A Critical Enquiry into the Diverse Factors

Underpinning Afghanistan’s Illicit Opium Poppy

Cultivation – An Alternative Path to achieving a

Cost-Effective Suppression and Positive National

Development Impacts

By

Yahaya Umar

Ph.D. Research Student, Department of Sociology (GenderSpecialization), University of Abuja, Nigeria

Email: yahaumar@yahoo.com Phone Contact: +2348033601535

Abstract Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have eroded

Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the

last decades. Notwithstanding the ongoing counternarcotics

efforts by the Afghan government, the United States and other

allies, Afghan remains the source of over 90 percent of the

world’s illicit opium production (Blanchard 2009). Opium poppy

cultivation in Afghanistan is widespread across the provinces

of the country, with a large part of the population benefiting

from its production, processing, and trafficking. Many

researchers attribute the booming state of opium economy in

Afghanistan to weak governance, strong local warlords, years

1

of war and the obvious impoverishment of the population. While

government suffers the ugly effects of these problems

including capacity incapacitation and conflicting tensions in

policy choices, it is the overwhelming believe of the

stakeholders in the Afghanistan post war reconstruction

project that the opium poppy production undermines the

country’s economy and sovereignty which in turn, weakens

efforts to build an effective, accountable national state

(Felbab-Brown 2007: 2). This is the reason for the foundation

and application of an array of proposals under the umbrella

approach called ‘counternarcotics strategy’. However, can the

application of the plan effectively suppress the opium boom in

poverty stricken, politically volatile and local warlords

dominated Afghanistan? Importantly, are the benefits of

suppression of illicit opium much more than the benefits

derivable from its licit production for the much needed

medicinal purposes?

This paper argues that since counternarcotics policies

are frequently of limited effectiveness in suppressing illicit

drug production, licencing of opium poppy production in

Afghanistan for useful medicinal and other useful purposes

will have positive national development impacts, and that, it

is much more cost-effective in achieving these outcomes. This

is because, since the state would no longer have to engage

itself in the herculean task of eliminating the population’s

means of livelihoods in the licensed areas, the hostility of

the population to the government would be drastically reduced

2

and then, the legitimacy of the state would be enhanced. The

paper holds the view that the benefits accruable from

legitimizing opium production in Afghanistan, backed by

stringent bureaucratic and legal measures are likely to

outweigh the difficulties associated with the current

ineffective but costly control measures. Therefore, given the

robust evidence of the importance of opium production in the

Afghan’s microeconomic sector, attempt at its forceful

suppression, is counterproductive and inimical to the

country’s stability and economic growth.

3

A Critical Enquiry into the Diverse Factors

Underpinning Afghanistan’s Illicit Opium Poppy

Cultivation – An Alternative Path to achieving a

Cost-Effective Suppression and Positive National

Development Impacts

Introduction

Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have eroded

Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the

last decades. Notwithstanding the ongoing counternarcotics

efforts by the Afghan government, the United States and other

allies, Afghan remains the source of over 90 percent of the

world’s illicit opium production (Blanchard 2009). Opium poppy

cultivation in Afghanistan is widespread across the provinces

of the country, with a large part of the population benefiting

from its production, processing, and trafficking. Many

researchers attribute the booming state of opium economy in

Afghanistan to weak governance, strong local warlords, years

of war and the obvious impoverishment of the population. While

government suffers the ugly effects of these problems

including capacity incapacitation and conflicting tensions in

policy choices, it is the overwhelming believe of the

stakeholders in the Afghanistan post war reconstruction

project that the opium poppy production undermines the

country’s economy and sovereignty which in turn, weakens

efforts to build an effective, accountable national state

4

(Felbab-Brown 2007: 2). This is the reason for the foundation

and application of an array of proposals under the umbrella

approach called ‘counternarcotics strategy’. However, can the

application of the plan effectively suppress the opium boom in

poverty stricken, politically volatile and local warlords

dominated Afghanistan? Importantly, are the benefits of

suppression of illicit opium much more than the benefits

derivable from its licit production for the much needed

medicinal purposes?

