e-book_janji kampanye.pdf

8/10/2019 e-book_janji kampanye.pdf

1/28


2/28

Almost from the first,the challenges posed bypublic funding wereevident. How do weknow how muchspending is right? Can

the law be sufficientlysupple to respond tochanging circumstances,yet sufficiently rigorousto resist unscrupulousmanipulation?Moreover, is theredemocratic value topolitical fundraisingin requiring politicians

to appeal to the peoplefor supportthat is lostwhen campaigns arepublicly funded?

GOLDWATER INSTITUTE I po li cy rep or t

2

Introduction

With the recent passage of a cleanelections law in Connecticut, publicfinancing reforms are enjoying arenaissance of attention andcommentary. The idea that thegovernment should subsidize campaignswith taxpayer moneyrather than allowvoluntary private funding to run acampaignhas a long pedigree.

President Theodore Roosevelt called forpublic financing of elections in 1907,proposing a congressional appropriationto defray political party expensescoupled with a contribution limit andpublicity of party accounts.1 In 1909,Colorado enacted a program to subsidizeparties based on their success at thepolls, but the Colorado Supreme Courtdeclared the law unconstitutional onlyone year later, albeit without a written

opinion explaining its reasoning.2 PuertoRico enacted the next public fundinglaw in 1957, which paid party expensesout of a commonwealth Election Fund.3

Almost from the first, the challengesposed by public funding were evident.On what basis should funds be granted?4

Will the law discourage new or thirdparties?5 If everyone is funded, would

there be a way to avoid having theprogram swamped by politicalfaddists?6 How do we know how muchspending is right? Are we spending toomuch or not enough? How can programfunding be maintained? Can the law besufficiently supple to respond tochanging circumstances, yet sufficiently

rigorous to resist unscrupulousmanipulation?7 What spending activityis political enough to count? Will therebe exemptions, and, if so, can they befairfor instance, would the media andtheir owners be at an advantage?8Whatremedies are appropriate to deal withcheating? Moreover, is there democraticvalue to political fundraisinginrequiring politicians to appeal to thepeople for supportthat is lost when

campaigns are publicly funded?9

Today, Connecticut, Maine, NewMexico (for corporate regulators), NorthCarolina (for judicial candidates), andVermont, as well as Arizona, provide fullpublic financing to candidates who agreeto abide by spending limits and forgoprivate contributions.10 Vermonts lawcontains a mandatory spending limitand is currently before the U.S. Supreme

Court in a First Amendment challenge.11A number of other states subsidizepolitics in other waysby providingfinancial support to candidates orparties, for instance.12

How the Clean ElectionsAct Operates

Arizonas Citizens Clean ElectionsAct created a Clean Elections Fund.13

Candidates for statewide and legislativeoffices may participate in the programand receive funding for their campaignsfrom this Fund, or they may raisecampaign funds privately. The 2000

Campaign Promises: A Six-year Review of ArizonasExperiment with Taxpayer-financed Campaignsby Allison R. Hayward, Campaign Finance Attorney


3/283

March 28, 2006

election was the first election cycle inwhich legislative and statewide officecandidates could use the Clean Elections

law to finance a candidacy. CleanElections funding is available only toparticipating candidates. Participatingcandidates qualify by gathering $5contributions from in-district registeredvoters and observe strict spending andcontribution limits.14

For example, in the 2006 election, aqualifying candidate for governor will

need 4,200 qualifying contributions of$5 from in-district voters (whothemselves must file reporting slips intriplicate for the money to count); alegislative candidate must collect 210.15

During the exploratory andqualifying periods, candidates canraise private money for their efforts toqualifythe individual contributionlimit is $120 per donor, and the overalllimit for outside private contributions is

$46,440 for governor and $2,980 for thelegislature.16 The Act also limits theamount of personal money a candidatecan use at this time to $1,160 forgubernatorial candidates and $580 forlegislative candidates.17

The 2006 primary election spendinglimit is $453,849 for gubernatorialcandidates and $11,945 for legislativecandidates.18 The general electionspending limits will be $680,774 and$17,918, respectively.19 These limitswork out to about $0.25 per activeArizona voter statewide, but given thevast differences in registration andturnout among legislative districts, themoney-per-active-voter ratio varies

widely from one legislative district toanother. Under the Act, if a legislativecandidate is running in a district

dominated by one political partywhere the election may well be resolvedin the primarythe candidate canreallocate some general election fundingto that race.

The Act does not allow candidates tocarry forward money from one period tothe next. At the end of each of the threeperiodsthe privately funded

qualifying period, the primary electionperiod, and the general electionperiodcandidates must return unspentmoney to the Fund.20 Participatingcandidates may also receive additionalmatching funds of up to three timesthe relevant spending limit if anonparticipating opponent spends overa certain threshold.21

The Act also restricts

nonparticipating candidates, or thosecandidates who are funding theircampaigns the traditional way by raisingtheir own campaign money. It requiresnonparticipating candidates to observecampaign contribution limits andprohibitions on contributions bycorporations and unions, and to adhereto reporting requirements. The 2006contribution limits to statewide officesare $760 per individual or politicalaction committee (PAC); $3,784 percertain super-PACs and political partycommittees, with a combined cap of$75,624 from all PACs; and a separate$75,624 from all political parties andpolitical organizations.22 The limits forlegislative offices are $296 per individual


4/28


4

or PAC, $1,512 per super-PAC, and theoverall cap from PACs and parties is$7,568. Arizona law also limits the total

an individual can give to candidates andto committees that give to candidatesan individual cap that is presently$3,530 per year.23

The Citizens Clean ElectionsCommission may impose civil penaltiesfor violations of the limits and reportingrequirements. If a candidate exceeds theapplicable spending limit by over 10

percent, the penalty is disqualification asa candidate or forfeiture of office, ifelected.24 As of this writing, onelegislator who allegedly overspent hisprimary campaign limit by $6,000 hasbeen removed from office.25

The Clean Elections Fund obtainsits revenue from several sources. Itreceives a surcharge of 10 percentimposed on all civil and criminal fines

and penalties.26 It also receives a $5voluntary contribution per taxpayerwhen filers mark an optional check-offbox on the first page of their tax return.Through the check-off, the taxpayerstaxes are reduced by $5, and $5 goes tothe Clean Elections Fund.27 The Fundalso receives tax-preferred donationsfrom individuals or business filers.Donors receive a dollar-for-dollar taxcredit of up to 20 percent of the taxamount on the return or $550 pertaxpayer, whichever is higher. The Fundalso receives the excess qualifyingcontributions of participating candidates(i.e., those private funds raised but notused during the qualifying period) andcivil penalties assessed against violators

of the Clean Elections Act.28

Originally, the Clean Elections Act

imposed a $100 fee on certain classes ofregistered lobbyists.29 An Arizona trialcourt declared that sectionunconstitutional because it violated theFirst Amendment.30 The court latersevered it from the remainder of theClean Elections Act.

Goals of the Clean Elections Act:Fulfilling the Promise?

