J. of Modern African Studies, , (), pp. –. # Cambridge University PressDOI: .}SX Printed in the United Kingdom

‘Enough is Enough’: an

ethnography of the struggle

against impunity in Burkina Faso

Sten Hagberg*

This article analyses the ways in which socio-political opposition is expressedby looking into the morally loaded discourse of political legitimacy in Bur-kina Faso that emerged after the assassination of the journalist Norbert Zon-go in December . Through the analysis of different political statements,newspapers and various comments from the ‘street ’, it locates the struggleagainst impunity in a social and political undercurrent in Burkinabe society.In this context, notions of the public space are central, because the publicspace defines both the boundaries of public debate and the behaviour of keypolitical actors. Two recurrent themes in Burkinabe political discourse,namely ideas of truth and courage, and the legitimacy of White people, il-lustrate the various ways in which socio-political opposition seeks to definethe public space within which politics is to be practised and the behaviourto be observed by those acting there. But the struggle against impunity alsotakes place on a symbolic level at which key symbols are appropriated, inter-preted and incorporated into political discourse.

Corruption, criminalisation and disorder emerge as major themes in

contemporary conceptualisations of ‘ the African State’. It has been

argued that the patrimonial nature of the state favours vertical

clientelistic relationships rather than horizontal organisational struc-

tures. Many features of public life in Africa suggest that the State itself

is becoming a vehicle for criminalisation and disorder (Bayart ;

* Research Fellow, Department of Cultural Anthropology & Ethnology, Uppsala University.Fieldwork has been carried out mainly in western and central Burkina for a total of five years ; ofparticular importance to this article is the fieldwork between October and April . Anearlier version of the article was presented for the panel ‘A socio-anthropology of corruption:comparative perspectives ’ organised by Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan atthe nd Meeting of the African Studies Association in Philadelphia – November . Thearticle has also benefited from the critical reading of many colleagues, notably the members of theLiving Beyond Conflict Seminar at Uppsala University (http:}}www.antro.uu.se}lbc}). I amparticularly grateful for Jan Ovesen’s critical reading and inspiring comments. Thanks also forcomments provided by Mats Ha/ rsmar, Murray Last, Christopher Clapham and the anonymousreferees of the Journal of Modern African Studies.

Bayart et al. ; Chabal & Daloz ; see also Bratton & van de

Walle ; Schatzberg ). While I do not question the seriousness

of state crises in many African countries, in this article I seek to avoid

two methodological shortcomings in the way in which African politics

is often conceptualised. First, there are far too many sweeping

generalisations about ‘ the African State’, without due attention to the

specificity of each context. Instead, I suggest that an ethnography of

national politics is required for understanding the specific political

culture of a given country. In today’s painstaking struggles for

democracy and human rights, it is important to provide accounts that

seek to grasp the socio-cultural logic underpinning national politics.

Secondly, in current writings on ‘the African State’, cultural

dimensions are increasingly highlighted. While cultural analysis may

be useful for understanding processes of legitimisation of ‘ illicit

activities ’ carried out in the name of the state, the same cultural

repertoires may also be used to struggle against criminalisation and

disorder. I therefore suggest that the struggle over key symbols and

cultural idioms is central to the assessment of national political

discourse.

In this article I address the criminalisation of the state by means of

an account of the struggle against impunity in Burkina Faso. The

overall purpose is to analyse the ways in which socio-political opposition

is expressed by looking into the morally loaded discourse of political

legitimacy. There are multiple bases of political legitimacy in Burkina

Faso. Formal democratic legitimacy gained in multiparty elections is

one basis, while the morality of key political actors is another. The issue

of impunity – that is, the freedom from punishment for ‘blood’ and

economic crimes committed by holders of political power – has recently

become a leading theme in Burkinabe politics in general, and in the

popular and trade union movement Trop c’est trop (‘Enough is

enough’) in particular. While the concept of impunity is increasingly

used internationally, it also forms part of a specific historical trajectory

in Burkinabe politics. It refers to freedom from punishment for ‘blood

crimes’ and big corruption rather than for the everyday ‘petty

corruption’." The tradition of strong trade unions and other forms of

horizontal organisational structures makes Burkina Faso an interesting

case for an ethnography of national politics.

The article takes a series of recent events as its starting point. In

December Norbert Zongo – journalist and director of the weekly

L’IndeUpendant – was found dead in his burned-out vehicle together with

three companions (his younger brother, an employee and the driver) in

Sapouy, a village about kilometres south of the capital Ouaga-

dougou. It was soon confirmed that the four men had been killed.

Zongo and his companions had been travelling to Zongo’s game

reserve Safari Sissili when they were killed in what rapidly became

known as le drame de Sapouy. Later, different investigations established

that first they were shot and then the vehicle was set on fire (RSF ;

CEI ; CS ; see also OPJI ). After the ‘Sapouy Drama’,

Burkina Faso experienced a deep socio-political crisis. Strikes and riots

became common in the struggle to bring justice to Norbert Zongo and

other victims of blood crimes in which the perpetrators were neither

tried in court nor punished. Impunity must come to an end, it was

argued, before any rule of law could be real.

My main concern in this article is to provide a culturally informed

account of such a social and political turmoil by exploring the socio-

cultural logic at stake in the struggle against impunity. Through the

analysis of different political statements, newspapers and various

comments from the ‘ street ’, I locate the struggle against impunity in a

social and political undercurrent in Burkinabe society. This struggle

articulates ideas of what is socially and morally ‘acceptable ’ to public

opinion. Despite the country’s ethnic and regional diversity, and the

fact that the movement Trop c’est trop is mainly urban-based and

French-speaking, there are commonly shared and morally loaded ideas

of how to practise politics.

The next section describes the main political events from the

‘Sapouy Drama’ of December through to September .

The following section seeks to contextualise the socio-political crisis in

postcolonial Burkina Faso. While President Blaise Compaore! gained

formal democratic legitimacy in November , the Collectif d’organi-

sations deUmocratiques de masse et de partis politiques, created in December

, claimed to represent ‘ the real country’. The crisis broke the

silence of public opinion regarding past blood crimes, including the

assassination of the late President Thomas Sankara in . The third

section explores the relationship between ‘ impunity’ and ‘public

space’. Opposition movements recurrently use the public space to raise

the issue of impunity. In this context, the public space both defines the

boundaries of public debate and the behaviour of key actors in

Burkinabe politics. This is exemplified by some recurrent themes in

political discourse such as ideas of truth and courage, and the

legitimacy of White people. Finally, the concluding discussion shows

how appeals to cultural norms underpin the struggle against impunity

in Burkina Faso. This ethnography of national politics suggests that

conceptualisations of the African State need to take cognisance of the

various ways in which social movements and political oppositions seek

to define the public space within which politics is to be practised and

the behaviour to be observed by those acting within this space.

‘ ’

After starting his weekly newspaper L’IndeUpendant in June , Norbert

Zongo rapidly became known as a particularly sharp and critical

observer of Burkinabe politics. He urged the Burkinabe people to

contest and struggle against injustice. One of his recurrent statements

was: ‘what is worst is not the malice of bad people but the silence of

good people ’.# After his death many belatedly recognised that, in

practice, ‘he had been the opposition’. He dealt with a wide range of

sensitive affairs involving members of the political and economic elite.

His articles were characterised by a mixture of investigative journalism

and social commitment. Many articles ended with a suggestion or

advice to the president, to the judicial system or to other powerful

institutions or people.

