Post on 18-Jan-2023
Teleology and the Investigation of Natural Sciences – Philosophical
Contributions
Available online at:
http://pt.scribd.com/doc/124754643/Teleology-and-the-Investigation-of-Natural-
Sciences-%E2%80%93-Philosophical-Contributions
Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos 1 Paulo Pereira Martins Junior 2
1 – Legislative Consultant of Environment and Sustainable Management at the Legislative Power of Minas
Gerais State, Brazil. PhD. student in Geology. Master of Arts in Geography. Specialist in Soil and Environment.
Bachelor in Philosophy. Environmental Technician. Computer Science Technician.
2 – PhD. Geologist. Federal University of Ouro Preto (UFOP), Brazil. Foundation Technological Center of Minas
Gerais (CETEC-MG), Minas Gerais State, Brazil.
Paper originally published in Portuguese, at:
VASCONCELOS, V.V. MARTINS JUNIOR, P.P. A Teleologia e o Estudo das Ciências da
Natureza – Contribuições da Filosofia. AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO: Revista de Educação
Ambiental. Vol. 16(1), 2011. Available at:
http://www.seer.furg.br/ambeduc/article/view/1676/1199
Proofreading of the English version by Carolina Dias, in February, 2013
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________59
TELEOLOGY AND THE INVESTIGATION OF NATURAL
SCIENCES – PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos*
Paulo Pereira Martins Junior**
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the theme of Teleology, as it has been used through the
history of human thought, especially since the development of the scientific
theories about Nature. It begins with most current definitions of Teleology and their uses. Then, the historical background comes into consideration, by starting
with Aristotle’s teleological (or finalistic) explanation, to the incorporation of
teleological approach in early and Christian thought of the Middle Ages. Kant’s and Hegel’s perspectives of teleology, in Modern Age, are briefly revised.
Finally, a study of the “philosophical teleological approach” in human and social
science’s Epistemology was focused in Marx’s, Weber’s and Habermas’ ideas. The paper ends with a proposition of arguments about how these themes are
relevant for the Environmental Science, wherein the study of Physics, Biology
and Human systems are practiced with nuances and uses of teleological concepts. Key Words: Teleology, Philosophy of Nature, Sciences of Nature, Causality,
Environmental Sciences1
1* Legislative Consultant of Environment and Sustainable Management at the Legislative Power
of Minas Gerais State, Brazil. PhD. student in Geology. Master of Arts in Geography. Specialist
in Soil and Environment. Bachelor in Philosophy. Environmental Technician. Computer Science Technician.
** PhD. Geologist. Federal University of Ouro Preto (UFOP), Brazil. Foundation Technological
Center of Minas Gerais (CETEC-MG), Minas Gerais State, Brazil.
60_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
A Teleologia e o Estudo das Ciências da Natureza – Contribuições da
Filosofia
RESUMO Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar como a temática da Teleologia foi
tratada no decorrer da história do pensamento humano, em especial no intercurso
relacionado ao desenvolvimento das teorias científicas referentes ao estudo da Natureza. Inicia-se por uma reflexão a partir das definições correntes sobre o
significado e uso do conceito Teleologia. Em seguida, é abordada uma
contextualização histórica, partindo da explicação teleológica ou finalista de Aristóteles, passando pela incorporação desta perspectiva teleológica dentro do
pensamento cristão medieval. Na modernidade serão retomados os tratos da
Teleologia empreendidos pela filosofia kantiana e hegeliana. Por fim, apresenta-se um estudo da abordagem teleológica na Filosofia das ciências humanas e
sociais, na qual têm foco o pensamento de K. Marx, M. Weber e J. Habermas.
Finda-se o artigo com uma reflexão sobre como os temas tratados são pertinentes dentro da área de estudos das ciências ambientais, em que são tratados sistemas
físicos, biológicos e humanos, com as diversas nuances e utilizações de conceitos
teleológicos. Palavras-Chave: Teleologia, Filosofia da Natureza, Ciências da Natureza,
Causalidade, Ciências Ambientais
THE CONCEPT OF TELEOLOGY2
The concept of Teleology comes from two Greek words: telos
(aim, goal, purpose) and logos (reason, explanation). Therefore,
Teleology could be understood as the explanation or reason of
something regarding its purposes or explanation which draws upon
purposes or goals (VILLA, 2000, p. 723). In synthesis, the concept or
idea of Teleology may be defined as the study of the aims or functions
of things (BLACKBURN, 1997, p. 376). On the scope of a theoretical
system or worldview, Teleology can be stated as “the philosophical
60_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
doctrine that all of Nature, or at least intentional agents, are goal-
directed or functionally organized” (AUDI, 1995, p. 791).
