History, field definition andmanagement studies: the case of

the New DealJason Foster

Faculty of Business, Athabasca University, Edmonton, Canada

Albert J. MillsManagement Department, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Canada, and

Terrance WeatherbeeF.C. Manning School of Business, Acadia University, Wolfville, Canada

Abstract

Purpose – The aim of this paper is threefold. First, to argue for a more historically engagedunderstanding of the development of management and organization studies (MOS). Second, to revealthe paradoxical character of the recent “historical turn,” through exploration of how it both questionsand reinforces extant notions of the field. Third, to explore the neglect of the New Deal in MOS toillustrate not only the problem of historical engagement, but also to encourage a rethink of theparadigmatic limitations of the field and its history.

Design/methodology/approach – Adopting the theory of ANTi-history, the paper conducts ananalysis of historical management textbooks and formative management journals to explore how andwhy the New Deal has been neglected in management theory.

Findings – Focussing on the New Deal raises a number of questions about the relationship betweenhistory and MOS, in particular, the definition of the field itself. Questions include the ontologicalcharacter of history, context and relationalism, and the link between history and MOS, ethics,Anglo-American centredness, and the case for historical engagement.

Originality/value – The paper argues for a new approach to historical understanding thatencourages a revisiting of what constitutes the field of MOS; a greater awareness of and opening up toalternative (hi)stories and, thus, approaches to MOS; and a re-evaluation of phenomena such as theNew Deal and other more radical ways of organizing.

Keywords Historical research, Management history, Historical periods, United States of America

Paper type Conceptual paper

The roots of this paper lie in two important phenomena – one theoretical and onesocio-economic. The theoretical root arises out of arguments for an historic turn inManagement and Organization Studies (MOS)[1]. The socio-economic root is thepost-2008 economic crisis that serves as the context in which we are grappling with theproblem of history. The two, as we will argue, are not unrelated. We were struck bysimilarities between the current economic crisis and those of the 1929 Wall Street Crashleading to the Depression. We were also struck by how, in either period, managementand organizational scholars rarely, if at all, drew lessons from the New Deal for dealingwith organizational crisis. How is it an emergent field of MOS (Buchanan andHuczynski, 1985; Wren, 1979) was able to neglect a socio-political phenomenon whoseorganizational and managerial reach influenced countless lives across the USA andbeyond (Hiltzik, 2011; Taylor, 2008)? To deal with this question we return to the debate

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Journal of Management HistoryVol. 20 No. 2, 2014

pp. 179-199q Emerald Group Publishing Limited

1751-1348DOI 10.1108/JMH-02-2013-0011

around the “historic turn” (Booth and Rowlinson, 2006) and the role of history in MOS.Specifically we ground our analysis in Durepos and Mills’ (2012a, b) notion ofANTi-History, which is an approach to history that fuses insights from actor networktheory (Latour, 2005; Callon, 1986), the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim, 1968), andpoststructuralist historiography (Jenkins, 1991; Munslow, 2010).

A question of historyAlfred Kieser’s (1994) call for a historic turn in organization theory was somewhatparadoxical. After all, the field was not bereft of historical accounts. One need onlythink of the influence of the work of Chandler (e.g. 1977), and Kieser’s (e.g. 1989) morerecent contributions, as well as historical accounts of the field itself (e.g. George, 1972;Wren, 1979; Shenhav, 1995). Kieser (1994, p. 612) felt existing accounts were becomingdecreasingly evident and increasingly reduced to “myopic fact-collect[ing]”. Heproposed a reintegration of history and organizational science, in which he sought to“enrich organization theory by developing links with the humanities, including history,literary theory and philosophy, without completely abandoning a social scientificorientation” (Usdiken and Kieser, 2004, p. 8). It was from this grounding that Keiser(1994) proceeded to develop an argument for “why organization theory needs historicalanalyses.

The contextual phaseIn developing a case for the historic turn Kieser (1994, p. 609) focussed on the role of“historical development” and its interrelationship with current research outcomes. Heargued that “to understand contemporary organizations it is important to knowsomething of their historical development”, which, can provide a “more radical test oforganizational change theories than mere confrontation with data on short-runchanges” (Kieser, 1994, p. 612). Historical analyses, thus, can reveal the sociallyconstructed nature of organizational structures (Kieser, 1994, p. 611).

In critiquing what might be called the contextual phase of the historic turn,Goldman (1994), from a scientific approach, made two telling points that would proveuseful to later management historians – the atheoretical nature of history in MOS andthe theoretically underdeveloped state of organization theory. First Goldman (1994,pp. 621-622) agreed with Kieser (1994) that historical analyses were prone to “factcollecting without a method” but, unlike Kieser, he saw little hope for historicalmethods outside of scientific enquiry. Second, Goldman (1994) contended thatorganization theory is still an emergent field of enquiry, yet to consolidate around anagreed set of theoretical principles. As such, history stands to exacerbate, rather thanenlighten, the problems of organization theory.

The methodological phaseThese themes were later taken up by Rowlinson (2004). In what we call themethodological phase of the historic turn, Booth and Rowlinson (2006, p. 8) argue notonly for greater reflection on historical methods, styles of writing, and philosophies ofhistory but also “a thorough-going critique of existing theories of organization for theirahistorical orientation”. Among other things, this reorientationalist approach served toput into perspective the varying relationship between historical accounts and researchmethodologies raised by Goldman (1994). In an outline of major historical perspectives

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used in MOS, Rowlinson (2004) identified factual, narrative and archaeo-genealogicalapproaches; each with a different philosophy, theoretical grounding andmethodological approach. The factual approach, with its focus on history as “arepository of facts” (Rowlinson, 2004, p. 10), accords with Kieser’s and Goldman’scritiques. The narrative approach, drawing on White (1984), works from the premisethat history is not an account of the facts but rather is a narrative developed from bothselected “traces” of past events and narrative style: “These ‘traces’ are the rawmaterials of the historian’s discourse, rather than the events themselves” (White, 1987,p. 102, cited in Rowlinson, 2004, p. 10). The archeao-genealogical approach ariseslargely from the work of Foucault (1972) and views history as discursive knowledge ofthe present (in contrast to factual knowledge of the past). From this perspective historyis not a linear progression of associated facts but a series of dominant notions of realityand truth that define an era or episteme. The archeao-genealogical approach begins tomove us beyond methodology to issues of epistemology and ontology that form whatwe will call the epistemic phase of the historic turn in MOS.

