1 Assessing Deception Differences with Mimicry ... - OSF

49
1 Assessing Deception Differences with Mimicry Deception Theory Melissa S. de Roos, PhD University of Roehampton And Daniel N. Jones, PhD* University of Nevada Reno *Corresponding Author Daniel N. Jones University of Nevada, Reno Department of Management and Interdisciplinary Social Psychology 1664 N. Virginia Ave Reno, NV, 89557 [email protected] [email protected] In Press: Journal of Personality Assessment

Transcript of 1 Assessing Deception Differences with Mimicry ... - OSF

1

Assessing Deception Differences with Mimicry Deception Theory

Melissa S. de Roos, PhD

University of Roehampton

And

Daniel N. Jones, PhD*

University of Nevada Reno

*Corresponding Author

Daniel N. Jones

University of Nevada, Reno

Department of Management and Interdisciplinary Social Psychology

1664 N. Virginia Ave

Reno, NV, 89557

[email protected]

[email protected]

In Press: Journal of Personality Assessment

2

Abstract

Mimicry Deception Theory (MDT) argues that deception varies along a long- to short-term

continuum. Long-term deception involves complex deception, community integration, slow

resource extraction, and low detectability, whereas short-term deception is the opposite. To date,

no self-report scale exists that assesses a dispositional orientation towards long-term deception.

Across four studies, we developed and validated a Mimicry Deception Scale (MDS) to assess

individuals’ dispositional orientation towards long-term deception. Using theoretically driven

items, we found a reliable four-factor structure through exploratory and confirmatory factor

analyses. Further, MDS components were strongly correlated and had acceptable internal

consistency. For convergent validity, long-term MDS positively correlated with

Machiavellianism, conscientiousness, and planning. Finally, the test-retest reliability of the MDS

was acceptable, and the complexity facet of the MDS predicted successful lying over time. The

findings have implications for how to profile, identify, and recognize patterns of deception,

especially with respect to long-term patterns using self-report.

Keywords: Dark Triad, Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, Mimicry Deception

Theory; Deception

3

Assessing Deception Differences with Mimicry Deception Theory

Deception occurs in everyday life (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996), and has been extensively

studied (i.e., Buller & Burgoon, 1996). However, not all deception is the same. Research has

demonstrated that the motivations, severity, and frequency of deception all differ. For example,

some individuals deceive when trying to attract a partner (Tooke & Camire, 1991), or in order to

maintain a social bond (Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Deception can be altruistic or

selfish, and deception may vary with interpersonal closeness (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998) or

method of communication (Whitty & Carville, 2008). A non-trivial percentage of individuals

frequently engage in mild deception, such as not telling the whole truth in everyday

conversations (Turner et al., 1975). However, individuals also vary in how consistently they

engage in deception, and the circumstances under which someone will deceive (Eysenck et al.,

1974). Some deceive only when they can justify or rationalize it, such as when an organizational

culture normalizes such behavior (Jenkins & Delbridge, 2017). With respect to lying frequency,

Serota and colleagues (2010) assessed the prevalence of lies among a representative sample of

1,000 Americans. Results indicated that people told one to two lies a day on average, with most

participants reporting no lies. Interestingly, they found the distribution of lie prevalence was

skewed, such that a few prolific liars accounted for the majority of lies told. Thus, some

individuals are dispositionally more honest than are others (Lee & Ashton, 2005). Even among

those that are dispositionally dishonest, there are differences in how they deceive, and in which

situations (Jones & Paulhus, 2017).

However, among all these differences in deception, none have addressed temporal scope.

Thus, it is unknown whether individuals differ in how motivated they are to deceive others in a

way that goes undetected for longer periods of time. Although some deceive impulsively, others

4

think through their lies ahead of time in a strategic fashion. Thus, some individuals strive to

maintain long-term deception, such as those who build a false reputation within a community. In

contrast, others deceive with short-term intentions, such as feigning legitimacy in order to

swindle someone. Nevertheless, to date, there is little research on what distinguishes short-term

from long-term deception, and what components are involved. Further, no research has

investigated the profile of an individual who engages in long-term deception. Finally, no

assessments exist that can assess deception that is long-term focused.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the contribution that long-term deception

patterns make to the science of deception. We argue that individuals vary in their disposition

towards long-term deception. Consequently, such deception is designed to be robust against

immediate detection. In contrast, others deceive in ways that, although potentially effective in the

moment, are discovered quickly. Thus, despite the potential for initial success, deceivers may

differ in the long-term believability of the deceptions in which they engage. Further, the

tendency to successfully deceive over the long-term should correlate with a strategic personality

profile. It is important to note that attempts at long-term deception are not synonymous with

aptitude or skill. There are some highly skilled fraudsters who take advantage of a quick moment

to scam others (Pratkanis & Shadel, 2005), and there are some highly skilled deceivers who build

a long-term reputation for manipulation that plays out over decades (e.g., Bernie Madoff). Thus,

temporal orientation does not speak to whether deception is effective. Nevertheless, it is

reasonable to assume that individuals differ in how much they engage in deception that is

sustained over longer periods of time.

We first briefly review the literature on deception, with a focus on Mimicry Deception

Theory (Jones, 2014). We then report on the psychometric properties of a scale designed to test

5

the tendency for long-term deception. We validate this scale by determining if individuals who

report having long-term deception orientation have a more strategic personality profile and tell

lies that are more likely to go undetected.

Deception, Lies, and Mimicry Deception Theory (MDT)

Deception is defined as a complex interpersonal process whereby the deceiver violates

the assumption of the other person that they are telling the truth (Mitchell, 1996). Mitchell

(1996) suggests that this action requires the deceiver to be aware of the expectations of the

person being deceived and to tailor their actions to those expectations. The degree to which the

deceiver puts time and effort into this process highlights the fact that deception can be thought of

on a continuum from long- to short-term. The Mimicry Deception Theory (MDT) framework

(Jones, 2014) breaks deception down into four components in order to identify a long-term or a

short-term deceiver. The components are Community Integration, Complexity of Deception,

Resource Extraction, and Detectability.

At the long-term end, individuals put in time, effort, and resources in order to maximize

gain and minimize the risk of being discovered. At the short-term end, individuals utilize a more

opportunistic approach that lacks strategic planning. In terms of MDT, a long-term vs short-term

dimension can be identified in each of its four components. Community Integration (CI) is part

of a long-term strategy, whereby individuals take their time to integrate the community

surrounding targets, earning the trust of people close to targets or relevant establishments. On the

other hand, in a short-term strategy, Community Integration is negligible or minimally used.

Instead, short-term individuals should be motivated to span communities in order to deceive

quickly and find a new target.

6

Complexity of Deception (CD) is a component of long-term oriented deceivers aimed at

maximizing the length of the deception. Because such individuals extract resources slowly, are

motivated to avoid detection, and integrate into a community, engaging in and maintaining

sophisticated and deep-level deception is critical. Short-term oriented deceivers will use

deception that is shorter, simpler, temporary, or superficial. This assertion emerges from the fact

that such individuals do not care about detection because they will move quickly to a new

community of targets, taking as much as they can all at once. Resource Extraction (RE), when

slow, is a component of long-term oriented deception. The slow extraction rate is to avoid

detection, maintain good standing in the community, and is maintained over time through

complexity of deception. When taken over a long period of time, rewards can be maximized. A

short-term strategy would be to take as much as possible in the shortest possible amount of time.

This immediate extraction approach would be advantageous when engaging in superficial

deception or when spanning communities. Lastly, Detectability (DE) centers on measures taken

by the deceiver to minimize the risk of being caught. Depending on whether the strategy is long-

or short-term, minimizing detectability will be important to the deceiver.

As expected, research on MDT from the victim’s perspective established that these four

components positively correlated (Jones & de Roos, 2016). Jones and de Roos (2016) had

participants recall a time when they were deceived and answer questions about the details of the

deception. In the first study, the variables used as proxies for the four components of MDT were

positively and significantly correlated. Further, long-term deception was associated with

uncertainty and confusion on the part of the victim. Finally, long-term deception correlated with

increased monetary loss in cases when the deception had led to financial loss. In a follow-up

study, Jones and de Roos (2016) replicated this effect and found that neither perceived

7

intelligence nor charm of the deceiver could account for the findings. Thus, MDT patterns can be

categorized by long- vs. short-term deception, and this categorization has consequences for long-

term lie believability. Further, long- vs. short-term patterns are not redundant with manipulative

skill. Thus, the purpose of MDT is to differentiate between long- and short-term oriented

deception. However, more research with self-reported assessments is necessary to determine how

this orientation correlates with broader personality constructs across different contexts, such as

an organizational context.

