THE EMERGENCE OF A FILIPINO AMERICAN ANTI-MARTIAL LAWMOVEMENT, 1972-1974

As 3G

2o IS AA S

• C s H

Master of Arts

In

Asian American Studies

A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree

by

Joemar Nillo Clemente

San Francisco, California

Summer 2015

Copyright by Joem arN illo Clemente

2015

CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read The Emergence o f A Filipino American Anti-Martial Law

Movement, 1972-1974 by Joemar Nillo Clemente, and that in my opinion this work meets

the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for

the degree Master of Arts in Asian American Studies at San Francisco State University.

Allyson Tintiangco-Cubales Professor

Dawn Bohulano Mabalon, Ph.D. Associate Professor

THE EMERGENCE OF A FILIPINO AMERICAN ANTI-MARTIAL LAWMOVEMENT, 1972-1974

Joemar Nillo Clemente San Francisco, California

2015

This thesis is fundamentally interested in the effects of the Anti-Martial Law Movement on Filipino American community life. It examines and unravels the complex series of events that led to the rise and growth of a Filipino American Anti-Martial Law Movement from the proclamation of Martial Law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972 until the emergence of a fragile solidarity among competing movement organizations in early 1974. Focusing on the role of three organizations: the Katipunan Ng Mga Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP); the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP); and the Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), it traces the events in both the U.S. and the Philippines that catalyzed the early formation and growth of the movement. Despite the political differences between these competing Anti-Martial Law organizations, Filipino Americans built institutions that strengthened community bonds, spurred Filipino American engagement in American politics, and engendered a growing awareness of events in the Philippine homeland.

I certify that the abstract is a correct representation of the content of this Master’s Thesis

Dateif/r

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was written under the unwavering support of members of my thesis committee: Allyson Tintiangco-Cubales and Dawn Mabalon. Daniel Phil Gonzales also served as an unofficial, yet indispensible, advisor to this thesis. I am indebted to the numerous individuals who sat for or merely entertained requests to sit for an oral history interview. Although not all of the interviews made it to this final thesis draft, they will be instrumental in developing my future research. I received tremendous support in writing this thesis, but its errors, its shortcomings, and its real (not imagined) provocations are mine alone.

A Sally Casanova Pre-Doctoral Fellowship and a summer fellowship through UC Irvine’s Graduate Division financially supported the production of this thesis. Finally, this work would not have been possible without the countless community activists who lived the Anti-Martial Law Movement, and the numerous scholars who made it possible for this movement to be an important subject of historical inquiry.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures........................................................................................................................viii

List of Appendices................................................................................................................. ix

Chapter 1: Introduction............................................................................................................1

American Colonialism.................................................................................................3

Genesis & Growth of Filipino America......................................................................5

“Independence” & Post-World War II U.S. Neo-Colony...................................... 10

Post-War Filipino America & the Seeds of a Movement...................................... 19

Brief Historiography of the Anti-Martial Law Movement....................................22

Thesis Overview....................................................................................................... 31

Chapter 2: Martial Law & Transpacific Reverberations.....................................................35

Martial Law’s Immediate Aftermath in the Philippines........................................ 43

Mixed Reception Stateside...................................................................................... 49

Youth Reaction......................................................................................................... 51

NCRCLP’s Early Organizational Structure............................................................56

NCRCLP Growth & Continuity..............................................................................58

Chapter 3: Rising Tide of Opposition.................................................................................68

U.S. Press Criticism................................................................................................. 78

Defecting Diplomat.................................................................................................. 80

NCRCLP Transitions to KDP..................................................................................86

Baliao’s “Disengagement” with NCRCLP.............................................................90

Genesis of the Movement for a Free Philippines................................................... 94

July 1973 Referendum............................................................................................. 97

Princeton’s Imee Opposition....................................................................................101

Conclusion................................................................................................................ 110

Chapter 4: Conclusion: A Fleeting Point of Unity..............................................................112

FFF & its December Ultimatum............................................................................. 114

FFF’s “Counter-Intelligence” ..................................................................................117

Coda: A Fleeting Point of Unity..............................................................................122

List of Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 124

References..............................................................................................................................125

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page

1. KDP Anti-Martial Law Spheres of Influence........................................................90

ix

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix

1. List of Acronyms

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Although the story of the Anti-Martial Law Movement is the subject of numerous

scholarly inquiries—particularly since Marcos’s ouster is one of the most well

documented “peaceful” democratic transitions in the last century—the scholarship on the

movement remains rather uneven and as diverse as those who participated in the struggle

to topple Marcos’s dictatorship.1 Studies on the Anti-Martial Law Movement, however,

ignore movement organizing within the United States. Although there is no way for

certain to determine or fully ascertain if Anti-Martial Law activities in the United States

ultimately contributed to regime change in the Philippines, the Filipino American Anti-

Martial Law Movement arguably helped sort out Filipino American relations with their

homeland with under interrogated consequences for today. In the process of organizing

against Martial Law in their homeland, I argue Filipino Americans built community

institutions that strengthened community bonds, despite their political differences, that

spurred Filipino American political engagement in the U.S. and a growing awareness of

events in the Philippines albeit heavily reliant on Marcos’s tight control of information.

In the United States various groups composed of exiled political elites,

professional class and working class immigrants, students, and Filipino Americans born

to earlier immigrants generations worked in conflicting and shifting coalitions to

challenge Marcos’s military dictatorship from the United States. One of the major U.S.-

based groups organizing against Philippine Martial Law included the Movement for a

1 Mark. R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines, (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1995), 68-70.

2

Free Philippines (MFP) led by former Philippine Senator and Constitutional Convention

Delegate Raul S. Manglapus, and other exiled political elites who embodied a moderate

political opposition that attracted a middle class following. MFP’s seemingly progressive

values were contained only by Cold War liberalism’s fear of socialism and its unyielding

fidelity to a free market economy. Another organization included the Friends of the

Filipino People (FFP) composed of mostly intellectuals and academics and non-Filipinos

interested in thwarting any U.S. military intervention in the Philippines.

Radical Leftist organization consisted of the Katipunan ng Mga Demokratikong

Pilipino (KDP), which inherited some of its young membership and Maoist political

predilections from its predecessor organization the Kalayaan (Freedom) Collective, an

underground anti-imperialist study group based in the San Francisco Bay Area. The

Kalayaan Collective was instrumental in forging the first Anti-Martial Law organization

in the United States, the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the

Philippines (NCRCLP), founded the same weekend as Martial Law’s declaration.

NCRCLP attracted a young professional class support base with varying political values

united primarily under the need for reestablishing some semblance of democratic order,

as exhibited by civil liberties, in the Philippines. Marco’s declaration of Martial Law

virtually eviscerated any form civil liberties as a fundamental democratic check on

government authority. The coalitions forged by these competing organizations were

fraught by social, economic, and political differences. In fact, the organizations

3

themselves were internally fractured along various ethnic, generational, class, immigrant

status, linguistic, and political lines among others.

American Colonialism

The United States first came into contact with the Philippines during the Spanish

American War. Entering into an alliance with Filipino revolutionary forces fighting for

national independence, the U.S. would later renege on its promise to grant the Philippines

independence, acquiring the country as part of the peace settlement with Spain driven by

America’s growing desire for colonial markets and resources. Having already established

a government with a sworn President, Congress, and national capital in Malolos, Filipino

nationalists were ready for self-government. American attempts to annex the country

following the Spanish-American War sparked the Philippine-American War—

inaccurately referred to as an “insurrection” in American history books—on February 4,

1899. The war was brutal, and the American strategy responded viciously to the Filipino

nationalist by pioneering “modern” warfare techniques. Americans resorted to burning

entire villages, massacring civilians and placing entire communities into concentration

camps, among other atrocities. Invading American sentries also deployed various torture

methods, including the “water cure,” or waterboarding in today’s parlance.2 Although

there is no way to know for certain, historians today estimate one million Filipinos died

2 Renato Constantino, A History o f the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 241-245.

4

as a result of “fighting from battle, disease, and malnutrition.”3 The brutality exhibited by

colonizing sentries is partly explained by the fact that the American troops sent to the

Philippines were veterans of the Indian wars against Native Americans in the American

West. In fact, the Philippines served as the western terminus of American expansionist

Manifest Destiny.4

Although Filipino resistance dragged on for years, the U.S.’s enactment of the

Philippine Organic Act of 1902 marked the “official” end of the Philippine-American

War, creating provisions for the establishment of a Philippine colonial Assembly upon

the termination of Filipino guerilla activity and the completion of a census.5 Anticipating

the country’s inevitable “independence,” passage of the Jones Act reshuffled the

Philippine legislature into a bicameral body modeled after the U.S. system with the act

functioning as the colony’s Constitution until receiving limited, nominal independence in

1934. Changes of the Philippines’ legislative system mirrored the larger American

mission in the Philippines that articulated a responsibility to uplift its Filipino “brown

brother” through colonial tutelage. Espoused by American President William McKinley,

the United States’ Benevolent Assimilation policy held that the country’s principle

objective in the Philippines was to “win the confidence, respect, and affection of the

3 Dawn Mabalon, Little Manila Is In The Heart: The Making o f the Filipina/o American Community in Stockton, California (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 31.4 Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony, American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919-1941, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 15. Fujita-Rony’s analysis asserts the Philippines became part and parcel of the American West, expanding the region into a broader transpacific frame.5 Vicente L. Rafael, White Love and Other Events in Filipino History, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 24. Rafael notes the Census o f the Philippine Islands was “began in 1903 and published in 1905.”

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inhabitants of the Philippines.”6 As historian Vicente Rafael observes, Benevolent

Assimilation conjoined assimilation with colonization in America’s project in the

Philippines.7 In its official policy to Americanize Filipinos, education became central to

the U.S.’s colonizing mission, and the U.S. introduced a public education system

modeled after its own, curriculum and all, for all Filipino children. Thus, the American

strategy to civilize and educate in order to uplift the Filipino sought to displace

indigenous and Hispanic values for American principles, molding a Filipino colonial

subject.

Genesis & Growth of Filipino America

Filipinos have been present in the Americas for centuries in large part due to the

Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade that occurred between 1565 and 1815. Thus, Filipino

• • 8migration to the Americas emerged as a direct product of Spanish colonialism.

Contemporary Filipino migration to the United States, however, began in the early

1900s.9 The Insular Cases carved out the ambiguous status of Filipinos as “U.S.

Nationals,” granting them entry and exit privileges denied to other Asiatic groups. Class

divisions trisected First-Wave (1906-1934) Filipino migration to the United States.

6 William McKinley, “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation,” Humanities Website, accessed March 10, 2015, http://www.humanitiesweb.org/spa/hcp/ID/23008.7 Rafael, 21.8 Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and Communities in San Diego, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 8-10.9 Because Filipinos entered the country as Americanized colonials and benefited from the status as U.S. Nationals, I use the term migration before World War II to emphasize the colonial relationship between the Philippines and the United States.

6

One stream emerged from members of elite families participating in the

Pensionado program that began in 1903 as a pet project of Philippine Governor-General

William Howard Taft. Though the participants were mostly young men, a small yet

important number of participants in the programs were Filipinas—a significant feat since

the American colonial project prided itself on offering women equal educational

opportunities denied under Spanish colonialism. The program brought the country’s

brightest students to study in America’s great universities as “disciples of democracy”

and as “shining examples of the benevolence and exceptionalism of the American

colonial project.” Although the Pensionado program was intended to train the next

generation of Philippine elites to help automate American colonialism and continue the

U.S. colonial project of civilizing and educating, not all participants returned as intended.

Among those that returned, many did so by the outbreak of World War II.

As Dawn Mabalon observes, the selective nature of the program—in which a

majority of the participants came from wealthy Filipino families—helped consolidate and

solidify the growing patron-client relationship between Filipino elites and the American

colonial government. The program’s prestige coupled with the glowing reports of

America sent back home by Pensionados, and the colonial mentality inculcated among

Filipinos in American colonial schools in the Philippines attracted a second stream of

middle and lower middle class Filipino migrants to the U.S. as “working students.”

Motivated in obtaining an education, particularly an American education for its purported

7

superiority, many working students believed it would be cheaper and more prestigious to

pursue higher education in the United States.10

A majority of Filipinos migrants of the First Wave, however, came from the third

stream, which consisted of recruited agricultural workers from the Ilocos region of

Northern Luzon and the Visayas region of central Philippines recruited to work the fields

of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) and later work in the American

West Coast.11 Filipino status as “U.S. Nationals” made them desirable recruits because of

their legal right to migrate to the U.S. in an era of Asiatic exclusion. Recruiters

specifically targeted illiterate and undereducated Filipino men—qualities recruiters

falsely believed would produce a more docile labor force. Although Filipinas held the

same legal right to migrate, fewer Filipinas did so due to a confluence of factors,

including recruiter preference for single men; Catholic cultural values relegating women

to the domestic sphere; and lack of family resources prioritizing the “migration of

sons.”12 Migrants from the agricultural stream of the First Wave, reflecting their

generation’s single male numerical majority and Ilocano ethnolinguistic composition,

assumed the historical appellation manong—an Ilocano term for “older brother.”

In the U.S., Filipinos built vibrant communities in rural sites like the agricultural

labor campos as well as in Filipinotowns or Little Manilas at major cities throughout the

10 Mabalon 36-39.11 Filipinos in Hawai’i would later undergo secondary migrations to the mainland U.S and settle in the American West Coast, following the 1924 Sugar Strike in which plantations blacklisted Filipino labor union members. (See Mabalon, 52.) At the start of Filipino migration, Hawai’i was not yet a U.S. state but a territory.12 Mabalon, 46-49

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American West, including Seattle, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Stockton among

numerous others.13 In addition to becoming a permanent settlements for a few Filipino

families and their children, Little Manilas became important waystations for Filipinos

traveling the migratory labor circuit along the entire West coast. Within the context of the

Great Depression of 1929; the Great Depression’s subsequent xenophobic backlash; the

Filipino male’s perceived sexual threat to white women; and Filipino penchant for labor

agitation provided the sites of competition that fueled an Anti-Filipino nativist movement

among white workers. Anti-Filipino sentiments erupted into race riots.

The Anti-Filipino nativist movement combined with the colonial Philippine

government’s Independence lobby gave way to the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934,

which granted the Philippines Independence following a Commonwealth period of

transition. Immediately, the Philippines established a Constitutional Convention,

assembling purported “nonpartisans” elected by a mere forty percent of the electorate to

frame a new charter culminating in the 1935 Constitution.14 Because many delegates

were product of the American educational system, unsurprisingly the charter imitated the

American model of Presidential and bicameral legislative systems since delegates

ascribed only to democracy in terms of the American form in which they were

inculcated.15 Interrupted only by the Japanese during World War II who, upon invading

13 See Mabalon; Fujita-Rony; Guevarra; and Linda Espana-Maram, Creating Masculinity In Los Angeles s Little Manila, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).14 Renato Constantino, The Making o f A Filipino: A Story o f Philippine Colonial Politics, (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1969), 103-4.15 Ibid, 135.

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the Philippines, established their own charter under an installed puppet government, the

1935 Charter would stay in force until replaced by the 1973 Constitution used by Marcos

to usurp power.

As a de facto form of Filipino exclusion, Tydings-McDuffie jettisoned the

Philippines as a U.S. colony, rescinding the Filipino colonial status of “U.S. National”

and rebranding them as “aliens ineligible to citizenship” following the trajectory of other

previously excluded Asiatic groups.16 Within the U.S. restrictive immigration regime,

Filipinos were relegated to an annual quota of 50 persons.17 To ameliorate lingering

nativist animosity towards Filipinos, Congress earmarked funds for the Filipino

Repatriation Act the following year in 1935 to facilitate the free transport of Filipinos to

the Philippines on the condition they relinquish their right to return to the U.S. Despite

this free one-way ticket home, however, only 2,165 (far short of the 30 to 40 thousand

predicted) accepted the offer because most Filipinos, rightly so, saw the program as a

deportation measure.18

Tydings-McDuffie created a Philippine Commonwealth that would, within a

decade, transition into an independent country—a transition interrupted by the U.S. entry

16 Ronald Takaki, Strangers From A Different Shore: A History o f Asian Americans, (New York: Back Bay Books, 1989), 331-2.17 Ibid. Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making o f Modern America, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 17. Ngai notes the U.S. restrictive immigration regime began with the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924.18 Mabalon, 144-6. According to Rick Baldoz, The Third Asiatic Invasion: Empire and Migration in Filipino America, 1898-1946, (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 192, Filipinos numerically participated in the program as follows: 157 in 1936; 580 in 1937; 502 in 1938; 392 in 1939; and 425 in 1940. Utilizing data collected from passenger manifests and government documents, Ngai offers the preliminary demographic characteristics of returning Filipinos, but left many questions unanswered about this returning stream of migrants (p.120-148).

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into World War II on December 7, 1941. The Philippines Commonwealth’s semi-colonial

status as an American protectorate made the country a target, and Japan invaded the

Philippines within hours of bombing Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941, annexing the

country into its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese established a

puppet government, recruiting docile members of the Philippine elite as collaborators.

Japanese occupation of the Philippines was brutal. Japanese treatment of Filipinos was

abusive, and Filipino living conditions under occupation was unbearable. The battle to

retake the Philippines caused billions of dollars in damages.

“Independence” & Post-World War II U.S. Neo-Colony

World War II left the Philippines devastated. Because General Douglas

MacArthur—who vowed to “return” upon being forced to flee by the Japanese

invasion—“liberated” the Philippines from Japanese rule, he was able to impose

numerous conditions over the country that favored American interests.19 First of

MacArthur’s actions included the reestablishment of the pre-war Philippine oligarchy,

some of who collaborated with Japanese occupation. Contrary to Filipino public opinion,

MacArthur rashly exonerated Manuel Roxas for any crimes committed as part of the

Japanese-imposed puppet government. Before the war, Roxas served as a prominent

politician of Capiz Province in the Visayas, served as the Philippine Assembly Speaker in

1922, and later elected as Senator in 1941, joining the United States Armed Forces in the

Far East (USAFFE) at the war’s outbreak. After being captured by the Japanese, Roxas

19 Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 151-2.

11

served as a cabinet member, chairing the Economic Planning Board of the Japanese-

sponsored Philippine government.20 When MacArthur captured Roxas in the spring of

1945, Roxas was promptly pardoned, freed and “restored to his rank as general on

MacArthur’s staff.”21 The exceptional treatment Roxas received signaled for many in the

post-war Philippines that the U.S. implicitly favored Roxas over Sergio Osmena. Osmena

took over as president of the Philippine Commonwealth government in exile following

President Manuel Quezon’s death in August 1944. Osmena’s hope for an extended term

in a post-war Philippines was dashed when Roxas and his running mate Elipido Quirino

won the April 1946 election under U.S. support.22 Roxas and Quirino presided over the

transition to an “independent” Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. Roxas, however, did

not serve his full term in office, dying of a heart attack in April 15, 1948, but not before

pardoning other suspected Japanese collaborators months prior.

MacArthur’s de facto pardon of Roxas represented the U.S. meddling endemic of

Philippines’ internal political affairs that began in the early colonial period. Saddled with

the challenges of post-war national security, particularly the genesis of the Cold War with

the USSR, the US government relied on the Philippine oligarchy to ensure the stability

needed for capitalism and democracy to flourish in the “Independent” country.24 In short,

the oligarchs represented an early bulwark against the spread of communism, which

20 Ibid, 159-162; Luis H. Francia, History o f the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos, (New York: Overlook Press, 2010), 190.21 Constantino and Constantino, 171; David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II,(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), 115.22 Francia 191-2.23 Ibid, 192-4; Steinberg, 115.24 Francia, 194.

12

started to grow into a serious regional security threat with rise of communist China and

the division of the Korean peninsula following the Korean War. Americans were likewise

anxious of the remainder of the Hukbalahap or Huk (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon)

in the War’s aftermath.

During World War II, the Huks gained a agricultural class following and operated

as an Anti-Japanese People’s Army, serving as the military wing of the Soviet Stalinist-

oriented Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) that successfully liberated portions of

central Luzon from Japanese rule and established pockets of stability under their direct

control during the war.25 Huk services during the war manifested in the group

establishing an elected foothold with six candidates winning seats in the Philippine House

of Representatives and three seats in the Senate in 1946 under the Democratic Alliance

party and developed a mass base of support in Manila and Central Luzon much to the

growing anxiety of the U.S.26 Roxas, however, refused to seat Democratic Alliance

candidates—accusing them of fraudulently winning their seats—in order to secure the

passage of key pieces of legislation the U.S. demanded as a precondition to Philippine

post-war rehabilitation aid.27

Impelled by U.S. pressure, Philippine President Roxas entered military and

economic agreements that reified a “special relationship” between the Philippines and the

U.S.—a political platitude that virtually rendered the Philippines into a neocolony in

25 Constantino and Constantino, 165; Francia 184; 204.26 Ibid, 184; Francia 201-2.27 Francia 203.

13

exchange for post-war development aid. In May 14, 1947, Roxas pushed for the approval

of the U.S. Bases Agreement—contrary to provisions outlined in the 1935 Philippine

Constitution—that extended the U.S.’s lease of military bases in the Philippines for

ninety-nine years, and ceded control of over 23 bases (16 active and 7 others on held on

reserve).28 The U.S. left a large post-war military footprint in the Philippines, and two of

the larges bases—Subic Naval Base in Olongapo City and Clark Air Force Base in

• • • 90Angeles City—would become major staging grounds for the Vietnam War.

The Philippine Trade Act, or the Bell Trade Act 1946, created a lop-sided trade

agreement benefiting the United States. The deal allowed duty-free export to the U.S. for

eight additional years until 1954 upon which tariffs would be imposed increasing

gradually until 1974. Bell Trade stunted the Philippine manufacturing industry, for it

forbade the country from producing goods that would compete with products made in the

U.S.—restricting the Philippines into a mere market for U.S. goods. The most notorious

portion of the Bell Trade Act was the “parity clause” which stipulated U.S. corporations

and investors held equal right as Filipino citizens in exploiting Philippine natural

resources. Through the Philippine Rehabilitation Act 1946, the U.S. Congress tied post­

war rehabilitation economic aid to the passage of the “parity clause.” Roxas’s

administration resorted to nasty political maneuverings, including unseating elected

members of the Democratic Alliance—who held ties with to the communist party—to

28 Ibid, 198-9.29 •Constantino and Constantino 204-5.30 Ibid, 198.

14

ensure the passage of the Bell Trade Act, which cleared the Philippine congress by

merely one vote.

Because one of the unseated legislators in Roxas’ neocolonial collaboration with

the U.S. included the Hukbalahap’s Commander-in-Chief Luis Taruc, Roxas inflamed

tensions with the highly organized Leftist. After government orders persecuting the

organization’s top leaders, the Huks renewed their armed struggle. Taruc later agreed

under negotiations with Benigno Aquino to an unconditional surrender, which incensed

more radical elements of the organization.31 Aquino came from a wealthy political family

from Tarlac Province, and many viewed him as Ferdinand Marcos’s successor well

before Martial Law’s declaration and subsequent assassination in 1986. Taruc’s surrender

signaled the end of the PKP’s commitment for armed struggle, and it paved the way for

the Jose Maria (JoMa) Sison to reboot a new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)

following a maoist orientation on Mao Zedong’s birthday on December 26, 1968 at a

secret retreat in Pangasinan Province in Northern Luzon.32

Under the Cold War paranoia of the Domino Theory—which stipulated a single

country’s fall to communism would set off a chain reaction in which its neighboring

countries would likewise fall to communism as if in a chain of subsequent set of falling

dominoes—American policy in the “Third World,” including Asia, Southeast Asia, and

the Philippines during the 1950s up to the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s,

31 Francia, 202-3; 229.32 William Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1987, 11; Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party o f the Philippines 1968-1993, (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 25.

15

pursued a tactic of containment that sought inhibit the spread of Communism—even if it

meant meddling in other countries internal affairs. The U.S.’s use of Philippine military

bases as a staging ground during the Vietnam War—and its backing of pro-American,

pro-capitalist Roxas as opposed a much more nationalist Osmena who readily accepted

support from the red-baited Democratic Alliance party—represented only the beginning

of post-war U.S. meddling in the Philippines.33

Succeeding Philippine presidential administrations relied heavily on U.S. aid, and

all but one candidate won the Philippine presidency without American support and

sponsorship. Following President Roxas’ death on April 15, 1948, and his vice president

Quirino’s succession, Ramon Magsaysay, a guerilla during the Japanese occupation,

became the next U.S.-backed Philippine President. Magsaysay was appointed Defense

Secretary under Quirino, and he employed the talents of CIA operative Edward G.

Lansdale, recruited to coordinate Anti-Huk activity under the Joint US Military

Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in August 1950. Lansdale deployed nefarious tricks to beat

the Huk insurgency, including disguised informants, raids, suspension of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus, and media management. Among his most notable strategies included

“psy-war” tactics, where squads employed by Lansdale resorted to exploiting Filipino

folk fears as a psychological weapon. As Constantino observes, “at least in one occasion”

psy-war squads “Killed a Huk, punctured two holes in his neck to simulate a vampire

bite, drained the body of blood and left the corpse to be discovered” by locals. Psy-war

33 Constantino and Constantino, 184.

16

squads would then “plant stories about an aswang”—shape-shifting, vampire-like

creatures—among locals to scare Huk insurgents.34 Lansdale’s expert use of the media

and image-making would wind its way into the political process, helping Magsaysay craft

the “populist” political persona needed to win the 1953 Presidential elections by a

landslide.35 As President, Magsaysay appointed Philippine Senator P. Laurel on a trade

mission to the U.S. in 1954 to renegotiate the Bell Trade Act passed after World War II.

Laurel, negotiating with an American panel headed by James M. Langley devised the

Laurel-Langly Trade Agreement, which formally replaced the Bell Trade Act in 1955.

