Post on 13-Mar-2023
Building Bulwarks in Troubled Times
Party System Institutionalization inRussia and Brazil
Daniel J. Epstein
Colgate University
Parties & Party Systems
Political Parties Important for Democracy (Tocqueville; Schattschneider; Aldrich; Linz & Stepan; Levitsky & Cameron)
Party System Literature focused on old democracies (Lipset & Rokkan) or on Number of Parties, Polarization (Sartori; Moser; Mainwaring & Scully)
Party System as Institution
Institutions: “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington)
Behavior: Choosing
Continuity in the set of choices (parties)
Interruptions to continuity:Party birth, death, marriage, and divorce
Capturing Continuity: Electoral Volatility
Electoral Volatility: How much vote-shares shift between parties from one election to the next
Higher Electoral Volatility =
Worse Party System Institutionalization
Electoral Volatility: Old & New (1)
Pedersen's Index of EV:
Sum of Squares Index of EV:
∑i=1
n ∣P i1−Pi2∣
2×100
12∑i=1
n
P i1−Pi2 2×100
Electoral Volatility: Old & New (2)
Party Country A Country BElection 1 Election 2 Election 1 Election 2
Party A 30% 30% 30% 10%Party B 30% 30% 30% 30%Party C 20% 20% 20% 40%Party D 6% 0% 6% 6%Party E 5% 0% 5% 5%Party F 4% 0% 4% 4%Party G 3% 0% 3% 3%Party H 2% 0% 2% 2%Party I 0% 6% 0% 0%Party J 0% 5% 0% 0%Party K 0% 4% 0% 0%Party L 0% 3% 0% 0%Party M 0% 2% 0% 0%Pedersen's Index 20 (0.2) 20 (0.2)Sum of Squares Index 9.5 (.095) 20 (0.2)
Research Design Case SelectionCross-Regional Cases improve Generalizability
Russia
89 Federal Sub-units*
74-year non-democratic regime
Transition Year: 1991
*Regional mergers since 2005 have reduced the number to 83
Brazil
27 Federal Sub-units
21-year non-democratic regime
1985 Transition Year
Incentives for Politicians to Build PartiesTwo Routes to Power:
Executive Office or Legislative Office
Via Executive Office, 1 step: Election
Via Legislative Office, 2 steps:1) Election, 2) Control of Multi-member body
Party Indispensable to Control:Caucus Origin of Political Parties
(Schattschneider)
Hypothesis
Greater Legislative Power
↓Greater Incentives for Party-Building
- and by contrast -
Greater Executive Power
↓Incentives for Anti-Party behavior
(Legislative Politicians sell out to the Executive)
Statistical Testing of Hypothesis
Russia● Three Electoral Intervals: (State Duma 1995-1999,
1999-2003, 2003-2007)
● OLS for each cross-section
● Dependent Variable: Sum of Squares Electoral Volatility in State Duma Party List Vote in Each Region
● Key Explanatory Variable: Ratio of Executive Employees to Legislative Employees per Deputy
● Controls: Regional wealth, regional growth, Pensioners
Russia ResultsOLS Regressions of Executive Dominance on Party System Institutionalization
Sum of SquaresVolatility
1995-1999 (n = 88)
Sum of SquaresVolatility
1999-2003 (n = 88)
Sum of SquaresVolatility
2003-2007 (n = 84)ExecutiveDominance overLegislature
0.00215*(0.000881)
0.00337***(0.00107)
-0.00053(0.00034)
ControlsWealth -1.47*
(06.88)-01.66
( 01.84)-006.82(004.84)
Economic Growth -0.00605(0.02094)
-0.0867(0.18236)
-0.0036(.0529)
Pensioners -0.82301***(0.27884)
-0.41719(0.40869)
-0.11985(0.13706)
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 All regressions used robust standard errors to compensate forpossible heteroscedasticity in the data.
Russia ResultsOLS Regressions of Executive Dominance on Party System Institutionalization
Sum of SquaresVolatility
1995-1999 (n = 88)
Sum of SquaresVolatility
1999-2003 (n = 88)
Sum of SquaresVolatility
2003-2007 (n = 84)ExecutiveDominance overLegislature
0.00215*(0.000881)
0.00337***(0.00107)
-0.00053(0.00034)
ControlsWealth -1.47*
(06.88)-01.66
( 01.84)-006.82(004.84)
Economic Growth -0.00605(0.02094)
-0.0867(0.18236)
-0.0036(.0529)
Pensioners -0.82301***(0.27884)
-0.41719(0.40869)
-0.11985(0.13706)
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 All regressions used robust standard errors to compensate forpossible heteroscedasticity in the data.