This paper will consider howsuccessful the Arizona Clean Electionslaw has been at achieving its goals asexpressed by the Acts supporters. Whatwas Arizonas Clean Elections lawintended to accomplish? Because the lawpassed by initiative, there are nolegislative committee reports or floor

statements to consult. However, the Actdoes contain a declaration, reading:

The people of Arizona declare ourintent to create a clean electionssystem that will improve theintegrity of Arizona stategovernment by diminishing theinfluence of special-interest money,will encourage citizen participationin the political process, and will

promote freedom of speech underthe U.S. and Arizona constitutions.Campaigns will become moreissue-oriented and less negativebecause there will be no need tochallenge the sources of campaignmoney.31


5/285

March 28, 2006

Clean Elections imposes

real burdens onpolitical speech and onthe ability to run foroffice. Since ArizonasClean Elections systemhas not reached itsgoals, reformers shouldbe advised to seriouslyreconsider fundamentalaspects of the law.

In the words of the Clean ElectionsInstitute, an organization dedicated topromoting the Clean Elections law,

Arizonans promoted and passed theClean Elections law to increaseparticipation in the electoral process,reduce the influence of big money incampaigns and government and increasecompetition among candidates.32

Admittedly, some of theseaspirations are more easily measuredthan others. This paper separates the

Acts goals into three broad categories:

Participation: Since the passageof the Clean Elections Act in 1998, arethere indications of greater citizenparticipation in the political process?

Competition: Clean Electionsclaims to make it easier for citizens tobecome candidates, thereby encouragingmore competitive elections. Is there

evidence that the Clean Elections lawhas made candidacy more accessible andelections more competitive?

Tone: Has the tone ofcampaigns improved? Are they lessnegative and more issue-oriented?

The paper then considers theburdens created by the Clean Electionslaw. Has the laws complexity createdadditional burdens for candidatesrunning for office? Has it chilled thepolitical speech of candidates and othergroups?

In brief, we find little evidence tosupport any argument that the Clean

Elections law has fulfilled its statedgoals. Moreover, it imposes real burdenson political speech and on the ability to

run for office. Since Arizonas CleanElections system has not reached itsgoals, reformers should be advised toseriously reconsider fundamental aspectsof the law.

Participation

One claim made by supporters ofthe Clean Elections Act is that it will

increase political participation. Wemight measure citizen participation inthe political process in a variety of ways.The most common indicator ofparticipation is voting: we can observewhether voter turnout rates haveincreased since the passage of the CleanElections law. Another form ofparticipation is providing financialsupport to political activity. Since onepurpose of the law is to reducereliance

on private contributions, it would notmake much sense to measure the lawsparticipatory success in that way. Rather,we can look at Arizona Department ofRevenue statistics to observe whetherthere are improvements in participationin Arizonas various check-off programs,both for the Clean Elections Fund itselfand for other political beneficiaries.Finally, we can also see whether morepeople participate in politics by runningfor office, although this is a muchnarrower path of participation open onlyto those with the time and temperamentto be a candidate.

Figure 1 depicts the turnout forelections from 1992 to 2004.


6/28

These numbers indicatelittle beyond the factthat turnout improvesin presidential electionyears; they show novoter turnoutimprovement that canbe attributed to CleanElections.


6

Candidates were able to use CleanElections funds starting in the 2000election. As the chart shows, the highestrecent turnout election year in Arizonawas in 1992 for both the primaryelection (29%) and the general election

(77.2%), unless one counts the 2000presidential preference primary as aprimary (35%). The next highestturnout for a general election was in2004 (77.1%), and for a primary, in1994 (28.6%).33 Turnout statistics showno effect from the 1998 passage of theClean Elections law.

The way most people participate inelections is by voting. Yet nothing in the

voter turnout trends in Arizona electionssuggests that the Clean Elections law hasan effect here.

The Public Interest Research Group(PIRG) compiled its own Arizona votingstatistics, measuring voter turnout as apercentage of voting age population

(VAP). These statistics show that in1998, turnout as a percentage of VAPwas 28 percent; in 2000, 40.2 percent;in 2002, 30.7 percent; and in 2004,39.2 percent.34 These numbers indicatelittle beyond the fact that turnout

improves in presidential election years;they show no voter turnoutimprovement that can be attributed toClean Elections.

Another form of citizenparticipation is providing financialsupport to various candidates andpolitical groups. The law encouragestaxpayers to make a $5 contribution tothe Clean Elections Fund in exchange

for a $5 reduction in tax liability. In2001, out of 2,210,747 returns,315,395, or 14 percent, made the $5check-off contribution.35 This per-centage has been growing, as Figure 2indicates, so that by the end of the 2004tax year, out of 2,368,223 tax returns,583,719, or 25 percent, marked the

Figure 1: Voter Turnout Percentages, 1992-2004

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1992Primary

1992Gene

ral

1994Primary

1994Gene

ral

1996Primary

1996Gene

ral

1998Primary

1998Gene

ral

2000Pres.Pr

ef.

2000Primary

2000Gene

ral

2002Primary

2002Gene

ral

2004Primary

2004Gene

ral


7/28

March 28, 2006

The experience in otherstates has been thatcheck-off systemsbecome less popular andyield fewer dollars asthe programs mature.

7

check-off.36 Yet, tax return check-offsmay be more an illustration of taxpayers

acting on economic interests than anydegree of increased politicalparticipation. The $5 reduction in taxliability provides a sufficient financialincentive for citizens to participate.

The experience in other states hasbeen that check-off systems become lesspopular and yield fewer dollars as theprograms mature.37 Political scientistsMichael Malbin and Thomas Gais notedin their study of check-off programs thatfrom 1980 to 1994 the typical check-off state went from 20 percentparticipation to 11 percentparticipation.38 If Malbin and Gaissanalysis holds, it suggests that Arizonansparticipation in the Clean Electionscheck-off program may drop as well.

To judge whether the check-offs

cost is justified, it might be useful toknow whether other indications ofparticipation have improved. Arizonatax forms also allow taxpayers tocontribute to other causes. In particular,taxpayers can designate contributions topolitical parties.

Revenue records show that thenumber of returns in which taxpayers

designate contributions to theRepublican and Democratic parties havegrown recently by a greater percentagethan the number of returns generally.The total number of returns designatingparty contributions grew from 1,511 in2001 to 1,922 in 2004, an increase of 27percent. The bulk of this increase was inreturns designating contributions to theDemocratic Party.39 At the same time,the number of total individual returnsincreased by only seven percent. To besure, this period overlaps with theapproach of the 2004 presidentialelection, an event that typically capturesmore public attention than otherelections, and would be of particularinterest to Democrats, who lacked anincumbent standard-bearer or even apresumptive nominee. Scholars havealso observed that there is a partisan

effect in public funding programs.Simply put, Democrats are morecongenial to public funding, aspolicymakers and as participants, thanRepublicans are.40

The participation trend for party-designated contributions appears to be

Figure 2: Clean Elections Check-off Participation

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1997 1998 1999 2000

PercentageofTax

Filers

2004200320022001


8/28


8

doing better than contributions to othercauses. From 2001 to 2004, returnsdesignating contributions to what has

been the most popular charitable causelisted on the Arizona returnchildabuse preventionfell from 12,302 in2001 to 10,502 in 2004, a 17 percentdecrease.41 The tax form designation forparties is admittedly a form of politicalactivity very few Arizonans useonlyabout 2,000. So, whatever participationtrends we might see, they involve a tinynumber of people and may not be

reflective of political participation byArizonans as a whole.

Another measure of participationthat necessarily involves a small fractionof the states citizens is the number ofpeople who decide to becomecandidates. In Arizona statewide andlegislative primary elections held afterthe passage of the Clean Elections law,223 candidates total ran in 2000, 247 in

2002, and 195 in 2004. From 2002 to

2004, the number of statewidecandidates dropped from 39 to 7, andlegislative candidates from 208 to 188.

