Theleology and the Investigation of Natural Sciences - Philosophical Contributions

Teleology and the Investigation of Natural Sciences – Philosophical

Contributions

Available online at:

http://pt.scribd.com/doc/124754643/Teleology-and-the-Investigation-of-Natural-

Sciences-%E2%80%93-Philosophical-Contributions

Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos 1 Paulo Pereira Martins Junior 2

1 – Legislative Consultant of Environment and Sustainable Management at the Legislative Power of Minas

Gerais State, Brazil. PhD. student in Geology. Master of Arts in Geography. Specialist in Soil and Environment.

Bachelor in Philosophy. Environmental Technician. Computer Science Technician.

2 – PhD. Geologist. Federal University of Ouro Preto (UFOP), Brazil. Foundation Technological Center of Minas

Gerais (CETEC-MG), Minas Gerais State, Brazil.

Paper originally published in Portuguese, at:

VASCONCELOS, V.V. MARTINS JUNIOR, P.P. A Teleologia e o Estudo das Ciências da

Natureza – Contribuições da Filosofia. AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO: Revista de Educação

Ambiental. Vol. 16(1), 2011. Available at:

http://www.seer.furg.br/ambeduc/article/view/1676/1199

Proofreading of the English version by Carolina Dias, in February, 2013

http://pt.scribd.com/doc/124754643/Teleology-and-the-Investigation-of-Natural-Sciences-%E2%80%93-Philosophical-Contributions

http://pt.scribd.com/doc/124754643/Teleology-and-the-Investigation-of-Natural-Sciences-%E2%80%93-Philosophical-Contributions

http://www.seer.furg.br/ambeduc/article/view/1676/1199

AMBIENTE & EDUCAÇÃO | vol. 16(1) | 2011 ______________________________59

TELEOLOGY AND THE INVESTIGATION OF NATURAL

SCIENCES – PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos*

Paulo Pereira Martins Junior**

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the theme of Teleology, as it has been used through the

history of human thought, especially since the development of the scientific

theories about Nature. It begins with most current definitions of Teleology and their uses. Then, the historical background comes into consideration, by starting

with Aristotle’s teleological (or finalistic) explanation, to the incorporation of

teleological approach in early and Christian thought of the Middle Ages. Kant’s and Hegel’s perspectives of teleology, in Modern Age, are briefly revised.

Finally, a study of the “philosophical teleological approach” in human and social

science’s Epistemology was focused in Marx’s, Weber’s and Habermas’ ideas. The paper ends with a proposition of arguments about how these themes are

relevant for the Environmental Science, wherein the study of Physics, Biology

and Human systems are practiced with nuances and uses of teleological concepts. Key Words: Teleology, Philosophy of Nature, Sciences of Nature, Causality,

Environmental Sciences1

1* Legislative Consultant of Environment and Sustainable Management at the Legislative Power

of Minas Gerais State, Brazil. PhD. student in Geology. Master of Arts in Geography. Specialist

in Soil and Environment. Bachelor in Philosophy. Environmental Technician. Computer Science Technician.

** PhD. Geologist. Federal University of Ouro Preto (UFOP), Brazil. Foundation Technological

Center of Minas Gerais (CETEC-MG), Minas Gerais State, Brazil.

60_________________________ Vitor Vieira Vasconcelos e Paulo Pereira Martins Junior

A Teleologia e o Estudo das Ciências da Natureza – Contribuições da

Filosofia

RESUMO Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar como a temática da Teleologia foi

tratada no decorrer da história do pensamento humano, em especial no intercurso

relacionado ao desenvolvimento das teorias científicas referentes ao estudo da Natureza. Inicia-se por uma reflexão a partir das definições correntes sobre o

significado e uso do conceito Teleologia. Em seguida, é abordada uma

contextualização histórica, partindo da explicação teleológica ou finalista de Aristóteles, passando pela incorporação desta perspectiva teleológica dentro do

pensamento cristão medieval. Na modernidade serão retomados os tratos da

Teleologia empreendidos pela filosofia kantiana e hegeliana. Por fim, apresenta-se um estudo da abordagem teleológica na Filosofia das ciências humanas e

sociais, na qual têm foco o pensamento de K. Marx, M. Weber e J. Habermas.

