TILBURG UNIVERSITY IP PROGRAM DEMOCRACY AND TILBURG UNIVERSITY IP PROGRAM DEMOCRACY AND COSMOPOLITANISM 2013. COSMOPOLITANISM 2013.

ANCIENT COSMOPOLITANISM. ANCIENT COSMOPOLITANISM. THE STOICSTHE STOICS

Maftei Stefan, PhD, Department of Philosophy“Babeş-Bolyai” University, Cluj, Romaniastmaftei@yahoo.com

““Cosmopolitanism”Cosmopolitanism” Generally, the term cosmopolitanism (gr. kosmopolitês, ‘’citizen of the world) defines a

view focused on the idea that “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community”. Kleingeld and Brown show that cosmopolitanisms are particularly diverse: various versions of cosmopolitanism perceive the community differently. They differ by focusing either on political institutions, or on moral norms, or on “shared markets and forms of cultural expression”. Every cosmopolitanism will see the “universal community of world-citizens” as a “positive ideal”. However, sometimes this idea serves only to deny “the existence of special obligations to local forms of political organizations”. Cosmopolitanisms differ also on their understanding of citizenship. There are also literal or metaphorical readings of the notion of ‘world-citizenship’. (Kleingeld & Brown, 2013)

Nowadays, philosophical cosmopolitanisms focus particularly on the reevaluation of the notion of “world fellowship” or “world citizenship” with respect to the new social, political and economical developments in the new interconnected, networked, globalized, and inter-dependent world. The emergence of the new global society will raise not only hope for positive visions of the future, such as the “new cosmopolitanism” of the postmodern sociology (Fine 2007), but also a number of fears and concerns regarding the nature, the legitimacy and the political and judicial effectiveness of cosmopolitan ideas, especially in the field of international law and international politics, regarding the functioning of the international judicial system and the international political system (the UN, the WTO) – i.e. issues such as civil wars and their legitimacy, wars between countries, the rights of the POWs, the rights of persons deemed as ‘terrorists’, the punishment of “crimes against humanity” and the effectiveness of international penal law-courts – and political issues, such as the “humanitarian military interventions” in Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Irak, an issue which opened a lot of political and theoretical debates in the last decade.

Short History of Ancient Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan IdeasCosmopolitan Ideas

The political writings of Plato and Aristotle generally do not endorse cosmopolitan views, i.e. ideas of ‘world citizens’ or ‘fellow humans’. They will endorse, nevertheless, the idea of a human kind, or of mankind.

Vth and IVth century Greeks usually kept a very strict division between “Greeks” and others, “barbarians”, as well as between classes, ‘high-birth’ (noble) and ‘low-birth’, or between rich and poor, free and slave, male and female, adult and child. The division between Greeks and the rest is sometimes substituted by a division of mankind in itself, between “Greeks” and “barbarians”.

Some nuances can be observed already in the case of the Sophists, e.g. Antiphon, in his few remaining fragments:

Our prevailing class distinction between those of high and low birth, which goes back to Homer and is still with us, has created within our society a division like that conventionally drawn between Greeks and barbarians, so that this gulf which we imagine separates us from foreigners exists in our own midst, and the two sections of our community do not understand each other, any more than we Greeks understand the Egyptians. Such a cleavage is wrong, whether in our own society or in the wider world. For by nature Greeks and barbarians are alike, as a study of their essential attributes will show. After all, the operation of breathing, like all our necessary physical processes, is common to the entire human race. Antiphon, quoted in Baldry, 1965, 44.

Short History of Ancient Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: PlatoCosmopolitan Ideas: Plato

Scattered fragments against slavery can be found in IVth century authors auch as the orator Alcidamas: God has left all men free, nature has made no man a slave (Baldry, 1965, 60).

Plato, however, remains reluctant to the idea of the ‘world fellowship’, as the Republic exemplifies. The philosopher is by nature the superior type, fitted for the task of knowing the Good and for ruling. The philosopher’s place is thus outside and above the real city (at least outside the society of IVth century Athens, as the comedian Aristophanes suggests). Rep. 469 c-e; 487d-489b.