The numbers of both Democrat andRepublican candidates declined duringthis period. However, the number ofcandidates participating in the CleanElections program remained stable, sothe percentage of participatingcandidates in primaries rose from 56percent to 61 percent and in legislativeraces from 54 percent to 58 percent,even though the number of candidates

fell in absolute terms.42

One explanation for the decline inthe number of primary candidates in2004 may be the uncertainty of thestates legislative district lines. Accordingto the Clean Elections Institute, anumber of candidates dropped out ofprimary races after courts ruled that thestate had to use a precleared 2002legislative map for the 2004 elections

instead of a more competitive 2004 map.43

From 2002 to 2004,the number ofstatewide candidatesdropped from 39 to 7,and legislativecandidates from 208 to188.

Table 1: Numbers of Primary Election Candidates, 2002 and 2004

2002 (Clean Elections 2004 (Clean Electionsparticipants) participants)

Primary candidates 247 (139) 195 (118)

Legislative primary 208 (113) 188 (111)candidates

Democrats 110 (71) 82 (57)

Republicans 124 (60) 101 (58)

Other 13 (8) 12 (2)


9/289

Since the candidate drop-offoccurred before nominating petitionswere due, and rarely do all purported

candidates file their papers, it is not clearwhether the change in redistricting plansin fact suppressed candidates who mighthave otherwise gone forward or whetherthe uncertainty might have inflated thenumber of tentative candidacies ofpeople who might not otherwise haveexplored running in a more stableenvironment. Whichever the case, the2004 situation makes it difficult to say

anything definitive about the effect ofthe Clean Elections law on the numberof candidates in primary elections, butthere is certainly no evidence to supportthe contention that more candidacieswill necessarily occur under CleanElections. Data supporting the goal ofincreased participation remain un-convincing in this regard.

In general elections there is, as

would be expected, less fluctuation inthe number of candidates since their

numbers are largely determined by thenumber of seats up for election andrelatively few races include libertarians

or independent candidates.

An important subsidiary aspect ofthe law is the partisan breakdown ofClean Elections candidates. Democratsremain more likely to use the program,but the difference between Democratand Republican participation isnarrowing. Figure 3 shows thepercentage of candidates from both

parties who participated in the CleanElections Fund from 2000 to 2004.

When looking at these percentages,it is useful to remember that Arizonaremains a Republican state: Republicanslead Democrats in statewide registrationby 5.5 percent and have a 6-to-2advantage in the U.S. Congress, a 17-to-13 advantage in the State Senate, and a39-to-21 advantage in the State House.44

In summary, most indicators reveal

March 28, 2006

Most indicators revealno changes in politicalparticipation as a resultof the Clean Electionsprogram.

2002 (Clean Elections 2004 (Clean Electionsparticipants) participants)

General election candidates 170 (89) 156 (88)

Legislative candidates 147 (73) 149 (82)

Republicans 76 (30) 74 (44)

Democrats 77 (51) 66 (46)

Other 17 (8) 16 (2)

Table 2: Numbers of General Election Candidates, 2002 and 2004


10/28

The most direct form ofparticipationturningout to actually cast avoteshows noimprovement from thelaws passage.


10

no changes in political participation as aresult of the Clean Elections program.While the funding of Clean Electionsitself has increased, it is not clear thatthis is an accurate measurement ofpolitical participation since taxpayersreceive a financial incentive to reducetheir tax liability under the program.Likewise, larger portions of candidatesare participating in the Clean Electionsprogram. Other measures of broaderpolitical participation seemunaffectedmost significantly, voterturnout.

Advocates of clean elections reformsassert that the system will encouragecitizen participation in the politicalprocess, but the most direct form ofparticipationturning out to actually

cast a voteshows no improvementfrom the laws passage. One of the otherarticulated goals of the Act is toencourage more people to run for office.Achievement of that goal remainselusive, too, as the number of primarycandidatesthe key point of entry intoany campaign for officefell

substantially in the last cycle. In short,the data do not reveal any trend ofgreater political participation byArizonans since the passage of CleanElections.

Competition

Success for the Clean Electionsprogram cannot be claimed merelybecause it has been able to perpetuateitself by attracting funding andparticipants. The program should have asalutary effect on other aspects ofpolitics. As we have seen, the data do notreveal an overall improvement inpolitical participation. Yet another statedpromise of the Clean Elections law isincreased electoral competition. As oneprominent researcher described this

goal: It is difficult to argue with theposition that, other things being equal,more competition is preferable to less.Our view is that in a state with trulycompetitive elections, many otherproblemswhether corruption, insul-ation, or undue interest groupinfluencewill take care of them-

Figure 3: Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Participating in CleanElections, 2002 and 2004

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%

2

000Pr

imary

2000

Gen

eral

2

002Pr

imary

2002

Gen

eral

2

004Pr

imary

2004

Gen

eral

Democrats

Republicans


11/28

March 28, 2006

According to the GAO,access to public fundingin 2000 and 2002 didnot affect incumbentreelection rates, andextending the GAOsapproach to 2004, itwould seem incumbentreelection rates actuallyrose for House seats.

11

selves.45 Competitiveness, whiledifficult to measure, seems on the wanein Arizona.

Two factors complicate our ability toevaluate the effect of the Clean Electionslaw on electoral competition. First,Arizonas 30 legislative districts eachsend one state senator and two staterepresentatives to the Capitol. At theHouse level, competitiveness in termsof election vote margins is difficult toevaluate, since candidates do not run

head-to-head. Instead, each partynominates up to two candidates for thegeneral election race, and the top twogeneral election vote-getters serve in theHouse. So, a House district might berepresented by two Republicans or splitbetween the parties, assuming that thetwo major parties are fielding thesuccessful contenders.

Second, as noted briefly above,

Arizonas legislative district map remainsa work in progress. As provided inProposition 106, passed in November2000, an Independent RedistrictingCommission (IRC) draws Arizonaslegislative boundaries.46 However,challengers attacked the initial mapdrafted by the IRC, and the Departmentof Justice denied preclearance of thelegislative plan under Section 5 of theVoting Rights Act.47 The IRC crafted aninterim plan for use in the 2002election. It crafted another plan basedon the 2002 map that was successfullypre-cleared by the federal governmentfor the 2004 election.48

The year 2000 was also the first year

term limits on legislators affected theability of some incumbents to run forreelection. While it may be that this

effect has now stabilized, the term limitslaw should be kept in mind whencomparing data from the last threeelection cycles with pre-2000 races.

Incumbent Reelection Rates

In May 2003, the U.S. GeneralAccounting Office (now theGovernment Accountability Office)

released a study of clean electionsprograms, including Arizonas.49

According to the GAO, access to publicfunding in 2000 and 2002 did not affectincumbent reelection rates, andextending the GAOs approach to 2004,it would seem incumbent reelectionrates actually rosefor House seats.50

The GAOs calculations were calledinto question in a paper authored by

Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Wernerand Amanda Williams, politicalscientists from the University ofWisconsin affiliated with the WisconsinCampaign Finance Project.51 They notedthat the GAO only looked atincumbents who lost in generalelections, and did not includeincumbents who lost in primaries.52 Hadthe GAO altered its methods, the Mayerteam contends that the numbers wouldhave shown a drop in incumbentreelection rates in 2002 to 70 percent forHouse races and 81.3 percent for Senateraces, after having been in the mid-ninetieth percentile from 1994 to 2000.The Mayer groups analysis alsorecalculated the reelection rates after


12/28

Another importantmeasure ofcompetitiveness iswhether incumbent

victory margins havenarrowed under theClean Elections Act.Looking independentlyat the numbers for2004, we see that onlytwo of 24 incumbentelection contests in theArizona Senate madethe GAOs compe-titive criteria of a

margin of 15 percent orless.