If we include the notion that these purposes must be pursued
through processes (here denominated means), we may propose a third
definition, in which teleology means “Doctrine which considers the
world as a system of relations between means and purposes”
(FERREIRA, 1986, p. 1658). This viewpoint of concatenated events
in relation to a purpose may be defined within the following
conception:
when we say that an event is teleological regarding a framework of
reference, it means that there is a tendency, propensity, etc., in this
framework biased to develop specific types of structures that […]
will take place provided that some variables remain constant; and
with respect to these structures, this event is a phase, stage or
moment of their development. (VILLA, 2000, p. 723).3
The entry for Teleology, in the Dictionary of Contemporary
Thought, presents a more detailed explanation, seeking the ontological
assumptions which would sustain a teleological explanation or
doctrine. The entry explains that, when an event or process is stated as
teleological, it implies that (1) we admit that the case study is not
random or that the current framework or structure which the object
appears in, is not the result of random processes and events; (2) we
admit that there is an aim, goal or purpose which is the reason,
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explanation or direction of an event and this may be (2-a) immanent,
with the finality being admitted in the core, or essence, of each being
or set of beings; (2b) transcendent of the whole being, as a reason
behind the world (VILLA, 2000, p. 723-725).
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Aristotle [384-322 a.C.], in his Metaphysics, listed several
types of explanations on the world processes. These types of
explanations correspond to four types of causes. Recollecting his text:
Actually, cause may be used in four meanings: in the first, we
understood that the cause is the substance or quiddity4 (the reason,
therefore, leads back to the ultimate notion, and the first reason is
both cause and principle); the second [cause] is the matter and
subject5; the third is where movement [comes from]
6; the fourth,
which opposes itself to the third one, is the “end for what”7 and the
goodness (because this is indeed the finality of all genesis and
motion) (ARISTOTLE, I, 3, 983ª 25-32, [1993]).
Respectively, there are: 1st – formal cause; 2
nd – material
cause; 3rd
– efficient cause. As the fourth and last causal type, we have
the teleological or finalist explanation, which explains the purpose (or
4 Essence
5 Or substratum, as an alternative translation 6 Or change, in a more general meaning
7 Finality
62_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
goal) that an event or being is predestined to (VILLA, 2000, p. 724).
On this explanation, Aristotle asserts that all things trend naturally to a
purpose. In other words, this means that the teleological notion of
reality makes it possible to explain the Nature (end or goal) of all
beings (ALMEIDA, 2006). On this conception, the teleological notion
of Aristotle refers to the essence of each being, i.e., to an internal
teleology of the natural entities (AUDI, 1995, p. 791). The final cause
makes the object move and even change, seeking its perfection. And
this perfection will just be reached in the extent that the object
accomplishes the function for which it was designed in essence. The
same conception is applied to Ethics (BLACKBURN, 1997), like in
the work Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle proposes that the
human beings have the intrinsic finality of seeking their own
happiness.
However, what seemed to refer only to a teleology internal to
beings gets the outline of a totalizing teleology, when Aristotle writes
on the first universal cause and on how this cause is regarded both as
the first efficient cause and as the first final cause. The Aristotelian
sequence of reasoning (Physics, 242a 50-54, apud LOMBARDI,
1997, p. 65) is the following:
1) The world is dynamic only because of the motion of shapes,
which is due to the effects of the causes.
2) Thus, an object causes a change in another object, which
causes another change in a third object, and so forth.
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3) When a causal chain is investigated, at the end there is no
option but postulating that there was an original first cause, which
gave the first causal impact from which all the other movements and
changes in the world have originated.
Aristotle denominates this original cause as the First Immobile
Mover. However, in this passage, Aristotle refers to a series of
efficient causes, the rationale would be applied for all the other causal
types, thus proving that any causal series may not be infinite (cf.
Metafísica 994a 1-11 apud LOMBARDI, 1997, p. 65). The First
Immobile Mover is identified as God by analogy, who is also the pure
perfection and the supreme goodness, to whom all other beings try to
get close through the final cause. Thus, on the one hand it explains the
becoming of the world by a series of physical movements (efficient
causal model). And on the other hand, it explains the becoming of the
world as the beings’ desire for returning to the original perfection
(final causal model). Therefore, each entity with its own final cause in
essence refers to an outstanding perfect finality.
