the impact of gang brutality on the state can be seen inGuatemala where maras dominate urban and rural areas alike, using beheadings

and mass violence to ensure collection of street taxes from bus operators and

merchants and inter-operating with cartels-including Los Zetas- to smuggledrugs and control tenitory in so-called "zones of impunity."

As Hal Brands has noted, the impact on state capacity throughout LatinAmerica in the face ofcriminal incursions, whether you view them as brigandageor "criminal insurgency,' is significant (Brands, 2010):

Across Latin America, the state is under attack. During the Cold War, the regionwas roiled by political bloodshed and left-wing insurgencies; today, the threatemanates from the actions of organized crime syndicates, extremely violentyouth gangs, and international drug cartels. From Tijuana, Mexico, to Sao Paulo,Brazil,these groups participate in illicit activities ranging from drug smugglingto arms dealing to simple extortion, they use bribery and coercion to hollow outstate institutions from within, and they murderpolicemen, govemment officials,and citDens who refuse to coopelate. These tactics have had a devastating impacton gov€rnance; in the slums ofBrazil, cities inNorthern Mexico, and elsewhere,

the formal state has effectively collapsed and real power lies with the

predominant gang or cartel rather than with the authorities.Essentially, Brands describes a situation where criminal elements

are waging a form of irregularwarfare against states. [n Latin America,this has what he calls profoundly pernicious consequences. Unless thethreat is contained and strategic, operational, and tactical approaches tocriminal insurgency and counter-gang violence are developed andnurtured, the threat has the potential to spread along the networkedeconomic circuits that these gangs and cartels exploit. We have alreadyseen Mexican cartels spread their reach into Central America and acrossthe Atlantic to West Africa; we have seen them build alliances with the'Ndrangheta, forge alliances or sub-contract with maras, and seen cross-border gangs like the Aztecas operate on both side of the Rio Grande.

In Guatemal4 for example, the Zetas have reportedly created bases to notonly facilitate smuggling, but to control and defend their territories militarily.These Zeta bases are believed to train a rmtge of gangsters including marerosfrom MS-13. The result is a neo-feudal patchwork of gang micro-fiefs where

10 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer,2012

gangs wage a non-ideological or "criminal insurgency" that challenges the stateand controls local destinies (Sullivan and Elkus, 2010). In many cases (insegments of Mexico, Guatemala, Brazilforexample), gangs impose order, rationsocial goods, collect taxes, and effectively maintain the day-to-day monopoly onviolence. State forces (police and military) penetrate these enclaves only inorganized operations and in large numbers, often by conducting raids (or serving'owarrants") and then leave, allowing the gangs to fill the void.

This expanding criminal reach is now involving limited pockets ofviolence in U.S. and Canadian cities as well. The conditions now stimulatingsuch "spillover" constitute an essential intelligence question for U.S. Federal andlocal law enforcement agencies. For example U.S. prison and street gangs linkedto the Mexican cartels (Table 2.)have substantial reach and number in the tens-of-thousands of members:

Table 2. U.S. Prison and StreetlSureftos) Gangs Affiliated withlsL

a. National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, December 2008 and National

GanglntelligenceCenter, NationolGangThreatAssessment200g,lanuary2009;b.USDeparfmentofJustice, Attorney General's Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas,

April 2008; c. Via other OSINT. Source: Robert J. Bunker, "Strategic Threat: narcos and narcoticsoverview," Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries, London:Routledge, 20ll 14.

Sinaloa. Gulf. J or ana carteName Tvoe Reach SizeBarrio Azteca Prison National (Texas, SE

New Mexico)b2,000

18"'Street SEeet National (44 cities 20states) & Mexico,Central America'

30,000 - 50,000

Hermanos de PistolerosLatinos

Prison Local (Texas, Mexico) 1,000

Mara.Salvatrucha (MS-l3)

Sfreet National (& Mexico,Central America)

8,000-lo,ooo (30,000-50.000 The Americas)

Mexican Mafia(La Eme)

Prison Regional (California,Southwest, Pacificareas)

200350-400b I

I

Mexikanemi (Emi) Prison Reeional (Texas) 2.000

Florencia 13 (Fl3 orFX13)

Street Regional (Califomia,4other States)

3,000+

Surefios Gangs (Sur-13;includes Avenues, Fl3)

Street National(MostlyCalifornia)

50,000 - 75,000

Taneo Blast Street-Prison Reeional 14.000+

Texas Syndicate Prison Regional (South-Westboth sides of theborder)b

1,300'


War and Insurgency-Parallel Cauldrons: Iraq and the Americas?

