Building Bulwarks in Troubled Times: Party System Institutionalization in Russia and Brazil

Building Bulwarks in Troubled Times

Party System Institutionalization inRussia and Brazil

Daniel J. Epstein

Colgate University

Parties & Party Systems

Political Parties Important for Democracy (Tocqueville; Schattschneider; Aldrich; Linz & Stepan; Levitsky & Cameron)

Party System Literature focused on old democracies (Lipset & Rokkan) or on Number of Parties, Polarization (Sartori; Moser; Mainwaring & Scully)

Party System as Institution

Institutions: “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington)

Behavior: Choosing

Continuity in the set of choices (parties)

Interruptions to continuity:Party birth, death, marriage, and divorce

Capturing Continuity: Electoral Volatility

Electoral Volatility: How much vote-shares shift between parties from one election to the next

Higher Electoral Volatility =

Worse Party System Institutionalization

Electoral Volatility: Old & New (1)

Pedersen's Index of EV:

Sum of Squares Index of EV:

∑i=1

n ∣P i1−Pi2∣

2×100

12∑i=1

n

P i1−Pi2 2×100

Electoral Volatility: Old & New (2)

Party Country A Country BElection 1 Election 2 Election 1 Election 2

Party A 30% 30% 30% 10%Party B 30% 30% 30% 30%Party C 20% 20% 20% 40%Party D 6% 0% 6% 6%Party E 5% 0% 5% 5%Party F 4% 0% 4% 4%Party G 3% 0% 3% 3%Party H 2% 0% 2% 2%Party I 0% 6% 0% 0%Party J 0% 5% 0% 0%Party K 0% 4% 0% 0%Party L 0% 3% 0% 0%Party M 0% 2% 0% 0%Pedersen's Index 20 (0.2) 20 (0.2)Sum of Squares Index 9.5 (.095) 20 (0.2)

Research Design Case SelectionCross-Regional Cases improve Generalizability

Russia

89 Federal Sub-units*

74-year non-democratic regime

Transition Year: 1991

*Regional mergers since 2005 have reduced the number to 83

Brazil

27 Federal Sub-units

21-year non-democratic regime

1985 Transition Year

Incentives for Politicians to Build PartiesTwo Routes to Power:

Executive Office or Legislative Office

Via Executive Office, 1 step: Election

Via Legislative Office, 2 steps:1) Election, 2) Control of Multi-member body

Party Indispensable to Control:Caucus Origin of Political Parties

(Schattschneider)

Hypothesis

Greater Legislative Power

↓Greater Incentives for Party-Building

- and by contrast -

Greater Executive Power

↓Incentives for Anti-Party behavior

(Legislative Politicians sell out to the Executive)

Statistical Testing of Hypothesis

Russia● Three Electoral Intervals: (State Duma 1995-1999,

1999-2003, 2003-2007)

● OLS for each cross-section

● Dependent Variable: Sum of Squares Electoral Volatility in State Duma Party List Vote in Each Region

● Key Explanatory Variable: Ratio of Executive Employees to Legislative Employees per Deputy

● Controls: Regional wealth, regional growth, Pensioners

Russia ResultsOLS Regressions of Executive Dominance on Party System Institutionalization

Sum of SquaresVolatility

1995-1999 (n = 88)


1999-2003 (n = 88)


2003-2007 (n = 84)ExecutiveDominance overLegislature

0.00215*(0.000881)

0.00337***(0.00107)

-0.00053(0.00034)

ControlsWealth -1.47*

(06.88)-01.66

( 01.84)-006.82(004.84)

Economic Growth -0.00605(0.02094)

-0.0867(0.18236)

-0.0036(.0529)

Pensioners -0.82301***(0.27884)

-0.41719(0.40869)

-0.11985(0.13706)

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 All regressions used robust standard errors to compensate forpossible heteroscedasticity in the data.

Statistical Testing of Hypothesis

Brazil● Five Electoral Intervals (1986-1990, 1990-1994, 1994-

1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006)● Panel Data, Random Effects● Dependent Variable: Sum of Squares Electoral Volatility in

Brazilian Chamber of Deputies vote in each state● Key Explanatory Variables1. Annual State Expenditure on Legislative Function (mod. 1)

2. Sitting Governor's Vote Share (mod. 1)3. Normalized Ratio of 1. to 2. (mod. 2)● Controls: State wealth, State growth, Expenditure on All

Government Functions

Brazil ResultsRegression of Legislative Strength, Executive Strength, and Executive Dominance on

Sum of Square Electoral Volatility in Brazil: 1986-2006 (Random Effects)Model 1 (Legislative &

Executive Strength Separately)Model 2 (Ratio of Executive

Strength to Legislative Strength)Legislative Strength -0.00137*

(0.00058)Executive Strength 0.15746†

(0.08672)Executive Dominance (Ratio ExecutiveStrength to Legislative Strength)

0.89963*(0.37635)

ControlsExpenditure for all governmentfunctions

-2.17e-07*(9.01e-8)

-2.37e-07*(1.06e-08)

Wealth 2.30e-04(3.17e-04)

-1.77e-05(2.85e-04)

Growth -0.24879(0.25956)

-0.23014(0.27828)

† p<.10 * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.005 Regressions used robust standard errors to compensate for possible heteroschedacity in the data, andalso corrected them for autocorrelation within states across time.

Acceptable Hypothesis

Executive-Legislative Balance is an important factor explaining the institutionalization of party

systems in Russia and Brazil.

