Post on 24-Apr-2023
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Bachelor of Arts in Comparative Literature
King's College London
Moments of Vision: a study of time in Camus's La Mort Heureuse
and Buzzati's Il Deserto dei Tartari
Supervisor: Alicia Kent
01/05/2013
Word Count: 8226
13 Canterbury Place, London
SE173AD
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‘Does the past exist? No. Does the future exist? No. Then only the present exists. Yes.
But within the present there is no lapse of time? Quite so. Then time does not exist? Oh, I
wish you wouldn’t be so tiresome.’1
Time is the most defining mode of our experience2, and it has been the subject of
centuries of philosophical speculations. The philosopher Martin Heidegger, in the
introduction to his masterwork Being and Time, states that 'time must be brought to light - and
genuinely conceived - as the horizon for all understandings of being'3, suggesting that our
concept of time is essential to understand our existence.
In the novels here considered, La Mort Heureuse by Albert Camus and Il Deserto dei
Tartari by Dino Buzzati, time is a key theme, to the point that the protagonists' concepts and
reaction to time determines their lives and meaning. The influence of Heidegger's philosophy
of time pervades both novels; and thus despite being radically different in terms of plot, it is
possible to observe a similar philosophical framework, and linked them in particular to and
existentialist standpoint. The present investigation will consider how the authors appropriate
and dramatize elements of early existentialist philosophy into the novels, focusing in
particular on the subject of time; for this reason, Heidegger’s Being and Time will be used
extensively for their interpretation.
Both novels were written during the first half of the twentieth century, which according
to a standard periodisation corresponds to the first phase of existentialism, and after the
publication of Heidegger's Being and Time in 1927.4 La Mort Heureuse is the first novel by
Albert Camus: Camus writes it between 1936 and 1938, but leaves it incomplete: the final
draft will be published only after his death, in 1971.5 The novel narrates the story of Patrice
Mersault, an office clerk who after committing a murder abandons his alienating job and
seeks happiness in an alternative way of living (see appendix for detailed plot). The plot
presents numerous affinities with L'Etranger; it also anticipates several philosophical notions
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that the author will explicate in Le Mythe de Sisyphe, which for this reason has been
extensively used in this analysis. However, La Mort Heureuse is possibly considered Camus’s
least accomplished work.6 It is nonetheless the most suitable for this investigation, as it
extensively deals with time, and in particular presents a connection between this subject and
the concepts Camus later developed, such as the Absurd. Il Deserto dei Tartari is published in
1940 and is Buzzati's most praised work. It narrates the story of young official Drogo, who
moves into a Fortress as part of a division to defend the border from the Tartars, and ends up
waiting his entire life for an attack that never takes place (see appendix). While Camus is
obviously an exponent of existentialist thought, Buzzati is not equally so. The novel is very
unique and adopts elements from various literary currents, Surrealist techniques especially.
Nonetheless, several common points can be traced between existentialist thought and the
philosophical framework of the novel; and is thus of great interest as an Italian appropriation
of existentialist ideas.
The analysis will be divided in two parts, following the structures of the novels: the first
part will consider the dimension of time linked to the protagonists’ work routines, and the
second will relate the shift to an alternative kind of temporality that will be defined as
kairological time. On the whole, it will be possible to show how these conceptions of time
reveal the existentialist framework of the novels, and are in particular connected to what will
be later developed into the conception of the Absurd.
First of all, the relation between time and narrative has been the subject of extensive
studies, and must be held as a premise to this investigation. Genette observes that in any lexis
(verbal representation of events, according to Plato’s definition) there is a temporal diegetic
component, and that readers always approach a story as a sequence of events;7 and similarly,
Ricoeur emphasises that narrative has always, although not exclusively, a chronological
episodic dimension8. In other words, any novel must present an underlying structure of events
as ordered by chronological directional flow. That does not necessarily mean that events are
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presented in chronological order. The two novels here considered, for example, present
numerous flashbacks and flash-forwards: the entire first part of La Mort Heureuse is a
flashback to the year that precedes the episode narrated in the first chapter; in Il Deserto dei
Tartari, the narrator conveys flash-forward like reflections that foreshadow the subsequent
events. Chronological sequences can nonetheless be retraced by the reader, and thus
chronological temporality remains intrinsic to the narratives. That being said, both Camus and
Buzzati attempt at a representation of different ways of perceiving and representing time,
circumventing in a way the chronological requirements of narrative.
