Jelavich - Revolt 1881-2

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The Revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1881-2

Author(s): Charles JelavichReviewed work(s):Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 31, No. 77 (Jun., 1953), pp. 420-436Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4204461 .

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The Revolt in

Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1881?2

CHARLES JELAVICH

In the fifty years preceding the outbreak of the first world war theprovinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina, despite their relative back?wardness and remoteness, figured prominently as centres of agitationand potential areas of great-power conflict. The crises of 1875-8,1908-9 and 1914 are familiar to the historian because of their widesignificance in European diplomatic history. However, many of theissues involved in these episodes also made their appearance in aserious uprising which occurred during 1881 and 1882, only a fewyears after the Austro-Hungarian government had received the rightto occupy and administer the provinces at the Congress of Berlin. Theinternational repercussions of this incident, as well as its effect on theinternal politics of the Empire, demonstrated the difficulties whichthe Habsburg authorities encountered in their attempt to administerand control the South Slavonic Balkan lands.

The ostensible reason for the revolt was the announcement thatmilitary service would be introduced in Southern Dalmatia, that is inthe area of Boka Kotorska and Dubrovnik, and in the newly acquiredprovinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Previously, in 1869, Austriahad attempted to enforce conscription in Southern Dalmatia only tobe met with such widespread resistance that the measure had to beabandoned. In this as in the later instance the opposition to theauthorities was based on the legal grounds that when the Monarchyacquired Dalmatia after the Napoleonic wars, the Emperor Francis Ihad agreed to respect the privilege of exemption from military serviceenjoyed by the people of the Dubrovnik area under Venetian rule.1Despite the failure of the initial attempt the Austrian governmentdecided again in 1881 to impose military service.The announcement immediately produced disturbances in theKrivosije area of Southern Dalmatia, which then spread into Herce?govina and parts of Bosnia when similar military regulations wereissued for these provinces. In November 1881 it was decreed thatevery able-bodied man in Bosnia-Hercegovina should on reaching his

1 For a brief summary of the question of military service in 1869 and 1881 see: GreatBritain, Public Record Office, Political Despatches, St John to Granville, F.O. 7/1023,No. 3, Ragusa, 16 March 1881; No. 6, Ragusa, 28 September 1881 (hereafter cited asF.O.); Grga Novak, ProUostDalmacije,Zagreb, 1944, II, 403-4; Edward A. Freeman, 'TheRevolt in Dalmatia', Nation, XXXIV, 16 February 1882, pp. 140-2; The Times, London,2 July 1881, p. 7; Neue Freie Presse, 14 January 1882, pp. 1, 2; 22 January 1882, p. 2.Hereafter, all newspaper dates, unless otherwise indicated, will refer to the year 1882.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 42 Itwentieth birthday be required to serve three years in the army andnine years in the reserve.2 To appease the Moslems provisions weremade to respect their religious observances and traditions.3 TheAustrian government also tried to persuade the local inhabitantsthat it was their duty to join in the defence and maintenance oforder in their lands, but such arguments were received with littlesympathy.

Although the introduction of military service was the immediatecause of the uprising, this was merely the culmination of a series ofevents which the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina deeply resentedor misunderstood. In the first place, the occupation had from thebeginning been received with the greatest disfavour. The OrthodoxSerbs had no desire to exchange Turkish for Austrian rule, but wishedto join either Serbia or Montenegro. The Orthodox were as distrust?ful of the predominantly Catholic Dual Monarchy as they had beenof the Moslem Ottoman Empire. The Moslems, who had hithertobeen masters in the provinces, bitterly opposed their transference fromTurkish to Austro-Hungarian authority, even though the Conventionof 1879 provided that they remained technically the subjects of thesultan. Moreover, both religious groups had been led to believe thatthe occupation would be terminated after a period of perhaps a fewyears. With the passing of time however they began to realise theprobable permanence of the situation. Thus the two once antagonisticgroups were able to cooperate on the basis of their common enmity toHabsburg rule.4In addition, the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina soon had much tocomplain of in the character of the administration to which they werenow subjected, particularly the corruption of the officials. In discussingthe various causes of the revolt, the British consul at Dubrovnikreported to his government on 23 January 1882 that Austria-Hungary 'was either unwilling or unable to send out a well-paid andefficient staff, and consequently recruited her officials from amongthose whose promotion in the public service at home was, to say theleast, doubtful'.5 This opinion was confirmed by the British consul atSarajevo, who wrote on 8 May that impartial and unprejudicedofficials were urgently needed, because 'good employees have beenunwilling to come to Bosnia and the administration has hitherto beenchiefly carried on either by incapable and corrupt persons who wereunable to obtain employment in their own country' or by inexper-2 Neue Freie Presse, 4 November 1881, p. 1; 5 November 1881, pp. 1-2; VladimirOorovic, Politickeprilikeu Bosni i Hercegovini,Belgrade, 1939, p. 31.3 The Times, 5 November 1881, p. 5.4 Vladislav Skaric et al., Bosna i Hercegovina od Austro-UgarskomUpravom,Belgrade,1938, p. 9.5 St John to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 5, Ragusa, 23 January 1882; No. 36, 8 April1882.