The new agreement further eroded Philippine economic interests. As Constantino

observes, “Whereas the Bell Trade Act had limited American parity privileges,” the new

agreement “opened the entire range of the economy to domination by U.S.

corporations.”36 As a U.S. neocolony in the Cold War, Magsaysay also willingly entered

the Philippines into the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)—an anti­

communist mutual defense organization. In addition to Thailand, the Philippines was the

only Southeast Asian signatory in the treaty composed mostly of Western countries,

including the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan.37

Magsaysay’s death in a plane crash in Cebu on March 17, 1957 handed the

presidency to his Vice President, Carlos P. Garcia, who failed to win re-election in 1961

because of his nationalist economic policies. For the Americans, the 1961 election

34 Ibid, 235; 239-40.35 Ibid, 259-60.36 Ibid, 291.37 Ibid, 286-7.

17

yielded mixed result. The U.S. succeeded in its principle objective to “discredit”

nationalist “crusader” Claro M. Recto, yet it failed to elect its preferred candidate, Jose

Yulo, to the presidency. Yulo’s running mate, Diosdado Macapagal, however, won the

Vice Presidency and served under Garcia—leaving the Philippines in SEATO. Garcia

pursued a nationalist economic policy, dubbed “Filipino First,” that gave preferential

treatment to Filipino and Filipino businesses, drawing the ire of Chinese and Americans

business interests. As a consequence, Garcia failed to win reelection in 1961, losing to

Macapagal who benefited from U.S. support—receiving campaign funds from the CIA.

As President, Macapagal restored U.S. economic dominance in the Philippines.38

In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the Philippines. Marcos came

from a politically active family in the Ilocos region of Northern Luzon, yet his pedigree

was far from presidential. In 1938, Marcos stood trial for murdering one of his family’s

political rivals, which was overturned on appeal in 1940. His intelligence led him to law

school at the University of the Philippines—the nation’s most prestigious—and he was

eventually elected Congressman representing his district in Ilocos Norte in 1949. He rose

through the ranks, entering the Senate in 1959. Marcos grew rich while in office.

Through corrupt dealings, and Marcos’s foray into precious metal trading—perhaps

connected in the rumored confiscation of the golden Buddha statue; the smelted remains

38 Ibid, 300; 303-4; 308-311.

18

of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s wartime booty from World War II—made

him into a multi-millionaire.39

Ferdinand would meet his wife Imelda Marcos on April 6, 1954 through Imelda’s

cousin Congressman Daniel Z. Romualdez at the Philippine House of Representatives

cafeteria. Their meeting sparked the “famous eleven-day courtship” that became a staple

of their public mythology. In fact, Ferdinand was already in a common-law marriage with

Carmen Ortigas, his live-in fiance who bore four of his children. Imelda came from a

political family from Leyte in the Visayas, and her public image communicated a perfect

balance of “beauty” and “brains.” As a beauty queen, she garnered titles such as the

“Rose of Tacloban” and the runner-up title “Muse of Manila.”40 Like the puppet regimes

before him, Ferdinand Marcos won the presidency through U.S. patronage and brilliant

politicking. First, Marcos chose Fernando Lopez, a member of one of the country’s

richest oligarchical families, as his running mate. The Lopez family held substantial

media holdings, ensuring the Marcos campaign blanket radio and TV coverage

unparalleled by Macapagal’s reelection bid.41 He deployed nationalist jingles and

slogans, and projected a carefully crafted public image and mythology.

Ferdinand and Imelda grew into a formidable power couple. As historian Vicente

Rafael observes, the Marcos’ projected complementary characteristics in their public

engagements, and the spectacle they evoked bordered on pornography—drawing large

39 James Hamilton-Peterson, America’s Boy: the Marcoses and the Philippines, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1998), 146.40 Ibid, 146-9.41 Ibid, 195.

19

public attention and delight.42 Ever the patron of the arts, the Marcos’ commissioned

creative works propagating a mythology depicting them as destined for greatness—

including the production of a book turned movie to add to the election propaganda.

Marcos’ most important electoral arsenal, however, was his important U.S. contacts,

which, as history has shown, played a critical role in the election of the post-war

Philippine presidents. One of Marcos’ most important contacts was Jaime Ferrer—

Edward Lansdale’s “protege”—and many involved in Marcos’ Presidential campaign

were Lansdale’s former employees. Moreover, Marcos received positive American press

coverage that added prestige to his candidacy 43

Post-War Filipino America & the Seeds of a Movement

Filipino immigrants of the Second Wave (1934-1965) were mostly affiliated with

the U.S. military. Following the “watershed” of World War II, the U.S. faced internal—

from domestic pluralist activist groups—and external—driven by American geopolitical

interest—pressures during the Cold War, to reform its racially restrictive immigration

policies, culminating in the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 that abolished national origin quotas

and recodified them into more flexible hemispheric limitations.44 The liberalization of

U.S. Immigration in 1965 opened the door to a Third Wave (1965-Present) Filipino

American immigrants consisting of family members reunified with earlier Filipino

immigrants, and a new Filipino professional class. Participants of the Anti-Martial Law

42 Rafael, 122-161. See book essay “Patronage, Pornography, and Youth: Ideology and Spectatorship During the Early Marcos Years.”43 Hamilton 197.44 Takaki, 257-8; Ngai 258-61.

20

Movement consisted of Filipino elites and middle class professionals and Filipino

Americans bom to First and Second Wave families. Many Filipino elites from wealthy

and politically influential families fled the Philippines either before the imposition of

Martial Law’s travel ban or escaped the country after Martial Law’s proclamation

through backdoor escape routes.45 Other Filipino elites were abroad upon learning

Martial Law was publically declared, opting to stay abroad rather than return to the

Philippines. Some Filipino American elites, thus, managed to stay in the U.S. as political

asylees.

Middle class Filipinos left the Philippines as a result of a confluence of different

factors, including in order to pursuing educational or economic opportunities abroad. Due

to inadequate economic opportunities in the Philippines, some left out of economic

necessity or for purposes of family reunification. Others left because their student or

political activism in the Philippines marked them as targets of the state’s policy of

salvaging—military kidnap, torture, and summary killing 46 Some Filipino immigrants

were politicized at universities in the Philippines that bore the brunt of Marcos’ creeping

fascist and dictatorial policies. Some held affiliations with the Maoist-oriented

45 Backdoor escape routes out of the Philippines need further investigation. One possible route included escaping through Sabah in Northern Borneo, which at the time the Philippines held a strong claim over the territory.46 According to Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise o f the Surveillance State, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 617. In footnote number 12, McCoy notes, “The term salvaging probably derives from Tagalog salbahe, meaning ‘wild’ or ‘savage,’ which may in turn come from the Spanish salvaje, meaning ‘barbarous.’ In an editorial on the ‘summary killings,’ the Philippine Daily Inquirer (6/29/1996), commented, “We call this ‘salvage,’ demonstrating our talent to reinvent the English language.’ During Marcos’s dictatorship, the military reportedly coined the term to mean ‘the elimination of detainees after torture instead of placing them in official detention centers.’

21

Communist Party of the Philippines, (CPP), and they brought their political orientation

with them to the United States. To many immigrants of the post-war middle class stream,

relocation to the U.S. was viewed as merely a temporary necessity and not a permanent

life change—though many eventually chose to stay in the U.S. upon Martial Law’s

formal end in 1986.

Filipino middle class youth and professional immigrants met Filipino American

youth born to earlier immigrant streams largely at institutions of higher learning and

other social circles in the U.S. The political milieu of the 1970s politicized many

members of the Filipino American youth who drew inspiration from the social and

political movements of the time, such as the Anti-War Movement, Civil Rights

Movement, Black Power, and struggles for the establishment of Ethnic Studies at San

Francisco State and the University of California Berkeley. Following the lead of other

ethnic and racial groups, Filipino Americans of both immigrant streams pioneered a

Filipino American identity based movement, which imbricated Anti-Martial Law

Movement organizing. Filipino American activist, like other student activists of color at

the time, increasingly identified with the Third World.47 This Third World orientation

directly linked the struggle for racial justice in the U.S. to the global struggle against,

imperialism, and national liberation, as most evident in the earliest Filipino American

Lefist group the Kalayaan (Freedom) Collective. Filipino Americans, similar to other

Asian American Leftist organizations at the time, drew much of their early analysis and

47 Estella Habal, San Francisco s International Hotel: Mobilizing the Filipino American Community in the Anti-Eviction Movement, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 23-4.

22

framework from Maoist China derived through its Philippine interlocutors or other

domestic American activist groups.

Brief Historiography of the Anti-Martial Law Movement

Much of the existing literature on the Anti-Martial Law Movement focuses,

rightly so, on events in the Philippines with many of these works written by political

scientists and social scientists. Mark R. Thompson’s The Anti-Marcos Struggle

interrogates the personalistic leadership style deployed by Marcos to explain political

developments throughout the regime’s tenure. Thompson’s work sheds important insight

into shifts in regime organization throughout the Martial Law period and tactical shifts by

Anti-Marcos forces.48 Another political scientist, Robert L. Youngblood argues that the

economic developmental strategies of Marcos’ regime clashed with the contemporaneous

social justice orientation of the Philippine Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches.

These conflicting interests consecrated antagonistic relations that ultimately led to

Church opposition to Marcos, accelerating the regime’s downfall.49 David C. Kang offers

a comparative study of the Philippines and South Korea where he argues Philippine

policy decision were driven by political rather than economic motivations, hampering

government bureaucracies from charting the best fiscal course. Kang’s work helps to

explain why two nations with similar histories with imperialism and experiments with

48 See Thompson.49 Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 6-1.

23

dictatorship led to divergent results.50 Kang’s study explains the ultimate economic

conditions that motivated the citizenry’s material motivations for toppling Marcos.

Numerous other works examine the contributions of Martial Law and the Anti-Martial

Law Movement to the broader cultural (literary and artistic) aesthetic expressions of the

Philippines.51 Other works also examine Anti-Martial Law Leftist organizations in the

Philippines and its leaders.

In the past few decades, literature on the Filipino American Anti-Martial Law

Movement has steadily grown into a substantial corpus. Dominated by movement

insiders, however, much of this intellectual work has seen accepted assertions not yet

vetted by a historian’s critical evaluation. Although insider perspectives of the Anti-

Martial Law Movement yield valuable insight, at times they can inadvertently reify

personal lived animosities. Moreover, intellectual works from movement insiders all too

often omit the necessary historical context in order to fully understand movement events,

inhibiting a deeper understanding of the movement. As such, this thesis, mindful of and

50 David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-12.51 Select works include: Gerald Lico, Edifice Complex: Power, Myth, and Marcos State Architecture, (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila Press, 2003); Alice G. Guillermo, Protest: Revolutionary Art in the Philippines, 1970-1990, (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2005).52 Select works include: Jose Maria Sision and Ninotchka Rosea, At Home in the World: Portrait o f a Revolution (Greensboro, NC: Open Hand Publishing, 2004); Militant But Groovy: Stories ofSamahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan, eds. Soliman M. Santos Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos, (Manila, Philippines: Anvil, 2008); Tibak Rising: Activism in the Days o f Martial Law, ed. Ferdinand C. Llanes, (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: T’bak Inc. and Anvil Publishing Inc, 2012); Jim Richardson, Komunista: The Genesis o f the Philippine Communist Party 1902-1935, (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University,2011); Ken Fuller, A Movement Divided: Philippine Communism, 1957-1986, (Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippine Press, 2011); Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party o f the Philippines 1968-1993, (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press 2001); The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986, ed. Patricio N. Abinales, (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1996).

24

indebted to the valuable historical testimonies and insights from those who lived the

movement, humbly unravels and order the series of events conducted by some of the

movement’s key players within their historical context.

To date, Jose V. Fuentecilla’s recent monograph, Fighting From A Distance: How

Filipino Exiles Helped Topple A Dictator, offers the most complete work on the history

of the U.S.-based Anti-Martial Law Movement. Fuentecilla’s work, though path breaking

as the first book-length monograph on the U.S. based Anti-Martial Law Movement, is

limited to the experiences of members to the Movement for a Free Philippines, and in

many ways reads like an institutional history of MFP. In fact, Fuentecilla centers the

MFP and the organization’s major figures within his historical narrative. He even relies

heavily, if not almost exclusively on MFP historical sources, causing him to postdate the

start of the Anti-Martial Movement by about an entire year. Fuentecilla notes MFP’s

founding, September 22, 1973 as the date in which “the first U.S.-based resistance to

Philippine martial law was formally organized” despite the fact that Leftist activists had

already established Anti-Martial Law organizations the same weekend as Martial Law’s

declaration.53 To his credit, Fuentecilla does attempts to incorporate other organizations

including the KDP and FFF in his study even if only in passing and albeit with minor

inaccuracies.54

53 Jose V. Fuentecilla, Fighting From A Distance: How Filipino Exiles Toppled A Dictator, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013.54 Fuentecilla discusses Anti-Martial Law organizations in Chapter 6: “Early Organizing: Conflicting Opposition Groups” on pages 32-43. Notably, he incorrectly states on p.49 that Walden Bello “received his Ph.D. in 1975 from Cornell University in New York.” According to Bello’s website, however, “Bello

25

Owing much to the Leftist orientation of Asian American Studies, the

contributions of Leftist organizations in the Anti-Martial Law Movement received much

more scholarly attention. Madge Bello and Vincent Reyes offered among the first

reflective articles on the U.S.-based opposition in the wake of Marcos’s ouster in 1986.

As an early reflection, Bello and Reyes’ 1995 reflection appear to fall into the trap of

other works that seek to diminish the significance of a U.S.-based opposition. In

recounting the various activities and campaigns coordinated by the U.S.-based Anti-

Martial law opposition groups, they lament that “there is no definite yardstick which can

be used to measure the effectiveness of the U.S.-based opposition,” noting “the decisive

factors leading to Marcos’ overthrow were the events in the Philippines itself.” To Bello

and Reyes, the main contribution of the U.S.-based opposition was “to keep the light of

resistance’ aflame especially in the early years of martial law”—an important factor

given the complete decimation of aboveground Philippine Martial Law opposition in the

early years.55 Many works that followed, reflecting the inadvertent personal biases of

their authors, examine the contribution of the U.S.-based resistance in helping to forge a

Filipino American activist identity and political consciousness. In doing so, many of

these accounts were highly personal accounts that reflect the interplay between the

author’s life and the larger Anti-Martial Law Movement to which they belonged.

obtained his PhD in sociology from Princeton University in the US in 1975...”; “About Walden,” Professor Walden Bello’s Website, accessed March 23, 2015, http://www.waldenbello.org/about-walden/.55 Madge Bello and Vincent Reyes, “Filipino Americans and the Marcos Overthrow: The Transformation of Political Consciousness,” Amerasia Journal 13, no. 1 (1986): 73-83.

26

Personal accounts of the Anti-Martial Law Movement by activists amount to

historical testimonies, and they constitute an important genre within the historiography of

the U.S.-based Anti-Martial Law Movement. Gil Mangaoang was the first to offer a

personal reflective history of the Leftist Anti-Martial law organizations from his

perspective a “Gay Filipino American Activist.”56 In his essay, Mangaoang traces his

own personal development as a gay Filipino activist, and explains how his involvement in

Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Martial Law Movements shaped his life’s trajectory. One of

Mangaoang’s comrades in the KDP, Trinity Ordona, would later take up the similar task

of evaluating the contributions of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) members to the

KDP’s organizational culture. Ordona asserts that KDP served as a “haven for Filipino

American gays” in the 1970s largely because homophobia ran rampant not just in the

larger U.S. society, but also among Asian American Leftist groups. A significant portion

of the KDP’s members identified as LGB. Many LGB members not only helped found

the organization, but also served in positions of leadership. The organization’s LGB-

friendly attitudes, however, spurred rumors that everyone in the organization was gay

among their contemporaries and youth activist counterparts.57

56 Gil Mangaoang, “From the 1970s to the 1990s: Perspective of a Gay Filipino American Activist,” Amerasia 20 (1994): 33-44. Mangaoang’s article was later reprinted in Asian American Sexualities: Dimensions o f the Gay and Lesbian Experience, ed. Russell Leong (New York: Routledge, 1996), 101-111.57 Trinity A. Ordona, “Coming Out Together: An Ethnohistory of the Asian and Pacific Islander Queer Women’s and Transgender People’s Movement of San Francisco,” (PhD diss., University of California Santa Cruz, 2000), 93-94. A refined chapter of Ordona’s dissertation chapter was later published as “Asian Lesbians in San Francisco Struggles to Create a Safe Space, 1970-1980s,” in Asian / Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, eds. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 319-334.

27

Filipina American women also published accounts of their experiences as part of

Leftist Anti-Martial organizations. Helen Toribio’s classic Amerasia article “We are

revolution” offered among the first scholarly insights into the KDP. Lifting the title from

Carlos Bulosan’s socialist poem with the same name, Toribio’s article traced the history

of the KDP from its origins in the Santa Cruz Mountains by youth activists, including an

overview of the group’s important activities through to its formal dissolution in 1986.58

Estella Habal published her own account of how she stumbled into the life of Filipino

American “revolutionary” activism first through the United Mexican American Students

(UMAS—a precursor to MECha), and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement before joining

the Kalayaan Collective—a precursor to the KDP.59 A troika of Filipina American

women activists in the Anti-Martial Law Movement published their experiences in Asian

Americans: The Movement and the Moment anthology.60 Prosy Abarquez-Delacruz and

Carol Ojeda-Kimbrough’s activism experiences with student activism before Martial

Law’s declaration, for instance, reflected the experiences of many Filipino students

leaving the country for their own safety and economic mobility.61 In the same anthology,

58 Helen Toribio, “We Are Revolution: A Reflective History of the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP),” Amerasia Journal 24, no. 2 (1998): 155-177.Toribio expanded and republished her article as “Dare to Struggle: the KDP and Filipino American Politics,” Legacy to Liberation: Politics & Culture o f Revolutionary Asian/Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (Edinburgh: AL Press, 2000), 31-46.59 Estella Habal, “How I Became A Revolutionary,” in Legacy to Liberation (See note 58). Habal incorporates part of her experiences in her monograph San Francisco’s International Hotel: Mobilizing the Filipino American Community in the Anti-Eviction Movement, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007).60 Cecile Caguingin Ochoa, “Touching the Fire: An Introduction to Three Essays from Filipino American Activists,” in Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment, (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 2001), 49-55.61 Prosy Abarquez-Delacruz, “Holding a Pigeon In My Hand: How Community Organizing Succeeds or Falters,” Asian Americans, (See note 60), 57-62; Carol Ojeda-Kimbrough, “The Chosen Road,” Asian Americans, (See note 60), 64-73.

28

Rose Ibanez shares the experiences that politicized her as a participant in San Diego State

University’s Filipino American student organizations and as a member of the KDP.

Other relevant personal historical accounts also appeared beyond the purview of

academic publishing. Writing for a more general audience, former KDP member

Abraham Ignacio Jr. shared his memories in Maganda Magazine, contextualizing the

KDP to a new generation of Filipino American.63 Former KDP member Florante Ibanez

recalls his experiences with the Filipino People’s Far West Convention, which nurtured

the Filipino American identity movement that overlapped and buttressed the U.S. Anti-

Martial Law Movement.64 Thomas Churchill’s Triumph over Marcos examines the

Marcos regime’s June 1981 assassination of Gene Viernes and Silme Domingo—two

labor union organizers in Seattle who were members of the KDP. The limitation in

Churchill’s work on the study of history, however, is its delivery as a piece of dramatized

historical fiction as opposed to a traditional history monograph.65 Ligaya Rene

Domingo’s PhD Dissertation Building A Movement: Filipino American Union and

Community Organizing in Seattle in the 1970s localizes the KDP’s simultaneous

attentiveness to local issues, focusing on the KDP’s Seattle and the Pacific Northwest

62 Rose Ibanez, “Growing Up in America as a Young Filipina American during the Anti-Martial Law and Student Movement in the United States,” Asian Americans, (See note 60), 75-77.63 Abraham Flores Ignacio Jr., “Makibaka Huwag Matakot: A History of the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino,” Maganda Magazine, 1994, http://www.flashpoint-design.net/images/KDP- Ignacio.pdf.6 Florante Peter Ibanez, “The Phenomena and the Politics of the Filipino People’s Far West Convention: 1970’s-1980’s,” Filipino American Library, December 8, 2003, http://filipinoamericanlibrary.com/Images/ FWC.pdf.65 Thomas Churchill, Triumph Over Marcos: A Story based on the lives o f Gene Viernes & Silme Domingo, (Seattle: Open Hand Publishing Inc, 1995).

29

union work.66 Catherine Choy examines the victories of KDP organizing during the

Filipina Narciso and Leonora Perez case, two Filipina immigrant nurses in Ann Arbor,

Michigan wrongfully accused of murder.

A more rigorous synthesis of the historical context and intergroup dynamics of the

various Anti-Martial Law organizations has been a growing trend in the literature.

Former member of the Friends of the Filipino People, Barbara Gaerlan asserted in her

article that the Anti-Martial Law Movement “ultimately proved effective in influencing

American public opinion and eventually U.S. government policy towards the Marcos

regime,” noting the movement’s importance as “the first time a U.S.” anti-imperialist

movement held a “significant, even dominant, [number of] participant[s that came] from

a population of recent immigrants to the United States—Filipinos and Filipino

Americans.” Gaerland’s work was the first to rigorously situate the intergroup

competition among the various Anti-Martial Law organizations.68 Others would follow

Gaerland’s lead, including Benito M. Vergara Jr.’s comparative study of the KDP and

MFP by tracing their fundamental ideological differences.69 Daryl Joji Maeda situates the

66 Ligaya Rene Domingo, “Building a Movement: Filipino American Union and Community Organizing in Seattle in the 1970s,” (PhD diss,, University of California Berkeley, 2010).67 Catherine Ceniza Choy, Empire o f Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 139-145.68 Barbara S. Gaerlan, “The Movement in the United States to Oppose Martial Law in the Philippines, 1972-1991: An Overview,” Pilipinas: A Journal o f Philippine Studies 33 (1999): 75-89.69 Benito M. Vergara Jr., “Looking Back: Indifference, Responsibility, and the Anti-Marcos Movement in the United States,” Pinoy Capital: The Filipino Nation in Daily City, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 109-133. Vergara’s work incorrectly understands KDP as the “Kilusang Demokratikong Pilipino (Filipino Democratic Movement)” noted on page 109 of his monograph instead of the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino. Another example of scholarship on Anti-Martial Law inter-organizational dynamics includes Kim Geron et al, “Asian Pacific Americans’ Social Movements and Interest Groups,” Political Science and Politics 34, no.3 (2001): 619-624.

30

politics of the KDP alongside many of the KDP’s contemporary organizations in his

• • 70seemingly comprehensive examination of the Asian American Movement.

Although seen in its time as a movement in exile, the U.S. Anti-Martial Law

organization was transnational from the outset. This distinction has grown considerably

in the recent literature, mirroring the larger transnational turn in the history discipline.

Historian Catherine Ceniza Choy pioneered this transnational turn with her article as the

first to consciously use the term “transnational,” as she sought to deconstruct the “false”

dichotomous approach to Filipino social movements. In Choy’s estimation, the contained

“nation-based” histories marginalize “women’s stories and [their] transnational

commitments,” utilizing the Anti-Martial Law Movement as a case study.71 Benito

Vergara also published a chapter in Pinoy Capital: The Filipino Nation in Daily City

examining the transnational impact of The Philippine News, which was instrumental in

informing the Filipino American community about conditions under Philippine Martial

Law and news about the Filipino American community.72 Finally, Augusto Espiritu’s

Journeys o f Discovery article synthesized the rigorous transnational linkages between the

KDP and its Philippine counterpart, incorporating the biographies of key organizational

leaders.73

70 Daryl Joji Maeda, Rethinking the Asian American Movement, (New York: Routledge, 2012).71 Catherine Ceniza Choy, “Towards Trans-Pacific Social Justice: Women and Protest in Filipino American History,” Journal o f Asian American Studies 8, no. 3 (2005): 293-307.72 Vergara, “Spreading the News: Newspapers and Transnational Belonging,” (See note 56), 80-108.73 Augusto Espiritu, “Journeys of Discovery and Difference,” In The Transnational Politics o f Asian Americans, ed. Christina Collet and Pei-Te Lien (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009), 38-55.

31

Thesis Overview

This thesis is fundamentally interested in the effects of the Anti-Martial Law

Movement on Filipino American community life. Guided by the question: “How did the

Filipino American Anti-Martial Law Movement emerge?”, it ventures an answer by

unraveling the complex series of events from the proclamation of Martial Law in the

Philippines in September 21, 1972 until the consolidation of a fragile solidarity among

competing movement organizations in early 1974. Because much of the literature on the

U.S.-based opposition has consisted of broad overviews and personal reflective histories,

I argue a more rigorous timeline-driven history of Martial Law is very much needed to

help a new generation of Filipino Americans fully understand the intricate historical

context of the Anti-Martial Law Movement. I start at the beginning of the movement,

believing a strict timeline-driven thesis is instrumental to tracing the official genesis of

specific movement frames and phenomena that, thus far, has been merely approximated

in the current literature and not yet rigorously historicized. Invested in the transpacific

conversations the Martial Law Movement engendered, this thesis shuttles spatially

between developments in the Philippines and their corresponding repercussions in the

U.S. Although the U.S. Anti-Martial Law opposition often took a reactionary posture to

events in the Philippines, events in the U.S. likewise informed Marcos’s governing tactics

and his attempts to discredit the Anti-Martial Law Movement.

“Transpacific Reverberations” (Chapter 2) tracks the genesis of the Martial Law

regime, illustrating the context of its declaration and its immediate after effects both in

32

the Philippines and the United States. Despite this transnational approach, however, my

ultimate concern lies with historicizing the effects of the Anti-Martial Law Movement on

Filipino American social and political life and identity. My goal with the chapter was to

paint a dynamic picture of events in the Philippines to illustrate Martial Law’s unjust

governance and to contextualize the reasons many Filipinos opposed Martial Law’s

practice. Because my focus is on the movement’s impact on the Filipino American

community, I found it necessary to lean heavily on Filipino American sources, mostly

drawn from the mainstream Anti-Martial Law Movement publication of the Philippine

News and the less mainstream, youth-published Leftist-oriented Kalayaan International

and Ang Katipunan newspapers along with select oral history interviews. This deliberate

limitation to Filipino American sources gives us an important window into the ways in

which Filipino Americans were limited in their knowledge and understanding of Martial

Law, and the relative success of the Marcos’ regime in controlling discourse and criticism

of its rule.

