Post on 23-Feb-2023
The Worst Military Disasters - India Post Independence
By
Col Dr Narendar Singh
The best military decisions rightly go down in history as great
events and the people who made them are immortalised for all of
time.
But what about the worst decisions? They also changed the course
of history, but not for the right reasons.
India has fought many conventional wars since independence; it
has also been involved in fighting insurgency and proxy wars
during this period. Many heroes that these wars produced have
become household names. However, these wars also produced heroes
who remain unsung; whose stories of bravery and gallantry are not
so well known.
Fall of Gilgit and Sakrdu 1947
Gilgit Baltistan, a region is legally part of former Princely
State of Jammu and Kashmir. Britain had leased Gilgit, which was
strategic, as also the corridor to Muzaffarabad.from the Maharaja
in 1935 in a lease agreement effective for 60 years and
integrated Gilgit Agency with the North West Frontier Province.
When Gilgit was returned in August 1947, Brigadier Ghansara
Singh, General Staff Officer of J&K State Forces, was appointed
Governor New Delhi ignore a direct warning by Major Onkar Singh
Kalkat about the impending attack planned by General Frank
Messervy, British chief of the Pakistan Army, within days of the
creation of Pakistan? Kalkat had accidentally stumbled on the
conspiracy and was placed under house arrest, but made a daring
escape and reached Delhi on 18 October 1947. Pakistan had already
imposed an economic blockade on J&K.
Governor, Ghansara Singh realised the gravity of the situation on
Gilgit given the attitude of the Scouts, 6th Kashmir Infantry,
civilian local employees, and the local notables. Shockingly
however, he never got a response to any of his appeals from
either Ram Chandra Kak, his successor General Janak Singh, and RL
Batra, the then Deputy Prime Minister, a grave dereliction of
duty on the part of each gentleman.
Yet, instead of rushing arms in anticipation of trouble, Nehru
and the geo-strategically savvy Mountbatten sat unmoved even
after Kalkat’s warning, and enforced further delay by insisting
that Hari Singh first sign the Instrument of Accession before
sending the Army. This led to an erratic Indian position, in 3
communiqués, one omits any reference to Gilgit; this lease also
proves the strategic importance of this land to the West, as
subsequent history has proven. India's only fault: not taking a
firm position on the Gilgit lease, and that erratic wavering
communiqués, which did nothing to ease the problem?
India Not whole of Kashmir of Pakistani Invaders in
1947By the late 1930s, British India consisted of ten provinces
administered in large part by Indian politicians, elected on a
small percentage of the adult franchise, and working under a
British constituted centre. Princely India consisted of over 600
states of varying sizes, making up almost two-fifths of the
Empire. The Princely States were the remains of the various
regional kingdoms conquered by the British in the expansive
phases of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Essentially feudal, these states were associated directly with
the Crown through the principle of `paramountcy', a vague concept
under which the British granted the princes considerable autonomy
of action in exchange for their political loyalty and the
surrendering of foreign policy and defence to the supremacy of
British imperial interests.
Constitutionally, British and Princely India did not co-exist
well with each other. The conflict between representative
government (however limited) and monarchy was fudged during the
long period of constitutional reform that set in at the turn of
the century. From the 1890s until the adoption of the 1935
Government of India Act, the doctrine of Paramountcy shielded the
princes from the need to reform their governments along
representative lines, although some chose to do so through
expedience. By the late 1930s, Jammu and Kashmir had an
indirectly elected assembly (the Praja Sabha) and an embryonic
party-based system made up of the National Conference and the
Muslim Conference. In this regard, the Dogra Kingdom was an
exception, but even so, the Maharaja appointed his Wazir (or
Prime Minister) without regard to party representation within the
assembly, or to wider popular sentiment.
As the British moved towards the inevitability of Indian
independence they attempted to persuade the princes to federate
with a new independent Indian republic, and then, after
Mountbatten's declaration on June 3rd, 1947, to decide between
joining either Pakistan or India.
the Dogra kingdom of Kashmir was one of the few large Princely
States that, due to its geographical location, could join either
India or Pakistan. Moreover, as the British were increasingly
aware throughout the summer of 1947, the Maharaja Hari Singh was
thinking of joining neither state, but of becoming an independent
country in his own right. Jammu and Kashmir had signed stand-
still agreements with India and with Pakistan, but had delayed on
signing the Instrument of Accession. Hari Singh was to hold out
for an independent state until October 1947, when tribal
incursions coming from the vicinity of Poonch, a district close
to the new Pakistani border, forced him to join India in exchange
for Indian military help. In his letter to the Governor-General
of India (Mountbatten) of October 26th the Maharaja blamed
Pakistan for the invasion, alleging that it had failed to honour
the stand-still agreement as part of a concerted effort to coerce
Hari Singh into joining Pakistan. The Maharaja also wrote that he
intended to appoint Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the National
Conference and a man closely associated with Nehru, to the post
of prime minister in a new interim government.
