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Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif. The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Movements (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2010). Pp. 150. Price $137.75. ISBN 978-0-415-68614-3.

Anthony D. Smith writes that sociologically, nations are repeatedly formed and re-formed, at least in part, on the basis of the symbolic processes of ethnogenesis (Smith 2009, 49). This has happened with Pakistan. It was formed on the basis of religion, but soon after, the movements based on primordial identities emerged. One out of those movements led to liberation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971, and raised a question over the basic hypothesis of India’s partition in 1947. In sixty eight years of Pakistan’s existence, many of them are still persisting, and a few more have erupted. In this book, Farhan Hanif Siddiqi has tried to explore reasons for Pakistan’s turning into an ethnic cauldron.

In Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’, the author has given two preliminary thoughts that informed his interests in the subject are: (a) What lessons, if any, had the Pakistani state learned in the aftermath of the secession of East Pakistan where an army-led military action against the Awami League resulted in disintegration of the Pakistani nation(s) state?, and (b) An initial review of post-1971 Pakistan revealed a picture of increased ethnic conflict highlighted by military action against the Baloch in the 1970s, against the Sindhis in the 1980s and Mohajirs in the 1990s. Ethnic conflict and ethnic movements in post-1971 Pakistan had certainly not abated but had shown a remarkable tendency to rise (p. 2). They act as research question-cum research puzzle, which Farhan Siddiqi has tried to resolve, in the later part of the book.

In Chapter 2 of the book titled ‘Nationalism, Politics of Ethnicity and the State’, the author talks about Sinisa Malesvic’s notion of nationalism, who has given a notion of normative and operative aspects of nationalism (p. 9). The author treats ethnic groups not as cultural–linguistic entities but rather as political actors. Ethnic groups function in order to attain the desired political rights and objectives which they believe they are being consciously denied. In order to give voice to such demands, ethnic groups more often than not create political organisations of their own and it is precisely at such moments that ethnicity is politicised (p. 15). In this section the author has also talked about intra-ethnic conflict, which, he maintains, is an essential reality of ethnic politics. It is prudent to view ethnic politics not from the paradigm of an ethnic ‘group’ in conflict, but different organisations of a single ethnic group in conflict with each other, at least one of whom is also involved in a conflict with the state (p. 18).

India Quarterly 70(2) 173–185

© 2014 Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)

SAGE PublicationsLos Angeles, London,

New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC

DOI: 10.1177/0974928414524653http://iqq.sagepub.com

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Talking about state he finds that it is an omnipotent and an omnipresent institution (p. 19). When one speaks about the power of the state, one is alluding to the power of the state and its institutions, the bureaucracy, military and the police, not the power of the government. In many post-colonial contexts the balance of power between the state and government is heavily tilted in the favour of the former (p. 26).

Chapter 3 is titled ‘The State and Politics of Ethnicity in Post-1971 Pakistan’. In this, he maintained that the Military is more responsible than civilian government for exacerbating ethnic conflicts in Pakistan (p. 31). Despite being weak, the author writes, politicians and political process are indispensable and an essential component of Pakistani politics even in times of military rule. In fact, military rulers from Ayub Khan to Pervez Musharraf have relied on the support of political leaders and parties for their sustenance and survival. This phenomenon is labelled as the ‘civilianisation of military rule’ by Hasan Askari Rizvi implies that the ‘military rulers create ‘beneficiaries’ through their political and economic policies and prop up the political elite who are willing to join them and play politics within their game plan’ (cited on p. 32). Inverting Hasan Askari Rizvi’s characterisation of co-option of political elites during times of military rule as ‘civilianisation of military rule’, the author finds out that Bhutto’s time in power may well be labeled the ‘militarisation of civilian rule’. The ‘militarisation of civilian rule’ implies most succinctly Bhutto’s authoritarian style of political governance as well as his critical role in instigating ethnic conflict in Balochistan in 1973 (p. 32). The civilian supremacy under Bhutto was manifested in the widespread changes that he instituted within the bureaucracy—military. By authorising such changes Bhutto proved that the state was indeed subservient to the government and incapable of resisting the government and its diktat (p. 33).