Tracking the complex events that contextualize Marcos’ declaration of Martial

Law, which later named ang Bagong Lipunan or the New Society, Chapter 2 also traces

corresponding events in the U.S. that laid the foundation of future Anti-Martial Law

work. The immediate decimation of public dissent in the Philippines is contrasted to a

much more hopeful assembly of a small and dedicated, yet seemingly rushed, U.S.-based

opposition the same weekend as Martial Law’s declaration under the aegis of the

National Committee for the Restoration for Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP).

33

Founded by the underground San Francisco Bay Area-based anti-imperialist Kalayaan

Collective, NCRCLP coordinated much of the Anti-Martial Law activity for the next few

months. Their tactics, unfortunately, were initially limited to mass action demonstrations

and informational campaigns. Nevertheless, NCRCLP managed to help educate and

politicize members of the Filipino American community.

Consulate General Ruperto Baliao’s defection from the Philippine’s Los Angeles

Consulate (discussed in Chapter 3) revealed Philippine state secrets that sent shockwaves

throughout the Filipino American community. News of Baliao’s defection electrified an

already organized Filipino American Left against Martial Law and catalyzed the

formation of a moderate, mainstream Anti-Martial Law organization in the U.S., the

Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP) led by Raul Mangalpus. Baliao’s

“disengagement” with NCRCLP, and NCRCLP’s eventual redbaiting, added extra

incentives for members to abandon the organization for the newly formed Katipunan Ng

Mga Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP). Following the tone of the existing literature, the

chapter attempts to situate the competing organizations by demarcating their political

views and illustrating their organizational tactics. The emphasis of the political

differences among these organizations, though important in order to understanding the

movement as a whole, seeks not to suggest that opposition to Marcos’ Martial Law

regime occurred solely within the purview of organizational work—these organizations

are by no means the “natural container” of the Anti-Martial Law Movement. Despite this

fact, understanding competing organizations in relation to each other and their political

34

predilections yields a basic understanding of the key players in the movement, and the

ways in which conflicting political points of view pushed the movement forward into

different sites of contestation. Baliao’s defection served as the beginning of a rising

realization among some Filipino Americans that Martial Law produced deleterious

conditions in the Philippines.

This study concludes with the December 30, 1973 ultimatum issued by the

Filipino Freedom Fighters (detailed in Chapter 4), which threatened Marcos with a coup

d’etat unless he held “free and fair” elections. Within the melee, Filipinos deployed

humor as a grasp for agency. Previously competing Anti-Martial Law organizations set

aside their differences in an unprecedented show of unity against Marcos’s Martial Law

regime. This fractured unity, though fleeting, marked a shift in the Anti-Martial Law

Movement by birthing a much more collaborative posture for the movement decade to

follow.

35

CHAPTER 2:

MARTIAL LAW & TRANSPACIFIC REVERBERATIONS:

SEPTEMBER 21 - DECEMBER 31,1972

Ferdinand Marcos attempted to extend his term in office many times. Initially, he

sought to do so through legal means. As the first Philippine president to break with the

one-term convention, Marcos about neared the end of his Constitutionally permissible

two, four-year term limits. In addition to re-election, in which Marcos spent a hefty

amount of funds, mostly raided from the public treasury, he attempted to expand his

tenure through charter change in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, or Con-Con.

Originally proposed by oppositionists who later opposed it after Marcos jumped at the

idea, the Con-Con was another legal attempt. The convention was assembled to reform or

"update" the purportedly outmoded 1935 Philippine Commonwealth Constitution.74

Marcos jumped at the idea of charter change (what some today would call Cha-Cha or

Charter Change) particularly because oppositionists, and later Marcos, preferred a shift to

a parliamentary system. The shift to a parliamentary system would more embolden the

Executive to initiate necessary policy "reforms," but more importantly it would have

accord the executive with a potentially longer and less defined term of office with no

maximum term limit, and the ability to control when to call for new elections.

By early September 1972, however, the Con-Con moved in unexpected directions

beyond those desired by Marcos. For instance, Con-Con delegates were favoring a split-

74 Thompson, 60; discussed in footnote 61.

36

executive model, which divided the duties of the executive into two positions with

significantly limited terms of office.75 Moreover, Con-Con delegates were reconsidering

7earlier propositions to ban delegates from running in future elections. Because the Con-

Con process was mired with enormous corruption and bribery, it comes as no surprise

that future elections bans were used as political weapons among feuding political

dynasties. As such, political factions formed among Con-Con delegates. Alarmed over

Marcos’ newfound enthusiasm for the change, oppositionist delegates to the Convention

initiated a provision disqualifying Marcos or Imelda from running for Prime Minister

under the new constitution. Upon successfully defeating the proposed ban, the pro-

Marcos bloc of delegates targeted Diosado Macapagal, attempting to depose him as Con-

Con President in retaliation.77 Marcos’s declaration of Martial Law completely upended

the unencumbered political debate at the Con-Con itself.

Although even Philippine government historians are unsure when exactly

Ferdinand Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081 proclaiming a state of emergency in the

Philippines, the document was dated Thursday, September 21, 1972.78 The order to

implement Martial Law was to occur upon Marcos’ official “clearance,” which he

75 Sol L. Villa, “C-C Also votes for No Reelection: 8-year term for Presidency,” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1972, 9.76 Sol L. Villa, “Delegates’ Ban Revived In Convention,” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1973, 10.77 “Oust-DM Move May Backfire on FM Men,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1973, 9; “Convention Shelves Ban-FM Bid Anew,” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1973, 10; “Ban-FM Proposal Defeated in Convention,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1972, 9.78 “Declaration of Martial Law: The Anniversary of the Declaration of Martial Law Is on September 23 (NOT September 21),” Official Gazette o f the Republic o f the Philippines, accessed March 15, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/featured/declaration-of-martial-law/. Marcos harbored an occult-like affinity for the number 7 and the many numbers divisible by it.

37

granted at 9:00pm September 22 in the aftermath of the purported assassination attempt

against Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s motorcade had allegedly been

ambushed driving through the Wack-Wack subdivision in Mandaluyong City. By

September 23,1972, in a nationally televised address broadcast at 7:15pm Marcos

officially announced the entire Philippines had been placed under Martial Law.79

The declaration came as a last ditch effort by Marcos to remain in power,

particularly as he began approaching the end of his last term in office. Marcos justified

his draconian actions as an act of national self-preservation by safeguarding the country

from a series of security threats perceived to come from radical Leftist communist

guerrillas; a Muslim separatist movement in Mindanao; and mass civic unrest. Bombs

targeting government, civilian, and infrastructure sites wracked nerves throughout the

greater Manila region. In addition to the bombings, a rash of kidnappings targeting

members of Tsinoy, or Chinoy (Filipino-Chinese) families also heightened civilian

anxiety, pushing some into “a state of shock.”

Fear mongering caused heightened anxiety over a potential coup d’etat. Fear of

Communist was particularly acute with the world in the midst of a Cold War and the

regional instability caused by the near-by Vietnam War. A Philippine House of

Representatives Defense Committee, for instance, concluded in early September 1972

that the “communist threat” in the country was “real and alarming” based on “documents

79 “President’s address to the nation after imposing martial law,” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972, 1-11.

38

and testimonies presented” to the committee supplied by Secretary of Defense Juan

Ponce Enrile and other witnesses. Enrile also reported “two top ranking officers of the

communist New People’s Army [NPA] have slipped into greater Manila area to oversee

NPA mission of liquidation of top government officials and acts of sabotage and public

disturbances.”80 Accompanying the two-ranking officers, Enrile professed, included a

“15-man group of newly-trained NPA members.”81 During the same week, the growing

tensions between native Muslims and Christian settler colonist deteriorated further in

Mindanao, so much so that violence “flared” up in four of the island’s provinces.

Fighting was so intense a group of neighboring Sulu leaders feared the conflict would

spill over into their own territory.82 Activist of every political stripe had been critical of

Marcos’ administration since the late 60s. College-age youth pioneered a vibrant youth

movement. Just a few years prior, the First Quarter Storm 1970 and the Diliman

Commune in 1971 politicized an entire generation.

Despite the growing threat to national security, the previous week Marcos outright

refused to “enlist foreign troops” despite communist rebels purportedly receiving

“outside help.” In fact, he even allayed Congressional fears, assuring “Congress that he

would first consult with them before making any decision on martial law.”84 Just the

80 Lee Lescaze, “The Muslim Problem—From Abroad,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1973, 12.; “Violence Flares Up in 4 South Provinces,” Philippine News, September 21-27, 1972, 9.81 “House Defense Committee Finds Red Threat Real,” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1972, 12; “Communist Party Factions’ Politburo Members Named,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1972, 13.82 “Christian-Muslim Feud: Spillover Into Sulu Feared,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1973, 12.83 “Despite Infiltration: No Foreign Troops Vs. RP Reds—FM,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1972, 9.84 “FM Allays Fears on Martial Law,” Philippine News, September 21-27, 1972, 1-16.

39

week prior, Enrile made the same promise, insisting Martial Law appeared “remote”

despite the uptick in “subversive activities.”85 Leading Liberal Party opposition leader,

Senator Benigno S. Aquino, in a privileged speech before the Philippine Senate on

September 13, 1972—-just days before Martial Law’s implementation—exposed details

of Oplan Sagittarius. The plan, leaked to him by senior administration officials, allegedly

outlined Marcos’s “execution plan” to place the Greater Manila region under Philippine

Constabulary control as a precursor to nation-wide Martial Law. Aquino cautioned the

“increase sabotage activities and liquidation plans by urban guerillas operating” in the

region would be cited as the main justification for imposing Martial Law. Using the

codename Sagittarius, a zodiac symbol that began November 22, Aquino speculated the

plot could potentially coincide with the nation’s elections held the upcoming November,oz:

asserting the plan existed years prior to its discovery.

As Marcos’ leading opposition, Aquino’s warnings were perhaps drowned out by

other events occurring during the period. Marcos responded to Aquino’s warning by

discrediting him, alleging Aquino and members of the Liberal Party were in cahoots with

Communists, citing a September 7,1972 meeting at the private Forbes Park subdivision

between Liberal Party Leaders and Communist Party of the Philippines Chairman Jose

85 Vincent Maliwanag, “Enrile Insists Martial Law Still Remote,” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1972, 9.86 Alberto M. Alfaro, “Prelude to Martial Law?: Aquino Bares Plan to Put Greater Manila Under PC,” Philippine News, September 21-22, 1972, 9.

40

Maria Sison to forge a “common plan of propaganda logistics as well as armed

support”—a charge vehemently denied by Aquino and other Liberal Party leaders.

Marcos's announcement of Martial Law by Presidential Decree 1081 on

September 23 came as no surprise to many among the skeptical Left, for Marcos's

declaration only rationalized his increasingly totalitarian practices. About a year prior to

his Martial Law declaration on August 21, 1971, an unknown assailant lobbed a grenade

at Marcos’s leading opposition group, the Liberal Party, at a political rally at Plaza

Miranda adjacent to Quiapo Church in Manila, which served as the center of the city’s

political life. In the wake of the attack, Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus,

which he later rescinded after a groundswell of public outcry. Both the bombing and the

suspension of basic check on unwarranted government detention served as a beta test for

his future Martial Law regime. Nearly a year after Plaza Miranda bombing, many

questions remained about the incident, and Manila Chronicle even editorialized criticism

about the national leadership’s lack of political will to fully probe the incident. The

government’s lack of political will to properly investigate the Plaza Miranda incident led

to a longer, much more intensified series of bombings that began in March 15, 1972 and

climaxed with bombings in Manila in late August and September 1972, leading up to

Martial Law’s formal implementation. The bombings targeted prominent government

sites, civilian spaces, public infrastructure, and many activists blamed Marcos’

administration for orchestrating the bombings.

87 “FM says liberals meeting with Reds,” Philippine News, September 21 -27, 1972, 9 .; “Roxas, Aquino answer Marcos,” Philippine News, September 21-27,1972, 10.

87

41

Although historians have yet to find irrefutable evidence that Marcos orchestrated

the series of bombings that rocked Manila leading up to the proclamation of Martial Law,

many at the time attributed the series of bombings to Marcos’ administration. In fact,

many believed that his administration orchestrated numerous terrorist plots leading up to

Martial Law, for he had the most to gain and the most to avenge. One of the final targets

of the series of bombings was Quezon City Hall—the meeting site of the Con-Con—on

Monday September 18, 1972. It perhaps served as a retort to the Con-Con’s consideration

• • • • • * 8 8 of banning him from participating in future Prime Ministerial and Presidential election.

The following Wednesday, Con-Con delegates fired back, with 83 members signing a

declaration, denouncing the bombings and outside attempts to “remove the Convention

from the domain of a free search for reforms beneficent to the people and place it instead

OQunder the control and will of Malacanang.”

Other organizations, particularly those among the Philippine Left, also suspected

Marcos’ orchestration of terrorist plots seeking to plunge the country into Martial Law.

Thousands affiliated with the Movement for A Democratic Philippines, for instance,

demonstrated at Plaza Miranda braving rain and the hostile political climate. The

Communist Party of the Philippines alleged in its Ang Bayan editorial that Marcos and

the U.S. “stage[d] a series of bombings and shootouts” to “slander the CPP, the New

People’s Army and national democratic organizations” in order to create “a situation to

88 “Constitutional Convention site bombed; 14 injured,” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972, 9.89 “83 delegates sign declaration on bombing,” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 9.

42

justify the declaration of Martial Law .” 90 Offering a more judicious line of reasoning,

retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes opined “No balanced mind can conceive that the

subversives would be idiotic enough to announce an attack on Manila with a series of

isolated bomb explosions, by way of prelude to the actual drama. Nor should serious

revolutionist engage in bombings—of all places—comfort rooms [or restrooms], where

people are not prone to congregate...” casting serious doubt that the Manila bombings

were the work of serious national security threats.91

Marcos increased the size of the nation’s military in the name of national security

by capitalizing on the fear of an advancing National People's Army (NPA) communist

insurgency; a growing Muslim separatist movement in Mindanao, and disenchanted

youth, labor, and pastoral activists. The budget approved right before Marcos declared

Martial Law, for instance, registered a 5.15-Billion-Peso budget—the largest budget in

the country’s history. Among the many expenses, Marcos allocated one Billion Pesos to

the military budget alone— which included a 200 million Peso increase from the

previous fiscal year. The military benefited from the largest budget increase of any other

government priority for the fiscal year.92 This increasing militarization paved the way for

Marcos to declare Martial Law, according him the ability to solidify his authority over a

resistive citizenry.

90 “U.S.-FM Bombing Plot Charged,” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1973, 12.91 “Word war on bombings, martial law decried,” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972, 12.92 Francisco De Leon, “Marcos Okays P5.15-B Budget,” Philippine News, September 21, 1972,10; Alberto Alfaro, “P5.1-Billion Budget Okayed,” August 17-23,1972, 9.

43

Martial Law’s Immediate Aftermath in the Philippines

In the wake of September 22, 1972 implementation of Martial Law, the

government immediately imprisoned persons considered hostile to national security.

Under General Order No. 2 issued the same day as Martial Law’s implementation,

Marcos directed Defense Secretary Enrile and his personnel to arrest and detain

approximately 100 duly named individuals until otherwise ordered by the President.

Individuals named were accused to having violated one of the following: crimes of

insurrection or rebellion; crimes against the fundamental law of the State; crimes against

public order; crimes involving usurpation of authority, title, improper use of name,

uniform and insignia; crimes committed under public officers; crimes violating

Presidential decree or order.

Those captured in the national “dragnet” included “top political leaders of the

opposition Liberal Party; members of Congress; provincial governors; prominent

members of the Philippine press; and suspected subversives and radicals.” The top

political detainee included Benigno S. Aquino who—in addition to being the nation’s

leading presidential contender—also warned against Martial Law just days before it was

declared. Three Constitutional Convention Delegates were also arrested who were

“known for their anti-Marcos stand in the charter” deliberations. Journalist and editors

from leading national periodicals including the Manila Times, Philippine Free Press, and

the Manila Chronicle were also ensnared in the national dragnet. Philippine Foreign

Secretary and United Nations Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo continued to deny reports of

44

mass incarceration of Marcos’s critics and opponents, emphasizing instead the “peaceful”

effects of Martial Law.93 To trivialize arrests, political detainees were featured in press

photos engaged in pastime activities in air conditioned prisons, and leaving many

political prisoners unable to mount a serious legal challenge until weeks after their

detention when it was already too late.94 Even a number of Con-Con delegates were

under military detention when the final vote on the proposed charter occurred days after

Martial Law’s implementation. Other members fled the country, fearing arrests upon

Martial Law’s declaration. Still others were caught abroad when they learned of Martial

Law’s declaration, and they refused to return home, fearing the hostile political climate.

The dragnet arrests that began immediately after granting “clearance” to

implement Martial Law not only targeted Marcos’ political opponents but also his

prominent media critics. Upon declaring Martial Law, Marcos shut down “all

newspapers, radio and television stations.” The few media forms allowed to reopen a few

days after Martial Law’s declaration, such as the Philippines Herald and four other

Tagalog weekly magazines, operated under strict media censorship. By early October

1972, the government had established strict mass media guidelines on what could and

could not be published. Guidelines restrained critical media attention of the government

and the military; “seditious” and “non-factual” materials; and “materials corrupting

public morals, among others. Marcos established a Department of Public Information and

93 “Under Martial Law Philippines Calm and Peaceful: Civil Rights Unimpaired,” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972, 1-8.94 “Martial law’s legality questioned: Detainees seek high court ruling,” Philippine News, October 5-18, 1972, 1-11.

45

the Media Advisory council the following year in order to enforce the regulations.

Regulations were particularly acute for press media, requiring “prior written

authorization] . ” 95 Within the following year, however, Anti-Martial Law activists

established their own underground news agency, called Balita ng Malayan Pilipinas

(Free / Liberated Philippines News Service), that held a broad international reach with

reports syndicated in overseas Filipino publications, particularly among overseas Leftist

Anti-Martial Law publications such as Kalayaan International and its successor Ang

Katipunan. The news service emerged as a counter response to Marcos’s strict control

over information leaving the Philippines.96 Like any other military governments citing

“national security,” Marcos later also imposed postal censorship.

With tight controls over information leaving the country, the most up-to date

accounts leaving the Philippines immediately after Martial Law’s declaration came from

recently returned Filipino and American critics of Marcos. Melinda Paras, for instance,

was deported back to the U.S. from the Philippines on September 23, 1972 after the

07declaration of Martial Law. Born in Madison, Wisconsin, Paras was a Filipina

American activist who went on tours of the Venceremos Brigade in Cuba before going to

the Philippines. Studying at UP Diliman, she joins the swell of student activism in the

Diliman Commune protest against Marcos’ creeping authoritarianism in 1971, and she

95 “Guidelines for mass media in the Philippines,” Philippine News, October 5-11, 1972, 13; “Media advisory council created,” Philippine News, May 17-23, 1973, 16.96 “People’s News Agency Formed!,” Kalayaan International, June, 1973, 3; “People’s News Agency Formed!,” Kalayaan International, July-August, 1973, 1; “Kalayaan’s Philippine News Service,” Kalayaan International, June, 1973, 1; “Philippine News Sources,” Philippine News, July-August, 1973, 2.97 Ordona, 93.

46

joined the CPP’s youth wing, Kabataan Makabayan (KM - Patriotic Youth) .98 Paras

“moved to the Philippines specifically to organize American GIs stationed at the U.S.

military bases.” 99 Upon returning from the Philippines, she joined the National

Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP), the first

U.S.-based Anti-Martial Law organization. Paras went on national speaking tours,

providing a critical perspective on the Philippine situation. 100

In addition to controlling the flow of information, Marcos commandeered all

public utilities “in order to prevent any disruption of vital public services during the

duration of the present national emergency under Letter of Instruction No. 2.” Public

utilities, such as water mains, were the direct targets of bombs that exploded in the

months prior to Martial Law. If the bombings were orchestrated by Marcos’s

administration, targeting water mains would have been the most cost-effective way to

signal a threat to public utilities without destroying the country’s most expensive

infrastructure. Under the guise of security, Marcos took control of Manila Electric

Company (Meralco), which was owned by the family of his former Vice Presidential

Fernando Lopez’s family. Marcos would later abolish the Vice Presidency under

authority granted to him under the 1973 constitution. Other confiscated utilities included

the Philippine Long Distance Telephone, the National Waterworks and Sewage

98 Espiritu, 43.99 Rose Ibanez and Florante Ibanez, interview by author, Carson, CA, July 16, 2014.100 Ibid.

47

Authority, and the Philippine National Railways. 101 Marcos also policed human

movement, imposing a ban on unnecessary civilian travel to destinations outside the

country without government approval. The travel ban held a dual purpose: “to prevent the

flow of foreign exchange from the Philippines” and to inhibit Philippine dissidents

fleeing the country. 102 Unfortunately, however, the travel ban was not wholly effective

because some dissidents, including Raul Manglapus, managed to flee the country before

its full implementation. Still others fled the country through backdoor channels, island

hopping their way out through neighboring countries.

As the purported hotbed of Leftist radical activity, Marcos shut down all schools

for a period of a week following the declaration of Martial Law, and enlisted the support

of administrators to help quell student activism. In fact, Marcos selectively opened

colleges at the University of the Philippines, the country’s premier tertiary educational

institution, in order to manage militant student activists who were concentrated in

specific colleges. Moreover, under the “spirit of martial law[‘s] proclamation,”

universities observed more stringent operations procedures, limiting student political

speech and activities. Rumors that the government has finally imposed a ban on long hair

for men—interpreted as a sign of anti-establishment, libertine political views—and a ban

on miniskirts for women—understood as a sign of promiscuity and social degeneration—

added another layer of policing of self-expression. Marcos’ policing of long hair and

miniskirts, along with the invocation of “law and order” borrowed heavily from U.S.

101 “Under Martial Law Philippines Calm and Peaceful: Civil Rights Unimpaired.”102 “Aspiras named czar of tourism,” Philippine News, May 17-23, 1973, 13.

48

political discourse following the 1960s youth unrest on American college campuses and

civil society.

Public officials also cashed in on their enhanced power during Martial Law, and

corruption and abuse ran especially rampant—even more so than before Martial Law. For

a government under the purported threat of insurrection, a gun ban appeared logical, and

newspaper accounts reported confiscation or discovery of weapons or gun caches by the

thousands. 10'5 Stories of these confiscations underscored the prevalence of guns,

presumably among subversives, and news of gun confiscations suggested the purported

success of military disarmament campaigns. Another “reform” instituted in the wake of

Martial Law’s declaration included the cleanup of “government corruption” and removal

of “incompetent government officials.” 104 These government reforms shook the

Philippine bureaucracy to its core. In addition to reorganizing government bureaucracies, ̂ 1 AT

Marcos ordered a mass resignation of government officials. ” The massive government

cleanup drive even trickled down to the local government and local police levels. 106 The

massive government purge allowed Marcos to install his own acolytes at every level of

103 Among numerous reports, I cite a limited number of articles here. “Thousands of firearms surrendered,” Philippine News, October 12-18, 1972, 9; “Total firearms yielded: 250,000,” Philippine News, November 2-8, 1972, 1; “Yielded firearms total 416,045,” Philippine News, November 16-22, 1972, 12.104 “Under Martial Law: Philippines Calm and Peaceful.”105 Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy o f Authoritarianism (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 77. “Marcos also promulgated the reorganization of the government as his first presidential decree. On September 24, 1972, he enacted the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which had resulted from a study by the Commission on Reorganization, a joint executive-legislative group. The reorganization’s desired objectives were “promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development; and improving the service for transacting public business in government agencies.’ In fact, the result of the plan was to ensure that nothing interfered with the exercise of power by the military or the bureaucracy.”106 “Cleanup Drive: Purge of local gov’t starts,” Philippine News, November 16-22, 1972, 1-11.

49

the Philippine government, as he instituted new rules for civil servants. 107 Gift giving to

108any public officials was finally criminalized.

To support his decrees and orders, Marcos formed military courts under General

Order No. 12. The new court system was charged with trying “almost all violations of the

country’s penal laws, except those involving chastity, civil status of persons and honor.’"

That is to say the new military tribunals handled cases of National Security; crimes

committed by military personnel: violations against Marcos’s decrees, proclamations, and

general orders; among numerous other offenses. 109 Collectively, Marcos’s actions

following Martial Law’s declaration were necessary to birth, what he rhetorically termed

”Ang Bangong Lipunan,” or the “New Society” purportedly distinct from the period

before Martial Law marred by political infighting; government inefficiency and waste;

and social instability and insecurity.

Mixed Reception Stateside

Marcos's declaration of Martial Law received ambivalent reception in the Filipino

American community, at least initially. It became the subject of intense debate within the

diverse Filipino American community, and as a result of severe ideological, class,

immigration conditions, and numerous other social cleavages within the community,

opinions ranged the entire political gamut. In addition to the climate of fear, these deep-

107 “New probe rules for civil servants,” Philippine News, October 12-18,1972, 9.108 “Giving gifts to public officials is now a crime,” Philippine News, November 16-22, 1972, 10.109 “Military courts set up, jurisdiction defined,” Philippine News, October 5-11, 1972, 9.

50

seated political and ideological divides hampered large-scale overseas Filipino

community collective action from the outset.

Supporters of Marcos’s “New Society” Martial Law project comported with the

administration’s justification for Martial Law: Law and Order. Managing Editor Roy E.

Arcellano of the Philippines Mail, an influential newspaper printed out of Salinas,

California popular among early Filipino immigrants, or “Old Timers,” penned a pro-

Marcos, pro-Martial Law editorial. He observed that under Martial Law, Filipinos

enjoyed for the first time in history

internal peace, improved business, ever increasing exchange reserves, confidence of the people in the government, safety in their homes, safety in the streets, safety in taxicabs, cleaner cities and towns, graft and corruption put to rest and a long list of very positive gains which would have been impossible to attain in pre- martial law period. 110

Arcellano’s assessment reflected a popular camp within the Filipino American

community. Although somewhat skeptical, these community members were, willing to

acquiesce to Marcos draconian actions for national self-preservation.

Other responses to Marcos’ declaration of Martial law were met with greater

opposition. As reported by the Kalayaan International, “for three consecutive days after

the declaration, the Pilipino community, mainly professionals, picketed in front of the

Philippine Consulate in New York City.” 111 A majority of the immediate public

110 Roy E. Arcellano, “Editorial: Quid Pro Quo,” Philippines Mail, December 1972, 2.111 “Rally to the NCRCLP,” Kalayaan International, October-November 1972, 8.