However, in the ideal city and not the real one, philosophers are kings, and thus one with the city. Philosophers are neither “wise statesmen”, nor the men of “practical wisdom”, as in Isocrates’ case, but are endowed with wisdom that comes from the knowledge of universal truths. They are the possessors of genuine statesmanship, that are able to distinguish between what is good and what is bad for the city. (Baldry, 1965, 75). There is, nevertheless, a complete unity and fellowship in the Platonic Republic, there is a communism of property and women in the ideal city, but only among the wise. The ideal city is divided into classes. The unity of the ideal state depends on the inequalities, that will ultimately bring harmony into the city, as Plato suggests.

Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: PlatoIdeas: Plato

Plato will later have an influence upon the political vision of the Stoics, not because of this theory of inequality, but because of other ideas revealed in the Republic and other dialogues.

First, there is the idea of a moral city or a city of virtuous people, which are striving towards the common good, a good which can be known only by the philosophers. Only when their moral virtues will be perfectly harmonized with the virtue upheld by the state in the persons of the philosophers, will they have no more need for politics, i.e. debating, arguing, fighting, quarrelling, judging etc.

Then, there is the idea of a polis which is kept in harmony by the bonds of an order, which are the same bonds of the ordered cosmos. This is the origin of the later famous Stoic idea of a “cosmic city”, governed by harmony and love, an idea that Socrates puts forward in the Gorgias (Gorg. 507 e ff.): “[the man who merely follows his appetites] will be beloved neither by his fellow men nor by God. He is incapable of joining in a community, and where there is no sense of community (koinõnia), there ca be noi love. According to the wise, Callicles, both heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by sense of community and love and orderliness and self-control and justice, and this is why they call this universe a cosmos, a world of order, and not a world of disorder and licence.”

In his later dialogues (Statesman 262 c-d), Plato (with Socrates) will disregard the idea of distinguishing between “Greek” and “barbarian”, thus indirectly suggesting that the idea of dividing humanity is yet another prejudice of the Greeks. But earlier texts, such as the Republic (469b-471c) still talk of a pure “race” of the Greeks and of the natural enmity of the Greeks towards the “barbarians”, in the words of the same character: Socrates.

“I affirm that the Hellenic race (Ἑλληνικὸν γένος) is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian.” “Rightly,” he said. “We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, ( πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι) and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity.” (470 d-e)

Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: AristotleIdeas: Aristotle

Aristotle will not endorse cosmopolitan views. He will nevertheless pave the way for future developments in the Stoic political theory, especially regarding the natural law theory.

As a biologist, Aristotle, following the thoughts of naturalistic philosophers such as Anaximander and Anaxagoras, introduced the idea that man is the only living creature endowed with reason, and that his function, as a species, is the achievement of eudaimonia, happiness. He sees humans as a single species characterized by certain physical traits, and also by logos, which is their most precious quality He also makes remarks about the natural, innate, social nature of human beings, (Pol. 1253a25) not in terms of an idealistic supposition, but based on natural signs: the bonds of affection between the members of the human race, as he suggests in the Nicomachean Ethics (1155a16-22, also quoted in Baldry). He will also defend the idea that the family, founded on a monogamous union, is a natural feature of human life and society (EE 1242 a 23 ff.)

1155a16-22: And the affection of parent for offspring and of offspring for parent seems to be a natural instinct, not only in man but also in birds and in most animals; as also is friendship between members of the same species; and this is especially strong in the human race; for which reason we praise those who love their fellow men (τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν). Even when travelling abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and friendship exist between man and man universally (ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.).

Short History of Ancient Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: AristotleCosmopolitan Ideas: Aristotle

Pol. 1253 q 25 It is clear therefore that the state (πόλις ) is also prior by nature (φύσει) to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.

However, Aristotle will also strongly defend the idea that the female sex is by nature inferior to the male (she does not possess logos), and that children are strictly inferior to parents (Gen. An. 767 b 6-13, Hist. Anim. 608 a 31-b 15). The slave is also considered as being inferior to their masters (free men). At this point, Aristotle will face the contradiction between this doctrine and the idea that there is a bond of friendship (philia) between all members of the human species. Therefore, he will grant to the slave the quality of being human (anthropos) and thus being capable of friendship, even if, as a slave, he is just a “living tool, just as a tool is a slave without life”: So there is no possibility of friendship towards his as a slave, but there can be friendship in relation to him as a human being (anthropos) (EN 1161 b 2 ff.). The slave can also apprehend logos, even if he does not possess it.

Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: Cynic cosmopolitanismIdeas: Cynic cosmopolitanism

Cynics (kynikoi, gr. “dog-like”) were members of a Socratic philosophical school, “stripping away cant and pretence” to the extreme, living naked and unashamed as “examples of the Natural Man” (Baldry, 1965, 101). They were called “dogs” by their contemporaries. They were really living deliberately as outsiders of the ancient society. They were considering themselves “natural” human beings, rejecting all social conventions, all social barriers between humans. Their embodiment of the “Natural Man” lead them also to the idea of a “Universal Man” (ibid., 101), which was evidently the reasonable consequence of envisioning ‘man’ essentially as a pure, natural being, beyond all social conventions and divisions (male/female, slave/master, Greek/barbarian, rich/poor, low-birth/high birth, citizens/non-citizens). They also considered that human are fellows precisely because they are essentially interconnected through this ‘natural’ bond.

Short History of Ancient Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: Cynic Cosmopolitan Ideas: Cynic cosmopolitanismcosmopolitanism

However, sources on the Cynics are scant. What we know about them is mostly related to the lives and doctrines of Antisthenes (455-360 BC) and Diogenes (400- 325 BC), which are registered and narrated, probably from first-hand sources, by authors such as Diogenes Laertius or Philodemus. We surely know that they had a great influence upon the Stoics.

At the centre of the Cynic doctrine stood the sophos (wise man), the “true and natural man” (Baldry, p. 104.) The Cynic sophoi anthithesized themselves with the rest of the world. That is why their alleged cosmopolitanism is easily open for debate. They were well-known for their irony, self-irony and their mordant, ‘biting’ criticisms against society. The contrast between physis (nature) and nomos (law, convention) was taken to the extremes. They opposed, As Laertius mentions, “confidence to fortune, nature to law, reason to suffering”. Their motto was: “Simplicity”. Antisthenes declared that the wise man will live in his city not by the established laws, but by the “law of virtue”. They treasured freedom (eleutheria) above all things. Freedom is freedom from all bonds: the first was the eleutheria of speech, the parrhēsia (free speech), which, according to Diogenes, was “the finest thing men have”. The second was the freedom to act and to behave as one wished, rejecting the conventions of the city and of society in general, by being “shameless” (anaidõs), overstepping decency (aidõs) in all the ways. (Baldry, p. 106)

They also saw as unnatural conventions the divisions of race, class, sex. Antisthenes saw that the goodness was the same for women as for men. Diogenes supported sexual promiscuity based on mutual consent. Antisthenes wrote, according to sources, a work named “Freedom and Slavery”. As Laertius accounts, Diogenes is supposed to have been captured by pirates and taken into slavery, but when was asked what he could do, he replied: “Rule men”. This is not just one example of Diogenes’ paradoxical, startling answers. It also involves the idea that slavery cannot affect the fact that the wise is still wise and worthy, even as a slave. Cynics practiced an autarkeia, an independence, a self-sufficiency well beyond what has been ascribed to it by Aristotle. The Cynic is first and foremost an isolated individual, a nomad, a homeless, an outcast, but also a sage. (Baldry, p. 108)

Short History of Ancient Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: Cynic Cosmopolitan Ideas: Cynic cosmopolitanismcosmopolitanism

As for the Cynics’ cosmopolitanism, their individualism radically asserted that the wise will acknowledge no city and no low of ordinary men. They rejected commerce with men, as well as weapons and currency. Diogenes said that he had “no city, no home, no fatherland – a wanderer, begging his daily bread” (DL VI.38). He also named himself a kosmopolitēs, a ‘citizen of the universe’. The phrase implied not that he was a citizen of a world state, but more that he was indifferent to any form of political convention. So their is no accommodation of a political idea here. The wise man is ultimately independent. He is a nomad, he admits allegiance only to the highest power, the Universe or Nature. “Nature is his only address” (Ibid., 109). His fellow-citizens are only the wise that share his ideas. This in not “the all-embracing society of mankind” (ibid., 110). Other authors account for the Cynics’ philanthrōpia (benevolence towards others), but this is inconsistent with the Cynic wise man’s behaviour towards his fellow citizens.

Short History of Ancient Short History of Ancient Cosmopolitan Ideas: Stoic Cosmopolitan Ideas: Stoic cosmopolitanismcosmopolitanism

Division of the Stoa Stoa - From 301 BC, Zeno taught his philosophy at the Stoa Poikile gr. ("the painted porch") in Athens. The Stoa will bear the name of the place where Zeno taught.

