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J. of Modern African Studies, , (), pp. –. # Cambridge University PressDOI: .}SX Printed in the United Kingdom
‘Enough is Enough’: an
ethnography of the struggle
against impunity in Burkina Faso
Sten Hagberg*
This article analyses the ways in which socio-political opposition is expressedby looking into the morally loaded discourse of political legitimacy in Bur-kina Faso that emerged after the assassination of the journalist Norbert Zon-go in December . Through the analysis of different political statements,newspapers and various comments from the ‘street ’, it locates the struggleagainst impunity in a social and political undercurrent in Burkinabe society.In this context, notions of the public space are central, because the publicspace defines both the boundaries of public debate and the behaviour of keypolitical actors. Two recurrent themes in Burkinabe political discourse,namely ideas of truth and courage, and the legitimacy of White people, il-lustrate the various ways in which socio-political opposition seeks to definethe public space within which politics is to be practised and the behaviourto be observed by those acting there. But the struggle against impunity alsotakes place on a symbolic level at which key symbols are appropriated, inter-preted and incorporated into political discourse.
Corruption, criminalisation and disorder emerge as major themes in
contemporary conceptualisations of ‘ the African State’. It has been
argued that the patrimonial nature of the state favours vertical
clientelistic relationships rather than horizontal organisational struc-
tures. Many features of public life in Africa suggest that the State itself
is becoming a vehicle for criminalisation and disorder (Bayart ;
* Research Fellow, Department of Cultural Anthropology & Ethnology, Uppsala University.Fieldwork has been carried out mainly in western and central Burkina for a total of five years ; ofparticular importance to this article is the fieldwork between October and April . Anearlier version of the article was presented for the panel ‘A socio-anthropology of corruption:comparative perspectives ’ organised by Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan atthe nd Meeting of the African Studies Association in Philadelphia – November . Thearticle has also benefited from the critical reading of many colleagues, notably the members of theLiving Beyond Conflict Seminar at Uppsala University (http:}}www.antro.uu.se}lbc}). I amparticularly grateful for Jan Ovesen’s critical reading and inspiring comments. Thanks also forcomments provided by Mats Ha/ rsmar, Murray Last, Christopher Clapham and the anonymousreferees of the Journal of Modern African Studies.
Bayart et al. ; Chabal & Daloz ; see also Bratton & van de
Walle ; Schatzberg ). While I do not question the seriousness
of state crises in many African countries, in this article I seek to avoid
two methodological shortcomings in the way in which African politics
is often conceptualised. First, there are far too many sweeping
generalisations about ‘ the African State’, without due attention to the
specificity of each context. Instead, I suggest that an ethnography of
national politics is required for understanding the specific political
culture of a given country. In today’s painstaking struggles for
democracy and human rights, it is important to provide accounts that
seek to grasp the socio-cultural logic underpinning national politics.
Secondly, in current writings on ‘the African State’, cultural
dimensions are increasingly highlighted. While cultural analysis may
be useful for understanding processes of legitimisation of ‘ illicit
activities ’ carried out in the name of the state, the same cultural
repertoires may also be used to struggle against criminalisation and
disorder. I therefore suggest that the struggle over key symbols and
cultural idioms is central to the assessment of national political
discourse.
In this article I address the criminalisation of the state by means of
an account of the struggle against impunity in Burkina Faso. The
overall purpose is to analyse the ways in which socio-political opposition
is expressed by looking into the morally loaded discourse of political
legitimacy. There are multiple bases of political legitimacy in Burkina
Faso. Formal democratic legitimacy gained in multiparty elections is
one basis, while the morality of key political actors is another. The issue
of impunity – that is, the freedom from punishment for ‘blood’ and
economic crimes committed by holders of political power – has recently
become a leading theme in Burkinabe politics in general, and in the
popular and trade union movement Trop c’est trop (‘Enough is
enough’) in particular. While the concept of impunity is increasingly
used internationally, it also forms part of a specific historical trajectory
in Burkinabe politics. It refers to freedom from punishment for ‘blood
crimes’ and big corruption rather than for the everyday ‘petty
corruption’." The tradition of strong trade unions and other forms of
horizontal organisational structures makes Burkina Faso an interesting
case for an ethnography of national politics.
The article takes a series of recent events as its starting point. In
December Norbert Zongo – journalist and director of the weekly
L’IndeUpendant – was found dead in his burned-out vehicle together with
three companions (his younger brother, an employee and the driver) in
Sapouy, a village about kilometres south of the capital Ouaga-
dougou. It was soon confirmed that the four men had been killed.
Zongo and his companions had been travelling to Zongo’s game
reserve Safari Sissili when they were killed in what rapidly became
known as le drame de Sapouy. Later, different investigations established
that first they were shot and then the vehicle was set on fire (RSF ;
CEI ; CS ; see also OPJI ). After the ‘Sapouy Drama’,
Burkina Faso experienced a deep socio-political crisis. Strikes and riots
became common in the struggle to bring justice to Norbert Zongo and
other victims of blood crimes in which the perpetrators were neither
tried in court nor punished. Impunity must come to an end, it was
argued, before any rule of law could be real.
My main concern in this article is to provide a culturally informed
account of such a social and political turmoil by exploring the socio-
cultural logic at stake in the struggle against impunity. Through the
analysis of different political statements, newspapers and various
comments from the ‘ street ’, I locate the struggle against impunity in a
social and political undercurrent in Burkinabe society. This struggle
articulates ideas of what is socially and morally ‘acceptable ’ to public
opinion. Despite the country’s ethnic and regional diversity, and the
fact that the movement Trop c’est trop is mainly urban-based and
French-speaking, there are commonly shared and morally loaded ideas
of how to practise politics.
The next section describes the main political events from the
‘Sapouy Drama’ of December through to September .
The following section seeks to contextualise the socio-political crisis in
postcolonial Burkina Faso. While President Blaise Compaore! gained
formal democratic legitimacy in November , the Collectif d’organi-
sations deUmocratiques de masse et de partis politiques, created in December
, claimed to represent ‘ the real country’. The crisis broke the
silence of public opinion regarding past blood crimes, including the
assassination of the late President Thomas Sankara in . The third
section explores the relationship between ‘ impunity’ and ‘public
space’. Opposition movements recurrently use the public space to raise
the issue of impunity. In this context, the public space both defines the
boundaries of public debate and the behaviour of key actors in
Burkinabe politics. This is exemplified by some recurrent themes in
political discourse such as ideas of truth and courage, and the
legitimacy of White people. Finally, the concluding discussion shows
how appeals to cultural norms underpin the struggle against impunity
in Burkina Faso. This ethnography of national politics suggests that
conceptualisations of the African State need to take cognisance of the
various ways in which social movements and political oppositions seek
to define the public space within which politics is to be practised and
the behaviour to be observed by those acting within this space.
‘ ’
After starting his weekly newspaper L’IndeUpendant in June , Norbert
Zongo rapidly became known as a particularly sharp and critical
observer of Burkinabe politics. He urged the Burkinabe people to
contest and struggle against injustice. One of his recurrent statements
was: ‘what is worst is not the malice of bad people but the silence of
good people ’.# After his death many belatedly recognised that, in
practice, ‘he had been the opposition’. He dealt with a wide range of
sensitive affairs involving members of the political and economic elite.
His articles were characterised by a mixture of investigative journalism
and social commitment. Many articles ended with a suggestion or
advice to the president, to the judicial system or to other powerful
institutions or people.