Following this historical introduction on teleology, the heyday
of the Greek philosophy and culture gives rise to the hegemony of the
Roman Empire. With the fall of the Roman Empire, the remaining of
the Greek-Roman knowledge was preserved by the Christian and
Islamic-Arabic cultures which used classical ideas and theories, in
their own ways. However, due to the religious background, they
tended to interpret that knowledge (including the knowledge regarding
Nature) through a teleological approach. For medieval religious
people, the destine of human beings and the world was on God’s
64_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
hands. Thus, the only thing believer could do was to learn how to
understand and accept God’s will. That is, philosophy and science
were ultimately subordinated to faith – the docket natura et gratia of
Aquinus [1224-1274 AD]. Nature, indeed, will be taken into account
as a place for the signals that God sends to mankind– signals which
show the greatness of God. The correct understanding of Nature and
mankind would not be through the observation of the world. Instead,
this understanding would come through the interpretation of the Holy
Scriptures, which would teach about the meaning of God’s will and,
consequently, of all Nature created. Thus, it makes sense to recognize
a transcendent teleological interpretation of the world during the
medieval ages, as there was the perception that the phenomena and the
entities would fit within the objectives designed by God for the fate of
His creation (ALMEIDA, 2006, top. 2).
The Christian teleological worldview was highly compatible
with the teleological interpretation that the world would reach,
through the ages, an increasing improvement or perfection. For the
Christian thought, the world converges, over time and by means of the
divine laws, to the perfection ideal devised by God. And even after the
medieval ages, to the present days, this worldview of a cosmic
teleology, with Christian outlines, has markedly influenced many
interpretations, theological or not, for which the universe, Nature
and/or humanity are regarded as tending to a progress towards an
increasing perfection or towards some goal or finalist ideal. This
influence has been more evident in popular beliefs, philosophical
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doctrines and even theories with scientific pretensions (MAYR, 2005,
p. 56 and 57).
Following, in the transition from Medieval to Modern Ages,
an intellectual trend will rise, claiming more place and merit for free
thinking and for the knowledge that is validated and/or acquired by
human reason. This trend will be present as much in philosophy as in
the development of science and, often, on both of them in a conjoined
manner (as with Descartes [1596-1650 AD]); even if, in the
beginning, these thought systems would not directly oppose the
Christian doctrine. However, progressively, the thinkers and scientists
started to seriously disagree with some Christian dogmas, as in the
famous case of Galileo Galilei [1564-1642 AD] and the proposal of
the heliocentric theory.
Thereby, the Modern Age thought broadly proposed a new
knowledge methodology. Theories and statements about the world
should be strictly based on the observation of empirical phenomena
and submitted to logical and mathematical reasoning. Suppositions
which were not sustained on these criteria should be questioned. In
this way, Galileo and Descartes eliminated the Aristotelian final cause
from science (and thus, they also eliminated the models based on
immanent or transcendent teleology) (ALMEIDA, 2006, p. 3).
Descartes stated that, for science, just the efficient cause remains
(models of explanation based strictly on cause and effect), whereas the
inquiring into the final cause regarding each being or the whole
universe should be relegated to theologians. Moreover, ascribing
willpower and purpose to the matter would be imputing to the
66_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
substratum, attributes which are specific to the subjectivity (soul), and
that would not conform to the scientific method.
Afterwards, still in the Modern Age, another important thinker
would make his mark on the way to deal with the teleological
reasoning, both in sciences and in philosophy: Immanuel Kant [1724-
1804 AD]. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, ascribe the causality
judgment (cause and effect), but not the teleological judgment, as a
Category of Understanding (or Pure Concept of Understanding),
acquired synthetically a priori, thus, valid for building knowledge
(KANT, [1709] 1994). Nevertheless, Kant would reflect more upon
the Teleological Judgment in his later work Critique of the Power of
Judgment.