The novels are initially concerned with the representation of what Meyerhoff defines as
public time. Meyerhoff distinguishes public time from le temps humain, or the consciousness
of time: le temps humain is the subjective experience of time, while public time is objectively
measured and intersubjectively valid9. Public time is also characterised by circularity. It is
structured in relation to sidereal rhythms, which are cyclical; and it is marked by the clock,
which graphically renders the repetition of the very same twelve hours over and over. All
societal structures operate in the dimension of public time. 10 To function in society,
individuals have to adjust their lives to its fixed rhythm; but also to a circular routine where
every day is structured in the same way and repeated. This is the dimension of time that the
protagonists initially respond to. Both Mersault and Drogo dedicate their lives to their work,
one at the office and the other at the Fortress, and thus must abide by a precise work schedule:
this schedule is structured as a strict and repetitive routine. Camus extensively describes
Mersault’s routine in chapter two, from the moment he arrives at his office to the evening of
the next day. All time markers are obsessively specified in the narration: Mersault gets to the
office at five past two, deals with clients from three to four, leaves at six. The rhythm is so
precisely determined that it appears mechanical. Certainly it does not reflect a human pace of
living: it is an external imposition on human life and a mechanisation of time. Camus also
emphasises that in Mersault's routine hardly anything changes with time. The year following
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the events in the second and third chapter is in fact omitted from the narration, letting the
reader assume that nothing else has happened throughout this time. Every day is the same,
repeated according to a circular, non-progressive pattern. Work routine is based on endless
circularity, and thus regulates Mersault’s life as such. Buzzati does not provide a full
description of Drogo’s routine, but uses a specific episode as an example of it. Drogo’s life is
regulated by the military protocol, which determines every aspect of the soldiers’ life and
subjects it to a precise time schedule. In chapter five, Buzzati meticulously describe a portion
of this schedule, and adjust the narration so to mimic the protocol: each of the soldiers’ action
is reported, every requirement specified, time is measured obsessively. Also, timings are
discussed in detail, and Tronk, one of the officials, knows the different phases of the soldiers’
movements with a fifteen-minute accuracy. Again, as Mersault, Drogo is subjected to a
mechanical structuring of time. Buzzati uses the same expedient as in La Mort Heureuse to
deny linear progression: significant periods of time are omitted from the narration, to the
extent of a gap of no less than fifteen years between chapter twenty-four and twenty-five. The
Fortress protocol does not allow any change, is based on the repetition of the same schedule
and imposes a circular pattern on the soldiers’ life.
Thus work imposes on the protagonists’ lives a rhythm that is mechanical and endlessly
repeated, and that gives them a circular structure. So, Mersault and Drogo’s routines lack any
type of linear progression and thus do not lead towards any identifiable objective: circular
repetition simply prevents the development towards something. As a result, the protagonists’
lives seem to have no purpose. Mersault's job seems to have no objective: the nature of his
position is not even specified, and thus the reader can only perceive Mersault’s routine as a
sequence of actions with no specific purpose. Buzzati instead proves to the reader that there is
no reason that justifies the soldiers' routine, and is thus pointless. Soldiers claim that the
military protocol is enforced to protect the Fortress in case of an attack by the Tartars’ army.
The Tartars, however, have not been spotted in centuries and it is even suggested that they are
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just an ancient legend. In light of this information, the strict respect of the protocol appears as
an irrational obsession; the routine that the soldiers abide by is a mere repetition with no
actual goal.
If it is true that work routines structure the protagonists’ lives as stagnant repetitions, it
is not the authors' intention to convey a mere social critique of work patterns. Neither of the
authors in fact suggests that other aspects of life can provide an alternative to this stagnation.
On the opposite, all aspects of life seem to fall into the same lack of purpose, and ultimately
do not allow to the protagonists to break away from the circular rhythm. Mersault’s day off
from work is spent in complete inertia, looking down from his balcony and interrupting only
to smoke or to eat. As soon as time is detached from the mechanical rhythm of the workdays,
it becomes completely empty: perhaps not circular, but even more stagnating. Accordingly,
Mersault perceives it as slow and interminable. The narration reflects this perception: the text
breaks into short paratactic sentences that describe every single action performed by Mersault
or by the passers-by, becoming deliberately boring. The reader is prompted to emphatise with
Mersault’s mood, and both are finally relieved when the day comes to an end. Moreover,
Mersault’s relationship with his lover Marthe could provide a way-out from his work, but
instead she is nothing more than an 'image' to him. The gratification provided by Marthe is
only temporary, and in fact it soon fades away: as Mersault explains, he soon loses interest in
her. Certainly she does not provide Mersault’s life with the purpose that he does not find in
his job. Similarly, Drogo could find an alternative to the Fortress routine by returning to the
city. When in chapters eight and nine he goes back on a license, however, he is not able to
appreciate the city way of living. The parties and female company that he indulges in
resemble Mersault’s 'image': they provide nothing more than a momentary pleasure, and
finally have no more purpose than the military routine, which at least, to Drogo’s mind, is
characterised by a certain honorable integrity.
Overall, neither Mersault nor Drogo have a meaningful alternative to the mechanical
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and circular routines, in which they find themselves trapped. At this point, however, there is a
fundamental distinction to be made between the characters, and that is in regard to the way
they react to these routines. Mersault is frustrated by his routine, and is not deceived into
thinking that it has a meaning: all he does is just wait for time to pass and simply wants to
'dormir jusqu'à ce que tout soit consommé'.11 Drogo’s attitude resembles that of Mersault only
at the beginning of the novel. When he first arrives at the Fortress, he is told that the Tartars
do not pose a real threat and thus realises that the military routine is pointless. Disappointed,
he soon asks for a transfer: at this point, similarly to Mersault, all he does is just wait for time
to pass. However, this initial attitude soon changes: while the transfer is repeatedly delayed,
he develops a certain fascination with the Fortress. The mechanisms of the Fortress seem to
exude a magical charm on the soldiers, who for no apparent reason decide to remain on the
outpost and submit to its absurd protocol. The officials that have fallen to it often end up
spending their entire life at the Fortress. The charm can be defined as the ‘disease of the
Fortress’12 and can be interpreted as a fictional representation of the power of habits.13 The
repetitive routine, in fact, is not only pointless and frustrating, as in Mersault’s case, but can
also provide a certain comfort and feeling of security and familiarity. Drogo, in fact, grows
attached to the Fortress and his initial disillusionment disappears. It is finally easier for him to
accept the routine of the Fortress than to leave.
