Post on 01-Mar-2023
Neo-Stoicism and Agricultural Biotechnology:
A Stoic Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically
Modified Crops
Anthony J. Gavin
Concordia University
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 1
ABSTRACT:
In “A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically Modified Crops”,
Sandler develops a virtue ethics framework for assessing whether
certain genetically modified crops should be promoted. The
framework maintains a presumption against the use of genetically
modified crops, but allows that “some crops might still be
acceptable under certain circumstances if there are compelling
virtue-based reasons to use them” – Golden Rice is an example of
an acceptable genetically modified crop. Central to his
framework is Sandler’s “external goods criterion”, which
“establishes a minimum level of consideration for the
environment” (Sandler 2005, 218-9) for both Stoic and
Aristotelian traditions of virtue ethics. I argue that Sandler’s
virtue ethics perspective only represents the Aristotelian
tradition; Stoics need not accept his criterion. I go on to
develop a Stoic virtue ethics perspective on genetically modified
crops, grounded in Stoic naturalism, cosmic sympathy, and the
virtue of natural piety. Natural piety provides a strong
prohibition against the use of genetically modified crops in
agriculture, and against the genetic modification of natural
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 2
entities in general. By refuting the external goods principle,
the Stoic virtue ethics framework will also caution against the
commodification of the environment, encouraging sustainable
agricultural practices without the use of genetic modification.
My heart leaps up when I behold
A rainbow in the sky:
So was it when my life began;
So is it now I am a man;
So be it when I shall grow old,
Or let me die!
The Child is father of the Man;
And I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 3
William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up (1802)
Introduction
Contemporary scholarship in environmental ethics is deeply
seeded with virtue language. The strength of a virtue ethics
framework lies in its seamless integration with our commonsense
moral vocabulary, offering itself to a unique and dynamic
discourse on ethical quandaries that are central to the health of
the planet, and our continued survival as a species. The plight
of environmentalists is often phrased in terms of having a
certain respect or compassion for nature, condemning the greed or
hubris of alternative, anthropocentric approaches. ‘Respect’ and
‘compassion’ are two among many examples of what we might call
environmental virtues, while ‘greed’ and ‘hubris’ count among the
vices1.
Traditionally, virtue ethics theories have concerned
themselves with ideals of human excellence, and as such may
rightly be called egocentric. The central ethical norm for moral
agents is the cultivation of virtue in the individual. It is not
clear prima facie that a virtuous person will behave in any
particular way towards the environment. Thus, the question of
securing some level of care for the environment on a virtue
1 For further reading on the use of virtue language in environmental ethics, see Louke van Wensveen, “The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Language,” in Environmental Virtue Ethics (Washington: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pg. 15-30.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 4
ethics framework is of central importance to the development of
an environmental virtue ethic. There have been many attempts to
articulate an answer to this question in the literature, ranging
from extensionist theories, to agent benefit theories, and
others2. In this paper, I shall focus on one strategy in
particular, which focuses on the role of ecosystems in providing
necessary material preconditions for the cultivation of virtue.
This kind of strategy is most clearly taken up by Louke van
Wensveen and Ronald Sandler. Wensveen argues for ecosystem
sustainability as a genuine virtue3; Sandler’s ‘external goods’
argument makes use of the same premises as Wensveen’s, with a
weakened conclusion4.
This strategy, which amounts to assigning an instrumental
value to the environment in ethical considerations, is
potentially dangerous, and not required on a Neo-Stoic approach.
The primary aim of this paper will be to assess the application
of Sandler’s external goods approach in the case of genetically
modified crops5, with specific reference to the example of Golden
Rice6. Sandler argues that both Aristotelian and Stoic2 See Ronald Sandler, “Introduction: Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Environmental Virtue Ethics (Washington: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pg. 1-12.3 Louke van Wensveen, “Ecosystem Sustainability as a Criterion for Genuine Virtue,” in Environmental Ethics 23 (2001): 227-41.4 Ronald Sandler, “The External Goods Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Environmental Ethics 25 (2003): 279-93.5 Ronald Sandler, “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Genetically Modified Crops,” Environmental Virtue Ethics (2005): 215-233.6 Golden Rice is a Vitamin A enriched genetically modified crop engineered to help battle VAD in many poor countries where rice is a dietary staple, particularly in Southeast Asia. Though indisputably useful in the treatment of VAD, the crop has sparked some significant controversy. See Dawe et al., “Golden Rice: What Role Could It Play in Alleviation of Vitamin A Deficiency?”