This paper argues that since counternarcotics policies

are frequently of limited effectiveness in suppressing illicit

drug production, licencing of opium poppy production in

Afghanistan for useful medicinal and other useful purposes

will have positive national development impacts, and that, it

is much more cost-effective in achieving these outcomes. This

is because, since the state would no longer have to engage

itself in the herculean task of eliminating the population’s

means of livelihoods in the licensed areas, the hostility of

the population to the government would be drastically reduced

and then, the legitimacy of the state would be enhanced. The

paper holds the view that the benefits accruable from

legitimizing opium production in Afghanistan, backed by

stringent bureaucratic and legal measures are likely to

outweigh the difficulties associated with the current

ineffective but costly control measures. Therefore, given the

robust evidence of the importance of opium production in the

Afghan’s microeconomic sector, attempt at its forceful

5

suppression, is counterproductive and inimical to the

country’s stability and economic growth.

In order to prove this, the paper puts the debate around

the diversity of issues that plays out in the cultivation of

opium in Afghanistan, and attempts to explore opportunities

inherent in its production within the confines of the law for

medicinal and other useful purposes. The paper begins by

examining the reasons why the cultivation of opium poppy has

remained persistent in Afghanistan and the measures proposed

to stem its boom. It then attempts to explore the cost and

benefits derivable from the illicit opium production in

Afghanistan. Finally, the paper delves in to the opportunities

inherent in the cultivation of opium as a national resource

under a legalized mechanism, for the purpose of driving

development and national integration. Meanwhile, in this

paper, the broad ‘counternarcotics strategies’ is used

interchangeably with ‘substitution measures’ and include;

eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihood

programmes. Each is explained and views of the experts on

chances of their effectiveness and success, discussed one

after the other.

Why has the cultivation of opium poppy remained persistent in

Afghanistan?

Despite the implementation of continuous counter-

narcotics strategy by the Afghanistan government in

6

partnership with the international community, the country

continues to be a major contributor to the global drug supply.

This view is evident by the recent report of the Civil

Military Fusion Centre (2012), which notes that ‘of the

approximately 90 percent of the world’s opium, most of which

is processed into heroin, originates from Afghan fields’. A

number of factors motivate this scenario.

In the history of Afghanistan, the prevalence of high

scale of poverty among rural communities has been thought of

as a major factor influencing opium cultivation in the

country, which in turn has made it difficult for the success

of alternative livelihoods designed to achieve opium

suppression. As Afghanistan failed, cultivating opium became a

means of survival for rural communities. The basic means of

livelihoods for the teaming rural poor such as agricultural

products and livestock which sustained people hitherto the war

became diminished. This unfortunate situation according to

Ward & Byrd (2004: 9), led to a rise in the percentage of

unemployment, disappearance of non-farm jobs, the eventual

collapse of rural livelihoods and markets, hence, despite its

cultivation, even being understood under the Islamic

jurisprudence as haram (unlawful), opium production became

accepted as a livelihood and coping strategy. This view is

also corroborated by Mansfield (2001: 5), who notes that ‘in

certain parts of Afghanistan where land is rented to farmers,

the poor who are unable to meet the conditions of their rental

agreement, have had little option but to cultivate opium’.

7

Access to credit facility is undoubtedly, one of the

leading factors encouraging opium production in Afghanistan

and limiting substitution as an approach to weakening opium

production. This is because the opiate sector is based on a

system of advance payments locally called salaam Mansfield (p.

6), which offers opportunities for the crop to be bought well

in advance by the traffickers at a price below the market

value, thus, allowing farmers to meet their basic need

especially during hard times (UNODC 2003: 113; Dufour &

Kauffmann, 2010: 24). Mansfield explicates this succinctly by

noting that, in Pakistan, ‘local shopkeepers, known as beopari,

provide farmers with goods on the understanding that any debts

accrued will be repaid in form of opium (p. 6)’. Drawing on

these illustrations, it is obvious that the credit and other

forms of incentives provided by the traffickers, but

conditional on repayment by opium, from economic point of

view, entraps the farmers to the traffickers in a cycle of

debt which understandably inhibits their audacity to quit

poppy cultivation for alternative livelihoods being promoted

through national and International collaboration.

Central to the entire debate about the motivations for

opium boom in Afghanistan is the favourable climatic and agro-

ecological conditions as well as the agrarian systems. The

opium poppy cultivation maximises the yield of irrigated land,

using less water than wheat and vegetable cultivation. This

view is substantiated by Mansfield (p. 4), who notes that ‘the

8

Afghanistan’s environment characterized by war damaged

physical infrastructures, opium being a non-perishable, low

weight-high value product, simply becomes an option’. This is

because as opium poppy being an annual crop that is resistant

to drought and uses less irrigation water, has simply provided

a degree of security that many crops such as fruit and

vegetables, does not offer.