From the perspective of the Indian government, several key events
established the legitimacy of Indian sovereignty over Jammu and
Kashmir. Foremost is the actual signing of the Instrument of
Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh, on or about October 26th, 1947.
This, along with the stand-still agreement, fulfilled the
established procedures whereby Princely India opted to join
either India or Pakistan. In a formal sense, the legality of the
document is not in serious doubt, although some have suggested
that either the signature has been forged, the date changed, or
the whole document fabricated.
Signing of the Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh in
October 1947 legitimises India's `occupation' of the area. Now it
was for Indian Government to establish control over the
territories, But Nehru failed to do so and went to United
Nations.
The failure of Indian Government in 1948 led to loss of territory
and a permanent impasse, Iy led to a permanent loss of parts of
Kashmir.
India’s Withdrawal from TibetTibet is bordered by Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia in the north;
by China in the east; by Burma, India, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal
in the South; and by India (Punjab and Kashmir) in the west.
Bhutan and Sikkim were formerly part of Tibet but are now
separate states under Indian suzerainty. Both Tibet and Nepal
were under Chinese suzerainty, but whereas the Nepalese threw off
Chinese domination, Tibetan efforts to terminate dependence were
never completely successful. However, the term Chinese domination
calls for explanation. Chinese suzerainty meant at first the
overlord-ship of the Manchu Emperors. With their downfall,
Chinese Republican influence in Tibet decreased rapidly and
Chinese Communist influence was considered a menace in Lhasa long
before the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.
When British rule established itself in India in the nineteenth
century, a number of treaties ensured the settlement of all
controversial relations on the northeastern frontier. In a treaty
between Great Britain and China, concluded in 1890, the former
secured recognition of her protectorate over Sikkim. In 1904,
Great Britain concluded a treaty with Tibet securing an open
trade route frome Kalimpong in India, to Lhasa. Though direct
relations were established between the two countries, Great
Britain recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in 1906. In 1910
a British Protectorate over Bhutan was established. Thus India,
under British rule, had produced a system of security by which
her northeastern frontier could be considered more or less immune
against the turmoil of Chinese politics. As shown above, the main
elements of this security system were British India's suzerainty
over Bhutan and Sikkim, the free trade route between Kalimpong
and Lhasa opened after Colonel Francis Younghusband's expedition
to Lhasa in 1904, and friendly relations with Nepal which ceased
to be a vassal state in relation to China.
In view of the constant Chinese infiltration into Tibet, British
India had to consider how to maintain a balance of power there.
The Shimla Conference in 1914
1. Tibet was to be divided into two parts: Outer Tibet, adjoining
India and including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo; and Inner Tibet,
including the provinces near China and part of Eastern Tibet.
2. The principle of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognized,
but China was to observe strictly her limited position as a
suzerain. Suzerainty implies that internal sovereignty is vested
in the vassal state; in other words China could not, according to
the Convention, infringe upon the internal jurisdiction of the
Dalai Lama's Government.
3. The division of Tibet into Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet implied
the predominant interest of British India in the former and of
China in the latter.
4. Finally, the Chinese were to maintain a representative, called
Amban, in Lhasa. The Amban was later matched by the presence of
the British Indian Mission to the Dalai Lama.
Tibet was obviously to serve as a buffer state without giving up
its autonomy in its own internal affairs. It was also obvious
that British India's action was dictated not only by British
Commonwealth interests but by the natural requirements of any
future Indian policy.
Sir Charles Bell, one of the greatest experts on Tibet, made
clear in his work, "Tibet, Past and Present,"[ii] that if the
Chinese should disturb the Tibetan balance of power as laid down
in the Simla Convention, both Nepal and India would be threatened
Indo-China War 1962 Ill Prepared War and Non Use of Air Force
A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but
other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent
border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, when India had
granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward
Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including
several north of the MacMohan Line, the eastern portion of a Line
of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai in
1959.
As far as the McMahon Line was concerned India inherited the
dispute with China, which the British had created in the mid-
1930s by seizing the Tibetan territory they re-named NEFA
(Present day Arunachal Pradesh). The PRC government was prepared
to accept that border alignment but insisted that it be re-
negotiated, that it be put through the usual diplomatic process,
to wipe out its imperialist origins. Nehru refused, using
London's claim that the Simla Conference had already legitimised
the McMahon Line.