The epistemic phaseThroughout much of the debate on the historic turn there have been three constants –history, organization theory, and Anglo-American centeredness. History, whetherfactual, narrative or archeao-genealogical, has been viewed as some form of accountingof the past; involving researchers in various ways seeking out facts (e.g. Austin, 2000),traces (e.g. Kieser, 1989), or archives (in a Foucaldian sense) (e.g. Jacques, 1996). Yet, asMunslow (2010, p. 3) argues, history and the past are “ontologically dissonant”; thatwhile the past once existed it is no longer materially available to us.

[T]here is no possibility of bringing the past back to the present through reading oldbooks, exploring ancient cityscapes or viewing old master paintings and so on. Wecannot be “in touch” with the past in any way that is unmediated by historiography,language, emplotment, voice, ideology, perspective or physical and/or mental states oftiredness, ennui, and so on (Munslow, 2010, p. 37). The relationship between “the past”and “history” then is highly problematic and opens up questions about the role (ratherthan the methods) of history. Here Munslow (2010, p. 34) is insightful in his argumentthat “if historical knowledge is understood as a series of historians’ judgements aboutthe past and which, in effect, create the-past-as-history, the past cannot have anyepistemic status of its own.” But where does that leave history?

According to Munslow (2010, p. 36), at best, history is a process of epistemicskepticism, relativism, and ethically engaged research. The first proposition attemptsto deal with the absence of any grounding for historical truth in a history that is“ontologically incommensurable” with the past. The best the historian can hope for isto make “reasonable inferences” about the meaning of past events based on “wellverified factual knowledge” (Munslow, 2010, p. 4). We cannot, however, “demonstratein and through our histories that we have the basis for “true” knowledge of what thepast did mean” (Munslow, 2010, p. 4, original emphases). The second proposition isrecognition that without the possibility of grounding history in any independentlyverifiable truth it can only ever be considered as relative to the historian. The thirdproposition speaks to Munslow’s attempt to justify the discipline (or doing) of historyby arguing for a form of engagement with history whose aim is disruption of “thecertainties of the present [to open] the way to imagining a different future” (Munslow,

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2010, p. 70). To make his point Munslow shifts the ground from a focus on historicalmethod and verification of facts to an examination of the role of history itself. In theprocess, he makes a case for a relationalist approach to history that is not so muchconcerned with what history is but how the idea of history influences the production ofknowledge (Durepos and Mills, 2012b).

Munslow (2010, pp. 5-6) contends that history is a “constructed cultural creation”without which “there is no past to be understood” (Munslow, 2010, p. 37); that “the pastdoes not exist (i.e. is known) before it is ‘(hi)storied”’ (Munslow, 2010, pp. 3-4). Thisstrikes us more a description of the role of history in (and part of) the socialconstruction of knowledge rather than a defense of history per se. It is only when hecharacterizes history and the historian as discursive that Munslow foreshadows arelational perspective (i.e. one that understands history through the sociologicalprocesses of production). Drawing upon Foucault, Munslow (2010, p. 48) suggests thathistory is a powerful discourse that is controlled through “substantialcultural/discursive rules of exclusion”; a point that we shall be making later inregard to MOS and the neglect of the New Deal. Touching on relationalism, Munslow(2010, pp. 16, 26, 72, 73) makes four telling points:

(1) we cannot “know what we are until we create our own history” and thus need to“locate ourselves textually” before we even begin the necessary thoughtprocess;

(2) “in constructing and interpreting the past we create and use a ‘historicallanguage’ which with all its rules and regulations becomes our meta(historical)language through which we are permitted to talk about the past (-as-history)” ;

(3) “our ethics always precede our quarrying of the past because we embed ourethics in the discursive of ‘the-past-as-history’”; and

(4) that accounts of the past are “discursively created” stories of and for thepresent.

This suggests we need to explore the role of history as a meta-discourse whoseinfluence is embedded in other areas of knowledge.

Many of these themes have been taken up by Durepos et al. (Durepos and Mills,2012b; Mills and Durepos, 2010; Weatherbee and Durepos, 2010) in an “ANTi-History”approach to history that combines insights from the sociology of knowledge (SoK),poststructural historiography, and actor-network theory. Briefly, they call for arelational approach to history that “sets out to simultaneously represent anddestabilize selected past events with the ultimate aim of pluralizing history” (Mills andDurepos, 2010, p. 26). The first part aligns with Munslow’s notion of respecting theethical value of “the past” and the memories of those involved. The second part goesbeyond Munslow in attempting to destabilize the privileged role of history inknowledge production that serves to reify, deify, and legitimate our “knowledge” of thepresent.

Durepos et al. (2012) and Durepos and Mills (2012a, b) go on to argue for anapproach to the tracking of knowledge production over time that centers on a morehistorically reflective actor-network theory. Not only “following the actors” (Latour,2005), both human and non-human (e.g. history books), as they enrol, translate and fixa network of ideas but also viewing the actors in what Munslow (2010) called their

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textual location and embeddedness in the-past-as-history. These factors of translation,enrolment, and fixing, add the relational dimension of socio-politics to Munslow’s listof (largely individualized) mediating factors in grasping the-past-as-history.