The Iraqi Insurgency, much like the criminal activities of the urban streets

and Central America, also provides a laboratory for gauging the impact of thirdgeneration gangs. Nicholas L Haussler in his Master's Thesis for the NavalPostgraduate School examined the impact ofthe third generation model in regardto the Iraqi Insurgency. In that study, Haussler drew insights from thirdgeneration gang theory to illustrate the dynamics of insurgent networks in Iraq.The result, "Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraqi Insurgency" (2005)

examined 3 GEN theory for its utility, concluding it describes many of thedynamics found inthe Iraqi Insurgency. Haussler adapted the schemato providean integrated model suited to the Iraqi context of state-insurgent interaction.Similar efforts will be needed to tackle third generation gangs in the Americas(Bunker and Sullivan,2007). Specifically, lessons learned and tactics from bothcounterinsurgency (COIN) and community policing need to be carefullyassessed to distill viable counter-gang and counter-violence approaches thatfoster and sustain the legitimacy of the state while deJegitimizing criminalchallengers. This may require the development ofpolice operational art entailingthe development of "full spectrum policing" doctrine to address "intra-conflictpolicing" situations analogous to "post-conflict" policing missions found intransitional justice settings (Sullivan and Elkus, 20 I 0b).

-..-Integrating 3GEN Gangs Studies with Cartel and Feral Cities Research

As mentioned in the 2007 Joumal of Gang Research article written bySullivan and Bunker, 3 GEN Gangs studies are both influencing and beingintegrated with other forms of criminal-soldier and urban conflict research andstudy. The 3 GEN model was recently integrated with research on cartelevolutionary phases, first published in 1998 by these authors. In "Cartelevolution revisited," (Bunker and Sullivan, 201 I ), this research was updated andintegrated with street and prison gangs as they pertain to the criminalinsurgencies now taking place in Mexico. Until this time, only AlexsandarFatic's "The criminal syndicate as para-state in the Balkans" (2004) had soughtto expand on the original cartel evolutionary phases model. The intent of therevisited piece was partially to help determine what combinations of ganggenerations would exist with the various cartel phases and their interrelationship,given that cartels are the more dominant organizationalstructure to that of gangs.

Current research conducted by Bunker and Sullivan, to be published later in2011, focuses on integrating Richard Norton's 'Feral Cities' model (2003 &2010). The intent of this new line of research is essentially:

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t2 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012

[the] Blending of 'feral cities' with'3'dphase cartel' and '3'd generation gangs' (3GEN Gangs) research. The feral cities diagnostic tool will be expanded fromthree levels (green, yellow and red) to five (purple and black). This will beaccomplished by means of the addition of two new levels that model the shiftfrom ferality (deinstitutionalization) to criminal re-institutionalization of urbansocial and political structures around new patterns of living. Such processes setthe stage for the projected emergence of the BlackFor (Black Force) within theAmericas. BlackFor represents a confederation of illicit non-state actors-essentially a post-Modern form of societal cancer- linked together by means ofa network of criminalized and criminal (narco) cities as are now arising (Bunkerand Sullivan, Forthcoming).

Ultimately, 3 GEN Gangs research is being linked and integrated into an everincreasing range of non-state threat analyses and models used by defense and

security analysts as synergies and commonalities are recognized between them.