Throughout Zongo had written extensively about the ‘Affaire
David’, that is, the death of David Oue!draogo, the driver of the
younger brother of President Blaise Compaore! . In late Franc: ois
Compaore! , himself advisor to President Compaore! , delivered David
Oue!draogo to the president’s security forces at the Conseil de l’Entente in
Ouagadougou.$ This domain is a cluster of buildings lying in the heart
of Ouagadougou. The Conseil is legally directly under the president and
hosts the security forces of the president. David Oue!draogo was
together with two other employees accused of having stolen a large sum
of money in the domicile of their employer.% Norbert Zongo wrote that
such a theft should have implicated the police or the gendarmerie
rather than the security forces. In January David died (the
opposition said ‘ from torture ’, those close to the political power ‘of
sickness ’). The chief medical officer at the president’s dispensary issued
a death certificate according to which the driver died on January of
sickness.& No one informed his family nor did anyone reveal where
David Oue!draogo had been buried. The other two prisoners were
transferred to Ouagadougou prison. One of them, Hamidou Ilboudou,
later went to the press. Photos were published of his back, which had
been burnt by his torturers. Such a burning of prisoners was called
‘roasted chicken’ (poulet roW ti) at the Conseil.
Thus the family of David Oue!draogo was neither informed about the
death nor allowed to see the corpse before burial. Instead, he was
buried anonymously. Zongo wrote about the death of David
Oue!draogo in February , stating that one of the prisoners of the
Conseil had died and that two others had been confined to the
gendarmerie and transferred to the prison (L’IndeUpendant ..).
Zongo argued that in a state that adheres to the rule of law it is
unacceptable that those accused of theft, or more precisely suspected of
theft, are imprisoned and tortured by the president’s security forces.
Despite Zongo’s writings there was no official government reaction
whatsoever. In July a brother of David Oue!draogo instigated a
civil court case against Franc: ois Compaore! for responsibility for his
death. In late Zongo revealed that Franc: ois Compaore! had
refused to appear before the court to reply to the inculpation of
assassination and hiding of a corpse (meurtre et recel de cadavre).
When Zongo’s death was known in the capital Ouagadougou – the
national radio first related that he had died in a car accident (RNB
..) – many people took to the streets to demonstrate their
anger and despair. The anger mainly targeted various ‘ icons of power’
in Burkinabe politics : the HQ of the president’s political party Congre[ spour la DeUmocratie et le Progre[ s (CDP) and the homes of local CDP
politicians in Zongo’s native town Koudougou. Demonstrating students
and pupils cried Blaise assassin (‘Blaise murderer ’), accusing President
Blaise Compaore! of being involved in the killings. Several demon-
strations led to violent clashes with the armed forces (police,
gendarmerie and army).
The days following the killings gave rise to a protest movement that
came to be called Trop c’est trop (‘Enough is Enough’). The common
theme was that people were fed up with what they considered the
‘culture of impunity’, that is, that those in power may undertake illegal
actions such as killings and economic crimes without any punishment
whatsoever. Accordingly, a common expression that people use to
describe the actions of political power-holders is ‘They make you and
there is nothing’ (On te fait et il n’y a rien). To ‘make’ someone is here
synonymous with to kill. The independent press widely debated the
Zongo affair, and urban people were very upset about the killings that
came to indicate the ‘culture of impunity’. Zongo’s weekly L’IndeUpendant(..) published photos of the carbonised remains of Zongo and
his three companions. After a few days the government decided to
establish an independent commission to investigate Zongo’s death, but
this did not significantly calm people. Different opposition parties –
notably those of the so-called February group' – and civil society
organisations continued to protest. In particular, the Burkinabe
movement for human rights (Mouvement Burkinabe[ des Droits de l’Homme
et des Peuples, MBDHP), headed by Halidou Oue!draogo, took the lead.
The movement Trop c’est trop was organised within a few days as an
umbrella organisation. Halidou Oue!draogo became the leader of a new
organisation called Collectif d’organisations deUmocratiques de masse et de partis
politiques. The uniting theme of this umbrella organisation was
essentially that all possible light should be shed on the death of Norbert
Zongo, and that the culture of impunity should be stopped (Le Pays
.. ; L’Observateur Paalga .. ; see also Oue!draogo ).
The Collectif organised a series of demonstrations and strikes, so as to
maintain the mobilisation and keep the pressure on ‘the power’ (that
is, the government and ultimately the president himself).( The Collectif
also pursued its own investigation of Zongo’s death; in early
Halidou Oue!draogo gave several press conferences on the investigations
of the Collectif, an action which was repeatedly criticised by members
of the government.
While the state-controlled press reported the dramatic events during
the first weeks, they were soon transformed into what Oue!draogo
( : ) calls tableaux d’affichage (‘notice boards ’), in that they
merely reproduced official statements. But the independent press such
as L’IndeUpendant and Journal du Jeudi continued to report on the so-called
‘arm wrestling’ (bras de fer) between the Collectif and the Pouvoir
(‘Power’). In addition, underground tracts based on more or less
correct information started to flourish; people in the inner circle of the
political power were named in such tracts. However, some commenta-
tors close to the president’s party suggested that key individuals of the
opposition might have been behind the killings in order to tarnish
President Compaore! ’s reputation and, consequently, precipitate his
loss of power. According to this position, both Zongo and ‘the Power’
had been trapped (L’Opinion April : ). But most other
commentators, from the beginning, considered that people close to the
political power were involved in Zongo’s death. Debates in the media
as well as comments made by informants varied from the direct
accusation of the Compaore! regime to the accusation of ‘ the radical
opposition’. While in late December a high-level academic told
me that the government had no interest in killing Norbert Zongo,
others found it impossible to believe that Blaise Compaore! was not
informed. Even if the moment was not well chosen, the argument goes,
the culture of impunity led the holders of political power to misjudge
the potential effects of Zongo’s death.
After the socially and politically ‘hot ’ month of January , with
popular upheavals met by repression by the armed forces, negotiations
were initiated between the government and the opposition to find a
consensus for the investigation commission. By the end of January
the commission started work, with a strong representation of the
political opposition and civil society organisations ; only three out of
eleven commission members represented the government. The lawyer
Kassoum Kambou, representing the human rights organisation
MBDHP, headed the commission. Political debates, critical writings
and petitions continued in the many independent newspapers such as
L’Observateur Paalga, L’IndeUpendant and Journal du Jeudi. Anonymous
political tracts continued to circulate in Ouagadougou and other main
cities such as Koudougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.
At the beginning of May the commission handed over its report
to the government; it was immediately made public (CEI ). Yet
the three government representatives refused to sign the final report.
The opposition saw this as a sign that they were subject to pressure. The
report established that the ‘David’ and ‘Zongo’ affairs were linked to
one another. People in the inner circle of the president were likely to
have been involved in the killings. Indicators pointed to a group of six
men in the president’s security forces. Although the report could not
prove that they were guilty, the six men were seU rieux suspects (‘ serious
suspects ’) for the assassination of Norbert Zongo and his three
companions. Demonstrations started again and some leaders were
interrogated and arrested for a few days by the gendarmerie, notably
Hermann Yame! ogo (ADF}RDA), Halidou Oue!draogo (MBDHP and
Collectif) and Thibaud Nana (president of the Association Thomas
Sankara, which is pursuing a court case in order to investigate the
killing of the country’s former president). The strained political
environment and a fear for the implosion of the country led President
Blaise Compaore! to address the nation in a speech on May . He
announced financial compensation for the families of the deceased, the
reorganisation of the security forces and the submission of the report to
the judicial system. President Compaore! also announced the creation of
a Colle[ ge des Sages (‘College of Wise Men’), that is, an advisory board
of former heads of state together with religious and political authorities.