Chapter 4 is titled ‘Balochistan: Ethnic Politics in a Tribal Setting’. In this chapter, the author talks about the eruption and continuity of ethnic conflicts in Balochistan. Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan, but economically is the least developed. The Khanate was established in 1666 by Mir Ahmad but his domain comprised only Sarawan and Jhalawan. However, it was under the leadership of Mir Nasir Khan in the eighteenth century that the Khanate evolved into a centralised institution of power and authority (p. 53). The root of ethnic insurgency in Balochistan against Pakistan lies in the agreement signed among British Empire, Kalat state and Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, on 4 August 1947 (p. 59). The source of contention was Article V of that agreement, which makes the two parties to further discuss on the issue of control over ‘Defence Affairs, Foreign Relations and Communications, in the near future in Karachi’. Negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat fell into trouble as the former now demanded the integration and merger of the latter, as a part of Pakistan (p. 60). The situation in Kalat became further compounded when the All-India Radio broadcast a news bulletin on 27 March 1948 stating that ‘two months ago, the Kalat Government had applied to the Government of India for merger; but the Indian Government rejected their request on the ground of its geographical position’. It provided a sound excuse for the Pakistan government to opt for military action and put the Khan of Kalat in a very precarious situation. Sensing military action against the Khanate, the Khan aligned himself with Pakistan on 30 March 1948 (p. 60).

In 1952, the Government of Pakistan decided to form the Balochistan States Union by merging the states of Lasbela, Makran and Kharan with Kalat. After the One Unit policy was adopted, the arrangement was terminated. The Baloch reacted against that (p. 62). In 1958, the Pakistan Army, once again moved into the region. Then in 1973–1977, Baloch insurgency was the result of Bhutto’s political cunningness and nothing to do with military’s will to enter into the region.

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The author maintains that the ethnic insurgency in Balochistan has been divisive in nature. In 1948, Prince Abdul Karim fought a lone battle. In 1959 when Nauroz Khan took up arms against the state, he too was fighting a lone battle (p. 71). During 1973–1977 insurgency, most of the fighting was mainly restricted to territories where the Mengals and Marris predominated suggests that not ‘all’ Balochsardars, nor for that matter the Baloch middle class were involved in the war against the Pakistan Army (p. 72).

Title of Chapter 5 is ‘Sindh: Ethnic Politics in a Rural Setting’. Sindh was the first province which passed a resolution through its Assembly on 26 June 1947 to be part of Pakistan. However, soon after joining Pakistan, Sindh embroiled in a conflict with the state, which led to the development of Sindhi ethno-national parties (p. 75). The founder of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, proclaimed Urdu to be the national language of the country in 1948. This act alienated the Sindhis as they revered their language and were placed at disadvantage as they had to learn new language in order to apply for government jobs and positions (cited on p. 81).

The leader of Sindhi’s discontent, against the Pakistani state was G.M. Syed, who formed a party called Jeay Sindh Mahaj on 18 June 1972 at his residence in Karachi (cited p. 85). It was openly separatist, calling for the outright independence of Sindh and the creation of a Sindhu Desh. He elaborated his views in his book A Nation in Chains: Sindhu Desh in 1974 (p. 84). He felt that Pakistan and the two-nation theory became a trap for Sindhis—instead of liberating Sindh, it fell under Punjabi–Mohajir domination, and until his death in 1995, he called for a separate Sindhi ‘nation’, implying a separate Sindhi country (Cohen 2004, 212).

Like Balochistan, ethnic movement in Sindh, too, remains divisive. G.M. Syed was countered by Rasul Bax Palijo, who formed Awami Tahreek in 1970. During the 1970s and especially after the implementation of Zia’s martial law, Awami Tahreek as opposed to Jeay Sindh announced that it would resist martial law. In 1978, Palijo went further than the anti-Bhutto Syed by constituting Bhutto Bachayo Tahreek (Save Bhutto Movement) indicating that he preferred democratic Bhutto over Zia’s military dictatorship, while Syed could not look beyond his petty differences with Bhutto and his PPP (p. 92).

The title of Chapter 6 is ‘The Mohajirs: Ethnic Politics in Urban Setting’. The Mohajirs were and still are one of the most affluent political and economic ethnic groups in Pakistan (p. 93). After formation of Pakistan, they were well represented and formed backbone of the new state. Liaquat Ali Khan, a Mohajir, became the first Prime Minister of the Pakistani state. Measures such as adoption of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan and naming of Karachi as the capital of Pakistan, all pointed to the fact that Mohajirs were now the junior partners along with the Punjabis in the Pakistani state structure (p. 97). The relative shift in the power structure of the Mohajir community within the state structure started with the rise of Ayub Khan in power, a Pathan. The quota system introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto further hurt them (p. 99).