Kant acknowledges that, in the sciences based on empirical
observation, there are several laws, patterns and regular behaviors
which are not analytically built based on the a priori laws of
understanding. To ensure that these empirical laws are necessary,
Kant uses the reflecting judgment. The reflecting judgment is
“comparable to the scientific induction, […] goes from the particular
diversity of laws to a transcendental unifying principle” (PASCAL,
2001). This ideal of systematic organization leads to consider the
existence of a higher purpose, enabling to understand Nature as a
unified experience (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 271). For
Pascal (2001), commentator of Kant’s works, such reasoning leads
this philosopher to recognize the need for a purpose sense which
encompasses all Nature (and, indeed, it would be responsible for the
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________67
harmony observable in the natural world). It is what Pascal (2001)
exposes here:
Undoubtedly, the particular laws of Nature work through a pure
engine. However, the purpose is indispensable in order to understand
a system built from these laws. For someone who wants to
understand Nature, everything happens as if Nature has been
designed by a divine intelligence. The idea of purpose is, thus, a
regulative but not constitutive a priori concept: ‘by this concept,
Nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of
the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.’ (Kant, Critique of
the Power of Judgment, [1790], p. 20 apud Pascal, 2001, chapter
Critique of the Power of Judgment).
It is noteworthy that this purpose idea, ascribed to the natural
world, is only a regulative principle, without means to be proved a
priori through our cognitive apparatus. Nonetheless, there is still the
need to use this purpose idea to solve knowledge practical issues. It is
important to be aware that the purpose idea is an assumption, but not
an imputation to the objects. Instead of stating that such purpose
actually exists, the best would be to state that everything works as if
there was such purpose (PASCAL, 2001).
In these terms, the thesis that there could never be a “Newton
of the Grass Stalks” becomes coherent, because Physics, built on pure
concepts of a priori understanding, would have a higher degree of
certainty when compared to some knowledge corpus which would
68_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
need the assumption of a regulative teleological principle (for
example, as it is necessary to assume that the grass has the purpose of
its own growth). Kant emphasizes that care:
This transcendental concept of a finality of Nature is neither a
concept of Nature nor of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to
the object, i.e., to Nature, but only represents the unique mode in
which we must proceed in our reflection upon the objects of Nature
with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of
experience, and so it is a subjective principle, i.e., maxim, of
judgment. (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, [1790], p. 24,
apud Pascal, 2001, chapter Critique of the Power of Judgment)
The teleological judgment has a paramount importance in the
works of Kant, since only through such concept Kant will be able to
mediate the natural causality with the moral purpose principles.
Ultimately, the teleological judgment will move from the idea
of internal harmony of the transcendental subject (regarding the
subjective mental faculties, which are the presupposition of the
esthetical judgment), to the idea of a harmony which resides in Nature
itself. In order to ascribe a purpose for a Nature object, it is necessary
that such object would be the cause of itself, in a way that “the nexus
of the parts is set in such a way that each part appears to be
determined by the whole being; and the whole being, in its turn, would
only appear to be possible due to its parts” (PASCAL, 2001). The
main examples of such objects are the organic beings, which organize
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________69
themselves and, in a broader context, constitute together a higher
harmony that is the natural environment. Kant exemplifies: “An
organized product, in Nature, is something in which everything is
purpose and mean, reciprocally; in such product, there is nothing
useless, nothing aimless, or due to a blind natural mechanism” (KANT
[1790], apud PASCAL, 2001).
Consequently, Kant defines two methods to investigate
Nature. The first one is the discursive knowledge based on the
efficient causes and, thus, on the causal determinism, whose example
is the Physics. The second one is an intuitive way of understanding,
which initiates assuming purposes in a living being, or even in Nature
as an organic whole, to, afterwards, investigate its parts. The
following passage exposes that methodological duality:
Therefore, while our discursive knowledge cannot understand
Nature except for the additions of parts, the intuitive approach would
directly apprehend Nature as a whole. The intuitive approach
apprehends the whole before the parts and, thus, would understand
the parts through purposes in relation to the whole. Through the
intuitive approach, the subject tries to understand Nature under the
principle of purpose. Moreover, one must not forget that Nature, as
we know it, is just a phenomenon, through which our senses feel a
reality that is actually not directly accessible. Our cognitive faculties
understand this phenomenon in mechanical terms; which does not
mean, though, that the reality underlying this phenomenon cannot
organize itself teleologically. (PASCAL, 2001).
70_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
The teleological judgment, as previously exposed, is anchored
in the reflecting judgment and is essential for the study of vital
phenomena. Although it is not possible to apply the teleological
judgment with the strong rigor of an efficient cause, like in Physics,
the teleological judgment shall be a guideline for the Nature scientists,
in order to enable them to understand the living beings and the natural
environment. This hypothetically intuitive understanding, from the
whole to the parts, is what leads the Nature scientists to
presuppositions such as:
(1) Nature chooses the shortest way, (2) Nature does not leap, (3) in
Nature there is just a small number of types of causal interaction, (4)
Nature presents an understandable subordination of species in
genera, (5) in Nature it is possible to aggregate species into
progressively higher genera. (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p.