51

opposition to Marcos’s declaration of Martial Law in the U.S. emerged from Leftist

Filipino youth activists.

Youth Reaction

There already existed anti-imperialist Filipino American organizations in the U.S.

prior to the declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines. 112 These groups were organized

independently in major cities with large Filipino populations, San Francisco, Los

Angeles, New York, and Chicago. The largest of these groups was the Kalayaan

Collective, an underground study group, in the San Francisco Bay Area. 113 Among the

Collective's most prominent work included producing the national Kalayaan

International newspaper, which derived its name from Philippine Katipunan

revolutionary society's national organ. In Los Angeles, Jaime Geaga was part of another

collective and organized by members who met through the Search to Involve Filipino

Americans (SIPA) Filipino American community organization. The LA chapter did not

have a name like the other chapters. "We just called ourselves a study group," recalls

Geaga. "We'd meet once every week and the weekend. We'd have assigned reading and

come together and discuss it, the readings. Works by Lenin. Das Kapital. Mao Tse-

tung.” 114 The collective also studied the works of Jose Maria Sison.

Another member of the LA study group, Florante Ibanez, remembers reading the

Philippine Society and Revolution, which we "read from mimeograph sheets,” and “we

112 Choy, "Towards Trans-Pacific Social Justice, 294.113 Espiritu, 40; Terry Bautista Interview by author, Oakland, CA, March 3,2014.114 Jaime Geaga, Interview by author. San Diego, CA, August 2, 2014.

52

would sit in a circle and we would read sections of it and pass it along. Read sections of it

and pass it along. " 115 These groups accorded members opportunities to elevate and

sharpen their analysis of Philippine and American economic and political issues, and

would later serve an important component for the Kalayaan Collective’s successor: the

KDP, for the KDP would later initiate contact with potential recruits by inviting them to a

D.G. or Discussion Group.

In the fall of 1972, the Kalayaan Collective invited the various known Filipino

anti-imperialist collectives to a meeting with the hope of uniting the groups into a single

national entity. As the Los Angeles representatives to the meeting, Jaime Geaga and Ester

Soriano attend the retreat in the Bay Area:

.. .we arrived Friday. We had all these different discussions. Saturday, that night we heard the news that Martial Law was declared, so everybody's, you know. Anyways, it's a big development, and Sunday, we all agree to pass a resolution to create the, the National Coalition for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines, NCRCLP.

At the meeting, NCRCLP established “4 unifying principles...decided upon by the initial

chapters: 1) Oppose martial law; 2) Demand the restoration of civil liberties; 3) Demand

the freedom of all persons imprisoned for political reason; and 4) Demand that the U.S.

government abandon its support of the Marcos regime.” 116 Delegates to the NCRCLP

went back to their various groups, and were instructed to "hold mass action. " 117 Two

weeks after the meeting, NCRCLP chapters, usually in collaboration with other

115 Ibanez and Ibanez.116 “Rally to the NCRCLP,” 8.117 Geaga.

53

organizations, coordinated mass protests against Martial Law in seven major American

cities: New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San Diego, Madison, Wisconsin, San

Francisco, on what organizers called a “National Day of Action” on October 8 . 118

Notably, not all activity was held on October 8 , but occurred between October 6 to 9,

1972.

While the longest of these demonstrations took place in New York, the

demonstration with the largest attendance took place in San Francisco. The Philippine

News estimated the San Francisco demonstration attracted “some 200 demonstrators” to

rally outside “the Philippine consulate general in San Francisco from 12:30 to

1:30pm.”119 Kalayaan InternationaVs estimated up with “300 Denounce Marcos Fascism

at Local Consulate,” reporting at the end of the same article “250-300

persons”. . .“picketed for almost two hours.” 120 Demonstrators “shout[ed] such slogans as

“Oppose martial law!,” and “Ibagsak si Marcos!,” (Topple Marcos!) while the Philippine

News reported additional slogans such as “Free the political prisoners;” “Oppose Martial

Law;” and “Restore civil liberties.” 121 According to the Philippine News, the

demonstrations “served, ironically, as a welcome to [Consul] Trinidad Alconcel” who

just assumed the San Francisco post the week before after being promoted from the

118 “NCRCLP Organizes Anti-Martial Law Protests in 7 Cities,” Kalayaan International, October 1972, 1- 9; “Demonstrators vs. Martial Law picket RP consulates in US,” Philippine News, October 12-18, p.1-5; Kalayaan also claims activities occurred in Guam & the Philippine News also lists Seattle as another protest site.119 “300 Denounce Marcos Fascism At Local Consulate,” Kalayaan International, October-November 1972, 9.120 “NCRCLP Organizes Anti-Martial Law Protests in 7 Cities.”121 Ibid.

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Honolulu Consulate to replace [Consul] Carlos Faustino. 122 Kalayaan reported, the

Alconcel “had remarked to one of the press persons, ‘they the demonstrators’ don’t know

anything about the situation there [in] the Philippines.” In Kalayaan’s account,

The most militant stage of the picket towards the end, came when marchers began shouting, “Makibaka, huwag matakot!” the line ceased moving as the demonstrators turned towards the consulate with clenched fist striking the air, shouted in unison. The picket ended with the singing of the Internationale, song of the working class. The dispersal was quiet, with the street left clear of the usual demonstration litter. Even the police commended the group for an ‘excellent’ demonstration. 123

The hasty coordination of NCRCLP’s activities as well as the slogans chanted in their

rallies demonstrated the reactionary nature of the organization. NCRCLP was formed in

reaction to Marcos’s declaration of Martial Law, and the content of their slogans

demanded solely a scaling back of Martial Law or ouster of Marcos and the restoration of

civil liberties—even if only back to the corrupt politics that existed before.

The initial response illustrated the ambivalent response of the Filipino American

community to Martial Law. Despite being the largest, the San Francisco demonstration

estimated 250 participants most likely composed of a large portion of rally’s planning

committee. In the same article as the account above, Kalayaan International reported the

first planning meeting for the rally was first convened on September 30, 1972 with

“about 100 persons” in attendance. As such, it may well be possible that about half of the

total number of people attending the rally was involved, in some part, in its planning.

122 “Demonstrators vs. Martial Law picket RP consulates in US.”123 “300 Denounce Marcos Fascism At Local Consulate.”

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Rallies would become a central organizing tactic employed by Leftist activists, as they

signified the “mass actions” and mass support” for the cause.

Annually, at the anniversary of Martial Law’s declaration in the Philippines,

Leftist activist organized rallies to assert disapproval of the regime, occurring mostly in

front of Philippine Consulates and Embassy in cities throughout the U.S. with large

Filipino American populations. Estella Habal is a Filipino American born to a working-

class agricultural family from Seaside, California, and she stumbled into college, Anti-

Vietnam War, and later Anti-Martial Law activism. Supporting her two children while

actively organizing for social change in the U.S. and the Philippines, Habal recollects her

20s and asserts that she was “never really part of the demographic group of the KDP” for

she was “one of the olde[r] members.”

Habal recalls NCRCLP and its successor, the KDP, organized annual events

opposing Philippine Martial Law on September 22nd for 10 years or so. In fact, the KDP

would be instrumental in helping forge the Anti-Martial Law September 22nd Coalition.

At a family trip in the 1990s, however, someone pointed out to her and helped her realize

her group’s mistake. As a group we “promot[ed] September 22 because that’s when it hit

us here” in the U.S. Chuckling, she attributes the error to youthful oversight, explaining

“when you’re young and.. .don’t know crap.” 124 Young Filipino and Filipino American

youth activists overlooked the 15-hour time difference between the Philippines, where

Martial Law was publically announced on a nationally televised address at 7:15 pm on

124 Estella Habal, Interview by author. San Jose, CA, March 20,2014.

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September 23, 1972, and the U.S. West coast that experienced Martial Law’s aftereffects

on September 22. Aside from the comical oversight—which may partially be the root

causes of why some people today are still confused on Martial Law’s declaration date—

Anti-Martial Law events executed annually in September garnered publicity on the issue,

attracting serious media attention.

NCRCLP’s Early Organizational Structure

NCRCLP’s early Bay Area organizing entailed the formation of three committees:

activities, publicity, and finance. Kalayaan International describes the committees as

follows:

The activities committee primarily coordinates monthly demonstrations or rallies, and cultural activities. Publicity will develop and distribute general information and educational materials on the Philippine situation and the work of the NCRCLP. The finance committee must develop funds to sustain activities and other responsibilities of the committee.

The Bay Area chapter also coordinated on the West Coast activities. In planning the first

Anti-Martial Law rally, NCRCLP accommodated differing levels of membership

participation in the organization. As such NCRCLP divided participants into two

categories: working and general.

Working members will be those who can participate within one of the three committees, attending the weekly meetings of the respective committees and doing the almost-daily tasks. General participation members are those who can attend a monthly meeting program and who support and participate in NCRCLP activities.

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NCRCLP’s core leadership consisted of a coordinating committee composed of three

chairmen and selected committee representatives. 125 The structural and institutional

procedures and conceptualizations surrounding the organization’s work became

instrumental to NCRCLP’s successor organization, the KDP. The transition of

NCRCLP’s work surrounding Martial Law helps explain why KDP’s program on

Philippine Martial Law was far more developed than its American anti-racist and socialist

program.

NCRCLP timed the national Anti-Martial Law rallies to coincide with Marcos’s

appearance on NBC’s Meet the Press billed as an “unprecedented trans-oceanic satellite

broadcast” interview held on October 8,1972 where he was given a national platform in

defending his Martial Law regime, stating “It is my hope that I will be able to lift martial

law within the period of my term as president, that is, before the end of 1973.”126 Marcos

also justified his declaration of Martial Law by playing into U.S. Cold War hysteria,

justifying Martial Law in order to “fight the Red menace” and the Communist threat. 127

Marcos’s Meet the Press interview later became the basis for NCRCLP’s next major

event, a “Symposium on the Philippine Crisis” featuring a panel on Martial Law on

October 28 at Glide Memorial Church in San Francisco. The Symposium also featured

125 “300 Denounce Marcos Fascism At Local Consulate”126 “Transcript of Marcos interview in NBC’s ‘Meet the Press,” Philippine News, October 19-25, 1972,12.127 “Fear of Another Vietnam Cited,” Philippine News, October 12-18, 1972, 1-5.

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the NCRCLP singing troupe, which sang revolutionary songs, closing with Ang Bayan

Ko patriotic ballad. 128

NCRCLP Growth & Continuity

NCRCLP received an additional influx of support—although the extend to of

which is missing from the written record—as a result of the Marcos administration’s

reneging on a promise to facilitate the transport of relief goods for the Central Luzon

floods of 1972. The floods, dubbed by the New York Times as “the worst natural calamity

in Philippine history,” devastated Central Luzon. 129 In July 1972, Central Luzon, the

country’s rice basket, experienced a massive flood from torrential rains lasting four

weeks. The flood prompted President Marcos to declare a “state of emergency” on July

13, and he authorized the military to “commandeer private vehicles and food stocks for

relief purposes.” 130 By July 30, the National Disaster Coordinating Council organized the

“evacuation of thousands of people living near dams, rivers and lakes” with no signs of

the waters receding. 131

By August 1, 1972, the flood caused by the storm paralyzed Manila, flooding 80

percent of the city, causing a massive disruption in the city’s economy. 132 The storm had

not only severed communications channels throughout the region, it also inundated

transportation arteries isolating various parts of the region. As such, food shortages

128 “Symposium on Martial Law Held Oct. 28,” Kalayaan International, October-November 1972, 8.129 “Most of Manila Swept by Flood: Philippine Death toll rises,” New York Times, August 2, 1972,1.13° Perish in Luzon Floods; The Toll in Japan Put at 61,” New York Times. July 13, 1972, 38.131 “Thousands Are Evacuated As Waters Rise in Luzon,” New York Times, July 31,1972, 53.132 “Most of Manila Swept by Flood.”

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caused a sharp increase in the price of provisions, so much so that the government feared

food riots. Reports that a woman storeowner in Samal, Bataan Province had been hacked

to death by flood victims who were disgruntled by overpriced goods. Food shortages

caused looting in Arayat, and according to Agriculture Department officials, people

resorted to “cooking rats” to feed to their “starving children.” 133 Flooded traffic arteries

also caused gasoline shortages that slowed recovery efforts. Despite government’s best

attempts to aid disaffected citizens, the lack of rescue equipment hampered the efficacy

of recovery. The Philippine government even had to “appeal to the U.S. Government not

to withdraw 14 helicopters” which were long overdue for maintenance in Okinawa that

were being used to fly relief goods throughout the region—one helicopter had “crash-

landed while ferrying relief supplies” days earlier. 134 The U.S. military, particularly

stationed in Clark Air Force Base became the site of launching relief operations. Lack of

potable water caused outbreaks of Cholera, yet far short of a full out epidemic. In one of

the hardest hit areas, armed Philippine troops in Candaba, Pampanga province “prevented

desperate residents from destroying a dike to relieve water pressure to save their

homes.” 135 One month after the flood began, waters began to recede on August 6 , yet lack

of provisions and the slow movement of recovery goods gave rise to looting. 136

In the end, the Central Luzon, the Philippines’ most productive region, lay

devastated. One initial and underestimated tally for loss of life totaled 454, people.

133 “Philippine Fears Food Riots as Flood Recede,” New York Times, August 5, 1972, 3.134 “Most of Manila Swept by Flood”; “Thousands Are Evacuated.”135 “Most of Manila Swept by Flood.”136 “Philippine Flood Death Rise to 427,” New York Times, August 7, 1972, 5.

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Moreover, the storm decimated the region’s infrastructure. 137 In addition, the lasting

effect of the flood included the exacerbation of the country’s rice deficit that affected not

only the country’s economic output but also exacerbated the food shortage that hit the

Philippines in the following year as a result of OPEC oil embargos and decline in global

food production. Estimated cost of rebuilding from the flood totaled over $300 million. 138

With meager government resources and limited international assistance, Marcos

turned to Filipino communities abroad for aid. New York Philippine Consul General

Ernesto C. Pineda, for instance, raised relief funds for the flood victims. 139 The editors of

Kalayaan International reported that the Philippine government encouraged Filipinos in

America to send donations to three recognized agencies in the Philippines, including the

Philippine National Red Cross; Department of Health; and Imelda Marcos’ Project

Tulungan. Media reports surfaced that the government agencies failed to distribute relief

goods adequately. The Manila Times, for instance, reported hundreds of thousands of

nutria-buns, sent through the First Lady[‘s charity] ended up spoiled rotten in the

warehouses of Malacanang executive mansion because the goods “were waiting to be

individually wrapped in special parcels which carried the announcement: ‘Gift of Imelda

Marcos - Project: Tulunga” (Project: Help / Aide) . 140

137 “Philippine Toll at 454; Cholera Adding to Deaths,” New York Times, August 8, 1972.138 “Philippine Counts the Huge Cost of Flood Damage and Looks Abroad for Aid,” New York Times, August 15, 1972, 66.139 “Philippines in Flood Appeal,” New York Times. August 16, 1972, 26.140 Maximo V. Soliven, “By the way: US nutribun gifts get diverted,” Manila Times, July 22,1972, 5.

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Fearing the misappropriation of relief funds, on August 31, 1972 several Filipino

organizations including the Pilipino Flood Assistance Committee (PFAC, which

consisted of Bay Area Filipino youth) coordinated relief efforts in numerous cities,

including Seattle, San Jose, Stockton, Salinas, Los Angeles, and San Diego. 141 The

Filipino Information and Service Help Center, and church officials also purportedly

secured freight-free passage through Philippine Airlines and PAN-AM to the ecumenical

National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP). San Francisco Congressman

Philip S. Burton “interceded” between the PFAC and the Philippine Consulate to broker

the deal, which PFAC asserts, “was confirmed several times by the Consulate.” 142 The

agreement, however, was interrupted by the declaration of Martial Law on September 21,

1972, and the Philippine Consulate reneged on their previous agreement for free

shipment to NCCP, which caused PFAC to support to NCRCLP. PFAC’s article in the

Kalayaan International alleges consulate officials failed to notify the airline carriers,

suggesting that the Philippine Consulate’s “road blocking” was an attempt to thwart their

relief efforts from going through a neutral third party or perhaps channel all relief efforts

to one of the three state-sanctioned agencies.

The relief efforts for the summer 1972 Central Luzon floods were marred by

severe corruption. Forty-five-year-old Alejandro Dizon, a top ranking customs official

became one of 12 alleged for stealing “thousands of pesos worth of relief goods.” The

Philippine Constabulary purportedly recovered two truckloads of canned goods donated

141 “Flood Committee Report,” Kalayaan International, October-Novemberl972, 13.142 “Concerned Pilipinos Mobilize for Flood Relief,” Kalayaan International, August-September 1972,20.

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to the customs bureau for distribution to flood victims at Dizon’s house. 143 Another

scandal included the “anomalous distribution of some 10 million Pesos in cash aid” in

Pampanga intended for flood victims. Brigadier General Prospero A. Olivas, who was

appointed to the investigation, suspected the “anomalous” distribution resulted from local

government graft and corruption. 144 Despite these reports, US-AID still distributed funds

to flood-hit areas, earmarked specifically for rehabilitation of public facilities damaged

during the floods. 145 In November 1972, Philippine News reported a $50-Million

congressional earmark grant for Philippine aid. Funds were used for road reconstruction

and agriculture rehabilitation. 146

Sally (pseudonym) was born in the Philippines, and her family immigrated to the

U.S. in stages. First her mother, obtaining her teaching credential in Minnesota and

Stanford; then her father completing a doctoral residency in New York; followed by her

siblings in various stages. Not all of Sally’s family members, however, made it to the

U.S. in time to escape Philippine Martial Law. Sally observes that her family’s

immigration to the U.S. “coincided” with and “was kind of made by the declaration of

Martial Law.”

Upon arriving to the U.S. she became part of the Kalayaan Collective and later

NCRCLP. Among Sally’s numerous contributions to the movement involved writing for

143 “2 Truckloads of Relief Goods Seized From Customs Official’s House,” Philippine News, November 2- 8, 1972, 8.144 “P10-M Relief Aid in Pampanga Investigated, Philippine News,” Philippine News, November 9-15, 1972, 11.145 “US-AID fund to flood-hit areas,” Philippine News, December 21-27, 1972,13.146 “$50-M US aid to RP,” Philippine News, November 2-8, 1.

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the Kalayaan International, working for the newspaper’s “Philippine Beat.” Sally wrote

the newspaper’s “analysis of the huge floods in ’71,” that served as “a major galvanizing

thing,” and she admits that she perhaps prematurely “blamed everything on U.S.

imperialism.” “Now I have a more complex understanding of global warming, right?,”

she laughs, stating “it was so much easier blaming” U.S. imperialism and their lackeys,

the Marcoses. Moreover, Sally cites deforestation as another culprit, and more

importantly, the historical fact that “central Luzon and Manila have always been flood

plains.. .really, flood planes, so they should not be built upon. If you look at old Spanish

lithographs, houses were on stilts, and people traveled from banka to banka [boat to boat]

because the esteros [estuaries / waterways] were the highways back then.” 147

Sally’s reflection of the past, though inaccurate on exact dates, illustrates the

orientation of the groups in which she belonged that placed a premium on learning and a

refinement of political analysis. Over time, Sally realized that U.S. imperialism was but

one of many factors that contributed to the devastations of the 1971 floods. Leftist groups

like the Kalayaan Collective and many joint members of NCRCLP, while composed of

members at varying levels of political analysis, were united under an anti-imperialist lens

that sought to cultivate and sharpen their members’ analysis of the world by building on

criticism and critiques. This intellectual tradition allowed the organizations to respond to

real-world situations and complicated shifting political realities.

147 Sally [Pseudonym] Interview by author. San CA, April 11, 2014.

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By November 1972, NCRCLP added additional committees due to organizational

need. A fourth committee on research arose in response to the growing demand on

NCRCLP to provide information on events in the Philippines. In a meeting with

California Democratic Senator Alan Cranston, the chapter expressed a need for more

factual information on the Philippines. This demand for clearer information established

precedent for future work on the production of publication influential to public policy.

NCRCLP also formed a committee on mass media because earlier activity received poor

media attention. NCRCLP’s newly formed “speaker’s bureau” took over responsibility

for coordinating speaking engagements. NCRCLP also consolidated its “cultural arm”

which has grown to include skits from its original founding as a singing troupe. The

organization knew astutely the “importance of culture within a movement and its role as a

propaganda tool.” 148

NCRCLP also instituted a political education (or P.E.) program among its rank-

and-file membership in order to strengthen the organization as a whole. As such,

political education took “three phases: 1) by reading relevant articles regularly sent to

each of the members; 2) by reading the assessments or analyses in the Makibaka, the

chapter’s monthly newsletter; and 3) discussing these articles or related topics during the

regular working committee meetings.” The committees were made to answer to a

coordinating body, which became a “democratically-elected permanent body.” Reforms

also sought to better coordinate national NCRCLP activity by requiring each chapter to

148 “n c r c l p Consolidates,” Kalayaan International, November-December 1972, 10.

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submit regular reports to the Bay Area chapter, which collated and distributed the

collected information through the NCRCLP’s internal bulletin, facilitating a more

efficient national communication system between chapters.

In the first two months, NCRCLP established regular organizing activity. The

chapter aimed to hold at least one “mass action” activity each month. To make their

presence known, NCRCLP sent letters to Filipino community organizations and other

progressive groups. The organization’s finance committee escalated fundraising efforts to

include printed t-shirts and Christmas cards, and the cultural arm performed at various

functions. The publicity committee produced articles for leaflets and study sessions. 149

The speaker’s bureau prepared radio and television appearances for the Bay Area. One

local TV production included a local program aired out of Oakland’s KTVU television

station on December 3, 1972. The program entailed an overview of Philippine history

followed by a panel discussion of the Marcos administration as a “puppet” to U.S.

interests who declared martial law to “crush the growing National Democratic

Revolution.” 150 The day following the TV program, two Marcos agents visited KTVU, as

alleged in Kalayaan International:

Mr. Lamberto Almeda, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Bureau of Immigrations in Manila and Amado L. de Leon of the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco asked for the videotape for a rescreening. During the screening, they took down the names of the panel members and further asked questions as to WHO “masterminded” the show, [emphasis in the original]

149 “NCRCLP Consolidates.”150 “Marcos Agents Harass KTVU For NCRCLP TV Show,” Kalayaan International, December 1972- January 1973, 16.

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NCRCLP’s final rally of the year occurred on a bitterly cold Saturday, December 2,1972

in San Francisco’s Union Square, which was bustling with busy holiday shoppers. With

the intent to “denounce the U.S. role “ in supporting Martial Law, the banners, speakers,

and performances, flanked the Philippine flag and the red and black flag of the

Katipunan, attracted the attention of holiday shoppers. NCRCLP’s cultural wing started

the rally with songs before a speech by National Lawyers Guild Doug Sorenson, who had

been arrested in the Philippines” for his work doing GI counseling. Following Sorenson,

NCRCLP Bay Area chapter representative Gil Mangaoang spoke and ended his speech

with the four points of unity. The remainder of the rally focused on a skit honoring

plebian revolutionary hero Andres Bonifacio. The skit was a scathing indictment of

events in Philippine history and its role in supporting U.S. imperialism, ended with

Marcos declaring “Martial Law” and “himself dictator” under the approval of “Uncle

Sam.” 151

Demonstrations in the latter months of 1972 witnessed the hastily assembled

organization of NCRCLP, the first American opposition group against Philippine Martial

Law. This chapter outlined the context for Martial Law’s declaration in the Philippines,

and its immediate effects both in the Philippines and the United States. The U.S.

opposition to Philippine Martial Law occurred immediately despite its mixed reception.

Leftist youth activist responded with mass action demonstrations that yielded limited

results. Although their tactics were heavily reliant on mass actions and community

151 NCRCLP Consolidates.

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education drives, these early activities, however, would help grow and set the tone for

later movement organizing. The following chapter focuses on Marcos’ attempts at

legitimizing his rule through an equally rushed plebiscite vote on the country’s new

charter, which granted him sweeping dictatorial powers. Activists’ responses to Marcos’s

new charter plebiscite spurred the further growth of the Anti-Martial Law Movement in

the U.S.

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CHAPTER 3:

RISING TIDE OF OPPOSITION

(January 1,1973 - September 1973)

Martial Law’s declaration in the Philippine engendered an immediate U.S.-based

opposition, organized in large part by Leftist youth activists. The growth of the

movement, however, took a substantial turn with the formation of a moderate,

mainstream opposition. This chapter examines the factors that contributed to the Anti-

Martial Law movement’s growth in the United States. I argue the Filipino American

opposition emerged as a result of and in response to Philippine state actions in both the

U.S., through a scandal with its Los Angeles diplomatic corps, and in the Philippines

through the 1973 Plebiscite Elections, ratifying the state’s new charter that legitimized

Marcos’ dictatorial regime.

In the months following Martial Law’s declaration in the Philippines, finishing

touches to the country’s charter were well under way at the Constitutional Convention

(Con-Con) held in Quezon City. The final Con-Con vote on the charter occurred on

November 29 “with 273 voting affirmatively, 15 voting negatively and one abstaining.”

The remaining 27 delegates of the 316 total were unable to vote due to illness or absence

from illness. Other delegates were outside the country, leaving before Martial Law’s

declaration. Those abroad when they heard of Martial Law’s declaration refused to return

home. With an approved draft of the charter, signing ceremonies were held the following

day, November 30, 1972 on the plebian “hero” Andres Bonifacio’s 109th birthday

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anniversary on the 14th floor of Quezon City Hall to wrap up an 18-month-long charter

convention. Three delegates “signed or affixed their thumbmark in blood” to seal the new

social contract. The Philippine News reports:

Delegate Godofredo Reyes signed the Charter with his blood. Delegate Augusto B. Syjuco brought the blood of his children in a bottle which he used in signing the Charter. Delegate Godofredo Ramos affixed his signature in ink but impressed his thumbmark in blood.