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422 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWienced young men.6 Thus it appeared, particularly to the Orthodox,that despite the promises for better administration which Andrassyhad made at the Congress of Berlin the decadence and corruption ofthe Turkish period of control continued.Another cause of irritation centred in the system of taxation.Under Turkish rule taxes had been heavy and often collected byofficials who were primarily interested in extorting all they could.Nevertheless, methods had been developed for circumventing someof the obligations. Consequently, although the new administratorsoften proved inefficient in other respects, their meticulous exaction ofevery tax actually placed a heavier burden on the inhabitants thanhad previously been the case.7The Orthodox had also hoped for a change in the land-tenuresystem. During the Turkish occupation they had been for the mostpart the kmets, or tenants, of the Moslem begs, or landowners, whowere chiefly of Slavonic origin. Under the new rule they had expectedthat the beg-kmet relationship would end and the kmets would becomethe sole proprietors of the houses in which they lived and of the landthey cultivated. Such a result, however, did not follow. Meanwhile,in neighbouring Montenegro, which had also acquired Turkish landsin 1878, agrarian reform was immediately carried out. The contrastbetween the two administrations understandably increased thebitter-ness of the Austrian subjects.8

Perhaps the most serious source of dissatisfaction with the Habsburgofficials themselves was the fact that they ignored or failed to under?stand local customs and traditions. Although the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina were largely of Slavonic nationality and language, theprincipal element in the life of the individual was his religion. Eachof the three religious groups, Orthodox, Moslem and Catholic,cherished its unique characteristics and each held on with greattenacity to the legacy of the past. The new administrators paid littlerespect to the Moslem religion and in some cases used the mosquesfor ammunition dumps. Moslems who wished to make a pilgrimageto the Ottoman Empire or to migrate there were hindered from doingso. The Orthodox complained of interference by the military andcivil officials in their religious affairs, and many of their teachers

6 Freeman to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 15, Sarajevo, 8 May 1882. See also Theodorvon Sosnosky, Die BalkanpolitikOsterreich-Ungarnseit 1866, Stuttgart, 1914, II, pp. 31-2;Skaric, op. cit., p. 9. See also the comments of Dr Rus, a member of the Austrian delega?tion, Neue FreiePresse, 1 February, p. 3.7 Skaric, op. cit., p. 9; Freeman to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 4, Sarajevo, 27 January1882; Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 44, Scutari, 25 April 1882; NeueFreiePresse,6 January, pp. 2-3; 19January, p. 3; The Times, io February, p. 7.8 Skarid, op. cit., pp. 9-11; Freeman to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 4, Sarajevo,27 January 1882; No. 5, Sarajevo, 2 February 1882; Neue FreiePresse,6 January, pp. 2-3.For a description of the agrarian arrangements, see Paulina Irby, 'Bosnia and Its LandTenure', The Contemporaryeview,July 1889, pp. 28-40.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 423preferred to seek refuge in Serbia or Montenegro rather than remainunder such conditions.9

The widespread discontent with the Austro-Hungarian occupationpolicies meant that the revolt, once it had begun, enjoyed the sup?port of many factions in the country. However, the active partici?pants were primarily those who were immediately affected by theintroduction of military service?the eligible young men. Becauseof the nature of the movement it is impossible to estimate the numbersinvolved. No large-scale offensives were launched and, for the mostpart, the rebels operated in groups often, thirty, fifty or even a hun?dred men. They concentrated their attacks on scattered outposts andon roads, bridges and other means of communication. The primarysphere of operation was Southern Dalmatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina,i nthe area bounded by Mostar-Konjic-Sarajevo-Gorazde-Cajnice andthe Montenegrin and Turkish frontiers. The most potent ally of theinsurgents was perhaps the mountainous and rugged terrain of South?ern Dalmatia and Hercegovina, which gave virtually impenetrablecover. The Austrian troops were not familiar with the territory, norcould they count on aid from the local inhabitants, who, on the con?trary, freely supplied the rebels with food and shelter, as well as withinformation on the movements of the opposing forces.10When the revolt first broke out, the Habsburg officials consideredit of minor importance. However, when by January 1882 they hadbeen unable to restore order, the possible consequences of the spreadof the revolt caused concern. Through the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina the Dual Monarchy had added to the numbers of itsalready discontented South Slavonic subjects a group who were notonly easily stirred to action but who were experienced in resistingforeign control. Moreover, the occupation came after a period ofintense revolutionary upheaval, in which the population of theprovinces had failed to attain its national aspiration of union witheither Serbia or Montenegro. The danger thus existed that shouldthe revolt, which arose at first on the relatively minor issue of con?scription, show signs of succeeding, the territory as a whole might riseand fight for the larger objective. On io February the London Timesin an editorial on the subject correctly concluded that 'the totalresult is that the Austrian rule has become in three years as unpopularas Turkish rule ever was, and that the Empire has on its hands aninsurrection which is daily spreading through a most difficultcountry, and which, from the circumstances of the case, is full ofdangerous elements.'119 Skarid, op. cit., p. io.10Detailed accounts of the military phase of the revolt are to be found in Sosnosky,op.cit^.,pp. 34-42, and Skaric, op. cit., pp. 15-32. A good account of the day to day developmentsis to be found in The Timesand the NeueFreiePresse. n The Times,io February, p. 7.


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424 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWTherefore, to deal with this situation the Habsburg government

instituted a Commission of Reform with instructions to examine theentire problem. At the same time it was decided that the first taskshould be to restore order in the disturbed areas by persuading theinsurgents to abandon their resistance or, if this did not succeed,to destroy them. With the failure of the first alternative, steps wereinitiated to make the second effective. Because of the extent of therebellion and the wide area of its manifestation, it was recognisedthat the normal complement of soldiers allotted to the region wouldnot be adequate and that not only would additional troops be neededbut also an extra expenditure of 8,000,000 florins. These requestswere placed before the Delegations of the Empire when they met atthe end of January 1882.12 The demands were granted but during thecourse of the debate divergent points of view on the causes of therevolt were expressed by the delegates and government officials inattendance.