Finda-se o artigo com uma reflexão sobre como os temas tratados são pertinentes dentro da área de estudos das ciências ambientais, em que são tratados sistemas

físicos, biológicos e humanos, com as diversas nuances e utilizações de conceitos

teleológicos. Palavras-Chave: Teleologia, Filosofia da Natureza, Ciências da Natureza,

Causalidade, Ciências Ambientais

THE CONCEPT OF TELEOLOGY2

The concept of Teleology comes from two Greek words: telos

(aim, goal, purpose) and logos (reason, explanation). Therefore,

Teleology could be understood as the explanation or reason of

something regarding its purposes or explanation which draws upon

purposes or goals (VILLA, 2000, p. 723). In synthesis, the concept or

idea of Teleology may be defined as the study of the aims or functions

of things (BLACKBURN, 1997, p. 376). On the scope of a theoretical

system or worldview, Teleology can be stated as “the philosophical


doctrine that all of Nature, or at least intentional agents, are goal-

directed or functionally organized” (AUDI, 1995, p. 791).

If we include the notion that these purposes must be pursued

through processes (here denominated means), we may propose a third

definition, in which teleology means “Doctrine which considers the

world as a system of relations between means and purposes”

(FERREIRA, 1986, p. 1658). This viewpoint of concatenated events

in relation to a purpose may be defined within the following

conception:

when we say that an event is teleological regarding a framework of

reference, it means that there is a tendency, propensity, etc., in this

framework biased to develop specific types of structures that […]

will take place provided that some variables remain constant; and

with respect to these structures, this event is a phase, stage or

moment of their development. (VILLA, 2000, p. 723).3

The entry for Teleology, in the Dictionary of Contemporary

Thought, presents a more detailed explanation, seeking the ontological

assumptions which would sustain a teleological explanation or

doctrine. The entry explains that, when an event or process is stated as

teleological, it implies that (1) we admit that the case study is not

random or that the current framework or structure which the object

appears in, is not the result of random processes and events; (2) we

admit that there is an aim, goal or purpose which is the reason,


explanation or direction of an event and this may be (2-a) immanent,

with the finality being admitted in the core, or essence, of each being

or set of beings; (2b) transcendent of the whole being, as a reason

behind the world (VILLA, 2000, p. 723-725).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Aristotle [384-322 a.C.], in his Metaphysics, listed several

types of explanations on the world processes. These types of

explanations correspond to four types of causes. Recollecting his text:

Actually, cause may be used in four meanings: in the first, we

understood that the cause is the substance or quiddity4 (the reason,

therefore, leads back to the ultimate notion, and the first reason is

both cause and principle); the second [cause] is the matter and

subject5; the third is where movement [comes from]

6; the fourth,

which opposes itself to the third one, is the “end for what”7 and the

goodness (because this is indeed the finality of all genesis and

motion) (ARISTOTLE, I, 3, 983ª 25-32, [1993]).

Respectively, there are: 1st – formal cause; 2

nd – material

cause; 3rd

– efficient cause. As the fourth and last causal type, we have

the teleological or finalist explanation, which explains the purpose (or

4 Essence

5 Or substratum, as an alternative translation 6 Or change, in a more general meaning

7 Finality


goal) that an event or being is predestined to (VILLA, 2000, p. 724).

On this explanation, Aristotle asserts that all things trend naturally to a

purpose. In other words, this means that the teleological notion of

reality makes it possible to explain the Nature (end or goal) of all

beings (ALMEIDA, 2006). On this conception, the teleological notion

of Aristotle refers to the essence of each being, i.e., to an internal

teleology of the natural entities (AUDI, 1995, p. 791). The final cause

makes the object move and even change, seeking its perfection. And

this perfection will just be reached in the extent that the object

accomplishes the function for which it was designed in essence. The

same conception is applied to Ethics (BLACKBURN, 1997), like in

the work Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle proposes that the

human beings have the intrinsic finality of seeking their own

happiness.

However, what seemed to refer only to a teleology internal to

beings gets the outline of a totalizing teleology, when Aristotle writes

on the first universal cause and on how this cause is regarded both as

the first efficient cause and as the first final cause. The Aristotelian

sequence of reasoning (Physics, 242a 50-54, apud LOMBARDI,

1997, p. 65) is the following:

1) The world is dynamic only because of the motion of shapes,

which is due to the effects of the causes.

2) Thus, an object causes a change in another object, which

causes another change in a third object, and so forth.


3) When a causal chain is investigated, at the end there is no

option but postulating that there was an original first cause, which

gave the first causal impact from which all the other movements and

changes in the world have originated.

Aristotle denominates this original cause as the First Immobile

Mover. However, in this passage, Aristotle refers to a series of

efficient causes, the rationale would be applied for all the other causal

types, thus proving that any causal series may not be infinite (cf.