Too weak from ailments, several delegates attended in wheelchairs (perhaps tortured by

the Martial Law regime), and other delegates detained by Marcos were allowed to attend

in the spirit of civility. The following morning, Friday December 1, 1972, the charter was

officially presented to the President at the Malacanang Bulwagang Maharlika executive

mansion. Marcos urged for participation in the upcoming national plebiscite ordered by

decree the upcoming January 1973, which Marcos described as “a vast national

crusade.” 153

Given the fact that the new charter’s ratification offered the veneer of legitimacy

for his administration, Marcos took many steps to ensure its passage. By early December

1972, the Comelec, or Commission on Elections, had already purchased the necessary

152 “Charter confab completes task,” Philippine News, December 7-13, 1972, 1-16. Some entities misunderstood or deliberately manipulated the significance of the blood compact as a negative omen. The KDP, for instance, misinterpreted or misunderstood signing the new charter in blood as an act that “symbolized the blood that has been drained from the Pilipino people by the Marcos regime” in its Kalayaan International November 30-December 6, 1972, 1-8. Signing the new Constitution in blood represented an adherence to the ancient Filipino tradition of Sanduguan (in Tagalog) or Pacto de Sangre (in Spanish), meaning blood compact. There exists substantial literature on the blood compact ceremony in the various works of many Philippine historians. For a synthesis of the scholarship on Sanduguan ceremony, consult Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., “Pacto de Sangre in the Late Nineteenth-Century Nationalist Emplotment of Philippine History,” Philippine Studies (2010): 79-109.153 “Charter confab completes task”; “Plebiscite for new RP Charter set in January next year,” Philippine News, November 30-December 6, 1972, 1-8.

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equipment, and “mobilized some 300,000 public school teachers who had served as poll

inspectors” in order to meet the Con-Con’s favored election date of January 15, 1973.154

Marcos promised free and open debate rhetorically aimed to ensure “every man” held

“the opportunity to fully appreciate and understand the meaning of this Constitution.” 155

Directly after receiving the draft constitution early Friday December 1, 1972, Marcos

issued 3 general orders:

(1) [General Order 17] Directing Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and General Romeo V. Espino, Armed forces chief of staff, not to question any person for expressing views on the Constitution before or after the plebiscite; 156

(2) Directing Secretary Enrile to process and release members of the media under detention, except subversion suspects; [and]

(3) Directing the Defense Secretary to process and release detained members of the Constitutional Convention, except those who may be linked to subversion. 157

In addition to the three orders above, Marcos also orchestrated mass prisoner

release—a public relations ploy that sought to soften his public image and project a

benevolent persona. Such actions preceded Marcos’ intensive promotion campaign to

rally support for the new charter. He asked the Con-Con and Comelec to publish and

disseminate pro and con positions about the proposed Constitution. Marcos convinced

members of Congress, “national, provincial, city, municipal and barrio officials to help

154 Mobilization of public school teachers is not uncommon to elections today; “Plebiscite for new RP Charter set in January next year,” 1-8.155 “Martial law ‘effects’ suspended for polls,” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 1-3; “Judgment by the people: Vote on RP Charter is verdict on Marcos,” Philippine News, December 7-13, 1972, 1-8.156 “Claim certain groups abuse ‘free debates,” Philippine News, January 11-17, 1973, 1-15.157 “Judgment by the people.”

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mold unity among the people.” 158 He appealed to the National Ratification Coordinating

Committee (NRCC), described in the Philippine News as a group “organized to enable

the electorate in the remaining days before the plebiscite to cast their ballots

intelligently.” 159

The Con-Con through a special Convention Committee in partnership with NRCC

embarked on a 1 0 2 congressional district campaign to educate voters about the new

charter through seminars. 160 Marcos spurred speculation that “the approval of the new

Charter” would be grounds for “rendering Martial Law unnecessary.” 161 For instance, an

article syndicated in the Philippine News and “prepared by the Citizens Movement for a

New Constitution,” written in consultation with Con-Con Delegate Reynaldo T. Fajardo

of Manila, claimed “Martial law lifting [would soon be] seen [with] ratification,” and that

the new charter represented an important government “reform” necessary for national

progress. Proponents of the new charter also emphasized the gains of Philippine society

under Martial Law. The Philippine Constabulary, for instance, celebrated the social

“order” brought by Martial Law discipline. Despite being mostly entailed of petty crimes,

the “drop” in Luzon’s crime rate was rhetorically mobilized in support of the new

constitution as evidence of Martial Law’s success. According to political pundits, the new

158 ibid.159 Ibid; NRCC was chaired by Presidential Assistant Guillermo C. de Vega according to “Judgment by the people”; “Joint plebiscite campaign, Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 9.16° 0pens jnf0 drive,” Philippine News, December 21-27, 1972, 13.161 “Judgment by the people.”

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charter also served as a referendum on Marcos’ New Society project and continued

rule. 162

Con-Con delegates, well aware of the unpopularity of the new charter among

progressives, nonetheless tried their best to cajole progressive support. Jennie L. Ilustre

reports, for instance, in the Philippine News that the new charter offered more provisions

that empowered women. Citing largely Con-Con delegates, the new Constitution

“allow[ed] Filipina women to retain their citizenship even after marriage to aliens”—

important because of the increasing number of marriages between foreigners and

Filipinas under Martial Law. It also “guarantee [ed] equal employment opportunities” for

women. In other words, Ilustre concludes “No sex discrimination.” Whereas the 1935

Constitution only explicitly held only one explicit provision on women (Article XIV,

Section 6 ), the proposed 1971 Constitution offered “at least five provision on women,”

stated Con-Con Secretary Jose V. Abueva. 163 While the article states women were named

in at least five provisions, it merely discussed these two main provisions extensively and

emphasized that the new charter will give women a more equal footing. Press coverage

also reported the expanded influence of the youth in national politics. The new charter,

proponents argued, would expand the reach of democracy and lower the legal voting age

from 21 to 18 years of age, mirroring debates in the U.S. of lowering the voting age. It is

162 “Editorial: New Society reforms at stake in plebiscite,” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973,4; “Crime rate drops in Luzon areas: PC cites effects of martial law,” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 11.163 Jennie L. Ilustre, “Woman power in new Charter,” Philippine News, December 2 8 ,1972-January 3, 1973, 10.

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notable, however, that the youth were among Marcos’s major critics who, having been

locked out of the vote and disillusioned by the political process, resorted to other means

of expressing their political discontent. In fact, so concerned was the administration on

the youth perception, that Guillermo C. de Vega, concurrent chairman of NRCC and

Presidential Assistant leading the approval campaign, extended an invitation to critics to

“share the same platform instead of engaging in an underground campaign against the

charter. De Vega’s invitation,” reports Philippine News, was in response to “reports that

certain oppositionists were going around the university belt conducting what he branded

as a ‘surreptitious campaign of distortion.” 164

By the end of December, Comelec, under the influence of Marcos, was

considering postponing the date of the unpopular plebiscite, contemplating several

alternative dates which included February 19 or March 5 1973. The reason for the delay,

according the Marcos’ camp, was largely because of general consensus among people in

positions of authority that more time was needed for voter registration. In fact Marcos

extended the voter registration deadline originally set for December 23, 1972 . 165

In addition to a lawsuit challenging the new charter itself, members of Congress

maneuvered to force Congress open “so it could legislate and conduct investigation”—

suggesting the Congressional opposition’s desires to impeach Marcos for unconstitutional

behavior. By the last week of December 1972, former government officials, including

164 Emmie G. Velarde, “Youth for new voting age of 18,” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 10.165 “Charter voting is reset,” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 1-3.

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former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada and Con-Con delegate “Ramon Gonzales and Jesus

Barrera, as well as the old Civil Liberties Union have ... questioned” Marcos authority

over Martial Law, and critics with similar political persuasions sought to reconvene the

Senate as Constitutionally mandated on the fourth Monday of the new year, which fell on

January 22, 1972. With the new proposed constitution yet to receive approval, former

Congress members were adamant in following the 1935 Constitution still in force, and

members asserted themselves in meetings with Marcos after consulting Senators Benigno

S. Aquino and Jose W. Diokno imprisoned under the national dragnet on final strategy on

asserting Congressional authority. Marcos warned members of other branches of

government that tampering with Presidential Martial Law authority would spark a

“constitutional crisis” detrimental to the entire government. 166

The Congressional maneuvers coincided with increasing criticism over the

proposed new charter for its shoddy construction, lacking basic systems of checks and

balances. Jesus Barrerra, former Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court and Senator

Gerardo Roxas became vocal critics of the proposed constitution. Barerra and Roxas

were “Particularly opposed to the Transitory Provisions” for it “institute [ed] a system

which places the entire government in one single person [Marcos] for a period indefinite

and uncertain” period of time. 167 The Con-Con proposed a “transition government” in

which the President held the sole authority to convene the new government outlined in

166 “Charter crisis feared,” Philippine News, December 21-27, 1-14; “Martial law rule bucked: FM poises revolutionary gov’t,” Philippine News, January 4-10, 1973, 1-15.167 “Opposition to new RP Charter mounts: Barrera, Roxas fire salvos against draft,” Philippine News, January 4-10, 1973, 1-15.

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the new constitution—a provision that delegates viewed as an orderly transition from

Presidential Martial Law to Parliamentary governance. 168 Thus, under the “transitory

provision,” Marcos as President, was solely charged with the grave responsibility of

ensuring the start of a new government—a responsibility he failed to fulfill in a timely

manner.

Marcos utilized anti-charter activism to his own benefit. Despite the purported

success in the Philippine Constabulary’s ability to undercut crime, he evoked the specter

of communist insurgents yet again as justification for maintaining Martial Law order. In

fact the mere mention of Congressional maneuvers were enough to render the

government “weak” and “vulnerable” to attack, and “emboldened subversive and outlaw

bands to challenge the martial law powers of the President.” 169 Marcos even circulated

false government reports that alien influences and foreign agents conspired to “derail” the

charter reform. 170 He alleged “foreign agents” stationed in the Philippines were acting as

“contacts” for foreign forces opposing the martial law administration and charter reform.

Citing information gathered from the interrogation of “leaders of subversive groups who

are under detention.” 171

By January 10, 1973, Marcos revoked the temporary stay of Martial Law,

rescinding general order No. 17, which sanctioned free and fair debate on the new

168 Ben Lara, “Con-Con proposes a transition gov’t,” Philippine News, November 30-December 6, 1972,11.169 Charter crisis feared.”170 “For Defeat of new charter: Aliens aid the ‘antis’,” Philippine News, January 4-10, 1973, 9; “Foreign agents in RP?: Alien drive against martial law charged,” Philippine News, January 11-17, 1973, 1-13.171 “Foreign agents in RP?: Alien drive against martial law charged,” 1-13.

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Constitution, claiming that the roll back curbed increasing abuse of “free debates” by

subversive elements. In other words, Marcos charged his subversives were abusing the

democratic process. 172 Foiled assassination plots also appeared at politically

advantageous moments. At the start of the new charter election season, Philippine

officials identified Americans and “prominent Filipinos” that masterminded numerous

failed assassination attempts on Marcos—an early case used by the administration to

justify an extradition treaty with the United States. Another foiled assassination plot

would later appear the same week as the ratification election. 173 Even the timing of

Imelda Marcos’ failed assassination attempt by a man with a Bolo at Ngayong Pilipino is

suspect, occurring close to the new charter’s plebiscite. Imelda was attending the event as

the guest of honor for the awards ceremony for the National Beautification and

Cleanliness contest when she was attacked. 174 Officials linked the killed assassinator to

three individuals from “prominent Filipino families,” including Sergio Osmena III,

Eugenio Lopez, Jr., and Jesus Cabarrus, Jr.—three of Marcos’ chief political foes. 175

Facing mounting opposition to charter change, Marcos implemented the use of so-

called “Citizen Assemblies” in lieu of single-person private ballot to both hasten and

ensure the new charter’s ratification through Presidential Decree No. 8 6 issued on

December 31, 1972. The decree established 3,500 Citizens Assemblies in every barrio in

172 “Claim certain groups abuse ‘free debates.”173 “Red slay plot thwarted, PC claims,” Philippine News, January 18-24, 1.174 “Assassination Attempt: First Lady Now ‘Well and Safe,” Philippine News December 14-20, 1972, 1-12.175 “Three prominent Filipinos detained,” Philippine News, December 14-20, 1972, 1-15.

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the country and 1,000 in every ward of Manila. The Citizens Assemblies consisted of

registered “persons who are residents of the barrio, districts or ward for at least six

months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines,” and each Assembly

required a quorum of one-fifth of total membership living in the assembly’s

• • • • 17 • • • •jurisdiction. In addition to the lax residency requirements and very low quorum, each

Assembly would vote collectively by a show of hands in response to the following

questions:

(1) Do you approve of the citizens assembly as the base of popular government to decide issues affecting our people?

(2) Do you approve of the new Constitution?(3) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?(4) Do you want to hold elections in 1973 as provided for in the 1935

Constitution?(5) Of the elections in 1973 will not be held, when do you want to next elections

to be called?(6 ) Do you want martial law to continue? 177

Marcos justified the creation of the assemblies in order to “broaden the base of citizen

participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunities for the citizenry

to express their views on important national issues.” 178 Despite these expressed goals,

however, Marcos still warned “dissidents may be able to infiltrate these assemblies...in

such force as to suppress the free and untrammeled expression of the will of the

179 •people.” Marcos ignored earlier calls to postpone the ratification vote to February or

176 Philippine Presidential Decree No. 86 of December 31,1972, Creating Citizens Assemblies177 “US-style democracy dies in RP: President extends terms, signs new charter,” Philippine News, January 18-24, 1973, 1-15.178 Philippine Presidential Decree No. 86 of December 31, 1972, Creating Citizens Assemblies179 “Claims certain groups abuse ‘free debates.”

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March to allow for greater scrutiny and to accommodate late registrations. The threat to

reconvene Congress on the Constitutionally mandated 4 Monday of January led Marcos

to keep the elections as scheduled. The Citizens Assemblies met from January 10 through

the 15, and by January 18, 1973—a mere 45 days after the final draft of the new charter

was publically revealed—the new charter was successfully “ratified” under the aegis of

the military regime. Marcos’s railroading of the new charter vote was a brilliant legal

strategy to delegitimize his opponents. Further, the new charter’s “approval” accorded

Marcos the juridical cover to consolidate his Martial Law authority and power at the local

and national level.

U.S. Press Criticism

The diplomatic and media fallout from the January 1973 Con-Con Referendum

results triggered a wave of American Press criticism in the United States. Many national

newspapers, already “skeptical” of Marcos’s intentions of declaring Martial Law,

renewed their criticism of the regime. A brief New York Times editorial declared “Dark

days in Manila” because of Marcos “extended martial rule indefinitely while proclaiming

a new Constitution — one which,” according to the editorial, “even if it is eventually

invoked, would give him sweeping new powers.” 180 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch’s

January 19, 1973 edition quipped that there was nothing “democratic about the way”

Marcos extended his term in office, suggesting that Marcos declared Martial Law

iso “E(jjtorjais. Dark days in Manila,” New York Times, January 18, 1973,40.

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l O t

because “his own term of office under the old constitution.. .end[s] Dec. 31.” TIME

magazine’s January 29, 1973 issue declared the “fundamental purpose of the new

charter” was to establish a parliamentary government, which the paper lamented was a

“moot point” since “Marcos may rule by decree as long as he chooses.” TIME even

dwelled on Washington’s “muffled” and “cautious stance” due to “1) $1 billion in private

American business investment in the Philippines, and 2) strategic U.S. military bases

there”—military bases, particularly Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station

served as a staging ground for the Vietnam War. 182

In the aftermath of the January 18, 1973 plebiscite vote, Bernard Gwertzman of

the New York Times reported that although “high[-level] administration officials” in

Washington were “reportedly deeply concerned over the increasing movement towards

one-man rule in the Philippines” by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, officials decided to

pursue a “low-key” approach in public. 183 Even Newsweek joined the growing criticism,

noting that in the past months “Marcos’s law-and-order reforms have proved long on

order and woefully short on law” that “divested the country of its democratic institutions

[and] converted it into a new Asian dictatorship.” 184

The string of criticism purportedly stunned Marcos, forcing him to deny

publically his status as a dictator for the first time. He professed the Philippines was “still

181 St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial reprinted in “Guest Editorial: By show of hands,” Philippine News, Januaiy 25-31, 1973,4.182 “Farewell to Democracy,” TIME, January 29,1973, 31.183 Bernard Gwertzman, “Manila Trend to One-Man Rule Said to Worry U.S.,” New York Times, January 18, 1973, 8; “RP events ‘worry’ US,” Philippine News, January 25-31, 1973,1-7.184 “American Press Gets Critical of Marcos,” Philippine New, January 25-31, 1973, 1-15.

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under a presidential system” established by the Americans 26 years earlier, echoing

• 18Searlier assertions that Martial Law was not a military take over. As Marcos moved to

further consolidate his grasp on power, the administration and its critics would soon be

rocked by Ruperto Baliao’s defection as the Consul General of the Philippines’ Los

Angeles Consulate. Baliao’s defection would catalyze a string of events both in the U.S.

and the Philippines that fueled the growth of the Filipino American Anti-Martial Law

Movement.

Defecting Diplomat

Ruperto Baliao, acting General Consul of Los Angeles’ Consulate, defected on

Friday, May 18, 1973, requesting asylum in the U.S. 186 Having served the Philippine

government for 25 years and “regarded by so many circles” in the U.S. as a “loyal and

devoted Philippine government official,” the 47-year-old Baliao protested the “dictatorial

policies” of Marcos by “slashing] his left wrist with a razor blade in the office of the”

Los Angeles Times and “signed his name in his own blood to a document defecting from

the Philippine government and accusing] President Marcos of being a ‘New Hitler” in

his attempts to “extend Philippine martial law ‘in the United States’ to silence” dissent. 187

Coinciding with his appeal for political asylum, Baliao released a Philippine government

blacklist of 150 Filipino citizens in the U.S. 188 By revealing the names, he hoped to warn

185 “Marcos denies he is dictator,” Philippine News, January 25-31, 1973, 1-15.186 Al Martinez, “Philippines Consul Asks U.S. Asylum: Official in L.A. Defects, Calls Marcos ‘New Hitler,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1973,13.187 Lourdes A. Ongkeko, “Baliao defection reactions favorable,” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-11; Martinez, 13.188 Martinez, 13.

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those on the blacklist and accord them the opportunity to “request, if they wish,

protection and assistance.” Names on the blacklist appeared on two cablegrams, marked

“Confidential” and “Confidential-Secret,” dated April 25, 1973 from Manila to the

Philippine Ambassador [to the U.S., Eduardo Z. Romualdez,] in Washington, D.C. 189

Baliao also “disclosed a coded message” marked “secret.” The message was directed at

the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, and when deciphered purportedly read:

Secret - Upon... of President, endorsing his authority under Proclamation 1081 (martial law proclamation), you are hereby directed to cancel, repeat, cancel passports of Alejandro Esclamado, publisher of Philippine News, and all members of his staff. Make representations with local authorities, if necessary, to get their cooperation to ensure implementation of this order and take such other steps which will compel their return to the Philippines. Report full compliance immediately. 190

In addition to releasing the blacklist, Baliao urged Filipinos Americans to fight

Marcos’s proposed extradition treaty with the United States. Marcos had first proposed

an extradition treaty following a failed “assassination” attempt against him just months

earlier in December 1972 by an Americans in collaboration with “prominent

Filipinos.” 191 An extradition treaty, warned Baliao, if implemented would exacerbate the

current “harassing of Filipinos in the United States,” and a treaty “could be used by the

Marcos government as an instrument with which to extend the martial law rule in” the

189 “Embassy of the Philippines, Washington D.C.: The Ambassador’s Official Residence,” Philippine Embassy, accessed January 18, 2015, http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/philippines-dc/embassy-dc/.190 “150 names in ‘blacklist,” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-8.191 “Red slay plot thwarted, PC claims.”

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U.S. 192 The Philippine government tried its best to contain the controversy, attempting to

discredit Baliao. Marcos officials tried to explain Baliao’s defection was a result of “his

dissatisfaction over” his transfer to Pakistan, and that Baliao was wanted for charges of

“gun-running,” “immorality,” and “libel.” Baliao, however, secured a cabled response

from Carlos Romulo just a few hours before his defection discussing his promotion from

“First Secretary” to “Permanent Consul General” to Islamabad “in the interest and

exigencies of the service.” 193 He refused to return home to answer for the charges, and

dared Marcos to have Pacifico Evangelista, the succeeding Consul General of Los

Angeles, to sue him in the U.S. to answer for libel charges. By early June 1973, Baliao

had made his way to the East Coast, speaking at events against the Marcos regime at

venues in New York, New Jersey, Washington D.C. and Philadelphia. He even

entertained the possibility of raising a formal complaint with the United Nations

Commission on Human Rights for the administration’s human rights violations. 194

The Filipino American community received Baliao’s defection favorably. Many

in the Filipino American community in the Los Angeles area responded positively to

Baliao’s defection. A former leader of a Filipino American organization in Los Angeles,

who remained unnamed in the Philippine News, responded “It requires guts to do what he

did.” Other responses from anonymous respondents praised Baliao, “For once, there is

192 Nick G. Benoza, “Baliao urges: fight against proposed RP-US extradition pact,” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-10.193 “Consul Baliao: Denounces Marcos,” Kalayaan International, June 12, 1973, 1.; “Baliao refutes envoy’s denial,” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1-16.194 “Rebel Consul raises plaint to UN,” Philippine News, June 7-13, 1973, 1-13.

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someone who has the bravery to denounce a dictator who has changed the country from

one we all knew and loved to a country that is alien to us.” Another echoed the sentiment,

saying “It’s about time someone unveiled the truth.” A reporter for the Philippine

News—a publication which grew increasingly adversarial after revelation that its editor,

Alex Esclamado, was blacklisted—concluded:

All professionals interviewed were of the opinion that Consul Baliao should be praised for what he did. No one denounced his having gone to the LOS ANGELES TIMES to ‘tell his side of the story’ because the news media would be the sole means of getting at the core of what really happened.” 195

Many Filipinos, particularly those with relatives back in the Philippines, refused to react

to Baliao’s defections and Marcos’ actions publically because many feared reprisals. The

Philippine News grew to respect this growing community need for anonymity.

The Baliao blacklist featured a who’s who of progressive Filipino American

activists. 196 Filipino American youth activists in NCRCLP understood the Blacklist as a

tool of intimidation early on, particularly because the list exhibited numerous

inaccuracies in spelling people’s names. Florante Ibanez, an NCRCLP member listed

under number 52 on the April 26, 1973 blacklist recalled that although he and his fellow

activists did not take the list seriously, his parents warned him to stop his activities and

just “lay low .” 197 Teresita (Terry) Bautista, another NCRCLP member, listed number 2

on the April 25, 1973 blacklist, also continued her activities. “What I found out later was

195 Lourdes A. Ongkeko, “Baliao defection reactions favorable,” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-11.196 The complete Baliao Blacklist is reprinted in full: Nilo Sarmiento, “Counter-Offensive: The Blacklist Defense Committee,” Silayan, July 15, 1973,12-13 and “150 names in ‘blacklist’,” Philippine News, May 24-June 30, 1973, 1-8.197 Ibanez and Ibanez.

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that that was the name of a dead activist in the Philippines, it wasn’t even me in

particular,” she recalled. 198 Philippine citizens on the blacklist experienced difficulties

procuring official government documents, such as passports. Others on the blacklist were

barred from traveling to the Philippines altogether for security and safety reasons.

With many of its member blacklisted, NCRCLP pledged its support for Baliao

and those on the blacklist, organizing a 70-90 people rally on May 24 in San Francisco in

support of Baliao. 199 Baliao had fled to San Francisco to reunite with his family following

his defection in Los Angeles. At the rally, Baliao read his press release. The rally took

place outside the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, where Philippine Foreign

Affairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo was giving a speech promoting the New Society

before potential American investors.200 NCRCLP formed a “Blacklist Defense

Committee” chaired by Nilo Sarmiento which, according to an article in the

organization’s first and only Silayan newsmagazine, was formed to defend and to launch

a counter-offensive for those blacklisted.201

Within a week, NCRCLP’s Blacklist Defense Committee partnered with the

National Lawyers Guild in a class action lawsuit against the “Philippine Ambassador

[Carlos Romulo] and all consuls general in the United States” with the possibility of

including Lamberto Almeda who allegedly coordinated the information needed to

198 Bautista.199 “NCRCLP pledges its support for defecting diplomat,” Philippine News, May 24-30,1-11.2°° “pjijpjnos picket Romulo: Protest Blacklist-Support Consul Baliao!,” Kalayaan International, June 12, 1973,3.201 Sarmiento, 12-13; “Defense Committee Formed: Blacklisted Pilipinos Determined to Fight Back,” Kalayaan International, June 12, 1973, 13.

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compile the blacklist.202 The guild’s role in the lawsuit served as a reaffirmation of “its

standing commitment to provide legal assistance and support for U.S. Filipinos whose

rights are at stake as a result of harassment by President Marcos and his agents”—a

commitment reinforced at its national convention in February when members passed a

“pledge for legal assistance and support.” The guild’s Anti-Martial Law position took

form on September 22, 1972, the day of Martial Law’s implimentation, when one of its

members, Douglas Sorensen, “was arrested by Philippine soldiers inside Subic Naval

Base while handling the case of one soldier. Two of NLG assistants were subsequently

deported.” 203

In San Francisco, NCRCLP also held a joint program called “Bayang Mahal”

(Beloved Country) with the Filipino Forum, described in Kalayaan International as a

group “composed of concerned professionals and community persons held at Glide

Memorial Church.204 Baliao also served as the main speaker for NCRCLP’s June 16,

1973 program against the extradition treaty held at San Francisco’s Civic Center Plaza.205

Baliao’s defection also jumpstarted activities against the extradition treaty,

referred to as the “fugitive treaty” by the Marcos administration. Marcos had first

proposed the extradition treaty following an assassination attempt on his life in December

202 “On ‘Blacklist’: Class action suit up,” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1-16.203 “Nat’l Lawyers Guild pledges legal aid to ‘harassed’ Filipinos,” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1-16.204 “Filipino Forum, NCRCLP - ‘Bayang Mahal’: Baliao and Araneta Denounce Martial Law,” Kalayaan International, June-July 1973, 7.205 “Program on ‘blacklist,’ extradition,” Philippine News, June 7-13, 1973, 1-13.