The Colle[ ge was mandated to work for forty-five days to make
suggestions as to how Burkina could resolve the crisis. The Collectif or
political opposition remained quite sceptical about these promises. On
August the Colle[ ge submitted its report to President Compaore!(CS ). The report basically confirmed the analysis of the
Commission’s report (CEI ), but also recommended that a Truth
and Justice Commission for National Reconciliation should be created.
A new government was formed in October , but people continued
to wait for reactions of President Compaore! , who in late created
two ad hoc commissions to revise the judicial and political systems.
However, tensions continued between le Pouvoir (the government, the
president and what critics call the ‘party-state ’ CDP) and the political
and social opposition, assembled under the umbrella of the Collectif.
CDP members argued that the leaders of the Collectif sought to incite
students, pupils and the urban youth in general to vandalise property
and spoil social peace. Clashes sometimes made the usually peaceful
Ouagadougou look like a city under siege, with tear-gas, stone
throwing, police violence and burnt-out vehicles. For instance, in April
a demonstration led to serious clashes when the armed forces
stopped people marching towards the presidency. In early October
the government decided to invalidate the academic year
– because of the many strikes among students and pupils. In
November a new government was formed under the new Prime
Minister Ernest Paramanga Yonli ; the government was created on
the basis of an official agreement between the prime minister and
eight opposition parties. But the radical opposition refused to enter
the new coalition government. Indicators suggest that the unity of the
radical opposition was increasingly challenged. For instance, Herman
Yame! ogo’s ADF}RDA left the February Group in May .
Different government spokesmen negotiated with the opposition, but
the president himself remained silent. After Zongo’s death he only
addressed the nation on this topic on a few occasions. The president’s
silence together with different manoeuvres to create different commis-
sions emerge as well-established political strategies in Burkina. In
March the government initiated a National Day of Forgiveness
(JourneU e Nationale de Pardon). While several political and religious
leaders welcomed the initiative, which actually emanated from the
Colle[ ge des Sages (CS ), the Collectif and the radical opposition
rejected the idea of forgiveness before justice had been done.
Interestingly, defenders of the National Day of Forgiveness made a
strong cultural argument to unite the people in the struggle for
betterment and ‘civility ’. Former heads of state, notably Sangoule!Lamizana, Jean-Baptiste Oue!draogo and Saye Zerbo, participated
together with President Compaore! . The latter made a long speech
invoking the Burkinabe people collectively as ‘ thou’ (tu). But instead
of taking a personal stance, President Compaore! demanded in his
capacity as head of state the state’s pardon for ‘ tortures, crimes,
injustices, persecutions and all other faults committed on Burkinabe by
other Burkinabe in the name and cover of the State, from until
today’ (L’Opinion ..).
The socio-political crisis that prevails in Burkina is by no means over.
Hence this article deals with current politics, the outcome of which is
hard to foresee. While the ‘Affaire Norbert Zongo’ has led to the
deepest crisis in postcolonial Burkina, it is important to note that people
of the inner circle of the country’s political power have, since the s,
committed ‘blood crimes’ without any punishment. The current
struggle against impunity aims to render justice to those killed and their
widows and orphans.
The socio-political crisis in Burkina Faso is grounded in several
contexts. It was not only Zongo’s death that brought anger and
despair, but the widely shared sentiment that ‘enough is enough’. The
crisis broke the silence of public opinion regarding blood crimes more
generally. The first context is one of current legitimacy. President
Compaore! ’s party, the CDP, had an overwhelming majority in the
national assembly, and he himself gained formal democratic legitimacy
in the presidential elections of November . Yet while the CDP
claimed democratic legitimacy, the opposition saw itself as representing
‘ the real country’. A second context derives from the assassination
of President Thomas Sankara in the coup d’eU tat that brought Compaore!to power; in September Sankara’s widow instigated legal
proceedings to establish responsibility for the assassination of her
husband. Thirdly, there is a long tradition of social movements in
Burkina, including trade unions and student organisations. As we will
see, this tradition has been instrumental in the current crisis.
Contested legitimacy
The CDP is the dominant actor in Burkinabe politics. It is a coalition
of several parties into what is commonly called the presidential
movement ; its critics jokingly say that CDP stands for Congre[ s pour la
Distribution des Postes (‘Congress for Distributing Jobs ’). The present-
day CDP and its predecessor the ODP}MT) won overwhelming
majorities in legislative elections in and , as well as in
municipal elections in and . In President Compaore!won the presidential elections, but he was the only candidate since the
opposition boycotted them. Internationally, this created serious
problems of democratic legitimacy for Compaore! . Less than a quarter
of the registered voters participated in the elections. In early
the National Assembly changed the th article of the Constitution
according to which the president could be re-elected only once. Today
President Compaore! may be re-elected as many times as possible.
Critics say that, in practice, this means that he has become ‘president
for life ’ ; in consequence, the satirical Journal du Jeudi always portrays
Compaore! as Caesar with a laurel wreath. In November
Compaore! was re-elected in the presidential elections with ± per
cent of the votes. The only other candidates were those of ‘ the
moderate opposition’, that is, Ram Oue!draogo, ± per cent, and
Fre!de! ric Guirma, ± per cent (Burkina ). International observers
judged the elections to have been relatively fair, although ‘the radical
opposition’ of the February Group, led among others by Professor
Joseph Ki-Zerbo and lawyer Hermann Yame! ogo, boycotted the
elections. Despite the boycott President Compaore! gained a certain
democratic legitimacy.
Yet with the ‘Sapouy Drama’ one month later, Compaore! ’slegitimacy was increasingly questioned. Only one week after Zongo’s
death, Compaore! was to take the presidential oath in the presence of
a large number of African presidents in Ouagadougou (Sidwaya
..). Paradoxically, while the presidential elections had clearly
indicated that Compaore! remained ‘the boss ’, the death of Zongo soon
came to seriously challenge his regime. It also served to unite the
previously divided opposition. During the ‘hot ’ period following
Zongo’s death I met several people who argued that ‘you the
Europeans, you must see that we do not agree with what Blaise is
doing’. By this people claimed that despite ‘democratic elections ’
celebrated internationally, Burkina Faso is governed by one man, who
follows his own wishes and interests rather than the rule of law.
Throughout the crisis the Collectif and other actors supporting the
opposition argued that they represented ‘the real country’ (le pays reU el)and questioned the political legitimacy of Blaise Compaore! . The
political opposition together with civil society organisations claimed to
fight for the Burkinabe people. The Collectif also rejected the criticism
that the movement was a phenomenon of the big cities. In April ,
when serious clashes occurred in Ouagadougou, supportive demon-
strations took place in thirty-five of the forty-five provincial capitals.
A common saying in Burkina is that elections are won in the
countryside, but that power is lost in town. One reason is that the
urban population is politically much more powerful and well
articulated in national politics. Yet rural people represent the
overwhelming majority (about per cent) of the population. To what
extent did President Compaore! and the CDP maintain support from
rural people? How far into the countryside could the Collectif reach?
There is in fact a gap between the urban and French-speaking political
elite and the vast majority of rural producers (Hagberg ). Most
rural people had never read any of Zongo’s articles. Even the few who
read and write French rudimentarily would hardly be able to read
them, because Zongo’s style of writing required a relatively high level
of education. After his death, however, he became a popular hero for
many people, in particular among the urban youth. Jean Oue!draogo
( : ) raises a critical question: ‘How can the disappearance
of a simple journalist, editor of a small weekly, with hardly ,
copies, in a country of per cent illiterates, raise such an excitement? ’.
As argued below, Zongo represented something more than the content
of his articles ; for many people, he came to symbolise the courage to
speak out and tell the truth, a virtue celebrated in principle but much
more rarely translated into practice.