Metafísica 994a 1-11 apud LOMBARDI, 1997, p. 65). The First

Immobile Mover is identified as God by analogy, who is also the pure

perfection and the supreme goodness, to whom all other beings try to

get close through the final cause. Thus, on the one hand it explains the

becoming of the world by a series of physical movements (efficient

causal model). And on the other hand, it explains the becoming of the

world as the beings’ desire for returning to the original perfection

(final causal model). Therefore, each entity with its own final cause in

essence refers to an outstanding perfect finality.

Following this historical introduction on teleology, the heyday

of the Greek philosophy and culture gives rise to the hegemony of the

Roman Empire. With the fall of the Roman Empire, the remaining of

the Greek-Roman knowledge was preserved by the Christian and

Islamic-Arabic cultures which used classical ideas and theories, in

their own ways. However, due to the religious background, they

tended to interpret that knowledge (including the knowledge regarding

Nature) through a teleological approach. For medieval religious

people, the destine of human beings and the world was on God’s


hands. Thus, the only thing believer could do was to learn how to

understand and accept God’s will. That is, philosophy and science

were ultimately subordinated to faith – the docket natura et gratia of

Aquinus [1224-1274 AD]. Nature, indeed, will be taken into account

as a place for the signals that God sends to mankind– signals which

show the greatness of God. The correct understanding of Nature and

mankind would not be through the observation of the world. Instead,

this understanding would come through the interpretation of the Holy

Scriptures, which would teach about the meaning of God’s will and,

consequently, of all Nature created. Thus, it makes sense to recognize

a transcendent teleological interpretation of the world during the

medieval ages, as there was the perception that the phenomena and the

entities would fit within the objectives designed by God for the fate of

His creation (ALMEIDA, 2006, top. 2).

The Christian teleological worldview was highly compatible

with the teleological interpretation that the world would reach,

through the ages, an increasing improvement or perfection. For the

Christian thought, the world converges, over time and by means of the

divine laws, to the perfection ideal devised by God. And even after the

medieval ages, to the present days, this worldview of a cosmic

teleology, with Christian outlines, has markedly influenced many

interpretations, theological or not, for which the universe, Nature

and/or humanity are regarded as tending to a progress towards an

increasing perfection or towards some goal or finalist ideal. This

influence has been more evident in popular beliefs, philosophical


doctrines and even theories with scientific pretensions (MAYR, 2005,

p. 56 and 57).

Following, in the transition from Medieval to Modern Ages,

an intellectual trend will rise, claiming more place and merit for free

thinking and for the knowledge that is validated and/or acquired by

human reason. This trend will be present as much in philosophy as in

the development of science and, often, on both of them in a conjoined

manner (as with Descartes [1596-1650 AD]); even if, in the

beginning, these thought systems would not directly oppose the

Christian doctrine. However, progressively, the thinkers and scientists

started to seriously disagree with some Christian dogmas, as in the

famous case of Galileo Galilei [1564-1642 AD] and the proposal of

the heliocentric theory.

Thereby, the Modern Age thought broadly proposed a new

knowledge methodology. Theories and statements about the world

should be strictly based on the observation of empirical phenomena

and submitted to logical and mathematical reasoning. Suppositions

which were not sustained on these criteria should be questioned. In

this way, Galileo and Descartes eliminated the Aristotelian final cause

from science (and thus, they also eliminated the models based on

immanent or transcendent teleology) (ALMEIDA, 2006, p. 3).

Descartes stated that, for science, just the efficient cause remains

(models of explanation based strictly on cause and effect), whereas the

inquiring into the final cause regarding each being or the whole

universe should be relegated to theologians. Moreover, ascribing

willpower and purpose to the matter would be imputing to the


substratum, attributes which are specific to the subjectivity (soul), and

that would not conform to the scientific method.

Afterwards, still in the Modern Age, another important thinker

would make his mark on the way to deal with the teleological

reasoning, both in sciences and in philosophy: Immanuel Kant [1724-

1804 AD]. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, ascribe the causality

judgment (cause and effect), but not the teleological judgment, as a

Category of Understanding (or Pure Concept of Understanding),

acquired synthetically a priori, thus, valid for building knowledge

(KANT, [1709] 1994). Nevertheless, Kant would reflect more upon

the Teleological Judgment in his later work Critique of the Power of

Judgment.