Throughout Zongo had written extensively about the ‘Affaire

David’, that is, the death of David Oue!draogo, the driver of the

younger brother of President Blaise Compaore! . In late Franc: ois

Compaore! , himself advisor to President Compaore! , delivered David

Oue!draogo to the president’s security forces at the Conseil de l’Entente in

Ouagadougou.$ This domain is a cluster of buildings lying in the heart

of Ouagadougou. The Conseil is legally directly under the president and

hosts the security forces of the president. David Oue!draogo was

together with two other employees accused of having stolen a large sum

of money in the domicile of their employer.% Norbert Zongo wrote that

such a theft should have implicated the police or the gendarmerie

rather than the security forces. In January David died (the

opposition said ‘ from torture ’, those close to the political power ‘of

sickness ’). The chief medical officer at the president’s dispensary issued

a death certificate according to which the driver died on January of

sickness.& No one informed his family nor did anyone reveal where

David Oue!draogo had been buried. The other two prisoners were

transferred to Ouagadougou prison. One of them, Hamidou Ilboudou,

later went to the press. Photos were published of his back, which had

been burnt by his torturers. Such a burning of prisoners was called

‘roasted chicken’ (poulet roW ti) at the Conseil.

Thus the family of David Oue!draogo was neither informed about the

death nor allowed to see the corpse before burial. Instead, he was

buried anonymously. Zongo wrote about the death of David

Oue!draogo in February , stating that one of the prisoners of the

Conseil had died and that two others had been confined to the

gendarmerie and transferred to the prison (L’IndeUpendant ..).

Zongo argued that in a state that adheres to the rule of law it is

unacceptable that those accused of theft, or more precisely suspected of

theft, are imprisoned and tortured by the president’s security forces.

Despite Zongo’s writings there was no official government reaction

whatsoever. In July a brother of David Oue!draogo instigated a

civil court case against Franc: ois Compaore! for responsibility for his

death. In late Zongo revealed that Franc: ois Compaore! had

refused to appear before the court to reply to the inculpation of

assassination and hiding of a corpse (meurtre et recel de cadavre).

When Zongo’s death was known in the capital Ouagadougou – the

national radio first related that he had died in a car accident (RNB

..) – many people took to the streets to demonstrate their

anger and despair. The anger mainly targeted various ‘ icons of power’

in Burkinabe politics : the HQ of the president’s political party Congre[ spour la DeUmocratie et le Progre[ s (CDP) and the homes of local CDP

politicians in Zongo’s native town Koudougou. Demonstrating students

and pupils cried Blaise assassin (‘Blaise murderer ’), accusing President

Blaise Compaore! of being involved in the killings. Several demon-

strations led to violent clashes with the armed forces (police,

gendarmerie and army).

The days following the killings gave rise to a protest movement that

came to be called Trop c’est trop (‘Enough is Enough’). The common

theme was that people were fed up with what they considered the

‘culture of impunity’, that is, that those in power may undertake illegal

actions such as killings and economic crimes without any punishment

whatsoever. Accordingly, a common expression that people use to

describe the actions of political power-holders is ‘They make you and

there is nothing’ (On te fait et il n’y a rien). To ‘make’ someone is here

synonymous with to kill. The independent press widely debated the

Zongo affair, and urban people were very upset about the killings that

came to indicate the ‘culture of impunity’. Zongo’s weekly L’IndeUpendant(..) published photos of the carbonised remains of Zongo and

his three companions. After a few days the government decided to

establish an independent commission to investigate Zongo’s death, but

this did not significantly calm people. Different opposition parties –

notably those of the so-called February group' – and civil society

organisations continued to protest. In particular, the Burkinabe

movement for human rights (Mouvement Burkinabe[ des Droits de l’Homme

et des Peuples, MBDHP), headed by Halidou Oue!draogo, took the lead.

The movement Trop c’est trop was organised within a few days as an

umbrella organisation. Halidou Oue!draogo became the leader of a new

organisation called Collectif d’organisations deUmocratiques de masse et de partis

politiques. The uniting theme of this umbrella organisation was

essentially that all possible light should be shed on the death of Norbert

Zongo, and that the culture of impunity should be stopped (Le Pays

.. ; L’Observateur Paalga .. ; see also Oue!draogo ).

The Collectif organised a series of demonstrations and strikes, so as to

maintain the mobilisation and keep the pressure on ‘the power’ (that

is, the government and ultimately the president himself).( The Collectif

also pursued its own investigation of Zongo’s death; in early

Halidou Oue!draogo gave several press conferences on the investigations

of the Collectif, an action which was repeatedly criticised by members

of the government.

While the state-controlled press reported the dramatic events during

the first weeks, they were soon transformed into what Oue!draogo

( : ) calls tableaux d’affichage (‘notice boards ’), in that they

merely reproduced official statements. But the independent press such

as L’IndeUpendant and Journal du Jeudi continued to report on the so-called

‘arm wrestling’ (bras de fer) between the Collectif and the Pouvoir

(‘Power’). In addition, underground tracts based on more or less

correct information started to flourish; people in the inner circle of the

political power were named in such tracts. However, some commenta-

tors close to the president’s party suggested that key individuals of the

opposition might have been behind the killings in order to tarnish

President Compaore! ’s reputation and, consequently, precipitate his

loss of power. According to this position, both Zongo and ‘the Power’

had been trapped (L’Opinion April : ). But most other

commentators, from the beginning, considered that people close to the

political power were involved in Zongo’s death. Debates in the media

as well as comments made by informants varied from the direct

accusation of the Compaore! regime to the accusation of ‘ the radical

opposition’. While in late December a high-level academic told

me that the government had no interest in killing Norbert Zongo,

others found it impossible to believe that Blaise Compaore! was not

informed. Even if the moment was not well chosen, the argument goes,

the culture of impunity led the holders of political power to misjudge

the potential effects of Zongo’s death.

After the socially and politically ‘hot ’ month of January , with

popular upheavals met by repression by the armed forces, negotiations

were initiated between the government and the opposition to find a

consensus for the investigation commission. By the end of January

the commission started work, with a strong representation of the

political opposition and civil society organisations ; only three out of

eleven commission members represented the government. The lawyer

Kassoum Kambou, representing the human rights organisation

MBDHP, headed the commission. Political debates, critical writings

and petitions continued in the many independent newspapers such as

L’Observateur Paalga, L’IndeUpendant and Journal du Jeudi. Anonymous

political tracts continued to circulate in Ouagadougou and other main

cities such as Koudougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.

At the beginning of May the commission handed over its report

to the government; it was immediately made public (CEI ). Yet

the three government representatives refused to sign the final report.

The opposition saw this as a sign that they were subject to pressure. The

report established that the ‘David’ and ‘Zongo’ affairs were linked to

one another. People in the inner circle of the president were likely to

have been involved in the killings. Indicators pointed to a group of six

men in the president’s security forces. Although the report could not

prove that they were guilty, the six men were seU rieux suspects (‘ serious

suspects ’) for the assassination of Norbert Zongo and his three

companions. Demonstrations started again and some leaders were

interrogated and arrested for a few days by the gendarmerie, notably

Hermann Yame! ogo (ADF}RDA), Halidou Oue!draogo (MBDHP and

Collectif) and Thibaud Nana (president of the Association Thomas

Sankara, which is pursuing a court case in order to investigate the

killing of the country’s former president). The strained political

environment and a fear for the implosion of the country led President

Blaise Compaore! to address the nation in a speech on May . He

announced financial compensation for the families of the deceased, the

reorganisation of the security forces and the submission of the report to

the judicial system. President Compaore! also announced the creation of

a Colle[ ge des Sages (‘College of Wise Men’), that is, an advisory board

of former heads of state together with religious and political authorities.