271)
In addition, there is also the presupposition of intrinsic
harmony among the living beings and, accordingly, the purpose,
accredited to these systems, of maintaining such harmony.
Furthermore, PASCAL (2001) reiterates that the teleological
judgment is only a supposition, and its application limit is to never
conflict with the deterministic mechanical knowledge of the world.
The teleological and the mechanical knowledge shall not be mutually
contradictory. The teleological approach is a guide and a complement
to the causal knowledge, as Georges Pascal emphasizes:
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________71
The mechanistic explanation shall be conducted as far as possible,
because only the phenomena susceptible to this kind of explanation
will constitute truly objects of knowledge. Though, when the
mechanical explanation seems to be insufficient, the teleological
explanation could, and even should, be applied, but without the
supposition that it provides knowledge stricto sensu. These
considerations are valid both for beings which are found within
Nature, as to Nature considered as a whole. (PASCAL, 2001)
Briefly, it is worthwhile to expose Hegel [1770-1831 AD]
thoughts, as they have much to do with the appliance of teleology.
Hegel proposes a broad philosophical system in which the world, as
the Spirit, would be in a continuous historical process of gradually
higher rationality and perfection. Therefore, “the Hegelian thought
system introduces, consistently, the idea of an internal purpose in
Nature, associated to transformation, change and progress. Nature is
real, but provisional, as a current which flows, within itself, towards
the Spirit.”(NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 273).
The teleology proposed by Hegel would be explicit both in the
analysis of the universal whole, and in the several processes and
evolutions that comprise this whole. This teleology would happen
through the dialectical method, in which the opposing trends (thesis
and antithesis) collide resulting in a synthesis. The synthesis is,
essentially, more perfect and complete than the thesis and the
antithesis. Hegel has the virtue of creating a new trend in Philosophy:
72_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
the trend of approaching the most diverse topics via an inquiry on
their genesis throughout history. The Hegelian thought has a strong
influence in science and in the world views after that period, as “the
historical approach on Nature, life and human spirit introduces new
concepts in the cosmology of the XIX century and points towards
considering Nature and life, not anymore through Mechanical Physics
of the XVIII century, but through Evolutionary Biology of the XIX
century (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 273).
In his philosophical system, Hegel addresses the physical
world, the animals and humanity in an evolutionary approach,
respectively, in which the Spirit gains a progressive consciousness of
itself. This evolution of the Spirit is also conjugated with the
teleological approach, which turns to be more explicit, as shown in
this comment:
In Nature, the rock is the subject while it resists (time, pickax, etc.),
but it does not have a history, neither an inner purpose. The plant
(seed, flower, whole vegetable being), on the contrary, in addition to
resisting the environment, has an internal history (its development)
without, though, being able to think about its own purpose. The
human beings, however, (children, adults, literate, rational) are
thinkers of their own inner purposes and, being rational, are able to
preserve themselves, while in the previous stages the subject only
conserves itself. Thus, the higher form of development is freedom.
In this context, for Hegel, being a complete being means being free,
eternal. (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 272).
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TELEOLOGY IN HUMAN SCIENCES
The teleological explanation will be of special importance in
the Philosophy of Human Sciences. This importance lies in the
consensus on conceiving the human being as a being who seeks for
particular ideals and goals and, for such, articulates its own thoughts
and actions (MAYR, 2005, p. 75). This teleological Nature of the
human being can be verified individually by each person, in their
subjective living experience and, also, in the obvious acknowledgment
of human teleological Nature through the analysis of human
discourses, from the ordinary to the deepest ones. In effect, what else
is the whole set of technical theories, but a description of how to reach
specific goals? And even the moral theory, what is more than a
theorization about the ultimate purposes of human life and how to
proceed in order to better achieve such purposes?
One shall take into account all the inquiry endeavors regarding
the individuals and society through strict empirical observations
proceeded with causal explanation approaches, as intended by
Durkheim [1859-1917 AD], the neoempirists of the Vienna Circle8,
behavioral psychology9 and social sciences with quantitative
methodologies. However, even recognizing that these areas of
scientific investigation obtained useful progresses, it is still patent that
the universe of experience of human beings is much broader than a
8 As in its exponents Moritz Schlick [1882-1936 AD] and Rudolf
Carnap [1891-1970 AD]. 9 School initiated by John Broadus Watson [1878-1958 AD].