Kant acknowledges that, in the sciences based on empirical

observation, there are several laws, patterns and regular behaviors

which are not analytically built based on the a priori laws of

understanding. To ensure that these empirical laws are necessary,

Kant uses the reflecting judgment. The reflecting judgment is

“comparable to the scientific induction, […] goes from the particular

diversity of laws to a transcendental unifying principle” (PASCAL,

2001). This ideal of systematic organization leads to consider the

existence of a higher purpose, enabling to understand Nature as a

unified experience (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 271). For

Pascal (2001), commentator of Kant’s works, such reasoning leads

this philosopher to recognize the need for a purpose sense which

encompasses all Nature (and, indeed, it would be responsible for the


harmony observable in the natural world). It is what Pascal (2001)

exposes here:

Undoubtedly, the particular laws of Nature work through a pure

engine. However, the purpose is indispensable in order to understand

a system built from these laws. For someone who wants to

understand Nature, everything happens as if Nature has been

designed by a divine intelligence. The idea of purpose is, thus, a

regulative but not constitutive a priori concept: ‘by this concept,

Nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of

the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.’ (Kant, Critique of

the Power of Judgment, [1790], p. 20 apud Pascal, 2001, chapter

Critique of the Power of Judgment).

It is noteworthy that this purpose idea, ascribed to the natural

world, is only a regulative principle, without means to be proved a

priori through our cognitive apparatus. Nonetheless, there is still the

need to use this purpose idea to solve knowledge practical issues. It is

important to be aware that the purpose idea is an assumption, but not

an imputation to the objects. Instead of stating that such purpose

actually exists, the best would be to state that everything works as if

there was such purpose (PASCAL, 2001).

In these terms, the thesis that there could never be a “Newton

of the Grass Stalks” becomes coherent, because Physics, built on pure

concepts of a priori understanding, would have a higher degree of

certainty when compared to some knowledge corpus which would


need the assumption of a regulative teleological principle (for

example, as it is necessary to assume that the grass has the purpose of

its own growth). Kant emphasizes that care:

This transcendental concept of a finality of Nature is neither a

concept of Nature nor of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to

the object, i.e., to Nature, but only represents the unique mode in

which we must proceed in our reflection upon the objects of Nature

with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of

experience, and so it is a subjective principle, i.e., maxim, of

judgment. (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, [1790], p. 24,

apud Pascal, 2001, chapter Critique of the Power of Judgment)

The teleological judgment has a paramount importance in the

works of Kant, since only through such concept Kant will be able to

mediate the natural causality with the moral purpose principles.

Ultimately, the teleological judgment will move from the idea

of internal harmony of the transcendental subject (regarding the

subjective mental faculties, which are the presupposition of the

esthetical judgment), to the idea of a harmony which resides in Nature

itself. In order to ascribe a purpose for a Nature object, it is necessary

that such object would be the cause of itself, in a way that “the nexus

of the parts is set in such a way that each part appears to be

determined by the whole being; and the whole being, in its turn, would

only appear to be possible due to its parts” (PASCAL, 2001). The

main examples of such objects are the organic beings, which organize


themselves and, in a broader context, constitute together a higher

harmony that is the natural environment. Kant exemplifies: “An

organized product, in Nature, is something in which everything is

purpose and mean, reciprocally; in such product, there is nothing

useless, nothing aimless, or due to a blind natural mechanism” (KANT

[1790], apud PASCAL, 2001).

Consequently, Kant defines two methods to investigate

Nature. The first one is the discursive knowledge based on the

efficient causes and, thus, on the causal determinism, whose example

is the Physics. The second one is an intuitive way of understanding,

which initiates assuming purposes in a living being, or even in Nature

as an organic whole, to, afterwards, investigate its parts. The

following passage exposes that methodological duality:

Therefore, while our discursive knowledge cannot understand

Nature except for the additions of parts, the intuitive approach would

directly apprehend Nature as a whole. The intuitive approach

apprehends the whole before the parts and, thus, would understand

the parts through purposes in relation to the whole. Through the

intuitive approach, the subject tries to understand Nature under the

principle of purpose. Moreover, one must not forget that Nature, as

we know it, is just a phenomenon, through which our senses feel a

reality that is actually not directly accessible. Our cognitive faculties

understand this phenomenon in mechanical terms; which does not

mean, though, that the reality underlying this phenomenon cannot

organize itself teleologically. (PASCAL, 2001).