The Colle[ ge was mandated to work for forty-five days to make

suggestions as to how Burkina could resolve the crisis. The Collectif or

political opposition remained quite sceptical about these promises. On

August the Colle[ ge submitted its report to President Compaore!(CS ). The report basically confirmed the analysis of the

Commission’s report (CEI ), but also recommended that a Truth

and Justice Commission for National Reconciliation should be created.

A new government was formed in October , but people continued

to wait for reactions of President Compaore! , who in late created

two ad hoc commissions to revise the judicial and political systems.

However, tensions continued between le Pouvoir (the government, the

president and what critics call the ‘party-state ’ CDP) and the political

and social opposition, assembled under the umbrella of the Collectif.

CDP members argued that the leaders of the Collectif sought to incite

students, pupils and the urban youth in general to vandalise property

and spoil social peace. Clashes sometimes made the usually peaceful

Ouagadougou look like a city under siege, with tear-gas, stone

throwing, police violence and burnt-out vehicles. For instance, in April

a demonstration led to serious clashes when the armed forces

stopped people marching towards the presidency. In early October

the government decided to invalidate the academic year

– because of the many strikes among students and pupils. In

November a new government was formed under the new Prime

Minister Ernest Paramanga Yonli ; the government was created on

the basis of an official agreement between the prime minister and

eight opposition parties. But the radical opposition refused to enter

the new coalition government. Indicators suggest that the unity of the

radical opposition was increasingly challenged. For instance, Herman

Yame! ogo’s ADF}RDA left the February Group in May .

Different government spokesmen negotiated with the opposition, but

the president himself remained silent. After Zongo’s death he only

addressed the nation on this topic on a few occasions. The president’s

silence together with different manoeuvres to create different commis-

sions emerge as well-established political strategies in Burkina. In

March the government initiated a National Day of Forgiveness

(JourneU e Nationale de Pardon). While several political and religious

leaders welcomed the initiative, which actually emanated from the

Colle[ ge des Sages (CS ), the Collectif and the radical opposition

rejected the idea of forgiveness before justice had been done.

Interestingly, defenders of the National Day of Forgiveness made a

strong cultural argument to unite the people in the struggle for

betterment and ‘civility ’. Former heads of state, notably Sangoule!Lamizana, Jean-Baptiste Oue!draogo and Saye Zerbo, participated

together with President Compaore! . The latter made a long speech

invoking the Burkinabe people collectively as ‘ thou’ (tu). But instead

of taking a personal stance, President Compaore! demanded in his

capacity as head of state the state’s pardon for ‘ tortures, crimes,

injustices, persecutions and all other faults committed on Burkinabe by

other Burkinabe in the name and cover of the State, from until

today’ (L’Opinion ..).

The socio-political crisis that prevails in Burkina is by no means over.

Hence this article deals with current politics, the outcome of which is

hard to foresee. While the ‘Affaire Norbert Zongo’ has led to the

deepest crisis in postcolonial Burkina, it is important to note that people

of the inner circle of the country’s political power have, since the s,

committed ‘blood crimes’ without any punishment. The current

struggle against impunity aims to render justice to those killed and their

widows and orphans.

The socio-political crisis in Burkina Faso is grounded in several

contexts. It was not only Zongo’s death that brought anger and

despair, but the widely shared sentiment that ‘enough is enough’. The

crisis broke the silence of public opinion regarding blood crimes more

generally. The first context is one of current legitimacy. President

Compaore! ’s party, the CDP, had an overwhelming majority in the

national assembly, and he himself gained formal democratic legitimacy

in the presidential elections of November . Yet while the CDP

claimed democratic legitimacy, the opposition saw itself as representing

‘ the real country’. A second context derives from the assassination

of President Thomas Sankara in the coup d’eU tat that brought Compaore!to power; in September Sankara’s widow instigated legal

proceedings to establish responsibility for the assassination of her

husband. Thirdly, there is a long tradition of social movements in

Burkina, including trade unions and student organisations. As we will

see, this tradition has been instrumental in the current crisis.

Contested legitimacy

The CDP is the dominant actor in Burkinabe politics. It is a coalition

of several parties into what is commonly called the presidential

movement ; its critics jokingly say that CDP stands for Congre[ s pour la

Distribution des Postes (‘Congress for Distributing Jobs ’). The present-

day CDP and its predecessor the ODP}MT) won overwhelming

majorities in legislative elections in and , as well as in

municipal elections in and . In President Compaore!won the presidential elections, but he was the only candidate since the

opposition boycotted them. Internationally, this created serious

problems of democratic legitimacy for Compaore! . Less than a quarter

of the registered voters participated in the elections. In early

the National Assembly changed the th article of the Constitution

according to which the president could be re-elected only once. Today

President Compaore! may be re-elected as many times as possible.

Critics say that, in practice, this means that he has become ‘president

for life ’ ; in consequence, the satirical Journal du Jeudi always portrays

Compaore! as Caesar with a laurel wreath. In November

Compaore! was re-elected in the presidential elections with ± per

cent of the votes. The only other candidates were those of ‘ the

moderate opposition’, that is, Ram Oue!draogo, ± per cent, and

Fre!de! ric Guirma, ± per cent (Burkina ). International observers

judged the elections to have been relatively fair, although ‘the radical

opposition’ of the February Group, led among others by Professor

Joseph Ki-Zerbo and lawyer Hermann Yame! ogo, boycotted the

elections. Despite the boycott President Compaore! gained a certain

democratic legitimacy.

Yet with the ‘Sapouy Drama’ one month later, Compaore! ’slegitimacy was increasingly questioned. Only one week after Zongo’s

death, Compaore! was to take the presidential oath in the presence of

a large number of African presidents in Ouagadougou (Sidwaya

..). Paradoxically, while the presidential elections had clearly

indicated that Compaore! remained ‘the boss ’, the death of Zongo soon

came to seriously challenge his regime. It also served to unite the

previously divided opposition. During the ‘hot ’ period following

Zongo’s death I met several people who argued that ‘you the

Europeans, you must see that we do not agree with what Blaise is

doing’. By this people claimed that despite ‘democratic elections ’

celebrated internationally, Burkina Faso is governed by one man, who

follows his own wishes and interests rather than the rule of law.

Throughout the crisis the Collectif and other actors supporting the

opposition argued that they represented ‘the real country’ (le pays reU el)and questioned the political legitimacy of Blaise Compaore! . The

political opposition together with civil society organisations claimed to

fight for the Burkinabe people. The Collectif also rejected the criticism

that the movement was a phenomenon of the big cities. In April ,

when serious clashes occurred in Ouagadougou, supportive demon-

strations took place in thirty-five of the forty-five provincial capitals.

A common saying in Burkina is that elections are won in the

countryside, but that power is lost in town. One reason is that the

urban population is politically much more powerful and well

articulated in national politics. Yet rural people represent the

overwhelming majority (about per cent) of the population. To what

extent did President Compaore! and the CDP maintain support from

rural people? How far into the countryside could the Collectif reach?

There is in fact a gap between the urban and French-speaking political

elite and the vast majority of rural producers (Hagberg ). Most

rural people had never read any of Zongo’s articles. Even the few who

read and write French rudimentarily would hardly be able to read

them, because Zongo’s style of writing required a relatively high level

of education. After his death, however, he became a popular hero for

many people, in particular among the urban youth. Jean Oue!draogo

( : ) raises a critical question: ‘How can the disappearance

of a simple journalist, editor of a small weekly, with hardly ,

copies, in a country of per cent illiterates, raise such an excitement? ’.

As argued below, Zongo represented something more than the content

of his articles ; for many people, he came to symbolise the courage to

speak out and tell the truth, a virtue celebrated in principle but much

more rarely translated into practice.