Recent Gang Research Compatibte with 3 GEN Gan$studies

A survey ofrecent publications on gang research suggest that other worksare emerging, or have emerged, that are readily compatible with 3 GEN Gangsstudies or may compete with it. The first work of note is William Dunn's TheGangs of Los Angeles (2A07). Dunn, a Los Angeles Police Department Officer(LAPD), is a gang expert with expertise in Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Afterdiscussing the violence and politicized nature of Central American gangs, in afollowing chapter he discusses lessons leamed for the U.S. His concerns aresobering and are as follows:

What the average person doesn't understand is the gang problem is slowlyencirclingthem. There is arapidlyenlarging segmentof ourcivilization which isspinning out of control, that can't keep their minds right, and ifwe don't reel themin, we're all in for an ultra violent future, one that will affect us all; even thosewho think they have enough money and riches to live above and beyond it all.Because eventually there will be no escape. Although a few major cities, LosAngeles included, have experienced a decline in gang population, mainly due toincreased housing prices, the nationwide gang problem is growing exponentiallyeach year. We are cunently on course for a gang culture that could explode intoinsurrection in this country. It is a very real possibility Gry.262-263).

Additionally, Max Manwaring is finishing up his important trilogy;Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime (2008), Gangs Pseudo-militaries and Other


Modem Mercenaries (2010), and The Complexity of Modem Inegular War(forthcoming). His second work in this series focuses on state-supported gangs,

state-associated gangs, and non-state actor associated gangs. He is seeingstrategic-level analytical commonalities that "...apply to virtually any situationin which the gang phenomena is generating the instability and violence that isintended to bring about radical political change" (p. 150). The third work, in finaldraft form, provides a brilliant comparative analysis of different forms ofpoliticized gangs and how, in some instances, the tenants ofMaxist-Leninism are

being used by strongmen to direct them.Finally, the work of John Hagedorn is of great interest to those engaged

in 3 GEN Gang studies. His edited volume Cangs in the Global City (2007) andA World of Gangs (2008a) represents his transition from more traditional formsof gang studies. In his chapter on "Gangs in Late Modernity" in the 2007 work,he is moving away from an interstitial gang focus- gang members as

unsupervised groups ofjuveniles (p. 3 10)- to other forms per his own tyfology.Perceptions such as social exclusion, media-diffirsed oppositional culture, andthe ability of gangs to assume institutional roles (social, economic, political,cultural, religious or military) are now coming into his definition of gangs (p.307). These perceptions readily became evident in his 2008 work, with aforeword by Mike Davis of Planet of Slums (2006), on the internationalproliferation of urban gangs. He calls this research on "...'armed young men'aroturdjhe world, including institutionalized gangs, para-militaries, militantfundarnentalists, terrorists, and drug cartels" (viahis uic.edu site). His break withtraditional criminology was complete in 2008a with his final words to thediscipline "De mortuis nil nisi bonum" (p. 134). This makes Hagedorn's work ofsignificant importance to the exploration of contemporary gang phenomena,especially in the 3 GEN Gang studies arena, however, to date, he has been criticalof the 3 GEN typology (Hagedom, 2008b) and appears to be developing acompeting (or perhaps complemenhry) paradigm of study.

Countering Gangs: Intelligence, Enforcement and Counter-violence

Countering gangs and their impact on state capacity and security requiresa balanced and agile mix of intelligence, enforcement, and counter-violenceapproaches. It is imperative that counter-gang intelligence efforts be coordinatedwithin metropolitan regions, among state, local, and tribal agencies in the UnitedStates, and with multilateral partners throughout the Western Hemisphere andindeed throughout the globe. This would first require a standardized andcoordinated effort to track gang crimes, document gang spheres of influence(turf;, and activities, alliances, and markets. This would also require buildingbridges to span the stovepipes that segment counter-narcotics (drug intelligence)

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from gang intelligence, and broader homeland security efforts. In short, it wouldrequire a network of fusion centers to fuse the products of separate specialty andregional centers. Essentially, this network would enable the "co-production" ofcounter-gangs intelligence (Sullivan and W irtz, 2009).