12

removing incumbents who were runningagainst each other because ofredistricting, and the reelection ratesincreased but slightly.53

Looking independently at 2004results through the Mayer prism, of the48 incumbents running in the House,eight lost either in the primary or in thegeneral election, for a reelection rate of83.3 percent. Out of 25 Senate

incumbents running, one lost (in aprimary, no less), for a reelection rate of96 percent. Using the Mayer formula, itappears that both these retention ratesare substantially higher than those in2002, indicating that incumbentreelection rates are increasing again evenunder the Clean Elections Act.54

Incumbent Victory Margins

Another important measure ofcompetitiveness is whether incumbentvictory margins have narrowed underthe Clean Elections Act. The GAOstudied Arizona Senate races only, thusavoiding the issue of how to evaluatemultimember House districts. Defining

competitive districts as those with amargin of 15 percent or less between thewinner and the next runner-up, theGAO determined that 10 percent of theSenate races were competitive in 1996,29 percent in 1998, and 40 percent in2000, but only 33 percent werecompetitive in 2002.55

Looking independently at thenumbers for 2004, we see that only two

of 24 incumbent election contests in theArizona Senate made the GAOscompetitive criteria of a margin of 15percent or less between the winner andthe next runner-up (when there wasone). The incumbent in District 12 wonwith 54.1 percent of the vote, and anincumbent in District 25 won with 56percent of the vote. Meanwhile, 10incumbents were uncontested in the2004 general election. Two out of 24

seats would lead to a competitivenesspercentage of about 8 percent, seeminglyback to 1996 levels.56

In their analysis, Mayer, Werner, andWilliams disputed whether the GAOsapproach was appropriate. They

Senate incumbents House incumbents

retained (%) retained (%)

1996 100 951998 96 982000 (term limits effective) 100 942002 100 902004 (calculations by author) 100 92

Table 3: Incumbent Reelection Rates, 1996 to 2004


13/28

March 28, 2006

Incumbent retentionand victory marginnumbers are movinghigher, indicating thatcompetitiveness,however measured, maybe on the wane.

13

campaigns by an array of politicalparties. Since the passage of the CleanElections law, the Green Party is no

longer officially recognized in Arizonaand no longer fields candidates. Thedemise of the Greens probably has moreto do with the rise and fall of theirpresidential nominee Ralph Nader in2000 than with any effect of the CleanElections law. At the same time, the lawdoes not appear to have assisted in thedevelopment of minor or third-partyparticipation or success in Arizona

elections.

Funding Adequacy

Some scholars argue that providingadequate funding of candidates isanother element necessary forcompetitiveness. It may be that the one-size-fits-all spending limits under theClean Elections law burdens somecandidates more than others. Moreover,

Arizonas spending limits are lower thanthose of other states with similar laws.This may not be healthy in a fast-growing state where it is necessary forcandidates to attract the attention ofnew residents who are unfamiliar with,and possibly apathetic to, local politics.

The Arizona Clean Elections lawfails to account for the vast differences invoter registration among Arizonaslegislative districts. For instance, as ofOctober 2005, District 4, a spaciousdistrict including portions of Maricopaand Yavapai counties, currentlyrepresented by Tom Boone and JudyBurges in the House and Jack W. Harperin the Senate, has 123,059 active

concluded that only studying the Senatejettison[ed] valuable data. In theirstudy, they created pseudo-pairs to

simulate single-member contests out ofmultimember Arizona House seats.They paired the top vote-getter of oneparty with the weakest of the other, andthe second best with the highest vote-getter of the opposite party. They alsodefined competitive as a winning total ofunder 60 percent, rather than the 15percent margin the GAO used. Withthis different approach, the Mayer team

determined that 36 percent ofincumbents were in competitive races in2000 and 47 percent in 2002, but thenonly 36 percent in 2004.57

Whichever method one adopts,clean elections reforms do not seem tohave a lasting effect on competitiveness.Under both measurement approaches,competitiveness appears to be on theretreat after peaking in 2000 and 2002.

Given the abundance of other factorsthat would affect the hardiness ofincumbentsfrom the shakeoutfollowing the term limits law to thepassage of a redistricting act thatmandates competitiveness as a factorin redistrictingit is hard to see how theclean elections law could have affectedcompetitiveness in a manner measurablein these circumstances. Even so, theincumbent retention and victory marginnumbers are moving higher, indicatingthat competitiveness, however meas-ured, may be on the wane.

One might argue that realcompetitiveness comes from having arich variety of viewpoints represented in


14/28


14

registered voters. District 13, a morecompact Tucson district represented bySteve Gallardo and Martha Garcia in the

House and Richard Miranda in theSenate, has 49,061 active voters.Candidates in both districts run with thesame expenditure limit$17,918 in2006so District 4 candidates who optfor the Clean Elections system haveabout $0.14 to spend per active voter,while District 13 candidates have about$0.36 per active voter.58

In defense of the current system,supporters might say that it is notappropriate to evaluate the expenditurelimits based on active voters. Insteadthey should be evaluated based onresident population. Districts with manynonvoting residents should not be seenas unfairly advantagedin fact,spending in such areas might be morenecessary, for instance, to increaseinterest in Arizona politics among new

(not yet voting) residents.

Looking at Arizonas spending limitson a per-resident basis, however, callsinto question their sufficiency. In a studyreleased in 2005 by the Center forGovernmental Studies (CGS), Arizonasper-resident spending limit ranks at thebottom.59 According to CGS, Arizonalimits candidates for governor to $0.08per resident in the primary and $0.11 inthe general elections, and legislators to$0.12 in the primary and $0.18 in thegeneral elections. Maine, overall the nextlowest among states with spending limitsin per-resident spending allowances,gives gubernatorial candidates $0.16 perresident in the primary and $0.31 in the

general, State Senate candidates $0.18 inthe primary and $0.46 in the general,and State House candidates $0.16 in the

primary and $0.48 in the general. Timewill only exacerbate the gap betweenArizona and Maine, since Arizona is oneof the fastest growing states in thenation, expected to add 2.2 millionpeople in the next three decades, whileMaine is one of the nations slowestgrowing states.60

Issues of sufficiency have

implications for competitiveness. Notedone Arizona activist in October 2005,The simple reality is that with anyoffice that doesnt have a pressing set ofnewsworthy issues, its going to be veryhard to beat an incumbent on a CleanElections budget.61 If that is true, thenonly particularly controversial orvulnerable incumbents need fear theirconstituents at election time. Since weare already observing that the number of

candidates has fallen, that incumbentretention rates are rising, and thatincumbent reelection margins are ampleand growing, perhaps we are witnessinga larger combination of effectscorrelating with the Clean Elections lawthat work together to insulateincumbents.

One of the stated goals of the CleanElections law was to increasecompetition among candidates. It wouldbe ironic if, over time, the CleanElections spending limits helped solidifythe campaign finance advantagesincumbents already enjoy in the form ofstaff, state office budgets, outside officeaccounts, and free media.