Dark Triad

From a personality perspective, three personality traits have been focused on with respect

to dispositional duplicity, which have been referred to as the “Dark Triad” of personality

(Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These traits consist of Machiavellianism and subclinical

psychopathy and narcissism. These personality traits share a common core of callousness

manipulation (Jones & Figueredo, 2013). From a HEXACO perspective, these traits universally

score low on Honesty-Humility (HH) (Lee & Ashton, 2005; Book et al., 2015). Thus, there is

relatively strong agreement that individuals high in any Dark Triad trait will manipulate others.

According to Moshagen and colleagues (2018), deception and manipulation are active tactics

that a dark personality individual will use to maximize personal utility at the expense of the

utility of someone else. Although individuals high in these traits are all manipulative and

dishonest (Hodson et al., 2018), they are distinct in terms of the situations when they will

deceive and their methods of deceiving (Jones & Paulhus, 2017).

In the original conceptual paper, Jones (2014) noted that long-term deceivers are

descriptive of those high in Machiavellianism, whereas short-term deceivers are descriptive of

those high in psychopathy. Book and colleagues (2015) provided empirical evidence for the

8

assertion pertaining to psychopathy, demonstrating that they are quite effective in engaging in

superficial deception. Nevertheless, there is a lack of consensus surrounding whether

Machiavellianism and psychopathy can be organized in a long- vs. short-term fashion (c.f., Jones

& Paulhus, 2010).

A recent study partially supported the idea that individuals high in Machiavellianism

engage in long-term patterns of deception akin to those found in MDT. Blickle and colleagues

(2020) studied the effects of Machiavellianism combined with political skill (the ability to

understand one’s coworkers and influence them to benefit oneself or the organization) in the

workplace. They took the temporal orientation proposed by MDT into account and differentiated

between employees who had been in their job for a short time and those who had been there for

longer. Based on MDT, the authors hypothesized that individuals high on Machiavellianism and

political skill would delay engaging in counterproductive work behaviors in order to build a good

reputation in the organization. Results indicated that individuals high on both Machiavellianism

and political skill reported they did not refrain from engaging in counterproductive work

behaviors when their tenure at the organization was short. However, and importantly, their

coworkers’ evaluation of their performance was not negatively impacted by these behaviors. In

other words, they maintained their reputation, despite engaging in short-term antisocial behavior.

Presumably, this would allow them to continue extracting resources and engaging in

counterproductive work behaviors without being discovered.

A lack of consensus on the temporal orientation of Machiavellianism and psychopathy

highlights the importance of assessing deception separately from personality. The MDT

framework focuses directly on temporal orientation of deception, rather than using personality as

a proxy. Although personality assessment is valuable, MDT provides a structural framework for

9

assessing long- vs. short-term deception in action. Thus, data that is retrospective or observable

can be applied to MDT without the need for personality assessment. However, a self-report

measure of temporal orientation in deception would be useful, but has yet to emerge.

In sum, it is advantageous to have a self-report assessment of long-term deception for

several reasons. For example, self-report can be used to corroborate observational data or can be

used as a variable in research using survey or experimental methodology. Further, a self-reported

assessment of a long-term orientation towards deception is useful in understanding how

individuals vary when engaging in deception. Thus, although related to personality, MDT is a

flexible concept and can change depending on one’s motivation or circumstances. However, to

date, no theoretically driven assessment of long-term deception exists.

Present Study & Predictions

Guided by MDT, we developed 33 items that assessed different aspects of deception from

the perspective of a deceiver. These items (properly coded) were designed to correlate with

strategic rather than impulsive manipulation. Thus, this scale should record the highest

correlation with Machiavellianism above and beyond the other Dark Triad traits. Finally, this

scale should not correlate with other factors such as intentions, age, gender, ethnicity, or

education.

Study 1 – Student Sample

Methods

Participants

10

Participants in this study consisted of a sample of undergraduate psychology students at a

Southwestern university who participated for class credit. The first sub-sample consisted of 342

participants (72% women) with a mean age of 20.39 years (SD = 4.46 years). The second

subsample consisted of 342 participants (64% female) with a mean age of 20.86 years (SD = 4.09

years). All studies were approved by a university Institutional Review Board (Studies 1-2:

protocol name, Prescreen #548187-5; Studies 2-4: “An exploratory survey of business and

personality” #1320683-2). All data that support the findings of the studies reported throughout

the manuscript can be found here:

https://osf.io/rc2xe/?view_only=20aec752e8664b19804658c5d5feeed4 or can be made available

from the corresponding author, upon reasonable request.

Power analyses. Given that Study 1 focused on psychometric and correlational work,

samples above 250 are desirable (Schönbrodt, & Perugini, 2013). Thus, we collected a large

sample and split into two subsamples (Study 1A & Study 1B): one for an Exploratory Factor

Analysis, and one for a Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

Measures

Short Dark Triad (SD3; Jones & Paulhus, 2014). The Short Dark Triad (or SD3)

assesses the three Dark Triad traits using nine statements per trait. Each statement is rated on a 5-

point Likert type scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. Example items

include: “It's not wise to tell your secrets.” (Machiavellianism), “People see me as a natural

leader.” (Narcissism), and “I like to get revenge on authorities.” (Psychopathy). The SD3 has

demonstrated good validity across studies (Baughman et al., 2012; Giammarco et al., 2012; Lee

et al., 2013). The three subscales had acceptable or nearly acceptable internal validity in Sub-

11

sample 1A (Psychopathy α =.73; Narcissism α =.64; Machiavellianism α =.73) and in Sub-

sample 1B (Psychopathy α =.73; Narcissism α =.61; Machiavellianism α =.74).

Mimicry Deception Scale (MDS). An initial 33 items were written to assess the four

components of Mimicry Deception Theory. Each item was scored on a 5-point Likert scale

ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. Participants were given the following

instructions before completing the scale: “We have all tried to convince someone of something

that may not be entirely true. Perhaps it is for selfish gain, desperate need, or for the greater

good. As such, we have all committed a deception in life; it is part of being human. For the

following questions, please think back to a time where you deceived someone. For the following

questions, please indicate HOW you behaved. There are no right or wrong answers. Example of

greater good: Taking resources from someone who is using them to hurt someone else. Example

of desperate need: Taking resources from a corrupt organization so you can survive. Example of

selfish good: Taking resources to improve your own situation. Please put yourself in the

situation and indicate how much you agree with the following questions.” After filling out the

MDS, participants were asked: “Finally, tell us whether this deception was for the greater good,

desperate need, or selfish good.”

Procedure

The survey was programmed in Qualtrics and participants accessed the survey through

SONA systems survey platform. After the informed consent form, participants were directed to a

few demographic questions. Following this, they were presented with the 33 MDS items and the

SD3. After completion, participants were thanked for their participation.

Results and Discussion

12

Psychometrics

Descriptive statistics of Studies 1A and 1B are displayed in Table 1. Given that the

Eigenvalue > 1 rule tends to over-extract factors, we first ran a set of analyses based on Parallel

Analysis (PA; Horn, 1965) in the R package “random.polychor.pa” on the 33 items found in

Sample 1A. After considering Velicer MAP criterium and the PA results, we determined that

seven real factors were present. From there, we ran an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) in

SPSS version 24 on the 33 items found within the first subsample (1A) using Principal Axis

Factoring (PAF) extraction with a Promax (4) rotation and Kaiser Normalization extracting

seven factors. Details of this analysis can be found in Table 2. From these original items we used

theoretical considerations and factor loadings to select a subset of items for each subscale. These

items are bolded in Table 2.

Following the EFA, we performed a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the second

subsample (1B) using Mean and Variance centered Weighted Least Squares (WLMSV)

extraction in the R package, lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). We specified a four-factor correlated

model, with no correlated errors, using the 13 selected items from the EFA. The result was an

acceptable fit to the data according to most fit indices except for the chi-square test: χ2 = 85.57,

p = .013, CFI = .94, TLI = .92, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .045.

