Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence?

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Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence? Author(s): Anne Margaret Baxley Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Mar., 2003), pp. 559-586Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131857Accessed: 15-05-2015 20:23 UTC

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DOES KANTIAN VIRTUE AMOUNT TO MORE THAN CONTINENCE?

ANNE MARGARET BAXLEY

J\s IS WELL KNOWN, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins his analysis of what he takes to be our shared, prephilo

sophical understanding of morality by insisting that the good will is the only thing in this world (and even beyond this world) that is good

without limitation (ohne Einschr?nkung).1 In accounting for the

goodness of this will, Kant draws a sharp contrast between duty and

inclination as the two competing sources of motivation for the human

will, and claims that only action from duty possesses moral worth.

Given this connection between the good will and duty, the picture seems to be that having a good will amounts to doing one's duty for

the sake of duty, not from emotion or inclination. Kant famously con

trasts action done from duty and action done from inclination in his

discussion of four kinds of conformity to duty. Neither the prudent

Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic In stitute and State University, 223 Major Williams Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061.

1 Apart from the Lectures on Ethics, all references to Kant are to Kants

gessamelte Schriften (hereafter, "KGS"), herausgegeben von, der Deutschen

(formerly K?niglichen Preussischen?) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vol umes (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-). References to the Lectures on Eth ics are to Eine Vorlesung ?ber Ethik, ed. Paul Menzer (Berlin: Rolf Heise, 1924). Within the body of the text, the English translations used are referred to immediately following the reference to the German text. In many cases, I have substituted my own translations of Menzer's collection for Infield's.

Many people provided me with helpful feedback on earlier versions of this material, for which I am most grateful. Members of the philosophy de

partments at the University of Georgia and l'Universit? de Montr?al, as well as audiences at a symposium session at the Eastern Division of the American

Philosophical Association (2000) and a conference honoring Rosalind Hurst house (Virtue Ethics: Old and New, 2002) raised questions and criticisms that

challenged my thinking about Kant's account of virtue. Jerry Doppelt and Steve Palmquist were generous to provide valuable written comments on an

earlier draft. Andy Reath's insightful commentary in his official capacity as commentator at the symposium session and Paul Guyer's critical remarks in his capacity as chair on that occasion advanced the work in a variety of ways. Above all, I thank Henry Allison and David Brink for their extended engage ment with this project on Kant.

The Review of Metaphysics 56 (March 2003): 559-586. Copyright ? 2003 by The Review of Metaphysics



560 ANNE MARGARET BAXLEY

shopkeeper, who treats his customers fairly out of self-interest, nor

the man of sympathy, who helps others out of a sense of sympathy,

displays moral worth. By contrast, Kant finds moral worth in both the

person who performs beneficent action even though his own sorrows

have extinguished natural sympathy for others and in the person who

performs beneficent action despite what might be characterized as a

wholesale indifference to the sufferings of others. These two charac

ters seem to be grudging moralists whose sense of duty either is suffi

cient in the absence of natural emotions and inclinations or must

overcome countervailing emotions and inclinations.2

This account of the good will has struck many readers as coun

terintuitive. Whereas Kant seems to think that the person in whom a

sense of duty must overcome indifference or contrary inclination can

and does display a good will, our intuitions about human goodness

suggest that there is something deficient or lacking in the grudging

2 Is it accurate to say that these two dutiful agents are grudging? Typi cally, when we say that someone does something grudgingly, we mean that he has a negative attitude toward what he does and that this negative attitude is manifest in his conduct, perhaps through his expression of resentment at

having to do what he feels compelled (for whatever reason) to do. Insofar as

doing something grudgingly amounts to expressing contrary desires about what one feels obligated to do, it might be misleading to say that these are

grudging moralists, for Kant does not state that they complain about the obli

gation to beneficence or that they resent helping and make this apparent. Rather, the claim is that one agent is without the natural sympathy for others he once had and the other is altogether indifferent about the sufferings of

others, which seems to imply a more global lack of natural feelings of love of

humanity. But even if these two agents, as Kant describes them, do not ex

press resentment about the beneficent action they see as required of them in certain circumstances and thus are not begrudging in this strong sense, we

might nevertheless conceive of them as grudging moralists insofar as they lack the feelings of sympathy that, in The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant himself takes to be conducive to beneficence. These two can therefore at least be

thought of as grudging in this weaker sense where this means lacking any de sire to do what one recognizes as obligatory. Moreover, it appears that Kant

would be willing to attribute moral worth to a dutiful agent's maxim of action if he helped from the motive of duty and was in fact grudging in the stronger sense. In other words, for all that Kant says at the outset of Groundwork I,

having contramoral inclinations is compatible with performing beneficent action because morality requires it and is therefore compatible with having a

good will. The term "grudging" is thus a useful heuristic because it brings out in a dramatic way what many have found deficient with the Groundwork ex

amples of action from duty.



KANTIAN VIRTUE: MORE THAN CONTINENCE? 561

agent. Aristotle, for example, would think that the grudging moralist

displays continence, rather than virtue, because he thinks it is the

mark of the virtuous person that he does not experience a conflict be

tween the rational and nonrational parts of the soul and that his emo

tions and appetites harmonize with rational judgments.

Such doubts about the moral psychology of the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason motivate and structure an examina

tion of Kant's later and less familiar ethical texts, which appear to ar

ticulate a full conception of virtue and a more robust moral psychol

ogy.3 Yet the prospect for reconstructing a Kantian account of virtue

from these texts that assigns moral value to emotions and inclinations

appears bleak when we see that Kant conceives of virtue as moral

strength of will over recalcitrant inclinations and characterizes virtue

in terms of the autocracy of pure practical reason. This conception of

virtue in terms of self-rule over one's sensuous nature initially rein

forces, rather than resolves, familiar criticisms of Kant's rationalism.

The aim of this paper is to show that the self-mastery constitutive

of Kantian virtue requires not only the regulation, but also the cultiva

tion, of one's sensible nature according to reason; this means that cer

tain states rooted (at least in part) in the affective and conative side of

human nature play an important role within Kant's account of virtue.

The paper is divided into four sections. After analyzing Kant's concep

tion of autocracy and its relation to autonomy (section 1), section 2 in

vestigates the worry that autocracy is a repressive form of self-gover nance. Section 3 introduces the resources and subtleties in Kant's

doctrines that make room for his positive account of the role emo

tions and appetites play within virtue. This constructive role sensibil

ity plays within virtue is set out in (some) detail in section 4.

3 Kant's theory of virtue is contained in The Doctrine of Virtue (1797) and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, (1793), as well as the various versions of his lectures on ethics, some of which are antecedent to the Groundwork (1785).




I

Kant's Conception of Virtue as Autocracy. Kant's most ex

tended discussion of virtue as a character trait appears in The Doc

trine of Virtue. There he defines virtue in a number of different ways, but what is common to most of these definitions is the notion of self

constraint or self-mastery, as well as a contrast between virtue and

holiness. While holiness is the highest moral station for perfect be

ings who need no constraint in order to act in conformity with the

moral law, Kant insists that virtue is the highest condition that finite

rational beings like ourselves can attain. He describes virtue as

"strength of mind," "soul," "will," or "maxims" and characterizes it in

terms of an "ability" or "capacity" (Fertigkeit) or "courage" or "forti

tude" (Tapferkeit). The definition of virtue as "a self-constraint in ac

cordance with a principle of inner freedom, and so through the mere

representation of one's duty in accordance with its formal law" seems

best to bring together the different elements involved in Kant's con

ception of virtue.4 The particular term Kant uses to describe this

moral capacity for self-governance is "autocracy." This notion of au

tocracy is the overriding metaphor throughout Kant's treatment of vir

tue as a character trait, and it provides the key for reconstructing

Kant's conception of virtue. Since Kant consistently contrasts the au

tocracy of pure practical reason with autonomy, we need briefly to

spell out the distinction between these two concepts in order to deter

mine why Kant thinks we need autocracy, and not merely autonomy,

for virtue.