The reason why the two protagonists react in such opposite ways to similar
circumstances is to be found in their perception of time. In order to explain and contextualise
this distinction within existentialist thought, it is necessary here to outline a brief overview of
Heidegger and Camus's ideas. In Being and Time, Heidegger observes that death is the sole
inescapable truth of human life.14 Any other principle or structures of meaning that is
presented as transcendentally truthful is only a construction of society. The only way man can
live truthfully, in what he defines as authentic existence, is through the acknowledgement and
confrontation of death.15 Consciousness of death, however, generates Angst: not only because
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it forces man to accept his own mortality, but also because it reveals all other principles to be
artificial and ultimately illusory. Man thus naturally attempts to escape Angst and, rather than
confronting death, chooses to rely on the illusory principles of society. He conducts an
inauthentic existence, and the meaning that he has constructed for his life according to these
principles is equally illusory and untruthful.16 The concept of Angst shares many similarities
with Camus’s notion of the Absurd, which he theorises in Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Camus first
defines the Absurd as a feeling rather than a philosophical concept: a sense of 'divorce entre
l'homme et sa vie'.17 Man, who naturally seeks to understand the world, comes to the
realisation that the world is inexplicable to him. As does Heidegger, Camus recognises that
death is the greatest source of the Absurd. Principles and structures of meaning that elude
death are only 'illusions et (de) lumières'18 that man superimposes on reality and that are
ultimately false.
Circularity can be identified as one of the illusory principles that both Heidegger and
Camus deal with. It superimposes a structure onto the otherwise chaotic world: work routines,
in fact, organise the protagonists’ interactions with their surrounding and reduce the world to
a manageable schedule. They are mechanical, not natural, and that suggests that they do not
reflect the true nature of reality. As Camus’s 'illusions et lumières', they turn reality into
something orderly and understandable. Besides, they create a meaning that is equally false
and artificial. Although work conventionally tends towards an objective, in the novels this
objective is either omitted or presented as absurd. The authors suggest, in the end, that any
meaning attached to the circular routine is unreachable and illusory. Most importantly, the
circular pattern does not correspond to the nature of human life. Circular time is characterised
by endless repetition; all things cyclical have neither beginning nor end, and are therefore
connected to the eternal. Human life is limited and contingent, and thus cannot be integrated
within circularity. It is a progression from birth to death and belongs to the dimension of
linear time. Work, and the structure of public time in general, by causing men to fall into the
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illusion of circularity, negate the linearity and contingency of human existence. In short,
circular time can be defined as an inauthentic structure. Since the protagonists submit their
lives to this illusory principle, they can be said to be conducting inauthentic existences.
What distinguishes Mersault and Drogo is their level of awareness that their lives are
inauthentic; their different reactions depend on whether or not they recognise circularity as an
illusion. Mersault does not fall into the illusion of circularity. He is aware that the circular
work routine has no purpose and that it is an artificial structure that is imposed on his life, and
thus finds it unbearable. If he abides by it and lives his life inauthentically, it is only because
he sees no better alternative. In light of Camus’s thought, Mersault can be identified as an
early representation of the man who has perceived the Absurd: who, in other words, has
exposed the 'illusions et lumières', has ultimately become aware of the meaninglessness of all
things and feels estranged from the world. Drogo, on the opposite, does not recognise that
circularity is an illusion. Caught in the ‘disease of the Fortress’, he never ponders that the
circular Fortress routine has no purpose and he simply accepts circularity as a proper way to
structure his life. In other words, Drogo has no perception of the meaninglessness and of the
Absurd.
The illusion of circularity distorts the protagonists’ perception of time. As mentioned
earlier, circularity always repeats itself and never progresses, and therefore it is connected to a
dimension of time that is cyclical and eternal. The man who lives according to a circular
pattern falls into the illusion of living in an eternal dimension of time; or, in other words, he
sees his life always repeating itself and fails to perceive the linear passage of time. Man can
locate himself within linear time only when circularity is revealed as an illusion, and when he
comes to the acknowledgement of his own death. The consciousness of death destroys man’s
illusion of eternity. It causes him to understand that his life proceeds linearly and that his time
is limited, and it makes him conscious of the inevitable passage of time. Again, the
protagonists do not present the same level of awareness in relation to death and to the passage
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of time. Mersault is aware that circularity is an illusion and is conscious of his own mortality.
