1

2009 Parliamentary Elections in Jammu and Kashmir

Rekha Chowdhary

Chapter in Suhas Palshiker, K C Suri and Yogender Yadav (eds) Party Competition in

Indian States: Electoral Politics in Post Congress Polity , Delhi, OUP, 2014

In the background of the conflict situation as it has engulfed the state since 1989, the 2009

Parliamentary election in the state of J&K has to be located in the context of gradually

expanding democratic space on the one hand and the assertion of separatist politics on the

other. With the onset of armed militancy and ascendancy of separatist politics, the democratic

political space had suffered a total retreat. It is only since the 2002 Assembly elections, that

democratic politics has attained some relevance. However, as the separatist political space

remains intact, the two kinds of politics – the democratic and the separatist - operate side by

side – overlap at a number of points and impact each other in interesting ways. A

manifestation of this phenomenon of duality of politics of Kashmir is reflected in the political

events before and subsequent to the 2009 Parliamentary election. These elections were

preceded by enormous display of separatist sentiments during the 2008 Amarnath agitation

and were immediately followed by the massive participation of people in the Assembly

elections. Soon after the Parliamentary election, Kashmir witnessed a year of unrest over the

rape and killing of two women in 2009 and a mass political upsurge during the summer of

2010.

Analysing the 2009 Parliamentary elections in the overall context of separatism in Kashmir,

this paper will seek to focus on the nature of democratic politics as it has evolved during the

first decade of this century. It will seek to understand as to how democratic and separatist

politics operate in parallel manner. It will also seek to analyse the impact of changing nature

of party politics on the democratisation of politics of the state. The emergence of the PDP as

an alternative regional party of Kashmir and the resultant decline of the National Conference

as the dominant political force has consequences not only for power politics but also for

inter-regional relations within the state. The era of coalition politics has opened possibilities

both for democratically locating the power politics in the popular responses as well as for

federalising the power structure. The paper will also seek to locate the Congress party in the

power politics of the state. Since 2002, the Congress has emerged as a balancing regional

force within state politics. Aligning with one of the Kashmir-based political party (either PDP

or NC) to form the coalition government, it has emerged as significant political actor in the

state politics.

I

The Background: 2000-2010

The decade of 2000-2010 has been quite eventful in the politics of the state. Both separatist

and democratic politics underwent a kind of transition – while separatist politics transcended

2

from the period of militancy to the phase of post-militancy; democratic politics embarked on

the process of regeneration and rejuvenation with relatively greater credibility of last two

Assembly elections (2002 and 2008).

Separatism, as it had asserted itself in the post-1989 period, was essentially manifested

through militant activities which were supported and legitimised by people. Though the

explicit support of people to armed militancy was withdrawn in the later years of 1990s, it

continued to define the dominant response in Kashmir. During the period under discussion,

however, militancy has so declined that it does not have any impact on the political

responses. This decline of militancy has not in any way, resulted in the contraction of

separatist political space. Separatist politics that has a substantial base in the Valley of

Kashmir is expressed and sustained through the popular political responses. During last few

years, there have been a large number of popular protests where separatist sentiments have

been asserted. In early 2007, whole of Kashmir valley erupted over the killing of five

innocent civilians in a fake encounter by the security forces. The year ended with protest

demonstrations in two separate incidents of killings in Budgam and Kupwara districts. A

strong reaffirmation of separatist sentiments also took place in the summer of 2008. The

Amarnath land controversy triggered massive demonstrations lasting for months. These

demonstrations, reverberating with the ‘anti-India’ and ‘azadi’ slogans, were so intense that

these became the ground not only for consolidating the separatist response but also for

initiating the youth in separatist politics. The separatist assertion continued through protest

politics in 2009 and 2010. The whole of year 2009 was consumed by the protests over the

rape and killing of two women in Shopian. In the year 2010 Kashmir witnessed a massive

upsurge of the separatist sentiments. Triggered by the incidents of fake encounters, the

popular protest, mostly participated by the stone-pelting youth, acquired intensively separatist

form (Chowdhary, 2010, 10).

Popular separatist sentiment notwithstanding, the vibrancy of democratic politics has

gradually increased during the last few years. Totally delegitimized during the early

1990s, democratic politics gained some legitimacy after 2002 Assembly election.

Unlike the 1996 Assembly election which were highly contested and failed to evoke

popular enthusiasm, the 2002 Assembly elections were generally perceived as not

only ‘fair’ and transparent but also genuinely competitive. Conducted under the

international glare, these elections restored the credibility of electoral process and

initiated a phase of expansion of democratic political space. This political space had

become so invigorated that more than a year before the next Assembly election was

due in 2008, Kashmir had started witnessing hectic electoral activities. Huge rallies

were organised in different parts of the valley not only by local parties but also by the

national parties.