Note that the fit and loadings were acceptable regardless of whether we treated the data

as categorical or linear. Thus, we report linear estimations which can be found in Figure 1. Table

3 shows the correlations for both Studies 1A and 1B among the four extracted factors, which

were all positive and significant. We then computed an overall MDS score by calculating the

mean of each subscale and then averaging across the four subscales. We did this separately for

Studies 1A and 1B.

13

For the overall sample, we examined the types of lies that participants told (i.e.,

greater good, selfish good, desperate need). Of those who responded, 49% indicated that

their lie was for their own selfish good, 17% indicated that their lie was for desperate need,

and 34% indicated that their lie was for the greater good.

In Study 1A, we correlated the overall MDS scale with the Dark Triad traits. We found

that the MDS was positively and significantly correlated with psychopathy (r = .15, p = .008)

narcissism (r = .14, p = .013), and Machiavellianism (r = .37, p < .001). Note that the

correlation with Machiavellianism was noticeably higher. Thus, we tested the strength of these

correlations using Fisher’s r-to-z test for correlation strength (Fisher, 1921). Indeed, the

correlation of the 13-item MDS and Machiavellianism was significantly stronger than that of the

other correlations: narcissism-MDS and psychopathy-MDS (both t > 4.50, p’s < .01).

In Study 1B, the correlation between Machiavellianism and the MDS was again

significant (r = .19, p < .01) as was the correlation between narcissism and the MDS (r = .13, p

= .019). However, the correlation between psychopathy and the MDS was not significant (r

= .08, p = .145). The Machiavellianism-MDS correlation differed significantly in strength from

the psychopathy-MDS correlation, t = 2.36, p = .05. However, the narcissism-MDS correlation

did not differ from the other two correlations.

Table 4 displays correlations between the MDS subscales and the Dark Triad. In Study

1A, Machiavellianism correlated significantly with all four subscales of the MDS. In contrast,

psychopathy correlated with Complexity of Deception and Resource Extraction only, and

narcissism only correlated with Complexity of Deception.

In Study 1B, Machiavellianism was positively and significantly correlated with all four

MDS components except for Community Integration. Psychopathy positively correlated with

14

Resource Extraction, and narcissism positively correlated with Complexity of Deception and low

Detectability. Following these correlations, we combined Studies 1A and 1B and regressed each

component of the MDS on the Dark Triad traits. Results of these regressions are shown in Table

5.

Finally, with respect to discriminant validity tests for Study 1A, the 13-item MDS did not

significantly differ with gender, t(293) = 1.58, p = .116, deceptive intentions (i.e., greater good,

selfish good, desperate need) F(2, 293) = 0.65, p = .521, or ethnicity (European heritage, Latinx,

& Black), F(3, 300) = 0.33, p = .716. However, there was a small and negative correlation

between age and long-term deception, r = -.13, p = .031, such that older participants had a

tendency towards longer-term manipulation.

In Study 1B, the 13-item MDS was not associated with deceptive intentions, F(2, 291) =

2.34, p = .098, or ethnicity, F(3, 286) = 0.12, p = .728. However, this time, it did differ by

gender, t(291) = 3.68, p < .001, with men (M = 3.50, SD = 0.61) scoring higher in long-term

manipulation than did women (M = 3.195, SD = 0.72). Scores on the MDS did not vary as a

function of age, r = -.06, p = .297. In total, the items selected in the final version of the MDS

showed the expected positive and significant relationship among the four components. When we

assessed the associations between the MDS and the Dark Triad and found support for the

hypothesis that Machiavellian individuals are the most long-term with their deception. When

looking separately at the four MDS facets, Machiavellianism was positively and significantly

correlated with each component, although community integration and Machiavellianism were

not correlated in Study 1B. With respect to psychopathy, we only found a consistent and positive

link with Resource Extraction, indicating that psychopathy may be associated with slower

resource extraction. Finally, narcissism was consistently correlated with Complexity of

15

Deception, indicating that narcissistic individuals also put time and effort into deeper and longer-

term deception, like those high in Machiavellianism.

Finally, we analyzed whether type of lie interacted with Dark Triad trait to predict

MDS scores. We dummy coded type of lie with selfish good as the reference group and

conducted three hierarchical linear regressions for each Dark Triad trait. However, none

of the interactions were significant. Further, Step 2 of each regression was not significant

(all F change < .442, all p > .50), and the change in R2 was less than .002 for all models.

Thus, the associations among the Dark Triad and MDS do not differ as a function of the

type of lie that was told.

Study 2 – MTurk Sample

Study 2 was required for several reasons. First, Study 1 consisted of university students

who participated in a pre-screening measure. Thus, other assessments were included that were

irrelevant to the purposes of the study, but nevertheless, may have impacted participation.

Second, Study 1 used a brief measure of the Dark Triad (the SD3), and it is important to know if

Study 1 findings will generalize to earlier Dark Triad measures. Further, this switch was also

important given that the SD3 narcissism subscale did not reach acceptable levels of internal

consistency (< .70). Third, replication in a different population would provide further confidence

in the findings.

Power Analysis. Study 2 was designed to replicate the correlations from Study 1 in a

separate sample. Given the effect sizes of the correlations between the MDS and

Machiavellianism (the personality variable of interest) of the subsamples A (r = .37) and B (r

= .19) of Study 1, we averaged these effects (.28). We used the heuristic from Richard et al.

16

(2003) as a guide, who indicated that typical correlations in personality psychology are

around .21 (i.e., needing 80% means 173 participants). Thus, we collected 187 participants for

Study 2.

Methods

Participants

We recruited 187 Mechanical Turk workers (67% women; Mean age = 35.72, SD =

11.63; 63% White / European Heritage, 9% Black / African Heritage, 8% Latino(a), 4% East

Asian, 16% other). The most commonly reported income was between $15,000 and $25,000 per

year. However, because data from MTurk are susceptible to cheating, speeding through

surveys, and non-attention (e.g., Ford, 2017), best practices for using MTurk data includes

some form of attention check (Kees et al., 2017). Thus, we included two attention check

questions (“I breathe oxygen every day,” “I have walked on the moon”) screening out

participants who failed these attention checks left a final sample of 141 (72% women; Mean

age = 36.60, SD = 12.21; 68% White / European Heritage, 10% Black / African Heritage,

9% Latino(a), 1% East Asian, 12% other).

Measures

Machiavellianism. To assess Machiavellianism in this sample, we used the Mach-IV

(Christie & Geis, 1970). The Mach-IV consists of 20 items scored on a 5-point Likert type scale

1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. We purposely excluded one item that is an

outdated euthanasia item: “People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice

of being put painlessly to death.” The internal reliability of the Mach-IV in this sample was

acceptable (α = .84; M = 2.59; SD = 0.57).

17

Psychopathy. We assessed psychopathy using the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale

(Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 2016) Short Form (SRP-SF), which is a 29-item version (see also

Neumann & Pardini, 2014) of the larger 64-item assessment. The SRP-SF was scored on the

same 5-point Likert type scale. Internal reliability in this sample was excellent (α = .89; M =

1.90; SD = 0.50).

Narcissism. Narcissism was assessed using the 13-item short form Narcissistic

Personality Inventory (NPI-13: Gentile et al., 2013). This 13-item version of the original NPI (40

items; Raskin & Hall, 1981) asks participants to pick one of two statements that best describes

them (which were scored narcissistic statement = 2, non-narcissistic statement = 1). Internal

reliability in this sample was acceptable (α = .71; M = 1.22; SD = 0.19).

Mimicry Deception Scale. The final version of the MDS from Study 1 was used in

Study 2. As in Study 1, scores were first averaged within facet and then the four facets were

averaged together. Internal reliability in this sample was acceptable (α = .84; M = 3.55; SD =

0.71). We also asked whether their lie was for selfish good (38%), greater good (36%), or

desperate need (26%).

Procedure

The study was programmed in Qualtrics and participation involved accessing the survey

through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. First, participants signed an indicated consent through

clicking through a consent window. Participants were then directed to a few brief demographic

questions. After these questions, they were presented with the MDS and the SD3. After

completion, participants were paid for their participation.