74_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
simply chain of causal effects. The rough cut of all teleological
explanations would reduce a lot the amount of accessible information
about the human world, also reducing the usefulness of the human
sciences and, furthermore, reducing the conception of what is a human
being, as long the subjectivity is being cut too.
The approach of Marx [1818-1883 AD] on the teleology
implicit in the human nature is also useful to this topic. In his classical
illustrative example, in Capital, Marx compares the activity of the
bees, while building the honeycomb, with the work of a foreman
building a house. Even with the highest perfection of the honeycomb
construction, and even with the many limitations that the foreman may
have, this last one has something essentially specific: the foreman
imagines the work that he will perform, constructing a purpose, an
ideal moment, which will be pursued through work (CARLEAL,
2001, p. 80). Thus, Marx postulates the existence of a conscious
teleological attribution, exclusive of the human condition. Considering
this formulation of the work as teleology in a historical perspective,
the result is that:
for animals, history happens, but they do not elaborate their own
historical project (they are, therefore, alienated beings). Thus,
animals would not be the purpose of their own history. Humankind,
in its turn, every time that advances further away from the animal
kingdom, advances more in the construction of its own history,
becoming subjects (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2000, p. 124).
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________75
José Chasin has also studied about work and its teleological
aspect in his research about Marx’s ontological assumptions and its
respective methodological definition (CHASIN, 1995). In accordance
with his interpretation, first it is necessary to recognize the explicit
ontological dimension of the Marxian theory, which defines human
beings as active beings, whereas the role of objects takes place in the
context of the sensitive activity of humans. With the notion of
sensitive activity, it is possible to understand subjectivity as “a
possibility of being something in the world” and objectivity as “the
range of possibilities, […] tolerating subjective forms in the limit of
its plasticity” (CHASIN, 1995, p. 398). Human activity, such as work,
will build the link between subject and object, enabling the
effectuation and confirmation of both in the surrounding world.
Besides the ability of devising their own goals, human beings
are also able to observe the sensitive objectivity and understand its
operation. Thus, human beings will “be able to put at their service […]
the specific logic of a specific object, the lawfulness of the causal
mesh of the primary material substrata” (CHASIN, 1995, p. 399).
Therefore, based on the ontological assumptions of work, Marx
succeeds in conjugating a complex that, while uniting subject and
object, also articulates the use of human cognitive faculties and of
actions oriented to purposes: “the practice implies, brings embedded
in itself, indissolubly, […] the proponent subjectivity – teleology –,
and the receptive subjectivity – the cognitive ability” (CHASIN, 1995,
p. 399).
76_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
According to Marx, the role of teleological activity of human
labor will not be only transforming the object. Such activity occurs
within a social environment and, in the meantime, the product of
human action transforms this social environment in which the own
human being is formed. The social objectivity is updated by humans’
sensitive activity, acting as subjects. Hence, they are “social beings
[…] as builders of themselves and of their world” (CHASIN, 1995, p.
397). The human way of being, in its turn, is generated, conformed
and confronted to its socio-historical condition, in a way that
“humans, while developing their material production and their
material intercourse, also change, in addition to their reality, their way
of thinking and the products of their thoughts” (CHASIN, 1995, p.
407). Therefore, in their conscious activity, from their needs of
emotions and knowledge, the human beings create an ideation, an
action plan that can transform the complex-object, creating a structure
which will be the base to build their own subjectivity: “humans’
subjectivity and objectivity are the products of humans’ self-
constructiveness, due to the overcoming of their naturalness”
(CHASIN, 1995, p. 392).
Another important philosopher to study the human teleology
is Habermas [1929AD- ]. Habermas understands human activity and
thought from a pragmatic-linguistic perspective. In his philosophical
system, he uses the concepts of goals and means, which requires a
brief explanation about how Max Weber [1864-1920 d.C.] first came
up with these concepts. Weber, in his works on social sciences defines
the ultimate goals that an individual pursues as a choice of an active
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________77
human, a personal issue of someone’s private life (WEBER, [1904]
1993, p. 110). The choice for these goals would not be possible to be
rationally analyzed, since it refers to values, which cannot be
compared among themselves. But this does not mean that science and
human rationality are not useful, since when the goals are established,
science may act in several ways, such as:
a. Helping active humans to be aware of their ultimate goals,
comprising the conceptual and logical analysis of their established goals.