Drawing on the various insights from the epistemic phase of the historic turn wewill attempt to explain how the “New Deal” was largely ignored by MOS and thesignificance of this observation for the role of history in the development of the field.We will argue that:

. historical accounts of the development of MOS (e.g. George, 1968; Burrell andMorgan, 1979) have played an important role in defining the field, and what isincluded and what is excluded from its considerations;

. these more or less formal histories of MOS largely appeared in the Cold War eraand were influenced by the socio-political era in which they were written (Cooke,2006; Cooke et al., 2005); and

. somewhat ironically, historical accounts of MOS’ development have encourageda field that is largely ahistorical, overly scientifistic (i.e. focussed on positivistmethods of analysis), presentist (i.e. studying phenomena as if they weretimeless), managerialist (i.e. viewing organizational behavior from the “bottomline” perspective of senior management), and private sector oriented (i.e. viewingthe “natural” or “normal” focus of MOS as the corporate organization).

Constructing history, defining disciplinesAn interrogation of the New Deal in MOS needs to commence at the intersection of twoquestions. First, how is history constructed and what is the process of inclusion orexclusion from that history? Second, how do disciplines come to define themselves, andhow do they erect the theoretical fences that enclose and demarcate legitimate lines ofinquiry?

As Cooke (1999, p. 84) observes “our histories are inevitably socially constructed.”Further, in their construction certain elements are emphasized while others arediminished (Weatherbee and Durepos, 2010). The storyline that results is reported asobjective truth, and thus the very act of construction becomes invisible (Durepos et al.,2012), as does the political context in which it was created (Spector, 2006). The cloakingof history’s construction is significant because the act of creating history is imbuedwith political and social selectivity (Munslow, 2010).

Thus critically examining a discipline’s history is important to revealing thecontexts, interests and selectivity behind the storyline. Weatherbee and Duperos (2010,p. 15) argue that post hoc judgment of what is significant possesses deeply moralimplications for it shapes “the formation of a collective identity of a community ofscholars at any given point in space and time”. This effect also has practicalimplications. For example, the contribution of women to management thoughtremained unacknowledged for some time (Tancred-Sheriff and Campbell, 1992) whileothers have argued that the work of key figures, such as Weber and Maslow, has beendistorted and simplified in order to maintain a well-guarded boundary around thediscipline (Clegg and Lounsbury, 2009).

Further, historical selectivity, cloaked by language of objectivity (Durepos et al.,2012), leads to the cropping out of particular ideological perspectives. Cooke (1999,p. 82) demonstrates “how ideas developed by or for the political left have been

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incorporated as central concepts in [change management] discourse . . . [and] how thisdebt to the left has continued to be excluded from the management history of the field.”In addition, the transformative nature of the ideas they generate are often co-opted andstripped of their change-oriented purpose (Cooke, 2006). What remains is intended to fitinto existing conceptions of management and the study of management.

Defining the fieldThe origins of the modern discipline of MOS are far from clear and depend on theexistence of defining narratives that serve to unify a number of disparate factors –various research studies, theorizations, and philosophies; textbook distillations;business school activities; the foundation of scholarly associations and journals; theappearance of histories of the field, and so on (Wrege, 1986; Grant and Mills, 2006). Ithas been argued elsewhere that much of the activities that became the central core ofMOS coalesced in the years immediately following World War Two (but with originsthat go back as far as Taylor and even Robert Owen) (Urwick, 1963; Wren, 1979). Thetiming of the drive to construct a more coherent and “scientific” organizational studiesis significant for it coincides with the rise of the Cold War. Kelley et al. (2006) argue thatthe Cold War’s intense political environment profoundly affected the ideologicaloutlook of the discipline’s leading practitioners.

The discipline’s relationship to capitalism was a key determining factor inestablishing disciplinary boundaries. Important MOS organizations, such as theAcademy of Management, formed with the intent of drawing together scholars andmanagement practitioners who shared a similar outlook (Wren and Hay, 1977). TheCold War’s intense ideological divisions further propelled the already operatingmotivation to affiliate explicitly with capitalism. Therefore, not only did the context ofthe Cold War lead to a silencing of alternative perspectives (Mills, 1998) – particularlyaccounts by feminists (O’Connor, 2000), the left (Cooke, 1999), and anti-colonialistthinkers (Nkomo, 1992) – management scholars themselves often took up the role ofactive Cold War warriors (Spector, 2006).

If we push the “origins” of North American MOS even earlier, we still cannot escapea deep intertwining of politics and the emergence of the discipline. O’Connor’s (1999,p. 129) account of the origins of the Harvard Business School following World War Onereveals “a number of ideological agendas at play”, including a clear political purposeaimed at so-called threats to political and economic security. Thus, in its early stages,MOS became intertwined with a particular conception of capitalism; one defined byindividualism, economic freedom and the superiority of private organization(s).Alternative organizational approaches, especially those with a collectivist orcommunitarian objective, were viewed not only as inherently inferior, but as apotential threat to the capitalist order (Cooke, 1999).

It can be further argued that subsequent iterations of historical accounts thatappeared throughout the later stages of the Cold War were also influenced by variouspressures on business schools to re-balance their focus on the theory and practice ofbusiness; a re-focus which was needed in order to gain and sustain legitimacy withinboth the business and academic communities (Khurana, 2007). In this process scientificapproaches were to be reinforced as a central methodology in business research.

This re-surfacing of the context in which MOS history was constructed is anessential step to understanding how the New Deal was/is regarded by the discipline. It

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provides a mechanism for analyzing the process of historical exclusion that occurredduring the periods being studied.