Institutional weakness and grave insecurity also features

prominently in the accounts for the wide spread of opium

production in Afghanistan, and this is a major blow to the

effectiveness and realization of the noble goals of the

counternarcotics strategies. This is because the conditions of

anarchy, promoted by domestic and regional interests who by

all accounts, feeds on it (Ward & Byrd 2004: 4), weakens the

capacity of the government to establish and enforce laws aimed

at controlling opium production . This ultimately encourages

production of opium and makes export easier especially along

the country’s borders. What development measures have been

proposed to facilitate suppression of opium in Afghanistan?

Measures proposed to diminish the cultivation of opium poppy

in Afghanistan

The cultivation of opium poppy and drug trafficking

persist in Afghanistan which raises serious concerns about the

unmitigated production of the drug crop, as it has been seen

as a threat to Afghanistan’s peace and stability. Therefore,

9

measures introduced to control opium production in Afghanistan

revolve round some elements of counternarcotics strategy,

which include; eradication, interdiction and alternative

livelihood programmes.

According to the accounts by Felbab-Brown (p. 1),

eradication entails targeting the farmers who are the most

identifiable segment of the drug trade, and destroy the crops.

However, the researcher notes that ‘eradication even in its

more coercive form, such as aerial spraying, rarely succeeds

in decreasing cultivation since the farmers and traffickers

have a range of approaches they often use; such as replanting

after eradication and shifting production to other areas that

have not come to the attention of the authorities for

eradication. According to Felbab-Brown, rather than

discouraging opium boom, eradication boosts it production,

because, the approach shoots up price, thereby making its

production to be more attractive economically. In addition,

given various evidence of past scientific research which

paints a picture of failure of counter-narcotics efforts in

Colombia where crops were destroyed by force without offering

the local population sufficient alternative livelihoods to

achieve desired results, (Werb et al. 2008: 442) considers the

success of the application of substitution model in

Afghanistan as questionable.

A second element of the counternarcotics strategy being

used to control opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan as

10

suggested by Febab-Brown is interdiction. According to the

researcher, this approach involves focusing on the

traffickers, who encourages opium growth among farmers through

a variety of means as evident by Mansfield’s judgments in the

preceding section. Given the evidence of the gross

incapacitation of the Afghan government coupled with the

weakness of the security agencies to effectively police the

nation’s borders, Febab-Brown (p. 1) concludes, ‘interdiction

remains unlikely to increase efficacy of opium cultivation

suppression in Afghanistan’.

Another critical element of the substitution strategy

supposedly applied in discouraging opium production in

Afghanistan is the alternative livelihood programmes. It is

important to take a bird’s eye view on what the strategy

implies. According to the report of the Civil Military Fusion

Centre (2012), ‘alternative livelihood programmes relates to

activities geared towards ‘replacing economic dependence on

illicit narcotics with alternative legal activities, and

revolves around any or a combination of agriculture, non-farm

employment, social safety nets, such as public works, jobs

etc.)’. The notion of alternative livelihood programmes is

related to that of the alternative diversification, as they

both share similar characteristics. This is evident in the

goals of the alternative diversification identified by Ellis &

Allison (2004), which include; ‘helping in lessening the

vulnerability of the poor to food insecurity and livelihood

collapse, and providing the basis for building assets that

11

permit individuals and households to construct their own exit

routes out of poverty’. Although essential for any sustainable

reduction in narcotics production and for minimizing the

political gains of the Taliban, alternative development has

been critically slow to reach large areas of the country

(Ahrari et al., 2009; Ward & Byrd 2004: 4). The researchers

adduced the incessant violence in the southern part of the

country to this argument, which accordingly, has halted many

projects such as the electricity generation, dam construction

etc.

As using one single approach to diminishing illicit drug

possesses weak evidence of effectiveness and sustainability,

Dufour & Kauffmann (2010: 33) identifies four further broad

substitution measures, (though collapsible into the earlier),

adopted and applied to controlling illicit opium business in

Afghanistan. These include; promoting alternative crops to

replace opium poppy, development of alternative livelihoods

programmes, implementation of normal agricultural and rural

development programmes, implemented in regions where opium

poppies are or could potentially be cultivated. The fourth,

relates to funding mechanisms developed to facilitate the

implementation of national programmes, which could contribute

to reducing the production of opium poppy.