Weber reiterates that one of the essential tasks of every science of human
cultural life has actually been, since the beginning, a clear presentation
of their ideas, in order to understand them and also to know why they
should be striven for (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 110). Thus, science may
perform a formal-logical evaluation of the content which is presented on
value judgment and historically given ideas, and an evaluation of ideals,
regarding the assumption of no inner contradiction of what is being
desired (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 110).
b. Establishing which means would be appropriate or not to
certain proposed goals (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 109).
c. Verifying and proving what would be the consequences of
applying the required means (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 109).
d. Helping to clarify the cost of reaching the desired goal, in
terms of the foreseeable losses of not reaching other goals (WEBER,
[1904] 1993, p. 110).
Thereby, the main role of Science and rationality is trying to
understand the means. By reflecting on the means, it is possible to
78_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
think on how the world works and which are the alternatives of action.
The reflection on the means provides the human beings with the way
that seems to be the most propitious to achieve their desired aims.
Going ahead with Weber propositions, regarding the human
action based on the use of reason on the required means to reach the
goals, Habermas divides the human action in two different groups: [1]
Instrumental action, characterized by “the relationship between
subject and object, as effective manipulation, domination and control
over reality or the objective world, conducted only by technical rules
based on empirical knowledge” (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5). [2] Strategic
action, characterized by “the correct evaluation of alternatives and
choices of means of manipulation, domination and control, organized
by the instrumental action, or, in addition, the influence among social
actors regarding goals of domination” (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5). This
influence on other actors, in the strategic action, may happen by
means of weapons, goods, intimidation, seduction, rhetoric, etc.
(HABERMAS, 2003, p. 164). These two categories of action
constitute together the rational-purposive action (BONFIM, 2002, p.
5). These individual goals were previously defined by the subject,
whereas reason is used just to define the most appropriate mean to
achieve the goal. Even in any cooperation, each individual is only
interested in what he or she may obtain individually from that joint
action (HABERMAS, 2003, p. 164-165).
Nonetheless, unlike Weber, Habermas is in favor of the
rational discussion of the goals which drive humans, through
intelligible arguments with pretension to validity and justification
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________79
(BERTEN, 2004, p. 72-73). This kind of discussion is found in the
actual use of language (BERTEN, 2004, p. 73), for example, in
political, legal, moral and etiquette discussions (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5).
This possibility of a rational discussion of goals may lead to a social
action based on consensus, denominated as communicative action
(HABERMAS, 2004, p. 165). Habermas proposes that the society
should move progressively from the strategic action to the
communicative action. In this way, people may reach a social practice
in which the individuals rationally discuss about the goals to seek,
setting and reformulating the goals intersubjectively, towards a
harmonic point of interests and action plans. In this kind of action, the
orientation is no longer exclusive to the individual success, becoming
oriented to mutual agreements. The communicative action assumes a
fundamental role in the Habermasian philosophical theory, because:
where the thelos (ultimate goal or objective) of understanding lies,
under the aegis of language (die Sprache), is where the process of
obtaining knowledge (Verstand) occurs, from the consensus among
the interactively and linguistically competent subjectivities.
Thereby, for Habermas, communicative reason is the category which
structures the human social system (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5).
Although both types of teleological orientation (rational-
purposive action and communicative action) have the mark of human
rationality, the major difference between them is that, in the rational-
purposive action, the definition of the goals does not interact with
80_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
other subjects and their own arguments and purposes; whereas in the
communicative action there is the possibility of dialogue about the
goals. In this dialogue, the subjects think together about which are the
best goals to be pursued by the social group. The communicative
action, as a facilitator of the action coordination, enables the mutual
agreement. Thereby, it will be the basis for the defense of democracy,
in the political scene, and for the consensus on the fundamental human
rights. In the same way, it will help in the criticism of repression,
censorship and other actions that hamper the dialogue within the
society. (BERTEN, 2004)
FINAL THOUGHTS – CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHY
REGARDING TELEOLOGY IN ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCES
Ecology, like the other Environmental Sciences, studies the
physical and biotic environments together, as well as their interaction
with human beings, with the goal of maintaining the processes which
enable the survival of the living beings. During these studies, the
scientist generally employs several concepts with a teleological
background, which involves the different shades of meaning
investigated in this paper.