Russia ResultsOLS Regressions of Executive Dominance on Party System Institutionalization
Sum of SquaresVolatility
1995-1999 (n = 88)
Sum of SquaresVolatility
1999-2003 (n = 88)
Sum of SquaresVolatility
2003-2007 (n = 84)ExecutiveDominance overLegislature
0.00215*(0.000881)
0.00337***(0.00107)
-0.00053(0.00034)
ControlsWealth -1.47*
(06.88)-01.66
( 01.84)-006.82(004.84)
Economic Growth -0.00605(0.02094)
-0.0867(0.18236)
-0.0036(.0529)
Pensioners -0.82301***(0.27884)
-0.41719(0.40869)
-0.11985(0.13706)
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 All regressions used robust standard errors to compensate forpossible heteroscedasticity in the data.
Statistical Testing of Hypothesis
Brazil● Five Electoral Intervals (1986-1990, 1990-1994, 1994-
1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006)● Panel Data, Random Effects● Dependent Variable: Sum of Squares Electoral Volatility in
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies vote in each state● Key Explanatory Variables1. Annual State Expenditure on Legislative Function (mod. 1)
2. Sitting Governor's Vote Share (mod. 1)3. Normalized Ratio of 1. to 2. (mod. 2)● Controls: State wealth, State growth, Expenditure on All
Government Functions
Brazil ResultsRegression of Legislative Strength, Executive Strength, and Executive Dominance on
Sum of Square Electoral Volatility in Brazil: 1986-2006 (Random Effects)Model 1 (Legislative &
Executive Strength Separately)Model 2 (Ratio of Executive
Strength to Legislative Strength)Legislative Strength -0.00137*
(0.00058)Executive Strength 0.15746†
(0.08672)Executive Dominance (Ratio ExecutiveStrength to Legislative Strength)
0.89963*(0.37635)
ControlsExpenditure for all governmentfunctions
-2.17e-07*(9.01e-8)
-2.37e-07*(1.06e-08)
Wealth 2.30e-04(3.17e-04)
-1.77e-05(2.85e-04)
Growth -0.24879(0.25956)
-0.23014(0.27828)
† p<.10 * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 Regressions used robust standard errors to compensate for possible heteroschedacity in the data, andalso corrected them for autocorrelation within states across time.
Brazil ResultsRegression of Legislative Strength, Executive Strength, and Executive Dominance on
Sum of Square Electoral Volatility in Brazil: 1986-2006 (Random Effects)Model 1 (Legislative &
Executive Strength Separately)Model 2 (Ratio of Executive
Strength to Legislative Strength)Legislative Strength -0.00137*
(0.00058)Executive Strength 0.15746†
(0.08672)Executive Dominance (Ratio ExecutiveStrength to Legislative Strength)
0.89963*(0.37635)
ControlsExpenditure for all governmentfunctions
-2.17e-07*(9.01e-8)
-2.37e-07*(1.06e-08)
Wealth 2.30e-04(3.17e-04)
-1.77e-05(2.85e-04)
Growth -0.24879(0.25956)
-0.23014(0.27828)
† p<.10 * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 Regressions used robust standard errors to compensate for possible heteroschedacity in the data, andalso corrected them for autocorrelation within states across time.
Acceptable Hypothesis
Executive-Legislative Balance is an important factor explaining the institutionalization of party
systems in Russia and Brazil.
Exigency of Troubled Times:Urgent Economic Reforms
1980s & 1990s: Economic Reforms Require “Painful Adjustment” (Cutting Deficits, Privatization, Stabilization that chokes of growth)
To succeed: Strong Executives, Technocratic “Change Teams,” Insulation from Societal Interests, Pressures (ie, Legislatures & Parties)
(Haggard & Kaufman 1992 & 1995, Nelson, 1994, Waterbury, 1992)
Executive “Decretismo” a concern, but how much? What mechanism?
National Executives & LegislaturesEconomic Policy-making in Brazil & Russia
● Sarney & PMDB Cruzado Plan
● Collor & Congress: Decretismo, Failure, Impeachment
● Cardoso: “Technopol” and the Real Plan
● Some Decrees, More Cooperation
● Yeltsin & Gaidar: CPD grants decree power, “Kamikaze Cabinet”
● Yeltsin insulates Gaidar
● Intransigence over Economic Policy spawns Constitutional Conflict
After Early Stages
● Cardoso as President uses Party Coalitions
● Leaves Constitution alone (except re-election!)