One of the stated goalsof the Clean Elections

law was to increasecompetition amongcandidates. It would beironic if, over time, theClean Electionsspending limits helpedsolidify the campaignfinance advantagesincumbents alreadyenjoy in the form ofstaff, state office

budgets, outside officeaccounts, and freemedia.


15/28

March 28, 2006

In 2002 some of theharshest electioncommunications were

made by participatingcandidatesamongthem mailers accusing acandidate of defendingchild molesters, anotherof sympathy with aradical homosexualagenda, andadvertisements statingthat a candidate was

soft on polygamy.

15

Tone of Campaigns

The Clean Elections law was also

intended to improve the tone ofcampaigns. The theory is that oncecandidates need not appeal to specialinterest donors, they will turn theirattention to rank-and-file voters. Thiswill, some say, lead to more substantiveand less combative campaigns.Moreover, the Clean Elections lawprovides a voter guide for candidates touse to get their message to voters and

requires candidates to participate indebates. These venues for votercommunication are promoted as beingmore responsible and informative thanprivately funded advertising.

Clean Elections rules attempt toregulate indirectly that which may notbe regulated directly. In 1993, Arizonaslegislature attempted to remedynegative campaigning by requiring

persons or groups making independentexpenditures in the closing days of acampaign to provide an advance copy ofthe communication to the candidatesnamed in it. The courts struck down thelaw, concluding that it impermissiblyburdened political speech.62 The CleanElections law attempts to improve thetone of campaigns in a more indirect,and legally sustainable, manner.

Tone and negativity arenotoriously slippery concepts tomeasure.63 But in general, there is noindication that the Clean Elections Actimproved the tone of Arizonacampaigns. In a study prepared for theGoldwater Institute in 2001, Robert

Franciosi observed:

Receiving clean elections money

certainly did not make candidatesclean campaigners. One challengermailed several scathing andmisleading flyers that distorted heropponents record. One flyercontained several negativenewspaper headlines that either hadnothing to do with her opponent,or were completely made up . . .Such abuses led the Clean Elections

Commission to contemplate askingcandidates to take an oath swearingnot to smear opponents . . .64

In 2002, as the same analystobserved in a later study, some of theharshest election communications weremade by participating candidatesamong them mailers accusing acandidate of defending child molesters,another of sympathy with a radical

homosexual agenda, and advertisementsstating that a candidate was soft onpolygamy.65

Hard-edged campaigning hascontinued. Reportedly, in 2004candidates for the first time used theClean Elections statewide voter guide asa vehicle to attack opponents.66 Oneveteran Arizona politician speculatedthat the Clean Elections law allowedmore negative attacks to prosperbecause of the lack of accountabilitypublicly funded candidates owed todonors. Former State Rep. MikeGardner noted in a newspaper interview,In traditional campaigns, the peoplewho contribute to your campaign are


16/28


16

like your regulators. If they dont like themessage youre delivering, they will stopgiving you money and your funding

dries up.67

Finally, it would seem nave toexpect that a move to public fundingwould result in kinder and gentlercampaign messages. Why would thesimple presence of clean electionmoney change the dynamics of moderncampaign advertising? Studiesdemonstrate that negative campaign

messages work. Relevant negativeinformation about a candidate used inadvertising that identifies the risksassociated with electing a specificopponent are among the most effectivetechniques for swaying public opinion.68

Clean Elections money will notameliorate the tone of campaigns.Candidates will use whatever resourcesthey have to best serve the cause of

winning. We should expect thatnegative messages will persist as part ofthe mix.

The Costs of Clean Elections

While there is some admittedambiguity in measuring whether the

Clean Elections Act has lived up to itspromises, overall the evidence suggeststhat the Act has not led to increasedparticipation or competitiveness and hasnot improved the tone of campaigns.Furthermore, the Clean Electionsprogram is not without costs. The Actsimplementation also requires a web of

complicated regulations, and complaintsunder the Act can lead to invasiveenforcement matters that impose real

costs on participants and theirsupporters.

First, the cost of the program takesfunding away from the states GeneralFund. In a state where the General Fundbudget is over $8 billion, the CleanElections Funds expenditures of justunder $8 million in 2004 might seemtrivial. But recall that the Clean

Elections funding mechanism has adouble-edged impact on state finances.It takes $5 from a taxpayers taxes andcredits each taxpayer another $5.

Although the Clean Elections Fundsexpenditures are a small part of overallstate spending, they are not trivial. Themore than $4.3 million distributed tocandidates in 2004 would almost coverthe $4.6 million operating budget for

the Arizona Department of HealthServices in that same year and wouldeasily cover the departments vaccinationand immunization spending ($2,903,800and $406,700, respectively) or its EmergencyMedical Services expenditures ($4,020,300).The $7,992,868 total Clean ElectionsFund expenditures for 2004 (whichincludes the Clean ElectionsCommissions administration, enforce-ment, and voter education expenses aswell as funds to campaigns) would havecovered the personal services of thestates Department of Water Resourcesin 2004 ($6,994,400).69

The nonmonetary costs of theprogram are more difficult to quantify.

Clean Elections requiresa web of complicatedregulations, andcomplaints under theAct can lead to invasiveenforcement mattersthat impose real costson participants andtheir supporters.


17/28

March 28, 2006

The Commissionsobligation to monitorabuse of public funds

requires a level ofinvasive investigationinto campaigns that issimply not necessary intraditionally fundedsystems. When acandidate raises hisown funds,squandering campaigndollars is its own

punishment.

17

One concern is the complexity of theprogram. Seemingly technical andpicayune accounting details take on

enormous significance when the lawimposes an expenditure limit. Violationsof seemingly trivial proportions, such asfailing to report food and suppliespurchased by family members of acandidate on the day they were made,become material for administrativeinvestigations and enforcement.70 In aworld of spending limits, managingsimple post-election refunds of deposits

placed during the campaign becomes amatter requiring informal settlementwith the state government.71

Some Clean Elections policies seemto lack adequate justification. Forinstance, although it is a commonpractice to hire a consultant to managemany of a campaigns activities, underthe Clean Elections law this vendor maynot be the reported recipient of

campaign payments; rather, thecampaign must pay directly and reportthe subvendor or whomever is the finalprovider of services.72 The CleanElections Commissions stated rationaleis that if campaigns are allowed to reportlumped expenditures, this may hidethe fact that the underlying goods orservices in fact cost more than what wascharged by the consultant, obscuring theexistence of an illegal in-kindcontribution.73 Yet, this is informationthat the campaign may not have, anddoes not reflect the long-standingpractice of using consultants to provideunified direction for campaigns. Anumber of recent enforcement mattershave involved this very fact pattern: a

campaign would accurately report apayment to a consultant for literature,but by failing to track, pay directly, and

report the expenses and final providersof all goods, services, postage, designers,graphic artists, etc., that were part of theliterature, it had violated the Act.74

In a publicly financed system, it alsobecomes necessary to evaluate whethercandidates are squandering publicmoney or enriching their friends andassociates, or paying for frolicsome

goods and services not related to thecampaign. For example, threeparticipating Libertarian Partycandidates running in 2002 wereordered to repay $104,237 in CleanElections funding after the CleanElections Commission found that thosefunds had been improperly spent onfood, alcoholic beverages, and othergoods and services arguably of a festiveand personal nature.75 This enforcement

matter presents an extreme example,admittedly, but there are other, lessextreme examples of abuse. Forexample, Democratic House candidateEd Ableser received some $7,000 inmatching funds on election day, whenit was too late to spend them oncampaign ads. Instead, Ableser threw aparty for campaign volunteers where herented a $287 frozen drink machine andreimbursed his father $1,118 for foodand drink costs. Ableser also made oneof his campaign volunteers a paidconsultant and paid her $3,628.76

Even in less colorful contexts theCommissions obligation to monitorabuse of public funds requires a level of


18/28


18

invasive investigation into campaignsthat is simply not necessary intraditionally funded systems. When a

candidate raises his own funds,squandering campaign dollars is its ownpunishment.