To represent their ethnic demands and issues, on 11 June 1978, the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO) was formed at the University of Karachi with Altaf Hussain as Chairman. Later on, Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was formed in March 1984. During the late 1980s, its activists, had established a reign of terror in Sindh. Criticism against the MQM leadership, particularly against Altaf Hussain, was considered unpardonable and the whole organisation was run on the style of the Nazi and fascist parties of Germany and Italy (cited p. 104). Operation Clean Up began in May 1992 ostensibly to root out dacoits in the interior of Sindh. However, soon after, the army moved into Karachi against the MQM in June 1992. Its attack was directed against the MQM activists. Hundreds of them

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were killed in an extra-judicial manner (p. 104). During the operation most of the MQM leadership went underground or exile to London (p. 106). In 1994, the army was called off, but government under Benazir Bhutto leashed terror in Karachi. During 1995 and 1996 under direct supervision of General Naseerullah Khan Babar, the Karachi city witnessed some of the worst excesses of state authority. By 1995, Karachi had become the most dangerous city in Asia and was termed the ‘city of death’ (p. 106).

Like others, division based on interests is visible among Mohajir’s groups. Other Mohajir parties distanced themselves from the politics of MQM. In fact, one Mohajir party MQM (Haqiqi) courted an active alliance with the military in order to flush out the MQM and its supporters from key areas in Karachi (p. 107).

Finally, Farhan Siddiqi has exquisitely concluded that the history of ethnic conflict in post-1971 Pakistan amply proves that despotic powers have been readily applied in order to resolve ethnic conflicts than have political strategies of accommodation and compromise. Even when accommodation and compromise have been applied, they have been largely symptomatic of the state’s contrivance in co-opting radical ethnic elites and their respective ethnic organisations without attending to the larger political, social and economic problems that the non-dominant ethnic groups face (p. 114). He further says that even Punjabis have suffered (and in many ways continue to suffer) from their own real or imagined Pakistani (Punjabi) state (p. 119).

This is a very well-researched book. Though the author has taken cases of ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, his analyses about the nature of conflicts is aptly applicable on ethnic conflicts at other places also. Therefore, this book can be helpful to all, who are interested in knowing about ethnic conflicts in, general, and, particularly, in Pakistan.

References

Cohen, Stephen P. (2004). Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brooking Institute Press. Smith, Anthony D. (2009). Ethno-symbolism and nationalism: A cultural approach. London and New York:

Routledge and Taylor & Francis.

Amit RanjanFellow, Indian Council of World Affairs

New Delhi, Indiaamitranjan.jnu@gmail.com

Pattanaik, Smruti S. (ed.), Four Decades of India Bangladesh Relations: Historical Imperatives and Future Direction (New Delhi: IDSA, 2012). Pp. 292.

DOI: 10.1177/0974928414524654

The relationship between India and Bangladesh seems to be stuck at present. But it had witnessed resurgence in March 2010 when Bangladesh Prime Minister Mrs. Sheikh Hasina Wajed visited India. At the end of the visit, both countries signed a 51-point joint communiqué covering various issues of mutual interest including India’s decision to grant 1 billion dollar credit to Bangladesh. Since then, it has been considered to provide direction to all dimensions of bilateral relationship.

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The book under review covers four decades of India–Bangladesh relationship encompassing topics of mutual interests to both countries. Contributions in the book are from scholars of leading think tanks of India and Bangladesh—Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi and the Bangladesh Institute for International and Strategic Studies, (BIISS), Dhaka. The authors have described the issues mainly from their respective countries’ perspectives. It would have been interesting if some of the scholars had tried to address some of the bilateral issues without necessarily following either country’s well-known viewpoints.

The background of the book has been introduced by the editor describing historical milestones taken place between the two countries in the last four decades. The introductory chapter underlines how India has got dragged into domestic politics of Bangladesh because of local internal political calculations of the mainstream parties—the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). This bitter internal political dimension gets reflected in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship through four decades. This has not let both neighbours to enjoy the full potential of geographical and social proximity. The book under review discusses issues of mutual interests like river water, security aspects, trade and transits.

Chapters covering river water issues between the two countries present the well-known positions of both countries. On the river water issue, the Bangladeshi author presents the traditional viewpoint describing how its vital interests are being compromised because of upstream river water activities in India. But this traditional description of river water has to be updated. As water situation is going to be erratic in the future due to the retreat of Himalayan glaciers as being predicted by the scientists, it is important to understand how irregularity of water will be dealt with by both neighbours. For this, the scope of the Joint River Commission (JRC) should be further widened. The JRC, at present, mandated to meet four times a year, sometimes does not meet even once. This anomaly urgently needs to be corrected to deal with emerging realities.