Early Stoa (340-140 BC): Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chryssipus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus)

Middle Stoa (140 -50 BC) (Panaetius and Posidonius)

Late Stoa (50 BC – 180 AD): Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius

StoaStoa: Basics: Basics Stoics were monists, they provided a unified account of the world, consisting of

logic, ethics, physics. The World (Kosmos) or Nature is one and ruled by a law of Reason (Logos). Ethics was their main focus of interest.

Stoicism preaches the achievement of freedom through self-control, i.e. controlling the passions. A real wise man will thus ultimately grasp the nature of the Logos, Universal Reason. The laws of the human mind and the laws of the Universe are ruled by the same Universal Reason. But to achieve intellectual excellence is not enough. A wise man’s aim in life is first and foremost the achievement of a moral well-being. To the Stoics, to be virtuous means to have a “will that is in agreement with Nature”. But achieving individual moral well-being is not the only aspect of “being in agreement with Nature”. Interpersonal relations need also be guided by the same principle. Being free from anger, envy and other destructive passions towards the others promotes a virtuous living together and also a virtuous individual life. Accepting the others and living together virtuously includes accepting everyone, even slaves, as equals of other men. All humans are alike, because all humans are products of Nature. (B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 254-264).

The Universe is a single whole, deterministically ordered. The only order which is separated but not different in essence from the order of Nature is the Moral Order. Epictetus will distinguish between “things that are in our control”, and “things that are not in our control”, thus between freedom and necessity. Every thing that does not belong to free will (prohairesis) is necessary (“body, property, reputation, command”). The will is the unique seat of human freedom. Freedom is thus moral freedom, and moral freedom can only be achieved within the confines of the will. The Moral order is grasped thus only by the human being, the only living being which is endowed with a free will. Putting your moral life (ordered by moral choice) in accordance with Nature means understanding your role in the great scheme of things. Not according your free will to the moral order means creating disorder not only individually, but also cosmically. To destroy your moral structure means destroying a part of the order in the Universe also. The individual human being is thus autonomous, within his free will, but not independent from the life of others or from the cycle of natural life. cf. Epictetus, Encheiridion (The Handbook).

Stoic cosmopolitanism: A City in Stoic cosmopolitanism: A City in the Heavens?the Heavens?

Early Stoa defined the Stoic polis as a well-ordered system, governed by “law” (nomos). “Law” is defined as “right reason”, describing the standards of right and wrong. Yet, polis is a name given to no extant political community. Polis is a name given to an ideal city, such as the city that is described by Zeno in his Republic. Cf. also Plat. Rep. 422e. Only the kosmos alone, with his perfectly well-ordered structure, satisfies the definition of polis. This will delineate the Stoic notion of kosmopolis. (Brown, 2006)

“If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens;  if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state “ (Εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος, καθ᾽ ὃν λογικοί ἐσμεν, κοινός: εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ  λόγος κοινός: εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός: εἰ τοῦτο,πολῖταί  ἐσμεν: εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν: εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί).

“For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race (τῶν ἀνθρώπων πᾶν γένος) are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source. ” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV. 4

Stoic cosmopolitanism – Withdrawal Stoic cosmopolitanism – Withdrawal or embrace?or embrace?

The question that emerges from here is whether the Stoic sage can be a citizen of an ordinary polis or not. Or if this definition of polis can settle for some sort of extant political community or not. Is the Stoic polis a City in the Heavens? In this case the principle of “living as a citizen of the cosmos” would be no more than a metaphor for “living in agreement with Nature”. Seneca will obviously see it this way in his definition of the Stoic city in De Otio 8.1 and Ep. 68. 2, where he will propose withdrawal from public life “on the grounds that no extant city satisfies the Stoic standards of a true political community” (Brown, 2006) .Other sources account for different versions of this argument: according to Chrysippus (DL VII 121) , the Stoic can participate in politics “if nothing prevents him”. Thus Chrysippus is supposed to have been the inventor of the ideal “cosmopolitan politics” (Brown 2006). To live in agreement with Nature (Reason) is not to withdraw from public life, but to adjust your impulse and your judgment to the best laws of Reason. Philosophical training can be fulfilled even when living a public life. Moreover, public life can be a test for the strength of your moral and intellectual virtues. The philosopher must be the same (equal) everywhere. Chrysippus will extend the argument: ‘to live in agreement with Nature’ means not only 1. to live in agreement with myself; but also 2. to live in agreement with others and 3. to live in agreement with cosmic nature in general. 2. or 3. do not contradict 1. The aim of the Stoic life, happiness, is not achievable strictly individually. One cannot achieve happiness if control is not achieved in relation with all the passions, including the passions towards others. A special kind of Stoic virtue is beneficence (kindness towards others). Beneficence is “a species of justice”, and one can achieve justice only “by coming to find other human beings akin to one”. Parental love is one of the examples where Stoics explain that benefiting others is natural to human beings. Helping others becomes one of the aims of Stoic ethics. Politics is the best way to achieve excellence in the virtue of helping others. Politics becomes “the business of improving lives by restraining vise and promoting virtue” (Brown 2006). Cf. DL VII. 121