Strict compliance with thecomplicated limits and reportingrequirements is necessary for the CleanElections system to work, so penaltiesare stiff. Under the law, the civil penaltyfor a violation of a reporting

requirement is $110 a day, and thepenalty for violation of an expenditurelimit is 10 times the amount exceedingthe limit.77 In a system limitinglegislative candidates to $11,945 for aprimary race and $17,918 for a generalelection campaign, penalties socalculated can quickly dwarf the expenseallotment for an entire election. Perhapsin light of this, the Commission hasadopted a rule capping penalties at

$10,000, unless the violation isknowing and willful, in which case thecap is $15,000, a figure that is still wellover the primary limit and approachingthe general election limit.78

Yet, there is broad agreement thatsome of the laws onerous requirementsare not necessary. Even advocates of theClean Elections law, and theCommissions own executive director,have recommended that the rulesrequiring frequent, sometimes daily,filing of campaign reports by candidatesin campaigns with no participatingcandidates are overly burdensome,unnecessary, and should be removed.79

There are costs, too, in theinterference the program imposes onpolitics. One more obvious case of this is

the subsidy systems bias towardparticipating candidates.80 In a racefeaturing a participating candidate and atraditional candidate, independentexpenditures supporting the particip-ating candidate or opposing thetraditional candidate provoke nomatching payment. Since thenonparticipating candidate has chosento fund his campaign with private

money, the Fund will not step in andcompensate for independent spendingagainst him. Expenditures touting thetraditional candidate or criticizing hissubsidized opponent will result in amatching payment to the subsidizedcandidate. The Fund will level thefield, but only for participants.

This imbalance might be defendedby observing that a candidate knowingly

accepts these rules when he chooseswhether or not to participate and shouldnot be heard to complain when he facesthe consequences of that choice. Yet, thisunequal treatment might actually pushcandidates to enter the system. Insteadof freely choosing to participate,candidates may come to the realizationthat Clean Elections confers so manyone-sided benefits that it isimpracticable to run without itssupport. When this happens, candidatesare coerced into participating in CleanElections, forcing them to surrendertheir First Amendment right of freespeech. But campaign finance spendinglimit systems must be voluntary underprevailing case law.81 A system that


19/28

March 28, 2006

For candidates, theunequal treatmentafforded under the law

may coerce candidatesto surrender their FirstAmendment right tofree speech by limitingtheir expenditures. Forcitizens, the systemcreates disincentives tospeak, impairing theirFirst Amendmentrights.

19

provides additional money forparticipating candidates based on theindependent political speech of

unrelated outside groups could becomeunduly coercive.

In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. SupremeCourt upheld the right of citizens underthe First Amendment to spendunlimited amounts of money forpolitical speech.82 As the Court noted,being free to engage in unlimitedpolitical expression subject to a ceiling

on expenditures is like being free to drivean automobile as far and as often as onedesires on a single tank of gasoline.83

Maintaining a system of unequaltreatment under Clean Elections thatcoerces candidates into participating inthe program infringes on their protectedFirst Amendment rights.

Clean Elections matching fundsmight also seem to invite manipulation.

An ally of a publicly funded candidatecould direct an outside group to spendfunds on expensive but ineffectiveadvertisements against the candidatewith the intent that additional resourcesbe directed to that candidate.Conversely, some outside groups mayforgo political expression supporting anonparticipating candidate because theydo not want to indirectly fund theopposition candidate by increasing hisstate funding through matching funds.

Thus, Arizonas Clean Electionssystem may burden constitutionallyprotected activity of candidates andcitizens grassroots organizations. Forcandidates, the unequal treatment

afforded under the law may coercecandidates to surrender their FirstAmendment right to free speech by

limiting their expenditures. For citizens,the system creates disincentives to speak,impairing their First Amendment rights.

Third-party candidates can invokeadditional complexities. During the2002 gubernatorial campaign, RichardMahoney, an independent candidateparticipating in the Fund, requestedmatching funds to counter expenditures

made by the Democratic Party for JanetNapolitano. His request was denied,despite the fact that the two candidateswere both running for the same seat, onthe grounds that the pro-Napolitanoadvertisement attacked the Republicanchallenger only.84

History teaches us that any schemeof campaign regulation will encourageactivists and partisans to use

enforcement against political adver-saries. In fact, the Clean ElectionsInstitute in its 2002 report on theArizona system recommended that theprocess must be adjusted so thatcomplaints cannot be used as campaignweapons.85 Yet, in October 2004, thesame Institute filed a complaint assertingthat six Republican candidates hadillegally coordinated expenditures withthe Club For Growth, a nationalpolitical group dedicated to supportingconservative candidates. Afterconsidering the complaint and responsesfrom the accused, the Commissionconcluded that there was no reason tobelieve the alleged violation hadoccurred. This resolution, naturally,


20/28

Public funding lawshave a statistically

significant negativeeffect on public viewsabout whether peoplehave a say in theirgovernment or whetherofficials care. Bycontrast, disclosure lawsappear to have apositive effect on publicviews of politicalefficacy.


20

came after the election, in April 2005. 86

The Clean Elections Institute, despite itsavowed mission limiting it to

promoting, enhancing and defendingArizonas unique Clean Elections law,and despite the lack of any connectionto the Arizona-specific questions, alsofelt moved to file a similar complaintagainst U.S. Rep. Trent Franks and theClub For Growth with the FederalElection Commission (FEC). InSeptember 2005, the FEC similarlyfound no reason to believe that the

respondents had violated the law.87

Clean Elections and Democracy

Finally, moving beyond the specificdata from Arizona, there may be reasonfor concern about the effect of publicfinancing on public confidence ingovernment. In a pathbreaking study,

professors Jeffrey Milyo and DavidPrimo examined a variety of state-levelelection laws, including those related topublic financing and spending limits,and whether the presence of these lawsenhances public views of politicalefficacy.

Their conclusion was that publicfunding laws have a statisticallysignificant negative effect on publicviews about whether people have a sayin their government or whether officialscare.88 By contrast, disclosure lawsappear to have a positive effect on publicviews of political efficacy. The authorsexplain:

Disclosure laws probably do notreduce overall campaign spending,so they do not reduce the positive

aspects of political advertising. Onthe other hand, public financingschemes are typically devised tolimit overall expenditures, so theymay have a greater negative impacton the beneficial aspects of politicalexpenditures. In addition, publicfinancing may be predicated onfalse promises for a betterdemocratic process. When the

smoke clears and politics as usualreturns after reform, individualsmay become even more dis-enchanted with their government.Therefore, the apparent counter-intuitive finding that disclosure andpublic financing work in oppositedirections on political efficacy isquite plausible.89

Despite the fact that campaign

finance reform is assumed to improvepublic confidence in government, formany reforms the connection is lacking.Certain reforms, such as publicfinancing and spending limits, may evendo harm. In an era when reform isassumed by courts and policymakers toimprove public confidence ingovernment, the implications of thisstudy are profound.90 If Milyo andPrimos theory holds true, ArizonasClean Elections system may do more toharm the electoral process in Arizonathan to help it.