There is a specific episode in the narration that describes the moment when Mersault comes to
acknowledge mortality, and that is the moment of his mother’s death, narrated in a flashback
to many years before. Before the mother’s death, he conducted a happy life and was not
frustrated by the routine. At the funeral, he begins to show disillusionment towards life; it is
stated that not on his mother but 'sur lui, au vrai, que sa pité se retournait',19 and the reader can
assume that this pity derives from the acknowledgement of his own mortality. Consciousness
of death seems to function here as the catalyst to the perception of the Absurd, as in
Heidegger’s notion of Angst: from the moment of the mother’s death, Mersault becomes
frustrated with circularity and perceives its meaninglessness. Since aware of mortality,
Mersault is able to locate himself within linear time and is aware of its passage.20 He actually
looks forward to the end of time, to death, as the moment that will end his anguish. Drogo, on
the opposite, does not question the illusion of circularity and is not conscious of his own
mortality. This does not mean that Drogo imagines himself as immortal: he knows that he is
destined to die, but cannot fully contemplate the concept: when he imagines the war with the
Tartars, for example, he picture himself surviving the fight. As both Heidegger and Camus
point out, man is not capable of imagining his own death.21 As a result, Drogo fails to locate
himself within linear time. His routine relates to a circular dimension of time and he blindly
subjects himself to it. He does not perceive that his life proceeds linearly, nor that his time is
inevitably passing by.22 Buzzati emphasises Drogo’s unawareness of time in a number of
ways. First, Drogo acts as if his time were inexhaustible. He accepts, in fact, to spend long
periods of time just waiting, and all his life is finally characterised by one waiting after the
other: he has waited to graduate from the military Academy, he waits to be transferred away
from the Fortress, he then begins to expect the Tartars and finally, in old age, he even waits
for the recovery. These waits start when he is young, and he uses his youth to reassure himself
that he still has a long time in front of him and that he can afford wasting some of it just
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waiting. However, this attitude does not change as he ages: old and sick, Drogo is still
convinced that he will have time for what he wants to achieve. To put it simply, he thinks and
acts in the dimension of eternal time.23 Second, Drogo simply does not notice that time goes
by. Life at the Fortress is an endless repetition of the same routine, with little development. In
regard to the few things that actually change, Drogo simply overlooks them: he does not
realise, for example, that some of his habits are actually changing due to the fact that he is
aging. Through most of the narration, as years pass by, he is said to feel always in the same
way, and does not realise that he is growing old. Basically, as all days are the same and Drogo
hardly distinguishes between them, he simply has a sense that time is fixed.24 This perception
is reflected in the narration. As mentioned, vast periods of time are completely omitted, and
there are gaps of up to fifteen years between chapters: because of this expedient, the reader
not only assumes that everything has remained the same, but does not even realise that time is
passing until the narrator states that it has done so. It is the narrator that, while Drogo remains
unaware, reminds the reader of the passage of time. This voice, introduced alongside the
report of Drogo’s thoughts, emphasises the distinction between Drogo’s perception of things
and the reality, and finally prevents the reader from fully identifying with the former. The
narrator, in fact, locates Drogo within a linear dimension of time. While Drogo perceives time
as circular and fixed, the narrator contradicts him and states repeatedly that time is running
by. In particular, it points out to the reader all the indicators of the passage of time that Drogo
fails to notice: his age and the number of years that have passed, first of all, but also the many
transformations that have occurred in the city while life at the Fortress has remained more or
less the same. The reader is reminded of the passage of time also through the motif of water.
Time is often compared to a river that drags human beings along with its flow; and it clearly
recalls Heraclitus’s concept of Panta Rhei, thus emphasising that time passes relentlessly and
things never remain fixed.25 The motif of water, in particular, appears in the form of a drop
that falls at regular intervals in the Fortress cistern, mimicking the ticking of a clock as well as
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the motion inside an hourglass. The sound can be heard from Drogo’s room and acts as a
constant reminder of the passage of time. Drogo’s reaction to the noise reflects his perception
of time: when he has just arrived at the Fortress he is bothered by it, but as he falls into the
‘disease of the Fortress’ he gets used to it to the point that he does not hear it any longer. He
does not perceive the drop fall as he does not perceive time.
To sum up, it has thus far been observed that both protagonists regulate their lives
according to patterns that function within a circular dimension of time; and that Mersault
remains nonetheless aware of the linear temporality of human life, while Drogo falls into the
illusions of circularity and of eternal time. As a result, Mersault is aware of the passage of
time, while Drogo is not. Intuitively, one would imagine that Mersault expects change as
brought by the linear progression of things and thus thinks of his future; and that Drogo, on
the other hand, accepts the cyclical repetition and does not conceive a future. However, the
novels show quite the opposite. Mersault has no expectation whatsoever for his future and,
feeling trapped in circularity, doubts that things are ever going to change. He hypothesises
about alternative ways of living but never locates them in his future. Drogo, on the opposite,
is constantly projecting things in the future. Not only is he projecting: he faithfully trusts that
certain things are going to happen, and for this reason spends his life waiting for them. In
particular, the great future event around which the whole narration is constructed is the arrival
of the Tartar army. Drogo frequently fantasises about the eventual war, and imagines that in
that occasion he will perform the heroic act that will give meaning to his entire existence.26
This distinction, although counter-intuitive, reflects the different concepts of time as
developed by Heidegger. As earlier mentioned, Heidegger states that death is the only truth of
life and therefore that life is lived authentically only in acknowledgement of death. The
authentic being is, as he phrases it, a being-towards-death:27 there is no other truth or meaning
to be sought. Accordingly, he distinguishes two types of temporality: the inauthentic
temporality of man who seeks meaning and the authentic temporality of man who has
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accepted death. Inauthentic temporality is identified with the common conception of time as
chronological, that is to say, the succession of past, present and future. Chronological time is
in fact an abstraction derived from the need to construct meaning. Man uses the past to find
causes and the future to expect consequences, in the belief that he can eventually progress
towards the achievement of his purposes. In other words, he conceives time in a way that can
fit with certain structures of meaning. Needless to say, chronological time is as illusory and
inauthentic as these structures of meaning. As meaning is only an illusion, the expected future
when it will be finally achieved does never come into effect.28 Authentic temporality is
instead derived from the acknowledgement of death and is based on the unity of past, present
and future. The only truthful future is that of death; and by acknowledging death, the
authentic being is constantly projecting himself onto the future. He also accepts his past in its
entirety: while the inauthentic being discriminates the past to determine meaning, the
authentic being acknowledges that his past determines his present in a way that is inexplicable
to him. He simply submits to this determination, or fate, and by doing so acts his past out in
his present. Thus the authentic being always exists in the present intersection of past and
future; only in this way can the present become authentic and truthful.29 Heidegger defines
this intersection as an ecstatic moment of vision, or a kairological dimension of time.
