Post on 28-Jan-2023
Political trends in the Israeli Arab population and its vote inparliamentary elections
Alexander Bligh*
Department of Political Science, Ariel University Centre of Samaria, Ariel, Israel
Full Arab Israeli involvement in the national political system is disappearingfrom the Israeli political scene. A parallel system is being developed by thecommunity’s political leaders. Within this new structure, national electionsand the Knesset are viewed as marginal; they serve mainly as a PR arenaintended to bring the Arab Israeli message to Jewish/Zionist awareness.Judging from the evidence of recent election results among Arab voters, it ispossible to cautiously conclude that the Israeli Arab political stance is lessand less a part of the general Israeli political culture.
Keywords: Israeli Arabs; voting patterns; political participation; elections;Israel; political culture
In 1977 the Israeli political system experienced a change which brought new
parties to power. However, that change also contributed to an inherent systemic
lack of stability which in turn led to more frequent election campaigns than
envisioned by Israeli law. Instead of every four years, elections take place almost
once every three years. This increased frequency gives the researcher a more
accurate tool in verifying the political behaviour of the Arab/Palestinian citizens
of Israel.
For most citizens throughout the democratic world, a routine electoral process
provides an opportunity to manifest solidarity and confidence in the national
political system and its values. Thus, measuring rates of electoral participation
may often indicate the robustness of a political system and the true interests of the
voters and their confidence in their ability to bring about a change through
elections. Moreover, it is a common paradigm that modernizing societies usually
develop increased political awareness and consequently tend to upgrade their
participation in choosing nationally elected political bodies.1 These paradigms
will be analysed in the following pages in relation to the Arab citizens of the State
of Israel.2
This article mainly explores the Arab political behaviour as far as national
elections are concerned. Although most, if not all writers today include the Druze
community within their research frame, this is a mistake since the Druze have
their own voting patterns that are dissimilar from the Arab minority, yet also
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
*Email: director@ariel.ac.il
Israel Affairs, 2013
Vol. 19, No. 1, 21–50, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2013.748286
different from the Jewish electorate. Essentially, though removing the Druze
population from the data, it is clear that the emerging patterns of the Muslim and
Christian Arab population of Israel, which, as of 2010, amounted to 17% of the
total population (non-Jews married to Jews are not included within this study)
tend to defy this modernization–participation supposition in the Israeli national
arena.3 From a quantitative study of representative criteria of modernization, it is
evident that since the mid-1960s the Arab sector has undergone a process of
modernization.4 Parallel to this, there has been a two-pronged political process
reflected in a diminishing rate of participation in national parliamentary elections
and a growing rate of voting for parties that are not potential members of any
Israeli coalition government. The reasons for this apparent paradox are
numerous, but perhaps the most significant is that though this particular segment
of Israeli voters manifests an increasing degree of political involvement, this
involvement is limited to its own Arab Israeli civil society organizations. While
these bodies fill the vacuum between government and grassroots by responding to
the social needs of the population, they also develop a uniquely new kind of
national affiliation, namely Palestinian under Israeli sovereignty, which differs
from Palestinian under occupation in the 1967 territories.5
The outcomes of the Israeli parliamentary elections since the mid-1980s add
to the accumulated evidence that Israel is now home to two distinct peoples: the
Jewish-Zionist-Israeli and the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli. The latter is Palestinian in
its national affiliation and identity, and Israeli in its civil identity. Arab citizens
have not become part of the Israeli-Zionist-Jewish political texture yet neither are
they a fundamental organ of the Palestinian entity in the territories. Moreover,
this law-abiding population within Israel fully shares the values of its Palestinian
brothers residing outside of Israel. Sela, Amara and Schnell, Suleiman and others
all believe that Israeli Arab society has developed into a unique political
community: it is simultaneously all of the above.6 Members of this group have
embarked on a new road: developing a political identity that allows them to enjoy
all the benefits offered to members of all of these communities. This particular
emerging political pattern of behaviour is unique, reminiscent of neighbouring
societies, yet different in many ways.