This study examined whetherArizonas Clean Elections Act met itslisted goals, such as increasing


21/28

Reduced competition inpolitics may be a resultof overregulation.

Eliminating CleanElections funding andspending limits,liberalizing the complexmatrix of statecontribution limits,and opening up politicsto more privatefinancial participationwould encourage

participation andcompetition, andengage the public moreeffectively than theClean Electionsprogram.

21

March 28, 2006

competition, participation, andimproving the tone of campaigns. Noneof these goals seems to be affected by the

Clean Elections Act. Instead, the lawimposes costs on the political process bymaking it more complicated andlitigious. It also creates significantburdens on constitutionally protectedrights of candidates and citizens. Whilethe First Amendment fully protects theright to speak, and to spend money onspeech, Arizonas Clean Elections systemstands in direct contradiction to that

guarantee, potentially dampening whatotherwise could be a vibrant politicalexchange in Arizona.

Conclusion

As Milyo and Primos smoke clearsin Arizona, there may be reason to thinkthat the Clean Elections system is not

reaching its stated goals. The evidencetoday suggests that the system fails todeliver on its promises, while costingArizonans more than just money. Dataindicate that voter participation hasbeen unaffected by the enactment ofClean Elections and that the number ofcandidates has actually fallen.Incumbent reelection rates are returningto previous levels, as are incumbentvictory margins. More Arizonans are

choosing to support Clean Elections inthe tax check-off, but one has to wonderwhether that will persist or, as in otherstates with check-off programs, willtaper off with time.

We can expect that, as the Arizona

public comes to understand these trends,it will, as Milyo and Primo predict,become more disenchanted with its

government, which could furthersuppress participation. No doubt a newset of reformers will say that the law isinsufficiently rigorous, and will agitatefor yet additional restrictions orprograms to level the playing field.

Instead, reduced competition inpolitics may be a result ofoverregulation. Eliminating Clean

Elections funding and spending limits,liberalizing the complex matrix of statecontribution limits, and opening uppolitics to more private financialparticipation would encourageparticipation and competition, andengage the public more effectively thanthe Clean Elections program.


22/28


22

NOTES

1. John S. Bottomly, Corrupt

Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. Rev. 331, 380 (1950) (citingCongressional Record, December 3,1907, p. 78.)

2. Ibid. (citing Colorado sessionlaws, 1909 c. 141, and People v.Galligan, no citation); see also James K.Pollock, Party Campaign Funds (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926): 90, n. 48

(citing to an original writ of mandamus,no. 7323, and the petition wasdismissed on October 10, 1910); EarlSikes, State and Federal Corrupt PracticesLegislation (Durham, NC: DukeUniversity Press, 1928): 144-145.

3. Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy(Chapel Hill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press,1960): 433.

4. Sikes, 250.

5. Ibid. See also Pollock, 99.

6. Ibid.

7. Pollock, 92.

8. Pollock, 94, n. 49.

9. Pollock, 102.

10. Massachusetts had a cleanelections system until its legislaturerescinded it in 2004. New Jersey ran aclean elections pilot program in twostate assembly districts in 2005.Connecticuts system takes effect

December 31, 2006, and will beavailable to candidates running for stateoffice in 2008.

11. Landell v. Sorrell, No. 04-1528(cert. granted September 27, 2005).

12. See Michael J. Malbin andThomas L. Gais, The Day after Reform:Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons fromthe American States (Ithaca, NY:Rockefeller Institute Press, 1998): 52-62(discussing different forms of public

financing).

13. See Arizonas Citizens CleanElections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-940to 16-961 (2004).

14. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-941.

15. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-946.Different limits apply to intermediateoffices, but these have been omitted in

the interest of brevity.

16. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-945.

17. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-941(A).These limits are adjusted for inflation.See http://www.azcleanelections.gov/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/2005-2006Limits.pdf.

18. Arizona Citizens Clean ElectionsCommission, Participating CandidatesExpenditure & Contribution Limits for2006 Elections, http://www.azcleanelections.gov/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/2005-2006Limits.pdf

19. Ibid.


23/28

March 28, 2006

23

20. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-953.

21. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-952.

22. A super-PAC is any PAC thatreceives donations from 500 or moredifferent individuals of at least $10 inthe year prior to applying for super-PACstatus with the Arizona Secretary ofState. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-905.Super-PACs so registered with theSecretary of State are listed athttp://www.azsos.gov/scripts/superpac.c

gi.

23. These limits are adjusted forinflation also. See http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/20052006limits.pdf

24. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-942(C).

25. David Burnell Smith, Office ofAdministrative Hearings decision (MUR

04-0023), http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/ItemXIDavidBurnellSmithOAHDecision.pdf. Smithchallenged this decision. See PaulDavenport, Smith Cites ConstitutionalImmunity in Plea to Put Ouster Case onHold, Arizona Republic, January 1,2006, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/0101campaignfinance01.html. On January 26, 2006, theArizona Supreme Court affirmed thedecision that found Smith had violatedthe Act and thus should face ejection.See Smith v. Arizona Citizens CleanElections Commission, No. CV-06-0021(January 26, 2006) (Order),http://www.supreme.state.az.us/clerk/smith%20order.pdf. See also Thomas

Ropp, Arizona Supreme Court TellsSmith to Vacate Office, ArizonaRepublic, January 27, 2006,http://www.azcentral.com/community/scottsdale/articles/0127smith27.html.

26. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-116.01.

27. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-954.

28. The Citizens Clean ElectionsCommission summary of its fundingsources is available online at

http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/CCECRevenueSources.pdf.

29. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-944.

30. May v. Bayless, No. CV 2001-006078 (Mar. Cnty. Super. Ct. April 2,2002).

31. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-940.

32. Clean Elections Institute, TheRoad to Victory: Clean Elections Shapes2002 Arizona Elections (Phoenix,December 2002), Executive Summary,http://www.azclean.org.

33. The statistics are derived from dataavailable online from the ArizonaSecretary of State at http://www.azsos.gov/election/PreviousYears.htm.

34. See State-By-State Turnout Rates1998-2004 by Voting Age Population,http://www.nypirg.org/election04/VAP.pdf.

35. Arizona Department of Revenue,December 2001 Tax Facts.


24/28


24

36. Arizona Department of Revenue,December 2004 Tax Facts. Data for thechart were also obtained from the

Arizona Department of Revenue TaxFacts for December of each year. Inaddition, Arizona also offers taxpayersthe opportunity to make tax-preferredgifts to the Fund. Gifts are reportedmonth to month and are not cumulatedby year, so we looked at figures fromApril of each year, since that is theheaviest month for tax filings. Arizonastaxpayers donated about $20,000 in

April 2001 to the Fundbycomparison, in April 2004 it was$12,633. As a percentage of totalrevenue collected by the state, April2003 was the high point for thisprogram at 0.01 percent of revenue, or$18,078. There is no apparent trendeither up or downfor the voluntarydonations made to the Fund, and in anyevent it is a small fraction of activity.