The legacy of Sankara

Blaise Compaore! came to power in the coup d ’eU tat of October ,

in which President Thomas Sankara was assassinated together with

twelve of his closest collaborators. In the first official comments

transmitted by the new regime, the Popular Front, Sankara was

described as autocrate, misogyne and deU voyeU . The ‘patriotic forces ’ had

decided to finish Sankara’s ‘autocratic power’. Sankara was assassi-

nated, but until today it has never been officially established how. On

the request of Mariam Sankara, the widow of the late president, a

medical officer at the Conseil de l’Entente delivered a death certificate in

January . According to this document, Thomas Sankara died a

‘natural death’ (Andriamirado : ) ! In September

Mariam Sankara instigated a civil court case against X for having

caused the death of her husband. She did not accuse a specific person,

but still her husband had been killed and no legal action had been

taken. Although this case is still pending, it continuously recalls the

legacy of Thomas Sankara. An organisation has been created to pursue

this case. When discussing the blood crimes committed by the

Compaore! regime, Sankara’s name is regularly evoked. For instance,

Radio France Internationale (RFI) interviewed Mariam Sankara in early

September about the absence of action taken by the court (see

also Le Pays .. : ). The legacy of Thomas Sankara still influences

Burkinabe politics (see Andriamirado ; Bane! gas ; Baxter &

Somerville ; Otayek et al. b). Many of the leading politicians

were involved in the so-called Revolution of –. Apart from those

in the CDP, these include Halidou Oue!draogo, the leader of the

Collectif, who was a judge in the Revolutionary Popular Court (Tribunal

Populaire ReU volutionnaire, TPR). The TPR judged mainly economic

crimes committed by powerful people (ministers, civil servants) prior to

the Revolution, and its rulings were broadcast nationally. Hence these

years were formative for many people in the current political class.

Many Burkinabe student leaders abroad, e.g. in Dakar, later became

deeply involved in national politics. Some notable exceptions to this

pattern need to be pointed out : Joseph Ki-Zerbo was in self-imposed

exile in Senegal – and Hermann Yame! ogo returned to politics

only in (McFarland & Rupley ).

The legacy of Sankara is also evident in party politics. Several

political parties label themselves sankaristes ; their leaders claim to keep

Sankara’s political ideas alive. These parties are allowed to practice

politics and participate in elections, but have suffered seriously from

internal conflicts. Yet despite several splits and contradictions the

Sankara movement held a congress in the Maison du Peuple in central

Ouagadougou in August . The most important sankariste or-

ganisation is the Front des Forces Sociales, led by Norbert Michel

Tie!ndrebe! ogo (see FSS n.d.).

The tradition of social movements

There is a long tradition of protest among social movements and trade

unions in postcolonial Burkina (Balima ; Otayek et al. b;

Savonnet-Guyot ). The first president of independent Haute

Volta, Maurice Yame! ogo, lost power on January after protests

and demonstrations among pupils and trade unions, bringing General

Lamizana to power. In pupils and students protested against the

Lamizana government, which was followed by a coup d’eU tat that brought

Colonel Zaye Zerbo to power. In May the arrest of then Prime

Minister Thomas Sankara led to demonstrations and strikes, and to

Sankara’s eventual release. Such events still serve as a reminder for

people that when people get really frustrated they have the capacity to

overthrow the regime.

In general, it can be argued that trade unions, chieftaincies,

churches, NGOs and the associative movement have for a long time

been sufficiently strong to escape being swallowed by the state, despite

repeated attempts of political power-holders to control civil society.

Trade unions have often mobilised against the authoritarianism of

different regimes and for democratic liberties. Otayek et al. (a:

–) argue that despite the lack of a ‘democratic culture’ in Burkina,

there is at least a tradition of political debate around the democratic

question on which the foundation of democracy could be built.

Accordingly, it is a society used to a certain freedom of expression

(Dubuch ). Even in the current socio-political crisis the state

administration still maintains certain legitimacy. Although newspapers

write that the ruling majority party CDP has ‘ taken over’ the state,

many of those who take the lead in criticising the government are state

agents. In other words, while the government’s legitimacy may be

questioned, the legitimacy of the state administration itself is not

addressed.

The demonstrations that occurred after the ‘Sapouy Drama’ thus

enter into this tradition of social movements. A few weeks after Zongo’s

death protest demonstrations were planned for January .

Symbolically, this reminded people of the coup d’eU tat ; rumours

held that the opposition politician Hermann Yame! ogo wanted to

revenge his father Maurice Yame! ogo’s loss of power years earlier.

Although the government had explicitly forbidden demonstrations,

officially for security reasons, many people gathered to demonstrate in

cities and towns across the country. They were violently persecuted by

the armed forces. In Ouagadougou many demonstrators fled to the

cathedral, but this did not prevent the armed forces from attacking

them (Journal du Jeudi –.. ; L’IndeUpendant ..).

The leader of the Collectif, Halidou Oue!draogo, is a key person

together with Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Tole Sagnon, the leader

of the trade union ConfeUdeU ration GeUneU rale du Travail du Burkina(CGT-B).

On June the Collectif organised its th National Meeting}March to keep the pressure on the struggle against impunity. Yet

criticism was increasingly heard against Halidou Oue!draogo and the

other leaders of the movement. The invalidation of the academic year

– and the closure of the university in October exposed

them to open scepticism even among people supporting the struggle.

Many people state that while the children of the elite – both the power-

holders and the opposition – are sent abroad to study to get university

diplomas, the higher education of poor people’s children in Burkina

Faso is sacrificed for political reasons.

In the attempt to unfold the socio-cultural logics in the struggle against

impunity, I have chosen to work especially with political discourse,

mainly expressed in newspapers and petitions. On the basis of different

fieldwork periods carried out since and a continuous reading of

some main Burkinabe newspapers, I seek to analyse the morally loaded

political discourse that has emerged in Burkina following the ‘Sapouy

Drama’ in December . Beyond the specific claims for justice, the

struggle against impunity can be related on a more general level to

notions of the public space. This section assesses the relationship

between impunity and public space in Burkina Faso, followed by a

reflection on how ideas of truth and courage and the legitimacy of

White people are used in Burkinabe political discourse. It argues that

political discourse in media, political petitions and tracts, and also in

personal discussion, is reproduced within a specific frame of reference

according to which the boundaries of the public space and the

appropriate way to behave there are contested issues. Where is the

proper place for political debate? What is the proper way to behave

there? In this sense, I endorse a perspective according to which

anthropology should try to understand civil society to refer ‘more

loosely to the moral community, to the problems of accountability,

trust and co-operation that all groups face’ (Hann : ). Instead

of defining ‘civil society ’ and ‘social capital ’ and then looking for

empirical phenomena which could fit such definitions, I find it far more

satisfactory to address issues related to moral community and political

culture more loosely. In this vein, the struggle against impunity

highlights behaviour and boundaries in Burkinabe public space.

Impunity and public space

The concept of impunity emerged in human rights discourse in the

s. Impunity is generally defined as the exemption or freedom from

punishment, harm or loss ; it is a concept closely connected with abuse

of human rights by powerful actors cum institutions. Amnesty

International sees the struggle against impunity as a main priority. The

struggle against human rights violations appeals to international

opinion, and uses networks linking people together globally. In the

Hague Appeal for Peace (), it is argued that :

International Law is an essential tool for the advance of peace and justice, butthe worthy principles established in international treaties are often violated bythe same governments that proclaim them. Therefore we need effectiveinternational institutions to protect our rights when the national legal systemsare proven to be unable or unwilling to comply with their duties. Otherwise,the culture of impunity will be reinforced, thus weakening the hope in justice,and encouraging the repetition of the same offenses.