When identifying the internal elements of the Israeli Arab political behaviour,
its interaction with the central government and other communities should not be
ignored, as indicated by Jamal.7 Each community operates within a larger
political context, friendly at times, hostile at others. The undercurrents
prescribing the public relations between the Arab and the Jewish communities
consist of several elements: the mutual expectations of each player – whether
each believes it can convince the other to reach a common ground or if it will
have to fight for its rights. Thus, political direction may take either path:
conciliatory or confrontational. Moreover, self-assured political behaviour takes
into account the need to find a rational way to separate itself from a neighbouring
or hostile political society that will allow each community to go its own
independent way. Another aspect is the ability of each neighbouring or similar
A. Bligh22
political community to devise a way to form temporary or stable coalitions with
other political/civil societies.
How do these characteristics fit into the political behaviour of the Israeli Arab
community as reflected in the most recent national parliamentary elections?
Clearly, the continued Israeli–Arab tensions since 1948 have been the major
contributing factor to the perceived contradiction between a Jewish Zionist
country and an administration that has been at war with its Arab, mostly Muslim,
neighbours for generations now. The outcome is a mind-set of distrust of the
Jewish government and of parliamentary politics. And, indeed, if since 1948 no
accepted representative of the Arab population (as opposed to candidates
nominated by the central government) has ever served in any position remotely
reminiscent of decision making – why should the system be trusted? This
mistrust is now deeply embedded within Arab Israeli political thinking.
Moreover, these feelings of mistrust have already led to a reality of conflict. It is
not usually a violent conflict, but most Israeli Arabs would not side with Israel in
times of crisis. Quite the contrary: During the two waves of Palestinian violence
in the territories (1987–1992, 2000–2005), Israeli Arabs as a community sided
with their brothers, even helping them with short outbursts of their own violence,
and opposing their country, in any non-violent or violent way they could.
As already noted, an analysis of the development of Israeli Arab political
behaviour needs to be performed concurrently with a study of their modernization.
Clearly, in material terms, their terms of reference are neither the Palestinians in
the territories nor Arabs living in any Arab country; the one and only reference
group is the Jewish Israeli sector. Thus, every indicator selected shows a dramatic
improvement in living conditions of the studied population, attesting to an
accelerated modernization process. Clearly, none of the statistics fully conforms to
the parallel statistics among the Jewish population, but gaps are definitely closing
at an accelerated rate. All in all, the modernizing trend is undeniable. The question
that arises is whether that modernization translates into enhanced political
involvement in the Israeli political system. Put differently, the matter at stake is:
what are the current expressions of Israeli Arab political behaviour?
Two main issues are discussed in this article based on figures taken from raw
material supplied Election results by the Central Election Committee, Jerusalem
(2009) and tabulated from each and every polling station in an Arab village and
town. Mixed towns were not included since it is impossible to ascertain the exact
number of Arab voters out of the total voters:
(1) The rate of Israeli Arab citizens, among the eligible voters, who choose to
exercise their civil rights and go to the polls each time a new Knesset
(Israeli parliament) is elected, and its significance.
(2) The degree of voting for consensual Israeli parties, i.e. parties which have
the potential of becoming members of a coalition government, as
opposed to protest parties that may send great orators to parliament but
that never have any access to the Israeli decision-making process.
Israel Affairs 23
National elections
Before beginning a detailed and comparative analysis of the election results, it is
important to explain that one campaign in Israel was not included in this study:
the direct election of the Prime Minister in 2001 – the only election not held
simultaneously with the elections for the Knesset. The 2001 elections were held
not long after outbreak of the October 2000 riots for which most Arabs held then
Prime Minister Barak and his cabinet responsible. Since the alternative (Ariel
Sharon) was not to their liking either, most Arab voters refrained from voting.
This unique incident cannot be dealt with in this paper since, though it may serve
as a precedent in the future, to date it is a single case, which does not affect the
general tendencies of this voting public.
Sectarian participation in election voting can be measured in two ways:
absolute figures – i.e. the percentage of voters out of all eligible voters – or
relative participation – i.e. comparing the Arab participation with the general
participation, meaning that if the general participation equals the Arab
participation, the relative Arab participation equals 1 (or 100%). If the Arab
participation is below the general participation, the descriptive statistic would be
smaller than 1 (or, in percentage points, less than 100%). Measured this way, it is
evident that if the Arab vote is higher than that of the general voting body, they
stand a better chance of being better represented in the Knesset, while lower
voting rates would be translated into smaller representation. Modernizing
societies usually vote in higher numbers as they discover the power of democratic
instruments. Thus, political participation and influence become part and parcel of
their political behaviour. Moreover, an Arab voting rate equal to that of the
general population would indicate political behaviour similar, if not identical, to
the rest of the population. If the Arab vote is proportionately lower than that of
the general population, the gap that necessitates explanation is only that part
which falls below the general rate. Differently put, it is apparent that the general
voting rate has been declining in recent campaigns (see Figure 1) and it is
reasonable to assume that the cause of this particular part of the decline in the
Arab vote can be attributed to reasons similar to those of the decline among the
Jewish public. However, an explanation is needed for the rest of the drop in the
Arab vote.