Basically, kairological time is the opposite of chronological time. While chronological time
has a quantitative and measurable value, kairological time has a qualitative one: the
significance of a moment within kairological time exceeds its chronological limitations.30 It is
important to clarify that chronological time is not a better alternative than circular time, and
neither the chronological and circular dimensions of time are mutually exclusive. They are, in
fact, both conceptions of time that respond to the desire to obliterate death. The only authentic
dimension of time that acknowledges human contingency is that of kairological time.
Turning back to the novels, it has been observed that Mersault is conscious of death,
whereas Drogo is not: as a result, Mersault is able to reject inauthentic temporality, while
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Drogo can only conceive time as chronological. Mersault knows that all attempts to construct
meaning are destined to fail, and that the only certain future is that of death. Therefore he
renounces to future expectations and to the chronological construction of time altogether, and
simply accepts to live meaninglessly until death. However, neither does he seem to reach a
kairological dimension of time, at least not in the first part of the novel. His life is all but
structured as a qualitatively significant moment. Mersault is aware of the illusion of
chronological time as he is aware of the illusion of circular time, yet he finds himself trapped
in a certain way of living and feels that forces him to abide by both. He states in fact several
times that his work robs him of time and keeps him from living an authentic life; or as he
phrases it, from ‘earning’ his life.31 Finally, he can only imagine how his life would be if he
could structure his time in a different way, but is initially not able to act on it. Drogo, on the
opposite, has not accepted death or the absurdity of life, and still seeks to construct a meaning
for his existence. He projects the achievement of this meaning onto the future and, although
he continues to live according to a circular pattern, he transforms his life into a constant
expectation. The expectation will never be fulfilled: mirroring Heidegger’s notion that future
meaning is illusory, the occasion that Drogo waits for and that will give a sense to his
existence never becomes reality. Drogo, in fact, will never be able to confront the Tartars in
war. Throughout the narration, Buzzati presents to the reader two different perspectives on
Drogo’s expectation. On the one hand, he voices Drogo’s thoughts: the reader, if he identifies
with the protagonist, falls into the same illusion that the attack will actually take place. On the
other hand, Buzzati also provides the reader with a number of clues that suggest that the army
is only a legend, and thus that the expectation is illusory. First, as mentioned, the Tartars have
not attacked in centuries, to the point that it is suggested that they are only a legend spread
and passed on by the soldiers. At the military headquarters, the Fortress is not considered an
important outpost: as the general met by Drogo states, there is no threat coming from that
border. This becomes more and more evident through the narration, as the Fortress
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complement is periodically reduced. Second, at a certain point an army is actually spotted in
the desert, but the soldiers’ immediate excitement then disappears: the army does not pose
any threat and only intends to demarcate the border. At the end, however, the question of the
existence of the Tartars remains open to the reader. A second army is spotted in the desert,
and it appears that this time the Tartars have finally arrived; but Drogo, by now old and sick,
is sent away from the Fortress before he gets the chance to confront the army. What is
important to the plot and to this investigation is not whether the Tartars really exist, but that
they do not provide the occasion that will give meaning to Drogo’s life. In relation to Drogo
only, the expectation of the Tartars and of the heroic act proves to have been an illusion, and
the future that he much waited for never becomes reality. Actually, as Drogo's death and the
arrival of the Tartars occur almost simultaneously, Buzzati seems to suggest that the Tartars
are a symbol of death, and that thus death was the only future that Drogo could expect.
However, failing to realise that, he organises his life according to the same circular and
meaningless patter; unaware that his time is inevitably running by, he ends up waiting for the
Tartars his entire existence.