Accordingly, impunity does not prevail as single events, but needs to

be understood as a culture, that is, a system of meaning embraced by

holders of political power and their closest collaborators. Reviewing

different cases of impunity internationally, the salient point is that ‘ the

official or quasi-official status of the perpetrators shielded them from

sanction, creating a culture of impunity in which the most inhumane

acts could be carried out without fear of repercussions ’ (Roht-Arriaza

: ). President Blaise Compaore! is in no way exempt from

allegations raised internationally (Amnesty ). Although the Zongo

affair is first and foremost a domestic issue (despite the involvement of

international organisations such as the African Union for Human

Rights and Reporters sans Frontie[ res), the president’s role in diamond and

arms trafficking in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola has been

condemned by international organisations, including the United

Nations (). In this context, L’IndeUpendant (.. : ) wrote that

‘ this delinquent behaviour of our authorities on the international

scene’ leads Burkina towards an international embargo, adding

ironically : ‘We have to pray that Savimbi has enough diamonds to

compensate us. ’

In Burkina, the culture of impunity is generally held to have

emerged after the coup d’eU tat in October , although some argue that

it dates from the advent of the Revolution in . The ‘Sapouy

Drama’ was not interpreted as a single and isolated assassination, but

as part of a certain political culture. It thus became the starting-point

for an organised and widely mobilised socio-political struggle against

impunity. The impunity concept is clearly linked to global processes of

holding people in power, including former heads of state such as

Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic, responsible for their

misdeeds. Yet impunity is simultaneously linked to local concerns and

strife. Although the combat against impunity includes economic crimes

as well as ‘blood crimes’, it is particularly the right to life (droit a[ la vie)

that tops the agenda in Burkina Faso. If the right to life is not respected,

the argument goes, it does not matter whether other rights are granted

or not. Political parties of the so-called radical opposition boycotted the

elections for this reason. One critical headline suggested that the

municipal elections in September were elections to cover

‘democratic repression’ (L’IndeUpendant ..).

Since a long list of people have been assassinated or have

‘disappeared’. There are an increasing number of orphans and

widows. Some of the best known ‘blood crimes’ preceding those of

David Oue!draogo and Norbert Zongo include Professor Guillaume

Sessouma in , the medical student Dabo Boukary in and

Cle!ment Oumarou Oue!draogo, a prominent opposition leader, who

was killed in a grenade attack in central Ouagadougou in . In

addition to killings of civilians, several people in the inner circle of

political power have been killed – often in ‘car accidents ’ – after

having been seen as threatening. After the death of Cle!ment Oumarou

Oue!draogo, Norbert Zongo wrote an article in Journal du Jeudi

(–.., reprinted ..–..), arguing that the first

sign, the ultimate sign, the only evident sign of the existence of the rule

of law is respect for human life. The Constitution, the electoral law, the

Supreme Court and all ‘ the verbal salad’ are only mediocre varnish, if

human life may be taken away at every corner. Zongo ended the article

with the now famous expression: De graW ce! Plus jamais cn a!

The death of Norbert Zongo has implied that the ‘culture of

impunity’ is publicly challenged. While other people have been killed

since December , the assassins can no longer be sure of political

protection. In January , for example, a civil servant working for

the National Power Company SONABEL was tortured to death by

gendarmes in Bobo-Dioulasso after a private quarrel in a bar. This led

to massive protests and a nation-wide cut in electricity for one day

effected by the colleagues of the victim. The gendarmes were judged

and put in prison. In June sons of the traditional Mossi king in

Tenkodogo, some km southeast of Ouagadougou, killed a man

belonging to the political opposition in town. This led to a serious

questioning of the implication of traditional chieftaincies in national

politics (Journal du Jeudi –.. : ). The king himself was accused

of ‘non assistance to a person in danger’, because the assassination took

place in the royal courtyard. The perpetrators of the Tenkodogo events

are to be tried in court, but the king himself, however, died a natural

death in September (L’IndeUpendant .. : ; Journal du Jeudi

–.. : ).

The relationship between impunity and the public space is

conceptually challenging. While impunity is to a large extent associated

with darkness, nightly operations and secrecy, the public space implies

overt and visible deliberations. The struggle against impunity is not

only a struggle to render justice to specific victims of ‘blood crimes’, but

also to render operations and actions public. Ideally, the public space

is characterised by transparency and open debate ; the expression ‘ to

shed light ’ ( faire la lumie[ re) on the death of Norbert Zongo clearly

illustrates this. The role of popular music for disseminating political

messages to an otherwise non-political audience, the youth, is also

significant. Alpha Blondy dedicated a song to the memory of Norbert

Zongo in his album Elohim. The song starts with Blondy singing alone:

‘Au clair de la lune, mon ami Zongo} Refusa de bayonner sa plume,

Burkina Faso} Et Zongo est mort, bru# le! par le feu} Que justice soit faite

pour l’amour de Dieu’ (Blondy ). Alpha Blondy’s use of the

famous French song Au clair de la lune (‘ in the moonlight ’) to urge

justice for Norbert Zongo emphasised the symbolic need ‘to shed light ’

and ‘render public ’ what otherwise would lurk in the darkness.

It should be clear, however, that there is not one single public space

in Burkina Faso, but that, instead, there is a public space to be

managed in every community. The concept refers to the public gaze of

events linked to the rise of modern mass media. Free press and public

debates favour the emergence of a public space. But public space is not

only associated with the modern state and in African contexts the

postcolonial state. To be legitimate the public space related to the

postcolonial state must link up with other spaces, such as those linked

to ethnic, religious and regional belongings.*

Two main characteristics of the Burkinabe public space are linked to

behaviour and boundaries. This public space defines first a way to

behave and second a bounded space within which politics should be

practised. First, the public space urges a certain behaviour on key

actors, because it is in the acts of people – be they politicians,

journalists, trade unionists or ordinary people at the grass roots – that

the public space is shaped. In the public space people are expected to

act according to the implicit rules of a code of conduct. The behaviour

of political actors is particularly under scrutiny. Secondly, the public

space in national politics also defines the boundaries within which

politics is to be practised. The current crisis involves a continuous

struggle over the drawing of boundaries, because the boundaries of the

public space are constantly negotiated. While, in principle, any actor

might intervene in Burkinabe public space, the boundaries are

particularly highlighted with respect to French people.

Truth and courage

Norbert Zongo started his weekly newspaper in and soon became

admired for his courageous analyses of Burkinabe politics. Zongo did

not hesitate to pick up sensitive topics such as the gold traffic of the

CEMOB (Compagnie d’exploitation des mines d’or du Burkina), the illegal

selling of urban land plots (linked to politicians of the ruling CDP) and

the issuing of multiple electoral cards (cf. Zongo ). He developed

a strong argument against Compaore! ’s manoeuvres to become

‘president for life ’, that is, the modification of the th article of the

Burkinabe Constitution. Zongo emerged as one of the few who dared

challenge the power-holders of the Fourth Republic. Although he used

a pseudonym – ‘Henri Sebgo’ or simply ‘H.S. ’ – it was well known

that he was the author. Yet while most articles were published in his

name (‘H.S. ’), it later became clear that he had had a group of

journalists around him.

In Norbert Zongo started to write about the death of the driver

of the petit preU sident Franc: ois Compaore! , younger brother of President

Blaise Compaore! , publishing his weekly revelations to the increasing

interest of the readers. But despite Zongo’s writings and the fact that

David Oue!draogo had died at the Conseil, the judicial system took no

action. A brother of Oue!draogo instead instigated a civil court case

against Franc: ois Compaore! . But Compaore! did not present himself to

the court. In one of his last articles, published only five days before his

own death, Norbert Zongo addressed Franc: ois Compaore! directly

(L’IndeUpendant .. : ) :

We recall Mr Compaore! Franc: ois that the first article of our Constitution saysthis : ‘All Burkinabe are born free and equal in rights ’. Sir, one has to take thatinto account. A man is dead and you are accused. Go and respond, if not wewill finish believing that you are guilty and stand above the constitution.