Historicizing MOS 1900-1940In 1916 the American Association of Colleges and Schools of Business (AACSB) wasformed. One of the initial power brokers that brought together the deans of 16 businessschools was Leon Marshall of the University Chicago’s College of Commerce andAdministration. Marshall, a leading liberal economist, would later “come to play animportant role in shaping New Deal policies as a member of the National IndustrialRecovery Board, which reported directly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt” (Khurana,2007, pp. 144-145).

The AACSB went on to play an important role in curricula developments among itsmember business schools, which by 1936 numbered 46, including many elite schools.From the onset of the Depression the AACSB began to call for a reappraisal of the roleof the business school, tracing “the crisis in the American economic system to anuncritical embrace by business schools of the laissez-faire market ideology adhered toby business itself” (Khurana, 2007, p. 190).

In the process the AACSB leadership suggested that the New Deal might offer away forward for business and for business schools alike. At the 1934 annual meeting ofthe AACSB the Dean of the Wharton School noted that “the New Deal has given us all ashaking up, which causes us to reconsider the fundamental values upon which oureducation planning is based” (quoted in Khurana, 2007, p. 184). He went on to suggestthat the New Deal “created opportunities for business schools to contribute to nationaleconomic recovery and stabilization,” through its various programs, and “its attemptsto build new institutions for a complex industrial society” (Khurana, 2007, p. 184). Justtwo years later a survey of its members “revealed significant changes in the businesscurricula” (Khurana, 2007, p. 189). This included courses that emphasized such thingsas a focus of business and society relations (Dartmouth’s Tuck School), and arequirement to study “the public responsibility of business and the role of businessleaders in contributing to social order” (Harvard) (Khurana, 2007,p. 189).

Despite these obvious links between the business schools and the New Deal,histories of MOS’ development in the pre-Second World War era focus only on theemergence of the so-called Scientific Management and Human Relations schools ofthought (Rose, 1978; Wren and Bedeian, 2009). We suggest that one reason lies in thestruggle that ensued over the politics of the New Deal, with large corporations reactingagainst New Deal agencies that were seen as over-regulating their businesses (Morgan,2003; Khurana, 2007). Another reason is politics within business schools as theystruggled for legitimacy (Khurana, 2007). A third reason lies in the changing conditionsin the post-war era, which, following wartime practices, saw a massive upturn inscientifism, corporatism, and the sharp rise of government and corporate sponsorshipof research (Robin, 2001). It was in this environment that histories of MOS were beingwritten (Cooke, 1999; Grant and Mills, 2006). That is not to say these historicalaccounts were made up; they clearly drew on well documented accounts. However, wecontend those accounts were selected, selective and influenced not only by thesocio-politics of the eras in which they were written but also (in terms of available“documentation” and other “traces”) the socio-politics of immediately previous periods.

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The early politics of management thoughtAnalysis of a random selection of US business textbooks, published between 1933 and1949 (i.e. the period during and the five years following the Roosevelt era)[2] – seefollowing list – suggest a field that is managerialist, heavily focussed on the“scientific” method, timeless, universal and operating largely independently of socialforces, with little to say about the human side of people at work. The books reviewedare:

(1) Anderson, A.G., Mandeville, M.J. and Anderson, J.M. (1942), IndustrialManagement, rev ed., The Ronald Press Company, New York, NY.

(2) Balderston, C., Canby, K., Stanislaus, V. and Brecht, R.P. (1937), Management ofan Enterprise, Prentice Hall, New York, NY.

(3) Barnes, R.M. (1937), Motion and Time Study, John Wiley & Sons, New York,NY.

(4) Barnes, R.M. (1940), Motion and Time Study, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons,New York, NY.

(5) Barnwell, G.W. (Ed.) (1941), The New Encyclopedia of Machine Shop Practice,Wm. H. Wise & Co., New York, NY.

(6) Brown, A. (1947), Organization of Industry, Prentice Hall, New York, NY.

(7) Davis, R.C. (1940), Industrial Organization and Management, Harper& Brothers, New York, NY.

(8) Diemer, H. (1942), Business Management, LaSalle Extension University,Chicago, IL.

(9) Folts, F.E. (1938), Introduction to Industrial Management, 2nd ed., McGraw-HillBook Company, New York, NY.

(10) Folts, F.E. (1949), Introduction to Industrial Management: Text, Cases, andProblems, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, NY.

(11) Glover, J.G. and Maze, C.L. (1937), Managerial Control, The Ronald PressCompany, New York, NY.

(12) Goetz, B.E. (1949), Management Planning and Control: A Managerial Approachto Industrial Accounting, 1st ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, NY.

(13) Knowles, A.S. and Thomson, R.D. (1943), Management of Manpower, TheMacmillan Company, New York, NY.

(14) Knowles, A.S. and Thomson, R.D. (1946), Industrial Management, TheMacmillan Company, New York, NY.

(15) Koontz, H.D. (1941), Government Control of Business, Houghton MifflinCompany, Boston, MA.

(16) Lansburgh, R.H. and Spriegel, W.R. (1940), Industrial Management, 3rd ed.,John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.

(17) Lowry, S.M., Maynard, H.B. and Stegemerten, G.J. (1940), Time and MotionStudy and Formulas for Wage Incentives, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.

(18) Maze, C.L. (Ed.) (1947), Office Management, The Ronald Press Company,New York, NY.

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(19) Newman, W.H. (1947), Business Policies and Management, 2nd ed.,South-Western Publishing, Cincinnati, OH.

(20) Petersen, E. and Gosvenor Plowman, E. (1946), Business Organization andManagement, 5th printing ed., Richard D. Irwin, Chicago, IL.