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1 9 7 2 206 By early June, 1973, a national Stop the Extradition Movement (SEM) was

formed and headed by former Senator and former Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus,

former Consul Ruperto Baliao, and Raoul Beloso. An American priest, Rev. Fr. Bruno

Hicks served SEM’s national public relations coordinator.207 Baliao’s defection marked

the transition point for the emergence of a national U.S.-based opposition not inspired by

Leftist orientation, catalyzing the formation of the Movement for a Free Philippines and

emboldening Filipino American Leftist youth activist. Philippine News columnist and

Filipino exiled journalist, Hermie Rotea, for instance, analogized Baliao’s defection as

Marcos’s Watergate scandal, and it represented a fracture within Marcos’s very

administration.208

Baliao was the first high-profile defector from Marcos’s regime since the

beginning of Martial Law, and many others would follow. Months later in March 7,1974,

one of Marcos’s former Malacanang staffer, Elly Valez Pamantong would be the next

official to defect, but Baliao’s defection was far more damaging to the administration.

NCRCLP Transitions to KDP

Formed in direct response to the declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines,

NCRCLP was the largest and oldest US-based Anti-Martial Law organization. From its

founding on the same weekend as Martial Law declaration in September 1972, it

coordinated most if not all Anti-Martial Law activity in the country. The organization

206 “Red slay plot thwarted, PC claims.”207 Nick G. Benoza, “ ’Stop Extradition’ Drive Set in Motion,” Philippine News, June 7-13, 1973, 1-13.208 Hermie Rotea, “Baliao’s Defection Exposes Marcos’ Watergate,” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973,5.

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even managed to produce one publication of its planned monthly periodical Silayan,

meaning “observe.” Silayan, however, lasted only for one issue published on July 15,

1 9 7 3 209 Many 0f the members of NCRCLP, however, slowly transitioned into the newly

formed Katipunan ng Mga Democratikong Pilipino (KDP) starting in the summer of

1973.210

Not all NCRCLP members, however, transitioned into the KDP. Jaime Geaga, a

member of Los Angeles’s NCRCLP chapter recalls the original members of the Kalayaan

Collective (who transitioned into NCRCLP’s Bay Area Chapter) visited the different

NCRCLP chapters throughout the country. When they visited Los Angeles, they came

with an invitation to join a new organization called the Union of Democratic Filipinos

(KDP). Geaga recalls, “somehow of all the collectives [invited to join], our collective

[was the only who] said no.” Of the six members of the LA chapter, Geaga was the only

one who voted to join the KDP. Although Geaga could not recount the exact reasons for

the “No” vote, he hinted that part of the reason had to do with tensions over where to

focus their organizational activity: a focus on the Philippines or in the United States.

Geaga recalled a prominent critique was “We should really....build more the [United

States’] workers’ party.” This tension between Filipino homeland and Filipino American

issues evident in the LA Chapter’s deliberation over whether or not to join the KDP,

would later become a major tension within the KDP itself. The LA collective’s rejecting

209 “Silayan,” Kalayaan International, July-August, 1973, 6.210 NCRCLP’s Bay Area Chapter member & KDP founding member, Terry Bautista notes that the transition started as early as April 1973.

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an invitation to join the KDP meant that only 6 official members of the LA chapter

remained in NCRCLP when KDP announced its founding.211 Although not everyone in

NCRCLP joined the newly formed KDP, the transition was a timely one because the

organization was redbaited by September 1973 as noted in the next section.

The U.S.-based KDP, then, formed at the confluence of two streams: (1) Filipino

immigrant youth fleeing Philippine Martial Law functionally exiled due to their political

views and activism, and (2) Filipino Americans politicized in the milieu of the Civil

Rights and Anti-Vietnam War Movements. Drawing a substantial portion of its initial

membership from its predecessor the Kalayaan (Freedom) Collective, an underground

San Francisco Bay Area Anti-Imperialist Filipino organization, and Kalayaan’s parallel

organization the NCRCLP, Filipino youth mostly constituted the KDP. The formation of

the moderate-oriented MFP and the redbaiting of NCRCLP accorded Filipino youth

activists the ability to reassemble a brand new Leftist organization without hampering the

Anti-Martial Law Movement. Founded on the weekend of July 27-28,1973 by seventy to

eighty Filipino youth activists gathered in the mountains of Santa Cruz, the organization

championed a dual political line of: (1) realizing a socialist government in the U.S. and

(2) supporting the National Democratic Movement in the Philippines.212 Because KDP

(and later others in Anti-Martial Law Movement) activists viewed the Philippine Martial

Law regime as a “U.S.-Marcos Dictatorship,” the struggle against Philippine Martial Law

211 Geaga.212 “Nation-Wide Organization Formed: Founding Congress of the Katipunan Ng Mga Demokratikong Pilipino,” Kalayaan International, September 1973, 1-4.

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among members of the KDP entailed not merely a scaling back of Ferdinand Marcos’

totalitarian regime, but the realization of a truly free Philippine state unrestrained by

foreign political and economic influences.

KDP activist envisioned a U.S. strategy that operated on a multi-layered,

concentric “spheres of influence” concept to guide its Anti-Martial Law activity and

organizational structure. Within the entire American Universe, people would encounter

Anti-Martial Law activism in varying degrees based on Anti-Martial Law activity.

Someone entered the Fourth Sphere of Influence once they grew an awareness of

Philippine Martial Law, which typically occurred with KDP propaganda work, such as

flyering on the streets or at Filipino American functions, such as in front of the Philippine

Embassy or Consulate. Entering the Third Sphere of Influence entailed a mild

commitment, such as voluntarily and consciously attending a workshop for a few hours.

Second Sphere necessitated a conscious level of material or immaterial support for the

Anti-Martial Law Movement, which can be as little as sharing water with someone at a

protest event. First Sphere of influence necessitated a extreme level of commitment

where people organized for the Anti-Martial Law Movement, such as serving on a phone

bank, but were not involved in the day-to-day planning of Anti-Martial Law activity. The

Anti-Martial Law Movement’s Core Sphere of Influence consisted of KDP activists

involved in the day-to-day planning of Anti-Martial Law activity.213 These Spheres of

213 Carol Ojeda-Kimbrough, “Speaking Out About the Anti-Martial Law Movement” (paper presented at the Association of Asian American Studies Conference, San Francisco, California, April 16-19, 2014).

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Figure 1: KDP Anti-Martial Law Spheres of Influence

American Universe

Influence represented not only the ways in which everyday Americans encountered the

Anti-Martial Law Movement, but they also represented positions in which KDP activists

were assigned. That is to say, KDP activists were assigned to specific spheres based on

their assigned tasks.

Baliao’s “Disengagement” with NCRCLP

NCRCLP coordinated many activities and even supported defecting Consul

General Baliao. Returning in kind, Baliao collaborated with NCRCLP on Anti-Martial

Law rallies and events. Relations between the two, however, soured in September 1973

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when Baliao announced in a public statement his “disengagement” with NCRCLP

According to his public statement, Baliao had “suspected” NCRCLP’s penetration by

“Maoist Communist elements” as early as October 1972. His suspicions, however, were

not confirmed until he “obtained possession of incontrovertible evidence” that came from

a “Top American investigating agency in San Francisco”—later disclosed as the FBI—

and “by the very admission of NCRCLP’s national spokesperson in a correspondence

with MFP’s Raoul H. Beloso. Baliao found this Moist infiltration particularly

“reprehensible” and “unacceptable” because he found “communism ... incompatible with

civil liberties.” “I did not decide to campaign against President Marcos,” Baliao declared,

“just to help deliver the Philippines into the hands of the Communists,” asserting he

would prefer “President Marcos” over the Communists “a hundred times over” if he was

“made to choose between the two.” He vowed not to associate with any entity who, in his

view, sought “to undermine Philippine and American democratic institutions.” As a

consequence, Baliao announced no other choice but to “disengage” from NCRCLP unless

the “committee purge[d] its ranks of undesirable Communist elements.” 214 Baliao’s

Communist allegations may have even caused an internal split within in NCRCLP 215

The falling out between Baliao and NCRCLP may also have arisen from

intergroup competition within the U.S.-based Anti-Martial Law Movement itself. His

214 Nick G. Benoza, “NCRCLP unmasked: Filipino Movement in U.S. Exposed as Red-tainted,” Philippine News, September 20-26, 1973, 1-13. Baliao identified the name of the “top American investigating agency” in an open letter to California Democratic Senator Alan Cranston included in the same article.215 This hunch is subject to further inquiry, as one interviewee informed me that a group of people “tried to take over NCRCLP”—the details of which remained unelaborated in the interview.

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announcement to disengage with NCRCLP came just before MFP’s first national

convention on the one-year anniversary of Martial Law’s implementation. He would also

later swap sides, formally joining the MFP. Furthermore, Baliao did, in fact, “confirm”

his suspicion through correspondence with NCRCLP initiated by Raoul Beloso. Beloso

joined the MFP through an affiliate organization he founded called Filipinos for

Freedom. Beloso served as a commissioner and former chair of the Philippine Small

Farmer’s Commission under Marcos’ administration. Entering the U.S. on a tourist visa,

Beloso learned about Marcos’s declaration of Martial Law while “attending a conference

in New York.” 216 Angered by the development, Beloso wrote an open letter to President

Nixon that was printed in the New York Times—an act he later used as the basis for his

asylum request, which he later won on appeal on August 1, 1973.217

In his monograph on the MFP, Jose Fuentecilla notes, Beloso’s extreme

homesickness, isolation from family, and refusal to retract his letter drove Beloso to

commit suicide on April 6, 1975. Beloso’s body was eventually repatriated back to the

Philippines.218 Beloso played an important role in Baliao’s disengagement with

NCRCLP. Hermie Rotea, a close friend, reported in his Philippine News column that

Beloso personally “telephoned Baliao in San Francisco [from New York to] strongly

urg[e] him to break away from NCRCLP because of its alleged communist leanings,”

216 Fuentecilla, 5.217 Raoul H. Beloso, “Letter to President,” New York Times, November 15,1972, 47; Linda Greenhouse, “Ex-Manila Aide Plans to Test Fight Against Deportation From U.S.,” New York Times, July 30,1973,2; “U.S. Allows A Stay to Ex-Manila Aide,” New York Times, August 1, 1973, 5.218 “Deaths,” New York Times, April 12, 1975, 25.

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supplying the correspondence with NCRCLP chair Cathy Tactaquin as evidence. Baliao

hung up the phone on Beloso, who purportedly “threatened to attack Baliao if he didn’t”

break away from NCRCLP.219

In the wake of his discovery, Baliao shared his findings in an open letter to U.S.

Senator Alan Cranston—one of the early Congressional supporters of the Anti-Martial

Law Movement—published in the Philippine News. Announcing his motivations for

sharing the information, Baliao hoped

“that in planning and implementing measures aimed at alleviating the present situation in the Philippines” the Senator “and his government would also avail of the counsel and services of other legitimate Filipino libertarian movements in the United States, like the Movement for a Free Philippines, the National Association of Filipinos in the United States, and the Filipino Forum as well as to take into serious consideration [the] matter of communist exploitation of the legitimate

• • • • • • • • 990libertarian aspirations of Filipinos in America.

Baliao’s sentiments were not unlike those of his contemporaries, who while possibly

holding socially progressive values were tempered in the Cold War anti-communist

politics.

Baliao’s disengagement with NCRCLP became fodder for Marcos’ propaganda

machine in Manila which used the case to discredit the Anti-Martial Law movement.

New evidence has surfaced recently that Baliao’s defection was motivated by other

factors besides intergroup competition. A U.S. government cable reported that Marcos’

219 Hermie Rotea, “Baliao - left or right?,” Philippine News, February 28-March 6, 1974, 4-8.220 Nick G. Benoza, “NCRCLP unmasked: Filipino Movement in U.S. Exposed as Red-tainted,” Philippine News, September 20-26, 1973, 1-13.

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chief government media censor Primitivo Mijares—who would himself later defect to the

United States—accompanied Baliao’s younger brother, Vincent Baliao, to the U.S. with

the explicit purpose of obtaining a statement from the defected diplomat discrediting

NCRCLP weeks before Baliao released his statement. Baliao’s statement disengaging

from NCRCLP, according to the diplomatic cable, was authored by Primativo Mijares

and published in the Philippines by the Daily Express, and syndicated in other Filipino

American publications, upon Mijares’ return to Manila. United States embassy officials

speculated that the orchestrated statement “was timed to discredit NCRCLP on the eve of

221its planned Anti-Marcos Rallies” on the anniversary of Martial Law’s declaration.

Genesis of the Movement for a Free Philippines

Occurring on May 18, 1973, Baliao’s defection helped galvanize the formation of

a mainstream moderate U.S. based opposition led by Filipino exiled elites under the

leadership of former Philippine Senator and Con-Con Delegate Raul S. Manglapus. Jose

Fuentecilla, who authored Fight From A Distance, asserts MFP began at a May 19, 1973

gathering of students and young professionals at the Holy Name School on West 97th

Street in New York City borough of Manhattan. Because MFP’s beginnings occurred the

day following Baliao’s defection, it is reasonable to assert news of his defection led many

to take up the Martial Law issue with their collective efforts culminating into the MFP.

221 Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, to Secretary of State Washington DC, September 12,1973 [Online version, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=142650&dt=2472&dl=1345]; Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973-12/31/1978; Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-12/31/1978; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, MD. This diplomatic cable was declassified by the U.S. State Department in 2006 and became part of WikiLeaks’ 2010 mass release of U.S. diplomatic cables.

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The organization’s Holy Names School meeting in New York marked Manglapus’ first

appearance in the United States since the declaration of Martial Law. Manglapus

understood that he was a “prime target” for arrests by the Marcos regime, which he

evaded because he was abroad when Martial Law was declared. To the Marcos regime,

Manglapus was a powerful threat, for according to Manglapus, “Mr. Marcos was in fear

of four distinct but allegedly related plots with the common objective of seizing power: a

communist conspiracy, a Muslim independence movement, and a Christian Socialist

Movement and a rightist revolution and coup d’etat.” Manglapus founded the Christian

Socialist Movement in 1967 which he described as a

progressive alliance broadly based on the working class and embracing those in all classes who favored peaceful change, (that) could offer what the people really wanted - a political ideology, indigenous, Filipino, that could reorganize Philippine society and that would harmonize social justice with individual dignity.222

As a liberal during the Cold War period, Manglapus’ progressive politics were

limited only by his derision for what he would criticize as Leftist or communist

radicalism. At the New York meeting before an estimated crowd of 300 people, he

dismissed, and asked his followers to “ignore” Marcos’s threats against U.S. Filipinos as

“childish” and “idle.” He even issued a 5-point plan addressed primarily to Philippine

armed forces:

1) Restore civil liberties and release political prisoners immediately;2) Place the country under the provisional rule of a civilian council composed of

respected senior citizens who will pledge never to run for office in the future;

222 “Manglapus exhorts Filipinos in the US to ignore FM threats,” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973,1-11.

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3) Reconvene the Constitutional Convention and give it two weeks to eliminate the “obnoxious transitory provisions which gives Mr. Marcos dictatorial powers'” and other provisions which the delegates may have been forced to accept after the declaration of martial law such as the one on arrests and searches without court authority;

4) Submit the new constitution in separate questions to the people in a secret ballot plebiscite as provisioned in the 1935 constitution;

5) Set a definite date for elections under whatever constitution may be in force99 ̂after the plebiscite.

Notably, Manglapus’ plan to restore democracy to the Philippines borrowed from his

Leftist ideological opponents, the left-leaning NCRCLP, who first proposed the

restoration of civil liberties. His five-point proposal was even marred with confusion,

understandably so, over which constitution was currently in force in the Philippines.

Within the Anti-Martial Law discourse, however, Manglapus became the first major

Anti-Martial Law figure to question the true legitimacy of the January 1973 charter

asserting, “that the old charter, and not the ‘patently invalid’ 1973 version, is still in force

and therefore the Armed Forces no longer need obey their commander-in-chief after

December 30 this year [1973], the end of Marcos’ second term, as specified by the 1935

charter.” Manglapus’ December 30, 1973 deadline would later become a common point

of unity among Filipino American Anti-Martial Law activists.224 As an acclaimed orator,

following his May 24, 1973 speech in New York, Manglapus spoke to large audiences at

a number of universities in the East Coast before embarking on a West Coast speaking

tour. Large turnouts at his speaking engagements in the East Coast, according to the

224 Ibid. The full text of Manglapus’ New York speech was reprinted as a column in the Philippine New entitled “Philippine Martial Law: The Truth and the Fiction” on May 24-30, 1973 (p.1-4) and May 31-June 6,1973 (p. 1-4).

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Philippine News, indicated Manglapus’ success “in convincing people opposed to martial

law and Marcos that they have nothing to fear from Marcos in the United States” with

American politicians unwilling to support Marcos’s extension of Martial Law to the

U.S.225 While in San Francisco on August 11, 1973, Manglapus even accepted an

invitation from the city’s Commonwealth Club, refuting point by point Philippine

Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo’s defense of Marcos and Martial Law the previous

month 226

Manglapus meteoric rise as a prominent Anti-Martial Law leader fully crystalized

with MFP’s first national convention on September 22, 1973, where Manglapus was

elected the organization’s National President. The convention boasted 75 delegates from

11 states. Aside from the usual speechmaking, MFP also held discussions on the

organization’s support for the Filipino Freedom Fighters, a Philippine organization

described in Ang Katipunan as “(reportedly a ‘centrist’ organization opposing martial law

in the Philippines).”227

July 1973 Referendum

Manglapus’s December 30 deadline, proposed at a New York rally the day after

Baliao’s defection, caused speculation that Marcos was “preparing” efforts to “legitimize

225 “Manglapus to go on speaking tour in the West Coast,” Philippine News, June 7-13, 1973, 1-15. Manglapus’ speaking engagement itinerary included the major Filipino American population centers, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Stockton, Salinas, Vallejo, and San Jose.226 “Manglapus will refute Romulo on martial law,” Philippine News, June 14-20, 1973, 1-12.227 “MFP National Convention,” Ang Katipunan, October 1-15, 1973, 5.

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228his stay in power” beyond the expiration of his term of office on December 30,1973.

Sure enough, by mid-June 1973, Marcos ordered through Presidential Decree No. 227

during the period between Dr. Jose Rizal’s Birthday of June 19 and Philippine-American

Friendship Day on July 4, 1973 to serve as the barangay registration period for a national

election in which he sought a new mandate.229 Malacanang Executive mansion justified

the timing of the referendum “as a fulfillment of the promise of the President [under the

results of the January 1973 Referendum] to convene the barangays before the end of the

year” and the New Society government’s commitment to “consult with the governed”

promised in the wake of the January 1973 elections.230 The July 27, 1973 National

Referendum attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to not repeat the voting irregularities that

marred the charter plebiscite the previous January.

The entire election process, from its announcement to the final vote tabulation,

was as rushed as the January plebiscite. In fact, the Comelec used the exact same polling

places, and Marcos approved the revalidation of the voter list from the previous

election.231 Those allowed to participate included those registered to vote from age 15

and up, and some “qualified” political detainees held in military detention centers were

extended the vote.” Like in the January referendum, Comelec and local officials helped

228 “Manglapus to go on speaking tour in the West Coast,” 1-15.229 “Marcos to seek new mandate,” Philippine News, June 14-20, 1-12; “Comelec & metro mayors to step up barangay drive,” Philippine News, June 28-July 4, 1973, 9.2 0 “Marcos to seek new mandate.”231 “Comelec to use old polling places,” Philippine News, July 26-August 1, 1973, 11; “Second plebiscite slated on July 27,” Philippine News, July 5-11, 1973, 1.232 “Second plebiscite slated on July 27”; “IPC Zone detainees sign up for referendum,” Philippine News, July 19-25, 1973, 12.

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in promoting the upcoming elections.233 Pledging its neutrality, however, the Comelec

registered voters vigorously, and elections officials were granted exemption from the

evening curfew.234 By mid July, the Comelec had adopted a “series of resolutions

designed to ensure the sanctity of the barangay ballot.” As such, the July referendum

voting occurred by secret ballot in response to criticism over the January plebiscite’s “by

a show of hands” public voting system in the Citizens Assemblies.

Although the July 27, 1973 National Referendum solicited voter input on a whole

host of policy issues on the direction of the New Society, the most important issue for the

referendum concerned Marcos’s tenure as “President” under Martial Law. Unlike the

January 1973 plebiscite, Marcos did not suspend any provisions of Martial Law for the

polity during the election, despite advising voters to “speak freely and courageously”

through the barangay election. As such, elections under military rule unsurprisingly

yielded approximately a 95 percent affirmative vote to extend Marcos’s term in office

233 “Comelec & metro mayors to step up barangay drive,” 9; “Mayors intensify ‘yes’ vote campaign in Metro Manila,” Philippine News, July 26-August1, 1973, 10.234 “Comelec registrars exempt from curfew,” Philippine News, July 5-11, 1973, 9.235 “Sanctity of ballot assured,” Philippine News, July 12-18, 1973, 9.236 “One of 9 issues: Presence of US military bases decided in RP poll,” Philippine News, July 19-25, 1973, 1-13. Other issues include the establishment of ties with socialist and communist countries; the presence of American bases in the Philippines; The power and structure of local government and tenure of elect[ed] officials of these local governments; The performance of the various departments of Government including Government-owned or controlled corporations; The Green Revolution of Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the wife of the president; The convening of the interim National Assembly; The supremacy of civilian authority over that of the military; The martial law administration and the various reforms initiated by President Marcos under it.237 “President tells nation to vote courageously,” Philippine News, July 19-25, 1-13.

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among the 18 million votes cast.238 The “youth vote,” enlisted 15 to 18-year-olds, in

9 ^ Qparticular accounted for “almost one-hundred percent increase in the voters’ total.”

Even though election conditions in the Philippines were anything but “free and

fair,” many performed engagement in the electoral process. Marcos had successfully

transformed the “electoral process” into merely a performance of democratic legitimacy

that his regime most needed. Many Citizens in the Philippines only acquiesced to

Marcos’s electoral performance for he decreed mandatory registration and mandatory

participation in the elections through Presidential Decree 210 and 229. Despite

mandatory voter participation, many did not participate and government officials were

forced to expressed leniency for non-voters. “The government policy is to be strict in the

enforcement of the law to develop ‘voter discipline,” stated one government official, “but

at the same time to prevent mass inconvenience to the citizenry.”240 Following Marcos’

cultivated “benevolent dictator” public persona, the Comelec offered voters until

September 8, 1973 to file sworn statement or affidavits explaining their “neglect” to

partake in the July national referendum. “Should the excuse be found to be meritorious,”

clarified the Comelec, “the case against the voters shall be summarily dismissed.”241 The

Comelec would later extend the sworn affidavits deadline, citing difficulties for those in

238 “Barangay referendum: Marcos given nod; assembly rejected,” Philippine News, August 2-8 1973, 1-13.239 Bernardo De Leon, “Youth, views make it unique,” Philippine News, August 2-8, 1973,13.240 “Non-voters won’t be detained,” Philippine News, August 9-15, 1973, 11.241 “Truant voters get deadline,” Philippine News, August 16-22, 1973, 14.

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rural areas before dismissing the need for affidavits altogether because the bureau lacked

• • • • 242policies and administrative capacity to adjudicate cases of voter non-participation.

Princeton’s Imee Opposition

Princeton University became an important site of Anti-Martial Law activism

following speculation that Maria Imelda Marcos’ (better known as Imee Marcos) might

enroll. Imee attended Santa Catalina, an elite girl’s boarding school in Monterey,

California.243 In an interview with Myra McPherson of the Washington Post on January

1973, Imelda Marcos revealed that her daughter, Imee, was planning on attending

Princeton.244 By early April 1973, Princeton University’s student newspaper, the Daily

Princeton, picked up the story, spreading news of Imee’s probable attendance to the

broader campus community. In the wake of Imelda’s revelation, five students and one

professor led by Princeton student Alec Farquhar authored a joint letter criticizing

Ferdinand Marcos’s Martial Law policies; Imee as a potential target of political criticism;

and her potential bodyguard retinue.245 Issues raised in the Farquhar letter sparked a

robust debate among campus circles and student activists. Princeton University student

Kailim Toy and Physics Instructor Michio Kaku, in a letter to the Daily Princeton,

vehemently objected to Imee attending the university “on money extorted from her own

242 “Defaulting voters get grace,” Philippine News, September 13-19, 1973, 9-10.243 Imee enrolled in Princeton,” Philippine News, May 10-16, 9; Denny Chin, “President Marcos’ daughter Imee admitted to Princeton Class o f ’77,” Daily Princetonian, April 18, 1973, 1.244 “Asian studies oppose Imee’s admission at Princeton University,” Philippine News, April 19-25, 1973, 1-13; “Letters to the Editor: O f‘corrupt’ Asian dictators and old Nassau,” Daily Princetonian, April 9, 1973, 6-7; “Students Protest... Admission of Dictator’s Daughter,” Kalayaan International, May 1973, 5.245 The article reports the group consisted of: Alan S. Yee ’74, Alexander W. Farquhar ’73, Edgar G. Rios ’74, Ignacio Perez ’73, Nai-Pew Ong ’73, and Assistant Professor of Anthropology Stephen A. Barnett. Denny Chin, “Imee Marcos may join Princeton Class of ’77,” Daily Princetonian, April 6, 1973, 1-9.

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people,” and the potential disruption of campus life wrought by her bodyguards.

Reflecting an emergent Asian American student consciousness, Toy and Kaku closed

their letter by stating, “ ...we as Asians feel that admitting [Imee] would be similar to

admitting the daughter of Hitler during World War II.”246 In fact, Princeton’s Asian

American Student’s Association (AASA) took the helm over a coordinated student

response, leading activities against Imee’s admission. AASA even alleged that the

University violated its own policies by providing Imee advanced notice on her

acceptance.247 Imee received her acceptance notice in January despite the fact that formal

admissions notices were usually sent starting in April.

In a rally before the university’s McCosh Hall on Friday, April 13, 1973, a

speaker at the rally, Malayang [Free / Liberated] Filipino—described by the Daily

Princetonian as “an exiled Filipino student” and “spokesman for the militant student

Movement for Democratic Philippines”—deplored Imee’s admission and possible

attendance, cautioning Marcos’s “best security men,” many of whom “are of criminal

backgrounds,” posed a threat to the entire American Filipino population as well as to

Princeton’s Asian students. Malayang Filipino, the pseudonym used by the student

newspaper, also claimed that Marcos security agents posed a threat to the entire New

York and New Jersey area because “Marcos’s security men could gather the names of

any who expressed anti-Marcos sentiment and enable Marcos to prosecute their families

246 “Letters: ‘Hitler’s daughter,” Daily Princetonian, April 4-10,4.247 “Students Protest... Admission of Dictator’s Daughter,” 5.