Party competition and inter-regional relations

Apart from the ‘transparency’ of elections, the major reason for the vibrancy of democratic

politics was the changed nature of party politics within the state. The emergence of People’s

Democratic Party in 1998 brought about a transformation in the mainstream politics of

3

Kashmir. This politics, so far hegemonised by the National Conference, was distanced from

the popular responses. Since 1984, when the National Conference was ousted from power

(even after obtaining a massive popular mandate) through defections engineered by the ruling

party in the Centre, its leadership had been inclined to remain on the ‘right side’ of the

Centre. In the logic of power politics developed thereafter, the voters did not matter – what

mattered was the support of the Centre. However, with PDP entering the fray, power politics

acquired intensely competitive character. With two parties operating within the same political

space (and competing for votes), the logic of power politics came once again to be located in

the popular responses.

The PDP, the new entrant, looking for a political space, sought to bring issues to power

politics which till now were in the exclusive domain of separatist politics. Seeking approval

of the people, it gave a slogan of ‘healing touch’ to people traumatised by the prolonged

conflict and aggressively raised issues related to the human rights of people. Rather than

denying the separatist political agenda, it demanded a dialogue with separatists and also

offered its own formula for resolution of conflict. As an implication of PDP’s approach to

politics, the political discourse of mainstream politics within Kashmir was changed in

significant ways. The National Conference followed suit and brought conflict related issues

in its political vocabulary. This had the impact of reinvigorating democratic political space on

the one hand and introducing some element of legitimacy to the mainstream political actors,

on the other. The separatist political space remained intact, but a space for ‘politics of

governance’ was also demarcated. In the common political parlance of Kashmir, ‘the politics

of governance’ is distinct from the ‘politics of ultimate resolution of conflict’ and therefore

does not operate in contradiction to the separatist political space. This distinction itself has

helped democratic political space to extend itself.

The implications of the changed context of party politics were extended beyond the conflict-

related political setting of Kashmir. With the fragmentation of Kashmir’s mainstream

politics, the power equations within the state were also drastically changed. Since power

politics was earlier defined by the dominance of National Conference based in Kashmir, there

was political imbalance in the context of power positions. Jammu region was not adequately

represented in these. With most of the Assembly seats in Kashmir being captured by this

party, it could form the government with token representation from Jammu region.

The lack of representation of Jammu in power politics has led to a feeling of political

discontent which has been manifested in various forms. In a number of agitations, the issue of

regional imbalance on the matters related to development, resource allocation and neglect of

Jammu has been raised (Puri, 1983). However, behind all these issues, the most potent has

been the political imbalance between the two regions.

Since 2002, when Kashmir’s Assembly seats were divided between the NC and the PDP, no

single party could capture majority of seats at the level of the State. The coalition politics that

ensued after this development brought Jammu into the focus of power politics. Either of the

two Kashmir-based parties requires support from Jammu to form the government. Till now

two coalitions have been formed; the PDP-Congress coalition after the 2002 elections and the

NC-Congress coalition following the 2008 elections. In both the cases, the Congress with its

support base in Jammu region has succeeded in changing the balance of power in favour of

Jammu region. Not only there has been a substantial representation of ministers from Jammu

4

in the state cabinet, but also there has been a representation of the region in the top positions.

Besides Ghulam Nabi Azad who has been the first Chief Minister belonging to Jammu

region, the position of Deputy Chief Minister has been assigned to a Jammu-based minister

during the times when Kashmir-based Chief Minister has been appointed.

II

Locating Congress in the Politics of State

The history of the Congress party in the state has been very chequered. It was not formally

located in the state till 1965 and it operated mainly through the National Conference. In the

pre-Accession period, the Congress leadership had evolved a very cordial relationship with

the leadership of the National Conference and had extended its support to the anti-feudal and

anti-monarchical movement launched by the latter in the state. This relationship continued in

the immediate post-Accession period. In acknowledgement of the local base and popularity

of National Conference and its leader Sheikh Abdullah, the Congress did not establish a

branch in the State.

The relationship between the Congress and the National Conference underwent a major

transformation in the post-1953 period when the latter came under the leadership of Bakshi

Ghulam Mohammed. Sheikh Abdullah was removed from power in 1953 and was kept under

detention for a prolonged period. The resultant legitimacy crisis, from which the National

Conference suffered, made it lose its earlier autonomy and it came under heavy influence of

the Congress party. So huge was the influence that the party almost started operating as a

branch of the Congress without formally changing the organisational structure. A major

indication of this transformation was the ‘Kamraj Plan’ of 1963 which was a purely internal

plan for the reorganisation of the Congress party. The Plan was made applicable for the State

of J&K and Bakshi Ghulam Mohd was ousted from power at the behest of the Working

Committee of the Congress party. It was however, in 1965, under the leadership of Ghulam

Mohammad Sadiq, that the National Conference, after merging with the Congress, was

formally dissolved.

From 1965 to 1975, the Congress operated as the single dominant party in the state. However,

while it had taken roots in Jammu region, in Kashmir, its legitimacy continued to be

contested (Qasim, 1992, 99-114). A strong anti-Congress campaign initiated by the Sheikh-

led Plebiscite Conference made it generally unpopular even when it continued to sweep the

elections from the valley and form the government. In 1975, as a result of the Indira-Sheikh

Accord, the Congress government led by Mir Qasim resigned to make way for a government

led by Sheikh Abdullah who revived the National Conference. Though the Congress was

committed to supporting the NC government from outside, it withdrew the support very soon.