In the Introduction to The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant distinguishes between a doctrine of morals, which he connects with the autonomy

of pure practical reason, and a doctrine of virtue, which also includes

autocracy. The latter, he tells us, involves "consciousness of the ca

pacity to master one's inclinations when they rebel against the law, a

4 Die Metaphysik der Sitten (hereafter, "MS") (KGS 6), 394; The Meta

physics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 525. On this point, see

Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, (hereafter, "?TF") (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 163. For a fuller treatment of Kant's con

ception of autocracy, see Anne Margaret Baxley, "Autocracy and Autonomy," Kant-Studien 94 (2003): 1-23.




capacity which, though not directly perceived, is yet rightly inferred from the moral categorical imperative."5 In the Lectures on Ethics,

Kant claims that self-mastery is the highest duty to oneself.6 He

equates self-mastery with autocracy and explains: "Autocracy, there

fore, is the power to compel the heart in spite of every obstacle. Mas

tery over oneself, and not merely directing authority, belongs to autoc

racy."7 Elsewhere in these lectures, Kant reiterates the view that

virtue requires autocratic constraint over oneself when he insists, "a

human being must have an autocracy over his inclinations; he must

curb his inclinations for things which he cannot have or can have only

with great difficulty; if he does so he is independent with respect to

them."8

These passages tell us that autocracy, as a capacity for moral self

governance, is an acquired strength of will manifest in an ability to

overcome obstacles that stand in the way of the will's conformity to

the law, or the power to control and to subordinate inclinations when

they conflict with duty. Failure to acquire autocracy is characterized

in terms of surrendering authority over one's self and becoming a

"plaything" of sense. The autocratic person disciplines and masters

himself instead of yielding to emotion and inclination and by doing so

is portrayed as having securely subordinated his sensible to his ratio

nal nature. As a result of having acquired this moral strength of will,

he is largely immune to temptation and is able consistently to fulfill

the obligations incumbent on him as a rational, moral being with a

cheerful heart.

We need this moral capacity for self-constraint because what

defines our ontological status, on Kant's view, is that we are finite

5MS,383;515. 6 The lectures in this volume, first published by Paul Menzer in 1924 and

translated into English by Louis Infield in 1931, are from the manuscripts of three students: Theodor Friedrich Brauer, Gottlieb Kutzner, and Christian

Mrongovius. According to Lewis White Beck, these manuscripts provide us

with an accurate transcription of Kant's lectures on ethics as he gave them

during the period from 1775 to 1780. See Foreword by Lewis White Beck in

Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), x. 7 Eine Vorlesung ?ber Ethik (hereafter, uEthikn), ed. Paul Menzer (Ber

lin: Rolf Heise, 1924), 176; Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapo lis: Hackett, 1981).

8Ethik,2W.




rational beings, that is, imperfect beings whose needs provide a po

tential obstacle that can stand in the way of the conformity of the will

with the moral law.9 Thus, for nonholy beings like us, there is, as Kant

often puts it, a distinction between the objective and subjective neces

sitation of the will by pure practical reason.10 In virtue of our auton

omy, we stand under the moral law, which we recognize as

authoritative. Yet, we have needs that at times run contrary to the

law, and we tend to take those needs as sufficient reasons for action

even when they oppose duty. As a result, we sometimes fail to follow

the universally valid dictates of pure practical reason. We require au

tocracy, then, because recalcitrant inclinations must be subdued so

that we consistently act in accordance with our moral ends and do so

from the pure moral motive.

One suggestion of how to spell out this contrast between auton

omy and autocracy is to distinguish between a mere capacity for self

control (which we all have as rational beings) and the realization of

this capacity (which we have if we have acquired virtue). For it ap

pears that what is central to Kantian virtue is a distinction between

9 More precisely, we are merely finite rational beings, for on Kant's tax

onomy, our will stands in contrast to both the infinite holy will and the finite

holy will. Whereas the former has no sensible nature by which it could be af

fected, the latter is saddled with the sorts of needs that burden us. This means that having no inclinations (as God has no inclinations) is sufficient, but not necessary, for having a holy will. Kant holds that the existence of a sensuous nature is consistent with a will's being holy because either (a) its inclinations always accord completely with reason and thus do not pose any

temptation to act contrary to reason; or (b) even if they do pose such tempta tion (as Kant notes they did for Christ), the will has no propensity to prefer incentives of inclination to those of reason when the two diverge. As Kant sees it, both species of holiness of will have a perfect disposition and so al

ways act in accordance with the moral law, and this sets them apart from

merely finite rational beings like ourselves. (I thank an anonymous referee at Kant-Studien for clarifying this point about the two species of holiness of

will and the compatibility of holiness with the mere existence of inclina

tions.) 10 On Kant's view, the will of every rational being is determined by prac

tical reason in one sense because a free will is one governed by the moral law

(which is itself self-imposed). This means that every rational will is objec

tively necessitated by practical reason. But for imperfect rational beings who must be constrained in order to act in accordance with moral require ments, there is a distinction between the objective and subjective necessita

tion of the will by practical reason. This explains why moral requirements take the form of imperatives for us but not for a holy will. On this point, see

MS, 379; 512.




actual strength of character or self-control and the mere capacity for

it, and we might think that this distinction between actual self-mastery and the mere capacity for it is just what the autocracy-autonomy dis

tinction amounts to.11 That is, an autocratic agent is a finite being who

not only has the capacity for autonomy and thus the capacity to ac

complish his moral task, but actually is autonomous in the sense of

having his will conform to the moral law. If this is correct, autocracy

is really just a special case of autonomy, in that it is the realization of

autonomy for finite imperfect beings. On this reading, then, there is

no essential difference between these two notions, despite Kant's sug

gestion to the contrary.

In order to grasp more precisely why Kant thinks he must intro

duce autocracy in his theory of virtue as something over and above au

tonomy, we need to recall how Kant understands the autonomy of

pure practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant defines autonomy as

"the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of

every property of the objects of volition)."12 Thus, autonomy is fore

most a capacity for self-legislation, which Kant understands as a ca

pacity to make universal law through one's own will, that is, to adopt

maxims that are valid for oneself only because they are valid for all

other rational agents. With Kant's particular conception of autonomy,

the laws we give ourselves are prescriptions of our own reason,

through which we constrain ourselves in virtue of the recognition of

their validity for all rational agents.

In the Groundwork, Kant assumes that morality requires acting on the basis of the categorical imperative. He then introduces auton

omy as the supreme principle of morality in the sense of being the nec

essary condition of its possibility. The key point to Kant's argument in

11 The idea that the contrast is between a capacity and its realization is

suggested by Allison, KTF, 164, and Bernard Carnois, The Coherence of KanVs Doctrine of Freedom, trans. David Booth (Chicago: University of Chi

cago Press, 1987), 120. For a nice discussion of Kant's conception of autoc

racy (and the intrinsic value of autocracy), see Paul Guyer, Kant and the Ex

perience of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 346-50.