In the last few months of his life Norbert Zongo wrote explicitly that

he feared for his life. Early in November he was to have been

poisoned when he took a trip to Kaya, some km north of

Ouagadougou, but the attempt failed. In the issue of December

(L’IndeUpendant .. : ) Zongo wrote that, according to rumours,

solutions are now looked for, but are they good?

Let us today suppose that L’IndeUpendant definitively ceases to appear for onereason or another (the death of its director, his poisoning, the definiteprohibition to appear etc.). We remain convinced that the David problem willremain posed, and sooner or later, it has to be solved. Sooner or later !

During the very last days of his life Zongo is said to have been

increasingly aware that something was going to happen (CEI ).

But he changed neither his position nor his editorial policy. It is worth

noting, however, that since his death L’IndeUpendant has continued to

appear every week; it has not only pursued the Zongo affair, but has

also taken up other ‘affairs ’. But the journalists continue to celebrate

the courage of Norbert Zongo as pioneering.

Today, Zongo has become a national hero. Some link him with

former president Thomas Sankara. Both Sankara and Zongo are

sometimes treated as ‘ saints ’ : neither was afraid and both always said

what they thought. In October L’IndeUpendant (..)

republished an article written by Zongo on the th anniversary of the

death of Thomas Sankara. The introductory note states that both

Thomas Sankara and Norbert Zongo were killed, because they dreamt

about the same thing for this people of peasants : dignity and social

justice. The salient point is that Sankara and Zongo dared to tell the

truth and therefore had a lot of courage. In other words, they made

public what had long been kept secret and silenced. Such idealised

statements about a former president and an influential journalist

cannot be accepted at face value, but nonetheless reveal significant

clues to morality. And even though such a comparison is unfair to

Zongo – Sankara was a head of state and had taken power by force

– it is striking that the connection between the two is often made in

public debate.

The discourse on truth and courage is used to urge the president to

take action. In political petitions and analyses writers have appealed to

the courage of Blaise Compaore! . Hence the president is addressed not

only in terms of his political and administrative duties, but also in terms

of his moral obligations. The editorial of L’IndeUpendant often contains a

strong element of morality. It advises the president to do this or that in

order to solve the situation. President Compaore! has, on several

occasions, been advised to arrest his brother for the murder of the

driver. In August the editorial even suggested that President

Compaore! should step aside from the presidency (L’IndeUpendant.. : ) :

But Mr President, things have changed for every Burkinabe since the SapouyDrama. As long as President Blaise Compaore! makes no distinction betweenthe interests of his family and ‘the major interest of the Burkinabe people ’, hewill not govern this country.

It could be argued that it is in the strategic interests of journalists not

to challenge power-holders directly. Zongo’s death clearly illustrates

the danger that every critical journalist is running. Yet there is a sense

of common concern for the country that is expressed in most statements

and articles : ‘we’re among the poorest countries on the globe according

to the HDI-index’, ‘we need to preserve social peace’, and ‘ look at

wars raging our neighbours ’ (e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone). The

allegations against President Compaore! about the involvement in the

diamonds and arms trade in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone (UN

) is especially feared as it might drive Burkina into war.

Beyond these remarks, it is revealing that the political discourse on

impunity does not directly address its structural causes, but rather

addresses the president personally. The morality of the president is

questioned in the sense that he is not deemed to have acted according

to commonly shared ideas of how to rule. He has exaggerated and

transgressed the limits of the acceptable. According to many observers

the critical limit was when the th article of the Constitution was

changed, removing any limit to the number of times the president can

be re-elected (Constitution ). In practice, people say that this

modification means that ‘Blaise has become president for life ’. Blaise

Compaore! lost political legitimacy when he sought to make his

presidency ‘eternal ’. While Compaore! is legitimate according to

multiparty elections, the challenges to his morality erode other forms of

political legitimacy.

Ideas of leadership are not limited to the presidency. Since I

have found that in any discussion of a leader’s abuse of power people

tend to use the expression ‘we’ll wait and see’. Thus leadership is

related to ideas such as to ‘ tell the truth’ and to ‘be courageous ’. The

courage to speak out is highly valued both in villages as well as in

national political discourse. For instance, people of the Karaboro

ethnic group often characterise themselves as ‘people who walk on the

truth’, while their Tiefo neighbours say their very ethnic label

originates from the expression ‘ to tell the truth’ (tien fo) (Hagberg

). But the leader may also choose not to speak. While palaver is

held in a public space (Bidima ), silence may also communicate

meaning. In fact silence is a very common way to exercise power in

Burkina. President Compaore! has addressed the nation only on a few

occasions since December . Yet many writers have urged him to

speak. After the report of the Colle[ ge des Sages in August , people

expected the president to make a pronouncement, but he remained

silent. Such a silence is a way to rule and is politically significant,

although the politics of silence is highly ambiguous. While it may be an

instrument of resistance, silence is also an instrument of power, terror

and control (Le Breton : ). One editorial in L’IndeUpendant

(.. : ) commented upon the silence of the president after the

report of the Colle[ ge des Sages was submitted to him. ‘This silence of

Blaise Compaore! bodes no good. ’

Silence is likewise an element in traditional leadership. The Naaba,

that is, the king or chief in Mossi kingdoms, is expected to remain quiet

in public and simply give orders by nodding his head, or quietly relay

to his spokesman what he wants to say. Furthermore, the bard (griot in

French, jeli in Dyula) in many West African societies is seen as the

master of speech. The griot addresses members of the traditional

aristocracy, who reply by offering gifts to the griot. Here the art of

speaking is thus confined to a specific socio-professional category of

people. But as we will see the griot is also popularly seen as a servant

of power-holders.

Political discourse on truth and courage is highly moral, and this is

often expressed in kinship idioms. Two instances of kinship in political

discourse must be mentioned. First, Norbert Zongo and his younger

brother Ernest were killed in the ‘Sapouy Drama’. In Koudougou (the

hometown of the Zongo family) the protests against the killings were

particularly strong. When the news was made public by Radio France

Internationale (RFI), students and pupils in Koudougou went out in the

streets and attacked the homes and offices of leading CDP politicians.

A curfew was imposed for a week. When the opposition called in

January for three ‘dead city days ’ ( journeU es de villes mortes), it was

particularly in Koudougou that this call was heeded. In the press and

even more among people I have talked to, the assassination of Zongo

was seen as a conflict between the Zongo family (Norbert and Ernest)

and the Compaore! family (Blaise and Franc: ois). This has further been

interpreted as a conflict between the Mossi of Ouagadougou and the

Mossi of Koudougou (Journal du Jeudi ..–..). Kinship

is also at stake in the ‘Affaire David’. The Compaore! family was

accused of not informing the family of David Oue!draogo about the

latter’s death. In the military court in August , Franc: ois Compaore!was asked why he did not inform them and replied that he did not

know where David Oue!draogo lived! It was only in mid- that the

Compaore! and Oue!draogo families engaged in the traditional

reconciliation process to resolve the problem of David Oue' draogo’s

death between them (L’IndeUpendant .. : –).

Ideas about truth and courage are central in current political

discourse. These ideas express notions of the public space in the sense

of the ways in which leaders and other political actors should behave.

To tell the truth and to be courageous are celebrated virtues, but the

leader may also manage silence. To choose not to speak may be a

tremendous weapon.