Exigency of Troubled Times:Urgent Economic Reforms

1980s & 1990s: Economic Reforms Require “Painful Adjustment” (Cutting Deficits, Privatization, Stabilization that chokes of growth)

To succeed: Strong Executives, Technocratic “Change Teams,” Insulation from Societal Interests, Pressures (ie, Legislatures & Parties)

(Haggard & Kaufman 1992 & 1995, Nelson, 1994, Waterbury, 1992)

Executive “Decretismo” a concern, but how much? What mechanism?

National Executives & LegislaturesEconomic Policy-making in Brazil & Russia

● Sarney & PMDB Cruzado Plan

● Collor & Congress: Decretismo, Failure, Impeachment

● Cardoso: “Technopol” and the Real Plan

● Some Decrees, More Cooperation

● Yeltsin & Gaidar: CPD grants decree power, “Kamikaze Cabinet”

● Yeltsin insulates Gaidar

● Intransigence over Economic Policy spawns Constitutional Conflict

After Early Stages

● Cardoso as President uses Party Coalitions

● Leaves Constitution alone (except re-election!)

● Well-institutionalized Party System (competitive elections, opposition victories)

● Yeltsin writes superpresidential constitution, eschews parties

● Duma excluded from policy-making

● “Floating Party System” and “Transitional Citizenship” Evaporate

Volatility Comparison: Institutionalization in the Brazilian Party System while Russian Party System remains Inchoate

19

86 (

Br)

19

90 (

Br)

19

93 (

Ru)

19

94 (

Br)

19

95 (

Ru)

19

98 (

Br)

19

99 (

Ru)

20

02 (

Br)

2003

(R

u)

2006

(B

r)

2007

(R

u) 0

5

10

15

20

25

New Index of Electoral Volatility inRussia and Brazil, 1985 to present

BrazilRussia

Election Years

Vol

atil

ity

Conclusion

Implications for Democracy:Quick Economic Recovery (Business Cycles?)

vs.Long Term Bulwarks of Democracy

[Extra] Two Russian Regions: Voronezh & Volgograd

Neighboring Regions in Russia's “Red Belt”

Similar demographic conditions (population, levels of economic development, pensioners)

Began post-Soviet era on similar trajectories: Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) strength●1995 Big victories for KPRF in State Duma voting●1996 both regions elect Communist governors●In Voronezh, Ivan Shabanov●In Volgograd, Nikolai Maksiuta●1997 KPRF wins big in Oblast Duma elections

Diverging trends in Party System Institutionalization

[Extra] Voronezh and Volgograd: Diverging Trends in Party System Institutionalization

1993 1995 1999 2003 2007 -1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

Electoral Volatility of Volgograd and Voronezh State Duma PartyList Vote (Compared to Median for all Russian Regions) 1993-2007

Voronezh

Volgograd

Sta

ndar

d D

evia

tion

s fr

om M

edia

n

[Extra] Another metric of party strength: Party nominees as share of Oblast Duma candidates,

winners

1994 1997 1998 2001 2003 2005

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Proportion of Oblast Duma SMD Election Candidates and Winnerswho were Nominated by Parties in Volgograd and Voronezh, 1994-2005

Of All Volgograd Candidates

Of Volgograd Winners

Of All Voronezh Candidates

Of Voronezh Winners

Oblast Duma Election Year

[Extra] Volgograd Oblast Duma: Center of powerVoronezh Oblast Duma: Not a destination for genuine

pursuers of power

1993* 1994* 1997* 1998 2001 2003 2005

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

Heads and Deputy-Heads of Administration as a Percentage of Oblast Duma Election Candidates in Volgograd and Voronezh, 1993-2005

Volgograd

Voronezh

*For Volgograd 1993 and Voronezh 1994 & 1997, occupation status only available for winning candidates

Per

cent

age

of C

andi

date

s w

ho w

ere

Hea

ds o

r D

eput

y-H

eads

of

Adm

inis

trat

ion

[Extra] In Volgograd, Legislative Importance In Voronezh, Executive Domination

Volgograd● 1997 Maksiuta's KPRF co-

partisans fail to unseat Oblast Duma speaker Leonid Semergei

● 2001 At elections for new speaker, Oblast Duma refuses Maksiuta's choice, instead select Roman Grebennikov

● 2003 KPRF-UR struggle almost denies Grebennikov's re-election as speaker

● 2005 United Russia finally removes Grebennikov as speaker

Voronezh● 1997 after KPRF success in

Oblast Duma election, Communist governor Shabanov taps bland Anatoly Goliusov as speaker “for an easier life”

● 2001 after Vladimir Kulakov's 2000 victory in gubernatorial elections, his pick for speaker elected with 38 out of 43 votes

● 2004 after his aborted campaign against Kulakov's re-election, Oblast Duma removes speaker Yevgeny Nakvasin

[Extra] On Legislative Strength and the Role of Parties in Voronezh and Volgograd

“Of forty-five deputies, forty-three are bosses of enterprises. They're all chiefs of businesses who will not say a word against the governor!”

Valentin Pavlov,Ex-deputy Voronezh Oblast Duma

“The two principal parties that will fight for pride of place and will have the largest number seats and then compete for the speakership and deputy speakers and heads of the high-profile committees will be the KPRF and United Russia.”

Yevgeny ChemiakinHead of Department of Social Relations

Volgograd United Russia party organization

Building Bulwarks in Troubled Times: Party System Institutionalization in Russia and Brazil

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