Another important aspect is that at one level Bangladesh is suffering from high levels of pollution, at another level; farming is increasingly becoming dependent on irrigation. Aus, a pre-monsoon variety, is being replaced by boro—(irrigated) dry season rice. Boro has become the crucial crop after the introduction of High Yielding Varieties. According to the World Bank 2006 record, 7.6 million ha of the total cultivable land of 9.03 million ha used in agriculture are suitable for irrigation and about 4.5 million ha are irrigated. Thus, dependence on irrigated farming in Bangladesh is going to increase. In this situation, the question arises, how such a sensitive issue between the two countries will be dealt with without hyperbole of politics.

In the chapter ‘India–Bangladesh Cross-border Connectivity’, the authors present a case for greater connectivity between the two countries. But the rationale given for connectivity is different. The Indian author has approached connectivity in terms of utilitarian value and underlines how economical and quick transportation of goods to north-east of India would be furthering the development of this region along with serving Bangladesh’s interests. But Bangladeshi scholar has described how economic issue of transit has been approached in the domestic politics of Bangladesh; and it is considered as a bargaining chip.

In the chapter ‘Regional Security Environment in South Asia: Overcoming the Constraints’, the author enumerates factors for not having common understanding of security in South Asia. He further suggests that even SAARC has not been able to come with a common view on regional security. But there cannot be a common view on security, especially if some country in the region is promoting

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terrorist organisations as a matter of policy. But Bangladesh’s help in the arrest of ULFA’s operatives hiding in that country reassures India that cooperation on the issues of security with Bangladesh is very productive and possible.

It is very important to underline here that the Indo-Bangladesh relationship cannot be understood purely in rational pursuit of national interests as defined by the realist theorists of International Relations. As India is a topic of contention between opposing political factions in neighbour’s domestic politics, realist theories of international relations do not sufficiently explain the contours of bilateral relation- ship. In case of Indo-Bangladesh, the nature of relationship has been determined more by political regimes keeping in mind domestic political compulsions rather than by objective factors of alignment of national interests of both countries. This is especially true to the case of Bangladesh where both major national parties—Awami League and the BNP have been portrayed as pro or anti India.

Though India has a latent desire to promote democracy in the neighbourhood because of bitter experiences of military rule in the western border, it has always showed great disposition in dealing with particular regime in Bangladesh. Thus, India has inadvertently become symbol of supporter of Awami League, if not in the eyes of public, at least in the eyes of contesting political parties.

Recently, India has been changing its style of interactions with BNP and other political parties. Indian dignitaries visiting Bangladesh is making sure to pay a courtesy call to opposition political leaders as well. New Delhi’s attempt to broaden engagement with different political parties of Bangladesh is reflected in its recent gestures. The BNP leader Khaleda Zia, Jatiya Party chairman General H.M. Ershad and other political leaders visited India on New Delhi’s invitations. But when the Indian President made a visit to Bangladesh in March 2013, the opposition leader Khaleda Zia cancelled the scheduled meeting with him as a result of strike called by Jamaat as a wake of demand of death sentence by student pro- testers for Jamaat leader for a 1971 crime. Not only this, Indian High Commissioner’s vehicle was targeted amidst violence of war crime conviction. This suggests that India is still a factor of internal politics and will take a long time before it becomes just another neighbour for Bangladesh. It is difficult to explain why minorities and its temples are being attacked for court judgement on a crime conducted on Bangladeshi people by sympathisers of erstwhile Pakistani regime, except to deflect the attention.

At present, in spite of having positively inclined government towards New Delhi in Dhaka, the bilateral relationship has not witnessed a remarkable shift as was expected. The Indian government has not been able to maximise the presence of positive atmosphere. These days, it appears that Indian foreign policy is no longer the monopoly of the central government rather being dictated by varied interests of state governments. In case of Indo-Bangladesh, this becomes visible where New Delhi has not been able to deliver to Dhaka on the two important issues—Teesta river Agreement and ratification of Land Boundary amendment.

Recently, some positive developments have taken place in bilateral relationship. India will start supplying electricity to Bangladesh from 2013 through the new transmission line. The Indian govern- ment decision to hold border closing retreat ceremony at the Petrapole–Benapole border between Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) modelled on at the Wagah– Attari Indo–Pak border will also help in diffusing volatile situations in the border region. As India is alleged to bother only about neighbour in western front, this will have psychological impact on Bangladesh.

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There are some typographical mistakes like in page number 152. The book is a comprehensive read for students of Political Science and International Relations as well as for those who have interests in Indo-Bangladesh relations.

Punam PandeyIndependent researcher based in Germany

punampandey@gmail.com

Pant, Harsh V. (ed.), The Rise of China: Implications for India (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2012). Pp. 270, Price ` 795.