The teleological judgment, as previously exposed, is anchored

in the reflecting judgment and is essential for the study of vital

phenomena. Although it is not possible to apply the teleological

judgment with the strong rigor of an efficient cause, like in Physics,

the teleological judgment shall be a guideline for the Nature scientists,

in order to enable them to understand the living beings and the natural

environment. This hypothetically intuitive understanding, from the

whole to the parts, is what leads the Nature scientists to

presuppositions such as:

(1) Nature chooses the shortest way, (2) Nature does not leap, (3) in

Nature there is just a small number of types of causal interaction, (4)

Nature presents an understandable subordination of species in

genera, (5) in Nature it is possible to aggregate species into

progressively higher genera. (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p.

271)

In addition, there is also the presupposition of intrinsic

harmony among the living beings and, accordingly, the purpose,

accredited to these systems, of maintaining such harmony.

Furthermore, PASCAL (2001) reiterates that the teleological

judgment is only a supposition, and its application limit is to never

conflict with the deterministic mechanical knowledge of the world.

The teleological and the mechanical knowledge shall not be mutually

contradictory. The teleological approach is a guide and a complement

to the causal knowledge, as Georges Pascal emphasizes:


The mechanistic explanation shall be conducted as far as possible,

because only the phenomena susceptible to this kind of explanation

will constitute truly objects of knowledge. Though, when the

mechanical explanation seems to be insufficient, the teleological

explanation could, and even should, be applied, but without the

supposition that it provides knowledge stricto sensu. These

considerations are valid both for beings which are found within

Nature, as to Nature considered as a whole. (PASCAL, 2001)

Briefly, it is worthwhile to expose Hegel [1770-1831 AD]

thoughts, as they have much to do with the appliance of teleology.

Hegel proposes a broad philosophical system in which the world, as

the Spirit, would be in a continuous historical process of gradually

higher rationality and perfection. Therefore, “the Hegelian thought

system introduces, consistently, the idea of an internal purpose in

Nature, associated to transformation, change and progress. Nature is

real, but provisional, as a current which flows, within itself, towards

the Spirit.”(NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 273).

The teleology proposed by Hegel would be explicit both in the

analysis of the universal whole, and in the several processes and

evolutions that comprise this whole. This teleology would happen

through the dialectical method, in which the opposing trends (thesis

and antithesis) collide resulting in a synthesis. The synthesis is,

essentially, more perfect and complete than the thesis and the

antithesis. Hegel has the virtue of creating a new trend in Philosophy:


the trend of approaching the most diverse topics via an inquiry on

their genesis throughout history. The Hegelian thought has a strong

influence in science and in the world views after that period, as “the

historical approach on Nature, life and human spirit introduces new

concepts in the cosmology of the XIX century and points towards

considering Nature and life, not anymore through Mechanical Physics

of the XVIII century, but through Evolutionary Biology of the XIX

century (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 273).

In his philosophical system, Hegel addresses the physical

world, the animals and humanity in an evolutionary approach,

respectively, in which the Spirit gains a progressive consciousness of

itself. This evolution of the Spirit is also conjugated with the

teleological approach, which turns to be more explicit, as shown in

this comment:

In Nature, the rock is the subject while it resists (time, pickax, etc.),

but it does not have a history, neither an inner purpose. The plant

(seed, flower, whole vegetable being), on the contrary, in addition to

resisting the environment, has an internal history (its development)

without, though, being able to think about its own purpose. The

human beings, however, (children, adults, literate, rational) are

thinkers of their own inner purposes and, being rational, are able to

preserve themselves, while in the previous stages the subject only

conserves itself. Thus, the higher form of development is freedom.

In this context, for Hegel, being a complete being means being free,

eternal. (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2001, p. 272).


TELEOLOGY IN HUMAN SCIENCES

The teleological explanation will be of special importance in

the Philosophy of Human Sciences. This importance lies in the

consensus on conceiving the human being as a being who seeks for

particular ideals and goals and, for such, articulates its own thoughts

and actions (MAYR, 2005, p. 75). This teleological Nature of the

human being can be verified individually by each person, in their

subjective living experience and, also, in the obvious acknowledgment

of human teleological Nature through the analysis of human

discourses, from the ordinary to the deepest ones. In effect, what else

is the whole set of technical theories, but a description of how to reach

specific goals? And even the moral theory, what is more than a

theorization about the ultimate purposes of human life and how to

proceed in order to better achieve such purposes?