Since 1977, Congress was mainly located in Jammu. (Verma, 1994, 139). The 1983 election

was polarised on regional basis and was intensely competitive between NC and Congress.

While NC could attain most of the seats in Kashmir region, Congress could attain large

number of seats in Jammu region. (Of the total 26 seats that the Congress captured in this

election, 22 were from Jammu region). Unlike the NC in Kashmir, the Congress was not the

only political party competing in Jammu region, there were other parties like the Janata Party

5

and later BJP, Panthers Party, as well as the NC. However Congress remained the dominant

party of the region. As against the BJP which sought to represent the rightist response of

Hindu-belt of Jammu region, it represented the centrist politics of the region. In the context of

plurality of Jammu’s society, which unlike the homogenised culture of Kashmir’s society

(single religion, single language) was multi-religious and multi-cultural, there was a large

centrist political space. The Congress, as an alternative to the BJP, had its support base across

religious and caste lines. It had its reach both among the upper caste as well as Dalits in the

Hindu-dominated districts and both among Hindus as well as Muslims in the Muslim-

dominated districts in Jammu region. What makes Congress a successful party of Jammu is

that it distinguishes itself from the BJP and does not represent itself only as a party of Hindus.

It has had a solid base in many Muslim pockets of the region. The Gujjars, the hundred

percent Muslim community of the State, for instance have been strong supporters of the

Congress party.

Congress has been a major partner in the coalition politics since 2002. Its share of seats was

increased to 15 in 2002 and 13 in 2008. It registered its presence as the largest party of the

region, not only in terms of seats but also in terms of votes – polling 26.40% votes in 2002

and 23.98% votes in 2008 Assembly elections. After the 2002 elections, it joined the PDP

(along with few other minor parties) to form the government in the state on the basis of

rotational Chief Ministership. Hence while Mufti Sayeed, the patron of PDP remained the

Chief Minister for the first three years, Ghulam Nabi Azad from Congress was the Chief

Minister during the later three years. After the 2008 elections, Congress joined the NC as the

coalition partner.

III

Amarnath agitation and Assembly Election 2008

The immediate setting to the 2009 Parliamentary Elections was provided by two major events

– the massive Amarnath agitation of 2008 and the Assembly elections of 2008. It was in June

2008 that the state gearing itself up for Assembly elections to be held later that year was

suddenly inflamed by political unrest, first in Kashmir and then in Jammu over the issue of

diversion of forest land to Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) for the construction of

temporary structures for the pilgrims. The massive political response in Kashmir was

matched by the aggressive political mobilisation in Jammu, bringing to the surface not only

regression of mainstream politics and the reassertion of separatist sentiments in Kashmir but

also the widely prevalent political discontent in whole of the state. Of the two major

implications of the agitation, one was related to the changed context of separatist politics and

the other related to the tension in inter-regional relationship (Chowdhary, 2008).

The assertion of separatist politics during the Amarnath agitation reflected the ascendancy of

the hardliners. The pre-eminent position that the moderate leadership had acquired since the

beginning of the peace process, was lost1. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, known for his inflexible

1 It was in 2002-2003 period that the present peace process was initiated by the Government of India. Atal

Bihari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, offered dialogue with the separatists in Kashmir as well as

with Pakistan. With Pakistan’s president responding positively to the initiatives of Vajpayee, the peace process was formally launched in January 2004 on the sidelines of SAARC meeting.

Comment [DSP1]: Jyoti—please shift all foot notes to endnotes—at the end of the entire essay.

6

views on self-determination emerged as the key actor during this agitation. The public display

of the separatist sentiments during this time gave an indication that beyond electoral

vibrancy, the deep-rooted sense of alienation continued to prevail.

The agitation also resulted in the fractured relationship between Jammu and Kashmir regions.

Though politically divergent, the two major regions were not ever placed in such an

antagonistic relationship as then.2 It was for the first time in the history of this state that

political turmoil brought the two regions of Jammu and Kashmir to the brink of direct

confrontation. To a large extent the problem was accentuated by the state government,

especially the conflicting interests of the coalition partners, the PDP and Congress. Both

parties acted more out of electoral consideration in their respective constituencies, rather than

work responsibly to resolve the problem at hand. Viewing the turmoil in Kashmir both as a

danger signal of losing out to the Hurriyat as well as an opportunity to gain from the

radicalization of politics of Kashmiri identity, the PDP accentuated the crisis by disowning its

role in passing the order and demanded its revocation. It later withdrew from the government,

leading to its fall. The Congress, in turn, further aggravated the situation in Jammu by failing

to take a clear position on the issue and defending the revocation of the order. Paralyzed by

the response generated by the BJP, VHP and other similar organizations, it withdrew from the

political scene, leaving the space fully open for these organizations to not only articulate the

political sentiments in a communal and regionally chauvinistic manner, but also to

homogenize the responses by invoking the sentiment of ‘loyalty to Jammu’. Any dissenting

voice was termed as ‘anti-Jammu’.