DOI: 10.1177/0974928414524656

One of the most important developments that have occurred in the twenty-first century is the rise of China as a major Asian economic giant. This becomes evident from the fact that today China is not only the second largest economy in the world, but its economic clout can also be felt across all the regions of the world. More importantly, China has today become the largest creditor of the United States. With increase of its economic capacity, China has aggressively started its military modernisation programme and it has also focused on improving relations with developing countries, strengthening friendship relations with neighbouring countries and Third World countries and promoting its role in the United Nations to assert its position globally and regionally. Undoubtedly, this has helped China to create a special place for itself in the international political order, generating a debate about the future shape of the world order with China as a ‘great power’. Though China has already projected its rise as ‘peaceful rise’ giving an impression that its rise should not be seen as a threat to any country and that it is a responsible and cooperative member of the international community, yet skeptics believe that the rise of China must be seen in the historical context of the rise and fall of the great powers. And thus, they argue that China would try to establish its hegemony in the world, once it reached the status of a ‘great power’.

India, which is not only a close neighbour of China, but also having a long-standing border dispute with it, is also very closely watching its rise. Though Sino-India relations have improved significantly over last few years and China has become the largest trading partner of India, yet there are growing concerns within India that increasing clout of China both at the regional and international level can create problems for India. This concern looms large considering the fact in the recent past China has tried to assert its position against India on many occasions.

It is in this context that the book under review assumes a great significance. The book is divided into three sections containing 10 chapters. The first chapter is introductory in nature. The editor, Harsh V. Pant, discusses the level of analysis approach of international relations. In this contest, he mentions three variables, namely, the international system level, the state level and the individual level, under the broad framework of which the authors have written their chapters.

The next three chapters discuss role of the economic, domestic and military factors in the rise of China. Bibek Debroy, in his chapter, examines the economic growth trajectory of China and its implication for Sino-India economic ties. He argues that while India and China would continue to witness rise in their economic capacity, there is a huge gulf between India and China. This in turn also reflects

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in their bilateral relations. For instance, while trade between the two has increased over the years, it continues to be one-sided in favour of China, which is a major cause of concern for India. Varaprasad S. Dolla in his chapter tries to understand role of domestic factors in China’s emergence as a ‘great power’. In doing so, the author sheds lights on factors like ideology, the state, the party, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese government.

Srikanth Kondapalli discusses China’s military modernisation programme for the last few years. He mentions the several priority areas of PLA’s modernisation drive, which include change in military personnel profile, enhancing professionalism, demobilisation, raising elite and rapid response forces, infusing high-tech weaponry and others. The fifth chapter examines role of China in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. Ashok Kapur argues that while Chinese aggression cannot be ruled out in the region, China currently employs a two-track approach to Asia-Pacific affairs.

The sixth chapter analyses US-China relations against the background of assertiveness of Beijing in recent times and the implication of US-China for India. Arthur Waldron argues that while China wants to change the structure of the international order by carving out a special place for itself, the US, on the other hand, tries to maintain its sole superpower status with some adjustment with China. In this context, Arthur Waldron says that the US considers China an ‘ideal partner’. Of course, any attempt by the US to impress upon will have natural implications for India. It will not only affect US-India relations adversely, but China will also take an assertive posture against India.

D.S. Rajan, in his chapter, provides in-depth analysis of China’s resources diplomacy. In this regard, Rajan argues that China requires more energy to sustain its rising economic growth. To deal this problem, China has focused on developing close linkages with countries in Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and others to get access to energy resources in these counties. At the same time, the author believes that China’s move will change the prevailing energy scenario at the global level, leading to pose challenges to countries like India which are also looking for viable energy resources for maintaining its economic growth.

The eighth chapter examines the long-standing territorial disputes between India and China. David Scott discuses the claims of both the countries on disputed territories like Aksai Chin in the western sector and Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, and critically analyses the efforts taken for resolving the dispute. The ninth chapter is devoted towards evaluating the role of the Tibet factor in India–China ties. Elliot Sperling discusses the historical background of the Tibet factor in relations between New Delhi and Beijing. He also focuses on relevance of the issue for both the countries in the present context and finds that the Tibet factor will continue to impact negatively India’s ties with China.

Finally, the editor, Harsh V. Pant, in his concluding chapter gives a detailed account of China’s increasing involvement in South Asia and its implications for India. Pant provides a detailed account of China’s growing involvement with Pakistan, Sri Lank, Bangladesh and Nepal and he assets in his conclusion that China’s policy towards South Asia is based on encircling India. This in turn surely poses huge challenges for India’s national interests.