Guyer's discussion is the only extended analysis of autocracy I have found in the English secondary literature. As far as I can detect, he does not gloss the distinction between autonomy and autocracy as that of a capacity for self control versus its realization.

12 Grunglegung zur Metaphysik d,er Sitten (hereafter, "Gr") (KGS 4),

440; Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 89.




the Groundwork is that action on the basis of the categorical impera tive presupposes a capacity to determine oneself to act independently

of, and even contrary to, one's particular interests as a sensuous being with needs, namely, one's empirical interests. The idea of such a ca

pacity for self-determination is built into the characterization of au

tonomy as a property of the will. A will and only a will with the prop

erty of autonomy is capable of acting on the categorical imperative because only a will capable of determining itself independently of its needs as a sensuous being can act in accordance with a practical prin

ciple that commands unconditionally because of its mere form.13

This reminder of how Kant conceives of autonomy reveals that

the distinction between autonomy and autocracy is not one of a ca

pacity for self-control versus its realization because autonomy for

Kant is not best understood as a capacity for self-control. Rather, the

difference here is more adequately captured by distinguishing be

tween a legislative capacity of the will for creating laws that are uni

versally valid and an executive capacity of the will for observing such

laws consistently because they are universally valid. The former we

all possess as autonomous beings, and this is what defines our moral

personality; the latter we can acquire through a process of self-disci

pline, and it describes our actual moral condition.

While this contrast between a legislative and executive capacity

of the will explains the way in which autocracy is indeed something essentially different from autonomy, Kant's repeated remark that vir

tue requires the autocracy of pure practical reason in addition to au

tonomy tells us that there is still an important connection between

these two concepts.14 What we have seen is that not all possible ratio

nal wills (or all autonomous wills) need autocracy, for a holy will pos

sesses a perfectly pure moral disposition and so has no inclinations

that need to be mastered. Nonetheless, autonomy is a necessary con

dition for acquiring autocracy. That is, a prior condition for acquiring

the executive capacity of will to master oneself so that one actually

13 My understanding of Kant's conception of autonomy is largely in

debted to Allison, KTF, 85-106. 14 In addition to the claim in the introduction to The Doctrine of Virtue

that a doctrine of virtue also includes autocracy, there are two other pas sages where Kant indicates that the strength of will that characterizes virtue involves autocracy in addition to autonomy. See Moral Mrongovious II

(KGS 29:626) and the Vorarbeiten to The Metaphysics of Morals (KGS 23:396).




observes the dictates of morality and does so with a willing heart is

that the will possesses the capacity for self-legislation or the capacity for creating universal law. Thus, a will can be autonomous without

needing to become autocratic (as in the case of holiness of will), and a

will can be autonomous and fail to have acquired autocracy (as in the

case of weakness of will), but autocracy presupposes the autonomy of

pure practical reason.

II

The Problem with Autocracy. Some of the central features of this

initial account of autocracy lend themselves quite naturally to objec

tions to Kant's account of virtue and the moral psychology associated

with it. As our analysis has shown, virtue, for Kant, is foremost a form

of self-mastery or self-constraint consisting in the sovereignty of the

rational will over one's sensuous nature. The virtuous agent is vigilant

in mastering his inclinations (so that he does not take them as tempta

tions to transgress the moral law) and constant in having duty be the

sufficient motive for his actions. The problem, however, is that autoc

racy appears to amount to a repressive form of self-government, one

that might require the extirpation, or at least suppression, of inclina

tion. It is not at all clear how this conception of virtue as moral

strength of will in the face of recalcitrant inclinations could allow

emotions and inclinations a constructive role within virtue.

While the notion that virtue involves self-rule or self-mastery in

accordance with reason is quite common to traditional Greek views

about virtue, including Aristotle's, the issue is the particular form of

self-rule that appears to be constitutive of Kantian autocracy. A com

parison with Aristotle's view is instructive here, for it highlights the

worry that Kantian autocracy amounts to an overly rigid form of self

rule.

In his discussion of virtue as eudaimonic virtue in the Nicoma

chean Ethics, Aristotle claims that the human function is activity of

the soul in accordance with reason.15 The virtues of character con

cern both the part of the soul that has reason and the part that obeys

15Nicomachean Ethics, 2d ed., trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hack

ett, 1999), 1.7.1098al-15. All references to Nicomachean Ethics are to the second edition of Irwin's translation.




reason.16 Four possible relations between these two parts of the soul

are important to Aristotle's moral psychology:17

(1) Virtue: the rational and nonrational parts agree in pursuing the right ends.

(2) Continence: the rational and nonrational parts disagree; the rational part chooses the right ends; the nonrational part chooses the wrong ends; and the rational part wins.

(3) Incontinence: the rational and nonrational parts disagree; the ratio nal part chooses the right ends; the nonrational part chooses the wrong ends; and the nonrational part overcomes the rational part.

(4) Vice: the rational and nonrational parts of the soul agree in pursuing the wrong ends.

As Aristotle explains in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, the virtu

ous person has no base appetites. By upbringing and effort, his nonra

tional appetites have been shaped to harmonize with his right judg ments. In the vicious person, there is also agreement between the

rational and nonrational parts, but his judgments have been adapted to harmonize with inappropriate appetites. By contrast, there is dis

agreement in the souls of both continent and incontinent people, for

both have right judgments and base appetites.18 Whereas the actions

of the continent person conform to his right judgments, and thus he acts as he should, the actions of the incontinent person conform to his

base appetites, and he acts contrary to right judgment. On Aristotle's view, virtue is the condition in which the nonra

tional part of the soul that can obey reason does so and agrees with

rational choice.19 In one sense, then, Aristotle and Kant are in agree

ment, for they both hold that virtue requires an ordering of the soul in

accordance with reason and that acting from virtue in the strict sense

means acting rationally.20 Aristotle, however, holds that practical choice involves appropriate desires as well as correct decision. Nei

ther desire nor reason is sufficient on its own; both are necessary fac

tors in moral choice. First, for Aristotle, virtue is not just a cognitive

l6NE 1.7.1098a3-5,1.13.1102bl3-1103a3. 17'NE 1.13.1102bl4-28. 18ME'7.9.1151a6-14. 19 A? 1.13.1102b 14-28. 20 Robert B. Louden makes this same point in "Kant's Virtue Ethics,"

Philosophy 61 (1986): 486.




state consisting in the correct decision. The correct decision must be

effective, and this requires modification of affective and conative

states.21 Second, as the distinction between mere continence and vir

tue reveals, virtue does not consist simply in overcoming or subduing

unruly appetites and emotions that counter or oppose reason. Appe

tites and emotions must be trained to harmonize with correct choice.

Third, this harmonization does not merely consist in pruning unruly

affective or conative states by weakening or extirpating them because

virtue actually requires certain positive affective states (feelings and

motivations).

Generosity, for example, requires the right attitude toward prop

erty and others. One's attachment to personal property must not be so

strong as to overpower the correct decision to give; nor should the

correct decision win by subduing selfishness or by extirpating con

cern for oneself and one's property. Instead, one must have the

proper mix of self-regard and concern for others. Similarly, magna

nimity requires not only the proper training and curbing of self-aggran

dizement but also a healthy esteem for one's own accomplishments.