Drawing on the discussions, there seems to be a general

consensus among academics about the inability of substitution

method in Afghanistan and there is much evidence to

12

corroborate this argument. For example Ward & Byrd (2004)

suggests that the earliest and most simple forms of

alternative livelihoods promoted to divert attention from the

opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan were the distribution

of free or subsidised inputs such as seeds and fertilisers.

However, the researcher suggests that such interventions were

grossly inadequate, ill applied and rather than limiting opium

boom, the approach simply impelled poppy cultivation,

particularly in the areas where such inputs were not

distributed by the international community and Afghan

government. Meanwhile, Van Ham & Kamminga (2006: 69) sums up

the improbability of the success of alternative livelihoods,

using the glaring evidence of the overwhelming spread of opium

poppy to almost every province of Afghanistan, and its crops

delivering as much as 90 percent of all heroines consumed

worldwide, as representational of the abysmal failure of the

international community’s counternarcotic strategies in

Afghanistan.

The opium poppy and the Afghanistan economy – costs and

benefits

It is difficult to assume a discussion of opium poppy

production in Afghanistan without leaning discussions to its

costs and benefits to the country’s economy. One of the most

significant problems considered as a threat to stable and

prosperous Afghanistan is the opium poppy production. This is

corroborated by Clemems (2008: 408), who suggests that the

13

massive production of opium, the narcotic product of opium

poppies severely undermines economic growth in Afghanistan as

it contributes to insecurity and corruption that weakens the

Afghan Government. Opium is also considered a cost to

Afghanistan as its cultivation and heroin processing pull

economic resources into the black market (Blanchard 2009). By

implication, this situation complicates the emergence of a

strong national government, in that, it both reduces the tax

base and finances the warlords and militias with whom the

government competes for control. However, despite opium poppy

production been largely seen as problematic to the Afghan’s

national stability and economic growth, it has some benefits.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the fact

that Afghanistan remains economically dependent on the illegal

growth of opium poppy. This account is reinforced by Ham &

Kamminga (2006: 69) who asserts that ‘the Afghan drug economy

generates $2.8 billion annually, or about 50 percent of

Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, making almost three

million Afghans (12.6 percent of the population) dependent on

opium cultivation for their everyday needs’. This means

therefore, that opium production is central to Afghanistan’s

economy. As an illustration of this view, Ward & Byrd (2004:

34), notes that opium industry provides significant

macroeconomic benefits for the country, comprising a large

share of total economic activity, and it is a major source of

aggregate demand for services, durable goods, construction,

etc. Because of the strong promise between opium cultivation

14

and the different socio-economic groups Mansfield (p. 12),

sees attempts to replace income derived from opium poppy which

is the goal of alternative livelihoods as ‘though necessary

but insufficient condition for reducing levels of

cultivation’. Apart from opium’s long significant role as a

livelihood means, it portends opportunities for national and

global development. What are they?

Licencing Afghanistan’s opium production – an alternative path

to achieving positive national development impacts

Globally, the demand for opium-based medicines is

significant. This is evident by the fact that developing

countries where there is increasing demand for opium-based

medicines because of diseases have almost no access to them

Windle (2011: 666). There is therefore the urgent need for

the International community, to support the proposal for

licencing of Afghanistan’s opium industry for medicine being

spearheaded by the Senlis Council. This will enable farmers to

be licenced to cultivate opium poppies from which the state

produces medicinal morphine to sell to third-world nations.

Apart from the medicinal purposes for which Afghan’s opium can

be used, it can also be used for national revenue generation

purposes, meaning that, legalizing Afghanistan’s opium

production will yield the following results, which will be in

the best interest of the country.