However, the book has some lacunas. For instance, there should have been a chapter on China–Japan relations and its implications for India–Japan relations. The book also does not discuss China’s role in international institutions. Similarly, today when the issue of climate change has emerged as one of the major security concerns, the editor should have included a chapter on how both India and China are dealing with the issue. Notwithstanding these limitations, the book under review provides a detailed

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analysis of China’s rise and its possible implication for India. And indeed, it is a valuable addition to the available literature on the subject.

Sumit KumarICSSR Doctoral Fellow

UGC Centre for Southern Asia StudiesSchool of Social Sciences and International Studies

Pondicherry University, Puducherry Sumitjha83@gmail.com

Patrikarakos, David, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), Pp. 340, Price ` 1,503.

DOI: 10.1177/0974928414524657

Iran’s nuclear programme has alarmed the international actors as it is seen as a pursuit for nuclear weapons and a nuclear deterrent. Since the last decade till the run up to the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has been engaged with the West’s leading powers in a sustained diplomatic clash and has seen escalation ever since. In his book Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, David Patrikarakos sets out with an engaging account of the comprehensive story of Iranian nuclear policy. The author does an admirable job on the debated question about the rapid expansion of the Iranian nuclear programme and its rising international concern. The book proceeds with a chronological description of the evolution of the Iranian nuclear programme from its shambolic beginnings under the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the present, and its resumption later under the Islamic Republic. Unlike other existing work, Nuclear Iran addresses the factors behind the birth of the nuclear programme to the present day and what it means to Iran, and narrates the chronological history of the programme. The author has explored the political, economic, security, cultural and psychological significance of the nuclear programme for Iran. The nuclear debate has been referred to as a Manichean conflict dividing the developing and the developed world, and the Islamic and Western world, which in turn has created cultural and ideological assumptions on both sides.

The author uses Akbar Etemad―the founder of the Atomic Energy Agency (AEOI) and the father of Iran’s nuclear programme as the starting point of his narrative. His dreams of technologically advanced Iran powering to modernity, matched the revolutionary Shah’s personal ambitions for modernisation. Nuclear power is considered as the epitome of modern technology, the catalyst for economic growth and the future. The Shah fancied himself as an economist, and presented the pursuit of nuclear power as the reward of resource diversification, energy competition and technological advancement. The Iranian nuclear crisis has never been about just centrifuges, or producing weapons-grade uranium. A nuclear programme serves an important symbolic function; it reflects a country’s standing and its attempts to find a place within a perennially hostile and changing world order. They have a ‘normative’ value similar to ‘flags, airlines and Olympic teams: something some modern states believe they must have to be modern states’ (p. 34). Patrikarakos contends that the United States was the midwife of Iran’s nuclear programme, who was willing to transfer unlimited nuclear technology to pre-revolutionary Iran as well

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as increasing its number of advisors; however, it adopted an aggressive and oppositionist stance towards the Islamic Republic. Along with the growth in wealth and military power, the Shah intensified his pursuit of nuclear technology. Guided by the Shah’s conception of modernity and nuclear power as a symbol of Iran’s ancient glory, the funding for the programme was ceaseless. As a result, Western powers were encouraged and the French Foreign Ministry even created a Nuclear Attaché at their embassy in Tehran (p. 36) and signed the Framatome deal, which would supply nuclear-powered electricity to Iran. France and the USA even signed an agreement for training of Iranian engineers and technicians in their laboratories. Over 1,000 Iranians were sent abroad for training (p. 47).

However, the US was concerned about the ‘Snowball Effect’ and a possible proliferation chain across the modernising world. Although the Shah initially rejected nuclear weapons, he became more publicly aspirant after India’s 1974 nuclear test and showed dissatisfaction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) norms (p. 59) which he had signed to keep Washington happy (p. 56). Patrikarakos is convinced that the US, under Nixon, Ford and Carter made it tough for Tehran’s nuclear programme to take off. However, the Shah decided not to risk the relationship with Washington through the pursuit of its nascent nuclear programme. The US even demanded a ‘right of prior consent’ clause, which would compel the AEOI to run all nuclear activities past Washington, but could also get US approval on what Iran could do with the spent fuel of any reactor Iran purchased from Washington (pp. 76–77). In the late 1970s, Etemad was replaced and the Shah’s nuclear programme ended.