The position of the government was explained by the minister offinance of the Empire, J. de Szlavy, who was the titular head of theadministration of Bosnia-Hercegovina. He naturally denied that therevolt was caused by maladministration or overtaxation and pre?ferred to argue that the Bosnians and Hercegovinians, having foughtthe Turks for centuries, had a certain love of combat which theycould not be expected to lose quickly. He also contended that themilitary law was partially at fault.13 Despite these explanations theDelegations in February recommended a reform of the administrationand the land tenure system. The Habsburg officials promised to takesteps to raise the material standards of the population, to improve thetaxation system, to organise schools, to reform the administration ofjustice and, in particular, to treat the three religious groups withequality.14

Next the question of the suppression of the revolt was met. Afterreceiving additional men and money General Jovanovic, a Habs?burg officer of South Slavonic origin, who had previously beenhandicapped by a lack of supplies, now prepared to put an end to thedisturbances. He was able to make only slow progress in the difficultBosnian terrain and at a high cost. Moreover, another obstacle to com?plete success soon became apparent. Even when the governmenttroops were able to rout groups of rebels, it was found that the survivorsof these bands, instead of surrendering, crossed the frontiers intoMontenegro or the Ottoman Empire, where they found refuge amonga sympathetic population. They used the foreign territory to

12Neue FreiePresse,28 January, pp. 1-3; The Times, 30 January, p. 5.13Neue FreiePresse, 1 February, pp. 3-4; The Times, 1 February, p. 5.14Neue FreiePresse,7 February, p. 1.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 425reorganise their forces and then struck again at the Habsburg troops.If they met with further defeat, they recrossed the frontiers to con?tinue the same tactics. The objective assigned to General Jovanovicof defeating and wiping out the insurgent forces thus proved to beimpossible of accomplishment, unless Austrian troops were to beallowed to pursue the rebels across the borders of neighbouringstates. Such an action, however, would expand the area of conflictand would certainly reopen the whole explosive Balkan question.Since this was not the aim of Austrian policy, the problem becameone of diplomacy.

When the revolt had taken a turn for the worse in the autumn of1881, Prince Nikola of Montenegro had offered to serve as arbitratorbetween the Austrian government and the rebels.15 This suggestionwas declined, and the Monarchy subsequently demanded that Mon?tenegro should remain neutral and desist from aiding the insurgentforces. Nikola agreed to this, and, on the surface, it appeared that heintended to stand by his assurances.16 In February 1882 he visited thefrontier areas and instructed his subjects not to have any dealingswith their compatriots across the border.17 However, even if he hadbeen completely sincere in his actions and declarations, the enforce?ment of strict non-intervention would have been almost impossible.The Montenegrin population was wholeheartedly in sympathy withthe revolt. They believed implicitly the tales of the sufferings of theBosnians and Hercegovinians and were eager to aid those who werefighting for an apparently righteous cause. Sheltering of refugeesfrom what was regarded as Habsburg injustice and persecutionseemed only natural. If Nikola had commanded his frontier officialsand army to turn back the refugees, the order would probably havebeen ignored, and he would also have antagonised his subjects.18Although there is no evidence of his having issued directives contraryto his declarations to Vienna, it is known that his minister of theinterior, Maso Vrbica, actually instructed the frontier officials togive refuge to the rebels, with their families and their belongings.19The Dual Monarchy was thus unable to block this source of assistanceto the uprising.

Relations with the Ottoman Empire in this matter assumed muchthe same form. The Moslems outside the Dual Monarchy were15 Green to Granville, F.O. 103/15, No. 122, Cetinje, 15 October 1881; F.O. 103/18,No. 26, Cetinje, 9 March 1882.16 Skaric, op. cit., pp. 10-11; St John to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 12, Ragusa,13 February 1882.17Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 17, Scutari, io February 1882.18Despite the fact that the Austrian foreign minister, Kalnoky, defended before theDelegations of the Empire the correctness of the attitude of Nikola's government, theAustrian press, well aware of the aid and comfort given to the rebels by the population,strongly condemned the Montenegrins. NeueFreiePresse,28 January, pp. 1-2; 1 February,pp. 2-3; 9 February, p. 1; Skaric, op. cit., p. 11. 19 Loc.cit.


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426 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWsympathetic to those within, and they willingly extended what aidand support they could to their coreligionists, who, as has beenpreviously noted, were now cooperating with their old antagonists,the Orthodox. Certainly, the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, whoregarded Bosnia-Hercegovina as still part of their possessions, werenot unhappy to see the Austrians embarrassed. In Constantinoplea leading newspaper, Yakut, stressed the temporary nature of theoccupation and supported the argument that the inhabitants of theprovinces, being technically subjects of the sultan, could not be com?pelled to serve in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces.20 In general,other Turkish newspapers adopted a similar view and sought toarouse public opinion against the Habsburgs.Despite the tone of the Ottoman press and the open sympathies ofhis people, Sultan Abdul Hamid II apparently maintained anentirely correct attitude. Like Nikola he was willing to promise agreat deal. In January 1882 it was reported that he was disturbed bythe revolt. He had been led to believe that Moslem insurgents werefew in number, but he 'blamed and abhorred their insurrection.521 Amufti was subsequently ordered to take measures to counteract allenmity towards the Dual Monarchy. There was also a rumour thatthe sultan had even offered troops to assist in the suppression ofthe uprising. Unexplained troop movements did take place inFebruary along the frontier, but their purpose could not be deter?mined.22

However, as in the case of Montenegro, no matter what the trueintentions of the Porte were, it proved impossible to control theactions of the Moslem population and officials in the areas borderingon the Dual Monarchy.