On the whole, it was the failure of the ruling coalition and other mainstream political parties

to place the issues in perspective and provide a secular direction to the political responses at

the ground level. Both in Kashmir as well as in Jammu, it was a case of the mob setting the

political agenda and the political parties and organizations trying at best to follow it meekly.

The political space was captured by the separatists in Kashmir and by the BJP and other

Hindu fundamentalist organizations in Jammu. What could be seen as the most dangerous

implication of the agitation was the communally divisive mobilisation and the resultant

communal tension in the state.

Since the 2008 Assembly election was held soon after the Amarnath agitation, the impact of

the agitation, especially of the communally polarised mobilisation could be seen in these

elections (Chowdhary, 2009, 13-15). In an intensely competitive contest which gave a

fragmented verdict, PDP and BJP emerged as the gainers.

Table I

2 After the first phase of agitation which culminated with the revocation of the Government Order, the agitation

acquired a form in which the two regions were placed in a completely antagonistic form. Emotions were aroused

as the Order was seen as a ‘systematic plan’ of the State to change the demography of the Muslim-majority

state. The mass response forced the state to revoke the Order which led to a prolonged agitation in Jammu which

lasted for more than two months. The revocation of Order after the mass response in Kashmir, was projected as

anti-Hindu and anti-Jammu act of the state government and therefore led to a prolonged agitation in Jammu

which lasted for more than two months. To quell the sharpened regional response in Jammu, the State

government took the decision to restore 800 canal of land in Baltal to Shri Amarnath Shrin Board. This decision

of the government led to a fresh phase of agitation in Kashmir during which sharp regional sentiments were

expressed. Specifically, there were reactions against the ‘economic blockade’ of Kashmir during the Jammu

agitation. So strong was anti-Jammu response in Kashmir at that time that the traders took a decision to severe their links with their Jammu counterparts.

7

Comparative Performance of Political Parties in 2002 and 2008 Assembly Elections

Cong BJP PDP NC

Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes

Jammu 13

(-2)

23.98%

(-2.42)

11

(01)

22.94%

(17.80%)

02

(+2)

6.88%

(1.76%)

06

(-3)

20.16%

(23.95%)

Kashmir 03

(-2)

10.48%

(-3.93)

Nil

(Nil)

00.96%

(01.60%)

19

(+3)

27.41%

(24.51%)

20

(+2)

27.50%

(35.62%)

Total 16

(-4)

18.17%

(-3.21)

11

(01)

12.73%

(12.15%)

21

(+5)

15.68%

(09.04%)

28

(28)

23.59%

(28.23%)

Figures in brackets indicate change over from 2002

The electoral polarisation on communal basis was more clearly established in the Jammu

region.3 Here BJP could register its victory in the record number of 11 seats. The highest

number of seats that this party could ever attain earlier was 8 during the 1996 Assembly

election reflecting the immediate post-militancy response of the region. In the context of

violence faced by people of the region, BJP could succeed in extending its constituency.

However, as the violence level came down, the influence of BJP also weakened. During the

2002 Assembly election, this party could win only one seat.

The fact that the PDP could register its victory in two Muslim dominated constituencies in

Jammu region, provided additional reason to believe in the growing impact of communal

polarisation. Being a Kashmir-centric party which has been seeking to legitimise its politics

by emphasising its ‘pro-Kashmir’ orientation with a pro-Muslim bias, PDP’s entry into

Jammu’s Muslim dominated areas and its success in two predominantly Muslim

constituencies of this region was an indication of the communal polarisation that was taking

deeper roots in the State. In a way this reflected a very dangerous signal reflecting extension

of Kashmiri constituency to Jammu’s Muslim pockets and thereby creating new alignments.

IV

2009 Parliamentary Election

Voter Turnout

By the time the 2009 Parliamentary elections took place, it was clearly established that the

relevance of electoral politics that had suffered a retreat in the early period of armed

3 The communal polarisation of the electoral politics of the State is not unprecedented. The 1983 Assembly

elections is known to be one of the most communally polarised election of the State. In an intensely contested

election between the National Conference and Congress, the Congress was able to mobilise the Hindu voters of Jammu and register its massive victory in this region.

Comment [DSP2]: Jyoti---these seat figures do not tally in some places. Can you simply ask Himanshu to do a table for JK 2008 with change over from 2002 and put it here?

8

militancy and separatism, had been restored. The separatist call for boycott of elections which

resulted in lower voter turnout in elections, was not, however effective in 2008 Assembly

elections. This was despite the fact that Assembly election took place immediately after one

of the most aggressive manifestations of assertion of separatist politics in recent years. The

popular response during the Amarnath agitation in the summer of 2008 had generated a

feeling that people would not show interest in elections which immediately followed the

agitation. However, defying the boycott call by the separatists, people had responded to

electoral politics and recorded a massive voter turnout. As against around 30% voter turnout

in the Kashmir Valley during the 2002 Assembly election, it was 51.64% in 2008.