The legacy of Sankara
Blaise Compaore! came to power in the coup d ’eU tat of October ,
in which President Thomas Sankara was assassinated together with
twelve of his closest collaborators. In the first official comments
transmitted by the new regime, the Popular Front, Sankara was
described as autocrate, misogyne and deU voyeU . The ‘patriotic forces ’ had
decided to finish Sankara’s ‘autocratic power’. Sankara was assassi-
nated, but until today it has never been officially established how. On
the request of Mariam Sankara, the widow of the late president, a
medical officer at the Conseil de l’Entente delivered a death certificate in
January . According to this document, Thomas Sankara died a
‘natural death’ (Andriamirado : ) ! In September
Mariam Sankara instigated a civil court case against X for having
caused the death of her husband. She did not accuse a specific person,
but still her husband had been killed and no legal action had been
taken. Although this case is still pending, it continuously recalls the
legacy of Thomas Sankara. An organisation has been created to pursue
this case. When discussing the blood crimes committed by the
Compaore! regime, Sankara’s name is regularly evoked. For instance,
Radio France Internationale (RFI) interviewed Mariam Sankara in early
September about the absence of action taken by the court (see
also Le Pays .. : ). The legacy of Thomas Sankara still influences
Burkinabe politics (see Andriamirado ; Bane! gas ; Baxter &
Somerville ; Otayek et al. b). Many of the leading politicians
were involved in the so-called Revolution of –. Apart from those
in the CDP, these include Halidou Oue!draogo, the leader of the
Collectif, who was a judge in the Revolutionary Popular Court (Tribunal
Populaire ReU volutionnaire, TPR). The TPR judged mainly economic
crimes committed by powerful people (ministers, civil servants) prior to
the Revolution, and its rulings were broadcast nationally. Hence these
years were formative for many people in the current political class.
Many Burkinabe student leaders abroad, e.g. in Dakar, later became
deeply involved in national politics. Some notable exceptions to this
pattern need to be pointed out : Joseph Ki-Zerbo was in self-imposed
exile in Senegal – and Hermann Yame! ogo returned to politics
only in (McFarland & Rupley ).
The legacy of Sankara is also evident in party politics. Several
political parties label themselves sankaristes ; their leaders claim to keep
Sankara’s political ideas alive. These parties are allowed to practice
politics and participate in elections, but have suffered seriously from
internal conflicts. Yet despite several splits and contradictions the
Sankara movement held a congress in the Maison du Peuple in central
Ouagadougou in August . The most important sankariste or-
ganisation is the Front des Forces Sociales, led by Norbert Michel
Tie!ndrebe! ogo (see FSS n.d.).
The tradition of social movements
There is a long tradition of protest among social movements and trade
unions in postcolonial Burkina (Balima ; Otayek et al. b;
Savonnet-Guyot ). The first president of independent Haute
Volta, Maurice Yame! ogo, lost power on January after protests
and demonstrations among pupils and trade unions, bringing General
Lamizana to power. In pupils and students protested against the
Lamizana government, which was followed by a coup d’eU tat that brought
Colonel Zaye Zerbo to power. In May the arrest of then Prime
Minister Thomas Sankara led to demonstrations and strikes, and to
Sankara’s eventual release. Such events still serve as a reminder for
people that when people get really frustrated they have the capacity to
overthrow the regime.
In general, it can be argued that trade unions, chieftaincies,
churches, NGOs and the associative movement have for a long time
been sufficiently strong to escape being swallowed by the state, despite
repeated attempts of political power-holders to control civil society.
Trade unions have often mobilised against the authoritarianism of
different regimes and for democratic liberties. Otayek et al. (a:
–) argue that despite the lack of a ‘democratic culture’ in Burkina,
there is at least a tradition of political debate around the democratic
question on which the foundation of democracy could be built.
Accordingly, it is a society used to a certain freedom of expression
(Dubuch ). Even in the current socio-political crisis the state
administration still maintains certain legitimacy. Although newspapers
write that the ruling majority party CDP has ‘ taken over’ the state,
many of those who take the lead in criticising the government are state
agents. In other words, while the government’s legitimacy may be
questioned, the legitimacy of the state administration itself is not
addressed.
The demonstrations that occurred after the ‘Sapouy Drama’ thus
enter into this tradition of social movements. A few weeks after Zongo’s
death protest demonstrations were planned for January .
Symbolically, this reminded people of the coup d’eU tat ; rumours
held that the opposition politician Hermann Yame! ogo wanted to
revenge his father Maurice Yame! ogo’s loss of power years earlier.
Although the government had explicitly forbidden demonstrations,
officially for security reasons, many people gathered to demonstrate in
cities and towns across the country. They were violently persecuted by
the armed forces. In Ouagadougou many demonstrators fled to the
cathedral, but this did not prevent the armed forces from attacking
them (Journal du Jeudi –.. ; L’IndeUpendant ..).
The leader of the Collectif, Halidou Oue!draogo, is a key person
together with Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Tole Sagnon, the leader
of the trade union ConfeUdeU ration GeUneU rale du Travail du Burkina(CGT-B).
On June the Collectif organised its th National Meeting}March to keep the pressure on the struggle against impunity. Yet
criticism was increasingly heard against Halidou Oue!draogo and the
other leaders of the movement. The invalidation of the academic year
– and the closure of the university in October exposed
them to open scepticism even among people supporting the struggle.
Many people state that while the children of the elite – both the power-
holders and the opposition – are sent abroad to study to get university
diplomas, the higher education of poor people’s children in Burkina
Faso is sacrificed for political reasons.
In the attempt to unfold the socio-cultural logics in the struggle against
impunity, I have chosen to work especially with political discourse,
mainly expressed in newspapers and petitions. On the basis of different
fieldwork periods carried out since and a continuous reading of
some main Burkinabe newspapers, I seek to analyse the morally loaded
political discourse that has emerged in Burkina following the ‘Sapouy
Drama’ in December . Beyond the specific claims for justice, the
struggle against impunity can be related on a more general level to
notions of the public space. This section assesses the relationship
between impunity and public space in Burkina Faso, followed by a
reflection on how ideas of truth and courage and the legitimacy of
White people are used in Burkinabe political discourse. It argues that
political discourse in media, political petitions and tracts, and also in
personal discussion, is reproduced within a specific frame of reference
according to which the boundaries of the public space and the
appropriate way to behave there are contested issues. Where is the
proper place for political debate? What is the proper way to behave
there? In this sense, I endorse a perspective according to which
anthropology should try to understand civil society to refer ‘more
loosely to the moral community, to the problems of accountability,
trust and co-operation that all groups face’ (Hann : ). Instead
of defining ‘civil society ’ and ‘social capital ’ and then looking for
empirical phenomena which could fit such definitions, I find it far more
satisfactory to address issues related to moral community and political
culture more loosely. In this vein, the struggle against impunity
highlights behaviour and boundaries in Burkinabe public space.
Impunity and public space
The concept of impunity emerged in human rights discourse in the
s. Impunity is generally defined as the exemption or freedom from
punishment, harm or loss ; it is a concept closely connected with abuse
of human rights by powerful actors cum institutions. Amnesty
International sees the struggle against impunity as a main priority. The
struggle against human rights violations appeals to international
opinion, and uses networks linking people together globally. In the
Hague Appeal for Peace (), it is argued that :
International Law is an essential tool for the advance of peace and justice, butthe worthy principles established in international treaties are often violated bythe same governments that proclaim them. Therefore we need effectiveinternational institutions to protect our rights when the national legal systemsare proven to be unable or unwilling to comply with their duties. Otherwise,the culture of impunity will be reinforced, thus weakening the hope in justice,and encouraging the repetition of the same offenses.