The legitimacy of White people

Soon after Zongo’s death the international NGO Reporters sans Frontie[ res(RSF) sent an investigation team to Burkina. During one week the two

French journalists talked to most eyewitnesses and other people with

information on the ‘Sapouy Drama’. At the end of their mission they

held a press conference at which they presented their report (RSF

). They revealed that the police survey had not yet started more

than two weeks after Zongo’s death, and that most of the people whom

they had met had not yet been questioned. The presence of RSF

irritated government representatives. At a press conference the then

minister of justice Yarga Larba condemned the RSF investigation for

being conducted without appropriate permission. He argued that the

Commission d’EnqueW te IndeUpendante (CEI) that had been created should be

allowed to begin working.

At the end of January (due to strikes, riots etc.) the CEI started

work and the secretary general of RSF Robert Me!nard became a

member of it. The commission worked for four months and delivered

its report on May . Meanwhile, however, Me!nard gave some

interviews to RFI to report on the work in progress. This was badly

taken by the government representatives, who argued that Me!nard did

not respect the secrecy of the commission. In the report the commission

was unable to identify any guilty persons but pointed out six seU rieuxsuspects among the president’s security forces. On May, when he was

about to leave the country and return to France, Me!nard gave an

interview for Horizon FM, an independent Ouagadougou-based radio

station. During the interview he said that those responsible for the

killings in the security forces were voyous (‘bandits ’). At this moment

the gendarmes drove directly to the radio, interrupted the interview

and brought Me!nard back to his hotel where he was guarded in his

room until take-off for Paris.

In July when Me!nard wanted to return to Burkina to monitor

the results of the commission’s work, he was denied a visa. The reason,

according to a letter from the Security Minster Djibril Yipe!ne! Bassolet

to Me!nard (published in L’IndeUpendant .. : ), was his in-

volvement in the Zongo affair :

You have recently, with regard to this delicate affair, undertaken measuresand made statements, both in Burkina and abroad, which have provoked

passions that your mission of July will only revive, while we are working tocreate the conditions for a dispassionate and impartial justice, without anyform of pressure.

In September Me!nard was once again denied entry into Burkina.

When he arrived at Ouagadougou airport he was escorted back to his

plane by the security forces (BBC ..).

However, the presence of White people has not been limited to the

opposition. In March the death of David Oue!draogo was to be

treated by the civil court after a long procedure, with many attempts

to obstruct the dossier. The petit preU sident Franc: ois Compaore! had called

in the French lawyer Maı# tre Pierre Olivier Sur to support his

Burkinabe lawyer Maı# tre Abdoul Oue!draogo (L’Opinion –..).

The French lawyer dismissed the procedure and publicly attacked

Maı# tre Sankara, representing the brother of the victim. The symbolism

of this cannot be mistaken, in that even the power-holders had recourse

to French people. Apparently, Maı# tre Sur did not know much about

the court case in advance, but was called in to legitimise the claims of

innocence made by Franc: ois Compaore! . While the opposition already

had their supporter in Robert Me!nard, the government now had their

own ‘White’.

Another French citizen, Jean Guion, got involved as an advisor to

President Compaore! . In an article published by L’IndeUpendant (..

), he suggested that Zongo and his companions might have been

victims of a car accident. Guion portrayed Zongo as a big landowner

and as a devoted sankariste whose writings against the presidential

family were personally rooted. In the next issue of L’IndeUpendant(.. : ), Guion was portrayed as le griot blanc and his whole

argument was attacked:

What makes us get mixed up in the stories of chamberlains, troubadours,beggars and other musicians of the Royal Courtyard? We would voluntarilyhave liked to pass by if it was not, once again, about Norbert Zongo, aliasHenri Sebgo and his memory.

With the help of Maı# tre Sur, Franc: ois Compaore! won a victory. The

David Oue!draogo dossier was transferred from the civil court to the

military court. As it became clear that members of the president’s

security forces were the perpetrators, the civil court decided that it was

‘ incompetent ’ to judge the case (Le Journal du Soir ..). Despite

the fact that some of the agents were recognised to have participated in

the torture, the dossier could not be treated by the civil court.The

reason was that the case was no longer about the theft of money, but

instead about the accusation that David Oue!draogo had been involved

in a planned coup d ’eU tat. In August the military court finally

established that David Oue!draogo had been tortured to death by

members of the security forces. The head of the group was imprisoned

for twenty years and two others for ten years. Two members of the

group were acquitted for lack of evidence. The sixth member had died

earlier and, moreover, in January one of the two imprisoned for

ten years became ill and died. People fear that they will all die before

trial of the Zongo affair ! The different accusations against David

Oue!draogo – theft and attempted coup d ’eU tat – were not substantiated

by the court. Franc: ois Compaore! was called as a witness, but

accusations against him could not be tried. Yet the public attorneys

verbally and publicly ‘undressed’ Franc: ois Compaore! . He was morally,

if not legally, deemed guilty by public opinion.

In this political turmoil the presence of White people in general, and

the French in particular, is a hotly debated issue. An article in

L’IndeUpendant (..) discussed the possible involvement of France

and argued that the former colonial power had been involved in many

of the affairs treated by Norbert Zongo. Well-educated people often

strongly criticise the French, while, paradoxically, in daily discourse

White people are often represented as people who stand above

Burkinabe vested interests and are therefore ‘neutral ’. It does not seem

to be merely a coincidence that both the Collectif and the holders of

political power made recourse to White people, because national

politics needs to link up with global processes. The most important

material about the Zongo affair is, for instance, accessible on various

websites. Trade unions and human rights organisations mainly in

France supported the protests. Organisations created specific websites

for the Zongo affair."! The revealing point about the legitimacy of

White people is that both sides use French counterparts to justify their

positions, while at the same time criticising the opposite side for doing

just that. Robert Me!nard of RSF was repeatedly criticised for surveying

and talking to eyewitnesses and for delivering progress reports to the

media. Representatives of the political power did not define Me!nard

within the boundaries of the public space. Similarly, Maı# tre Olivier

Sur and Jean Guion were severely criticised by people in the opposition

for not knowing enough about the country. They were viewed as just

playing their roles as griots blancs to satisfy people in power in general

and the Compaore! family in particular. In L’IndeUpendant (.. : ),

a reader wrote a severe note directed towards Jean Guion: ‘I agree that

M. Guion as a friend of President Blaise Compaore! and as his advisor

wants to defend his interests, but please, do not mix up with the affairs

of a State. You are an expatriate. ’ According to the reader, Jean Guion

as an expatriate should not get involved in Burkinabe politics, because

he did not belong to the Burkinabe public space. The paradox lies in

the fact that while criticising the opposite side for taking recourse to

White people, there are always ‘good Whites ’ with whom one can

collaborate. All sides seek support from White people to gain political

legitimacy.

In the current political context the boundaries of the public space are

contested. The presence of White people has not only challenged these

boundaries, but also the ways in which people behave. While the

boundary between the free press issued in Burkina and the underground

tracts is one domain of contest, the imaginary boundary between

Burkinabe politics and global processes – here articulated through

Internet and international NGOs – is another. Underground tracts are

used in Burkina at critical periods. Prior to the coup d’eU tat in ,

rumours circulated intensely and tracts were spread. Similarly, the

‘Sapouy Drama’ provoked a continuous spread of underground tracts.

The media remains sceptical about such tracts, because they

disseminate rumours without taking the responsibility for naming

people. Yet tracts may also be seen as a way to express what is

impossible to say in public debate. The political use of sorcery has, for

example, been suggested in such tracts.