Throughout the valley one could get the impression about the enthusiasm of the voters. The

images of long queues outside the polling booths showed how people willingly exercised

their franchise.

One clear message that could be read from the 2008 Assembly election was that despite the

centrality of separatist politics, mainstream politics had been extended and legitimised. The

electoral exercise was now seen to be meaningful because of the relationship between the act

of voting and the outcome. The feeling that governments are made through local initiative

and are not imposed from above had given a new meaning to the electoral process. The

competitive nature of mainstream politics had also increased the attraction for electoral

politics.

As compared to the voter turnout in the 2008 Assembly election, the voter turnout was lower

during the 2009 Parliamentary elections. Only 31.24% voter turnout was recorded in the

Valley. But as one can see from Table 2 given below, voter turnout, on the whole, was lower

at the level of the State itself. As against the 60.92% voter turnout during the Assembly

election, it was 39.66% voter turnout in the Parliamentary election. Jammu region, which is

almost untouched by the separatist politics, itself, recorded a huge decline in the number and

percentage of votes cast during the Parliamentary elections. Here, the voter turnout in the

Parliamentary elections was 47.19% as against the 70.90% voter turnout during the 2008

Assembly election. It was only in Ladakh region that there was an increased voter turnout in

the Parliamentary election as compared to that in the Assembly election.

TABLE II

Voter Turnout in Jammu &Kashmir Region

2008 -2009

Assembly 2008

(%)

Lok Sabha

2009 (%)

J&K 60.92 39.66

Kashmir 51.64 31.24

Jammu 70.90 47.19

Ladakh 68.65 71.85

9

An important point to note here is that Parliamentary elections generally do not evoke as

much voter interest as the Assembly elections do and this trend can be seen from most other

states also. Due to the proximity with the Assembly election, people tend to respond to these

in much more intense manner as compared to the Parliamentary election. As the Table 3

clearly shows, the voter turnout during the 2004 Parliamentary elections was also quite low

and compared to that the 2009 Parliamentary election recorded a higher turnout in all the

constituencies in the Valley of Kashmir. Besides, the gap between turnout at Assembly and

Lok Sabha appears greater here since the Assembly election had taken place in the context of

unprecedented popular mobilization both in Jammu and Kashmir regions.

TABLE III

Voter Turnout in all constituencies of J & K: 2004 and 2009

2004 2009

Baramulla 35.65 41.84

Srinagar 18.57 25.55

Anantnag 15.04 27.09

Ladakh 73.52 71.86

Udhampur 45.09 44.88

Jammu 44.49 49.03

All figures in percentage

It was in acknowledgement of the increasing relevance of the electoral politics in Kashmir

that one of the leading separatists took the decision to enter the electoral fray. Sajjad Gani

Lone, the son of the assassinated separatist leader A G Lone (who was a founding member of

the All Party Hurriyat Conference), contested election from the Baramulla constituency. The

People’s Conference, led by Sajjad Lone, had been a prominent political party of Kashmir but

had joined the separatist politics after the onset of armed militancy. He, however, could not

make a dent in the electoral politics since the real competition was between the NC and the

PDP. Yet, his participation in the elections reflected the significance that electoral politics has

been acquiring over the period.

The dent that electoral politics has been making in Kashmir, since 2002, has been reflected in

the response of people of the state during the National Election Study4 conducted after the

2009 Parliamentary elections. Rather than being apathetic to the democratic processes, as

many as 71% respondents affirmed their faith in democratic process and stated that it is better

than any other form of government. However, the fact remains that the greater participation

in electoral politics does not either mean the waning of the separatist sentiment or the

lessening of the trust deficit vis-à-vis the Central government and the democratic institutions.

4

Comment [DSP3]: Note on NES in J & K; sample size and state coordinator etc as Note 4

10

This becomes clear from the relative responses to various questions asked from the

respondents in Kashmir and Jammu regions. On the question whether elections are fair or

unfair, 27 percent respondents in Kashmir region as against 9 percent in Jammu region felt

that elections were ‘unfair’. Also, a large section of voters in Kashmir region (43 percent0 did

not express any opinion on this issue. On the question of trust in Election Commission a large

majority of respondents in Kashmir region (56 %) stated that they lacked trust in it. Only 16

% respondents stated that they had trust in the ECI.

TABLE IV

Trust in Election Commission

No

Opinion

Great Deal Somewhat Not very

Much

Not at all

Kashmir

Region

28 6 11% 27 28

Jammu

Region

16 26 18 27 14

(Question: How much trust you have in Election Commission – is it great deal of trust, some trust, not very much trust or none at all?)

Similar difference can be seen in the context of the response related to the trust in the Central

government. As against 73% respondents in Jammu region who responded that they had great

deal or somewhat trust in the Central government, only 29% respondents in Kashmir region

stated so. As many as 52% respondents here stated that they had ‘not very much’ trust or ‘no

trust at all’ in the Central government.

The level of trust in political parties is also lower in Kashmir region as compared to Jammu

region. As against 50 % respondents in Jammu region, as many as 64% of respondents in this

region stated that they have either no trust at all or ‘not very much’ trust in political parties.