Accordingly, impunity does not prevail as single events, but needs to
be understood as a culture, that is, a system of meaning embraced by
holders of political power and their closest collaborators. Reviewing
different cases of impunity internationally, the salient point is that ‘ the
official or quasi-official status of the perpetrators shielded them from
sanction, creating a culture of impunity in which the most inhumane
acts could be carried out without fear of repercussions ’ (Roht-Arriaza
: ). President Blaise Compaore! is in no way exempt from
allegations raised internationally (Amnesty ). Although the Zongo
affair is first and foremost a domestic issue (despite the involvement of
international organisations such as the African Union for Human
Rights and Reporters sans Frontie[ res), the president’s role in diamond and
arms trafficking in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola has been
condemned by international organisations, including the United
Nations (). In this context, L’IndeUpendant (.. : ) wrote that
‘ this delinquent behaviour of our authorities on the international
scene’ leads Burkina towards an international embargo, adding
ironically : ‘We have to pray that Savimbi has enough diamonds to
compensate us. ’
In Burkina, the culture of impunity is generally held to have
emerged after the coup d’eU tat in October , although some argue that
it dates from the advent of the Revolution in . The ‘Sapouy
Drama’ was not interpreted as a single and isolated assassination, but
as part of a certain political culture. It thus became the starting-point
for an organised and widely mobilised socio-political struggle against
impunity. The impunity concept is clearly linked to global processes of
holding people in power, including former heads of state such as
Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic, responsible for their
misdeeds. Yet impunity is simultaneously linked to local concerns and
strife. Although the combat against impunity includes economic crimes
as well as ‘blood crimes’, it is particularly the right to life (droit a[ la vie)
that tops the agenda in Burkina Faso. If the right to life is not respected,
the argument goes, it does not matter whether other rights are granted
or not. Political parties of the so-called radical opposition boycotted the
elections for this reason. One critical headline suggested that the
municipal elections in September were elections to cover
‘democratic repression’ (L’IndeUpendant ..).
Since a long list of people have been assassinated or have
‘disappeared’. There are an increasing number of orphans and
widows. Some of the best known ‘blood crimes’ preceding those of
David Oue!draogo and Norbert Zongo include Professor Guillaume
Sessouma in , the medical student Dabo Boukary in and
Cle!ment Oumarou Oue!draogo, a prominent opposition leader, who
was killed in a grenade attack in central Ouagadougou in . In
addition to killings of civilians, several people in the inner circle of
political power have been killed – often in ‘car accidents ’ – after
having been seen as threatening. After the death of Cle!ment Oumarou
Oue!draogo, Norbert Zongo wrote an article in Journal du Jeudi
(–.., reprinted ..–..), arguing that the first
sign, the ultimate sign, the only evident sign of the existence of the rule
of law is respect for human life. The Constitution, the electoral law, the
Supreme Court and all ‘ the verbal salad’ are only mediocre varnish, if
human life may be taken away at every corner. Zongo ended the article
with the now famous expression: De graW ce! Plus jamais cn a!
The death of Norbert Zongo has implied that the ‘culture of
impunity’ is publicly challenged. While other people have been killed
since December , the assassins can no longer be sure of political
protection. In January , for example, a civil servant working for
the National Power Company SONABEL was tortured to death by
gendarmes in Bobo-Dioulasso after a private quarrel in a bar. This led
to massive protests and a nation-wide cut in electricity for one day
effected by the colleagues of the victim. The gendarmes were judged
and put in prison. In June sons of the traditional Mossi king in
Tenkodogo, some km southeast of Ouagadougou, killed a man
belonging to the political opposition in town. This led to a serious
questioning of the implication of traditional chieftaincies in national
politics (Journal du Jeudi –.. : ). The king himself was accused
of ‘non assistance to a person in danger’, because the assassination took
place in the royal courtyard. The perpetrators of the Tenkodogo events
are to be tried in court, but the king himself, however, died a natural
death in September (L’IndeUpendant .. : ; Journal du Jeudi
–.. : ).
The relationship between impunity and the public space is
conceptually challenging. While impunity is to a large extent associated
with darkness, nightly operations and secrecy, the public space implies
overt and visible deliberations. The struggle against impunity is not
only a struggle to render justice to specific victims of ‘blood crimes’, but
also to render operations and actions public. Ideally, the public space
is characterised by transparency and open debate ; the expression ‘ to
shed light ’ ( faire la lumie[ re) on the death of Norbert Zongo clearly
illustrates this. The role of popular music for disseminating political
messages to an otherwise non-political audience, the youth, is also
significant. Alpha Blondy dedicated a song to the memory of Norbert
Zongo in his album Elohim. The song starts with Blondy singing alone:
‘Au clair de la lune, mon ami Zongo} Refusa de bayonner sa plume,
Burkina Faso} Et Zongo est mort, bru# le! par le feu} Que justice soit faite
pour l’amour de Dieu’ (Blondy ). Alpha Blondy’s use of the
famous French song Au clair de la lune (‘ in the moonlight ’) to urge
justice for Norbert Zongo emphasised the symbolic need ‘to shed light ’
and ‘render public ’ what otherwise would lurk in the darkness.
It should be clear, however, that there is not one single public space
in Burkina Faso, but that, instead, there is a public space to be
managed in every community. The concept refers to the public gaze of
events linked to the rise of modern mass media. Free press and public
debates favour the emergence of a public space. But public space is not
only associated with the modern state and in African contexts the
postcolonial state. To be legitimate the public space related to the
postcolonial state must link up with other spaces, such as those linked
to ethnic, religious and regional belongings.*
Two main characteristics of the Burkinabe public space are linked to
behaviour and boundaries. This public space defines first a way to
behave and second a bounded space within which politics should be
practised. First, the public space urges a certain behaviour on key
actors, because it is in the acts of people – be they politicians,
journalists, trade unionists or ordinary people at the grass roots – that
the public space is shaped. In the public space people are expected to
act according to the implicit rules of a code of conduct. The behaviour
of political actors is particularly under scrutiny. Secondly, the public
space in national politics also defines the boundaries within which
politics is to be practised. The current crisis involves a continuous
struggle over the drawing of boundaries, because the boundaries of the
public space are constantly negotiated. While, in principle, any actor
might intervene in Burkinabe public space, the boundaries are
particularly highlighted with respect to French people.
Truth and courage
Norbert Zongo started his weekly newspaper in and soon became
admired for his courageous analyses of Burkinabe politics. Zongo did
not hesitate to pick up sensitive topics such as the gold traffic of the
CEMOB (Compagnie d’exploitation des mines d’or du Burkina), the illegal
selling of urban land plots (linked to politicians of the ruling CDP) and
the issuing of multiple electoral cards (cf. Zongo ). He developed
a strong argument against Compaore! ’s manoeuvres to become
‘president for life ’, that is, the modification of the th article of the
Burkinabe Constitution. Zongo emerged as one of the few who dared
challenge the power-holders of the Fourth Republic. Although he used
a pseudonym – ‘Henri Sebgo’ or simply ‘H.S. ’ – it was well known
that he was the author. Yet while most articles were published in his
name (‘H.S. ’), it later became clear that he had had a group of
journalists around him.
In Norbert Zongo started to write about the death of the driver
of the petit preU sident Franc: ois Compaore! , younger brother of President
Blaise Compaore! , publishing his weekly revelations to the increasing
interest of the readers. But despite Zongo’s writings and the fact that
David Oue!draogo had died at the Conseil, the judicial system took no
action. A brother of Oue!draogo instead instigated a civil court case
against Franc: ois Compaore! . But Compaore! did not present himself to
the court. In one of his last articles, published only five days before his
own death, Norbert Zongo addressed Franc: ois Compaore! directly
(L’IndeUpendant .. : ) :
We recall Mr Compaore! Franc: ois that the first article of our Constitution saysthis : ‘All Burkinabe are born free and equal in rights ’. Sir, one has to take thatinto account. A man is dead and you are accused. Go and respond, if not wewill finish believing that you are guilty and stand above the constitution.