One shall take into account all the inquiry endeavors regarding

the individuals and society through strict empirical observations

proceeded with causal explanation approaches, as intended by

Durkheim [1859-1917 AD], the neoempirists of the Vienna Circle8,

behavioral psychology9 and social sciences with quantitative

methodologies. However, even recognizing that these areas of

scientific investigation obtained useful progresses, it is still patent that

the universe of experience of human beings is much broader than a

8 As in its exponents Moritz Schlick [1882-1936 AD] and Rudolf

Carnap [1891-1970 AD]. 9 School initiated by John Broadus Watson [1878-1958 AD].


simply chain of causal effects. The rough cut of all teleological

explanations would reduce a lot the amount of accessible information

about the human world, also reducing the usefulness of the human

sciences and, furthermore, reducing the conception of what is a human

being, as long the subjectivity is being cut too.

The approach of Marx [1818-1883 AD] on the teleology

implicit in the human nature is also useful to this topic. In his classical

illustrative example, in Capital, Marx compares the activity of the

bees, while building the honeycomb, with the work of a foreman

building a house. Even with the highest perfection of the honeycomb

construction, and even with the many limitations that the foreman may

have, this last one has something essentially specific: the foreman

imagines the work that he will perform, constructing a purpose, an

ideal moment, which will be pursued through work (CARLEAL,

2001, p. 80). Thus, Marx postulates the existence of a conscious

teleological attribution, exclusive of the human condition. Considering

this formulation of the work as teleology in a historical perspective,

the result is that:

for animals, history happens, but they do not elaborate their own

historical project (they are, therefore, alienated beings). Thus,

animals would not be the purpose of their own history. Humankind,

in its turn, every time that advances further away from the animal

kingdom, advances more in the construction of its own history,

becoming subjects (NASCIMENTO JUNIOR, 2000, p. 124).


José Chasin has also studied about work and its teleological

aspect in his research about Marx’s ontological assumptions and its

respective methodological definition (CHASIN, 1995). In accordance

with his interpretation, first it is necessary to recognize the explicit

ontological dimension of the Marxian theory, which defines human

beings as active beings, whereas the role of objects takes place in the

context of the sensitive activity of humans. With the notion of

sensitive activity, it is possible to understand subjectivity as “a

possibility of being something in the world” and objectivity as “the

range of possibilities, […] tolerating subjective forms in the limit of

its plasticity” (CHASIN, 1995, p. 398). Human activity, such as work,

will build the link between subject and object, enabling the

effectuation and confirmation of both in the surrounding world.

Besides the ability of devising their own goals, human beings

are also able to observe the sensitive objectivity and understand its

operation. Thus, human beings will “be able to put at their service […]

the specific logic of a specific object, the lawfulness of the causal

mesh of the primary material substrata” (CHASIN, 1995, p. 399).

Therefore, based on the ontological assumptions of work, Marx

succeeds in conjugating a complex that, while uniting subject and

object, also articulates the use of human cognitive faculties and of

actions oriented to purposes: “the practice implies, brings embedded

in itself, indissolubly, […] the proponent subjectivity – teleology –,

and the receptive subjectivity – the cognitive ability” (CHASIN, 1995,

p. 399).


According to Marx, the role of teleological activity of human

labor will not be only transforming the object. Such activity occurs

within a social environment and, in the meantime, the product of

human action transforms this social environment in which the own

human being is formed. The social objectivity is updated by humans’

sensitive activity, acting as subjects. Hence, they are “social beings

[…] as builders of themselves and of their world” (CHASIN, 1995, p.

397). The human way of being, in its turn, is generated, conformed

and confronted to its socio-historical condition, in a way that

“humans, while developing their material production and their

material intercourse, also change, in addition to their reality, their way

of thinking and the products of their thoughts” (CHASIN, 1995, p.

407). Therefore, in their conscious activity, from their needs of

emotions and knowledge, the human beings create an ideation, an

action plan that can transform the complex-object, creating a structure

which will be the base to build their own subjectivity: “humans’

subjectivity and objectivity are the products of humans’ self-

constructiveness, due to the overcoming of their naturalness”

(CHASIN, 1995, p. 392).

Another important philosopher to study the human teleology

is Habermas [1929AD- ]. Habermas understands human activity and

thought from a pragmatic-linguistic perspective. In his philosophical

system, he uses the concepts of goals and means, which requires a

brief explanation about how Max Weber [1864-1920 d.C.] first came

up with these concepts. Weber, in his works on social sciences defines

the ultimate goals that an individual pursues as a choice of an active


human, a personal issue of someone’s private life (WEBER, [1904]

1993, p. 110). The choice for these goals would not be possible to be

rationally analyzed, since it refers to values, which cannot be

compared among themselves. But this does not mean that science and

human rationality are not useful, since when the goals are established,

science may act in several ways, such as:

a. Helping active humans to be aware of their ultimate goals,

comprising the conceptual and logical analysis of their established goals.