The aim of this paper was to contribute to help the Natural
Science researchers in increasing their sensitivity to teleological
aspects which are pertinent to their researches. In this context, the
investigated topics in this paper may be useful for the researches of
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________81
many environmental sciences. The Aristotelian classification of the
four causes, specially the efficient and final causes, is the first
epistemological scrutiny, as its elicitation in the environmental studies
may largely contribute to clarify the investigative structures. When
there is no such awareness, the division between causal systems that
are strictly causal and the ones that are teleological may go unnoticed.
This is specially the case in the studies of ecosystems, where the
emergence of teleology occurs through scales of evolution and
complexity that are not always clear and definite. For example, the
functioning of a bacterium or another cell organism may be explained
almost only based on strict chemical causal reasonings. On the other
hand, when dealing with more complex animals (like intelligent
mammals), issues such as purpose, thought and behavior become
increasingly patent.
Another controversial theoretical point is about the causal
explanation applied to systems of living beings (communities,
populations, ecosystems, biota, etc.). In such cases, it is usual to state
that a group of living beings interacts in favor of their survival, even
when there is not the assumption of a unique (transcendental)
consciousness behind the teleological system. Regarding this topic, it
may be useful to recall the Kantian discussions on the way human
beings perceive Nature as a system that tends to its own harmony. In
these discussions, besides recognizing the finalist aspect of Nature,
Kant was cautiously concerned about defining the limits of the finalist
explanation in its relation with the strict causal studies and
conclusions of empirical knowledge.
82_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
The Kantian discussion in his work Critique the Judgment
(KANT, 1781) finds a fruitful topicality in the contemporary scene of
environmental sciences. The Kantian Theorization of a dual method
for the investigation of nature, encompassing the reflective judgment
(intuitive observation of nature) complementary to the causal
determinism (empirical experimentation in Physics, with the use of
abstract categories) may be applied to the scientific contemporary
scene, leading to a possible complementarity between the geosciences
with systemic approach and the quantitative geosciences. The
geosciences with systemic approach (linked deeper to the reflective
judgment) care more for the perception of the interaction among
elements in dynamic and complex studies, based on presupposition
that Kant ascribed to nature (teleology, unity, harmony, among others)
by means of the reflective judgment. The quantitative geosciences, in
their turn, may be benefited from their great technical capability of
aggregating primary data and establishing patterns based on these
data. Mirroring the dual method of investigation proposed by Kant,
the environmental geosciences have a lot to gain with the conjugation
between systemic and quantitative approaches – since while the
systemic approach may provide a general frame for the proposal of
hypotheses, the quantitative geosciences attempts to prove whether the
hypotheses are valid or not, facing them with actual empirical data.
It is also interesting to elicit how the Kantian theorization can
be interlinked with the thermodynamics approach. In
thermodynamics, as shown in entropy and information analysis,
information and entropy increase while the systems develop. When a
AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________83
system reaches the threshold of a new internal order, something
occurs as if the system is inexorably drained to this new order. Thus, it
produces a teleological effect, a destiny, an imperative route in order
to maintain this new order. In the Theory of Self-Organization, when
analyzing a chaotic event through time series, the variables of a
system may go into a way that configures, over a time plot, a figure
denominated “strange attractor”.
Also, Hegel’s contributions should not go unnoticed, because
using the history of the investigated causal phenomena is important in
whatever comprehensive environmental study. In this point, the
researcher usually faces the lack of structure for collecting historical
environmental data, in the most diverse fields. This lack critically
hampers the reconstruction of past scenarios, which would be
important to identify the changes in relation to the present scenario.
This comparison with past scenarios is, indeed, a condition for the
reliability of any environmental prediction model.
Lastly, the teleological aspect that has been most taken for
granted in the environmental studies is the study of human purposes.
This becomes a crucial problem, as the interaction of humankind and
the environment gains increasing importance in many environmental
studies. The emergence of themes like human ecology and social
ecology is a confirmation of such trend. Nonetheless, many
environmental researchers graduated in fields like Biology, Nature
Sciences and Exact Sciences, and thus had no access to the scientific
heritage regarding the research of humanity, as well as the way to deal
with its teleological aspects. Accounting humankind just as a biologic
84_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior
being, within conventional ecological studies, is the same as
disregarding several studies and contributions undertaken by human
sciences. As discussed in this paper, useful starting points to interpret
the human beings as social beings and rational, purposive beings, in
relation to their environment, are: [1] the need to understand human
beings through their goals to change the world and themselves, as
studied in Marx; [2] the rational reasoning on goals discussed by
Weber, also considering the phenomenon of participatory
communication proposed by Habermas.
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