(21) Robbins, E.C. and Folts, F.E. (1933), Introduction to Industrial Management,McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.

(22) Scott, W.D., Clothier, R.C., Mathewson, S.B. and Spriegel, W.R. (1941), PersonnelManagement; Principles, Practices, and Point of View, 3rd ed., McGraw-HillBook Company, New York, NY.

(23) Scott, W.D., Clothier, R,C. and Spriegel, W.R. (1949), Personnel Management:Principles, Practices, and Point of View, 4th ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company,New York, NY.

(24) Shuman, R. (1948), The Management of Men, University of Oklahoma Press,Norman, OK.

(25) Smith, E.D. and Nyman, R.C. (1942), Technology & Labor, Yale UniversityPress, New Haven, CT.

(26) Spreigel, W.R. and Landsburgh, R.H. (1947), Industrial Management, 4th ed.,6th printing ed., John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.

(27) Spriegel, W.R. and Schulz, E. (1942), Elements of Supervision, John Wiley& Sons, New York, NY.

(28) Tead, O. and Henry, C. (1933), Personnel Administration. Its Principles andPractice, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.

(29) Tead, O. (1935), The Art of Leadership, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.

(30) Terry, G.R. (1949), Office Management and Control, Richard D. Irwin, Chicago,IL.

From these texts we get a strong impression of Taylor and scientific management asthe most popular and accepted theory of management at the time. Diemer (1942, p. 22),for example, refers to scientific management as “the modern plan of management” andstates that “Frederick W. Taylor was the first man to advocate the use of scientificmethods in management” (Diemer, 1942, p. 24). This is far from surprising given thevarious networks of actors, including professional engineering associations and,eventually, the Taylor Society, which helped to introduce and spread knowledge ofTaylorism to business and academia (Shenhav, 1995).

What is of more interest is the overwhelming lack of reference to the HumanRelations School and, in particular, Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson, and theHawthorne Studies. Two-thirds of the selected texts make no reference to Mayo and theHawthorne studies, including five (Balderston et al., 1937; Balderston et al., 1942; Folts,1938; Anderson et al., 1942; Knowles and Thomson, 1943) who reference WesternElectric as an exemplar of good plant layout and personnel policies. Of the rest, two(Balderston et al., 1937; Petersen and Plowman, 1946) refer to Mayo in regard to hisearlier studies of fatigue; while two others (Goetz, 1949; Lansburgh and Spriegel, 1940)only reference Mayo in the bibliography.

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Those that refer to the Hawthorne Studies do so mostly in passing, whileRoethlisberger and Dickson are briefly mentioned in three cases. It would be sometimebefore US business textbooks refer to the Hawthorne Studies as either making asignificant contribution to the field (e.g. Filipetti, 1953) or as situated as a school ofthought within the field (e.g. Costello and Zalkind, 1963).

This suggests: it would have taken considerable time for the research to be known(Barley and Kunda, 1992); the HR School which emerged is more likely to have becomeassociated with the Hawthorne Studies retrospectively in the post-Second World Warera; and the idea of a Human Relations school of thought was (and still is) a contestedconceptualization.

In terms of the New Deal only one textbook (Koontz, 1941) had anything to sayabout the New Deal and its relationship to management and organization. A total of 18made no reference to the New Deal and its agencies at all, while ten others offer onlybrief references to the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) with the primary intentof communicating new employer responsibilities under this regulatory regime. In thesetexts, the NLRB system is framed as a problem and a complication for management.One book focusses on leadership (Tead, 1935) and uses Roosevelt as an example ofstrong leadership, but contains no substantial discussion of the content of New Deal.

The one text offering extensive consideration of the New Deal does so because itsprimary purpose is to examine “the increasing government control of business in theUnited States” (Koontz, 1941, p. ix). Given its topic and date of publication, such atextbook could hardly ignore New Deal agencies. To that end it offers detailedaccountings of a variety of New Deal agencies and policies, including the Public WorksAdministration (PWA), the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the NLRB and theTennessee Valley Authority (TVA). New Deal agencies received the author’sendorsement when restricting themselves to what he perceives as traditionalgovernment functions, such as awarding construction contracts for infrastructureprojects. However, innovations that move government into competition with, oroversight of, private industry, such as the TVA and the NLRB, receive much lesslaudatory coverage. The New Deal is framed as a dangerous intrusion of governmentinto realms it should not tread. By doing so the text clearly reinforces the primacy ofprivate ownership, individual freedom and the superiority of the free market.

All of the authors essentially skip over the 1930s and the sizeable changes thatoccurred in response to the Depression, including the role of the AACSB. This is ourfirst indication that the problems and challenges of the 1930s were perceived bymanagement scholars to be separated from management; they were affairs ofgovernment, albeit a government whose growing role in regulating industry wasneither welcome nor willingly acknowledged. In sum, the innovations of the New Dealwere either ignored or scorned in management textbooks of the era, suggesting that formanagement scholars of the period, the New Deal was not perceived as a relevantteachable moment.

Finally, many of these authors went on to influence the post-war field through theirassociation with the Academy of Management (Grant and Mills, 2006). For example,Brecht (1941), Davis (1948), Folts (1953), Spreigel (1954), Shuman (1955), Brown (1947),Goetz (1958), Terry (1961), and Koontz (1963) were all Presidents (in respective years).These are also the individuals who would write and publish the seminal works whichwould first define the boundaries of the emerging field of MOS, who would map-out the

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intellectual terrain, and who would first write the “past” of the discipline, leading theothers to follow (cf. Koontz’s Schools of Management Thought).