In addition, enforcement efforts across sub-disciplines and jurisdictionsneed to be harmonized and intelligence-driven. This requires the development ofoperational and strategic intelligence capacities for law enforcement to enhancethe effectiveness of case-oriented tactical crime analysis. This does notnecessarily mean building a new federal infrastructure. Rather it may be moreeffective to link counter-narcotic and counter-gang efforts across states into acounter-gang enteqprise. Such an enterprise would link agencies laterally, notonly vertically from locality to state to federal. It would also require enhancedcross-border and transnational cooperation. These intelligence and enforcementneed to be accompanied by dedicated counter-violence efforts.

Counter-violence efforts help contain the violence tl1lt accompaniesgangs and illicit trade in narcotics. Gangs and crime syndicates (i.e. drug cartelsand their enforcers) utilize violence to secure markets, protec.lllipments, secureturf, control the plazas for transshipping product, and sustain their power. As wehave seen in Mexico and other parts of Central America, they increasinglyemploy violence to counter enforcement efforts. This will require the police tobe able to rapidly shift from community policing into formed units to counterintense violence in infantry-type operations, as well as to effectively inter-operate with military special forces and infantry (i.e. full spectrum policing).

Traditional counter-violence efforts include targeting violent criminalgangs through reactive enforcement. This typically occurs in response to a gangattack (i.e. drive-by shootings, assassinations) with police responding toinvestigate the crime and arrest the attackers. Saturation patrols in high violenceareas and crackdowns enforcing criminal statutes in areas frequented by gangsare also employed. More sophisticated gang enforcement approaches includegathering investigative intelligence on gang members and their organizations,warrant enforcement directed against gangsters for previous crimes, and thedevelopment of conspiracy and racketeering cases.

Civil gang injunctions, such as those piloted in Los Angeles, to disrupt a gang'scontrol over communities are a newer approach. These involve execution of acivil court order that prohibits a gang and its members from conducting specifiedactivities within a designated geographic area or neighborhood. The court orderessentially declares the targeted gang and its criminal activities to be a publicnuisance. The gang members must be individually linked as members of thegang and served notice of the injunction. Should the gang member violate theinjunction's provisions, they are subject to prosecution (for a misdemeanor withpotential sanctions including fines and/or six months in jail) for breeching the


court's injunction (violating a court order).The loss of the constitutional right to 'free assembly' these injunctions

strip away from individual gang members have made them controversial and insome ways designate those so targeted'enemies of the public,' much like those

sentenced under the statutes of the three-strikes (habitual offender) laws. Still,gang injunctions are often viewed as successful (Grogge\2002): Activities thatare typically proscribed include:

. Associating with other known gang members;

. Using of gang signs and colors;

. Using, possessing, selling, or transporting drugs;

. Using or possessing alcohol;

. Using or possessing dangerous or deadly weapons;

. Writing graffiti or performing acts of vandalism;

. lntimidating, threatening or harassing others.

Other viable counter-violence efforts include gang diversion and transitionprograms, employment development programs, and community stability and

resilience initiatives. These are likely to be the most effective means of limitingthe negative impact of gangs on a community. An exemplary gang transitioninitiative is 'Homeboy Industries.' This Los Angeles community-basedprografwas founded by Father Greg Boyle, S.J. to provide jobs to male and

female gang members. The initiative's goal is to facilitate the transition fromgang t'rfe to community life. Examples of its activities include the 'HomeboyBakery' and 'Homegirl Cafe' venues that allow the former gangsters to work ina team, developing skills while building self-esteem.

Effectively countering gang violence requires community support.Community support must be grounded in security and stability. Policing is a keyelement ofenabling community stability and is instrumental in fostering securitythrough enforcement and crime control efforts. Enforcement activities mustreinforce police legitimacy and be strongly grounded in community support inorder to sustain conditions for effective govemance. Without strong communityinvolvement and support-i.e., community policing--counter-violence effortswill likely suffer diminished long-term effectiveness, fueling a spiral thatsustains gang resurgence.

Conclusion

Third generationgangs have beenrecognized and studied foralmost adecadeand a half. During that period, a growing number of researchers have recognizedthe presence of these entities, documented and anticipated their evolution, and

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16 fournal of Gang Reseorch Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012

tracked their progress and proliferation. The resulting papers have shown theprogress of some gangs in their mutation from turf to market to mercenary orpolitical actors. Fortunately, only a few gangs have made the trek. Most gangs

remain firmly embedded in the first and, to a lesser degree, the second generation.