And temperance, the mean concerned with the pleasures associated

with the body, requires not just controlling appetites that could lead

us to choose inappropriately but also taking pleasure in the various

things that correct reason prescribes.22

On Aristotle's view, the self-mastery constitutive of virtue re

quires emotions and appetites that agree positively with reason. By

contrast, Kantian autocracy appears to be a form of self-mastery or

self-control that demands compliance of affective and conative states

by ruling over them. Just as the Groundwork examples of the grudg

ing moralist might strike Aristotle as recipes for continence, not vir

tue, so too if autocracy involves the extirpation or suppression of in

clination, it might likewise appear to be a recipe for mere continence.

21A^2.1.1103al5-4.1105bl8. 22 NE 3.10.111810-12.1119b20. See book 4 for Aristotle's discussion of

generosity and magnanimity and book 3 for his discussion of temperance. These examples reveal that part of the significance of the doctrine of the mean is the role it gives to affective states within virtue. In this emphasis on

the affective component of virtue, Aristotle's account contrasts with a

Socratic, cognitive account of virtue and resembles more closely the account Plato sets out in Republic 4.




There appear to be three different attitudes toward inclination

that autocracy might require, none of which suggests that Kant could

in principle hold that feelings and inclinations are important for a vir

tuous character.

In the first place, Kant at times indicates that autocracy involves wholesale extirpation of inclination. The claim that virtue requires

self-overcoming (Selbst?berwindung) and the description of virtue as

"a victory over inclination" both suggest such a view.2'* This interpre tation gains further support from two notorious passages from the

Groundwork and the second Critique in which Kant proclaims that

inclinations, as "blind and slavish," are so burdensome that rational

beings do and should wish to be free of them.24

In other passages, the idea seems to be that the domination or

suppression of inclination by reason is adequate for virtue. This meta

phor is in line with the characterization of virtue as strength of resolu

tion in relation to opposing inclinations, which must be resisted, or

the force and strength to subdue vice-breeding inclinations.25 The fol

lowing passage from The Doctrine of Virtue supports this interpreta

tion:

Since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a positive command to man, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his

(reason's) control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond for

bidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations

(the duty of apathy)', for unless reason holds the reins of government in its own hands, man's feelings and inclinations play the master over

him.26

On this model, virtue as autocracy can be cashed out in terms of rea

son's having the final verdict over, or demanding the compliance of,

unruly or countervailing inclinations, which must be subordinated,

dominated, or checked.

Finally, some claims indicate that autocracy might require some

thing like independence from inclination. Here virtue does not over

23KGS 27:465; 216. The passage cited is from Moral Philosophy Collins. See also Ethik, 91; 73.

24 See Gr, 429; 79; and Kritik der praktischen, Vemuft (hereafter, uKprV)(KGSS), 118; 235.

25 MS, 380, 405; 513, 533-4.

26 MS, 408; 208.




come or subdue other considerations; instead, it silences them so that

they do not conflict with the claims of pure practical reason.27

Whereas on the other two models inclinations provide an obstacle

that must be removed or restricted either by extirpation or domina

tion, here inclinations provide no such obstacle because, for the virtu

ous person, they appear to lack practical significance when pitted

against the demands of morality. Since the virtuous person has

trained himself to be largely independent of needs and inclinations as

sociated with his sensible nature, they hold no value or weight when

they conflict with duty.

Whichever of these three metaphors?extirpation, domination, or

independence?is most adequate for capturing what might be re

quired on Kant's conception of virtue, the relevant point is that, on any

of these interpretations, emotions and inclinations appear to be the

enemy that must be extinguished, conquered, or silenced by reason,

and we are left with the standard picture that the moral struggle on

Kant's view is a battle between a human being's finite nature and

freedom, or between sensibility and reason. If this picture is correct,

it raises doubts about the adequacy of Kant's theory of virtue. Kant

seems to reject the common view that certain feelings and desires

rooted in the affective and conative side of human nature are

27 This metaphor is used by McDowell, who has argued that, on Aristo tle's view, virtue does not outweigh or override other reasons; rather, it si lences them altogether. See McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonism in Aristo tle's Ethics" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ?d. Am?lie Rorty (Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1980), 369, and "Virtue and Reason," The Mo nist, 62 (1979): 335. On this interpretation, the truly virtuous person sees no conflict between the demands of virtue and other options. Considerations that would otherwise provide reasons for action lack practical significance

when pitted against the demands of virtue. While this silencing interpreta tion might seem necessary to explain Aristotle's contrast between virtue and

mere continence, it is not compelling. Aristotle does not think that virtue is a

complete good. External goods have value independently of virtue; there is no reason to think that they do not have value when they conflict with virtue. For Aristotle, virtue has a price, although it is a price worth paying. The dis tinction between the virtuous and the merely continent person requires only that the virtuous person have a sufficiently unwavering commitment to act as he judges best; it does not require that other considerations have no practical significance or that virtue has no cost.




significant for virtue, and it appears that he is unable to distinguish virtue from mere continence.

Ill

A More Adequate Conception of Autocracy. The first stage in as

sessing these criticisms of autocracy involves coming to terms with a

feature of Kant's moral psychology that, while often overlooked, is ab

solutely central to an adequate understanding of his conception of the

ethical life. This is the idea that what has to be mastered in the strug

gle to acquire a virtuous disposition is not inclinations per se but the

value we place on them. What Kant objects to in the nonautocratic

person is not the presence of emotions or inclinations as such but his

tendency to treat them as sufficient reasons for action when they con

flict with moral requirements, where the latter, on Kant's view, are al

ways overriding.28 Thus the obstacle that must be overcome if we are

to acquire a morally good character is this volitional tendency to sub

ordinate moral to nonmoral considerations. Kant refers to this pro

pensity as "radical evil," and this doctrine of radical evil is, in a very

real sense, the backdrop for understanding Kant's conception of vir

tue.29

By this striking term, "radical evil," Kant does not mean any ex

treme or diabolical form of evil but rather the root or ground of the

possibility of moral evil. For him, this amounts to the tendency to

adopt maxims that are contrary to the moral law. In Religion within

the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant sets out his doctrine that there

is a propensity to evil in human nature or, as he puts it, that a human

28 Of course, this overriding thesis stands in need of defense. David Brink raises serious doubts about whether Kant is entitled to this thesis that moral requirements always override nonmoral considerations in "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy," in Ethics and, Prac tical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 255-91. For a related discussion of this topic, in which he argues that the demands of a certain form of prudence constitute categorical reasons, see Terence Irwin's interesting discussion in "Kant's Criticisms of Eudai

monism," in Aristotle, Kant and, the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and,

Duty, ed. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63-101.