In the last few months of his life Norbert Zongo wrote explicitly that
he feared for his life. Early in November he was to have been
poisoned when he took a trip to Kaya, some km north of
Ouagadougou, but the attempt failed. In the issue of December
(L’IndeUpendant .. : ) Zongo wrote that, according to rumours,
solutions are now looked for, but are they good?
Let us today suppose that L’IndeUpendant definitively ceases to appear for onereason or another (the death of its director, his poisoning, the definiteprohibition to appear etc.). We remain convinced that the David problem willremain posed, and sooner or later, it has to be solved. Sooner or later !
During the very last days of his life Zongo is said to have been
increasingly aware that something was going to happen (CEI ).
But he changed neither his position nor his editorial policy. It is worth
noting, however, that since his death L’IndeUpendant has continued to
appear every week; it has not only pursued the Zongo affair, but has
also taken up other ‘affairs ’. But the journalists continue to celebrate
the courage of Norbert Zongo as pioneering.
Today, Zongo has become a national hero. Some link him with
former president Thomas Sankara. Both Sankara and Zongo are
sometimes treated as ‘ saints ’ : neither was afraid and both always said
what they thought. In October L’IndeUpendant (..)
republished an article written by Zongo on the th anniversary of the
death of Thomas Sankara. The introductory note states that both
Thomas Sankara and Norbert Zongo were killed, because they dreamt
about the same thing for this people of peasants : dignity and social
justice. The salient point is that Sankara and Zongo dared to tell the
truth and therefore had a lot of courage. In other words, they made
public what had long been kept secret and silenced. Such idealised
statements about a former president and an influential journalist
cannot be accepted at face value, but nonetheless reveal significant
clues to morality. And even though such a comparison is unfair to
Zongo – Sankara was a head of state and had taken power by force
– it is striking that the connection between the two is often made in
public debate.
The discourse on truth and courage is used to urge the president to
take action. In political petitions and analyses writers have appealed to
the courage of Blaise Compaore! . Hence the president is addressed not
only in terms of his political and administrative duties, but also in terms
of his moral obligations. The editorial of L’IndeUpendant often contains a
strong element of morality. It advises the president to do this or that in
order to solve the situation. President Compaore! has, on several
occasions, been advised to arrest his brother for the murder of the
driver. In August the editorial even suggested that President
Compaore! should step aside from the presidency (L’IndeUpendant.. : ) :
But Mr President, things have changed for every Burkinabe since the SapouyDrama. As long as President Blaise Compaore! makes no distinction betweenthe interests of his family and ‘the major interest of the Burkinabe people ’, hewill not govern this country.
It could be argued that it is in the strategic interests of journalists not
to challenge power-holders directly. Zongo’s death clearly illustrates
the danger that every critical journalist is running. Yet there is a sense
of common concern for the country that is expressed in most statements
and articles : ‘we’re among the poorest countries on the globe according
to the HDI-index’, ‘we need to preserve social peace’, and ‘ look at
wars raging our neighbours ’ (e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone). The
allegations against President Compaore! about the involvement in the
diamonds and arms trade in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone (UN
) is especially feared as it might drive Burkina into war.
Beyond these remarks, it is revealing that the political discourse on
impunity does not directly address its structural causes, but rather
addresses the president personally. The morality of the president is
questioned in the sense that he is not deemed to have acted according
to commonly shared ideas of how to rule. He has exaggerated and
transgressed the limits of the acceptable. According to many observers
the critical limit was when the th article of the Constitution was
changed, removing any limit to the number of times the president can
be re-elected (Constitution ). In practice, people say that this
modification means that ‘Blaise has become president for life ’. Blaise
Compaore! lost political legitimacy when he sought to make his
presidency ‘eternal ’. While Compaore! is legitimate according to
multiparty elections, the challenges to his morality erode other forms of
political legitimacy.
Ideas of leadership are not limited to the presidency. Since I
have found that in any discussion of a leader’s abuse of power people
tend to use the expression ‘we’ll wait and see’. Thus leadership is
related to ideas such as to ‘ tell the truth’ and to ‘be courageous ’. The
courage to speak out is highly valued both in villages as well as in
national political discourse. For instance, people of the Karaboro
ethnic group often characterise themselves as ‘people who walk on the
truth’, while their Tiefo neighbours say their very ethnic label
originates from the expression ‘ to tell the truth’ (tien fo) (Hagberg
). But the leader may also choose not to speak. While palaver is
held in a public space (Bidima ), silence may also communicate
meaning. In fact silence is a very common way to exercise power in
Burkina. President Compaore! has addressed the nation only on a few
occasions since December . Yet many writers have urged him to
speak. After the report of the Colle[ ge des Sages in August , people
expected the president to make a pronouncement, but he remained
silent. Such a silence is a way to rule and is politically significant,
although the politics of silence is highly ambiguous. While it may be an
instrument of resistance, silence is also an instrument of power, terror
and control (Le Breton : ). One editorial in L’IndeUpendant
(.. : ) commented upon the silence of the president after the
report of the Colle[ ge des Sages was submitted to him. ‘This silence of
Blaise Compaore! bodes no good. ’
Silence is likewise an element in traditional leadership. The Naaba,
that is, the king or chief in Mossi kingdoms, is expected to remain quiet
in public and simply give orders by nodding his head, or quietly relay
to his spokesman what he wants to say. Furthermore, the bard (griot in
French, jeli in Dyula) in many West African societies is seen as the
master of speech. The griot addresses members of the traditional
aristocracy, who reply by offering gifts to the griot. Here the art of
speaking is thus confined to a specific socio-professional category of
people. But as we will see the griot is also popularly seen as a servant
of power-holders.
Political discourse on truth and courage is highly moral, and this is
often expressed in kinship idioms. Two instances of kinship in political
discourse must be mentioned. First, Norbert Zongo and his younger
brother Ernest were killed in the ‘Sapouy Drama’. In Koudougou (the
hometown of the Zongo family) the protests against the killings were
particularly strong. When the news was made public by Radio France
Internationale (RFI), students and pupils in Koudougou went out in the
streets and attacked the homes and offices of leading CDP politicians.
A curfew was imposed for a week. When the opposition called in
January for three ‘dead city days ’ ( journeU es de villes mortes), it was
particularly in Koudougou that this call was heeded. In the press and
even more among people I have talked to, the assassination of Zongo
was seen as a conflict between the Zongo family (Norbert and Ernest)
and the Compaore! family (Blaise and Franc: ois). This has further been
interpreted as a conflict between the Mossi of Ouagadougou and the
Mossi of Koudougou (Journal du Jeudi ..–..). Kinship
is also at stake in the ‘Affaire David’. The Compaore! family was
accused of not informing the family of David Oue!draogo about the
latter’s death. In the military court in August , Franc: ois Compaore!was asked why he did not inform them and replied that he did not
know where David Oue!draogo lived! It was only in mid- that the
Compaore! and Oue!draogo families engaged in the traditional
reconciliation process to resolve the problem of David Oue' draogo’s
death between them (L’IndeUpendant .. : –).
Ideas about truth and courage are central in current political
discourse. These ideas express notions of the public space in the sense
of the ways in which leaders and other political actors should behave.
To tell the truth and to be courageous are celebrated virtues, but the
leader may also manage silence. To choose not to speak may be a
tremendous weapon.