Attempts to understand processes of legitimisation of ‘ illicit practices ’

of ‘ the African State’ within socio-cultural and postcolonial logics are

inherently problematic, because sweeping generalisations tend to

ignore the specificities of national historical trajectories (for a critique,

see Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan ). While there is a moral

matrix that can aid us in understanding basic questions of political

legitimacy (Schatzberg ), the ambition to generalise on a

continental scale – ‘African State’ and ‘African politics ’ – is easily

trapped in essentialist categories. In this article I have tried to

demonstrate that the struggle against impunity follows socio-cultural

logic. If the value systems and cultural codes which allow a justification

of ‘criminalisation’ and ‘corruption’ by those who practise it need to

be explored, my main argument is that we also need to seriously study

the struggle against such phenomena in its proper social and cultural

context. Detailed ethnographic accounts of national politics emerge as

a necessary remedy against sweeping generalisations of the African

State. Instead of searching for the replication of one particular Western

model of ‘civil society ’ or ‘ social capital ’, I find it far more fruitful to

explore notions of the public space as they are expressed in the struggle

against impunity. Political discourse is morally loaded in Burkina Faso.

First, ideas of truth and courage clearly deal with the public space as

a way to behave. That structural causes are left out clearly indicates the

emphasis on the individual behaviour of key actors. The morality of

political actors is at stake. Secondly, debates concerning the legitimacy

of White people strongly relate to the boundaries of the public space.

When White people have been involved in the Zongo affair, arguments

about their non-belonging to the public space have been put forward.

In other words, only those invested with the power to speak may have

a say, that is, practise politics. Thus in current political discourse in

Burkina, notions of the public space both define a way to behave and

the boundaries of public debate.

The Collectif seems to suggest that in contrast to current political

order, politics must be practised by morally worthy actors and in

public. The morality emerges as a particularly useful strategy, provided

that the movement’s leaders have good personal records. In this vein,

attacks on these leaders have been based less on political arguments

than on moral ones. Two examples may be cited. First, in early

some Ivoirian newspapers accused Halidou Oue!draogo of corruption.

He was supposed to have received a ‘gift ’ of million francs CFA

from ex-president Henri Konan Bedie! of Co# te d’Ivoire. While

Oue!draogo was later acquitted of these accusations by the court in

Co# te d’Ivoire, the affair was picked up by Burkinabe newspapers close

to the government (L’Hebdo du Burkina –.. : ; L’Opinion

.–.. : , –.. ; for more critical stance see L’IndeUpen-dant .., .. ; San Finna –..). Secondly, opposition

leaders are accused of sending their children abroad to study while

inciting ‘poor people’s children’ in Ouagadougou to strike. The

argument is that the invalidation of the academic year – did

not affect the children of the political elite.

In addition, the socio-political crisis is a means by which the public

space may be redefined. First, Internet connections and various web-

sites have increased people’s access to the different reports (CEI ;

CS ; RSF ), despite the fact that the overwhelming majority

of Burkinabe citizens do not have access to the Internet. Most people

do not understand French, nor do they read and write. Yet by

publishing these reports on the Internet, the very idea of keeping them

confidential evaporates. Burkinabe newspapers may then publish the

reports, because the information is already circulating in cities, and

soon in rural towns as well. It is therefore paradoxical that notions of

the public space are redefined by means of Information Technology

to which only a small minority has access.

Secondly, however, the circulation of underground tracts and

rumours contests the public space (cf. Oue!draogo ). Detailed

information about the president, his brother and other key actors

circulates intensely in the country. The web of communication connects

people through various bonds (e.g. kinship, regional belonging and

friendship). People are rapidly informed by what is going on in

different parts of Burkina. This web of communication is maintained

through phone calls, letters, hearsay and rumour. It has consequently

little to do with the Internet, but certainly contributes to redefining the

public space. The tracts are often dismissed by both political power-

holders and the media. They are seen as a way to disseminate rumours

without contributing to a serious political debate.

Freedom of the press has certainly been instrumental in Burkinabe

politics. Although political jokes and satirical comments are not new

(Badini ; Labaze! e ; Savonnet-Guyot ), the freedom of

the press has, in the s, led to an explosion of independent

newspapers and radio-stations. The government has come to accept

even strong criticism. Some would argue that this is precisely because

of President Compaore! ’s need to perform as a democratic pioneer

(‘washing the blood of Sankara’) without leaving the real power to

anyone else. Yet while political discourse is morally loaded and focuses

on the behaviour of key political actors, structural causes of the crisis

are rarely addressed. Few attempts have been made to question the

state administrative structure itself. Instead, the legalist argument has

been favoured. In other words, the rule of law must be respected, but

the law itself is not questioned. The reason for this is that the right to

life must be prior to any other right.

While the Collectif has successfully explored the moral dimension of

political discourse, it has largely remained outside party politics. The

Collectif itself has no political programme, although Halidou Oue!draogo

has been criticised for nurturing political ambitions. Paradoxically, the

Collectif is a main political actor that does not intend to transform itself

into a party. Political parties of the ‘radical opposition’ that are

members of the Collectif do have political programmes, but they have

on several occasions boycotted elections and thus remained outside

electoral competition. It can therefore be argued that morality provides

a political strategy for the ‘radical opposition’ and serves to unite

opposition and thus avoid fission. In this vein, it is interesting to note

that President Compaore! , whose CDP dominates party politics, has

recently sought to enter the morally loaded political discourse. The

National Day of Forgiveness on March focused on the need to

forgive. It seems to have been instrumental in dividing the opposition

by its appeal to the moral obligation to forgive.

Throughout this article I have argued that a culturally informed

analysis of the current socio-political crisis in Burkina allows us to

unfold political discourse. It helps us to focus on the ways in which

notions of the public space – both as boundaries and as behaviour – are

revealed in current power struggles. It is striking to what extent the

idea of the Burkinabe moral community is articulated in political

discourse. In all political camps people refer to the need to preserve

social peace. In the struggle against impunity attempts are made to

broaden the public space, to keep the initiative and make things

(information, knowledge etc.) public. It is the very acts of the political

power-holders that demonstrate the moral erosion. Therefore, the

struggle against impunity also takes place on a symbolic level at which

key symbols are appropriated, interpreted and incorporated into

political discourse. It clearly links up with the particular historicity of

Burkinabe politics, because the struggle against impunity seeks to

render public what has for a long time been seen as secret, and offers

a sense of meaning in a context of ruthless assassinations.

. Some recent studies deal with the daily ‘petty corruption’ as contrasted to ‘big corruption’(cf. Olivier de Sardan a; Blundo ).

. Le pire n’est pas la meU chanciteU des gens mauvais mais le silence des gens biens. All translations fromthe French in this paper are the author’s.

. The Conseil de l’Entente was originally built for the organisation with the same name that wascreated in to strengthen collaboration between Co# te d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Beninand Niger. This locality in Ouagadougou has been the scene of violent events in postcolonialhistory. In particular, the former president Thomas Sankara was killed there on October in the coup d ’eU tat.

. Later, the president’s security forces defended themselves by saying that David Oue!draogowas involved in planning a coup d ’eU tat.

. On the death certificate of David Oue!draogo was written ‘de! ce!de! le janvier a' hde sa maladie ’ (quoted in Oue!draogo : ).

. The group was formed on February to unite so-called radical opposition partiesagainst the majority movement of CDP. These opposition parties accused the power-holdingparty of fraud after the legislative elections.

. People often use the term le pouvoir en place (‘ the power in place ’) to describe the inner circleof the political power. The vagueness of the term le pouvoir allows for interpretation, but mostpeople agree that it is first and foremost the president who is targeted by using this term.

. Organisation pour la DeUmocratie et le Progre[ s}Mouvement du Travail. The ODP}MT was replacedby the CDP in January and all the seats in electoral assemblies were transferred to the CDP.

. Some recent works deal with the public space in different West African contexts (Laurent ; Le Meur ; Olivier de Sardan b).

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