Stoic cosmopolitanism – Stoic cosmopolitanism – Withdrawal or embrace?Withdrawal or embrace?

Zeno believed in the moral, virtuous city, in which every human being is virtuous - “in his Republic, he speaks of the virtuous as the only citizens” (DL VII.28) – so that is this city there would be no need for state’s institutions (law-courts, gymnasia). In this ideal city, erotic love will play the role in maintaining the concord (homonoia) in the city.

Plat. Rep. 497 a-d “But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?” ‘None whatever,” I said; “but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; …. But if ever [497c] it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government.” “Wrong,” he said “I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another.” “In other respects it is this one,” said I; “but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element [497d] having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.”

The city of the futureThe city of the future Plat. Rep. 499b-d : “For this cause and foreseeing this, we

then despite our fears declared under compulsion of the truth that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession [499c] either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are. Is not that so?” “It is.” “If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past, or now are in some barbaric region [499d] far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention  that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be realized when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state. It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit.”

Stoic cosmopolitanism – ethical Stoic cosmopolitanism – ethical cosmopolitanism or political cosmopolitanism or political cosmopolitanism?cosmopolitanism?

Objections (Brown 2006 ): A. Stoics did not invent cosmopolitan politics, they just lived in the conditions created by the cosmopolitan politics of the Hellenistic world.

B. Stoic cosmopolitanism is not an invention, but rather a joining together of different trends: the idea of a “citizen of the world” and the idea of “political advising” of the intellectuals.

C. Stoic cosmopolitanism in not political, since it does not ask for a transformation of political institutions. On the contrary, it practices indifference towards politics.

Question: Is Stoic cosmopolitanism advising for a political commitment or for a “rejection of more local citizenship?” (Brown 2006)

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contribution Cicero was less Platonic and more concerned with practical issues in his treatment of Stoic cosmopolitanism.

According to Pangle (1998), he presents a more “humane” version of the natural law theory.

First, he broadens the definition of the “wise” found in Stoic theory with a more relaxed vision that included all the “serious” men of “moral virtue” (De off. 1.7-8, 13-14, 148, 2.35, 3.14-17). “Law of nature” becomes more accessible to almost all human beings. Natural law will be assimilated to the ius gentium (law of nations) (De off. 3.21-23), that bespeaks a universal, sometimes unwritten, natural law, that applies to all peoples:

“3.22 For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase [p. 291] our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. 3.23 But this principle is established not by Nature's laws alone (that is, by the common rules of equity) [Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium], but also by the statutes of particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states the public interests are maintained.”

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contribution

Also, in the Stoic definition of the (not yet universal) “fellowship of men” he is interested in the “quasi-civil right” of the “human nature” that defines what is usually understood by ‘just’ and ‘unjust’. He maintains the idea that injustice is against Nature itself: ““But they think that this world is regulated by the wisdom of the gods, and that it is, as it were, a common city and state of men and gods, and that every individual of us is a part of the world. From which that appears to follow by nature, that we should prefer the general advantage to our own. (… ). And since the nature of man is such that he has, as it were, a sort of right of citizenship connecting him with the whole human race, a man who maintains that right is just, and he who departs from it is unjust. (De fin. 3.64)

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contributionIn De Republica, according to Pangle, he gives a political expression to the idea of Stoic “commonwealth”, by suggesting that the idea of universal law is already visible, although not fully achieved, throughout the political structure of the Roman empire:

“There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome and another at Athens; one thing to–day and another to–morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author,—its promulgator,—its enforcer. He who obeys it not, flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. For his crime he must endure the severest penalties hereafter, even if he avoid the usual misfortunes of the present life.” (Rep. 3.33-35).