29 Henry Allison emphasizes this point in his analysis of the connection

between virtue and radical evil within Kant's thought. See Allison, KTF, 162 71.




being is "evil by nature." There he explains, "the statement, The hu

man being is eviV cannot mean anything else than that he is conscious

of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the (occa

sional) deviation from it."31 Otherwise put, radical evil amounts to the

tendency to give priority to the principle of happiness even when it

conflicts with the dictates of morality. Kant describes this propensity

with reference to the distinction between good and evil in the follow

ing way:

Hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his

maxim (not in the material of the maxim), but in their subordination, (in the form of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other. It follows that the human being (even the best) is evil only be cause he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxim.32

The idea that it is not inclinations simpliciter that must be extin

guished or subordinated by reason, but rather our tendency to privi

lege them by granting them priority over duty, is implicit in several

passages where Kant describes the strength required for the attain

ment of virtue. He characterizes virtue as "a struggle against the influ

ence of the evil principle in a human being" and "a moral preparedness

to withstand all temptations to evil, so far as they arise from inclina

tions."33 Moreover, this notion that the source of moral evil is the sta

tus we grant inclinations sheds light on Kant's qualifications that the

obstacles that must be conquered if we are to attain virtue are inclina

tions that a human being "puts in the way of his maxims" and that im

pulses of nature involve obstacles "within man's mind to his fulfill

ment of duty."34 This perplexing doctrine of radical evil stands in need of explana

tion and defense, neither of which will be offered here.35 But the fact

30 Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vemuft (hereafter, "fid")

(KGS 6), 32; Religion, within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. and trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 56.

31/tei,32;55. 32 Ret 36- 59.

33MS, 440; 562; and KGS 29:604. 34 MS, 394, 380; 525, 513.

35 For two very different accounts of Kant's view about the nature and

origin of moral evil, see Allison, KTF, chap. 8 and Idealism, and, Freed,om,

(hereafter, "IF"), chap. 12 and Allen Wood's most recent analysis in Kant's Ethical Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 283-90.




that Kant takes this propensity of evil?in essence, our volitional ten

dency to give inclinations a deliberative weight that they do not

merit?as the real opponent of virtue and the ground of all con

tramoral action both mitigates the familiar portrait of Kant as an en

emy of the emotions and creates the conceptual space for any positive role he might grant to feelings and inclinations within virtue. On the

first score, this makes apparent that Kant does not hold the view (of ten attributed to him) that the mere possession of inclinations and

needs associated with our sensible nature prevents us from attaining a pure moral disposition, which might imply that we should strive

somehow to be free of those sensible features of ourselves, however

that might be accomplished. On the contrary, the problem is what

Kant perceives as a tendency we all have to give priority to inclina

tions when they stand opposed to the claims of morality. Thus, Kant

is an enemy of this propensity to evil, not of emotions and inclina

tions, and so it is this tendency, rather than our sensible nature as

whole, that must be overcome and guarded against in the ethical life.

On the second score, this feature of Kant's moral psychology has

far-reaching significance in enabling us to see how Kant can assign a

supportive role to certain feelings and inclinations within the moral

psychology of virtue. Since the self-mastery constitutive of virtue is

mastery over our tendency of will to give priority to appetite or emo

tion unregulated by duty, it does not require extirpating, suppressing, or being independent of, one's sensible nature as a whole. Autocracy

requires the proper ordering of the soul according to reason, whereby reason is the sovereign of one's sensuous nature. This, undoubtedly, involves weakening or limiting the scope of inclinations that are foes

of duty. But, at the same time, this leaves room for the possibility that

other inclinations that have been cultivated in accordance with rea

son might be allies of duty. This notion?that autocracy, as the ideal

state of moral health for us as finite rational beings, requires not just

the regulation of inclination by reason but in addition a sort of ethical cultivation of sensibility according to reason?enables us to make

sense of Kant's positive claims in The Doctrine of Virtue that we are

obligated to cultivate various affective and conative states that enable

us to act in accordance with our morally obligatory ends.

In section 4, we will turn directly to the passages in The Doctrine

of Virtue in which Kant grants moral significance to certain states

connected with our sensible nature that he thinks are important for

virtue. Here we should note that Kant's analysis of affects (Affekten)




and passions (Leidenschaften), which he characterizes in the Critique

of Judgment, Religion, The Doctrine of Virtue, and the Anthropology as pernicious states that interfere with the self-mastery required by

virtue, captures what we might think of as the "negative" aspect of au

tocracy requiring the virtuous agent to control and to limit the influ

ence on his will of affective and conative states that conflict with duty.

In his discussion of affects and passions, Kant appeals to some of the

very same analogies the Stoics used in their account of the passions

and the therapeutic treatment they believed these passions require.

He characterizes people subject to these particular types of emotional

agitations and inclinations as "ill," insofar as they "exclude the sover

eignty of reason."36 Whereas an affect, like anger, is a rash feeling that

precedes reflection and overcomes the patient, Kant claims that a pas

sion, like hatred, is a habitual sensible desire that involves reflection

and endorsement by the agent.37 Thus, passions, Kant holds, are more

deeply rooted in an agent's psyche and lead more readily to vice. De

spite this difference in their degree of "vehemence," Kant argues that

both affects and passions are maladies in need of healing. With re

spect to these particular kinds of feelings and inclinations, which ob

scure our judgment and lead to emotional excitement that might

tempt us to neglect or to violate our duties, he explains that virtue pre

supposes a kind of moral apathy (Affketl?sigkeit). This apathy is not

to be understood as a moral indifference but rather moral strength of

36 Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, (hereafter, "Anthro") (KGS

7), 251; Anthropology from a Practical Point of View, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Nyhoff, 1974), 119.

37 For Kant's account of affects and passions, see KriMk der Urteils

kraft (KGS 5), 272 n.; Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianap olis: Hackett, 1987), 132 n.; Rel, 29, 52-3; MS, 407-8; 535-6; and Anthro, 251

6; 119-23. In both The Doctrine of Virtue and the Anthropology, Kant charac terizes an affect as a type of rash feeling that precedes reflection and thereby

makes rational reflection difficult or even impossible. Being subject to an af fect involves being overtaken, unaware, by feeling, and Kant describes this as a paroxysm or fit of madness. A passion is not a feeling but rather a type of habitual sensible desire, or inclination, and it involves reflection and endorse ment by an agent. This seems to explain why Kant characterizes passions as more deeply rooted in an agent's psyche. In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant claims that being prone to strong emotional excitement is a lack of virtue and can coexist with the best will, whereas passions enter more readily into kin

ship with vice (MS, 408; 535). With respect to both, however, Kant insists that the duty of apathy requires us to rule over ourselves by bringing these

feelings and inclinations under the control of reason.




will, which manifests itself in a tranquil mind that is not excited or in

fluenced by these kinds of pathological feelings and inclinations. While these pathological affects and passions that interfere with

the self-governance required by virtue are foes of duty and therefore

must be controlled and limited by reason, Kant is able to distinguish

between pathological and practical feelings and inclinations.38 Practi

cal feelings and inclinations have been shaped and transformed by

reason, and are thus responsive to the authority of reason as the ulti

mate source of moral value, so that they are good and helpful within

the ethical.