The Arab Israeli case is atypical of modernizing societies. Right after the
Israeli War of Independence, with all the leadership of the Arab community
outside of the borders of the newly declared state, relative voting was 91%
(see Table 1). This figure reflects the confusion and disorientation of the Arab
community right after the end of hostilities. Between 1948 and 1966, Israel
imposed a military administration on its Arab citizens that gave the state a large
degree of control over the lives of this population. That control was translated
into a high rate of voting, and in most cases for the ruling party, the predecessor of
the current Labour party. Hence, it is no surprise that between 1951 and 1965,
relative Arab Israeli participation was always above 100%. It was still high in the
A. Bligh24
aftermath of the 1966 abolition of the military administration (the 1969 election)
and even higher in the 1973 election held while the guns of the October 1973 war
were still thundering. Since then, these rates have never been repeated even at
those times when outside observers would expect the Israeli Arab community to
vote for their own good in the face of existing or potential threats to their status
Table 1. Arab relative participation in Knesset elections.
Year Relative participation
1949 0.91 Military administration1951 1.14 Highest relative participation
Military administration1955 1.10 Military administration1959 1.09 Military administration1961 1.05 Military administration1965 1.06 Military administration1969 1.00 1966 – Military administration abolished1973 1.021977 0.961981 0.89 First national election after the Likud came to power1984 0.941988 0.951992 0.89 First Labour party victory since 19771996 0.97 Direct election of the Prime Minster1999 0.96 Direct election of the Prime Minster2003 0.912006 0.892009 0.87 Lowest relative participation
Figure 1. Arab, general and Arab relative voting by Knesset.
Israel Affairs 25
within the Jewish state. Thus, when the right-wing Likud first came into power in
1977, the relative Arab vote was less than 1. Even during the very tight race in
1981, when the Arab vote could have undoubtedly swung the leadership from
Likud to Labour, the relative Arab vote dropped to one of its lowest ever Figures
(88.8%, rivalled only by the 2009 figure of 87%). The relative Arab vote
recovered moderately only during the two campaigns (1996, 1999) when Israeli
voters cast two ballots: one for a political party and one for prime minister. Even
then, it did not cross the 100% threshold.
These figures are almost self-explanatory: In spite of the gradual, though
slow, increase in the proportional representation of the Arab population within
the general Israeli population, there was no parallel increase in voting of the Arab
population. Quite the contrary, more Arab representation has translated into less
voting in national elections. This may indicate that with the sectarian self-
confidence that comes with greater presence in Israel, the growing population
feels less a part of the Israeli fabric at large (see Figure 2). Obviously, that
translates into a sharp decrease in the absolute percentage of Arab voters among
eligible Arab voters, and consequently a very small increase in the number of
members of the Knesset who are elected mostly by Arab votes (Figure 3).
According to Ghanem and Mustafa,8 the individual desire to participate in voting
increases as long as there is an increase in the sense of one’s ability to influence
events. However, because the Israeli Arabs do not believe their votes make a
difference, their motivation and desire to vote has been declining.
At all major political junctions since the Likud came to power in 1977 Arab
voters have failed to deliver. With the neck-and-neck competition in 1981
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 18
Relative ParticipationProportion in Israeli Population
1712
Figure 2. Arab relative participation compared with Arab proportion in general.
A. Bligh26
(ending with a Likud victory), in the 1992 Rabin and Labour victory, and in the
switch from Likud to Kadima in 2006, there was no Arab input. With the
exception of the 1996 and 1999 campaigns, those years were marked by the
lowest relative participation since 1951. The political struggles in those election
years were characterized by issues seen by most Israelis as crucial to the future of
the Jewish state: the Iraqi nuclear reactor bombing and future relations with
Egypt (1981), the feeling that Prime Minister Shamir was not the right leader to
resolve the Palestinian issue (1992) and, finally, the disengagement policy of
Prime Minister Sharon and the future of Israeli–Palestinian relations (2006). Yet
on all these critical occasions, Arab participation rates were the lowest.