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 5
traditions in virtue ethics have reason to accept his external
goods criterion, which “establishes a minimum level of
consideration for the environment” (Sandler 2005, 218-9).
However, disagreement about the value of external goods harkens
back to the point of divergence between Aristotelian and Stoic
ethics; traditionally, the latter would not accept Sandler’s
criterion. The strength of a Stoic virtue ethics framework,
however, is that it does not stand in need of such a criterion to
establish a level of care for the environment.
Interconnectedness and cosmic sympathy7 are fundamental features
of Stoic metaphysics, which directly informs their resulting
ethical norms; indeed, some modern philosophers have pointed
towards convincing subtextual links between Ancient Stoicism, and
the Deep Ecology and Ecosophy platforms of radical
environmentalists like Arne Naess, Warwick Fox, George Sessions,
and others8. If the Neo-Stoic ethical framework that I begin to
develop in this paper will be preferable to the Aristotelian
alternative – in keeping with these environmentalist platforms –
it will be because the former approach will not lend itself to
viewing nature merely as a commodity, with instrumental value to
serve human ends.
Food Policy 27: 541-560; and Vandana Shiva, “Genetically Engineered Vitamin ‘A’ Rice: A Blind Approach to Blindness Prevention,” http://www.biotech-info.net/blind-rice.html for a small sampling of positions for and against.7 Evangelos Protopapadakis, “The Stoic Notion of Cosmic Sympathy in ContemporaryEnvironmental Ethics,” in Antiquity, Modern World and Reception of Ancient Culture (2012): 290-305.8 For example, see Jim Cheney, “The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism,”in Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 293-325.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 6
§1. Virtue Ethics and the External Goods Criterion
If virtue ethics are to provide a reliable normative
framework for moral reasoning about the environment and our
relation to it, then some level of consideration for the
environment must first be established. Virtue is eudaimonic, good
in itself, and the cultivation of virtue in the individual is a
crucial part of what it is to live the good life. The extent to
which virtue is itself constitutive of the good life is the main
point of disagreement between ancient traditions in virtue
ethics. The Aristotelian tradition maintains that virtue is
necessary, but is not by itself sufficient for living the good
life. If somebody is virtuous, but poor or in poor health, we
can meaningfully say that this person’s life could have been
better. Proponents of the Stoic tradition disagree, claiming
that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for living the good
life. Thus, those befallen by grave misfortunate with respect to
wealth or health are no less able to live the good life than
those whom fate has placed in better stead. Their disagreement
is about the intrinsic value of external goods; Aristotelians on
the one hand, affirming, and the Stoics denying it9.
External goods can be thought of as what gets produced by
ecosystems – evidently, things like food, water, and shelter are9 For more on the disagreement between the Aristotelian and Stoic virtue ethics traditions about the value of external goods, and the necessity or sufficiency of virtue, see Julia Annas, “Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue”, The Morality of Happiness (1995).
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 7
external goods provided by the environment in natural ecosystems.
Note that it is not necessary that external goods be produced by
natural ecosystems; we can conceive of advanced artificial
ecosystems that sustain our livelihood as well. The Stoics do
not see external goods as being intrinsically valuable, and the
Aristotelians do.
But although they disagree about the intrinsic value of external
goods – that is, about whether external goods are constituents of
human flourishing – both Aristotelians and Stoics must
acknowledge an indispensable instrumental role for external goods
in human flourishing (Sandler 2005, 217).
Sandler shifts the emphasis from intrinsic to instrumental value
in order to establish some degree of moral consideration for the
environment that would be acceptable for both the Aristotelian
and Stoic traditions. Refuting the instrumental value of
external goods would be stronger than the traditional Stoic claim
denying their intrinsic value. On this view, external goods are
not constitutive of human flourishing, but rather serve as a
necessary precondition for the cultivation of virtue.
Sandler’s move involves a creative interpretation of Stoic
texts, since they do not explicitly distinguish between
instrumental and intrinsic value. For an ethics essentially
founded on denying the value of external goods, founding a
criterion of care based on their (diminished) value should seem
like sleight of hand, particularly when we consider that the
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 8
Stoic position against the value of external goods is defined in
terms of their disagreement with Aristotle.
The Stoics, in arguing that Aristotle's account of happiness is
wrong, are in effect, though not in so many words, producing an
argument that virtue alone is complete and self‐sufficient and
thus competent to form our final end, without the addition of
external goods.