Weber reiterates that one of the essential tasks of every science of human

cultural life has actually been, since the beginning, a clear presentation

of their ideas, in order to understand them and also to know why they

should be striven for (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 110). Thus, science may

perform a formal-logical evaluation of the content which is presented on

value judgment and historically given ideas, and an evaluation of ideals,

regarding the assumption of no inner contradiction of what is being

desired (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 110).

b. Establishing which means would be appropriate or not to

certain proposed goals (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 109).

c. Verifying and proving what would be the consequences of

applying the required means (WEBER, [1904] 1993, p. 109).

d. Helping to clarify the cost of reaching the desired goal, in

terms of the foreseeable losses of not reaching other goals (WEBER,

[1904] 1993, p. 110).

Thereby, the main role of Science and rationality is trying to

understand the means. By reflecting on the means, it is possible to


think on how the world works and which are the alternatives of action.

The reflection on the means provides the human beings with the way

that seems to be the most propitious to achieve their desired aims.

Going ahead with Weber propositions, regarding the human

action based on the use of reason on the required means to reach the

goals, Habermas divides the human action in two different groups: [1]

Instrumental action, characterized by “the relationship between

subject and object, as effective manipulation, domination and control

over reality or the objective world, conducted only by technical rules

based on empirical knowledge” (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5). [2] Strategic

action, characterized by “the correct evaluation of alternatives and

choices of means of manipulation, domination and control, organized

by the instrumental action, or, in addition, the influence among social

actors regarding goals of domination” (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5). This

influence on other actors, in the strategic action, may happen by

means of weapons, goods, intimidation, seduction, rhetoric, etc.

(HABERMAS, 2003, p. 164). These two categories of action

constitute together the rational-purposive action (BONFIM, 2002, p.

5). These individual goals were previously defined by the subject,

whereas reason is used just to define the most appropriate mean to

achieve the goal. Even in any cooperation, each individual is only

interested in what he or she may obtain individually from that joint

action (HABERMAS, 2003, p. 164-165).

Nonetheless, unlike Weber, Habermas is in favor of the

rational discussion of the goals which drive humans, through

intelligible arguments with pretension to validity and justification


(BERTEN, 2004, p. 72-73). This kind of discussion is found in the

actual use of language (BERTEN, 2004, p. 73), for example, in

political, legal, moral and etiquette discussions (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5).

This possibility of a rational discussion of goals may lead to a social

action based on consensus, denominated as communicative action

(HABERMAS, 2004, p. 165). Habermas proposes that the society

should move progressively from the strategic action to the

communicative action. In this way, people may reach a social practice

in which the individuals rationally discuss about the goals to seek,

setting and reformulating the goals intersubjectively, towards a

harmonic point of interests and action plans. In this kind of action, the

orientation is no longer exclusive to the individual success, becoming

oriented to mutual agreements. The communicative action assumes a

fundamental role in the Habermasian philosophical theory, because:

where the thelos (ultimate goal or objective) of understanding lies,

under the aegis of language (die Sprache), is where the process of

obtaining knowledge (Verstand) occurs, from the consensus among

the interactively and linguistically competent subjectivities.

Thereby, for Habermas, communicative reason is the category which

structures the human social system (BONFIM, 2002, p. 5).

Although both types of teleological orientation (rational-

purposive action and communicative action) have the mark of human

rationality, the major difference between them is that, in the rational-

purposive action, the definition of the goals does not interact with


other subjects and their own arguments and purposes; whereas in the

communicative action there is the possibility of dialogue about the

goals. In this dialogue, the subjects think together about which are the

best goals to be pursued by the social group. The communicative

action, as a facilitator of the action coordination, enables the mutual

agreement. Thereby, it will be the basis for the defense of democracy,

in the political scene, and for the consensus on the fundamental human

rights. In the same way, it will help in the criticism of repression,

censorship and other actions that hamper the dialogue within the

society. (BERTEN, 2004)

FINAL THOUGHTS – CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHY

REGARDING TELEOLOGY IN ENVIRONMENTAL

SCIENCES

Ecology, like the other Environmental Sciences, studies the

physical and biotic environments together, as well as their interaction

with human beings, with the goal of maintaining the processes which

enable the survival of the living beings. During these studies, the

scientist generally employs several concepts with a teleological

background, which involves the different shades of meaning

investigated in this paper.