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in the Philippines.”248 Notably, not everyone at Princeton opposed Imee’s attendance.

One student, Gary M. Hecht, supported Imee’s attendance in a letter to the student

newspaper, standing on principle that Marcos’s dictatorial policies should bear no

negative consequence on his daughter’s acceptance. “Education must foster

disagreement,” argued Hecht. Another student, Lee L. Kaplan penned a letter asking

students to “Give [Imee] a chance,” arguing that perhaps a Princeton education would

enlighten the dictator’s daughter to empathize with her father’s critics.

By April 17, 1973, Princeton University officials confirmed Imee’s admission,

which drew the ire of campus Asian American activists.249 AASA co-coordinator Alan S.

Yee expressed concerns over the University’s promise of “special agreements” over

Imee’s security detail. AASA co-coordinator Paul G. Okubo elaborated further, stating

“We feel that these special arrangements will threaten the well-being of Third World

students on campus, as has been stipulated in the rules and regulations of the

university.” Asian American student activists maneuvered quickly, meeting with

university officials before talks began over Imee’s security agreements.251 In an hour-

long meeting with university President Bowen and Dean of the College Neil L.

Rudenstein on the morning of Thursday, April 19, 1973, twenty people representing the

AASA, “the Central Committee of the Association of Black Collegians (ABC) and the

248 Denny Chin and Harry Irizarry, “Exiled Filipino warns Princeton of potential security guard problems,” Daily Princetonian, April 16, 1973, 10.249 “Asian studies oppose Imee’s admission at Princeton University,” 1-13.250 Denny Chin, “President Marcos’ daughter Imee admitted to Princeton Class of ’77,” Daily Princetonian, April 18, 1973, 1; Imee enrolled in Princeton,” 9.251 “Clarification,” The Daily Princetonian, April 19, 1973, 8.

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University Action Group (UAG), and three faculty members” reached three points of

agreement:

• The university will not conceal any security arrangements concerning Marcos;• The university will attempt to conclude negotiations in the matter as promptly as

possible, although no definite deadline was set;• Representatives of the AASA will plan an integral part in the process of

formulating security arrangements if and when Marcos advises the university of9 S9her desire to enroll next fall.

These points of agreements were secured a few days before Imee expressed a desire to

attend the university. Imee never formally accepted the admissions offer using the

traditional method. Rather, on May 1 the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations,

Ernesto Pineda, contacted Princeton University Dean of Student Affairs Adele S.

Simmons regarding Imee’s interest in attending the University, pending a “clearer sense”

of security issues, which the University understood as “constituting] in some way or

9another [Imee’s] notification to the university.”

With confirmed interest in attending Princeton, Asian American activism

continued through security talks with Philippine and University officials. In addition to

meeting with University security officials, Philippine Military Attache Domingo visited

Princeton on an “exploratory” junket—a reconnaissance mission to survey the campus.

Asian American student activist, incorrectly believing Domingo came to negotiate, were

disappointed with his unresponsive attitude. At West College on May 16, Domingo was

252 Denny Chin, “Student delegations consider Marcos security procedures,” The Daily Princetonian, April 23, 1973, 1-2.253 Denny Chin, “Marcos indicates interst in Princeton,” The Daily Princetonian, May 1, 1973, 1.

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met by students shouting, “You’ll be standing in front of a firing squad of the New

People’s Army” and “Lackey go home.” Demonstrators carried placards reading, “No

Filipino Goons on Campus” and “Princeton Trains Dictator’s Successor.”254 Still other

student protesters indicated their fear of potential surveillance by Marcos agents by

placing paper bags over their heads.255 American journalist Helen Y. Zia, who was an

Asian American Student activist attending Princeton University at the time described the

meeting as “extremely unsatisfactory” and served as “an example of how the university

has been leading us along.” In fact, university officials appeared to drag the issue along

as long as possible, only finalizing the security issue in the summer. Perhaps the

administration hoped the summer break would diffuse the student movement.

Many activist feared Marcos agents were surveilling Anti-Marital Law activists in

the U.S. and in cities where Philippines consulates operated—a fear validated by the

Philippine’s Los Angeles General Consul Ruperto Baliao’s defection days later.

Notably, Marcos would eventually admit months after going into exile in 1986 to having

surveilled Filipinos in the United States using four Philippine intelligence agencies. Of

the four agencies, Marcos named three specific Filipino intelligence agencies operating

254 “Picket at Princeton U,” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1.255 Denny Chin, “Marcos talks touch off picketing of West College,” The Daily Princetonian, May 18, 1973, 1; “Imee stirs furor anew at Princeton,” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-10.256 Steve Freedman, “Filipino ex-diplomat attacks Marcos spying, blacklisting,” The Daily Princetonian, May 30, 1973, 1-4.

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through Philippine consulates, including the National Intelligence Security Authority, the

National Bureau of Investigation and the Presidential Security Commission.257

Undoubtedly, Asian American student protests influenced Imee’s security

arrangements. In a letter to Ernesto Pineda, the Philippine Ambassador to the UN

stationed in New York City, Princeton University’s Dean Simons asserted, “as required

by law” only security personnel pre-approved by “state and local officials and the

president of the university” would be allowed to carry guns on campus. Simons continued

that the University President was only willing to authorize “U.S. Secret Service agents or

U.S. State Department security personnel to carry guns” on campus. Moreover, Dean

Simmons also asserted that it will not provide any student records of any kind to the

Marcos family or the Philippine government “beyond that which is normally available to

our students and their families.” The issue over Imee’s security was finally resolved

shortly before she arrived on campus for Freshman orientation on Tuesday, September

11, 1973. Pineda announced that Imee “will not be accompanied by a Philippine security

agent on campus.”259

Throughout the whole ordeal, members of the public kept speculating on the size

of Imee’s security team, which during her time at the private boarding school in

Monterey, California started at 3 and promptly spiked to 7 security guards with the

257 “Marcos Is Said to Admit to Spying Activity in U.S.,” Washington Post, July 16, 1986, A 19.258 “Marcos’s Daughter Will Live Off the Princeton U. Campus,” New York Times, September 8,1973, 68.259 Denny Chin, “Marcos arrives here, attends frosh activities,” Daily Princetonian, September 12, 1973,1; “Beleaguered Marcos enrolls: Marcos Arrives,” Daily Princetonian, September 11, 1973, 5.

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960 • •declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines in September 1972. The security issue

raised by Asian American activists also affected Imee’s accommodations, and she settled

with living off campus at 231 Dodds Lane in Princeton.261 Imee earlier expressed a desire

to live in the dorms “if it could possibly be arranged,” but the Marcos’ switched to off

campus housing for security purposes, settling for “one Philippine security person” and a

Filipino chauffer to drive her “to and from the University.”262 The following semester,

Imee, however, had her chance at trying out her first residential preference, moving into

228 Henry Hall, a dormitory on campus without security agents. Her privacy was

“violated,” however, when the campus newspaper printed her new address despite her

objections. Imee objected on the grounds that publically announcing her address

constituted, in her words, “an invasion of my privacy—whatever of that is left” because

the “[Daily] Princetonian,’ she keenly observed, is ‘not only read by students.”263

Another student, Carl I. Moses echoed Imee’s outrage, criticizing the paper for exposing

her unguarded campus address to “anyone who picks up the Daily Princetonian”—an act

that in his estimation “jeapordiz[ed] her safety.” Notably, publication of addresses were

not uncommon in newspapers of the time. Imee remained at Henry Hall for only a week

before moving out on the “recommendations from university officials” following the

kidnapping of media heiress Patricia Hearst by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)

260 Denny Chin, “Asian-American students protest against security for Imelda Marcos,” Daily Princetonian, July 24, 1973, 3.261 “Unusual Freshman Has a Wish: She’d Like to Become an Ordinary One,” Daily Princetonian, September 27, 1973, 7.262 Denny Chin, “President Marcos’ daughter accepts offer to Class of ’77,” Daily Princetonian, May 4, 1973, 1; Denny Chin, “Marcos chooses to live off-campus,” Daily Princetonian, September 11,1973, 1-3.263 Denny Chin, “Marcos to live in Henry without security force,” Daily Princetonian, February 1, 1974.

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in Berkeley. Hearst was a college student at UC Berkeley who was kidnapped by the

SLA from her Berkeley apartment. Her kidnapping, along with the fact that the SLA

claimed “ideological ties with the people’s struggle in the Philippines” terrified the

Marcos’. In response, Anti-Martial Law forces vehemently denied any ties with the SLA,

denouncing the group’s actions.264

Despite Marcos’s concessions to Anti-Martial Law student activists and a human

interest story on Imee published on the front page of the Daily Princetonian expressing

her quest for the “life of an average student” while defending her father’s political record

in the Philippines, Imee was implicated, yet again, at a performance at McCarter Theatre

on October 8, 1973 where a Philippine’s Bayanihan Dance troupe performance

promoting Philippine tourism featured Imee’s special guest appearance. Activist charged

that the state-subsidized troupe was “being used for propaganda purposes by ‘the Marcos

dictatorship.”265 Anti-Martial Law forces on campus and the surrounding area appeared

to make Imee’s stay uncomfortable. In addition to rallies, prominent Anti-Martial Law

activist frequented the campus. NCRCLP National Spokesperson Melinda Paras visited

the university in February 1973, even authoring an opinion piece for the university

newspaper criticizing Imee’s admission.266 Epifanio San Juan Jr., a member of NCRCLP

and KDP, also spoke at an event sponsored by the Third World Center and the English

264 Tom Monahan, “Marcos deserts dorm for increased security,” Daily Princetonian, February 14, 1974, 1- 2; “Anti-Martial Law Groups Respond to Marcos and the SLA,” Ang Katipunan, February 15, 1975, 5.265 “Demonstration,” Daily Princetonian, October 9, 1973, 2.266 Denny Chin, “Filipino activist Paras draws Vietnam parallel,” Daily Princetonian, February 15, 1973, 1- 5; Melinda Paras, “Marcos’ henchmen,” Daily Princetonian, April 26, 1973, 6.

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department on “the struggle for freedom by Filipino peasants under” Marcos’s regime in

February 1974. Imee attended the event and remained silent except for “an occasional

grimace.”267 Walden Bello, a graduate student at Princeton University, who would later

join the KDP, returned to the US in early 1973 from fieldwork in Chile to defend his

thesis perhaps also played a substantial role in campus activism against Imee’s security

agents. Notably, Imee eventually settled for a private home in Princeton that would

later be turned over to Crazon Aquino’s government after Marcos’s ouster as part of the

larger goal of recovering the billions plundered and salted away by the Marcos’ while in

office.269

The Anti-Martial Law activism surrounding Imee’s Princeton attendance must be

understood alongside Marcos’s suppression of student activism throughout the

Philippines. In particular, the heavy surveillance, monitoring, and curtailment through

violence and torture of student activists in the Philippines contextualize the importance of

Filipino American students protesting Imee’s Princeton attendance, for it expressed youth

solidarity with activists in the homeland. Student activists daringly subjected Imee to

similar issues many student activists in the Philippines were experiencing under her

father’s rule.

267 Joanne Csete, “San Juan censures Marcos regime, scores policy of ‘U.S. imperialism,” Daily Princetonian, November 27, 1973.268 Walden Bello, “Pacific Panopticon,” New Left Review, no. 16 (July-August 2002), 77, available online http://newleftreview.org/II/16/walden-bello-pacific-panopticon.269 Mike Orszag, “Marcos holdings may include area properties,” Daily Princetonian, February 7, 1986, 3- 10.

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Conclusion

This chapter analyzes the negative aftermath of the January 1973 Plebiscite and

the events in the U.S. that catalyzed the formation and growth of a Filipino American

opposition to Marcos’s Martial Law regime. By focusing on these organizations, I do not

suggest that Anti-Martial Law opposition existed solely in organizational frameworks.

Instead, charting the conflicting and shifting coalitions of Anti-Martial Law organizations

provides a valuable window into the cleavages of Filipino American society. A series of

events unraveled in early 1973 to establish a robust opposition movement cutting across

ideological stripes. One survey by the Philippine Study Group conducted through a

questionnaire published in Chicago Philippine Times’ September 30, 1973 issue, for

instance, found 61.3 percent of respondents “strongly disapproved compared to a 11.1

percent who strongly approved of Martial Law. Regardless of his intentions, 65.5 percent

of respondents believed a few of Marcos promises would be achieved; 13.4 percent

believed most of his promises would be achieved while 1.6 percent believed all of his

promises would be achieved. When asked to select the “bad effects” of Martial Law, the

percentage of respondents who checked off: Civil Liberties were 87 percent; Press

Censorship 86,6 percent; and Establishment of a dictatorship was 81.1 percent.270 The

Philippine underground press, including BMP - Balita ng Malayang Pilipinas and

LIBERATION newspaper, syndicated the survey’s results and used it counterpropaganda

purposes.

270 “Chicago: Survey Reveals U.S. Filipinos Strongly Reject Martial Law,” Ang Katipunan, April 3, 1974, 5.

I l l

Although much more scrutiny must be applied to the Philippine Times survey

(particularly regarding randomization, distribution of respondents, and sample size), if

judged adequate, the survey suggests a majority of Filipino Americans, particularly those

who follow developments in the Philippines, strongly disapproved of Marcos’s Martial

Law regime; believed Martial Law was an attempt to extend Marcos’s term in office; and

that the U.S. Anti-Martial Law forces were successfully framing Martial Law as a serious

problem among Filipino Americans cognizant of political homeland issues.

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CHAPTER 4:

CONCLUSION:

A FLEETING POINT OF UNITY

Within a year of Martial Law’s declaration, the Philippines underwent a radical

shift in government structure from the Asian showcase of democracy to fascist

dictatorship and witnessed the establishment of security state bent on crushing and

thmanaging dissent. September 11, 1973 marked Ferdinand Marcos’s 56 birthday, and the

censored Manila press reported a “working birthday” for Marcos.271 A diplomatic cable

from the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, William Sullivan, however, reported

Marcos’ birthday “was a two-day blast [that began September 10] carefully orchestrated

by his wife Imelda” interrupted only by Manila Cardinal Rufino Santos who passed away

September 3. In fact, “all work came to a halt,” complained Sullivan, as “senior officials

of government, the top military brass, and chiefs of diplomatic missions... were paraded

through the ceremonies.”

Amid Marcos’s celebrations emerged signs the administration had grown

completely drunk on power. On the second day of Marcos’s birthday festivities

coordinated by Imelda, Juan Ponce Enrile recounts a “big and grandiose” party was

hosted at Malacanang palace garden on the bank of the Pasig River with many figures

from the “cream of Philippine society” attending, among them included Imelda’s

personal courtier of Blue Ladies and their husbands, “members of the cabinet, generals,

271 “President at his desk on his 56th birthday,” Philippine News, September 20-26, 1973, 9.

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and cornels, politicians, local and foreign bankers, businessmen, and foreign diplomats”

and their spouses. During a “lull” in the program, Imelda approached the microphone and

“asked the military to contribute its share to the festivities,” cuing the exit of General

Romeo Espino (the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines); General Fidel V.

Ramos (the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary); General Rafae Zagala (the

Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force); and Admiral Hilario Ruiz (the Flag

Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy). The five generals reappear with General

Fabian Ver dressed

in artificial straw skirts and high-heeled shoes. They had garlands around their necks and they were wearing bras to complete their costumes. Their lips were painted red with lipstick. The band played a Polynesian tune, and the six generals danced the “hula.” They wiggled and sashayed in front of the guests with their hands raised and rolled above their shoulders.272

Enrile’s account notes the only attendees amused by the display were Imelda, the Blue

Ladies and their husbands, and Ferdinand Marcos. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the

Philippines, reported of Marcos’ birthday festivities:

In general, every aspect of the occasion was too much, too long, and in questionable taste. For example, all general officers in the armed services (Constabulary Commander Ramos excepted) were required, as part of the palace floor show, to parade in garish female attire. This caused much grumbling among military hierarchy, and wives of service chiefs stood conspicuously in a grim, unsmiling phalanx throughout the hilarity.273

272 Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir, ed. Nelson A. Navarro (Quezon City: ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), 392-393.273 Sullivan.

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Notably, the sources above pin the entire show on Imelda, blaming her for “browbeating”

high-ranking military into submission. The drag show, then, represented to observer

Imelda’s display of her growing power and influence.

FFF & its December Ultimatum

Raul S. Manglapus, leader of the Movement for a Free Philippines, was neither

the first person to question the conduct and results of the January 1973 Con-Con

plebiscite nor the first person to raise the significance of December 30, 1973 as the

expiration date of President Ferdinand Marcos’s constitutional permissible term of office.

Manglapus’ turned the date, however, into a major speaking point, and his prominence as

an emerging Filipino American Anti-Martial Law Movement leader gave the date a new

level of importance. Inspired by Manglapus’ major speaking point, a group in the

Philippines calling itself the Filipino Freedom Fighters (FFF) amplified the date’s

meaning when they set December 30, 1973 as the deadline for an ultimatum to Marcos.

In early September, the FFF began widely circulating open letters serving as its

manifesto.274 A version of the letter, dated October 9,1973, was reprinted in full in the

December 6-12 issue of Alex Esclamado’s Philippine News. The FFF described itself in

moderate terms:

We are not politicians, oligarchs or rightist. Neither are we communist, radicals or subversives. We are but plain and simple citizens whose principal concern and burning desire is to preserve democracy as a way of life for Filipinos. And while

274 “Warning to Marcos...”, Ang Katipunan, October 16-31, 1973, 1-3. The article states the letter was “dated September 8[, 1973] and circulated in Greater Manila.” FFF’s next letter dated December 1, 1973, however, claimed its last letter appeared “last September 21st...”

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the tile of our organization may sound militant and while we do have Army Officers within our ranks, we are essentially men of persuasion.

FFF claimed Marcos’s term of office “expire[d] at noon December 30,1973,” and the

group—echoing the Biblical phraseology (read here as a signature of Manglapus’s

Christian Socialist Movement)—urged “Marcos to “submit” himself “to the people in an

election that is truly free.”275 The FFF outlined in length their preconditions of what

constituted free and fair elections, which among them included a sufficient period to

freely and fully debate the issues and candidates; removal of partisan officials among the

Comelec and Armed Forces; and a third-term ballot option for those that favored Marcos’

extended rule. According to the Ang Katipunan, the FFF existed months before issuing

the ultimatum letter to Marcos. In addition to “disseminating several statements on their

political position,” Major Antonio Luna of FFF’s “Counter Propaganda Corps”

denounced Marcos’s establishment of a dictatorship. In another statement, Captain Jose

Llaner of FFF’s “Field Command No. 175” urged unity “among Filipinos in the struggle

to restore freedom and democracy.”276

Despite FFF’s “moderate” self-description espoused in its letter, discussions over

MFP’s support of the organization took a controversial turn at its National Convention in

September 1973. Detroit delegate Dr. Norberto Portugal requested MFP first check “with

the American Embassy in the Philippines or with the CIA to verify whether the FFF was

275 Notably, FFF’s phraseology borrowed from the Bible. James 4:7 states “Submit therefore to God. Resist the devil and he will flee from you.” James 4:8 “Draw near to God and He will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners; and purify your hearts, you double-minded.”276 “Warning to Marcos...”

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in any way connected with the Communists” as a precondition to receiving MFP support.

A number of delegates at the convention raised the point that any challenge to Marcos’s

American-backed Martial Law regime would in perception of the U.S. government

constitute a Communist threat. In the deliberations, Manglapus and Charlie Avila, in the

position as “MFP special projects committee chairmen” professed that they “knew who

the members of FFF were” but were unable to “divulge the names of the people behind

the group composed of nationalist businessmen on the grounds of security.” Dr. Portugal

rescinded his objection upon Manglapus’ plea “to trust him and not the U.S. Embassy nor

the CIA,” and MFP presumably endorsed FFF.277

With Anti-Martial Law activists in the Philippines resorting to hand delivered

mimeographed letters, another piece of FFF correspondence emerged in December 1,

1973 and was reprinted in the Philippine News.2™ FFF’s December 1973 letter indicted

the regime for its contributions to what Marcos dubbed the “sick[ness]” of the “old

society” that produced the conditions necessary for a so-called “New Society.” Within

my survey of the Filipino American press, Marcos failed to dignified FFF’s ultimatum

letter with a response. He appeared content with having called and successfully “won” an

extended term of office beyond the December 30, 1973 deadline through the July 1973

Referendum. Also serving as Philippine National Hero Jose Rizal’s execution

277 “Warning to Marcos...”278 Alex Esclamado, “The Firing Line: Marcos, the cause of the Philippine problem?,” Philippine News, January 17-23, 1974, 1-5; Alex Esclamado, “The Firing Line: Marcos the cause of the Philippine problem?,” Philippine News, January 24-30, 1974, 1-8.

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anniversary, the December 30, 1973 deadline came to pass without the coup d’etat

promised by the FFF.

FFF’s “Counter-Intelligence”

Despite FFF’s promise to “restore democracy” to the Philippines if Marcos failed

to do so through free and fair elections, the December 30 deadline came and went without

any reported coup attempts. In fact, on December 30, 1973, Marcos issued a series of

Presidential Decrees improving benefits and remuneration received by members Armed

970Forces of the Philippines. Following the slow news developments common at the end

and beginning of the calendar year, FFF reemerged in the headlines on February 1974,

having purportedly grown to recently assemble “secret units” in America. In a press

release, the group claimed to having purposely limited its membership size “to screen out

Marcos agents and to maintain secrecy.” With its membership composed mostly of

Filipino professionals, exiled government officials, businessmen, students, clergymen,

and retired military officers, each member in the organization was purportedly assigned a

“code name” with “specific functions” according to each members’ “special

qualifications and skills.” According to the release, FFF already assembled or was in the

process of assembling chapters “in major metropolitan areas in the U.S. and Canada”

with two explicit goals to expose the truth about Marcos’ dictatorship, and to “monitor

and record all the ‘treacherous acts’ of Filipino organizations and individuals who”

support Marcos’ regime in words and/or deed. FFF claimed five distinct tactics:

279 “After Dec. 30, 1973: Marcos still wields power, makes vows,” Philippine News, January 3-9, 1974, 1- 13. For details, see Presidential Decrees 358-361.

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1) Infiltration of Filipino governmental, diplomatic, professional, business, religious, cultural and social circles;

2) Careful selection and recruitment of some of the established members of these various organizations abroad;

3) Identification and listing of all Marcos supporters, propagandist and spies inside and outside of Philippine government agencies in the US and Canada;

4) Documentation of all propaganda campaigns of Marcos collaborators; and5) Collection of dates recorded in newspapers, photographs, audio tapes of

public speeches, souvenir programs, Balikbayan promotional literature, pro- Marcos publications and all other forms of propaganda material.

FFF stopped short of a fully explaining the purpose of the gathered information,

mentioning merely the “probability’ that all of the data obtained will be transmitted to the

underground forces in the Philippines.” The fear of the data transfer manifested itself in

Philippine News ’ follow-up question, which inquired if the data was intended to “be used

against Marcos sympathizers and collaborators...[and] their innocent relatives in the

Philippines”—a question refused by FFF’s anonymous press informant.280

Filipino American community reaction to FFF varied considerably. In a purported

follow-up letter, the “F.F.F. of N.Y.C.” wrote Philippine News editor Alex Esclamado to

reiterate that the members of the organization were neither “terrorists” or “foreign agents

engaged in espionage or any kind of subversive action against a lawfully constituted

government.” Rather, they claimed to be a “law-abiding” group of citizens working to

restore “lawful democratic government to the Filipino people.” The letter even offered an

accounting of the group’s U.S. activity with the Chicago chapter coordinating activities

throughout the American Midwest, and New York chapter coordinating activities in New

280 “Counter-Intelligence move in U.S.: F.F.F. Blacklisting Pro-Marcos Agents,” Philippine News, February 28-March 6, 1974, 1-16.

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Jersey, Washington D.C. and Baltimore. Members from both the Chicago and New York

chapters, asserted the writer, “met recently in Jersey City” to better coordinate work

between the two chapters. Another letter, signed “R.D.” from California, facetiously

opined, “maybe, their [FFF] effectiveness could be hampered by the publicity made of

their existence and their planned activities,” for revealing so much, endangered their

anonymity. “I don’t believe they could remain anonymous for a very long time,” joked

R.D. Other editorial, however, was far more direct. One letter, signed “ANTI-F.F.F. IN

THE U.S.” responded laughing, “Ha, ha, ha! FFF terrorist in the United States do not

scare us. The F.B.I. and the CIA will also operate quietly and they will surely find them

out and quickly deport these undesirable aliens.” The letter continued to praise Ferdinand

Marcos as “a living saint,” before closing by rebranding FFF’s acronym to stand for:

“FAILURE, FAILURE, FAILURE.”

To date, my study of the Filipino American press (up to April 1974) has not

turned up additional mention of FFF. Notably however, the organization resurfaced in

May 1975 FBI files following the submission of a “bomb threat” to various entities,

particularly those that purportedly harbored pro-Marcos members. A May 1,1975 FBI

memo to two people (described as neighbors of in Sacramento, CA

and three others in Oakland, CA received a 3 Vi inch by 6 inch white envelope.

Notably some of the letters included educational material in the form of newspaper

articles by Filipino dissidents in the U.S. Although recipients of the letter and their home

addresses remain redacted, one organization recipient has been declassified. One of the

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letters was addressed to the Director of San Francisco’s Model Cities program, which at

the date of the letter was Reverend Dr. John E. Watts.281 FFF’s letter to Model Cities,

dated February 25, 1975 reads:

FROM: FREEDOM FIGHTERS

STOCKTON 3

TO: DIRECTOR

OUR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE VERRIFIED ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ SPY OF FASCIST DICTATOR FERDINAND MARCOS. IT IS CONFIRMED THAT HE IS SENDING NAMES OF PEOPLE ACTIVE IN ANTI-MARTIAL LAW MOVMENT, TO BE BLACK LISTED BY THE MARCOS DIC-TATOR GOV ‘ T.