● Well-institutionalized Party System (competitive elections, opposition victories)
● Yeltsin writes superpresidential constitution, eschews parties
● Duma excluded from policy-making
● “Floating Party System” and “Transitional Citizenship” Evaporate
Volatility Comparison: Institutionalization in the Brazilian Party System while Russian Party System remains Inchoate
19
86 (
Br)
19
90 (
Br)
19
93 (
Ru)
19
94 (
Br)
19
95 (
Ru)
19
98 (
Br)
19
99 (
Ru)
20
02 (
Br)
2003
(R
u)
2006
(B
r)
2007
(R
u) 0
5
10
15
20
25
New Index of Electoral Volatility inRussia and Brazil, 1985 to present
BrazilRussia
Election Years
Vol
atil
ity
Conclusion
Implications for Democracy:Quick Economic Recovery (Business Cycles?)
vs.Long Term Bulwarks of Democracy
[Extra] Two Russian Regions: Voronezh & Volgograd
Neighboring Regions in Russia's “Red Belt”
Similar demographic conditions (population, levels of economic development, pensioners)
Began post-Soviet era on similar trajectories: Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) strength●1995 Big victories for KPRF in State Duma voting●1996 both regions elect Communist governors●In Voronezh, Ivan Shabanov●In Volgograd, Nikolai Maksiuta●1997 KPRF wins big in Oblast Duma elections
Diverging trends in Party System Institutionalization
[Extra] Voronezh and Volgograd: Diverging Trends in Party System Institutionalization
1993 1995 1999 2003 2007 -1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
Electoral Volatility of Volgograd and Voronezh State Duma PartyList Vote (Compared to Median for all Russian Regions) 1993-2007
Voronezh
Volgograd
Sta
ndar
d D
evia
tion
s fr
om M
edia
n
[Extra] Another metric of party strength: Party nominees as share of Oblast Duma candidates,
winners
1994 1997 1998 2001 2003 2005
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Proportion of Oblast Duma SMD Election Candidates and Winnerswho were Nominated by Parties in Volgograd and Voronezh, 1994-2005
Of All Volgograd Candidates
Of Volgograd Winners
Of All Voronezh Candidates
Of Voronezh Winners
Oblast Duma Election Year
[Extra] Volgograd Oblast Duma: Center of powerVoronezh Oblast Duma: Not a destination for genuine
pursuers of power
1993* 1994* 1997* 1998 2001 2003 2005
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
Heads and Deputy-Heads of Administration as a Percentage of Oblast Duma Election Candidates in Volgograd and Voronezh, 1993-2005
Volgograd
Voronezh
*For Volgograd 1993 and Voronezh 1994 & 1997, occupation status only available for winning candidates
Per
cent
age
of C
andi
date
s w
ho w
ere
Hea
ds o
r D
eput
y-H
eads
of
Adm
inis
trat
ion
[Extra] In Volgograd, Legislative Importance In Voronezh, Executive Domination
Volgograd● 1997 Maksiuta's KPRF co-
partisans fail to unseat Oblast Duma speaker Leonid Semergei
● 2001 At elections for new speaker, Oblast Duma refuses Maksiuta's choice, instead select Roman Grebennikov
● 2003 KPRF-UR struggle almost denies Grebennikov's re-election as speaker
● 2005 United Russia finally removes Grebennikov as speaker
Voronezh● 1997 after KPRF success in
Oblast Duma election, Communist governor Shabanov taps bland Anatoly Goliusov as speaker “for an easier life”
● 2001 after Vladimir Kulakov's 2000 victory in gubernatorial elections, his pick for speaker elected with 38 out of 43 votes
● 2004 after his aborted campaign against Kulakov's re-election, Oblast Duma removes speaker Yevgeny Nakvasin
[Extra] On Legislative Strength and the Role of Parties in Voronezh and Volgograd
“Of forty-five deputies, forty-three are bosses of enterprises. They're all chiefs of businesses who will not say a word against the governor!”
Valentin Pavlov,Ex-deputy Voronezh Oblast Duma
“The two principal parties that will fight for pride of place and will have the largest number seats and then compete for the speakership and deputy speakers and heads of the high-profile committees will be the KPRF and United Russia.”
Yevgeny ChemiakinHead of Department of Social Relations
Volgograd United Russia party organization