Results and Discussion

18

Like Study 1, we explored the inter-correlations among all variables and components of

the MDS (see Table 6). As predicted all MDS facets correlated with each other positively and

significantly. However, unlike Study 1, Machiavellianism only positively and significantly

associated with slow Resource Extraction. We also found a positive and significant association

between psychopathy and slow Resource Extraction. Finally, narcissism was positively and

significantly associated with Complexity of Deception and slow Resource Extraction.

Machiavellianism had a positive and significant correlation with the overall MDS

composite, as did narcissism. Psychopathy did not significantly correlate with the MDS

composite. Note that none of these correlations were significantly different from each other

(all t’s < 1.40, all p > .26). Finally, we regressed the Dark Triad traits on the MDS facets and

overall composite (see Table 7). Narcissism was the only significant predictor of long-term

deception, although Machiavellianism was marginal.

Note that scores on the 13-item MDS did not differ according to income, r = .14, p = .11,,

ethnicity F(6, 185) = 0.51, p = .802, education F(6, 185) = 0.29, p = .943, or gender t(185) = -

0.69, p =.490. Further the MDS did not correlate with age, r = .04, p = .661. We again analyzed

the types of lies that participants told with respect to the MDS scale (i.e., selfish good, greater

good, desperate need). We conducted a One-Way ANOVA to using the MDS total score as

the dependent variable and type of lie (i.e., greater good, desperate need, selfish good) as

the independent variable. The results indicated no significant difference among the types of

lies, F(2, 140) = .66, p = .519. Thus, the type of lie told had no association with whether the

lie was long-term or not.

Finally, we analyzed whether type of lie interacted with Dark Triad trait to predict

MDS scores. We dummy coded type of lie with selfish good as the reference group and

19

conducted three hierarchical linear regressions for each Dark Triad trait. Once again, the

Step 2 of each regression was not significant (all F change < 2.03, all p > .10), and the

change in R2 was less than .028 for all models.

Study 3 – Convergent and Discriminant Validation

Study 3 was conducted to further expand the nomological network (i.e., a guiding set of

laws; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) and validity in the form of convergent and discriminant

correlations. Study 3 was also necessary because the results of Study 2 were somewhat

inconsistent with those of Study 1. Thus, we sought to further replicate the Dark Triad

correlations with the MDS. Further, we tested the nomological network according to a few

guiding principles. Specifically, long-term deception requires forethought, which should be

linked with conscientiousness and planning. Thus, given the MDS predicts long-term deception,

by definition, it should correlate negatively with the non-planning facet of impulsivity and

positively with the Big Five trait of conscientiousness.

Power Analysis. In order to calculate power, we used the correlation between the Mach-

IV and MDS in Study 2 (r = .17). In order to achieve 80% power with a correlation of .17, 212

participants are needed. Thus, the sample in Study 3 exceeded the 80% power threshold with a

sample of 277.

Methods

Participants

Participants consisted of 277 undergraduates (59% Women; Mean age = 21.25, SD =

4.89; 61% White / Euro Heritage, 14% East Asian Heritage, 5% Black / African Heritage, 5%

20

South Asian Heritage, 15% other) at a mid-sized Northwestern university, which was different in

both school and region of the United States with respect to Study 1.

Measures

Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 – Short Form (BIS-11-SF; Spinella, 2007). To assess

three central components to impulsivity, we used the 15-item shortened version of the 30-item

Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (e.g., Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). The BIS-11-SF breaks into

three correlated facets: Motor impulsiveness, Non-attention, and Non-planning (αs .72 - .80).

The overall scale had good internal consistency (α = .82; M = 2.56; SD = 0.51).

Big Five (Donnellan et al., 2005). To assess the five everyday personality dimensions

(i.e., the “Big Five” in brief), we used the 20-item mini-IPIP. The mini-IPIP used four items per

scale to assess extraversion (α = .74; M = 3.39; SD = 0.78), agreeableness (α = .69; M = 3.90; SD

= 0.65), conscientiousness (α = .63; M = 3.73; SD = 0.69), neuroticism (α = .50; M = 2.73; SD =

0.67), and openness to experience (α = .64; M = 3.39; SD = 0.48).

Short Dark Triad (SD3; Jones & Paulhus, 2014). We again used the SD3 measure of

the Dark Triad to assess the three inter-correlated traits, Machiavellianism (α = .76; M = 3.15;

SD = 0.59), psychopathy (α = .75; M = 2.33; SD = 0.60) and narcissism (α = .63; M = 3.04; SD =

0.47), which correlated in the expected range (Machiavellianism – psychopathy r = .37, p < .001;

Machiavellianism – narcissism r = .23, p < .001; narcissism – psychopathy r = .23, p < .001).

Mimicry Deception Scale. The 13-item scale was used to once again measure long-term

deception, with a strong internal consistency score (α = .88; M = 3.46; SD = 0.59), as well as a

strong internal consistency score for each of the four MDS facets (α = .77 - .83). In this sample,

we did not assess the type of lie (i.e., selfish good, greater good, desperate lie).

Procedure

21

The study was programmed in Qualtrics and participation involved accessing the survey

through SONA. Following the consent form, participants were directed to a few brief

demographic questions. After these questions, they were presented with the 13 MDS items and

the other three questionnaires. After completion, participants were paid for their participation.

Results and Discussion

Inter-correlations revealed that the MDS correlated positively and significantly with

extraversion, r = .16, p = .008, conscientiousness, r = .16, p = .009, and openness to experience, r

= .22, p < .001. Although these correlations are interesting, it is important to note that we only

predicted the correlation with conscientiousness. In contrast, there was no significant relationship

between the MDS and agreeableness, r = .10, p = .09, or neuroticism, r = -.10, p = .082. Thus,

levels of agreeableness and neuroticism are unrelated to whether someone is a long-term

deceiver. Note that the MDS does not assess whether someone lies or the frequency of lying.

Thus, a null correlation with agreeableness is not entirely unexpected. We expand upon

this finding in the General Discussion.

Although the correlation between the MDS and overall impulsivity was negligible, r =

-.04, p = .496, the non-planning facet of impulsivity was negatively related with the MDS as

predicted, r = -.17, p = .005. Interestingly, and not expected, motor impulsivity was positively

and significantly correlated with the MDS, r = .12, p = .047. Finally, the non-attention facet of

impulsivity was unrelated to MDS, r = -.07, p = .251.

Finally, MDS and Machiavellianism once again had a positive and significant correlation,

r = .17, p = .005. Narcissism and the MDS had correlation of similar strength, r = .23, p < .001.

Psychopathy was unrelated to the MDS, r = .02, p = .773. The comparison between correlations

22

(psychopathy – MDS vs. Machiavellianism – MDS) were again significantly different from one

another (t(274) = 2.92, p = .03). However, narcissism – MDS and Machiavellianism – MDS

correlations did not differ. Overall, we found that the MDS had expected correlations with

conscientiousness, non-planning, and Machiavellianism, providing evidence for the construct

validity of the MDS. Specifically, the MDS is associated with strategic manipulation and

forethought. Thus, the MDS is tapping a complex, integrated, sustainable, community-relevant,

and difficult to detect pattern of deception. However, the MDS is also associated with openness

to experience and extraversion. Although not predicted, these findings make sense, given the

social nature of deception (extraversion) and the creativity required to engage in long-term and

complicated deception (openness).

The MDS correlated with Machiavellianism more strongly than it did with psychopathy,

which replicated across two studies and three samples. Specifically, the correlation was

between Machiavellianism and MDS was stronger than the correlation between

psychopathy and MDS in all but Study 2 (which used the Mach-IV). Finally, narcissism

had correlations with the MDS that were similar to the Machiavellianism-MDS

correlations.

The MDS had an unexpected positive and significant relationship with motor

impulsiveness. Recent research has found that Machiavellianism in men also correlates with

motor impulsiveness despite a negative correlation with non-planning (Szabo & Jones, 2019).

Thus, motor impulsiveness may have to do with individuals willing to engage in opportunistic

behavior more than it does recklessness. However, future research is necessary given the

unexpected correlation.