37. Malbin and Gais, 66-70.

38. Ibid., 70.

39. In 2001, filers made 724contributions to the Democratic Partyand 524 to the Republican Party. In2004, Democratic filers grew to 1,127,while Republican filers grew only to709. Arizona Department of RevenueTax Facts for December 2001 andDecember 2004.

40. Malbin and Gais, 72-73.

41. Arizona Department of RevenueTax Facts for December 2001, 2002,2003, and 2004.

42. Statistics from the Citizens CleanElections Commission, http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/2

0002004DEMOGRAPHICS.pdf.

43. Clean Elections Institute, 2004Election Statistics, http://azclean.org/documents/2006WebPrimaryCandidateListing_022.doc.

44. Statistics available online from theArizona Secretary of State athttp://www.azsos.gov. A roster of the

State Senate is available online athttp://www.azleg.state.az.us/MemberRoster.asp?Body=S. A roster of the StateHouse is available online athttp://www.azleg.state.az.us/MemberRoster.asp?Body=H. Members of the U.S.House of Representatives are listed bystate at http://www.house.gov/house/MemStateSearch.shtml.

45. Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy

Werner, and Amanda Williams, DoPublic Funding Programs EnhanceElectoral Competition? paperpresented at the Fourth AnnualConference on State Politics and PolicyLaboratories of Democracy: PublicPolicy in the American States, Kent StateUniversity (updated March 2005),http://campfin.polisci.wisc.edu/Wisc%20Camp%20Fin%20Proj%20-%20Public%20Funding%20and%20Competition.pdf.

46. Arizona Constitution, art. 4, pt. 2,sec. 1.

47. See Arizona Minority Coalition forFair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent


25/28


26/28


26

63. See Lee Sigelman and MarkKugler, Why Is Research on the Effectsof Negative Campaigning So

Inconclusive?Journal of Politics65, no.1 (February 2003), 142.

64. Robert Franciosi, Is CleanlinessPolitical Godliness? GoldwaterInstitute Arizona Issue Analysis 168(November 2001): 11.

65. Robert Franciosi, Elections inArizona, Clean and Unclean, in John

Samples, ed. Welfare for Politicians?Taxpayer Financing for Campaigns(Washington, DC: Cato Institute,2005): 63.

66. Chip Scutari, Clean CashBlamed for Mudslinging, ArizonaRepublic, September 27, 2004.

67. Ibid.

68. Kim Leslie Fridkin and Patrick J.Kenney, Do Negative Messages Work?The Impact of Negativity on CitizensEvaluations of Candidates, AmericanPolitics Research 32, no. 5 (September2004): 570, 591.

69. These figures are taken from theCommissions 2004 Annual Report,issued March 2005. Other budgetfigures from the Arizona JointLegislative Budget Committee.Department of Health Services figuresavailable online at http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/06recbk/dhspub.pdf. Departmentof Water Resources figures availableonline at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/jlbc/06recbk/wat.pdf.

70. See Jahna Berry, ASU Instructorin Spending Inquiry over 04 HouseBid, Arizona Republic, December 9,2005.

71. See Minutes of Citizens CleanElections Commission, June 23, 2005,Item IV.E (Murchison), http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/agmn/mn050623.pdf.

72. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-948(c).

73. See, e.g., MUR 04-0029(Murphy), http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/ItemIV(B)Murphy.pdf. If someone intended to hide anillegal contribution, he or she couldsimply charge the candidate less than theactual cost. While there would be nolumping in the report, it would bedifficult for anyone, including the CleanElections Commission, to detect fromthe reports face that there is a violation.

So it is not obvious how the no-lumprule will better allow for the detection ofillegal activity. Meanwhile, it makes foradditional compliance burdens andconfusion among candidates who arenot bent on violating the law, but whomay have trouble obtaining theinformation from consultants.

74. See MUR 04-0025 (Mark Manoiland Nina Trasoff); MUR 04-0028/37(Gorman). These matters were dismissedonce the candidates corrected theirreports. In MUR 04-0048 (Flora), theClean Elections Commission found noreason to believe the law had beenviolated and thus did not pursueenforcement because the candidate


27/28

March 28, 2006

27

amended her reports on receiving thecomplaint.

75. David Pittman, Arizona CleanElections Law: Trio Is in Hot Water overMeaning of Political Party, TucsonCitizen, July 31, 2003. In settlement, thecandidates were ordered to repay lessthan this total due to their personalfinancial situations. See, e.g., Minutes ofCitizens Clean Elections Commission,October 21, 2003, Item VII (Settlementof MUR 02-0058 [Clevenger],)

(settlement of $15,000), http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/agmnHtml/mn031021.asp.

76. See Robbie Sherwood and ChipScutari, A Toast to QuestionableCampaign Expenditures, ArizonaRepublic, January 1, 2006,http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/0101polinsider01.html.

77. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-942(B)(reporting penalty); 16-942(A) (limitpenalty).

78. Ariz. Admin. Code R2-20-222.

79. Clean Elections Institute, TheRoad to Victory; see also Don Harris,Lang on Clean Elections: I Will DoMy Part to Make It Work, ArizonaCapitol Times, September 6, 2005.

80. See Chip Mellor, Three Lessonsfrom Arizona, in Samples, 37; see alsoFranciosi, Elections in Arizona, Cleanand Unclean, in Samples, 61.

81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19

(1976).

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 19, n. 18.

84. Franciosi, Elections in Arizona:Clean and Unclean, in Samples, 61-62.

85. See Clean Elections Institute, TheRoad to Victory.

86. Minutes of the Citizens Clean

Elections Commission, April 28, 2005,Item IV.F. (MUR 04-0027),http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/agmn/mn050428.pdf; see also PaulDavenport, Panel Clears Six ArizonaRepublicans in Campaign FinanceCase, Associated Press, April 28, 2005.

87. Compliance Cases Made Public,Federal Election Commission,September 8, 2005 (MUR 5609).

88. David M. Primo and JeffreyMilyo, Campaign Finance Laws andPolitical Efficacy: Evidence from theStates, working paper 0413, Universityof Missouri, Department of Economics(June 2005): 17.

89. Ibid., 19.

90. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.93 (2003).


28/28

The Goldwater Institute was established in 1988 as an independent, nonpartisan research and educational organization dedicated to the

study of public policy in Arizona. Through research papers, commentaries, and events, the Goldwater Institute works to broaden the

parameters of public policy discussions to allow consideration of policies consistent with the principles championed by the late Senator Barry

Goldwater and fundamental to free societieslimited government, economic freedom and individual responsibility. The Goldwater

Institute adheres to its educational mission and does not retain lobbyists or engage in partisan political activity. Consistent with a belief in

limited government, the Institute neither seeks nor accepts government funds and is supported entirely by the generosity of its members.

The Goldwater Institute is committed to accurate research and routinely consults outside scholars for independent review. The Institute

guarantees that all original factual data are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and that information attributed to other sources

is accurately represented. The Goldwater Institute encourages rigorous review of its research. If the accuracy of any material fact or reference

to an independent source is questioned and brought to the Institutes attention with supporting evidence, the Institute will respond in

writing. If an error exists, it will be noted in an errata sheet that will accompany all subsequent distribution of the publication, which

constitutes the complete and final remedy under this guarantee.

e-book_janji kampanye.pdf

Documents

Transcript of e-book_janji kampanye.pdf