Atypical expression of the resentment felt bythe Turks against their northern neighbours was uttered by Rizah

Bey, the Turkish envoy to Montenegro, when he spoke to theBritish representative 'with considerable warmth and indignation'on 'the atrocities that are being committed by the Austro-Hungariantroops against both Christians and Mohammedans and he . . .declared . . . that the insurrection can only be terminated by the

20 The Times, 21 November 1881, p. 5; 28 November 1881, p. 5; Green to Granville,F.O. 103/18, No. 51, Scutari, 22 May 1882; Skaric, op.cit., pp. 9?11; Slobodan Jovanovic,VladaMilana Obrenovica, elgrade, 1934, III, 52.21Austria-Hungary. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, Unruhen inBosnien und der Herzegovina, XXXX 209, Interna VIII, Calice to Kalnoky, XXXX 209,Tel. No. 26, Constantinople, 29 January 1882; No. 9 A-E, Constantinople, 7 February1882. Hereafter cited as H.H.S.Kalnoky also publicly affirmed the correctness of the sultan's policy. The Habsburgpress, in contrast to its treatment of Montenegro, tended to exonerate the Porte from anysuspicion of rendering aid to the rebels, although it was known that the Turkish public wassympathetic to the Moslems who had participated in the revolt. Neue Freie Presse, 1February, pp. 3-4.22 Calice to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 7C, Constantinople, 31 January1882.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 427annihilation of the Moslem population in the occupied pro?vinces ' 23

Despite the failure of the Monarchy to receive complete supportfrom either Montenegro or the Ottoman Empire in the attempt toend the revolt, satisfaction was obtained from a third state borderingon the afflicted provinces. In the summer of 1881 Prince Milan ofSerbia had signed a treaty with Austria-Hungary which made him avirtual vassal of that state. This policy brought him into conflict withthe majority of his subjects and henceforth made his tenure in powerprecarious. The chief support for this programme of subservience toVienna came from the Progressive Party, which was opposed by theLiberal and Radical parties. When the revolt broke out in Dalmatiaand Hercegovina, these latter groups immediately supported therebels, and the whole question became an issue in internal Serbianpolitics.24 The opposition presented the insurrection to the Serbianpublic in terms identical with those used in 1875-6. The allegedsufferings of the South Slavs in the two provinces were described inwords of horror and resentment, and the pro-Austrian policy of theprince and the Progressive Party received bitter criticism. It was thusin Milan's interest to see that the revolt should end as quickly aspossible, since its prolongation might well result in the overthrow ofhis government. Therefore, in order to protect himself and his sup?porters, he worked closely with the Austrian minister in Belgrade,Count Khevenhuller. All information which might aid in the suppres?sion of the revolt was passed on, and an attempt was made to seal thefrontier of Serbia with Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to prevent aidand volunteer detachments from crossing into the provinces.25 TheAustrian foreign office appreciated the cooperation which it wasreceiving and instructed Khevenhuller to express its thanks to Milanfor his 'ebenso loyalen als korrekten Haltung'.26

Since the existence of the treaty with Serbia was a closely guardedsecret, public opinion in the Dual Monarchy was not aware of theextent of the support received from the Serbian government. Indeed,a section of the press in Vienna and Budapest preferred to regardBelgrade as the headquarters of the conspiracy allegedly directingthe uprising. The influential Hungarian paper Pester Lloyd did notdoubt Milan's personal attitude, but felt that he was powerless toeradicate the subversive elements in his capital. It believed, in fact,

23Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 27, Cetinje, 9 March 1882; The Times,16 February, p. 5.24Jovanovic, op. cit., p. 52; Locock to Granville, F.O. 105/32, No. io, Belgrade,21 January 1882; No. 13, Belgrade, 22 January 1882.25Khevenhuller to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 5A-B, geheim, Belgrade,20 January 1882.26To Khevenhuller, ibid., Abschrift einer geheimen Depesche, Vienna, 20 January1882.


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428 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWthat the only way to end the 'anarchy' which existed along thefrontier was to use force.27

However, the majority of the newspapers of the Dual Monarchyreally regarded the South Slavs as tools used by the real enemy?Russia. Hence the Habsburg journalists launched a strong anti-Russian campaign. Apparent confirmation of their suspicions wasfound in a series of speeches delivered by General M. D. Skobelev,the hero of the recent war with Turkey^ and in reports of the activitiesof various Russian agents in the Balkans in favour of the insurgents.In St Petersburg on 24 January 1882, the first anniversary of the fallof Geok Tepe, its conqueror, General Skobelev, delivered the first ofhis two most notable addresses. After attacking the Russian intelli?gentsia for what he termed their 'cosmopolitan Europeanism', whichto him signified a betrayal of Russia, he spoke warm words of sym?pathy for the insurgents in Hercegovina.28 Several weeks later, whenin Paris on a private visit, he addressed a group of Serbian studentsand launched into a vigorous attack on the German powers. Althoughhis exact words on this occasion are a matter of dispute, he is reportedto have said:It is the German. I repeat it, and entreat you never to forget it?the Ger?man is the enemy. A struggle is inevitable between the Teuton and theSlav. It cannot be long deferred. It will be long, sanguinary, and terrible,but I entertain the faith that it will culminate in the victory of the Slav. Itis quite natural that you should be anxious to know how matters stand,since your kith and kin are even now shedding their blood. I will not saymuch, but I can assure you that if anyone ventures to touch the Statesrecognised by European treaties, such as Servia and Montenegro, youshall not be left to fight alone . . . if fate wills it, may we meet again on thebattle-field, shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy!29