Only 20% respondents here stated that they had ‘great deal’ or ‘some’ trust in political

parties. In Jammu region, 43% respondents showed their trust in parties.

Recovery of the Centrist Space

In the background of the regionally and communally polarised political response that had

been the hallmark of the 2008 Assembly elections, the 2009 Parliamentary election assumes

significance. It was marked by the recovery of the centrist political space. The NC and the

Congress which represent this space were in a position to improve their performance

compared to the Assembly elections.

It was the political mobilisation that had taken place during the period of Amarnath agitation

that resulted in the gains for the BJP and the PDP. However, the polarised politics lost its

impact soon after the situation became normal, both in Jammu as well as in Kashmir. In

11

Jammu, there was a rethinking about the agitation and the effect that it had on the region as a

whole. Apart from the huge economic loss that people suffered due to the agitation, there was

a feeling that Jammu did not gain much from the agitation. Similarly in Kashmir also there

was similar reassessment. Hence neither the BJP nor the PDP could sustain the momentum of

the support attained in the aftermath of Amarnath agitation (Chowdhary: 2008)

The Congress and the NC are the two parties of the State which have greater stakes in

inclusive politics. As mentioned earlier, the Congress has its stronghold in Jammu region but

what makes it a successful party of Jammu is that it distinguishes itself from the BJP and

does not represent itself only as a party of Hindus. Besides, to succeed in power politics, the

party has to extend its constituency beyond the Jammu region and therefore it has to have

presence as well as stakes in Kashmir as well as Ladakh, the third region of the State. Like

the Congress, the NC too, has its presence in all the three regions of the State. Though

Kashmir remains its primary constituency, it has its existence and therefore a stake in all the

three regions of the state. The history of the party located in its progressive ideology also

defines it as a centrist party. This is borne out by survey data on vote preferences of Hindus

of Jammu and Muslims of both Jammu and Kashmir regions as shown in Table V.

Table V

Vote preference by religious community in Jammu and Kashmir regions (2008 and 2009)

Cong NC PDP BJP Others

2008 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009

Jammu-Hindus 23 9 33 -* 6 23 41 45 20

Jammu Muslims 21 53 55 25 22 -* --* - 22

Kashmir Muslims 4 30 51 38 40 -* -* 28 9

Note: a) While Congress and NC were not in alliance in 2008, they were coalition partners in

2009; therefore, their combined vote for 2009 is shown under the column NC; b)Not reported

because of being less than one percent; c) N: 2008—Jammu Hindus=690 and Jammu

Muslims=248; Kashmir Muslims=367. 2009—Jammu Hindus=225 and Jammu

Muslims=121; Kashmir Muslims=169.

Following their alliance in 2008, the NC and the Congress had electoral alliance in 2009

Parliamentary elections also. Due to its stronghold in the Valley, the NC contested the three

seats of the Valley, while the Congress having its base in Jammu, fielded its candidates in

both the constituencies of the region. The third seat of Ladakh was also contested by the

Congress. As a consequence of this alliance, the contest was regionally localised. There was a

direct fight between the NC and PDP in the Valley and between the Congress and BJP in

Jammu region.

The strategy of these parties to contest in alliance helped them to gain both in the Valley as

well as in Jammu region. The NC-Congress combine was able to sweep the Parliamentary

12

elections winning five of the six seats. The sixth seat was won by the rebel candidate of NC.5

In two of the three constituencies of the Valley, the margin of votes attained by the winning

NC candidates over their PDP rivals was quite high (In Baramulla, NC attained 46.01% votes

as against 31.32% of PDP and in Srinagar constituency, the vote share of NC was 51.99% as

against 41.30% of PDP). It was only in Anantnag constituency that there was a close contest

between the two parties. In case of Jammu region also, the Congress was able to win the

Jammu seat with a very solid majority. As against 30.94% votes cast in favour of the BJP, it

could garner 45.33% votes. It was only in Udhampur constituency that there was a neck-to-

neck fight between the Congress and the BJP candidates.

TABLE VI

Performance of NC, Congress, PDP and BJP

2009 Parliamentary Elections

Winner % of Votes Runner Up % of Votes

Baramulla NC 46.01% PDP 31.32%

Srinagar NC 51.99% PDP 41.30%

Anantnag NC 46.53% PDP 44.89%

Ladakh IND 29.84% INC 26.48%

Udhampur INC 37.90% BJP 35.71%

Jammu INC 45.33% BJP 30.94%

Regional Analysis- Kashmir Region

In Kashmir Valley, the NC could not only register its victory in all the three seats of the

region but it also improved its share of votes compared to earlier election. While the

improvement of its share of votes was reflected in each individual constituency, however, it

was in Anantnag constituency that the NC gained substantially. Here it could actually double

its share of votes since 2004. While in 2004, the party’s voter turnout was 23.63%, in 2009 it

was increased to 46.53%.6

5 Though the seat of was officially contested by the Congress candidate, the NC cadre of Ladakh rather than

supporting him, worked for the victory of the NC rebel candidate who was able to wrest the seat defeating the

official candidate of the alliance partners. 6 The loss of Anantnag seat was a huge setback for the PDP. Interestingly, Anantnag is the stronghold of the