IV

The Constructive Role of Sensibility within Virtue. In The Doc trine of Virtue, Kant indicates that while autocracy requires the

proper ordering of the soul whereby reason is the sovereign of sensi

bility, feeling and inclination can and should be the ally of practical

reason. Indeed, he argues that we are obligated to cultivate moral

feeling, conscience, love, respect, and sympathy, all of which some

how assist us in following the moral law.39 Since it is in his discussion

38 This distinction can be found in the following places: Gr, 399; 55;

KprV, 83; 207; MS, 401, 452-7; 530, 571-6; and Anttiro, 236; 104. 39 To be precise, when we look at Kant's positive remarks about the aes

thetic side of morality in his theory of virtue, we find that he maintains a dis tinction between intellectually and sensuously based feelings and inclina tions. He explicitly recognizes practical feelings that are products of pure reason and conditions for moral agency so that we would not be moral

agents at all if we did not have them. These we might refer to as "intellectu

ally grounded moral feelings." Kant claims that there are four such feelings, which he identifies as moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and

respect for oneself (self-esteem) (MS, 399; 528). In addition, he holds that

sensuously based feelings, like sympathy, enable us to act in accordance

with our morally obligatory ends. These we can label "sensuously grounded moral feelings." The notion that Kant thinks that there are intellectually

grounded feelings or susceptibilities that are significant in the moral life is

not new to his theory of virtue. In the Groundwork and the second Critique, Kant claims that the act of recognition of the supreme authority of the moral

law affects the human faculty of desire by giving rise to the one unique moral

feeling of respect for the moral law, and this account of respect explains how

it is that the law itself can serve not only as a rule for action, but also as an in

centive for us. What is new, however, is the notion that there might be feel

ings and inclinations rooted in sensibility that have positive moral value.




of the particular duties of love we have toward others, especially in his

account of sympathy, that the positive moral significance Kant grants to feelings is most prominent, we will turn directly to this section in

The Doctrine of Virtue in order to determine what Kant has to say about the constructive role sensibility plays within virtue.40

Kant divides our duties to others into the two classes of duties of

love and duties of respect. Duties of love are imperfect duties of wide

obligation, and they are directed toward the "natural welfare" or hap

piness of others. The performance of these duties puts their recipient under an obligation, and performance of them, Kant says, is "meritori

ous." Duties of respect, by contrast, are perfect duties of narrow obli

gation directed at the "moral well-being" or "moral contentment" of

others.41 They do not result in obligation on the part of another, and

their fulfillment is "something owed." Kant explains that love and re

spect are "the feelings that accompany the carrying out of these du

ties."42 These general feelings of love and respect, as well as more spe

cific person-directed feelings, like sympathy and gratitude, are allies

40 As a general point, we should note that, on Kant's view, our general duty to perfect ourselves obligates us, indirectly, to cultivate whichever of our natural powers (both rational and sensible) make action in accordance with our obligatory ends easier and more effective and thus facilitate the ends of pure practical reason. Kant clearly thinks there are natural condi tions that facilitate the execution of moral action. First, he describes the un

derstanding, which he claims is the highest of the faculties that we are in structed to cultivate, as "the faculty of concepts and so too of those concepts that have to do with duty" (MS, 387; 518). Both understanding, as the faculty that supplies rules and thus determines objectively what our duties are, and

judgment, which is central to deliberation and conscience, are powers of

spirit (Geisteskr?fte) that are essential to morality. While these natural ca

pacities are theoretical powers, and so seem to be connected strictly with our rational nature, Kant's various descriptions of "moral anthropology" indicate that he also thinks that capacities connected with our sensible nature facili tate moral action and the actual fulfillment of our duties. In the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that the counterpart of a meta

physics of morals would be a moral anthropology, which deals "only with the

subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in ful

filling the laws of a metaphysics of morals" (MS, 217; 372). Although practi cal or moral anthropology does not prescribe duties, it is important insofar as

we are concerned with the actual execution of moral obligations. Our moral

perfection, then, requires, at least indirectly, the cultivation of these natural

powers that might serve as means to the realization of our obligatory ends. 41 MS, 393-4; 524-5.

42MS,448;568.




of duty in the sense of facilitating our ability to carry out our various

duties of virtue.

As Kant describes it, the duty of love in general instructs us to ad

vance the happiness or welfare of others through the specific duties

of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy.43 The specific duty of benef

icence seems to be equivalent to what Kant conceives of as practical benevolence. He defines benevolence as satisfaction in the happiness or well-being of others and claims that beneficence is "the maxim of

making other's happiness one's own end."44 This is an end that is a

duty to adopt, that is, we are constrained by reason to adopt this

maxim as a universal law, which amounts to striving to promote "ac

cording to one's means the happiness of others in need, without hop

ing for something in return."45

Next, the duty of gratitude is a duty toward others, which presup poses some act of kindness or charity that someone has bestowed on

me. Kant characterizes this duty in terms of honoring another be

cause of a kindness received and insists that even mere heartfelt

benevolence without any "physical results" is a duty.46 The virtuous

disposition with respect to gratitude is characterized as appreciative

ness, and Kant describes this feeling as one of respect for one's bene

factor. Presumably, the reason this is nonetheless a duty of love is

that this kindness puts me under an obligation to perform a similar

service of love in return for the kindness granted to me. Kant warns

that we are not to think of this debt of gratitude as a burden to be dis

charged. On the contrary, the occasion of gratitude is rather a "moral

kindness," which provides us with a chance for cultivating love of hu

manity. Kant characterizes the occasion of gratitude as:

an opportunity given one to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of

man, to combine the cordiality of a benevolent disposition with sensitiv

ity to benevolence (attentiveness to the smallest degree of this disposi tion in one's thought of duty) and so to cultivate one's love of human be

ings.47

His further suggestion that violating this duty of gratitude amounts to

"destroying" a moral incentive to beneficence indicates that cultiv?t

43 MS, 452-7; 571-4.

44 MS, 452; 571.

45 MS, 453; 572.

46 MS, 455; 573.

47 MS, 456; 574.




ing a grateful disposition, which involves being sensitive to benevo

lence and showing appreciation and cordiality to others for their acts

of kindness, is serviceable to morality, in that it encourages people to

be beneficent and thereby promotes a culture of virtue.

Finally, Kant says that sympathetic feeling is generally a duty. He

defines sympathetic joy and sadness as "sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasure" at another's state of joy or pain.48 These are "aes

thetic" feelings to which we are receptive by nature. He explains that

while there is no obligation for us to feel mere compassion in an

other's plight or to share ineffectually in their sufferings or joys, we

can use these feelings "to promote active and rational benevolence,"

and this clearly suggests that we are to make use of these feelings as

instruments toward fulfilling our morally obligatory end of benefi

cence. What is directly required of us, then, is "to sympathize actively"

in the fate of others, and, as we might expect, this involves adopting a

maxim of beneficence, which requires us "to promote according to

one's means the happiness of others in need, without hoping for some

thing in return."49 It is in relation to this end of beneficence that Kant

suggests that we have an indirect duty to cultivate sympathy feelings

and "to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on

moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them."50 Further, he

adds, "this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us

to do what the representation of duty alone would not accomplish."51

The idea seems to be that the cultivation of our sympathetic feelings

(which includes an obligation to visit scenes of human misery such as

hospitals and debtors' prisons) increases our sensitivity to human suf

fering and thereby renders us better able to fulfill the duty of benefi

cence. Such contact is an important reminder of the real condition of

my fellow human beings, whose pain and sufferings I might remain un

aware of, or blind to, were I to avoid any association with them. Kant

does not spell out in any further detail precisely how it is that sympa

thy facilitates our ability to act beneficently, nor does he offer any ex

planation for his (admittedly) puzzling remark that sympathy enables us to do what the mere thought of duty alone would not accomplish.

Although it goes well beyond the direct textual evidence available to

48MS, 456; 574-5. 49 MS, 453; 572.