(Annas, “Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue” 1995, 8)
It may seem prima facie to be the case that both Aristotelians and
Stoics would accept Sandler’s principle, even if we suspect that
they have been put together in an uncomfortable union; however,
by articulating one of the key virtues which arise from this
ethos of interconnectedness, I propose to show that, for every
case in which Sandler’s external goods criterion would apply, a
Neo-Stoic virtue ethics framework will have overriding virtue
based reasons to reject it in favor of a stronger principle.
Ancient Stoic ethics are largely influenced by their metaphysics,
which is a metaphysics of profound interconnectedness and unity
with the cosmos. Cultivating virtue in the individual, for the
Neo-Stoic philosopher, amounts to the same kind of project as
self-realization in the Ecosophy of Arne Naess. And it is in
light of this similarity of ideas that I hope to bring the
applicability of a Neo-Stoic framework to environmental ethics to
the fore.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 9
§2. Stoic Naturalism and Neo-Stoic Environmentalism
As the ethics of ancient Stoic thought have always been
directly influenced by their metaphysics, I will first venture to
describe the latter in such a way as to illustrate its similarity
with the conceptual platform of some radical forms of
environmentalism, like Deep Ecology and the Ecosophy of Arne
Naess. A later Stoic philosopher – Posidonius, with his concept
of cosmic sympathy – will be of special interest, as he carries the
ancient Stoic ethos of interconnectedness and unity with the
cosmos most fully through to its logical end. Bringing this
similarity to the forefront of our understanding will point most
clearly to the usefulness of ancient Stoic thought as a critical
device in modern environmental discourse, which I shall do by
using a Neo-Stoic virtue ethics framework to assess ethical
issues surrounding the use of genetically modified crops in
agriculture.
The Stoics envision a metaphysics of deep
interconnectedness, with individual beings all partaking of a
single, rational cosmic whole.
[E]ach being is associated with the rest of the world in the way
limbs and parts of the body are associated with the whole body:
they belong to it, and everything the body suffers has effect on
the part, and vice versa. Hence, private interests can only coincide
with the common one (Protopapadakis 2012, 292).
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 10
On this view, the idea that goods are external to the individual
is confusing, speaking more to our experience of the world than
to rationality. However, for the Stoics, the cultivation of
virtue is a rational activity that involves a process of
familiarization with the external, which allows us to transcend
the things themselves with the aim of arriving at an appreciation
of their rationally structured relations.
The Stoic speaker, Cato, begins his account with a description of
the process of ‘familiarization’ or oikeiōsis; we start from affinity
to and concern for ourselves and for natural advantages, but as
reason develops we come to discover that what matters to us as
rational beings is something which is distinct in kind from
these, namely the moral point of view. Just as we move from
valuing one friend to most valuing the person to whom he
introduces us, we move from valuing natural advantages in a
rational way to valuing our rationality itself, and appreciating
the demands it makes on us (Annas, “Theophrastus and the Stoics:
Forcing the Issue” 1995, 8).
Oikeiōsis, translated as ‘familiarization’, shares a root with
‘ecology’ (oikos logos). Oikos is the home, the hearth, that to
which I return. Thus, the rational activity of familiarization
amounts to internalizing the external, returning the rationally
structured relations among apparently external things to our
inner rationality.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 11
Nowhere is this strong unity of the cosmos and our ethical
stance within it more clearly given than in Posidonius’ notion of
cosmic sympathy10. The use of psychological language is a telling
clue about the character of Posidonius’ philosophy. Originally
interested in the effect that the moon had on the tides,
Posidonius came to think of change in nature as being the sum of
the “sympathetic relations” between its parts. These relations
are the manifestations of a pantheistic God or soul which
pervades all of nature. “Still this all pervasive soul is
nothing distinct of separate from nature, but just nature endowed
with sensation” (Protopapadakis 2012, 294). Coming to realize this
is tantamount to realizing that individual (human) and natural
flourishing are mutually sustaining; “bonum singulorum overlaps
with bonum omnium” (Protopapadakis 2012, 292). Living in
awareness with this fact is precisely what it is for the Stoic to
live virtuously; one could never willingly bring harm to the
whole of which one is part.
Self-realization as embedded within a cosmic whole is
exactly the kind of normative self-realization found in deep
ecology; it is particularly visible in Arne Naess’ Ecosophy.