Study 4 – Test Re-test Reliability and Lie Discovery over Time

23

Thus far, we have established that the 13-item MDS has a good factor structure that

represents the four components of long-term deception. Further, we have established that this

factor structure is replicable and internally consistent. We have also found that the necessary

components that would drive long-term deception (i.e., planning and conscientiousness) are

correlated with the MDS. We also demonstrated appropriate correlations with respect to the Dark

Triad. However, we have not established if the MDS is reliable in a test-retest fashion. This test-

retest reliability is critical given that our argument is that the dispositional tendency to lie in

long-term ways is consistent. Beyond test-retest, however, we must also conduct a critical test of

construct validity, which is whether the MDS can predict the lasting effect of deception, and

whether long-term deceivers are less likely to have their lies detected over time.

Power analysis.

For Study 4, we took the average of the three hypothesized correlations with the MDS

(Machiavellianism, conscientiousness, and planning), which were .37, .16, and .17, which was

roughly .23. According to G*Power, the needed sample size for 80% power with a correlation

of .23 is roughly 146 participants. Thus, for Study 4, we recruited 218 participants with the

anticipation of some attrition from Time 1 to Time 2.

Methods

Participants

The 218 student volunteers for Study 4 were recruited from a medium sized university in

the Northwest of the United States. A total of 218 students (38% women, Mean age (SD) =

20.90, (1.95), 61% European heritage, 17% East Asian heritage, 8% Latinx, 14% other).

Design and Procedure

24

Participants were first given a baseline survey, which consisted of demographics and the

MDS. Participants were asked (without identifying information) to briefly describe a lie (any lie)

that they told that day. Participants were also asked to rate “how big” the lie was on a scale of

1(a very trivial lie; low consequence) to 7(a very big lie; huge consequence), with most lies

scoring as fairly trivial (M = 2.20; SD = 1.32). A week later the same sample was asked to fill

out the second part of the study, and their data were matched using an anonymous PIN number

provided in the first study. The attrition rate was approximately 40%, with a final sample of the

second wave that was n = 123. Scores on the MDS at Time 1 did not differ between those who

completed and those who did not complete the second wave, t = 1.50, p = .135. Further, we had

no reason to believe attrition was not at random. Thus, we proceeded with the analyses using

default settings for missing data.

In the second wave, which was collected approximately a week later, participants were

asked several questions about culture and marketing (which were designed to obfuscate the

purpose of the present study). After these questions, participants again filled out the MDS and

one question related to lie discovery: Please think about the lie you reported…has anyone

discovered your lie? The responses were: 1 = no (79%); 2 = I confessed (10%); 3 = yes, but I

suffered no consequence (6%); and 4 = yes (5%). We compared Category 1 to all other

categories.

The MDS had acceptable overall internal consistency at time 1 (α = .74). However, some

of the facets did not reach appropriate levels of internal consistency (complexity: α = .63;

community integration α = .79; resource extraction α = .64; detectability α = .59). The MDS at

Time 2, however, had acceptable reliabilities for all facets (complexity: α = .75; community

integration α = .82; resource extraction α = .76; detectability α = .77) and the overall composite

25

(α = .86). With respect to the type of lie participants told, 43% indicated that their lie was

for selfish good, 10% indicated that it was out of desperate need, and 47% indicated that it

was for greater good.

Results and Discussion

We then analyzed the test-retest reliability of the MDS. We computed an intraclass

correlation between the MDS at Time 1 and Time 2, with an overall correlation of .64, which

demonstrates acceptable test-retest reliability. We then examined the intercorrelations among all

study variables (see Table 8). Complexity of Deception was a significant predictor of Time 2 lie

discovery, such that higher complexity was associated with less likelihood of discovery. We then

analyzed whether the MDS facet of complexity would remain significant after controlling for the

consequence of the lie and the other MDS facets. Specifically, we took the facets of MDS from

Time 1 and used them to predict the binary outcome (discovered = 1 vs. not = 0) of Time 2. We

analyzed the outcome using a binary logistic regression by simultaneously entering the four

components of the MDS and the one question asking about the size of the lie. This additional

covariate was included because larger lies may confound difficulty in hiding them. The overall

result was that Complexity of Deception was negatively associated with discovery at Time 2 (see

Table 9). However, unexpectedly, Resource Extraction was positively correlated with discovery

at Time 2, such that slow resource extraction was a risk factor for lie discovery. Although, it

should be noted that this effect only appeared in regression, the raw correlation between resource

extraction and Time 2 discovery was not significant (see Table 9).

We again conducted a One-Way ANOVA to using the MDS total score as the

dependent variable and type of lie (i.e., greater good, desperate need, selfish good) as the

independent variable. The results indicated no significant difference among the types of

26

lies, F(2, 217) = 1.49, p = .227. Thus, once again the type of lie told had no association with

whether the lie was long-term or not.

General Discussion

Using an MDT framework, we developed a 13-item Mimicry Deception Scale (MDS)

that assesses the four dimensions of long-term deception: Community Integration, Complexity of

Deception, slow Resource Extraction, and low Detectability. We provided further validation of

this scale through differential associations with the Dark Triad traits, Big Five personality

dimensions, and aspects of impulsivity. Among the Dark Triad, we found that narcissism and

Machiavellianism had moderate and positive correlations. In contrast, psychopathy had no

significant correlation with long-term deception. These findings fit the trait description of

Machiavellianism, which describes their manipulative tendencies as more strategic (Jones,

2016), flexible (Bereczkei, 2015), and situationally based (Jones & Mueller, in press). These

findings deviate from those of Blickle and colleagues (2020), who found that those high in

Machiavellianism would not refrain from engaging in short-term antisocial behaviors. It may be

the case that self-reported counterproductive work behaviors, when not detected, are part of a

larger attempt at deception whereby the deceiver “tries out” such behaviors to assess the

detectability of their actions. Further research using the MDS could assess the situational factors

that affect when someone might engage in long- versus short-term deception. However, these

explanations are speculative and require further investigation.

The lack of a negative correlation between psychopathy and MDS may raise suspicion

that the short-term end of the MDS is not really measuring short-term deception. This non-

correlation between psychopathy and long-term MDS does, suggests that two separate scales

may be needed (e.g., MDS – Short-term, MDS – Long-term). Indeed, it is possible that long- vs.

27

short-term deception are not opposites but two separate dimensions that can be assessed

simultaneously. Thus, long-term and short-term deception may be qualitatively different

processes. However, one potential explanation is that individuals high in psychopathy are

likely to try all forms of deception – long- and short-term, whereas individuals high in

Machiavellianism and narcissism lean more towards long-term deception. Thus,

individuals high in Machiavellianism and narcissism think more carefully about their

deceptive actions and shy away from impulsive lies. Nevertheless, future research should

address these potential explanations and perhaps address the need for a short-term version

of the MDS.

Narcissism, like Machiavellianism, consistently correlated in a positive direction

with long-term deception. This finding was not predicted like it was for Machiavellianism.

Although strategic deception is not part of the definition of narcissism, there are several

possible reasons for this correlation that are worth exploring. First, individuals high in

narcissism are extraverted and open to experience (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These

two Big Five factors were also related to long-term deception and may be a driving force

behind the positive correlation between narcissism and facets of long-term deception.

Second, individuals high in narcissism deceive through self-deception (von Hippel &

Trivers, 2011), which means that they convince themselves of their entitlement or

superiority, and that self-deception leads to the deception of others. Thus, self-deception

may lend itself to long-term deception because it is more deeply rooted in an individual’s

psychology. Future research should explore the link between self-deception and long-term

deception.

28

Nevertheless, narcissism was somewhat inconsistent in its relationship with long-

term deception, showing smaller a smaller relationship in Study 1 than other studies. One

explanation is that the cultural makeup of Sample 1 (predominately Latinx from Mexico)

was different from that of the subsequent samples (predominately White/European

Heritage). Thus, the nature of deception may be culturally dependent. For example, Mexico

is more collectivistic than is the USA (Shkodriani & Gibbons, 1995). This collectivism

means that the fundamental nature of interpersonal relationships is different (i.e.,

interdependent relationships are stronger), and being a member of the community is more

central to individuals’ identities. Thus, for example, it is possible that within a collectivistic

culture to deceive someone in the long-term requires less effort to engage in community

integration. Further research is needed to determine the impact of culture on long- vs.

short-term lies.