At this point, the second part of the novels can be taken into consideration; and that
concerns the ways in which the protagonists escape the circularity of their routines, and the
chronological perception of time in Drogo’s case, and reach Heidegger’s moment of vision,
that is, the kairological dimension of time. In La Mort Heureuse, the question of how to gain
time is faced in the dialogue between Mersault and Zagreus in chapter four; and the following
chapters then describe Mersault’s effort towards this goal. Camus, in an earlier version, had
actually chosen for the second part of the novel the title 'Gaining Time', opposed to the title of
the first part, 'Killing Time'.32 In light of the above analysis, it is possible to identify the act of
'killing time' with a circular temporality, and the act of 'gaining time' will the kairological
temporality that Mersault will achieve in the end. So Mersault and Zagreus discuss a series of
principles by which kairological time can be achieved, which Mersault will later put into
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practice; these principles present an evident resemblance with the three consequences of the
Absurd that Camus describes in Le Mythe of Sisyphe, to the extent that, one could argue, they
are possibly an earlier version of them. These consequences are the following: révolte, liberté
and passion.33 Révolte is defined as the constant contemplation of the Absurd34, and
resembles the acknowledgement of death at the basis of kairological time. Man who is in a
state of revolt knows that he is condemned to meaninglessness, yet keeps challenging it and
does not resign to irrationality.35 Mersault openly states that he is 'en état de révolte'36, and for
this reason he cannot be content in his work routine and in circularity. He is frustrated
because he constantly acknowledges its absurdity. Liberté is derived from the realisation that
all structures of meaning are illusory, which is also a premise to kairological time. Man
obtains freedom when he chooses not to abide by these structures, and that includes
circularity.37 Mersault recognises that circular work routine precludes his freedom, and
imagines that he would otherwise be able to structure his time in a different way. The reason
why Mersault continues to work is, quite simply, that he needs money to survive. Hence,
freedom is achieved through the murder of Zagreus, when he takes possession of Zagreus’s
savings. Only then he escapes circularity and can regulate his life within kairological
temporality. Finally, passion is the act of 'vivre le plus', of appreciating the whole experience
of life in spite of its absurdity.38 For this case, the comparison with kairological temporality is
apparent: passion is in fact accomplished only through a specific attitude towards time, and
this attitude pretty much structures it as kairological. Camus introduces passion as based on
'l'indifférence à l'avenir et la passion d'épusier tout ce qui est donné'.39 The 'indifférence à
l'avenir' can be viewed as a consequence of its lack of meaning, so as in kairological
temporality future is annihilated because there is no progression towards a purpose; and
although there is no mention of the past, the 'passion d'épusier tout' mirrors the full acceptance
of things as determined that Heidegger refers to. Passion is the appreciation of the present
regardless of its chronological definition. It leads to a qualitative intensification of the present,
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which can be in a way associated to a kairological dimension of time. In the dialogue with
Zagreus, Mersault proves to be already aware and longing for passion; and he in fact imagines
that, if liberated from his work routine, he would live passionately and enjoy indiscriminately
everything that happens to him. He aspires, in other words, to constant kairological
presentness.
The second part of the novel narrates Mersault’s progression towards the final
achievement of kairological time. He is not able to live passionately immediately after he
liberates himself from work through Zagreus’s murder: instead, he goes through a number of
stages before accomplishing his purpose. These can be identified through the different
locations where he travels. First, he arrives in Prague. For the first time, he is free from work
and able to structure his time as he pleases; yet all he does is just impose another schedule on
his life, which very much resembles his previous routine. Time is still regulated according to
precise markers, as in the dimension of public and circular time, and Mersault’s attitude soon
starts resembling that of the first art of the novel: he follows his schedule mechanically until
he completes it every day, and is then faced with emptiness and can only let time pass waiting
for the next day. His life is still void of passion. Mersault is then reminded of the Absurd by
the sight of a dead man, and this brings him back to his initial intent and convinces him to
move away from Prague.40 The question of time is emphasised once again during his journey
by train, where the speed of the vehicle reminds him of Zagreus’s words: 'il faut du temps
pour vivre'41, he remembers. Time here can be interpreted as to refer to kairological time: it is
not merely free time that he needs, that he already had in Prague, but a different kind of
temporality. He travels through a number of locations in Austria and in Italy, until he decides
to go back to Algeria; there he moves into the so-called Maison devant le Monde. At the
Maison devant le Monde, Mersault and the other residents conduct a life of pure pleasure.
Time seems to be completely annihilated. The narration suddenly adopts the present tense,
there are no time markers whatsoever and it is not clear how much time Mersault spends at
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the Maison overall. He then suddenly chooses to leave. It is not clear what prompts Mersault
to this decision: the only explanation that he gives is that he 'risquerai(t) d'y être aimé'42 by
another resident of the House, Catherine, and 'ça (lui) empecherait d'être heureux'.43 In a
sense, any human relationship creates an illusion of meaning that contradicts the Absurd. One
could argue that the perception of the Absurd is obliterated altogether whilst at the House.
Mersault lives in a kind of happy mindlessness, and that lacks the sense of revolt that is
necessary to confront the Absurd and live authentically.44 At last, he settles down in Le
Chenua village. Here, Mersault appears to have finally reached a state of passion, and that is
reflected in the way he regulates his life and conceives temporality. He starts each day with a
long swim that is said to leave him in a state 'd'abandon et de lassitude heureuse'45, and then
simply enjoys the rest of the day and does not define any specific plan or schedule.
This way of living allows him to reject any chronological definition of time and adjust
to kairological temporality. First, it presupposes that Mersault has no expectations and thus
does not conceive any future; but also it entails the indiscriminate compliance with all things
that happen to him. In particular, the mention of a 'destin sur mesure'46 recalls Heidegger’s
notion of the past determination of the present; and as kairological time calls for an
acceptance of the past in its entirety, Mersault is said to have to subject to this 'destin sur
mesure'. Second, by this way of living Mersault achieves a state of passion and of constant
presentness. Passion is expressed through the enjoyment of sensual pleasure, and in particular
of the physical sensations derived from nature: from the sun, but also and especially from the
water. Water acquires here a different connotation than in Il Deserto dei Tartari. Whereas
Buzzati represents water as a flow, Camus links it to the sea, and presents Meursault’s
morning swim as an emblem of the sensual communion with nature.47 Some critics have
argued that, in this section of the novel, Mersault simply submerges himself into nature and
into physical sensations, and enacts a full renunciation to his consciousness and sense of
self.48 According to this interpretation, he would fail to confront the Absurd. The dimension
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of time represented, rather than kairological, would be simply the cyclical and eternal time of
nature. It is true that all time markers in this section refer to the seasons and to natural
transformations; and that time passes quickly, with a few pages in chapter five covering
several years, and seems to elude Mersault’s consciousness. However, this interpretation is
contradicted by Mersault’s own words: he emphasises the importance of 'une sorte d'énorme
conscience toujours présente"49, which is not suppressed by sensual enjoyment and does not
disappear in a fusion with nature. Mersault remains thus also aware of the Absurd and
achieves authentic passion50. His state of conscious presentness gives to every moment a
qualitative significance. As stated, 'quelque chose d'éternel se figurait pour lui en chaque
seconde51: time has ultimately become kairological.