PDP. The PDP has been dominating both the Parliamentary as well as Assembly constituencies. In 2004

Parliamentary election, the seat was won by Mehbooba Mufti with 49.55% votes. And during the 2008

Assembly elections, the party had swept the four districts falling in this constituency, bagging 12 of the total 16

seats. What reflected the great decline of the party was its performance in two Assembly segments of Anantnag and Wachi from where Muft Syed, the patron of the party and Mehbooba Mufti, the party president, had

13

PDP’s failure to retain its own ground in the Valley could be seen as a rejection of the ‘soft-

separatism’ of the party. In order to ground its politics in the local sensibilities, the PDP

borrows heavily from the separatist agenda and often seeks to use emotive slogans to

strengthen its constituency. Even when it was a part of government, it continued to use the

populist rhetoric in order to claim its proximity with the separatist sentiments of people. It

was in the same vein that the party had joined the Amarnath agitation and had sought to raise

the emotive pitch of Kashmir’s politics. Though the party could gain during the Assembly

elections which was conducted in the heat of the sentiments raised during the Amarnath

agitation, it could not get advantage during the Parliamentary elections. As the situation was

normalised, the party relatively lost support at the ground level.

In the rejection of PDP during the Parliamentary elections, the Kashmir region also seems to

have rejected the polarised regional politics of the state. The PDP’s role in sharpening the

regional divide equals to that of the BJP. Both the parties gain mutually by stretching the

regional politics on opposite side. While BJP sharpens the pro-Jammu sentiments, the PDP

arouses pro-Kashmir sentiments. The mutual exclusivity of both the sentiments aggravates

the regional divide. The fact that the communal elements automatically creeps in this kind of

aggressive regional mobilisation, makes this politics quite dangerous.

Since Kashmir remains the primary constituency of the state, the NC also indulges in the pro-

Kashmir politics. However, what distinguishes the PDP’s politics from that of the NC is that

the former invokes ‘region’ as well as ‘religion’ in a more aggressive manner. NC’s Kashmir-

centric politics is more oriented towards the Centre, making demands upon it on behalf of the

State (therefore, its emphasis on State Autonomy). The PDP’s politics is more inward looking

and therefore focuses on Kashmir region defined in antagonistic terms vis-à-vis Jammu

region. In the definition of regional identity, the religious element of Kashmiri identity is also

invoked.

Regional Analysis – Jammu Region

It was in Jammu region that one could clearly see the changed response of people since the

2008 Assembly election. The BJP which had recorded its most impressive performance in

this election, could not repeat its performance during the Parliamentary elections. Polling

around 33 per cent votes, it lost both the seats of the region to the Congress. The Congress,

polling around 42 per cent votes, improved upon its performance both in comparison to the

2008 Assembly election as well as the 2004 Parliamentary election.

Though both the seats of Jammu have remained the traditional strongholds of the Congress,

the BJP could gain from the communal polarization during the peak of militancy and win

both the seats during the 1998 and 1999 Parliamentary elections. However during the 2004

elections it lost both the seats. Its expectations in the post-Amarnath agitation were quite high

and it had expected its victory this time as well – given the intensified mobilization by this

registered their victory with massive mandate during the Assembly election. During the Parliamentary elections, the vote share of PDP in both these segments had fallen drastically.

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party in the Hindu dominated areas of the region and the consequent polarization between the

communities that was reflected during the period of agitation.7

One definite message that is given by the voters during the Parliamentary elections in Jammu

region is that politics here cannot be controlled by the rightist forces for a long time. In very

certain terms people have shown their antipathy towards the forces that aim at mobilizing

them on religious basis, polarizing them on communal grounds and generating tensions

within the region. People might have been temporarily swayed by the emotions raised during

the Amarnath agitation, but that is not the normal political mood of the region. In defeating

Leela Karan Sharma from Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary constituency, the people have

distanced themselves not only from the politics of Amarnath agitation but from the

communal politics per se. The BJP, despite opposition from within the cadre, had taken the

decision to give ticket to Leela Karan because as chairman of the Amarnath Sangharsh

Samiti, he had become the most important face of the agitation.

The natural direction of politics of Jammu is quite secular and is manifested in secular

manner in a variety of ways. The plurality of Jammu as well as its multi-layered social and

political dynamics compels the regional politics to take a secular shape. However, in the

absence of a secular regional politics that takes into consideration not only the sensitivities of

the Hindu-heartland of Jammu region but also carries within itself the political concerns of

the backward sub-regions at the periphery, the politics has all the possibilities of becoming

communally divisive. About Amarnath agitation, one can safely say that, though it was

manifested in religious terms, the major reason for the mass mobilization was regional rather

than religious. This leads us to argue that communal elements which generally remain at the

margins of Jammu’s politics, seek to appropriate the regional discontent at any time they can

and change the very direction of popular responses.