Quite understandably these statements caused great anxiety.27Locock to Granville, F.O. 105/32, No. 14, Belgrade, 27 January 1882; Khevenhullerto Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 7A-B, Belgrade, 24 January 1882.28 O. (Olga) K. (Novikova-Kireyeva), Skobeleffnd theSlavonicCause,London, 1883, pp.253-62. An interesting account of Skobelev's career is given in V. F. Nemirovitch-Dantchenko, PersonalReminiscencesf GeneralSkobelejf,London, 1884.29O. K., op. cit., pp. 282-3, fn. 1; E. Tarle, 'Rech' Gen. Skobeleva v Parizhe v 1882g.', KrasnyyArkhiv,XXVII, 1928, pp. 219-20. There is a marked difference of opinionregarding Skobelev's comments in Paris. Olga Novikova-Kireyeva, op. cit., pp. 263-84,denies emphatically that the general ever made the remarks attributed to him. However,even if her opinion is correct, the European newspapers, the public and the governmentsthemselves assumed that such statements had been made. Skobelev's anti-German themecaused alarm in the European capitals, especially in Berlin. The international repercus?sions resulting from this are discussed in Hans Herzfeld, 'Bismarck und die Skobelewepi-sode', HistorischeZeitschrift, 142, 1930, pp. 279-302, and in William L. Langer, EuropeanAlliancesandAlignments, 871-1800, New York, 1950, pp. 238-42. Skobelev's speeches alsodisturbed the tsar, his chief adviser, K. P. Pobedonostsev, and the acting Russian foreignminister, N. K. Giers. They regarded the general's behaviour with extreme disfavour anddistrusted his growing popularity. He was compared to Garibaldi, and the Grand DukeConstantine was reported to have said, 'that one could be at the same time a hero on thebattlefield and a fool in politics'. Denkwurdigkeitenes BotschaftersGeneralvon SchweinitZjBerlin, 1927, II, pp. 182, 185; NeueFreiePresse,23 February, p. 1.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 429General Skobelev had captured the imagination of the Russianpublic through his well-known exploits in Central Asia as well asthrough the daring he had shown in the Russo-Turkish war. To theTurks he had been the 'White Pasha' who had demonstrated hisbravery by riding into battle in a white uniform. To his compatriotshe was one of the most romantic figures of the century. His speeches,containing as they did typical phrases of Russian Panslav hos?tility towards the Germans as well as expressions of sympathy forthe rebels in Bosnia and Hercegovina, received particular attentionin the press of Austria-Hungary. Although the tsar expressed hisdisapproval of the Paris speech and summoned the general home, itwas difficult for the Vienna and Budapest journals to believe thatSkobelev would have made these statements entirely on his owninitiative. The outstanding Viennese newspaper, Neue Freie Presse, ledthe attack. The theme of its numerous editorials of February 1882 isbest expressed in one of them, 'Russlands Doppelgesicht'. Here itwas questioned whether the Russian government was actually follow?ing a correct and loyal policy, and, if so, what practical measureswere being taken to check the revolt? Was Russia going to aid inits suppression or use it as an excuse to bring about a largerwar?30

The attitude of the Russian press also definitely contributed toarouse the distrust of the Habsburg newspapers. Sympathy wasfreely expressed for the insurgents. However, on the larger issue of theSkobelev speeches and his anti-German sentiments opinion wasdivided. Vestnik Tevropy maintained that the statements had caused adeep mistrust in Europe towards Russia and her foreign policy. Inorder to illustrate its point, it took the significant portions of the Parisspeech and showed how they would have sounded if they had beenmade by a German general to a group of Austrian students. Then hiswords would have been: * "It is the Russian. I repeat it and entreatyou never to forget it?the Russian is the enemy." ' What impressionwould this have made on the Russians, asked the journal?31 AnotherRussian paper, Golos, also disapproved of the general's anti-Germanviews, but it did not believe that the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herce?govina, as legal subjects of the sultan, should be expected to serve inthe Habsburg armed forces.32

Other Russian organs were more critical of the Austrian actions.Novoye Vremya, for instance, claimed that the true aim of Austrianmilitary activity in the provinces was the acquisition of Macedonia

30Neue FreiePresse,5 February, p. 2; 21 February, p. 1.31 'Inostrannaya politika', VestnikTevropy,17 -.3, March 1882, p. 426.32 Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 3G, St Petersburg, 13/25 January1882. The Russian press is discussed in Irene Griming, Die russischebffentlicheMeinungundihreStellungzu denGrossmachten,878-1804, Berlin, 1929.


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430 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWand Salonika.33 The strongest stand, however, was taken by Rus',whose editor Ivan Aksakov, one of the most influential of the Panslavwriters, wrote:

The Austro-Magyar campaign against the Krivosijani [SouthernDalmatians], Hercegovinians, Bosnians and in an indirect manner againstMontenegro, this is a campaign against us. . . . Every shot of the Austro-Magyars, which . . . strikes an Orthodox Slav, delivers a blow at us; theshedding of every drop of Slavonic blood falls on our souls, stains us andcalls for vengeance.34

In addition to the hostile attitude of parts of the Russian press, theHabsburg journalists found more proof of Russian intrigues in reportsof the activities of individual Russian citizens to aid the insurgents.The Slavonic Benevolent Society of Odessa, a Panslav organisation,appeared to be particularly active. Money was collected to aid so-called refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, and plans were made tosend a detachment of volunteers, chiefly composed of nationals of thetwo provinces, to aid the rebels.35 To show its sympathy further theSt Petersburg branch of the society elected one of the rebel leaders,Stojan Kovacevic, as an honorary member.36 Reports were alsopublished in the Austrian press of the landing of Russian officers andarms at Bulgarian Black Sea ports and of the active recruiting ofvolunteers under Russian auspices in Bulgaria.