There is no equivalent progress towards kairological temporality in Il Deserto dei
Tartari. Drogo in fact keeps abiding by his illusions of circular and chronological time until
the last chapter of the novel, when he is forced away from the Fortress. Only at that point, the
protagonist he envisions his own death and perceives the Absurd. Accordingly, also his
conception of time changes only in the last pages of the novel. He is obviously forced out of
the circularity of the Fortress; but also, he exposes the illusion of chronological time. For the
first time, in fact, Drogo renounces to the long sustained expectations of meaning and does
not contemplate any future. The present moment, he realises, is his only occasion to perform
the desired heroic act. This sole moment, therefore, is lived to the fullest, with the same
presentness shown by Mersault; and although there is no intensification of sensual pleasure as
there is for Mersault, the ultimate result is also that of endowing one moment with a
significance that exceeds its chronological limitations. At this point, chronological time does
not matter any longer and it seems that 'la fuga del tempo si fosse fermata'.52 Time acquires a
qualitative value and starts to be conceived as kairological. Contrary to La Mort Heureuse, in
Il Deserto dei Tartari the new dimension of time is not sustained for long, and is linked to
Drogo’s imminent death. There is almost no time frame between the acknowledgement of the
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Absurd and of mortality, and the actual moment of death. One could argue that, while Camus
describes an alternative truthful way of living, Buzzati claims that inauthentic life cannot be
escaped until death.53 In any case, within the dimension of kairological time, duration has no
importance. Duration relates in fact to a quantitative measurement of time that is connected to
chronological temporality, and does not express the qualitative character of kairological
temporality.54 Mersault exists for a few years within the dimension of kairological time, yet he
is constantly present and is not affected by the passage of time, to the point that to him it 'peu
importait qu'il fut deux ou vingt années'.55 In the same way, Drogo focuses only on a present
significant moment that is not chronologically quantifiable, and thus is not concerned by the
length of time he is left to live.
However, when it comes to the actual moment of death, Mersault and Drogo have
radically different attitudes. To Mersault, the moment of death is only 'un accident'.56 He has
accepted the Absurd as well as his own mortality, and throughout his life he has chosen to
remain conscious of both meaninglessness and of the eventuality of death. This has allowed
him to conduct an authentic existence; but also, more precisely, it has led him to happiness.
Camus emphasises that the authentic existence is, in a way, the best life that man can conduct:
one by which man is granted a sort of dignity that derives from the stoic rejection of illusory
structures in favour of the truths of death and of the Absurd, but that also is appreciated
passionately and to the fullest.57 The authentic being, or in Camus’s definition the Absurd
hero, is dignified and happy. Kairological temporality releases this happiness from its
chronological limitations, and endows it with a much greater qualitative value. At the moment
of death, therefore, Mersault must not only confirm his acceptance of mortality, but must be
thoroughly content with his life. Happiness is not annihilated by the imminent death, because
'la bonheur était qu'il fut". 58 Paradoxically, although the consciousness of death has
determined Mersault’s life, the moment of death does not seem to matter. For Drogo, the
moment of death defines the authentic existence. First, as mentioned, he can accept mortality
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and the Absurd, and thus access kairological time, only when this moment is imminent. But
also, he is said to be willing to die: not only does he acknowledge and tolerate mortality, but
also he makes a conscious effort to go towards death, he 'varca con il piede fermo il limite
dell'ombra'.59 He transforms in this way the moment of death into the occasion for the heroic
act that he had long expected: by going towards the certainty of death, Drogo proves the
courage and dignity that makes him worthy as a human being.60 The moment of death is the
kairological moment, qualitatively significant, that at once ends and justifies Drogo’s life.61
Only in this very moment, Drogo achieves the authentic existence and finds happiness;
finally, as the novel concludes, 'benché nessuno lo veda, sorride'.62
Overall, it has been observed that both La Mort Heureuse and Il Deserto dei Tartari
present the contrast between two, if not more, conceptions of time. The protagonists initially
abide by the illusory, circular pattern dictated by public time, and that causes a sense of
estrangement and Absurd to Mersault, while it drives Drogo into the illusions of eternity and
chronological time. Death, whether as the mother’s death for Mersault or the foreshadowing
of his own for Drogo, exposes the illusion of circularity. In a way, the protagonists perceive
the clash between two different temporalities: that of the repetitive circularity, seemingly
endless, and that of the linear progress towards death. This clash can be considered an
example of the Absurd, and to a certain extent one could argue that it is at the origins of
Camus’s definition in Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Circularity is defied only by shifting from circular
to kairological temporality. Although at very different points in the narration, both
protagonists reach kairological temporality, and are able to endow any present moment with
qualitative significance. At the end, Camus and Buzzati both convey what ultimately appears
as a positive humanistic message. They acknowledge the Absurd and the consequent angst
that befalls on men; yet they do not opt for inauthentic and illusory solution, nor they adopt a
nihilistic perspective over life. Instead, the kairological moment becomes the essence of
authentic existence; it constitutes a final act of redemption, which stems from the courageous
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acceptance of things as they are and provides dignity. And ultimately, it is the kairological
moment that defies the nihilism of the Absurd and, providing an answer to the basic
existentialist question of existence, makes human life worth living.