Back to the futureAssuming that, until recently, “despite serious theoretical and political differences,scholars have converged on a common vision of how American managerial thoughthas evolved” Barley and Kunda (1992, p. 363) and others have attempted to explain thesocio-political environment in which the Scientific Management and Human Relationsschools emerged. They set out to challenge “the prevalent notion that Americanmanagerial discourse has moved progressively from coercive to rational and,ultimately, to normative rhetorics of control”. In the process they contend the fieldmoved from a normative period of “industrial betterment” prior to 1900 to a period ofrational control in an era of “Scientific management” lasting until 1923. Then there wasa renewed normative period of “Welfare capitalism/human relations” that lasted until1955, giving way to a new rational era of “Systems rationalism” that takes us to 1980(Barley and Kunda, 1992, p. 364). Remarkably, in this work, human relations is linkedto welfare capitalism without a hint of a reference to the New Deal.

In a similar vein, O’Connor (1999, p. 117) attempts to explain the development of theHuman Relations school as “[a solution] to pressing social, economic, and politicalissues of the period between World War I and the New Deal”. Although she does notactually discuss management and the New Deal, she does at least recognize itsimportance as a different socio-political context and environment for the developmentof management theory.

She contends that the post-WWI era saw the development of two prominent groups– “democratic rationalists” who sought greater control by managers, with a focus onresponsible administrators, objectivity and the “clear sightedness of experts”(O’Connor, 1999, p. 119); and “industrial democrats” who sought greaterinvolvement of workers in decision making through forms of participation, arguingfor “the application of principles and practices from civic democracy to the workplace”(O’Connor, 1999, p. 119). The former group included Charles Merrian, Harold Lasswelland Walter Lippman, while the latter included John Dewey, Ordway Tead, MaryParker Follett and Mary Van Kleeck[3].

The theoretical debate consisted of a “highly politicized discussion aboutmanager-employer relations, industry-government relations, and, particularly, thebalance of power between management and workers” (O’Connor, 1999, p. 120).O’Connor (1999) goes on to conclude that the “democratic realists” triumph in the endthrough the development of a perspective – Human Relations – that reached out to theworker through such things as group dynamics and psychiatry that in fact facilitatedgreater managerial control through normative means. O’Connor (1999) challengesBarley and Kunda’s (1992) account by suggesting that there were contradictory forcesat work among those committed to rational control. Indeed, it has been argued thatpreceding Mayo and the Hawthorne Studies there was a growing feminist and leftistpresence among scientific management advocates, including Van Kleeck (Nyland andHeenan, 2005). O’Connor’s (1999) account, in part, points out the disappearance ofleftist and feminist influences in “histories” of management theory (Cooke, 1999;O’Connor, 2000).

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However, like Barley and Kunda’s (1992) characterization and “history” of the“Human Relations School”, O’Connor’s (1999) account relies on a meta-, or the, historyof MOS. What she contests is not so much the overall structure of the history as someof the details. However, as we argued above, the development of a Human RelationsSchool is contested and, regardless of any historical imprimatur, did not becomerecognized as an historical artifact until well into the 1940s and beyond. Had O’Connor(1999) included the period spanning the New Deal it would have been difficult to arguethat democratic realism had indeed triumphed – rather than that the debate was stillbeing played out, albeit but at a higher level of concern.

The “New Deal” and MOSFollowing the end of the Second World War, the environment for business professorshad dramatically changed, with the advent of large-scale government funding ofbehavioral research, the engagement with corporate foundations – in particular theCarnegie, Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the onset of the Cold War (Robin,2001; Cooke, 2006). There was a renewed emphasis on the importance of business insociety unseen since prior to the New Deal era but now there was an important twist.The business school had become the subject of direct political attention, being“considered vital to the economic, social, and political interests of the nation” (Khurana,2007, p. 231). Government funding for the social sciences was largely focussed on suchthings as the improvement of business practices and corporate foundation funding wasclosely linked to the Cold War notion that democracy was “inextricably linked tosupport for corporations and management” (Khurana, 2007, p. 239). The situation wassuch that, “in the McCarthy era, anything that looked like criticism of business arousedsuspicion” (Khurana, 2007, p. 234).

Against this backdrop new management journals were founded that played asignificant role in defining the emerging field of MOS. In the USA those journalsincluded the Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) in 1956, and the Academy ofManagement Journal (AMJ) in 1958, both of which continue to have a broad influenceon the field. Analysis of these two journals gives some indication of how the emergentfield was being shaped[4]. Although there are some clear differences between the twojournals – ASQ’s focus on “administrative science” and AMJ’s emphasis on“management” – they share several descriptions and prescriptions about the nature ofmanagement and organization studies: that private enterprise is the primary focus ofthe emerging field; that there is a need for control, authority and efficiency bymanagement for organizations; that the study of government has little relevance to thenew discipline; and that the interests of business and the prosperity of the nation wereintertwined. ASQ, in particular, linked many of these themes to individualism andentrepreneurship – seeing both as important factors in thwarting collectivist,bureaucratic, and socialistic solutions to modern society. It is little wonder that, withone exception, neither journal contained any reference to the New Deal[5].