15

One of the most significant current challenges to illicit

drug control in the world is the rising production of opium

poppy in Afghanistan; hence, there has been increasing calls

for more concrete partnership towards the suppression of the

illicit drug cultivation in the country. Licensing of

Afghanistan’ opium will therefore facilitate eradication,

national reconciliation and development. This is because, if

the cultivation of the opium is legalized under a stringent

regulatory mechanism, as was the case in Turkey and India, the

political capital of the Taliban would be destabilized. It is

a known fact that the Taliban warlords derives much of its

political capital and support from the poor masses, because

their opium poppy fields, are shielded by the Taliban forces

against destruction by the government and NATO forces (Felbab-

Brown 2007: 7). Licencing the production of the drug crop will

afford the larger population; to engage in legitimate opium

production, hence, would no longer need the Taliban’s

protection services for the preservation of their livelihoods,

and the political support for the warlords diminishes

considerably. Closely related to the ease of achieving

eradication, which I see as a recipe for national

reconciliation and development, is the ease of bringing

traffickers under effective control. Prohibition of opium

poppy cultivation is an important component of the counter-

narcotics strategy, but which has proved difficult, costly and

grossly ineffective in stemming the momentum of opium boom in

Afghanistan. However, with licencing of the Afghanistan’s

opium, exclusion efforts becomes more manageable, because the

16

size of the illegal areas of cultivation will be scaled down

drastically. The smaller level of trade would also imply that

the targeting of key traffickers operating in licensed areas

would become less politically problematic.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the scale

of economic dividends that may accrue from the licencing of

opium production in Afghanistan. According to Windle (2011:

665), such an initiative will lead to creation of job

opportunities such as farm labourers, security guards,

laboratory technicians and administrators. Furthermore, as the

processing of opium undergoes through different stages, the

state would be able to provide employment to the population in

the licensed areas and obtain potential large income from the

highly profitable business of producing pharmaceuticals, which

can be exported abroad like the developing countries where

Chouvy (2008: 2) notes ‘account for only six percent of global

pharmaceutical opium consumption’. This is especially if

Afghanistan is assisted by its international partners to

develop the capacity that will enable opium production

prescription drugs. What this implies is that the state would

be better able to absorb money generated by the opium economy

and become less dependent on donor assistance, which makes its

economy vulnerable to foreign manipulation. As the illicit

opium trade has become one of the biggest risks to

Afghanistan’s economic and political stability, licencing of

the drug crop becomes the best option to achieve its control.

17

Conclusion

This paper has given an account of the diverse factors

underpinning Afghanistan’s illicit opium poppy cultivation in

Afghanistan. It has been the contention of the paper that

licencing of the drug crop for licit production is the most

cost-effective way to controlling the cultivation of the drug

crop in Afghanistan. The paper has discussed the factors

influencing the cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan,

looking into the multiplicity of socio-economic factors that

plays out at the rural communities which tends to diminish the

audacity of the farmers to quit opium cultivation. It was

evident from the discussion that the Afghanistan’s opium

economy grew as a consequence of the degradation of

agricultural and economic infrastructure due to several years

of war, the acceptance of opium as a livelihood strategy by

many rural households, and the failure of the state. The

various counternarcotics strategies designed by the state

through the influence and support of the international

community also came under interrogation. With a careful

analysis, the paper discovered that the elements of the

strategy are not only ineffective but counterproductive,

especially considering recent growing violence and mounting

insurgency in Afghanistan’s major poppy-growing areas.

As a suggestion, there is the urgent need for both Afghan

government and the international community to support the

initiative of licencing Afghan’s opium with a view to

18

considering it an economic resource for sustainable growth of

the country. This is because Exports of Afghan’s opium for

medicinal use could become a central element of economic

reconstruction and represent a positive and productive

economic response to the opium problem, improving security and

sustainable development. Transition redefines the conduct of a

given society, and ultimately modifies occupations and

abilities in line with different economic realities and global

market mechanisms and requirements.

References

1. Ahrari, E, et al. 2009, NARCO – JIHAD: drug trafficking and security

in Afghanistan and Pakistan, National Bureau of Asian Research,

Seattle, Washington

2. Blanchard, CM 2009, Afghanistan: Narcotics and US Policy, Diane

Publishing Company

3. Chouvy, P 2008, ‘Licensing Afghanistan’s opium: solution

or fallacy? Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 2, no.

2, pp. 1-6

4. Clemens, J 2008, ‘Opium in Afghanistan: prospects for the

success of source country drug control policies, Journal

of Law and Economics, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 407-432

19

The author is an academic and his research focused on a

framework for estimating the potential for source country

drug control policies to reduce production. He suggests

that the interaction of the illicit opium production in

Afghanistan with eradication and alternative incomes

poses particularly notable difficulties. This paper was

quite relevant to my essay because it indicates

complexities in terms of income from alternative

livelihoods not matching the potentials producers of

opium derives from the drug crop.