50MS,457;575. 51 MS, 457; 576.




us, it seems that there are at least four distinct ways in which sympa

thy might be thought of as morally facilitating and hence important for virtue.

First, in order to see how sympathy is morally significant in facil

itating our ability to fulfill the duty of beneficence and to understand

why Kant thinks it enables us to do what the mere thought of duty

alone cannot accomplish, we must recall that the duty of beneficence

is an imperfect duty, or duty of wide obligation to adopt a particular

end. Duties of wide obligation, such as beneficence, do not, except

under very limiting conditions, require us to perform (or refrain from

performing) any particular act. What we are required to do is to pro

mote, according to our means, the happiness of others in need, with

out hope or expectation of something in return. To adopt this duty of

beneficence is to adopt a maxim or general policy of intent to help

others. Hence, there is great latitude in this requirement, which

leaves it up to the agent to decide when, to whom, in what way, and to

what extent aid is to be offered. It is in the move from this very gen

eral requirement to particular actions that sympathy comes in. If we

are to fulfill the duty of beneficence, we must have the moral percep

tion to pick out occasions where promoting the welfare of others is

needed and the moral sensitivity to be moved by the consideration of

their needs, which, in turn, helps us determine what we should do in

particular circumstances. Having certain feelings, such as sympathy,

is necessary in order to perceive and to understand the relevant moral

features of a situation and to gain insight into what I might do to help alleviate the sufferings of others. Thus, sympathy is morally facilitat

ing here in that it plays an important epistemic role.

The notion that sympathetic feeling is valuable for moral episte

mology fits perfectly with Kant's conception of duties of virtue as du

ties to adopt certain ends. Since virtue requires the adoption of ends,

it must involve the development of a range of feelings and desires as

sociated with having those ends. If I adopt the end of the happiness of

others, I come to have the various feelings and inclinations of love

that are "natural" to a beneficent person?ones that are necessary for

finding certain features of the world morally salient and for perceiving the world in the way this end requires.52 When we see with sympathy,

we see the world in a particular way. We see certain features and cir

cumstances about the lives of others to which we would otherwise re

main blind or ignorant. We see, for example, that people can be

harmed in a number of ways, often undeservedly, and in ways they




cannot control or prevent. Sympathetic feelings, then, enable us to

recognize occasions for rendering aid and provide us with insight into

how we can help our fellow human beings.

Second, Allison has argued that we are only in a position to un

derstand the need, on Kant's view, for cultivating feelings such as sym

pathy once we have reconsidered Kant's doctrine of radical evil and

the serious problem our propensity to evil poses with respect to the

actual fulfillment of our moral obligations, especially our imperfect

duties.53 Allison agrees with the general view, set out above, that

Kant's claim that we have an indirect duty to cultivate our sympathetic

feelings should be understood as a requirement to use these feelings as a means for increasing our awareness of, and sensitivity to, the suf

ferings of others, which, in turn, enables us better to fulfill the duty of

beneficence. Allison's further claim is that we must consider this indi

rect duty to cultivate sympathy in light of Kant's thesis that there is a

universal propensity to evil in human nature that is inextirpable and

so can never be completely vanquished but, nevertheless, must con

stantly be struggled against in the moral life. This tendency to subor

dinate the claims of morality to self-interest, Allison suggests, is espe

cially problematic in the case of wide duties such as beneficence. As

we have just seen, here duty requires merely the indeterminate end to

make the happiness of others one's own end, and this leaves it up to us

to decide when, how, and to what extent we are to exercise benefi

cence. The problem, then, as Allison correctly notes, is that "this, in

turn, leaves us still open to temptation at virtually every occasion at

which beneficent action might be called for."54 Hence, what we need

is a counterweight to this tendency to subordinate the claims of mo

rality to self-interest, which, Allison supposes, manifests itself in a ten

dency to rationalize neglecting opportunities to exercise beneficence

on the grounds that no action is strictly required of us with respect to

52 Korsgaard makes explicit this precise point in Creating the Kingdom

of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179-83. Of course, even though Kant does not explicitly extend his comments about sympathy to other feelings or inclinations, the point is that, if there are other feelings and inclinations that are instrumental in enabling us to fulfill our obligatory ends, we should cultivate those natural powers and susceptibilities, for the

very same reason Kant offers as to why we are indirectly obligated to culti vate sympathy.

53 Allison's analysis can be found in KTF, 166-8 and IF, 121-3. 54

Allison,/F, 123.




this indeterminate end. This counterweight, of course, is not to be

conceived of as a counterweight that opposes and strikes down coun

tervailing feelings and desires that are self-interested, for this suggests a conception of agency according to which feelings and desires are

psychic forces, the stronger of which wins out, and so is incompatible with Kant's view that inclinations determine the will only insofar as

they are taken up or incorporated into an agent's maxim. On the con

trary, Allison reasons that sympathetic feelings provide a counter

weight to the propensity to evil by serving "as a source of reasons to

act as duty requires."55 On this reconstruction, the increased sensitiv

ity to the needs of others arms us with powerful reasons to resist

temptations to self-indulgence or moral compromise, and, as a result, minimizes the ineliminable temptation to ignore our direct obliga

tions.56

In section 3, we agreed that Kant's thesis that there is a universal

propensity to evil in human nature is a central tenet of his moral psy

chology and a crucial feature in understanding his picture of virtue, for this propensity is the obstacle that must be overcome in the moral

struggle to attain a virtuous disposition. Allison's reconstruction, ac

cording to which cultivating sympathy is important insofar as sympa

thetic feelings provide a counterweight to radical evil, is therefore a

reasonable take on spelling out an important way in which sympathy

helps us to fulfill our obligatory end of beneficence and thereby ac

complishes what the mere thought of duty alone cannot accomplish.

Third, given the idea (present in the analyses of these first two

ways in which sympathy is morally facilitating) that sympathetic feel

ings supply us with "a source of reasons to act as duty requires," it

seems plausible to say that sympathy plays some sort of role in the

motivational field of the virtuous agent by "prompting" beneficent ac

55 Allison,/F, 122.

56 Here Allison suggests an analogy between the requirement to culti vate one's sympathetic feelings and the other indirect duty to which Kant re fers in all three of his m^jor ethical writings, the duty to cultivate one's own

happiness. See Gr, 399; 54; KprV, 93; 214-15; and MS, 388; 519. Kant explic itly connects this indirect duty to cultivate one's own happiness with the

need to ward off temptation when he suggests that, insofar as we ourselves are miserable, we have a greater temptation to focus on our own needs and

thereby ignore the needs of others. Thus, our own happiness, as well as sym pathy, Allison suggests, functions as a "facilitator of morality" (IF, 123).




tion.57 We must be careful, however, in specifying exactly what this

suggestion does (and does not) entail. Given Kant's repeated insis

tence on the sufficiency of the duty motive, any suggestion that sym

pathy might be instrumental in motivating the virtuous character to

act beneficently should strike us as perplexing. For while Kant does

not suppose that the good will or virtue is undermined by promoral in

clination or requires contramoral inclination, it does seem clear that

he supposes that virtue requires that the motive of duty be sufficient

for dutiful action. In other words, what is supposed to distinguish

morally worthy action is that it is determined by duty, not emotion or

inclination. Moreover, it is perfectly evident that Kant holds that vir

tue, as the highest moral station for us as merely finite rational beings, consists in a disposition in which one does one's duty from duty, that

is, in which the law itself serves as the incentive for action.