The legitimacy of White people
Soon after Zongo’s death the international NGO Reporters sans Frontie[ res(RSF) sent an investigation team to Burkina. During one week the two
French journalists talked to most eyewitnesses and other people with
information on the ‘Sapouy Drama’. At the end of their mission they
held a press conference at which they presented their report (RSF
). They revealed that the police survey had not yet started more
than two weeks after Zongo’s death, and that most of the people whom
they had met had not yet been questioned. The presence of RSF
irritated government representatives. At a press conference the then
minister of justice Yarga Larba condemned the RSF investigation for
being conducted without appropriate permission. He argued that the
Commission d’EnqueW te IndeUpendante (CEI) that had been created should be
allowed to begin working.
At the end of January (due to strikes, riots etc.) the CEI started
work and the secretary general of RSF Robert Me!nard became a
member of it. The commission worked for four months and delivered
its report on May . Meanwhile, however, Me!nard gave some
interviews to RFI to report on the work in progress. This was badly
taken by the government representatives, who argued that Me!nard did
not respect the secrecy of the commission. In the report the commission
was unable to identify any guilty persons but pointed out six seU rieuxsuspects among the president’s security forces. On May, when he was
about to leave the country and return to France, Me!nard gave an
interview for Horizon FM, an independent Ouagadougou-based radio
station. During the interview he said that those responsible for the
killings in the security forces were voyous (‘bandits ’). At this moment
the gendarmes drove directly to the radio, interrupted the interview
and brought Me!nard back to his hotel where he was guarded in his
room until take-off for Paris.
In July when Me!nard wanted to return to Burkina to monitor
the results of the commission’s work, he was denied a visa. The reason,
according to a letter from the Security Minster Djibril Yipe!ne! Bassolet
to Me!nard (published in L’IndeUpendant .. : ), was his in-
volvement in the Zongo affair :
You have recently, with regard to this delicate affair, undertaken measuresand made statements, both in Burkina and abroad, which have provoked
passions that your mission of July will only revive, while we are working tocreate the conditions for a dispassionate and impartial justice, without anyform of pressure.
In September Me!nard was once again denied entry into Burkina.
When he arrived at Ouagadougou airport he was escorted back to his
plane by the security forces (BBC ..).
However, the presence of White people has not been limited to the
opposition. In March the death of David Oue!draogo was to be
treated by the civil court after a long procedure, with many attempts
to obstruct the dossier. The petit preU sident Franc: ois Compaore! had called
in the French lawyer Maı# tre Pierre Olivier Sur to support his
Burkinabe lawyer Maı# tre Abdoul Oue!draogo (L’Opinion –..).
The French lawyer dismissed the procedure and publicly attacked
Maı# tre Sankara, representing the brother of the victim. The symbolism
of this cannot be mistaken, in that even the power-holders had recourse
to French people. Apparently, Maı# tre Sur did not know much about
the court case in advance, but was called in to legitimise the claims of
innocence made by Franc: ois Compaore! . While the opposition already
had their supporter in Robert Me!nard, the government now had their
own ‘White’.
Another French citizen, Jean Guion, got involved as an advisor to
President Compaore! . In an article published by L’IndeUpendant (..
), he suggested that Zongo and his companions might have been
victims of a car accident. Guion portrayed Zongo as a big landowner
and as a devoted sankariste whose writings against the presidential
family were personally rooted. In the next issue of L’IndeUpendant(.. : ), Guion was portrayed as le griot blanc and his whole
argument was attacked:
What makes us get mixed up in the stories of chamberlains, troubadours,beggars and other musicians of the Royal Courtyard? We would voluntarilyhave liked to pass by if it was not, once again, about Norbert Zongo, aliasHenri Sebgo and his memory.
With the help of Maı# tre Sur, Franc: ois Compaore! won a victory. The
David Oue!draogo dossier was transferred from the civil court to the
military court. As it became clear that members of the president’s
security forces were the perpetrators, the civil court decided that it was
‘ incompetent ’ to judge the case (Le Journal du Soir ..). Despite
the fact that some of the agents were recognised to have participated in
the torture, the dossier could not be treated by the civil court.The
reason was that the case was no longer about the theft of money, but
instead about the accusation that David Oue!draogo had been involved
in a planned coup d ’eU tat. In August the military court finally
established that David Oue!draogo had been tortured to death by
members of the security forces. The head of the group was imprisoned
for twenty years and two others for ten years. Two members of the
group were acquitted for lack of evidence. The sixth member had died
earlier and, moreover, in January one of the two imprisoned for
ten years became ill and died. People fear that they will all die before
trial of the Zongo affair ! The different accusations against David
Oue!draogo – theft and attempted coup d ’eU tat – were not substantiated
by the court. Franc: ois Compaore! was called as a witness, but
accusations against him could not be tried. Yet the public attorneys
verbally and publicly ‘undressed’ Franc: ois Compaore! . He was morally,
if not legally, deemed guilty by public opinion.
In this political turmoil the presence of White people in general, and
the French in particular, is a hotly debated issue. An article in
L’IndeUpendant (..) discussed the possible involvement of France
and argued that the former colonial power had been involved in many
of the affairs treated by Norbert Zongo. Well-educated people often
strongly criticise the French, while, paradoxically, in daily discourse
White people are often represented as people who stand above
Burkinabe vested interests and are therefore ‘neutral ’. It does not seem
to be merely a coincidence that both the Collectif and the holders of
political power made recourse to White people, because national
politics needs to link up with global processes. The most important
material about the Zongo affair is, for instance, accessible on various
websites. Trade unions and human rights organisations mainly in
France supported the protests. Organisations created specific websites
for the Zongo affair."! The revealing point about the legitimacy of
White people is that both sides use French counterparts to justify their
positions, while at the same time criticising the opposite side for doing
just that. Robert Me!nard of RSF was repeatedly criticised for surveying
and talking to eyewitnesses and for delivering progress reports to the
media. Representatives of the political power did not define Me!nard
within the boundaries of the public space. Similarly, Maı# tre Olivier
Sur and Jean Guion were severely criticised by people in the opposition
for not knowing enough about the country. They were viewed as just
playing their roles as griots blancs to satisfy people in power in general
and the Compaore! family in particular. In L’IndeUpendant (.. : ),
a reader wrote a severe note directed towards Jean Guion: ‘I agree that
M. Guion as a friend of President Blaise Compaore! and as his advisor
wants to defend his interests, but please, do not mix up with the affairs
of a State. You are an expatriate. ’ According to the reader, Jean Guion
as an expatriate should not get involved in Burkinabe politics, because
he did not belong to the Burkinabe public space. The paradox lies in
the fact that while criticising the opposite side for taking recourse to
White people, there are always ‘good Whites ’ with whom one can
collaborate. All sides seek support from White people to gain political
legitimacy.
In the current political context the boundaries of the public space are
contested. The presence of White people has not only challenged these
boundaries, but also the ways in which people behave. While the
boundary between the free press issued in Burkina and the underground
tracts is one domain of contest, the imaginary boundary between
Burkinabe politics and global processes – here articulated through
Internet and international NGOs – is another. Underground tracts are
used in Burkina at critical periods. Prior to the coup d’eU tat in ,
rumours circulated intensely and tracts were spread. Similarly, the
‘Sapouy Drama’ provoked a continuous spread of underground tracts.
The media remains sceptical about such tracts, because they
disseminate rumours without taking the responsibility for naming
people. Yet tracts may also be seen as a way to express what is
impossible to say in public debate. The political use of sorcery has, for
example, been suggested in such tracts.