A few have made it to the third-almost universally outside ofthe United States.

All gangs challenge civil stability and, at each progressive generation, the depthofthe threats posed increases.

Gangs are non-state armed actors that at times can, with the right catalysts(like interaction with cartels and other sophisticated entities), become non-statecriminal soldiers. As such, they challenge state institutions to foment instabilityand conflict. Gangs will no doubt continue to pose these challenges in areas

where state instihttions are weak, where the gap between those that have and

those that have not stimulate crime and instability, and in those areas whereinsurgency-both criminal and traditional-seeks to reign. As they do so, therole of third generation gangs must be studied and addressed.

This begs the question of at what point mainstream U.S.-?cademic gang

researchers begin to study the 3 GEN gangs phenomena. The difference inperceptions- between the traditional gang researchers and detEtrse analysts and

scholars concerning the dangers 3 GEN gangs ultimately pose to a sovereignstate-was quite evident to one of the authors during a meeting in support of theIraq Studies Group in 2008 where members ofboth groups attended. Much ofthediscussion saw the two groups talking past each other because of their verydifferent frames of reference.

Quite possibly this difference in perception will continue, especially, if street

and prison gangs in the U.S. remain insular and less evolved than their moredeadly counterparts now emerging in the under developed regions of the globe.

Still, it is hoped that this essay will form a foundation for understanding theunfolding potentials and aid efforts to counter the global insurgency where gangs

and global guerillas challenge states, security and stability. Understanding andaction (at all levels of govemment, and multilaterally in the case of transnationalgangs) must be combined to containthe threatthat networked gangs and criminalinsurgencies pose to civil govemance throughout the Westem Hemisphere and

beyond. Essentially, we must contain the crucible of conflict.

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About the AuthorsJohn P. Sullivan is a researcher and practitioner. He is a career police officer and

currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriffs Deparfrnent. He is alsoa Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terorism (CAST).He is co-editor of Countering Tenorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 20A6) and Global Biosecurity: Threats andResponses (Routledge, 2010) and author or co-author of Jane's UnconventionalWeapons Response Handbook, Jane's Facility Security Handbook, PolicingTransportation Facilities, as well as over 100 chapters or articles on terrorism,policing, intelligence, and emergency response. He holds a B.A. in government fromthe College of William and Mary, a M.A. in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis fromthe New School for Social Research, and is a doctoral candidate at the OpenUniversity of Catalonia (Internet Interdisciplinary Institute-IN3, UOC, Barcelona).His current research foclrs is the impact of gangs and transnational organized crimeon sovereignty, intelligence, terrorism, post- and intra- conflict policing, andcriminal insurgencies.

Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degtees in political science, govemment, behavioralscience, social science, anthropology-geagraphy, and history. Iraining takenincludes that provided by DHS, FLETC, DlA, Cal DOJ, Cal POST, LA JRIC,NTOA, and private security entities in counterterrorism, count?r-surveillance,incident-response, force protection, and intelligence. Dr. Bunker has been involvedin red teaming and counter-terrorism exercises and has provided operations supportwithin Los Angeles County. Past associations have included Futurist in Residence,FBI Academy, Quantico, VA; Counter-OPFOR Program Consultant (StatrMember), National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technolory Center-West, ElSegundo, CA; Fellow, lnstitute of Law Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army,Arlington, VA; Lrcturer-Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program,California State University San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA; instructor,University of Southem Califomia" Los Angeles, CA; and founding member, LosAngeles Terrorism Eady Waming Group. Dr. Bunker has over 200 publicationsincluding short essays, articles, chapters, pape$ and book length documents. Theseinclude Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism andGlobal Instrgency (editor); Criminal-Statgs and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); NarcosOver the Bddeildditor)i-and Red Tfams and Counter-terrorisni Training (co-author).

A Crucible of Conflict: Third Generation Gang Studies Revisited

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