However, the best apparent indication of Russia's being involved inthe revolt came from the events centring around the village of Cacakin Central Serbia. If men and material were in fact being sent to theprovinces, they would in all probability have to pass through Serbia,where conditions had become highly unstable. Parliamentary by-elections were scheduled for 27 May, and in both Belgrade andVienna fear was expressed that the Serbian Radical Party might useforce to win the election or to overthrow Milan and his government.Such a possibility was fraught with great danger for Austrian policy. Itwas feared that if either the Radicals or the Liberals came to power,they would abandon Milan's policy of the acceptance of Habsburgdomination and perhaps also his policy of strict neutrality towardsthe revolt. Thus the Dual Monarchy as well as the Progressive Partyfound themselves vitally interested in the results of the election, andparticular concern was felt over the possibility of internal disordersduring the campaign.3733 Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 3G, St Petersburg, 13/25January 1882. 34 I. S. Aksakov, Slavyanskiy opros,1860-1886, Moscow, 1886, p. 390.36 Thornton to Granville, F.O. 65/1135, No. 124, St Petersburg, 5 April 1882; NeueFreiePresse, 1 February, p. 4. 36Ibid., 5 February, p. 2.37Jovanovic, op. cit., pp. 53-4. The Habsburg government's concern over the possibleresults of the election is best indicated by the report of the Austrian minister in Belgrade,who wrote that: 'If Ristic [the Liberal Party leader] again comes to power, Austria willconstantly have to hold a gun at her side.' Furthermore, both Milan and the Austrians


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 431As a result of the extraordinary precautions taken, Serbian govern?

ment officials on 17 May seized near Cacak two wagon-loads of guns,apparently destined for Hercegovina, which were being conveyedby sixty armed Montenegrins. Immediately the Serbian oppositionparties attacked Milan and his supporters for this action and accusedthem of being mere Austrian puppets who were depriving fellowSlavs of the means necessary for their defence. The government, inanswer, declared that the arms were not destined exclusively for therebels, but were to be used to create disturbances during the impend?ing elections. The vital point in this episode was the fact that theMontenegrins had used Russian passports to enter Serbia.38 Thisappeared to be definite proof of Russian intrigue in the revolt.However, despite appearances, Russian intervention in theuprising would have been against the basic principles of Russianpolicy as it was being conducted at that time. Under the leadershipof N. K. Giers, the Russian foreign office was pursuing a policy whichaimed at peace and tranquillity in Europe. In June 1881 Russiasigned the Dreikaiserbund agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The maintenance of this alliance with the two Germanicpowers, who were the object of the hatred of the Panslavs, was thegoal of Russian diplomacy.39 This understanding gave Russia alliesand provided some guarantee that the status quo would be kept in theBosphorus and the Dardanelles. The recent war with Turkey, theresults of which had bitterly disappointed all groups in Russia, haddrained her military power and made her fear risking her southernflank to a possible British attack, if war should break out in the Bal?kans or the Middle East. If Russia wished to have her point of viewprevail at the Straits and in the Eastern Balkans without resorting toforce, it could only be with German support. The negotiations whichfinally culminated in the formation of the Dreikaiserbund had demon?strated the Habsburg government's lack of enthusiasm for an agree?ment with Russia. It was also apparent that if Bismarck were forcedto choose between Austria and Russia, he would abandon his easternrather than his southern neighbour. From the experiences of 1856and 1878 Russia had learned that she could not risk diplomaticisolation. Thus the Russian foreign office could not at this timeengage in any activities which would endanger the Dreikaiserbund.believed that the Radicals had received financial assistance from Russia for the electioncampaign. Loc. cit.38Ibid., pp. 52-3; Locock to Granville, F.O. 105/32, No. 89, Belgrade, 19 May 1882;No. 90, Belgrade, 20 May 1882.39Russian foreign policy in general and Giers' role in its formation is discussed inS. Skazkin, Konetsavstro-russko-germanskogooyuza, Moscow, 1928, I; Baron Boris Nolde,Valliancefranco-russe: es originesdusysterne iplomatique*avant-guerre,aris, 1936; Ada vonErdmann, 'Nikolaj Karlovic Giers, russischerAussenminister, 1882-1885: Eine politischeBiographic', Ze^cnr^fl fur OsteuropaischeGeschichte, IX, 4, 1935, pp. 481-540; J. Y.Simpson, The SaburovMemoirs,Cambridge, Mass., 1920, I, pp. 36-49; and Langer, op.cit.


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432 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWIn addition, during the negotiations with Germany and Austria-

Hungary, Russia, in return for the provisions she received in regard tothe Straits, was forced to grant reciprocal concessions to her allies.One of these dealt specifically with the Austrian rights in Bosnia-Hercegovina and stated that: 'Austria-Hungary reserves the right toannex these provinces at whatever moment she shall deem oppor?tune'.40 If Russia had actively sided with the rebels, whether openlyor secretly, such action would have implied a repudiation of therecognition of Austrian predominance in this part of the Balkansand, consequently, of one of the bases of the Dreikaiserbund. TheAustrian hesitation to conclude the original agreement had to a largeextent derived from the fact that it was difficult for the Austriangovernment to believe that Russia would not interfere in the Wes?tern Balkans, particularly in cases involving Orthodox Slavs. How?ever, for official Russia, Bulgaria and the Straits were of far greaterimportance than Bosnia-Hercegovina, regardless of the sympathywhich individual Russians might feel for the Slavonic inhabitants ofthese territories. Thus the Russian foreign office took definite steps tocheck any activities in aid of the insurgents.