Attempts to understand processes of legitimisation of ‘ illicit practices ’
of ‘ the African State’ within socio-cultural and postcolonial logics are
inherently problematic, because sweeping generalisations tend to
ignore the specificities of national historical trajectories (for a critique,
see Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan ). While there is a moral
matrix that can aid us in understanding basic questions of political
legitimacy (Schatzberg ), the ambition to generalise on a
continental scale – ‘African State’ and ‘African politics ’ – is easily
trapped in essentialist categories. In this article I have tried to
demonstrate that the struggle against impunity follows socio-cultural
logic. If the value systems and cultural codes which allow a justification
of ‘criminalisation’ and ‘corruption’ by those who practise it need to
be explored, my main argument is that we also need to seriously study
the struggle against such phenomena in its proper social and cultural
context. Detailed ethnographic accounts of national politics emerge as
a necessary remedy against sweeping generalisations of the African
State. Instead of searching for the replication of one particular Western
model of ‘civil society ’ or ‘ social capital ’, I find it far more fruitful to
explore notions of the public space as they are expressed in the struggle
against impunity. Political discourse is morally loaded in Burkina Faso.
First, ideas of truth and courage clearly deal with the public space as
a way to behave. That structural causes are left out clearly indicates the
emphasis on the individual behaviour of key actors. The morality of
political actors is at stake. Secondly, debates concerning the legitimacy
of White people strongly relate to the boundaries of the public space.
When White people have been involved in the Zongo affair, arguments
about their non-belonging to the public space have been put forward.
In other words, only those invested with the power to speak may have
a say, that is, practise politics. Thus in current political discourse in
Burkina, notions of the public space both define a way to behave and
the boundaries of public debate.
The Collectif seems to suggest that in contrast to current political
order, politics must be practised by morally worthy actors and in
public. The morality emerges as a particularly useful strategy, provided
that the movement’s leaders have good personal records. In this vein,
attacks on these leaders have been based less on political arguments
than on moral ones. Two examples may be cited. First, in early
some Ivoirian newspapers accused Halidou Oue!draogo of corruption.
He was supposed to have received a ‘gift ’ of million francs CFA
from ex-president Henri Konan Bedie! of Co# te d’Ivoire. While
Oue!draogo was later acquitted of these accusations by the court in
Co# te d’Ivoire, the affair was picked up by Burkinabe newspapers close
to the government (L’Hebdo du Burkina –.. : ; L’Opinion
.–.. : , –.. ; for more critical stance see L’IndeUpen-dant .., .. ; San Finna –..). Secondly, opposition
leaders are accused of sending their children abroad to study while
inciting ‘poor people’s children’ in Ouagadougou to strike. The
argument is that the invalidation of the academic year – did
not affect the children of the political elite.
In addition, the socio-political crisis is a means by which the public
space may be redefined. First, Internet connections and various web-
sites have increased people’s access to the different reports (CEI ;
CS ; RSF ), despite the fact that the overwhelming majority
of Burkinabe citizens do not have access to the Internet. Most people
do not understand French, nor do they read and write. Yet by
publishing these reports on the Internet, the very idea of keeping them
confidential evaporates. Burkinabe newspapers may then publish the
reports, because the information is already circulating in cities, and
soon in rural towns as well. It is therefore paradoxical that notions of
the public space are redefined by means of Information Technology
to which only a small minority has access.
Secondly, however, the circulation of underground tracts and
rumours contests the public space (cf. Oue!draogo ). Detailed
information about the president, his brother and other key actors
circulates intensely in the country. The web of communication connects
people through various bonds (e.g. kinship, regional belonging and
friendship). People are rapidly informed by what is going on in
different parts of Burkina. This web of communication is maintained
through phone calls, letters, hearsay and rumour. It has consequently
little to do with the Internet, but certainly contributes to redefining the
public space. The tracts are often dismissed by both political power-
holders and the media. They are seen as a way to disseminate rumours
without contributing to a serious political debate.
Freedom of the press has certainly been instrumental in Burkinabe
politics. Although political jokes and satirical comments are not new
(Badini ; Labaze! e ; Savonnet-Guyot ), the freedom of
the press has, in the s, led to an explosion of independent
newspapers and radio-stations. The government has come to accept
even strong criticism. Some would argue that this is precisely because
of President Compaore! ’s need to perform as a democratic pioneer
(‘washing the blood of Sankara’) without leaving the real power to
anyone else. Yet while political discourse is morally loaded and focuses
on the behaviour of key political actors, structural causes of the crisis
are rarely addressed. Few attempts have been made to question the
state administrative structure itself. Instead, the legalist argument has
been favoured. In other words, the rule of law must be respected, but
the law itself is not questioned. The reason for this is that the right to
life must be prior to any other right.
While the Collectif has successfully explored the moral dimension of
political discourse, it has largely remained outside party politics. The
Collectif itself has no political programme, although Halidou Oue!draogo
has been criticised for nurturing political ambitions. Paradoxically, the
Collectif is a main political actor that does not intend to transform itself
into a party. Political parties of the ‘radical opposition’ that are
members of the Collectif do have political programmes, but they have
on several occasions boycotted elections and thus remained outside
electoral competition. It can therefore be argued that morality provides
a political strategy for the ‘radical opposition’ and serves to unite
opposition and thus avoid fission. In this vein, it is interesting to note
that President Compaore! , whose CDP dominates party politics, has
recently sought to enter the morally loaded political discourse. The
National Day of Forgiveness on March focused on the need to
forgive. It seems to have been instrumental in dividing the opposition
by its appeal to the moral obligation to forgive.
Throughout this article I have argued that a culturally informed
analysis of the current socio-political crisis in Burkina allows us to
unfold political discourse. It helps us to focus on the ways in which
notions of the public space – both as boundaries and as behaviour – are
revealed in current power struggles. It is striking to what extent the
idea of the Burkinabe moral community is articulated in political
discourse. In all political camps people refer to the need to preserve
social peace. In the struggle against impunity attempts are made to
broaden the public space, to keep the initiative and make things
(information, knowledge etc.) public. It is the very acts of the political
power-holders that demonstrate the moral erosion. Therefore, the
struggle against impunity also takes place on a symbolic level at which
key symbols are appropriated, interpreted and incorporated into
political discourse. It clearly links up with the particular historicity of
Burkinabe politics, because the struggle against impunity seeks to
render public what has for a long time been seen as secret, and offers
a sense of meaning in a context of ruthless assassinations.
. Some recent studies deal with the daily ‘petty corruption’ as contrasted to ‘big corruption’(cf. Olivier de Sardan a; Blundo ).
. Le pire n’est pas la meU chanciteU des gens mauvais mais le silence des gens biens. All translations fromthe French in this paper are the author’s.
. The Conseil de l’Entente was originally built for the organisation with the same name that wascreated in to strengthen collaboration between Co# te d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Beninand Niger. This locality in Ouagadougou has been the scene of violent events in postcolonialhistory. In particular, the former president Thomas Sankara was killed there on October in the coup d ’eU tat.
. Later, the president’s security forces defended themselves by saying that David Oue!draogowas involved in planning a coup d ’eU tat.
. On the death certificate of David Oue!draogo was written ‘de! ce!de! le janvier a' hde sa maladie ’ (quoted in Oue!draogo : ).
. The group was formed on February to unite so-called radical opposition partiesagainst the majority movement of CDP. These opposition parties accused the power-holdingparty of fraud after the legislative elections.
. People often use the term le pouvoir en place (‘ the power in place ’) to describe the inner circleof the political power. The vagueness of the term le pouvoir allows for interpretation, but mostpeople agree that it is first and foremost the president who is targeted by using this term.
. Organisation pour la DeUmocratie et le Progre[ s}Mouvement du Travail. The ODP}MT was replacedby the CDP in January and all the seats in electoral assemblies were transferred to the CDP.
. Some recent works deal with the public space in different West African contexts (Laurent ; Le Meur ; Olivier de Sardan b).
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