The aim of this paper was to contribute to help the Natural

Science researchers in increasing their sensitivity to teleological

aspects which are pertinent to their researches. In this context, the

investigated topics in this paper may be useful for the researches of


many environmental sciences. The Aristotelian classification of the

four causes, specially the efficient and final causes, is the first

epistemological scrutiny, as its elicitation in the environmental studies

may largely contribute to clarify the investigative structures. When

there is no such awareness, the division between causal systems that

are strictly causal and the ones that are teleological may go unnoticed.

This is specially the case in the studies of ecosystems, where the

emergence of teleology occurs through scales of evolution and

complexity that are not always clear and definite. For example, the

functioning of a bacterium or another cell organism may be explained

almost only based on strict chemical causal reasonings. On the other

hand, when dealing with more complex animals (like intelligent

mammals), issues such as purpose, thought and behavior become

increasingly patent.

Another controversial theoretical point is about the causal

explanation applied to systems of living beings (communities,

populations, ecosystems, biota, etc.). In such cases, it is usual to state

that a group of living beings interacts in favor of their survival, even

when there is not the assumption of a unique (transcendental)

consciousness behind the teleological system. Regarding this topic, it

may be useful to recall the Kantian discussions on the way human

beings perceive Nature as a system that tends to its own harmony. In

these discussions, besides recognizing the finalist aspect of Nature,

Kant was cautiously concerned about defining the limits of the finalist

explanation in its relation with the strict causal studies and

conclusions of empirical knowledge.


The Kantian discussion in his work Critique the Judgment

(KANT, 1781) finds a fruitful topicality in the contemporary scene of

environmental sciences. The Kantian Theorization of a dual method

for the investigation of nature, encompassing the reflective judgment

(intuitive observation of nature) complementary to the causal

determinism (empirical experimentation in Physics, with the use of

abstract categories) may be applied to the scientific contemporary

scene, leading to a possible complementarity between the geosciences

with systemic approach and the quantitative geosciences. The

geosciences with systemic approach (linked deeper to the reflective

judgment) care more for the perception of the interaction among

elements in dynamic and complex studies, based on presupposition

that Kant ascribed to nature (teleology, unity, harmony, among others)

by means of the reflective judgment. The quantitative geosciences, in

their turn, may be benefited from their great technical capability of

aggregating primary data and establishing patterns based on these

data. Mirroring the dual method of investigation proposed by Kant,

the environmental geosciences have a lot to gain with the conjugation

between systemic and quantitative approaches – since while the

systemic approach may provide a general frame for the proposal of

hypotheses, the quantitative geosciences attempts to prove whether the

hypotheses are valid or not, facing them with actual empirical data.

It is also interesting to elicit how the Kantian theorization can

be interlinked with the thermodynamics approach. In

thermodynamics, as shown in entropy and information analysis,

information and entropy increase while the systems develop. When a


system reaches the threshold of a new internal order, something

occurs as if the system is inexorably drained to this new order. Thus, it

produces a teleological effect, a destiny, an imperative route in order

to maintain this new order. In the Theory of Self-Organization, when

analyzing a chaotic event through time series, the variables of a

system may go into a way that configures, over a time plot, a figure

denominated “strange attractor”.

Also, Hegel’s contributions should not go unnoticed, because

using the history of the investigated causal phenomena is important in

whatever comprehensive environmental study. In this point, the

researcher usually faces the lack of structure for collecting historical

environmental data, in the most diverse fields. This lack critically

hampers the reconstruction of past scenarios, which would be

important to identify the changes in relation to the present scenario.

This comparison with past scenarios is, indeed, a condition for the

reliability of any environmental prediction model.

Lastly, the teleological aspect that has been most taken for

granted in the environmental studies is the study of human purposes.

This becomes a crucial problem, as the interaction of humankind and

the environment gains increasing importance in many environmental

studies. The emergence of themes like human ecology and social

ecology is a confirmation of such trend. Nonetheless, many

environmental researchers graduated in fields like Biology, Nature

Sciences and Exact Sciences, and thus had no access to the scientific

heritage regarding the research of humanity, as well as the way to deal

with its teleological aspects. Accounting humankind just as a biologic


being, within conventional ecological studies, is the same as

disregarding several studies and contributions undertaken by human

sciences. As discussed in this paper, useful starting points to interpret

the human beings as social beings and rational, purposive beings, in

relation to their environment, are: [1] the need to understand human

beings through their goals to change the world and themselves, as

studied in Marx; [2] the rational reasoning on goals discussed by

Weber, also considering the phenomenon of participatory

communication proposed by Habermas.

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