Ecosophy … places itself in a tradition that conceives of correct
environmental practice as involving, in some fundamental way, an
understanding of the cosmos and humanity’s place in the wider
10 Though the idea finds its clearest expression in Posidonius, “it was by no means strange to the early Stoics and especially to Chrysippus, nor is it alien to the overall attitude of Stoicism in general” (Protopapadakis 2012, 293).
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 12
scheme of things. Ethics, as this term is used in the context of
Ecosophy … is to be understood “in the sense of the development
of an experientially grounded state of being that issues in ‘an
organic ethos, a way of life’”11 (Cheney 1989, 298).
Ethics understood as such clearly moves beyond the minimal
consideration of environment as external goods offered by
Sandler. Because the Stoics saw the cultivation of virtue as
familiarizing oneself with the rational relations governing
‘things’ within the cosmic whole, and as adequating agent
rationality to those ostensibly external relations, a Neo-Stoic
virtue ethics framework takes a deep level of care for the
environment for its very foundation.
There are two possibilities for the emergence of a virtue
language from this Stoic ethic. A more moderate Neo-Stoicism,
inspired by the rational project of the ancient Stoics, would
resemble a radical extensionism, seizing much or all of the
virtue vocabulary of interpersonal relations for the
environmental cause. Although ‘extension’ would be a misnomer,
since the widened use of interpersonal virtue language would
result uniquely from the realization of self as interconnected
with all entities, rather than just with other persons; if we
accept the Stoic metaphysics, then the interpersonal virtue
vocabulary was wrongfully constrained to exclusivity between
persons in the first place. However, by identifying God with11 Warwick Fox, Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan’s Critique of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20 (Hobart, Australia: Board of Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1986), 42.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 13
nature, Posidonius’ articulation leads us to a stronger virtue
approach, which I take to be more in line with the Ecosophy of
Naess12. One virtue that we might make use of on this approach
is that of ‘piety’. Abstracting away any accidental religious
connotations, ‘piety’ stems both from the Latin Pius, meaning
dutiful, faithful to kindred, prompted by natural affections; and
from Purus, meaning pure, or clean. The virtue of natural piety
does not stand moral agents apart from nature, as modern
religious piety seems to distance one from a God. By returning
to the original use of the word, cultivating the virtue of
natural piety can mean being faithful to kindred, where the
natural environment is one’s ken. It would only distance us from
an environmental vice – hubris, which stands at the root of the
anthropocentric disposition to shape nature to human ends – by
token of purity. On Sandler’s approach, hubris provides one
presumption against the use of genetically modified crops in
agriculture;
Given the historical record, it does appear to be hubris or
arrogance for us to believe that the best way to address our
12 A Neo-Stoic framework inspired mainly by the general rational project of the ancient Stoics would make a few assumptions about our epistemic access to nature; viz., that we have direct, unmediated epistemic access to the rational relations in nature, and that nature remains the kind of thing which might appear as rational to the human knower. The reason why Naess makes use of theterm ‘Ecosophy’ is by way of contrasting a form of wisdom (Sophia) with the rational knowledge implied by the Logos of ‘Ecology’. For the sake of buildingan ethical framework, the metaphysical commitments of Posidonius’ pantheism seem less problematic to me than these epistemic assumptions, if only because ethnography of early societies tends to reveal a spiritual, rather than a rational relationship with nature.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 14
agricultural problems is by further manipulation and domination
of nature, which is precisely what agricultural biotechnology
attempts to do (Sandler 2005, 226).
The Neo-Stoic virtue of natural piety should appear as radically
biocentric. But it is not an unprecedented view. In the
aftermath of the catastrophic 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Monsanto
aggressively pushed 475 tons of genetically modified corn and
vegetable seeds on Haitian farmers, who proceeded to burn the
seeds in protest. Monsanto’s seeds were seen as a threat to food
sovereignty and biodiversity in Haiti, and it is not uncommon to
hear Haitian farmers chanting about how the seeds will destroy
the people and the land. Haitian farmers share a sacred
relationship with local creole seeds and agriculture, which is
also threatened by genetically modified seeds13. Such a respect
for the land and natural biodiversity is surely an aspect of
natural piety.
§3. A Neo-Stoic Virtue Ethics Approach to Genetically Modified
Crops
Although the opposition of Haitian farmers to genetically
modified Monsanto seeds demonstrates the Neo-Stoic disposition of
natural piety, an application of the resulting virtue ethics
framework is likely not required. There are plenty of overriding13 From an interview with Jean-Baptiste Chavannes, Executive Director of the Peasant Movement of Papay (MPP), in GMO OMG (Compeller Pictures, 2013): 9:02 – 13:00.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 15
political and ecological considerations – such as food
sovereignty and biodiversity – against the use of the seeds.