Consistent with theory, the MDS also correlated negatively with non-planning and

positively with conscientiousness, which were predicted to be necessary components of long-

term deception. Unexpectedly, openness to experience and extraversion were also correlated

with the MDS. Although not predicted, long-term deception may also involve creative thinking

or sociability. Interestingly, these findings correspond to those from Kashy and DePaulo (1996),

who found that extraverted people have more interactions with others, thus providing more

opportunities for deception. This increased opportunity can lead these people to become better at

lying, or in the case of our findings, it may make them more likely to use a strategic, long-term

form of deception. Certainly, community integration and complexity of deception in particular

require an ability to interact with people in a manner that helps the individual achieve their

(deceptive) goals. With regards to openness to experience, vivid imagination and emotional

29

intelligence would also aid with the components of community integration and complexity of

deception. Indeed, a recent study found that both extraversion and openness to experience were

related to a higher frequency of lie-telling as well as more successful lie-telling (Elaad & Reizer,

2015). Finally, the MDS did not correlate with agreeableness or neuroticism. The lack of

correlation with agreeableness may seem surprising given the MDS assesses deception.

However, all participants filling out the scale were asked to rate a lie they told, not if they

told a lie. Thus, although the scale assesses lies, it assesses whether lies are long-term, not

whether someone tells a lot of lies. Future research should replicate and further explore the

implications that may exist for personality aspects associated with successful long-term

deception.

The MDS has several advantages over traditional personality scales when studying

temporal orientation in deception. First, Machiavellianism is a flexible (Bereczkei, 2015) and

opportunistic (Christie & Geis, 1970) trait. Individuals high in Machiavellianism are not always

going to behave in a long-term or conscientious way. Such behavior depends greatly on their

mental resources and the immediate situation (Jones & Paulhus, 2017). Further, the reliance on

self-report for traditional measures of personality make them a challenge to use in applied

settings. Research has shown that individuals high in different Dark Triad traits use different

strategies when it comes to resource control (Basak et al., 2018; Curtis et al., in press) or socially

engineered attacks (Curtis et al., 2018). Nevertheless, although it is possible to profile a

Machiavellian vs. a psychopathic attacker in an environment such as cyberspace, it is difficult. In

contrast, these patterns of attack or manipulation can be readily observed in code, strategies,

timing, and other aspects of a cyberattack (Jones et al., 2021). The same would be true of fraud

(Hermanson et al., 2017) or child predation (de Roos, 2017).

30

With regards to the usefulness of different components of MDT to avoid getting caught,

Complexity of Deception was the best predictor. This finding indicates that people who engage

in elaborate deception are indeed more successful at remaining undetected. As noted above,

MDT can be applied to different settings where it would be important to identify a risk factor

that maximizes the likelihood of remaining undetected. Complexity of Deception may be a good

starting point across a variety of contexts to identify specific patterns of deception employed, and

to recognize these at an early stage to minimize harm. However, slow Resource Extraction was a

risk factor for being discovered. It is likely that this finding is highly dependent on the specific

context. In some instances, it may be relatively easy to slowly extract resources without being

found out (e.g., financial employees, deceiving strangers). In other settings, slow extraction may

be easily spotted such that a first instance may alert others to the deception (i.e., deceiving

friends or family). Future research should take such circumstances into account to further explore

this finding because the type of deception used may depend on the specific situation.

There are several limitations to the present research. First, the samples were collected out

of convenience. Future research should examine known fraudsters, con-artists, or others who

have built a career on deception. Second, most of the data was cross-sectional, with the exception

of Study 4. Finally, the data were self-reported, and future research should examine behavioral

outcomes with consequence to determine the predictive validity of the MDS. Nevertheless, the

strengths include the use of samples drawn from separate populations (students from different

universities & MTurk workers) with somewhat similar results. Finally, the current research is

grounded in previously published theory rather than being assembled ad hoc (Jones, 2014).

It is critical to note that the MDS was more heterogeneous than we anticipated. For

example, high Complexity of Deception was a protective factor against lie discovery in Study 4,

31

whereas slow Resource Extraction was a risk factor. Thus, there are some components that may

be more useful than others across different contexts depending on the lie and the goal of the lie.

Further, some factors may become irrelevant depending on the type of lie. A lie that does

not necessarily extract resources renders that component irrelevant. However, given these

findings, we encourage researchers to study the subcomponents or facets of the MDS in addition

to the composite. Further, it would be useful to assess MDS scores in relation to more detail

about the type of lie being told. Although there were minimal differences between selfish

good, greater good, and desperate need and MDS scores, the size of lies, the central

importance, and the circumstances under which someone lies may have an impact on how

long-term the lies become. Future research should examine these possibilities.

In sum, individuals vary in their honesty (Lee & Ashton, 2005) and their deceptive skill

(e.g., Turner & Martinez, 1977), but to date no scale speaks to the long-term nature of deception.

Our findings demonstrate that the MDS is a psychometrically strong instrument that assesses

long-term deception orientation. The MDS demonstrated convergent validity in having a positive

correlation with planning, conscientiousness, and Machiavellianism. Further, the MDS is derived

from theoretical observations that have been established in the psychological literature. The

MDS promises to be a useful instrument in profiling, prototyping, assessing, observing, and

recording long-term deception in self-report.

References

Basak, A., Černý, J., Gutierrez, M., Curtis, S., Kamhoua, C., Jones, D., ... & Kiekintveld, C.

(2018, October). An initial study of targeted personality models in the flipit game. In

32

International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (pp. 623-636).

Springer, Cham.

Baughman H. M., Dearing S., Giammarco E., Vernon P.A. (2012). Relationships between

bullying behaviors and the Dark Triad: A study with adults. Personality and Individual

Differences, 52, 571-575.

Bereczkei, T. (2015). The manipulative skill: Cognitive devices and their neural correlates

underlying Machiavellian’s decision making. Brain and Cognition, 99, 24-31.

Blickle, G., Kückelhaus, B. P., Kranefeld, I., Schütte, N., Genau, H. A., Gansen-Ammann, D. N.,

& Wihler, A. (2020). Political skill camouflages Machiavellianism: Career role

performance and organizational misbehavior at short and long tenure. Journal of

Vocational Behavior, 118, 103401.

Book, A., Visser, B. A., & Volk, A. A. (2015). Unpacking “evil”: Claiming the core of the Dark

Triad. Personality and Individual Differences, 73, 29-38.

Brown, S. L., & Forth, A. E. (1997). Psychopathy and sexual assault: static risk factors,

emotional precursors, and rapist subtypes. Journal of Consulting and Clinical

Psychology, 65(5), 848.

Buller, D. B., & Burgoon, J. K. (1996). Interpersonal deception theory. Communication Theory,

6, 203-242.

Buss, A. H. (1961). The psychology of aggression. Wiley.

33

Camden, C, Motley, M. T., & Wilson, A. (1984). White lies in interpersonal communication: A

taxonomy and preliminary investigation of social motivations. Western Journal of Speech

Communication, 48, 309-325.

Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. Academic Press.

Cole, T. (2001). Lying to the one you love: The use of deception in romantic

relationships. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 18(1), 107-129.

Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological

Bulletin, 52, 281-302.

Curtis, S. R., Basak, A., Carre, J. R., Bošanský, B., Černý, J., Ben-Asher, N., ... & Kiekintveld,

C. (in press). The Dark Triad and strategic resource control in a competitive computer

game. Personality and Individual Differences, 168, 110343.

Curtis, S. R., Rajivan, P., Jones, D. N., & Gonzalez, C. (2018). Phishing attempts among the dark

triad: Patterns of attack and vulnerability. Computers in Human Behavior, 87, 174-182.

DePaulo, B. M., & Kashy, D. A. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 63-79.

de Roos, M. D. R. (2017). Mimicry Deception Theory Applied To Grooming Behaviors Of Child

Sexual Abuse (Unpublished Master’s Thesis), University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso,

Texas, United States.

Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). The mini-IPIP scales:

tiny-yet-effective measures of the Big Five factors of personality. Psychological

Assessment, 18, 192-203.

34

Elaad, E., & Reizer, A. (2015). Personality correlates of the self-assessed abilities to tell and

detect lies, tell truths, and believe others. Journal of Individual Differences, 36, 163–169.

Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Shaw, L. (1974). The modification of personality and lie

scale scores by special ‘honesty ’instructions. British Journal of Social and Clinical

Psychology, 13(1), 41-50.

Fisher, R. A. (1921). On the probable error of a coefficient of correlation deduced from a small

sample. Metron, 1, 1–32.

Ford, J. B. (2017). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: a comment. Journal of Advertising, 46(1), 156-

158.

Gentile, B., Miller, J. D., Hoffman, B. J., Reidy, D. E., Zeichner, A., & Campbell, W. K. (2013).

A test of two brief measures of grandiose narcissism: The Narcissistic Personality

Inventory–13 and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory-16. Psychological Assessment,

25, 1120.

Giammarco E. A., Atkinson B., Baughman H. M., Veselka L., Vernon P. A. (2012). The relation

between antisocial personality and the perceived ability to deceive. Personality and

Individual differences, 54, 246-250.

Hermanson, D. R., Justice, S. E., Ramamoorti, S., & Riley Jr, R. A. (2017). Unique

characteristics of predator frauds. Journal of Forensic Accounting Research, 2(1), A31-

A48.

Hilbig, B. E., Kieslich, P. J., Henninger, F., Thielmann, I., & Zettler, I. (2018). Lead us (not) into

temptation: Testing the motivational mechanisms linking honesty–humility to

cooperation. European Journal of Aersonality, 32, 116-127.

35

Hodson, G., Book, A., Visser, B. A., Volk, A. A., Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2018). Is the dark

triad common factor distinct from low honesty-humility?. Journal of Research in

Personality, 73, 123-129.

Horn, J. L. (1965). A rationale and test for the number of factors in factor analysis.

Psychometrika, 32, 179-185.

Jenkins, S., & Delbridge, R. (2017). Trusted to deceive: A case study of ‘strategic deception’and

the normalization of lying at work. Organization Studies, 38, 53-76.

Jones, D. N. (2014). Predatory Personalities as Behavioral Mimics and Parasites: Mimicry–

Deception Theory. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9(4), 445-451.

Jones, D. N., & Figueredo, A. J. (2013). The core of darkness: Uncovering the heart of the Dark

Triad. European Journal of Personality, 27(6), 521-531.

Jones, D.N., & Mueller, S.M. (in press). Is Machiavellianism dead or dormant? The perils of

researching a secretive construct. Journal of Business Ethics.

Jones, D.N., Padilla, E., Curtis, S.R., & Kiekintveld, C. (2021). Network Discovery and Scanning

Strategies and The Dark Triad. Manuscript Under Review.

Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2011). The role of impulsivity in the Dark Triad of personality.

Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 679-682.

Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2014). Introducing the short dark triad (SD3) a brief measure of

dark personality traits. Assessment, 21(1), 28-41.

Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2017). Duplicity among the dark triad: Three faces of deceit.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113, 329.

36

Jones, D. N., & de Roos, M. S. (2016). Validating the four components of Mimicry Deception

Theory from the victim's perspective. Personality and Individual Differences, 95, 37-39.

Kashy, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1996). Who lies?. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 70(5), 1037-1051.

Kees, J., Berry, C., Burton, S., & Sheehan, K. (2017). An analysis of data quality: Professional

panels, student subject pools, and Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Journal of

Advertising, 46(1), 141-155.

Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2005). Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism in the Five

Factor Model and the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and

Individual Differences, 38, 1571–1582.

Lee K., Ashton M. C., Wiltshire J., Bourdage J. S., Visser B. A., Gallucci A. (2013). Sex, power,

and money: Prediction from the Dark Triad and Honesty-Humility. European Journal of

Personality, 27, 169-184.

Miller, J. D., Hyatt, C. S., Maples‐Keller, J. L., Carter, N. T., & Lynam, D. R. (2017).

Psychopathy and Machiavellianism: A distinction without a difference?. Journal of

Personality, 85, 439-453.

Mitchell, R. W. (1996). The psychology of human deception. Social Research, 819-861.

Moshagen, M., Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2018). The dark core of personality. Psychological

Review, 125, 656.

37

Neumann, C. S., & Pardini, D. (2014). Factor structure and construct validity of the Self-Report

Psychopathy (SRP) Scale and the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI) in young

men. Journal of Personality Disorders, 28, 419-433.

Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt

impulsiveness scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 768-774.

Paulhus, D. L., Neumann, C. S., & Hare, R. D. (2016). Manual for the Self-Report Psychopathy

(SRP) Scale. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.

Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism,

Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(6), 556-563.

Pratkanis, A. R., & Shadel, D. (2005). Weapons of fraud: A source book for fraud fighters.

AARP Washington.

Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling and more. Version

0.5–12 (BETA). Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University.

Raskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1981). The Narcissistic Personality Inventory: Alternative form

reliability and further evidence of construct validity. Journal of Personality Assessment,

45, 159-162.

Richard, F. D., Bond, C. F., & Stokes-Zoota, J. J. (2003). One hundred years of social

psychology quantitatively described. Review of General Psychology, 7, 331–363

Schönbrodt, F. D., & Perugini, M. (2013). At what sample size do correlations

stabilize?. Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 609-612.

38

Serota, K. B., Levine, T. R., & Boster, F. J. (2010). The prevalence of lying in America: Three

studies of self-reported lies. Human Communication Research, 36, 2-25.

Shkodriani, G. M., & Gibbons, J. L. (1995). Individualism and collectivism among university

students in Mexico and the United States. The Journal of Social Psychology, 135(6), 765-

772.

Spinella, M. (2007). Normative data and a short form of the Barratt Impulsiveness

Scale. International Journal of Neuroscience, 117(3), 359-368.

Szabó, E., & Jones, D. N. (2019). Gender differences moderate Machiavellianism and

impulsivity: Implications for Dark Triad research. Personality and Individual

Differences, 141, 160-165.

Tooke, W., & Camire, L. (1991). Patterns of deception in intersexual and intrasexual mating

strategies. Ethology and Sociobiology, 12, 345-364.

Turner, R. E., Edgley, C., & Olmstead, G. (1975). Information control in conversations: Honesty

is not always the best policy. Kansas Journal of Sociology, 69-89.

Turner, C. F., & Martinez, D. C. (1977). Socioeconomic achievement and the Machiavellian

personality. Sociometry, 325-336.

von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011). The evolution and psychology of self-

deception. Behavioral and brain sciences, 34(1), 1-56.

Whitty, M. T., & Carville, S. E. (2008). Would I lie to you? Self-serving lies and other-oriented

lies told across different media. Computers in Human Behavior, 24(3), 1021-1031.

39

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics of Dark Triad and MDS Variables for Sub-Sample 1A and 1B.

Sample 1A Sample 1B

N M SD Min Max N M SD Min Max

Machiavellianism 338 3.23 .60 1.67 5.00 338 3.13 .62 1.33 5.00

Narcissism 335 2.98 .50 1.78 4.44 338 2.98 .50 1.67 5.00

Psychopathy 335 2.25 .58 1.33 3.89 338 2.28 .59 1.00 3.89

Complexity of

Deception 308 3.61 .90 1.00 5.00 308 3.60 .84 1.00 5.00

Community

Integration 301 3.44 1.08 1.00 5.00 308 3.40 1.01 1.00 5.00

Resource Extraction 294 2.65 1.09 1.00 5.00 300 2.69 1.03 1.00 5.00

Detectability 296 3.47 1.04 1.00 5.00 294 3.46 .96 1.00 5.00

MDS Overall 309 3.30 .78 1.00 5.00 296 3.46 .96 1.00 5.00

40

Table 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis on original MDS items.