This is one of Cicero’s examples that raised a lot of criticism towards the attempt at politically articulating the idea of a Stoic “commonwealth” upon the arrangement of an extant political form of governance. These criticisms are still raised today.

In De officiis (On duties), he will sketch out some arguments for the defense of the principles of natural law, esp. the principle of justice, which forbids blatant and unwarranted abuses on the life and property of a fellow human being (Pangle, 1998, 252):

1. ‘Human race’ is united by nature in a ‘society’ comparable to the parts of the body.

2. There is not only the “law of nations” that forbids injustice; there are also punishments, penalties, which are present in the laws of various peoples.

3. The principles of natural law follow “much more from the reason which belongs to nature, and which is divine as well as human law”.

4. To act against the principle of justice is to be ignorant of the fact that you are betraying and injuring your own soul.

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contribution

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contribution All principles of natural law, such as justice, fairness, kindness,

benevolence follow the universal, unwritten laws of human nature. The quality of these acts suggest the idea that there is a common, natural interest in humans to preserve their moral well-being as well as the well-being of others. This is the point where Cicero brings strongly to the fore the idea of a common, universal humanity:

[De off. 3. 27-28] And further, if Nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And, if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of Nature; and, if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by Nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the conclusion is likewise true. [28] For that is an absurd position which is taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a brother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their fellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence that they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations, social ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole structure of civil society. Others again who say that regard should be had1 for the rights of fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal brotherhood of mankind; and, when this is annihilated, kindness, generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who work all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods have established between human beings, and the closest bond of this fellowship is the conviction that it is more repugnant to Nature for man to rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss, whether to his property or to his person . . . or even to his very soul—so far as these losses are not concerned with justice …

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contribution Cic. Off. 1.53:

1. [50] 16. The interests of society, however, and its1 common bonds will be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship.

But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established among men (naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae). The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race (est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate); and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity (Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando,disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate). In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason or speech.

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contributionFinally, natural law manifests itself as a right to hospitality, which is one of the most important tenets of Cicero’s theory: the right to hospitality prove that human nature is inclined to show kindness and benevolence to everyone, especially strangers, or persons which are not members of the same kin: The one who denies the laws of hospitality towards strangers is considered “inhuman”:

De off. 3.47 They, too, do wrong who would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and would exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the laws of humanity (usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est.)

Cicero’ s contributionCicero’ s contribution The same right to be considered a member of the “human kind”

applies to enemies in wars. Cicero, when speaking of rights in the case of wars (he is one of the first to argue about the necessity of finding natural legal reasons for wars – hence his theory of the ‘just war’, a war which is fought under the legitimacy of a principle of law: law of honor or the principle of natural defense), adds that just wars should be waged against “just and legitimate enemies, with regard to whom there holds the Roman code as well as many common laws.” Even the enemy which is perceived as a lawful enemy (not as one who is “a common enemy of all mankind”, such as a pirate, for example) and whose aggression threatens the existence of the state cannot become by virtues of his act an enemy of all mankind: “For with such an enemy we may hope one day to resume peaceful relations that require the continuation of trust. It is only an enemy who has, in effect, declared war on all nations, or on humanity as such, with whom we lose all such hope and who therefore loses the claim to such respect and to those rights” (Pangle, 1998, 257).

References www. perseus.tufts.edu (Classic Texts: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Laertius,

Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius) P. Kleingeld, E. Brown (2013), “Cosmopolitanism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (online) (accessed 2.07.2013) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/

Baldry, H.C. (1965), The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought, Cambridge, CUP Fine, R. (2007), Cosmopolitanism (Key Ideas), Routledge Russell, B. (2004) History of Western Philosophy, Routledge Brown, Eric (2006), “THE STOIC INVENTION OF COSMOPOLITAN POLITICS” (For the

Proceedings of the Conference "Cosmopolitan Politics: On The History and Future of a Controversial Ideal“ Frankfurt am Main, December 2006), online: http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~eabrown/pdfs/Invention.pdf

Pangle, T. (1998), Socratic Cosmopolitanism: Cicero's Critique and Transformation of the Stoic Ideal, Canadian Journal of Political Science Volume 31 / Issue 02 / June 1998: 235-262