Golden Rice provides a more difficult example. The Vitamin A
enriched rice crop has not proven to be a likely threat to local
ecosystems, and I agree with Sandler that there are clear virtue
based reasons to promote its use14, such as compassion for the
millions of people in Southeast Asia who lose their sight or
their lives to VAD each year. The Neo-Stoic virtue of natural
piety is normatively opposed to any genetic modification of
natural entities, which is viewed as intractably anthropocentric.
In this way, natural piety functions much like Sandler’s vice of
hubris, which provides a presumption against the “further
manipulation and domination of nature” (Sandler 2005, 226). In
the example of Golden Rice, the question is whether virtue based
reasons to promote its use override the prohibition laid out by
virtue of natural piety; if not, we should ask ourselves whether
this is significantly problematic.
For Sandler, any use of agricultural biotechnology that
passes the external goods criterion is not hubristic. “The
external goods criterion is in part concerned with the effects
the technology might have on natural entities” (Sandler 2005,
224), insofar as the natural environment and entities within it
are taken to have only instrumental value, for the role that they
play in the production of goods for human consumption. Here,
Sandler’s view is inescapably anthropocentric. Using only the
14 Ronald Sandler, “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Genetically Modified Crops,” Environmental Virtue Ethics (2005): 215-233.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 16
external goods criterion, we can imagine the construction of a
perfectly sustaining artificial ecosystem, at the cost of wanton
destruction in the natural environment, so long as the artificial
ecosystem furnishes humankind on the whole with more goods than
nature. This conclusion would be abhorrent on the Neo-Stoic
approach. Using this kind of reasoning, Sandler concludes that
Golden Rice overcomes the anti-hubristic presumption against the
use of genetically modified crops. The Neo-Stoic virtue of
natural piety is stronger, strictly forbidding the genetic
modification of natural entities as an inherently anthropocentric
act. The comparative strength of the Neo-Stoic approach should
be expected – it ensures a profound respect for nature as
tantamount to the cultivation of virtue in the individual.
Making respect for nature a criterion of virtue results in a
deeper level of care than Sandler’s ad hoc environmental
considerations. Thus, Stoics will have reason to reject
Sandler’s external goods criterion in each case, in favor of the
stronger normative demands of virtue.
This conclusion seems to fly in the face of basic
humanitarian concerns – shouldn’t we do whatever is in our power
to alleviate human suffering? This question will arise only if
we see technology as our only means of salvation. Even Golden
Rice, a quick technological intervention to problems which are
fundamentally socioeconomic in character, fails to do the job
alone15; an average helping of the latest version of Golden Rice
15 Greenpeace, “Genetically engineered ‘Golden Rice’ is fools gold” (2001).
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 17
provides 60% of the RDA of Vitamin A16. The problem with
addressing the socioeconomic issues underlying health concerns
like VAD is that it is slow and difficult – in the absence of any
clear profit resulting from such an approach, it is even more
difficult to see who might step in to take on such a task. But,
as in the case of Haitian farmers, we cannot expect technological
quick fixes to address complex and foundational problems. Poor
socioeconomic conditions practically guarantee poor health
outcomes, and the technological approach can only tilt the scale,
offering improved human health outcomes at the expense of
environmental health. This runs counter to virtue on the Neo-
Stoic approach. The virtue requirement to disavow the quick
fixes of agricultural biotechnology, and the corollary to address
socioeconomic problems to alleviate human suffering, is surely an
onerous task. But a Stoic ethics is revisionary; “[i]f the
Stoics are right, then most of us have radically wrong priorities
in practical matters, and we should revise and improve our
practical beliefs in the light of Stoic theory” (Annas
“Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue” 1995, 7).
Protecting our natural environment to the extent that we should
is not easy, but the flourishing of the environment is essential
to the flourishing of humankind. A Neo-Stoic virtue ethics
framework for environmental ethics sets us on the right path to16 Amy Harmon, “Golden Rice: Lifesaver?” in The New York Times (2013). Although the RDA is lower than the EAR (Estimated Average Requirement), it is still clear that Golden Rice cannot alone ensure positive health outcomes in those countries afflicted by VAD. See also Dawe et al., “Golden Rice: What Role Could It Play in Alleviation of Vitamin A Deficiency?” in Food Policy (2002): 541-560.
NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 18
ensure the mutual flourishing of human and environmental kind, as
a unified whole.
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