The socio-political significance of the New DealThe “New Deal” itself is a contested term that refers to an expansive set of programsand policies that were introduced by the US government of Franklin Roosevelt,through its first (1932-1936) and, arguably into its second term (1936-1940), to combatthe effects of the Depression (Hiltzik, 2011; Leuchtenburg, 2009a). However, the legacy

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of the New Deal is vast and complex. While many argue its policies failed to stem theDepression and demonstrate the futility of government intervention (Badger, 2002),and some critics from the left see the New Deal as a program designed to shore up,capitalism (Zinn, 1997), few argue against the notion that the New Deal transformedAmerican politics. For decades after Roosevelt, subsequent US Presidents weremeasured against his accomplishments and the speed and effectiveness of the NewDeal projects (Leuchtenburg, 2009b). In addition to its political significance, historianshave also marvelled at the engineering and organization feats accomplished by NewDeal agencies in very short timeframes (Hiltzik, 2011; Taylor, 2008). Agencies (seeTable I) that, at one point or another, employed almost ten million people. For example,the Civil Works Administration (CWA) was employing around 4.25 million people bythe start of 1934; by late 1935 the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was employing500,000 young men, with more than 2.5 million moving through its ranks over its brieftenure; and at its peak the Works Projects Administration (WPA) employed 3.3 millionworkers (Taylor, 2008; Hiltzik, 2011). This scale of operation dwarfs that of theWestern Electric’s Hawthorne Works which, at its peak, employed 30,000 (Rose, 1978).In addition those New Deal agencies initiated 35,000 public works projects thatchanged the infrastructure of the USA through to today (Hiltzik, 2011).

In numerous other ways the New Deal transformed the landscape of the USA. Thesignificance of its various employment programs goes beyond sheer numbers in thefact that the WPA found ways of employing not only manual and skilled workers butalso professional workers, artists, musicians, writers, actors, archaeologists, historiansand many other cultural workers who influenced the cultural landscape of the USA fordecades (Taylor, 2008). It also represented a new way of looking at America’s workingpeople. The New Deal and its agencies aimed not just to provide relief, but also toelevate the dignity of the unemployed and to ensure their rights were respected; a verynew approach for the time. When looking at its legacy “the fact that shines through thestatistics and the human stories, the administrative dramas and political attacks, is theNew Deal’s fundamental wisdom of treating people as a resource and not as acommodity” (Taylor, 2008, p. 530).

Relevance and irrelevance in the politics of the New DealThe various agencies of the New Deal not only had political significance for their jobcreation, public works, and regulatory functions, they serve as illuminating cases intothe dynamics of organization. Most were hastily built from scratch, needing to “hit theground running”, and formed complex organizational structures designed to meetdaunting operational challenges. The result was, at times, innovative structures andprocesses, new forms of decision making, and complex organizational dynamics. Manyof these organizational achievements and innovations continue to go unrecognized.

Table I summarizes the potential organizational contributions offered by someselected New Deal agencies. As the table demonstrates, the goals and purposes of theagencies were diverse and thus so were their organizational approaches. For example,while the Works Progress Administration (WPA) developed a complex, multi-layeredorganizational structure (Taylor, 2008), the Civil Conservation Corps opted for minimaladministration by cooperating with existing government departments (Graham andRobinson Wander, 1985). Many of the agencies are early experiments in decentralizeddecision making (Leuchtenburg, 2009a), while others advanced alternative

The New Deal

191

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Table I.Select New Deal agenciesand organizationalcontribution

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192

organizational forms, such as electricity cooperatives (Hawley, 1966). The TennesseeValley Authority (TVA) was the first publicly-owned corporation in the USA(Pritchett, 1943). The Securities Exchange Commission and the National LabourRelations Board were first-of-a-kind entities charged with charting new regulatoryrelationships with powerful interests in US society (Badger, 2002).

This brief overview of some of the New Deal agencies highlights their significance.They can serve as useful subjects in the study of organization and management. Thisis particularly the case not only because of the breadth of the various programs butalso because of the management principles that were brought to bear on and in theirorganizing (Taylor, 2008; Hiltzik, 2011). As Alter (2007, p. xv), contends, study ofRoosevelt and the New Deal can help us “better understand a few timeless questionsabout the nature of crisis leadership”; and FDR’s swift “turnaround” of a failingenterprise” (Alter, 2007, p. xiv). And for Hiltzik (2011, p. 426):

Re-creating an accurate and objective picture of the New Deal may be more important todaythan at any time in the last eight decades. To study the period is to be struck by the parallelsbetween the economic and political conditions of the 1930s and those of the opening years ofthis century.

However, the staunch opposition from business to the New Deal is a crucial piece ofcontext that must be highlighted when studying the absence/presence of the New Dealwithin MOS history. The New Deal sparked a firestorm of protest and anger from largesections of business (Badger, 2002; Leuchtenburg, 2009a). Morgan (2003) argues thatmany of the aspects of McCarthyism were likely born in the reaction of business to theNew Deal.

The New Deal as a metaphor for field definitionFor several important reasons the New Deal draws attention to the problem of historyand the social construction of MOS as a field of study. These include; the sheer scale ofthe New Deal, its social-political impact, and the relevance of its various endeavours forstudy of management and organization. Finally, there is its location at a point in timewhen MOS was generally thought to be emerging and transitioning from ScientificManagement to Human Relations theory (Buchanan and Huczynski, 1985; O’Connor,1999). All of which, influenced the direction the field would take as it grew into theMOS of today.

Conclusion: the past-as-historyOur focus on the New Deal raises a number of questions about the relationship betweenhistory and MOS, in particular the definition of the field itself. Questions include theontological character of history, context and relationalism and the link between historyand MOS, ethics, Anglo-American centeredness, and the case for historicalengagement.

Ontological issuesThe various fragments associated with attempts to construct a history of MOS suggestthat “the past” is difficult to reproduce. It is not simply a case of uncovering and addingnew facts as some have suggested (Fry and Thomas, 1996) but often entailsfundamentally different pasts and radically different histories. It is not simply the casethat women or the left, or even the New Deal, were “written out” of history (Cooke,

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1999), but rather they were not included in managerialist accounts of the field. There isa profound difference here! The selected “facts” of any history need to be assembled tosome purpose. That purpose can include attempts to develop legitimacy with certaingroups (e.g. the business community – Khurana, 2007), to delineate the field from otherdisciplines (Davis, 1958) and, in the process, avoiding/excluding people and events thatthreaten paradigmatic integrity (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and political stability(Cooke, 2006). On all counts but especially the last one, the New Deal, with its taint ofleftism, government intervention, and wide-ranging concern for workers andcommunities, would have been difficult to include in the emerging narrative of MOSin the Cold War years.