HE IS THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE. HE IS THE TARGET OF

BOMB.282

SUGGEST YOU KEEP HIM OUT, BEFORE ACTION TAKEN. WE

ARE WATCHING YOUR OFFICE.

FREEDOM FIGHTERS

LONG LIVE THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !283

281 Joseph L. Alioto Papers (SFH 5), San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library, San Francisco, CA; Reverend Dr. John Watts was born October 19, 1936 and died on April 25, 2008 in Evergreen, Alabama according to his obituary found at “Notice, Condolence,” Times-Herald, April 29-May 1, 2008, accessed March 26, 2015. http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/timesheraldonline/obituary.aspx?n= john-watts&pid= 108626615.282 According to the document, the word “BOMB” is printed on “red tape measuring .76 x 0.23 inches.

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Although the name implicated in FFF’s letter to Model Cities above is redacted, a

possible person could be Vivencio D. Gomez, who was appointed by the Filipino

American Mission Organization (FAMO) of San Francisco to Model Cities Board of

Directors in November 1973.284 This claim, however, assumes a Filipino American was

the intended target of the letter and one of the highest-ranking Filipino members of

Model Cities.285 Despite these assumptions, Gomez is still a plausible target of the letter.

The FBI and U.S. Postal Inspector conducted lab work on the letters in order to

determine the model and make of the typewriter used to produce the letter. When both

agencies failed to turn up any finger prints or additional leads and after Sacramento and

San Francisco FBI divisions failed to uncover “any information relating to the prior

existence of the Filipino Freedom Fighters, Stockton 3” in either the areas of Stockton,

Oakland, or Berkeley, officials deemed no additional investigation was warranted and

closed the case by August 1975. In fact, as early as May 1975, officials believed FFF’s

“existence in the United States is unknown and unverified,” but suspected “its possible

presence in the southern regions of the Philippines.”286

283 Sac, San Francisco to Director FBI, May 1, 1975, “Filipino Freedom Fighters Stockton 3 Bomb Threat to284 “Filipino named to Model Cities board,” Philippine News, November 22-28, 1973,2. According to the California Death Index corroborated by his obituary [“Funeral Notes,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 2, 1985, 16.], Vivencio Dajeme Gomez was born in the Philippines on November 19, 1914 and died in San Francisco on July 1, 1985.285 Per law, the FBI is obliged to redact names of living persons. I plan to submit Vivencio D. Gomez’s obituary to the FBI with another request for documents pertaining to the Filipino Freedom Fighters. My suspicions will be confirmed if the returned documents leave Gomez’ name un-redacted.286 Sac, San Francisco to Director FBI, May 1, 1975.

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Coda: A Fleeting Point of Unity

With no way to identify who was behind the FFF organization and no way to

authenticate all FFF correspondence, the significance of the FFF incident, then, lies in the

humor deployed by Filipinos in response to the organization. The organization

threatened to trap the Filipino American community in the impossible position between

Marcos’s regime of torture and FFF’s purported mission to restore “democracy” to the

Philippines by replicating the same terror machine it sought to undermine. Thus, the

Filipino American response through the use of jokes sought to taunt the hypocrisy of

FFF’s tactics as a grasp for agency in a seemingly impossible positionality.

This historical study of the events in the first year and a half of Philippine Martial

Law and its effects on the Filipino American community ends at a fleeting point of unity

amongst politically and ideologically divided U.S.-based Anti-Martial Law opposition

groups. When Marcos ignored the December 30 deadline, the major Anti-Martial Law

organizations held a “unity” meeting in New York City. Notably, Marcos first used the

call for “unity” during the declaration of Martial Law—channeling the purported

collectivist project of the New Society. Five organizations: the Friends of the Filipino

People (FFP), an organization founded a month prior in November 1973, composed of

mostly non-Filipinos academics that advocated for a U.S. non-military interventionist

approach; the Katipunan ng Mga Democratikong Pilipino (KDP); the Movement for a

Free Philippines (MFP); the National Association of Filipinos in the United States

(NAFUS); and the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the

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Philippines (NCRCLP), released a joint press statement that marked an unprecedented

• • 9 O 7point of unity among a diverse group of competing organizations. Together, the

organizations articulated a demand on the U.S. government to end economic and military

aid to the Marcos’ regime, which represented the next tactical shift in the movement.288

On more practical terms, the dismissal of the December 30 ultimatum signaled for

opposition forces and observers within the Filipino American community Marcos’

entrenchment within the Philippine Presidency. This entrenchment, then, would be next

met with coordinated actions that would animate the movement decade to follow until the

August 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, which marked the unraveling of Marcos’

dictatorship.

“Unity...Magkaisa!:New Organization Founded to Oppose U.S. Intervention in Philippines,” AngKatipunan, November 11-30, 1973, 6.288 “Unity Meeting In New York: Marcos Denounced by Filipino Groups,” Ang Katipunan, January 15, 1974, 5.

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ACRONYMS

AAS Princeton University ’ s Asian American Student’s Association

Comelect Commission on Elections

Con-Con Constitutional Convention

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines (Chinese Maoist orientation)

FFF Filipino Freedom Fighters

FFP Friends of the Filipino People

Huk Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon / Hukbalahap / Anti-JapanesePeople’s Army

KDP Katipunan Ng Mga Demokratikong Pilipino / Union of DemocraticFilipinos

KM Kabataan Makabayan / Patriotic Youth

MFP Movement for A Free Philippines

NCRCLP National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in thePhilippines

NLG National Lawyers Guild

NPA New People’s Army

PFAC Pilipino Flood Assistance Committee

PKP Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas / Communist Party of the Philippines(Soviet Stalinist orientation)

SEM Stop the Extradition Movement

SIPA Search to Involve Pilipino Americans

SLA Symbionese Liberation Army

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REFERENCES

Primary SourcesPeriodicals:

Ang Katipunan

“Anti-Martial Law Groups Respond to Marcos and the SLA.” Ang Katipunan, February 15, 1975,5.

“Chicago: Survey Reveals U.S. Filipinos Strongly Reject Martial Law.” Ang Katipunan, April 3, 1974, 5.

“MFP National Convention.” Ang Katipunan, October 1-15, 1973, 5.“Unity Meeting In New York: Marcos Denounced by Filipino Groups.” Ang Katipunan, January 15, 1974, 5.

“Unity...Magkaisa!:New Organization Founded to Oppose U.S. Intervention in Philippines.” Ang Katipunan, November 11-30, 1973, 6.

“Warning to Marcos...” Ang Katipunan, October 16-31, 1973, 1-3.

Daily Princetonian

“Beleaguered Marcos enrolls: Marcos Arrives.” Daily Princetonian, September 11,1973,5.

Chin, Denny. “Asian-American students protest against security for Imelda Marcos.” Daily Princetonian, July 24, 1973, 3.

--------------- . “Filipino activist Paras draws Vietnam parallel.” Daily Princetonian,February 15, 1973, 1-5.

--------------- . “Imee Marcos may join Princeton Class of ’77.” Daily Princetonian, April6, 1973, 1-9.

--------------- . “Marcos arrives here, attends frosh activities.” Daily Princetonian,September 12, 1973, 1.

--------------- . “Marcos chooses to live off-campus.” Daily Princetonian, September 11,1973, 1-3.

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--------------- . “Marcos indicates interst in Princeton.” The Daily Princetonian, May 1,1973, 1.

--------------- . “Marcos talks touch off picketing of West College.” The DailyPrincetonian, May 18, 1973, 1.

--------------- . “Marcos to live in Henry without security force,” Daily Princetonian,February 1, 1974.

--------------- . “President Marcos’ daughter accepts offer to Class of ’77.” DailyPrincetonian, May 4, 1973, 1.

--------------- . “President Marcos’ daughter Imee admitted to Princeton Class of ’77.”Daily Princetonian, April 18, 1973, 1.

--------------- . “President Marcos’ daughter Imee admitted to Princeton Class of ’77.”Daily Princetonian, April 18, 1973, 1

--------------- . “Student delegations consider Marcos security procedures.” The DailyPrincetonian, April 23, 1973, 1-2.

Chin, Denny and Harry Irizarry. “Exiled Filipino warns Princeton of potential security guard problems.” Daily Princetonian, April 16, 1973, 10.

“Clarification.” The Daily Princetonian, April 19, 1973, 8.

Csete, Joanne. “San Juan censures Marcos regime, scores policy of ‘U.S. imperialism.” Daily Princetonian, November 27, 1973.

“Demonstration.” Daily Princetonian, October 9, 1973, 2.

Freedman, Steve. “Filipino ex-diplomat attacks Marcos spying, blacklisting.” The Daily Princetonian, May 30, 1973, 1-4.

“Letters to the Editor: Of ‘corrupt’ Asian dictators and old Nassau.” Daily Princetonian, April 9, 1973, 6-7.

“Letters: ‘Hitler’s daughter.” Daily Princetonian, April 4-10, 4.

Monahan, Tom. “Marcos deserts dorm for increased security.” Daily Princetonian, February 14, 1974, 1-2.

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Orszag, Mike. “Marcos holdings may include area properties.” Daily Princetonian, February 7, 1986, 3-10.

Paras, Melinda. “Marcos’ henchmen.” Daily Princetonian, April 26, 1973, 6.

“Unusual Freshman Has a Wish: She’d Like to Become an Ordinary One.” Daily Princetonian, September 27, 1973, 7.

Kalayaan International

“300 Denounce Marcos Fascism At Local Consulate.” Kalayaan International, October- November 1972, 9.

“Concerned Pilipinos Mobilize for Flood Relief.” Kalayaan International, August- September 1972, 20.

“Consul Baliao: Denounces Marcos.” Kalayaan International, June 12, 1973,1.

“Defense Committee Formed: Blacklisted Pilipinos Determined to Fight Back.” Kalayaan International, June 12, 1973, 13.

“Filipino Forum, NCRCLP - ‘Bayang Mahal’: Baliao and Araneta Denounce Martial Law.” Kalayaan International, June-July 1973, 7.

“Flood Committee Report.” Kalayaan International, October-Novemberl972,13.

“Kalayaan’s Philippine News Service.” Kalayaan International, June, 1973,1.

“Marcos Agents Harass KTVU For NCRCLP TV Show.” Kalayaan International, December 1972-January 1973, 16.

“Nation-Wide Organization Formed: Founding Congress of the Katipunan Ng MgaDemokratikong Pilipino.” Kalayaan International, September 1973, 1-4.

“NCRCLP Consolidates.” Kalayaan International, November-December 1972, 10.

“NCRCLP Organizes Anti-Martial Law Protests in 7 Cities.” Kalayaan International, October 1972, 1-9.

“People’s News Agency Formed!.” Kalayaan International, June, 1973, 1-3.

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“Pilipinos Picket Romulo: Protest Blacklist-Support Consul Baliao!.” Kalayaan International, June 12, 1973, 3.

“Rally to the NCRCLP.” Kalayaan International, October-November 1972, 8.

“Silayan.” Kalayaan International, July-August, 1973, 6.

“Students Protest... Admission of Dictator’s Daughter.” Kalayaan International, May 1973,5.

“Symposium on Martial Law Held Oct. 28.” Kalayaan International, October-November 1972, 8.

Los Angeles Times

Martinez, Al. “Philippines Consul Asks U.S. Asylum: Official in L.A. Defects, Calls Marcos ‘New Hitler.” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1973,13.

Manila Times

Soliven, Maximo V. “By the way: US nutribun gifts get diverted.” Manila Times, July 22,1972, 5.

New York Times

“32 Perish in Luzon Floods; The Toll in Japan Put at 61.” New York Times. July 13, 1972, 38.

Beloso, Raoul H. “Letter to President,” New York Times, November 15, 1972, 47.

“Deaths,” New York Times, April 12, 1975, 25.

“Editorials: Dark days in Manila.” New York Times, January 18, 1973, 40.

Greenhouse, Linda. “Ex-Manila Aide Plans to Test Fight Against Deportation From U.S.” New York Times, July 30, 1973, 2.

Gwertzman, Bernard. “Manila Trend to One-Man Rule Said to Worry U.S.” New York

129

Times, January 18, 1973, 8.

“Marcos’s Daughter Will Live Off the Princeton U. Campus.” New York Times, September 8,1973, 68.

“Most of Manila Swept by Flood: Philippine Death toll rises.” New York Times, August 2,1972,1.

“Philippine Counts the Huge Cost of Flood Damage and Looks Abroad for Aid.” New York Times, August 15, 1972, 66.

“Philippine Fears Food Riots as Flood Recede.” New York Times, August 5, 1972, 3.

“Philippine Flood Death Rise to 427.” New York Times, August 7, 1972, 5.

“Philippine Toll at 454; Cholera Adding to Deaths.” New York Times, August 8,1972.

“Philippines in Flood Appeal.” New York Times. August 16, 1972, 26.

“Thousands Are Evacuated As Waters Rise in Luzon.” New York Times, July 31, 1972, 53.

“U.S. Allows A Stay to Ex-Manila Aide.” New York Times, August 1, 1973, 5.

Philippines Mail

Arcellano, Roy E. “Editorial: Quid Pro Quo.” Philippines Mail, December 1972, 2.

Philippine News

“$50-M US aid to RP.” Philippine News, November 2-8, 1.

“150 names in ‘blacklist.” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-8.

“150 names in ‘blacklist’.” Philippine News, May 24-June 30, 1973, 1-8.

“2 Truckloads of Relief Goods Seized From Customs Official’s House.” Philippine News, November 2-8, 1972, 8.

130

“83 delegates sign declaration on bombing.” Philippine News, September 28-October 4,9.

“After Dec. 30, 1973: Marcos still wields power, makes vows.” Philippine News, January 3-9, 1974, 1-13.

Alfaro, Alberto. “P5.1-Billion Budget Okayed,” August 17-23, 1972, 9

--------------- . “Prelude to Martial Law?: Aquino Bares Plan to Put Greater ManilaUnder PC.” Philippine News, September 21-22, 1972, 9.

“American Press Gets Critical of Marcos.” Philippine New, January 25-31, 1973, 1-15.

“Asian studies oppose Imee’s admission at Princeton University.” Philippine News, April 19-25, 1973,1-13.

“Aspiras named czar of tourism.” Philippine News, May 17-23, 1973, 13.

“Assassination Attempt: First Lady Now ‘Well and Safe.” Philippine News December 14-20, 1972, 1-12.

“Baliao refutes envoy’s denial.” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1-16.

“Ban-FM Proposal Defeated in Convention.” Philippine News, September 14-20,1972,9.

“Barangay referendum: Marcos given nod; assembly rejected.” Philippine News, August 2-8 1973, 1-13.

Benoza, Nick G. “’Stop Extradition’ Drive Set in Motion.” Philippine News, June 7-13,1973,1-13.

--------------- . “Baliao urges: fight against proposed RP-US extradition pact.” PhilippineNews, May 24-30, 1973, 1-10.

--------------- . “NCRCLP unmasked: Filipino Movement in U.S. Exposed as Red-tainted.”Philippine News, September 20-26,1973,1-13.

--------------- . “NCRCLP unmasked: Filipino Movement in U.S. Exposed as Red-tainted.”Philippine News, September 20-26, 1973, 1-13.

Bernardo De Leon, “Youth, views make it unique.” Philippine News, August 2-8, 1973, 13.

131

“C-C opens info drive.” Philippine News, December 21-27, 1972, 13.

“Charter confab completes task.” Philippine News, December 7-13, 1972, 1-16.

“Charter crisis feared.” Philippine News, December 21-27, 1-14.

“Charter voting is reset.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 1-3.

“Christian-Muslim Feud: Spillover Into Sulu Feared.” Philippine News, September 14- 20, 1973, 12.

“Claim certain groups abuse ‘free debates.” Philippine News, January 11-17, 1973, 1-15.

“Cleanup Drive: Purge of local gov’t starts.” Philippine News, November 16-22,1972, 1-11.

“Comelec & metro mayors to step up barangay drive.” Philippine News, June 28-July 4, 1973, 9.

“Comelec registrars exempt from curfew.” Philippine News, July 5-11, 1973, 9.

“Comelec to use old polling places.” Philippine News, July 26-August 1, 1973, 11.

“Communist Party Factions’ Politburo Members Named.” Philippine News, September 14-20,1972,13.

“Constitutional Convention site bombed; 14 injured.” Philippine News, September 28- October 4, 1972, 9.

“Convention Shelves Ban-FM Bid Anew.” Philippine News, September 7-13,1973,10.

“Counter-Intelligence move in U.S.: F.F.F. Blacklisting Pro-Marcos Agents.” Philippine News, February 28-March 6, 1974, 1-16.

“Crime rate drops in Luzon areas: PC cites effects of martial law.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3,1973, 11.

“Defaulting voters get grace.” Philippine News, September 13-19, 1973, 9-10.

De Leon, Francisco. “Marcos Okays P5.15-B Budget.” Philippine News, September 21, 1972, 10.

132

“Demonstrators vs. Martial Law picket RP consulates in US.” Philippine News, October 12-18, p.1-5.

“Despite Infiltration: No Foreign Troops Vs. RP Reds—FM.” Philippine News,September 14-20,1972, 9.

“Editorial: New Society reforms at stake in plebiscite.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3,1973,4

Esclamado, Alex. “The Firing Line: Marcos the cause of the Philippine problem?.” Philippine News, January 24-30, 1974, 1-8.

----------------. “The Firing Line: Marcos, the cause of the Philippine problem?.”Philippine News, January 17-23,1974, 1-5.

“Fear of Another Vietnam Cited,” Philippine News, October 12-18, 1972, 1-5.

“Filipino named to Model Cities board.” Philippine News, November 22-28, 1973, 2.

“FM Allays Fears on Martial Law.” Philippine News, September 21-27, 1972,1-16.“FM says liberals meeting with Reds.” Philippine News, September 21-27,1972, 9.

“For Defeat of new charter: Aliens aid the ‘antis’.” Philippine News, January 4-10,1973, 9.

“Foreign agents in RP?: Alien drive against martial law charged.” Philippine News, January 11-17, 1973, 1-13.

“Giving gifts to public officials is now a crime.” Philippine News, November 16-22,1972, 10.

“Guest Editorial: By show of hands.” Philippine News, January 25-31, 1973, 4.

“Guidelines for mass media in the Philippines.” Philippine News, October 5-11,1972, 13.

“House Defense Committee Finds Red Threat Real.” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1972, 12.

Ilustre, Jennie L. “Woman power in new Charter.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972- January 3, 1973, 10.

“Imee enrolled in Princeton.” Philippine News, May 10-16, 9.

133

“Imee stirs furor anew at Princeton.” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-10.

“IPC Zone detainees sign up for referendum.” Philippine News, July 19-25, 1973, 12.

“Joint plebiscite campaign.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973, 9.

“Judgment by the people: Vote on RP Charter is verdict on Marcos.” Philippine News, December 7-13, 1972, 1-8.

“Judgment by the people: Vote on RP Charter is verdict on Marcos.” Philippine News, December 7-13, 1972,1-8.

Lara, Ben. “Con-Con proposes a transition gov’t.” Philippine News, November 30- December 6, 1972, 11.

Lescaze, Lee. “The Muslim Problem—From Abroad.” Philippine News, September 14- 20, 1973, 12.

Lourdes A. Ongkeko, “Baliao defection reactions favorable.” Philippine News, May 24-30.1973.1-11.

Maliwanag, Vincent. “Enrile Insists Martial Law Still Remote.” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1972, 9.

Manglapus, Raul S. “Philippine Martial Law: The Truth and the Fiction.” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1973, 1-4.

--------------- . “Philippine Martial Law: The Truth and the Fiction.” Philippine News, May31-June 6, 1973, 1-4.

“Manglapus exhorts Filipinos in the US to ignore FM threats.” Philippine News, May 24- 30, 1973, 1-11.

“Manglapus to go on speaking tour in the West Coast.” Philippine News, June 7-13,1973.1-15.

“Manglapus will refute Romulo on martial law.” Philippine News, June 14-20, 1973,1-12.

“Marcos denies he is dictator.” Philippine News, January 25-31, 1973, 1-15.

134

“Marcos to seek new mandate.” Philippine News, June 14-20, 1-12.

“Martial law ‘effects’ suspended for polls.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972- January 3, 1973, 1-3.

“Martial law rule bucked: FM poises revolutionary gov’t.” Philippine News, January 4-10, 1973, 1-15.

“Martial law’s legality questioned: Detainees seek high court ruling.” Philippine News, October 5-18,1972,1-11.

“Mayors intensify ‘yes’ vote campaign in Metro Manila.” Philippine News, July 26- Augustl, 1973, 10.

“Media advisory council created.” Philippine News, May 17-23, 1973, 16.

“Military courts set up, jurisdiction defined.” Philippine News, October 5-11, 1972, 9.

“Nat’l Lawyers Guild pledges legal aid to ‘harassed’ Filipinos.” Philippine News, May 31-June 6,1973,1-16.

“NCRCLP pledges its support for defecting diplomat.” Philippine News, May 24-30, 1-11.

“New probe rules for civil servants.” Philippine News, October 12-18, 1972, 9.

“Non-voters won’t be detained.” Philippine News, August 9-15, 1973,11.

“On ‘Blacklist’: Class action suit up.” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1-16.

“One of 9 issues: Presence of US military bases decided in RP poll.” Philippine News, July 19-25, 1973, 1-13.

Ongkeko, Lourdes A. “Baliao defection reactions favorable.” Philippine News, May 24- 30, 1973, 1-11.

“Opposition to new RP Charter mounts: Barrera, Roxas fire salvos against draft.” Philippine News, January 4-10, 1973,1-15.

“Oust-DM Move May Backfire on FM Men.” Philippine News, September 14-20, 1973, 9.

135

“P10-M Relief Aid in Pampanga Investigated, Philippine News.” Philippine News, November 9-15, 1972, 11.

“Philippine News Sources.” Philippine News, July-August, 1973, 2.

“Picket at Princeton U.” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973, 1.

“Plebiscite for new RP Charter set in January next year.” Philippine News, November 30- December6, 1972, 1-8.

“President at his desk on his 56th birthday.” Philippine News, September 20-26,1973, 9.

“President tells nation to vote courageously.” Philippine News, July 19-25, 1-13.

“President’s address to the nation after imposing martial law.” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972,1-11.

“Program on ‘blacklist,’ extradition.” Philippine News, June 7-13, 1973, 1-13.

“Rebel Consul raises plaint to UN.” Philippine News, June 7-13, 1973, 1-13.

“Red slay plot thwarted, PC claims.” Philippine News, January 18-24, 1.

Rotea, Hermie. “Baliao’s Defection Exposes Marcos’ Watergate.” Philippine News, May 31-June 6, 1973,5.

----------------. “Baliao - left or right?.” Philippine News, February 28-March 6, 1974, 4-8.

“Roxas, Aquino answer Marcos.” Philippine News, September 21-27, 1972, 10.

“RP events ‘worry’ US.” Philippine News, January 25-31, 1973, 1-7.

“Sanctity of ballot assured.” Philippine News, July 12-18, 1973, 9.

“Second plebiscite slated on July 27.” Philippine News, July 5-11, 1973, 1.

“Thousands of firearms surrendered.” Philippine News, October 12-18, 1972, 9.

“Three prominent Filipinos detained.” Philippine News, December 14-20, 1972, 1-15.

“Total firearms yielded: 250,000.” Philippine News, November 2-8, 1972,1.

136

“Transcript of Marcos interview in NBC’s ‘Meet the Press.” Philippine News, October 19-25, 1972, 12.

“Truant voters get deadline.” Philippine News, August 16-22, 1973, 14.

“U.S.-FM Bombing Plot Charged.” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1973, 12.

“Under Martial Law Philippines Calm and Peaceful: Civil Rights Unimpaired.”Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972, 1-8.

“US-AID fund to flood-hit areas.” Philippine News, December 21-27, 1972, 13.

“US-style democracy dies in RP: President extends terms, signs new charter.” Philippine News, January 18-24, 1973, 1-15.

Velarde, Emmie G. “Youth for new voting age of 18.” Philippine News, December 28, 1972-January 3, 1973,10.

Villa, Sol L. “C-C Also votes for No Reelection: 8-year term for Presidency.” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1972, 9.

Villa, Sol L. “Delegates’ Ban Revived In Convention.” Philippine News, September 7-13, 1973, 10.

“Violence Flares Up in 4 South Provinces.” Philippine News, September 21-27, 1972, 9.

“Word war on bombings, martial law decried,” Philippine News, September 28-October 4, 1972, 12.

“Yielded firearms total 416,045.” Philippine News, November 16-22, 1972, 12.

San Francisco Chronicle

“Funeral Notes.” San Francisco Chronicle, July 2, 1985, 16.

Silayan Newsmagazine

Sarmiento, Nilo. “Counter-Offensive: The Blacklist Defense Committee.” Silayan, July 15, 1973,12-13.

137

Times-Herald

“Notice, Condolence.” Times-Herald, April 29-May 1, 2008. Accessed March 26, 2015. http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/timesheraldonline/obituary.aspx?n= john-watts&pid= 108626615.

TIM E Magazine

“Farewell to Democracy.” TIME, January 29, 1973, 31.

Washington Post

“Marcos Is Said to Admit To Spy Activity in U.S.” Washington Post, July 16, 1986, A19.

U.S. & Philippine Government Documents:

Alioto, Joseph L. Papers (SFH 5), San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library, San Francisco, CA.

General Order No. 12 (1972)

Presidential Decree No. 86 (1972).

Presidential Decree No. 227 (1973)

Presidential Proclamation No. 1081. (1972)

Sac, San Francisco to Director FBI. May 1,1975. “Filipino Freedom Fighters Stockton 3 Bomb Threat to

Sullivan, William H. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, to Secretary of State Washington DC, September 12, 1973.http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=:142650&dt=2472&dl=1345]; Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1973-12/31/1978; Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973- 12/31/1978. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59. National Archives at College Park, MD.

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Oral History Interviews:

Habal, Estella. Interview by author. 20 March 2014. San Jose, CA.

Geaga, Jaime. Interview by author. 2 August 2014. San Diego, CA.

Ibanez, Rose and Florante Ibanez. Interview by author. 16 July 2014. Carson, CA.

Bautista, Terry. Interview by author. 3 March 2014. Oakland, CA.

Sally [Pseudonym] Interview by author. April 11, 2014. San CA.

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