Factor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. I learned as much as I could about the

person before persuading .34 .08 -.05 .35 -.02 -.06 -.02

2. I took my time convincing the person .71 .10 -.11 .15 -.13 .03 .01

3. I covered all my bases in my attempt to

persuade .71 -.07 .13 .06 .01 .05 -.09

4. I ensured that I looked like I walked the

walk .58 -.01 .18 -.03 .03 .03 -.04

5. I focused my persuasion on one particular

person. .55 .07 -.05 .12 -.04 -.19 .15

6. I waited for a moment’s hesitation to get

what I wanted. .52 .20 -.13 -

<-.01 .17 .05 -.01

7. I persuaded quickly. .56 -.18 .05 -.22 .41 <-.01 -.12

8. I looked legitimate only long enough to

convince the person to give me what I

wanted. .40 .35 -.19 -.04 .20 -.17 -.02

9. I made sure I came across as

friendly/helpful/trustworthy. .58 -.06 .27 .01 -.15 .08 .08

10. I pretended things that mattered to the

person mattered to me too. .42 .09 .11 -.10 -.03 .15 .08

11. I got to know the person well. .27 -.06 .07 .68 -.06 -.03 .04

12. I got to know the person’s family and

friends. -.12 <-.01 -.01 .85 .09 .04 .03

13. I spent a lot of time with the person. .07 <-.01 .01 .77 .08 -.05 -.05

14. I persuaded as many people as possible. .17 -.07 .05 .09 .14 .53 -.10

15. I only spent enough time with the person

to get what I needed/wanted. .16 .57 -.13 -.15 .03 .09 .14

16. I moved from person to person quickly. .03 .17 -.04 -.10 .13 .43 .11

17. I deceived multiple people at once. -.07 .02 .03 -.04 .09 .75 -.03

41

18. I took the things I wanted/needed

slowly. .04 .82 -.03 .02 -.27 .17 -.02

19. I took so little at a time that no one

noticed right away. -.14 .76 .26 .01 .02 -.05 -.10

20. I took things sustainably so that they

never run out. .05 .74 .13 -.07 .07 -.11 -.14

21. I took everything at once. -.07 -.01 -.18 .10 .61 .28 .03

22. I extracted all that I could in a short time. -.03 .03 .04 .08 .70 .07 .08

23. I maximized what I could take so I could

move on quickly. -.05 .14 .03 .06 .57 .09 .07

24. I gradually asked for more and more over

time. -.03 .45 -.02 .15 .19 .03 -.02

25. I left no trace of my deception .03 .10 .54 -.06 .36 -.06 .02

26. I maintained an excellent reputation. .15 -.13 .75 . -.01 -.06 -.01 .09

27. I ensured no one would ever suspect me

of anything bad. -.05 .14 .82 .02 -.02 -.01 .02

28. I left no immediate doubt about my

good intentions. .06 .09 .65 .05 -.06 .05 -.01

29. I left doubt in people’s minds as to

whether I did anything wrong. .04 .27 <-.01 .04 .01 .13 .08

30. I disappeared quickly. -.04 .41 <-.01 .05 .32 -.12 .03

31. I don’t care what those people think of me

now. .04 -.14 .05 -.01 .07 -.02 .67

32. I don’t care if those people hate me for

what I did. -.03 .06 .06 -.01 .06 -.03 .90

33. The people I deceived are still in my life. -.02 -.01 .15 .26 .11 .16 -.10

Note: Bolded items were selected for Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

42

Figure 1. CFA Diagram.

43

Table 3.

Correlations between MDS Components as assessed by final MDS Items.

Factor 1 2 3 4

1. Complexity of Deception ---- .58** .60** .44**

2. Resource Extraction .42** ---- .45** .31**

3. Community Integration .50** .26** ---- .49**

4. Detectability .56** .42** .42** ----

**p<.001. Correlations between extracted factors above diagonal.

44

Table 4. Correlations between MDS subscales and Dark Triad for samples 1a and 1b

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Complexity of Deception .40** .42** .52** .80** .21** .06 .18*

2. Community Integration .50** .19* .24** .66** .01 -.07 .04

3. Resource Extraction .42** .26** .35** .70** .20* .25** .06

4. Detectability .56** .42** .42** .73** .19* .01 .15*

5. MDS Composite .80** .73** .71** .80** .19** .08 .13*

6. Machiavellianism .37** .20* .29** .36** .37** .50** .24**

7. Psychopathy .13* .09 .20* .07 .15* .43** .22**

8. Narcissism .22* .10 .08 .07 .11 .17* .24**

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. Subsample 1a is below the diagonal, subsample 1b is above.

45

Table 5

Regression of Dark Triad traits on each component of the MDS, combining sub-samples.

B SE β t p 95% CI

Complexity of Deception

Machiavellianism .41 .06 .29 6.61 <.001 [.29;.53]

Narcissism .27 .07 .15 3.80 <.001 [.13;.40]

Psychopathy -.10 .07 -.07 -1.57 .117 [-.23;.03]

Community Integration

Machiavellianism .20 .08 .12 2.51 .012 [.04;.35]

Narcissism .12 .09 .06 1.35 .178 [-.06;.29]

Psychopathy -.10 .08 -.05 -1.17 .241 [-.26;.07]

Resource Extraction

Machiavellianism .31 .08 .18 3.93 <.001 [.15;.46]

Narcissism .01 .09 .003 .07 .941 [-.17;.18]

Psychopathy .26 .08 .14 3.18 .002 [.10;.42]

Detectability

Machiavellianism .52 .07 .32 7.16 <.001 [.38;.69]

Narcissism .14 .08 .07 1.67 .097 [-.03;.30]

Psychopathy -.21 .08 -.12 2.72 .007 [-.36;-.06]

MDS overall

Machiavellianism .33 .05 .28 6.34 <.001 [.23;.44]

Narcissism .13 .06 .09 2.13 .034 [.01;.25]

Psychopathy -.03 .06 -.03 -.61 .543 [-.14;.08]

46

Table 6

Correlations between MDS subscales and Dark Triad for Study 2.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Complexity of Deception ----

2. Community Integration .53** ----

3. Resource Extraction .56** .23** ----

4. Detectability .59** .38** .41** ----

5. MDS total .87** .72** .74** .73** ----

6. Machiavellianism .16 .07 .31** .07 21* ----

7. Psychopathy .15 -.01 .24** .10 .16 .63** ----

8. Narcissism .30** .09 .27** .11 .25** .29** .41** ----

*p<.05, **p<.001

47

Table 7

Regression of Dark Triad traits on each component of the MDS for Study 2.

B SE β t p 95% CI

Complexity of Deception

Machiavellianism 0.19 .16 .12 1.15 .253 [-0.13; 0.51]

Narcissism 1.25 .40 .28 3.15 .002 [0.46; 2.03]

Psychopathy -0.07 .19 -.04 -0.37 .711 [0.45; 0.31]

Community Integration

Machiavellianism 0.26 .21 .14 1.28 .203 [-0.14; 0.67]

Narcissism 0.57 .50 .11 1.15 .253 [-0.42; 1.56]

Psychopathy -0.31 .24 -.15 -1.28 .203 [-0.80; 0.17]

Resource Extraction

Machiavellianism 0.47 .20 .25 2.38 .019 [0.08; .0.86]

Narcissism 1.07 .48 .20 2.25 .026 [0.13; 2.01]

Psychopathy -0.02 .23 -.01 -0.07 .948 [-0.48; 0.45]

Detectability

Machiavellianism 0.02 .15 .02 0.16 .876 [-0.27; 0.32]

Narcissism 0.32 .36 .08 0.90 .372 [-0.39; 1.04]

Psychopathy 0.09 .18 .06 0.51 .611 [-0.26; 0.44]

MDS overall

Machiavellianism 0.24 .13 .19 1.78 .078 [-0.03; 0.50]

Narcissism 0.81 .33 .22 2.48 .014 [0.16; 1.45]

Psychopathy -0.08 .16 -.06 -0.50 .616 [-0.40; 0.24]

48

Table 8

1 2 3 4 5

1. Complexity of Deception

2. Community Integration .22*

3. Resource Extraction .29** .09

4. Detectability .47** .10 .23*

5. Lie Discovered -.18* .02 .15 -.16

Correlations between MDS Variables and Lie Discovered

*p<.05, **p<.001

49

Table 9.

Binary Logistic Regressions of MDS Components Predicting Lie Discovery.

Variable B Exp(B) 95%CI (ExpB) p

Complexity -1.49 0.23 0.06, 0.83 .025

Community Integration 0.03 1.03 0.57, 1.87 .913

Resource Extraction 1.19 3.27 1.37, 7.81 .008

Detectability -0.38 0.68 0.26, 1.77 .430

Lie consequence -0.14 0.87 0.61, 1.25 .457