1 Meyerhoff Time in Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp.6-7 2 Meyerhof, pp.2 3 Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp.39 4 Warnock, Existentialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.2-10. 5 Sarocchi, 'Afterword to La Mort Heureuse', A Happy Death (2002), p.107. 6 Ibid., pp.113-114. 7 Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp.128-136. 8 Ricoeur, "Narrative Time", Critical Inquiry, 7/1 (1980), p.174. 9 Meyerhof, Time in Literature, pp.5-6. 10 Ibid., p.6. 11 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.42. 12 Buzzati, p.46. 13 Cavallini, Buzzati: il Limite dell’Ombra (Roma: Studium, 1997, pp.93-94. 14 Heidegger, pp.169-219. 15 Hoffman, 'Death, time, history', The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, pp. 197-199. 16 Heidegger, pp.149-163. 17 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.18. 18 Ibid., p.18. 19 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.41. 20 A similar episode in Camus's Cahiers further justifies this claim. It relates the death of a lorry-driver's wife: the lorry-driver’s reacts by‘realize(ing) how old he was’ (Camus, A Happy Death, p.125). 21 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.30. 22 Biaggi, Buzzati: i Luoghi del Mistero (Padova: Messaggero, 2001), pp.85-86. 23 Cavallini, p.63. 24 Ibid., p.61. 25 Ibid., p.29. 26 Caratazzolo La Finestra sul Deserto: a Oriente di Buzzati (Acireale: Bonanno, 2006), pp.53-54. 27 Heidegger, pp.294-295. 28 Ibid., pp.219-224. 29 Ibid., pp.383-421. 30 Murchada, The Time of Revolution (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp.18-25. 31 Camus, A Happy Death, p.32. 32 Sarocchi, pp.112-113. 33 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.88. 34 Ibid, pp.77-78.
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35 Ibid., pp.76-77. 36 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.74. 37 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, pp.82-83. 38 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.86. 39 Ibid., p.84. 40 Ellison, Understanding Albert Camus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp.31-32. 41 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.115. 42 Ibid., p.155. 43 Ibid., p.155. 44 Hanna, The Thought and Art of Albert Camus (Chicago: H. Reignery, 1958), pp.3-9. 45 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.168. 46 Ibid., p.182. 47 Sagi, Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), p.36. 48 Strauss, 'A Reading of Camus’s La Mort Heureuse', Critical Insights Camus (Pasadena: Salem Press, 2012). 49 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.178 50 Ellison, p.35. 51 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.169. 52 Buzzati, p.199. 53 Baggi, pp.83-84. 54 Meyerhof, pp.16-17. 55 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.53. 56 Ibid., p.180. 57 Hanna, pp.24-25. 58 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.202. 59 Buzzati, p.200 60 Caratozzolo, La Finestra sul Deserto: a Oriente di Buzzati (Acireale: Bonanno, 2006), p.40 61 Biondi, Il Tempo e l’Evento (Roma: Bulzoni Editore, 2010), p.107. 62 Buzzati, p.202.
Appendix
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Synopsis of La Mort Heureuse
Mersault lives in the apartment in Algiers left to him by his deceased mother, works as a clerk
and occasionally sees his lover Marthe. He is frustrated by his job and his life in general.
Marthe introduces him to Zagreus, a rich and crippled man. After a long discussion with
Zagreus, Mersault kills him and takes his money. Mersault leaves Algiers and travels through
Prague, Vienna and Genoa. He returns to Algeria where he stays with friends at the House
Above the World, where he conducts a life of pleasures. He then moves out of the House to a
Le Chenua village, where he practises a simple life. At the end of the novel, he falls ill and
dies.
Synopsis of Il Deserto dei Tartari
Drogo has just graduated from the military Academy and is sent to the Fortress, an outpost
bordering the desert. When he realises that there is no chance of a war, he asks to be
transferred but then accepts to wait for four months. After four months, upon getting the
certificate for leaving the Fortress, he decides to stay. Life at the Fortress proceeds orderly
and unchanged except for few major events: the soldiers Lazzari and Angustina die, an army
is spotted by then revealed as not threatening. Drogo returns to the city twice, but in neither
case chooses to remain. Finally, an army is spotted one more time in the desert, but it takes
decades before it gets any closer. At the end of the novel, it is announced that the Tartars have
arrived, but Drogo is sick and moved away before the war. He then dies on his way back to
the city.
Bibliography
Primary texts
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Buzzati Dino, Il Deserto dei Tartari (Milano: Oscar Mondadori, 1995)
Camus Albert, La Mort Heureuse (Paris: Gallimard, 1971)
Translations
Buzzati Dino, The Tartars’ Desert, trans. by Stuart C. Hood (New York: Farras, Straus &
Young), 1952
Camus Albert, A Happy Death, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Penguin Books, 2002)
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