On the other hand, a number of disparate “facts” were woven into a story of a schoolof thought that saw management theory transition from scientific management tohuman relations. The “facts” included the work of Mayo, Roethlisberger, Dickson, andthe experiments at Western Electric’s Chicago works. But these schools also excludedthe work of feminist and radical members of the Taylor Society and, for the longesttime, the work of Parker Follett. Their histories also excluded the massive efforts of theNew Deal, whose focus on the human side of organizations arguably overshadowedthem all.

Context and relationalismHistorians of management and organizational scholarship have long argued the valueof an historical approach is that helps us to understand investigated phenomena incontext (Kieser, 1994). This is particularly the case when dealing with historiesthemselves. Building on existing literature, we have attempted to show how the eras ofthe New Deal and the Cold War were powerful, all pervasive contexts in which much ofcurrent management and organizational scholarship was developed. The New Dealwas far more contested, as business schools attempted to reconcile their need forlegitimacy with the business community with an interest in supporting broadinitiatives to solve the economic crisis of the Depression years (Khurana, 2007). TheCold War, on the other hand, with its focus on business as the heart of the struggleagainst communism, was totalizing in its effects, producing particularly partisanaccounts of management knowledge that was reproduced in journals (see above),textbooks (Mills, 1998), business schools (Khurana, 2007) and scholarly associations(Grant and Mills, 2006). In actor-network terms, these authors and non-human actors(i.e. journals, associations, textbooks, and business schools) served to limit or confinefuture generations of scholars to a particular vision of management and organizationalscholarship.

From a factualist account of history it might be argued that the people, theories,theorists, and events described actually happened. The experiments at the Hawthorneworks really happened. Other accounts either add to the history with new facts(e.g. Phipps, 2011) or offer a different interpretation of the existing facts (Graham,1996). This, however, is to stretch the notion of facts beyond what is empiricallyverifiable. That Mayo lived and worked at Harvard is beyond dispute. To say he is “thefather” of modern-day Human Relations theory (Wren, 1979) relies on the addition ofnarrative to selected “facts” (White, 1984).

A relativist approach would argue that all accounts of history are relative to thehistorian’s judgements about the past which, “in effect, create the-past-as-history”

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(Munslow, 2010, p. 34). That is not to say that any account would be accepted, e.g. onethat did not include “verifiable facts” that were weighed through a process of“reasonable inferences” (Munslow, 2010, p. 4); but rather that it would be left toindividual scholars to determine which narrative account was more acceptable.Moving beyond this, the relationalist approach seeks to understand how historicalknowledge is developed, generated and disseminated (Latour, 2005); so that the sourcesand processes of knowledge can be understood and destabilized. From this perspectivethe scholar is able to move beyond facts and to weigh “knowledge” claims and theircontribution to the field. This is the approach we have taken in this paper, one whichseeks to understand how a particular and dominant account of MOS was developed. Inweighing that account, we have attempted to include the socio-political contexts inwhich understandings of MOS and our disciplinary knowledge, was developed by theactants involved, and some of the narrative devices they used, including the presence(and absence) of socio-political effects of the Cold War and the New Deal.

MOS and historyWe contend that throughout all accounts of the past as currently historied there is ameta-discourse of history which serves as a court of final appeal for scholarsattempting to justify their accounts as rooted in the past (and thus history). Thisdiscourse tends to shut down debate just when it is primed to take off. Instead ofsearching for a past – real or relative – we need to treat history itself as relational andexplore its role in legitimating critical aspects of management knowledge. We are notarguing against historical engagement in MOS but rather for an approach thatsimultaneously encourages accounts of the past while recognizing the problem ofseeing those accounts as being more than reasonably inferred stories. In this way wehope that this can encourage: a revisiting of what constitutes the field of MOS; agreater awareness of and opening up to alternative (hi)stories and, thus, approaches toMOS; and a re-evaluation of phenomena such as the New Deal and other more radicalways of organizing.

Notes

1. Defining a field of study is no less part of the problem of attempting to delineate its historicdevelopment and boundaries. Roughly the same broad grouping of theories and theoristsfocused on the study of the structure, behaviour, and/or the management of organizationshave been referred to as a field or sub-field of organizational analysis: Burrell and Morgan(1979); organizational theory (Kieser, 1994); organization theory (Astley and Van de Ven,1983); organization science (Gergen and Thatchenkery, 1996); management thought (Wren,1979); management and organization studies (Cooke, 2004); and organization andmanagement theory (Hardy et al., 2001). We have adopted the term management andorganization studies (MOS) for both simplicity and the fact that the term arises from use by anumber of scholars.

2. We chose 30 textbooks that are part of a collection at Saint Mary’s University that consist ofsome 600 North American business textbooks published between 1928 and 2012.

3. Despite their pioneering work Follett was largely “written out” of MOS histories(Tancred-Sheriff and Campbell (1992), Phipps (2011)), and Van Kleeck’s was obliteratedNyland et al. (2005).

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4. We reviewed all the articles and research notes published in the first four volumes of ASQ(1956/57-1959/60) and the first three volumes of AMJ (1958-1960). A total of 88 articles inASQ and 69 in AMJ were reviewed, for a total of 157 articles.

5. The exception is Gore (1959). The article, which is a synthesis of key literature on decisionmaking, devotes a page summarizing Selznick’s TVA and the Grassroots.

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Corresponding authorJason Foster can be contacted at: jasonf@athabascau.ca

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