To back up that refusal — that was his Himalayan blunder. Then in
1954 he compounded that mistake by laying cartographic claim to a
swathe of territory in the north-west, the Aksai Chin, a claim
which was beyond anything the British had ever claimed and on an
area which Chinese governments had treated as their own for at
least a hundred years. To make matters worse, he ruled that there
should be no negotiation over that claim either! So Indian policy
had created a border dispute and also ruled out the only way it
could peacefully be settled, through diplomatic negotiation.
By September 1962 the Indian "forward policy" of trying to force
the Chinese out of territory India claimed had built up great
tension in the Western (Ladakh) sector of the border, with the
Chinese army just blocking it. Then the Nehru government applied
the forward policy to the McMahon Line eastern sector and when
the Chinese blocked that too India in effect declared war with
Nehru's announcement on October 11 that the Army had been ordered
to "free our territory", which meant to attack the Chinese and
drive them back. As General Niranjan Prasad, commander of 4
Infantry Division, wrote later: "We at the front knew that since
Nehru had said he was going to attack, the Chinese were certainly
not going to wait to be attacked" — and of course they didn't.
That's how the war began. The Chinese attack was both reactive,
in that General Kaul had begun the Indian assault on October 10,
and pre-emptive because after that failure the Indian drive had
been suspended to build up strength for a resumed attack.
The Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across
the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962. Chinese troops advanced over
Indian forces in both theatres, capturing Rezang la in Chushul in
the Western Theatre (Ladakh), as well as Tawang in the Eastern
Theatre (Arunachal Prdesh). The war ended when the Chinese
declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously
announced its withdrawal from the disputed area.
The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh mountain
conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailing
large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (14,000
feet). The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment
of the navy or air force by either the Chinese or Indian side.
Indo Pak War 1965 Vacating Haji Pir
Following the cease-fire after the Indo-Pak War of 1965, a
Russian sponsored agreement was signed between India and Pakistan
in Tashkent on 10 January 1966. Under the agreement, India agreed
to return the strategic Haji Pir pass to Pakistan which it had
captured in August 1965 against heavy odds and at a huge human
cost. The pass connects Poonch and Uri sectors in Jammu and
Kashmir and reduces the distance between the two sectors to 15 km
whereas the alternate route entails a travel of over 200 km.
India got nothing in return except an undertaking by Pakistan to
abjure war, an undertaking which meant little as Pakistan never
had any intention of honouring it.
Return of the vital Haji Pir pass was a mistake of monumental
proportions for which India is suffering to date. In addition to
denying a direct link between Poonch and Uri sectors, the pass is
being effectively used by Pakistan to sponsor infiltration of
terrorists into India. Inability to resist Russian pressure was a
manifestation of the boneless Indian foreign policy and
shortsighted leadership.
Return of Prisoners to Pakistan without any Resolution
of Kashmir Issue at Shimla
Pakistani Prime Minister Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi sign an agreement in the Indian town of
Simla, in which both countries agree to "put an end to the
conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their
relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious
relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in the
subcontinent". Both sides agree to settle any disputes "by
peaceful means".
The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17,
1971, as being the new "Line-of-Control (LoC)" between the two
countries, which neither side is to seek to alter unilaterally,
nor which "shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to
the recognised position of either side".
It is this that has given legitimacy to Pakistan.
Entry in to Sri Lanka
From a military perspective also the IPKF operation were a
failure because it failed to separate the LTTE from the Sinhala
forces, much less disarm them. In fact, the IPKF’s efforts to
establish Tamil governments in northern (Jaffna) and eastern
(Trincomalee) Sri Lanka failed spectacularly—they fell within a
few days of the IPKF’s withdrawal in early 1990. Besides, the
IPKF suffered major confusions in discerning its role in Sri
Lanka, with that role changing radically from peace-keeping to
peace-enforcing. Thereafter, an armed force designed to maintain
the peace and disarm the LTTE was called upon to maintain law and
order, suppress the LTTE, and collaborate with the Sinhala forces
against the Tamils.
The implications of this radical change in the IPKF’s basic
charter can well be imagine with peace-keepers turning into an
expeditionary force. Little wonder the IPKF got no cooperation
from the local population; in fact, they turned hostile and
became the eyes and ears of the LTTE. Compounding its constraints
was the fact that the IPKF forces were not equipped or trained
for a counter-militancy operation in another country. They lacked
the arms, training, orientation, even maps or knowledge of the
local language, customs and cultural norms. No wonder again that
the IPKF took heavy casualties in the initial few weeks of their
transformed role (August-October 1987) before the situation
crystallized.