One of the important reason as to why the rightist forces were able to capture the political

space during and after the Amarnath agitation, was the almost total vacuum generated by the

withdrawal of the Congress party. In the wake of aggressive campaign by the Hindu Rightist

forces, it could not strategise its political response and its leaders, many of whom were still

holding the senior ministerial positions, withdrew from the political scene. Since the agitation

had from the very beginning had taken an ‘anti-Kashmir’ direction, the party became

defensive due to its alliance with PDP which was seen in Jammu as a very aggressive pro-

Kashmir party.

To Conclude

7 However, the effect of the mobilization by the BJP does not seem to be lasting. Though it could get a large

number of votes from Hindus (exceeding its hold from 11 Assembly segments to 13), yet it failed to get the

advantage of winning the seats like it did in 1998 and 1999. It could not get all the Hindu votes of the region.

The Congress could get a substantial number of Hindu votes. (The NC-Congress combine also gained in the

region – with lead in 21 Assembly segments as compared to victory in 19 seats during 2008 Assembly elections).

15

In the context of the conflict situation of Jammu and Kashmir, the 2009 Parliamentary

election provides us interesting insights not only about the political preferences of people but

also about their changing response towards the electoral politics per se. Held in the

background of turbulence and mass mobilisation during the Amarnath agitation, the election

was an important milestone to judge the impact of the regional and communal divide

generated during this agitation. Though the 2008 Assembly election that was held

immediately after the agitation was impacted by such a divide, the impact of the agitation had

waned by the time the 2009 Parliamentary election was held. The failure of the BJP and the

PDP to register victory in any of the Parliamentary seat, reflected the limitation of politics of

regional and communal divide. For Jammu region specifically, where BJP had registered an

unprecedented gain during the Assembly election, the Parliamentary election was quite

meaningful. The improved performance of the Congress party indicated the relevance of

centrist politics for this culturally plural region. The success of the NC-Congress alliance, on

the whole, signalled that the people had moved on and were no more struck up with the logic

of polarised responses.

The 2009 Parliamentary election also gives us an understanding about the increasing

relevance of the democratic politics in Kashmir. Not only the increased voter participation

vis-à-vis the earlier Parliamentary election but also the participation of a key separatist leader

in the electoral process reflected the change in the ground political reality of Kashmir.

However, as the political developments in Kashmir prior and after the 2009 elections clearly

reveal, the expansion of mainstream democratic space has resulted within the broad

framework of the separatist political space which continues to assert itself from time to time.

After the summer of 2008 when Amarnath land row became the reason for colossal assertion

of separatist politics, the whole of the year 2009 witnessed intermittent protests. However, it

was the summer of 2010 when there was massive political upsurge leading to the death of

118 young Kashmiris. It was during this time that the unstable nature of the mainstream

political space came to surface.

It is in this context, that it becomes important to note the limitation of democratic political

space in Kashmir and to understand that its gradual expansion does not imply either that the

conflict situation has come to an end or that separatist political space has shrunk. The

democratic space exists parallel to the separatist space and remains precarious till the basic

issues underlying the conflict situation are finally addressed. Besides addressing the issues of

final resolution of conflict, there are issues related to militarisation of Kashmir and the human

rights violations, which need to be focused upon. It may be important therefore to end the

paper by highlighting the responses of people in Kashmir to some of questions related to

these issues asked during the NES 2009. There is a strong reaction of people of Kashmir, for

instance, around the question of presence of security forces. As against 25% respondents who

stated that they did not feel insecure about the action of police/army/security forces, as many

as 70% respondents stated they did feel insecure. On the question as to how should the

Kashmir problem be resolved, as many as 86.% stated that rather than suppressing the

agitation, the problem should be resolved through negotiation and mutual dialogue. Dialogue

is also preferred in the context of resolving the tension between India and Pakistan. Around

90% respondents disagreed that war is the only solution to Indo-Pak Problem (this was quite

a strong response as compared to a similar response by 65% in Jammu region). On another

question where they were asked to respond to the methods of dealing with cross border

terrorism and asked to choose between – India destroying all terrorist camps in Pakistan even

if risking full scale war or patiently engaging Pakistan in regular dialogue, only 8% agreed

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with the first option (as against 33% in Jammu region). 63% wanted India to engage Pakistan

(as against 45% in Jammu region),

(Question: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement – War is the only solution to the Indo-Pakistan problem? )

17

References

Chowdhary, Rekha, 2010 ‘The Second Uprising’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.

XLV, No.39, September 25.

Chowdhary, Rekha, 2009, ‘Separatist Sentiments and Deepening of Democracy’, Economic

and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, no. 3, January 17

Chowdhary, Rekha, 2008, ‘J&K: Once Again on the Brink’, Seminar, No. 591, November,

http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/591/591_rekha_chowdhary.htm

Puri, Balraj, 1983, Simmering Volcano: study of Jammu’s relationship with Kashmir, Delhi,

Sterling.

Qasim, Sayyid Mir, 1992, My Life and Times, Delhi, Allied

Verma, P S, 1994, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, Delhi, Vikas