In Chapter 6, the author addresses the causes behind the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 and the transformation of the country from an autocratic, pro-Western kingdom to an isolationist, Islamic and populist republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The nuclear programme was now ‘officially viewed as the continuation of colonialism by other means’ which Khomeini protested as ‘no Westoxification’ in Iran (p. 99). The collaboration with the foreign partners disintegrated after the revolution. The intensify-ing of the Iran–Iraq War in the mid-1980s saw Iraq bomb Bushehr; the Iranian officials’ complaint regarding Iraq’s violation of internationally accepted code of conduct did not get any reaction from the IAEA as well as the Western powers. Iran started to believe that the only way out was the development of indigenous nuclear technology. Working on the nuclear programme became a national service and the programme became an integral part of how the Islamic Republic defined itself in the modern world (p. 113). It, however, continued the Shah’s line and categorically rejected nuclear weapons. The programme was now a symbol of Iranian defiance in the face of a supposedly hostile world. The Islamic Republic learnt an important lesson from recent events. They witnessed the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011 after his nuclear programme was dismantled in 2003, and the same year Iraq that never had a nuclear programme, was invaded. However, nuclear Pakistan is an ally of the US and supported its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 in the so-called ‘war on terror’. The message is simple: nuclear weapons means security. Iranians now, more than ever, see nuclear energy as a symbol of their country’s independence and a totem of modernity and progress. The author accounted this value while discussing Ahmadinejad’s rebuff of the offer of negotiations by the Western powers, which led to it being referred to the Security Council and subsequent sanctions being imposed. Since then, Iranians have desperately tried to find a solution through negotiations. Patrikarakos has skilfully analysed the weakness of the hardliners, who have dominated Tehran from 2005 and how it has hurt Iran’s national interest. He points out that the programme may ‘derail . . . the regime’ (p. 278). Though Obama could not bring a détente on nuclear weapons, he has made Iran a diminished figure, under attack both nationally and internationally.

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India Quarterly, 70, 2 (2014): 173–185

Patrikarakos has concluded that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not the cause, but the effect of a dysfunctional relationship, between Iran and the West and it’s underlying relationship that must be addressed ‘through wider political solutions that resolve Iran’s place in the world’ (p. 280). The clash between Iran and the West will never be resolved until Iran’s capability rises and becomes comparable with the West in various political, economic, scientific and technological fields. This will enable call for negotiations but it is hard to see a rapprochement needed to break the impasse. The irony of the nuclear crisis is that Iran’s nuclear programme is the ultimate expression of its desire for acceptance, which is being pursued through the one means that will ensure it remains a pariah. Iran continues to learn that in an unforgiving world, acceptance can only be achieved from a position of strength although there remains some doubt. Sanctions may force Iran to reach a compromise; a prospective military strike may delay the programme, but only for a short term. The author’s only solution to the crisis is engaging Iran in the regional affairs, involving Iran in multi-lateral discussions, allowing Iran to play its intended role in regional and world affairs.

Nuclear Iran ends up in the form of a journalistic writing rather than scholarly work. The primary sources for this study are very less. He was deeply relying on a few interviews, that too especially from the Shah’s period. Persian sources cited are very few and the language used in the book is quite conservative. While illustrating the chronological charts of the programme, he has totally neglected the domestic politics, especially the widespread factionalism between the clerics. While the power structure in Iran is shared between the Supreme Leader, the President and other Council members, the word of the Supreme Leader is regarded as the final law. The author has left the conclusion in uncertainty, as he himself is uncertain of the programme to build a nuclear bomb.

However, the book represents a well-told story, for those interested in Iranian affairs and those who wish to learn more about the place, given the nuclear crisis. It can be a valuable resource for researchers on the nuclear exegesis of modern Iran from its evolution in 1950s to the present day.

Md. Abdul GaffarResearch Scholar, Centre for West Asian Studies

School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru UniversityNew Delhi, India

ab4ghaffar@gmail.com

Shambaugh, David, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (USA: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pp. 432. Price $29.95. ISBN-13: 978-0199860142.

DOI: 10.1177/0974928414524659

The unprecedented rise of China in both economic and military sphere has increased the level of attention which the country demands. These developments have also shaped and increased the Chinese presence globally. Today, goods manufactured in China as well as Chinese people (diplomats and tourists) have a global presence. This global presence and reach of China is unavoidable.

With the rise of China, questions related to Chinese behaviour and foreign policy have become primary in the international relations discourse. How China will behave and what makes it behave in a

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India Quarterly, 70, 2 (2014): 173–185

184 Book Reviews

certain way are questions which dominate this discourse. In addition to this, there is also a constant need to understand and follow the Chinese foreign policy manoeuvres. With economic opening up which was adopted under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has changed from being an isolated state to one which is highly integrated in the international system. This reform and opening up has also provided China with increased financial and military strength and in the recent years one perceives an increasing assertiveness in the Chinese behaviour both internationally and regionally. This also forces one to question as to whether China will attempt to change the existing global order or will it be happy to play a constructive role.