Although the Austrian press was not aware of the exact nature ofthe Dreikaiserbund, Count Kalnoky, the Habsburg foreign minister,realised its importance to Russia and believed that the Russiangovernment was adhering to the agreement. Thus, when the Delega?tions met in January-February 1882, Kalnoky publicly defendedRussia and insisted that she was following a correct policy.41 Never?theless, in March he instructed Count Wolkenstein, the Austrianambassador in St Petersburg, to make representations concerningcertain events involving Russian subjects. Wolkenstein questionedGiers on reports that Russian officers were on their way to Herce?govina and that they were actively promoting the recruitment ofBulgarians for service in the provinces. Giers denied that officiallyaccredited representatives were involved, but admitted that officersreleased from service might be engaged in such activities. Later, on24 May, when confronted with new Austrian accusations, he wasforced to admit that some of the charges had been confirmed.42

Despite this admission Count Wolkenstein reported to Vienna thathe was convinced that Giers and the Russian government had takenno initiative in the affair and that, on the contrary, they were deeplydisturbed by the turn of events in the Balkans.43 Wolkenstein's report

40The terms of the Dreikaiserbund re found in Alfred Franzis Pribram, The SecretTreatiesof Austria-Hungary, 879-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1920, I, pp. 36-49.41Neue FreiePresse, 1 February, pp. 2, 3, 4.42Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 16E, vertraulich, St Petersburg,17 February/1 March 1882; to Wolkenstein, ibid., Vienna, 1 May 1882; Wolkenstein toKalnoky, ibid., No. 32D, vertraulich, St Petersburg, 12/24 May 1882. 43Loc. cit.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 433agreed with earlier dispatches by the Austrian and British represen?tatives in Sofia to their respective governments. Both reported thatthey had learned that the Russian government had ordered itsrepresentatives in Bulgaria to refrain from any action which could beinterpreted as being in favour of the insurgents.44 Since the represen?tatives of Russia's two principal adversaries in the Balkans thusseemed to exonerate the Russian government, the question arises whowas responsible for the apparent Russian interference in the revolt.

The answer to this problem has been given in the admirable bookon the Dreikaiserbund by S. Skazkin, who had access to the RussianImperial archives. Evidently, Giers did live up to his declarations tothe Habsburg government and from the beginning did exert all hisefforts to prevent the revolt from developing into a new Europeancrisis. At the end of 1881 he instructed the Russian representative inMontenegro to caution Nikola to be wise and prudent in his attitudetowards the uprising.45 According to Skazkin, the real instigator ofthe interference in the revolt was the Russian consul-general in Sofia,M. A. Khitrovo, an ardent Panslav and Austrophobe, who actedwithout instructions from St Petersburg. From his advantageouslysituated diplomatic post in Sofia he organised aid for the rebels,supervised the collection of funds from the sympathetic Bulgarianpublic and distributed money to the volunteers. He also furnishedRussian passports which he hoped would enable the new recruits tocross Serbia into Hercegovina.46 Perhaps the best example of hislack of discretion and the extremes to which he was willing to go isthe fact that he even felt it proper to solicit funds from the Bulgarianprince, Alexander of Battenberg.47 The prince was already underattack from Austria-Hungary for allegedly permitting Bulgaria to bean assembly area for aid to the rebels, and he, needless to say, refused

44Biegeleben to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XV 19, No. io, Sofia, 4 March 1882; Lascelles toGranville, F.O. 78/3413, No. 34, Sofia, 24 March 1882.45 Skazkin, op. cit., p. 209. Later in March 1882 Giers informed the Austrians that hehad proposed to the tsar that 30,000 roubles should be granted to Nikola to relieve the Mon?tenegrin government of part of the burden of supporting the refugees who had fled intoMontenegro and who were without any means of support. Giers argued that Russia couldnot now desert these people whom she had aided many times before. He also hoped thatsuch a payment would prevent Nikola from accepting financial assistance from theSlavonic Benevolent Society. From the information available it appears that the Habsburggovernment did not object. In fact, in February 1882, the Austrians too had presentedNikola with a gift of 100,000 florins in the hope that this would serve as a further induce?ment to the prince to take steps to seal his frontiers. The sum was taken from the fund of8,000,000 florins voted by the Delegations for the suppression of the revolt. VladanDjordjevic, Crna Gora Austrija,1814-1804, Belgrade, 1924, pp. 462-4.46 Skazkin, op. cit., pp. 209-10. The highly incriminating evidence presented in R.Leonoff, ed., Documentsecretsde la politiquerusseen Orient,1881-1800,Berlin, 1893, has notbeen used in this article, because Skazkin, who has examined the Russian archives,declares the collection to be 'a crude and ignorant forgery'. Skazkin, op. cit., p. 295.47Simeon Radev, Stroitelite asdvremenna dlgariya,Sofia, 1911,1, pp. 339-42; A. Koch,PrinceAlexanderof Battenberg,London, 1887, pp. 102-4; and E. C. Corti, AlexandervonBattenberg:ein Kampfmit denZarenundBismarck,Vienna, 1920, p. 119.