The suggestion put forth here, then, is not that sympathy func

tions as a back-up or a supplement for the duty motive. Instead, the

idea is that, if sympathy serves as a source of reasons to act as duty re

quires, we can think of sympathy as "prompting" dutiful action by di

recting the virtuous person to act in ways that fulfill the end of benefi

cence, or orienting him toward occasions for exercising beneficence.

In others words, while sympathy cultivated in accordance with duty

engages him to act beneficently, his reason for acting beneficently

(what ultimately determines him to act) is not that sympathy moves

him, but that beneficence is required, or intrinsically right.

Finally, given Kant's discussion of gratitude and sympathy in The

Doctrine of Virtue, it seems that certain feelings are important within

the ethical life because they allow us to express our morally required action in a humanly engaged way. In his discussion of gratitude, Kant

insists that we should help others in a way that does not make them

feel obligated or indebted to us. His suggestion is that helping in a

grudging way would be contrary to the respect we must show to other

people. Similarly, it seems that promoting the happiness of others

with obvious indifference to their sufferings would be contrary to the

love we ought to have for our fellow human beings. Indeed, in the

Herder lecture notes on ethics, Kant explicitly states that although

57 Allison makes this suggestion in passing in KTF, 119, and the analysis here attempts to spell out what this "prompting" thesis could amount to.




cold-bloodedness is a very good trait insofar as it holds in check love

inspired by merely natural sympathy, which is blind, indifference is

"the opposite of human love."58 On Kant's view, then, the virtuous

person fulfills his obligations from duty with a cheerful heart and with a certain affective disposition, one that expresses (and certainly does

not contravene) the love and respect he ought to have for others.

Feelings like gratitude and sympathy thus have what Nancy Sherman has recently labeled an "attitudinai function," in that they comprise a

mode of conveying moral interest and are the vehicle through which

we communicate or signal our moral interest to others.59 This indi

cates that morally appropriate feelings for Kant are important not

only in the instrumental sense of facilitating our ability to act in accor

dance with duty, for they also have what would appear to approach a

kind of intrinsic worth insofar as they govern how we ought to re

spond to, and interact with, our fellow human beings.

V

Conclusion. In conclusion, this interpretation of Kant's concep

tion of virtue as autocracy and the different ways feelings and inclina

tions might function within the virtuous disposition supports the idea

that Kant has a theory of virtue that is more appealing than commonly

supposed and that bears favorable comparison with more familiar Ar

istotelian claims about virtue. On the view outlined here, Kant holds

that feelings and inclinations cultivated and regulated by reason are

advantages that enable and facilitate moral agency, and they play a

constructive role within virtue. Thus, Kant's account of virtue as au

tocracy contrasts starkly with Aristotelian continence. The Kantian

virtuous agent, who has acquired the proper moral self-mastery over

58 KGS 27:54; 24. Kant's claim here is that cold-bloodedness, which amounts to doing what is morally required in the absence of emotion and in

clination, is better than acting from natural sympathy unregulated by duty, because the latter leads to action that violates duty. This comparative claim

should not be taken as a claim that the cold-blooded person is morally better than the person who both has a firm disposition to act in accordance with

duty from duty and has cultivated what Kant refers to at one point as "true

sympathy" (which stands in contrast to natural or blind sympathy) (KGS 27:

58). 59

Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue (Cambridge: Cam

bridge University Press, 1997), 147.




his sensible nature in accordance with reason, does not experience

the sort of psychic conflict between the two parts of his natures that is characteristic of Aristotle's continent person. Insofar as he possesses

the sort of mastery over his sensible nature that Kant thinks is consti

tutive of virtue, the nonrational part of his soul does not, as Aristotle

says with respect to the continent (and incontinent) person, counter

and oppose reason.60 On the contrary, since autocracy requires gov

erning the soul in accordance with reason, but also cultivating our nat

ural powers that make action in accordance with our moral ends eas

ier and more effective, the virtuous person is not involved in a

constant struggle to do as duty requires. Indeed, Kant characterizes

the virtuous person as doing his duty with pleasure and ease; he sug

gests that the person who is unhappy or slavish in the performance of

duty is lacking in virtue; and he indicates that the virtuous person

takes satisfaction in fulfilling the duties that are incumbent upon him as a moral being and pleasure in the recognition that he possesses the

strength of will to act consistently in accordance with duty from a

pure moral disposition.61

Finally, while this more complex moral psychology seems closer

to our intuitions about character and human goodness, it also raises a

question about the coherence of Kant's overall doctrine. For it seems

that on this reconstruction of Kant's full conception of virtue, the

grudging moralist in the Groundwork whose sense of duty suffices in

the total absence of natural emotions and inclinations or trumps coun

tervailing emotions and inclinations does not qualify as virtuous. In

other words, this grudging moralist is not autocratic, or has not ac

quired the proper self-mastery over his sensuous nature, which in

volves training affective and conative states to work toward his moral

ends. Whereas the Groundwork suggests that there is nothing more to

aspire to than the conformity of the will with duty from the motive of

duty, autocracy implies otherwise. That is, we are to perfect ourselves

so that sensibility plays a constructive role in morality. My suggestion

is that this may point to a tension between Kant's full conception of

virtue and the Groundwork account of the good will, and highlights

60A?1.13.1102b22-5. 61 For Kant's analysis of the satisfaction and pleasure associated with

having done one's duty from duty, see MS, 388, 485; 519, 597-8; and Kant's brief discussion of Schiller in the Vigilantius lecture notes (KGS 27:489-92).




the way in which that account of the good will is incomplete as a Kan

tian account of character.62

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

62 My suggestion that there is a "tension" across these texts might be

misleading insofar as the aims of the Groundwork and The Doctrine of Vir tue are altogether different. In the former work, Kant intends to set out his

analysis of the nature and grounds of moral obligations, and he nowhere pro fesses to present a complete account of moral character or virtue (which ex

plains why autocracy never comes into the Groundwork). Moreover, there are clear grounds for thinking that Kant allows that there is a distinction be tween being virtuous and possessing a good will. In both Religion and The

Doctrine of Virtue, Kant appears to attribute a good will to agents lacking in virtue. In Religion, he claims that having a will "which in the abstract is good "

(im allgemeinen guten Willen) is compatible with an evil heart (Ret, 37; 60). In The Doctrine of Virtue, he insists that moral weakness, as lack of vir

tue, can coexist "with the best will" (MS, 408; 503). Nonetheless, we might take the following claims to establish some sort of inconsistency or, at the

least, to present a puzzle to be resolved:

(1) As the only unconditioned good, the good will is good without limi tation or qualification.

(2) Hence, the good will appears to be lacking in no good. (3) The Groundwork examples of the sorrowful moralist and the indif

ferent moralist tell us that the good will requires nothing more than acting in accordance with duty from duty.

(4) Virtue, on Kant's view, consists in the autocracy of pure practical reason.

(5) Autocracy, as the ideal state of moral health for merely finite ratio nal beings, involves strength over feelings and inclinations that might stand in the way of the will's conformity with duty, but it also involves cultivating affective and conative states in accordance with duty.

(6) Hence, while the virtuous person acts in accordance with duty from

duty, he does so with a cheerful heart and has cultivated morally facilitating feelings, the most important of which Kant seems to think is sympathy.



Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence?

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