Keeping the above developments in view the book China Goes Global: The Partial Power by David Shambaugh is a very timely contribution to the existing literature on the subject. The author argues that China should still not be seen as a global power but only as a partial one. According to him,

. . . it is clear that China’s global presence and reputation is mixed. It remains a long way from becoming a global superpower like the United States (which has comprehensive power and global influence across economic, cultural, diplomatic, security, governance and other realms). Over time [China] may gain these attributes but for the time being China remains very much a partial power. (p. 10)

He further adds that the, ‘China’s global image remains mixed and the majority of the world is very ambivalent about China’s rise’ (p. 12).

The book is divided into eight chapters: (a) ‘Understanding China’ Global Impact’; (b) ‘China’s Global Identities’; (c) ‘China’s Global Diplomatic Presence’; (d) ‘China and Global Governance’; (e) ‘China’s Global Economic Presence’; (f) ‘China’s Global Cultural Presence’; (g) ‘China’s Global Security Presence’ and (h) ‘Coping with a Globalized China’. Each of these chapters discusses in detail the concerned aspect and how with the increasing globalisation of China its response and interaction with the world is changing.

One very important observation which Shambaugh makes is that the Chinese foreign policy is heavily affected by the Chinese domestic situation and developments. (p. 16). While discussing the Chinese diplomatic relations with the world, the author provides the readers with a detailed outline of the Chinese interactions. He concludes this assessment with the observation that China ‘prefers bilateralism to multilateralism’ (p. 120). He also adds that, ‘China finds itself enmeshed in ambivalent and strained relationships’ (p. 120).

While discussing the Chinese role in the global governance the author argues that the general perception within China is that this is another way to hamper the Chinese growth as Beijing needs to focus on its domestic issues rather than contributing to global governance (p. 129). He concludes by saying that, ‘Beijing’s contributions [to the global governance] will likely remain selective and limited’ (p. 155).

The author concludes the discussion on the Chinese economic presence under four different sections. He states that there are ‘four distinct aspects of China’s economic footprint aboard: trade, energy, investment and aid’ (p. 205). He also adds that this is area where China’s ‘global impact is greatest’ (p. 205). The author also adds that even though China has become the second largest economy in the world, its domestic economy is struggling to move higher up the value chain of production. It also faces a number of problems like increasingly employment, maintain the GDP growth and also to expand its international presence (p. 206).

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Book Reviews 185

India Quarterly, 70, 2 (2014): 173–185

While discussing the Chinese cultural presence the author rightly states that the Chinese govern- ment has been working consistently towards improving its global cultural presence. Shambaugh argues that the Chinese government spends about ‘$7 to $10 billion to help build its global cultural image’ (p. 207). After a very detailed discussion over the various aspects by which the Chinese government works towards building a strong soft power or attractive cultural presence, the author concludes that, ‘the nation’s [China] soft power deficit is another indicator that it is a partial power’ (p. 268).

The military development of China is one aspect which greatly concerns the world. It also affects the Chinese relationship with the United States as sharply as it affects Chinese relations with its neighbours. The level of growth and investment which the Chinese military has witnessed makes the world uneasy about China’s ‘rise’. While discussing the Chinese global security presence, Shambaugh lucidly argues that, ‘China has thus far limited its military deployments to China’s own sovereign territory, it Asian maritime littoral, or under international peacekeeping missions in other regions. In other words, the Chinese military has not yet gone global’ (p. 269). The author concludes that, ‘all of China’s involvement in global security will be shaped by its own calculations of national interests (no matter what the inducements and pressure from the international community)’ (p. 306).

In the last chapter, the author sets out to answer questions arising from a globalised China. He questions that ‘What does it mean for the world, and how would the world respond?’ (p. 307). To this question, the author puts forth a very conclusive answer stating that, ‘Since China’s opening to the world in 1978, the world has changed China—and now China is beginning to change the world’ (p. 317). This conclusion clearly highlights the complexity and the magnitude of transformation which the world has witnessed with the rise of China.

One argument which one comes across whenever an attempt to find answers to the ways in which China will interact with the world is its ‘history’. It appears that the Chinese historical experience plays a very important role in determining its current and future policies, both domestically and internationally. In addition to this, it appears that the domestic developments play a very important role in shaping the Chinese policies abroad. In the past few decades, one has also seen that nationalism has been playing a very important role in shaping the Chinese policies.

The book is an important contribution to the existing literature and it will be appreciated equally by students, scholars and policy-makers pursuing the subject.

Gunjan SinghInstitute of Defence Studies and Analyses

New Delhi, Indiagunjsingh@gmail.com

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