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434 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWto have anything to do with actions of such a compromising charac?ter. In May 1882 Khitrovo was recalled from Bulgaria, not becauseof the role he played in the rebellion, the extent of which was notrealised until after his return to Russia, but because of his constantinterference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria.48 With his departure,aid from Russian officials in Bulgaria ceased. Thus, although theevents in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1881-2 in many instancesclosely paralleled those of the period 1875-6, the Russian govern?ment did not allow itself to be pushed into a policy which did notconform with Russian national interests.

Meanwhile, the original source of the trouble, the uprising inBosnia-Hercegovina, had almost completely died out. During Marchand April 1882 the Austro-Hungarian troops were able to recapturemost of the territory held by the insurgents. With the progressivediminution of their area of operation, the latter found it more difficultto re-enter Hercegovina from their sanctuaries in Montenegro and theTurkish provinces. In time the imperial troops were able virtually toseal the frontiers. Since it now seemed certain that the Monarchywould be able to reassert its authority over the area completely, therebels found less support for their cause in the provinces. However,the Montenegrin population continued to present a problem.Although apparently satisfied with Nikola's public declarations, theHabsburg government was displeased that he had not fully controlledthe actions of his subjects. Until almost the end some insurgent bandscontinued to operate from Montenegrin territory. In an attempt toclose this last avenue of serious resistance to their rule, the Austrianson 6 May sent a strong note to Cetinje, informing Nikola that this stateof things should be remedied or they would be forced to take 'allmeasures' necessary. Since the revolt had really spent itself and sincehis own subjects had lost much of their earlier enthusiasm, Nikolawas now able to put into effect measures to comply with the Austriandemand. Deprived of all outside assistance, the rebels thus met withdefeat by the end of May, although reports were received of con?tinued skirmishes within the provinces as late as August.49The revolt of 1881-2, despite the fact that it subsided withoutcausing a major crisis, exposed the uneasy peace that prevailedthroughout the Balkans and foreshadowed the events that were tofollow. In particular, it provided a warning signal of the areas of con?flict which were to foment the disastrous Austro-Russian rivalryin the region after the turn of the century. These issues did not leadto active conflict in the 1880's, because Russia was neither preparedfor nor willing to risk war. Under the leadership of Giers, Russian48 For a discussion of Khitrovo's role in Bulgarian affairs and the reasons for his recall,see C. E. Black, TheEstablishment f ConstitutionalGovernmentn Bulgaria, Princeton, 1943,pp. 195-219.49 Skarid, op. cit., pp. 29-32; The Times,29 April, p. 7.


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REVOLT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 435foreign policy had temporarily forsaken both the dreams of the Pan-slavs and the imperialist drive of the Russian empire towards theStraits, in favour of an agreement with the other two great conserva?tive empires. However, despite the policy of the government, theRussian public could still be aroused by tales of the sufferings of theOrthodox Balkan Slavs. Therefore, when someone like GeneralSkobelev, already a popular military hero, was ready to challengeGerman rule over Slavonic subjects and when such a prominentfigure as Ivan Aksakov made passionate pleas on behalf of the BalkanSlavs, the Russian foreign office found itself under strong pressure.Even the Austrian Councillor of Embassy in St Petersburg, BaronTrauttenberg, reported to his government in January 1882 that onecould not exclude the possibility that Russia 'gegen ihren Willen'would once again be forced to come to the aid of the Balkan Slavs.50The Russian government had thus both to contend with Austro-Hungarian moves in the Balkans and at the same time to exercise arestraining influence over the more adventurous of its own citizens.The Dual Monarchy also found itself in an unfortunate predica?ment. Ostensibly a policy of status quo in the Balkans was being sup?ported, but this was proving impossible to maintain. Austria-Hungary contained within her frontiers approximately half of theSouth Slavonic peoples, and these were becoming increasingly im?bued with nationalistic fervour. It appeared under these circum?stances that the choice would some time have to be made either ofabandoning these South Slavonic possessions or of bringing underHabsburg control those which were as yet outside the empire. Thefirst alternative would be a step towards the disintegration of theMonarchy, the second would in all probability lead to war withRussia. Just as in Russia Panslav ideas and the pressure of publicopinion influenced the government, so in the Dual Monarchy theresponsible officials had to contend with the activities of the Viennaand Budapest extremists, who wanted to put an end to the 'Slavonicmenace', which they believed responsible for the recent disturbances.

Moreover, the revolt showed that not only were Russia and Austria-Hungary confronted with the pressure of public opinion, but thatMontenegro, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire also faced a situationthat was difficult to manage. In all three states the authorities inthe last resort could not control the actions of their subjects. Thereal or alleged persecutions of the Orthodox and Moslem inhabi?tants of the Dual Monarchy found ready sympathy in the three states,whose citizens considered it almost their sacred duty to render what?ever assistance they could to their compatriots or coreligionists.

50Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 6C, geheim, St Petersburg31 January 1882.


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436 THE SLAVONIC REVIEWThese issues were bound to become questions of bitter internalstruggle if any government, as, for example, that of Milan in Serbia,should attempt to go against the popular current.

Thus, although the revolt of 1881--2 was suppressed, the problemof Austro-Hungarian relations with the newly acquired lands was notsolved. Despite the promises that had been made, the Habsburggovernment failed to introduce effective reforms in Bosnia-Herce?govina. Some changes were made, but these failed to meet the require?ments of the time and in no way checked the steady growth of anti-Habsburg sentiment. Consequently, the situation injune 1882, whenthe revolt had ended, was in reality basically the same as it had beenin January, when a contemporary observer wrote that 'where thereis so much combustible material, a feeble spark might set all in ablaze'.51 51 The Times, 7 January, p. 5.

Jelavich - Revolt 1881-2

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