5. Civil Military Fusion Centre 2012, Counter-Narcotics in

Afghanistan, Civil Military Fusion Centre, viewed

November 1 2012,

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/

resources/CFC_Afghanistan-Counter-Narcotics-

Volume_Aug2012.pdf

6. Dufour, C & Kauffmann, 2010, ‘Strategies to Counter

Opiate Production in Afghanistan: Are we on the right

track? The French Development Agency, Paris

http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/

Strategies_to_counter_opiate_in_Afghanistan.pdf

While Kauffmann is an agronomist who specialises in

Nutrition and Food security, Dufour is a Nutrition and

Food security specialist, and have both worked in

Afghanistan. The paper interrogates the efficacy of the

20

policies and programmes designed to reduce drug

production in Afghanistan either through eradication,

repression or via the implementation of alternative

agricultural or rural development activities. The result

of their research suggests abysmal failure of the

substitution measures and the national counter-narcotics

strategy.

7. Ellis F & Allison E 2004, ‘Livelihood diversification and

natural resource access’,

LSP Working Paper, no. 9, Overseas Development Group,

University of East Anglia,

UK, viewed 1 November 2012,

http://www.fao.org/es/esw/lsp/cd/img/docs/lspwp9.pdf

8. Felbab-Brown, V 2007, ‘Opium licensing in Afghanistan:

its desirability and feasibility’, Policy Paper, no. 1,

Foreign Policy at Brookings, viewed 1 November 2012,

http://www.scribd.com/doc/95852770/Opium-Licensing-in-

Afghanistan

This author is an Adjunct Professor with vast knowledge

and experience in Security studies. She is of the opinion

that licensing of opium for medical purposes in

Afghanistan, remains the best cost-effective option for

controlling the production of the drug crop in

Afghanistan, considering the fact that the country has

become the highest producer of the crop in the world,

even with the substitution and counter-narcotics

21

measures. The paper informed my argument that

legitimizing opium production remain a second to none

option in dealing with the very complicated problem of

opium the in Afghanistan.

9. Mansfield, D 2001, ‘The Economic Superiority of Illicit

Drug Production: Myth and Reality, Opium Poppy

Cultivation in Afghanistan,’ Paper prepared for the

International Conference on Alternative Development in

drug control and cooperation, Feldafing, 7-12 January.

The author is a consultant and with wide experience in

the dynamics of illicit drug production, and his paper

delves into the factors influencing opium poppy

production in Afghanistan. He claims that the incomes

derived from opium poppy is insufficient condition for

reducing levels of cultivation, and that attempts at

reducing opium growth in Afghanistan should recognise the

different motivations and factors that encourages people

to be tied to its production. This paper is central to my

argument because it unpacked reasons why suppression of

the drug cultivation in Afghanistan may not be achieved

in the near future, hence my suggestion for licencing.

10. Peter Van, H & Jorrit, K 2006, ‘Poppies for peace:

reforming Afghanistan's opium industry’, The Washington

Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 69-81.

22

11. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2003,

The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International

Problem, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,

viewed November 1 2012,

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/

resources/214E1694BBF78591C1256CC60049F953-unodc-afg-

31jan.pdf

12. Ward, C & Byrd, W 2004, ‘Afghanistan’s Opium Drug

Economy’, The World Bank, Washington DC

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/

Publications-Resources/20325060/AFOpium-Drug-Economy-

WP.pdf.pdf

Both authors are consultants to World Bank, and have

undertaken series of research on the opium poppy and

Afghanistan economy. Their research delves into the

likelihood of alternative livelihood to discourage opium

growth in Afghanistan. They conclude that associating

alternative livelihoods approaches with eradication is a

practical strategy that is capable of reducing opium

production, but there is no consensus yet on how this

might be done. This paper was useful to my argument

because it highlights the difficulties inherent in the

execution of the alternative livelihoods, which helped me

in arriving at a decision for licencing the Afghan’s

opium, for development.

23

11. Windle, J, ‘Poppies for medicine in Afghanistan: lessons

from India and Turkey’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol.

46, no. 6, pp. 663-677.

12. Werb, D, Kerr, T, Montaner, J & Wood E 2008, ‘The need

for an evidence-based approach to controlling opium

production in Afghanistan’, Journal of Public Health Policy, vol. 29,

pp. 440-448

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