Consequently, it is safe to assert that the Arab voters refrained from taking part in
what they saw as internal Jewish or Israeli political affairs. Additionally,
even though most Israeli Jews viewed the issues on the agenda as greatly
influencing the future of the Palestinian people as well, Israeli Arab voters did not
share this view.
The two campaigns of 1996 and 1999 were extraordinary in that they gave the
Israeli voter the opportunity to elect a Prime Minister and parliament in two
separate votes. The system, later to be cancelled, encouraged sectarian voting in
Israel and directly caused the collapse of the two leading parties, Likud and
Labour. Those were the only times when the Israeli voter did not have to vote for
a party in the hope that its leader would be called upon by the president of the
state to form a coalition government. Rather, voters felt that they could elect a
Prime Minster and yet give their representatives the opportunity to speak their
minds. The Arab vote was no exception, raising false hopes of gaining a swinging
Figure 3. Arab absolute participation compared with Arab representation in the Knesset.
Israel Affairs 27
vote in parliament, but once the old system was reinstated and Israeli voters at
large returned to their traditional voting patterns, the Arab voters followed suit
and resumed their absence from the polling stations. That and their
disappointment in the attempt to gain some degree of influence over the system,
contributed to a further decline in the rate of voting among the Arabs.
That abstention raises another issue: is there any correlation between showing
up at the voting booths and the pattern of party voting? Will more voters indicate
more representation for any of the Israeli parties? The statistical data strongly
suggest that there is a manifest correlation between relative participation and the
outcome of the vote of the Israeli Arab community. Larger relative participation
usually translates into more votes for the Israeli consensual parties; the lower the
vote, the more Arab votes go to Arab protest parties (see Figures 4 and 5).
The patterns of voting underwent two formative stages that affected the
emergence of Israeli Arab attitudes in regard to parliamentary politics: after 1966
and in 1981. The abolition of the military administration did not only cause a drop
in the relative participation. Obviously, it was also reflected in the way that Arab
voters used their potential to send members of the Knesset to Jerusalem.
Theoretically, if all eligible Arab voters had cast their vote, they would have sent
10 members to the Knesset in 1960 and 19 in 2000. In fact, after 1966, the votes
cast sent only six members. In other words, after the abolition of the military
administration, the actual vote dropped to below 50% of the potential vote, never
to recover, with only a short interval in the 1996 and 1999 direct elections for
Prime Minister, as already mentioned.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Relative participationVoting for consensual partiesVoting for Arab parties
Figure 4. Arab relative participation compared with voting for consensual and Arab parties.
A. Bligh28
In 1981, another process was added: the disappearance of the unique coalition
created Arab parties. In 1949, the ruling party at the time, today the Labour party,
created several satellite Arab parties. That meant that while Arab citizens were not
admitted to the Labour party, they had the option of voting for parties made up of
Arab citizens which did not however enjoy full rights in the Knesset. In practice,
that meant that elected members of satellite parties had to vote for the Labour
position, but were never admitted as full and legitimate partners in the Labour
coalition. This was only one manifestation of semi-official discrimination that
stripped the Arab voters of full representation within the political parliamentary
system. Indeed, beginning in the first parliamentary elections in 1949, a sizeable
proportion of Israeli Arabs voted for the Labour party and its affiliates. However,
in 1981 these parties were not voted in, and they disappeared. Although the
Labour party absorbed its Arab supporters into the party, it began losing Arab
votes. Thus, instead of the two traditional major blocs getting votes from Arab
Israeli voters, Labour and Communists, four major political blocs emerged:
(1) The Communist party (under various names), which has served as the
major Arab sector protest party since 1949.
(2) The Labour party.
(3) Other non-consensual Arab parties (since 1984).
(4) Other Zionist parties (since 1984 – mainly Shas – the party of the former
Minister of the Interior, the Likud and others).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Arab Absolute VotingVoting for consensual partiesVoting for Arab parties
Figure 5. Arab absolute participation compared with voting for consensual and Arabparties.
Israel Affairs 29
In terms of national party politics, 1981 marked the change away from Labour
and the beginning of new Arab protest parties. Even the right wing Likud began to
be perceived as a semi-legitimate party as it was the party that formed the
coalition and put together the country’s budget. A comparison of the outcomes of
national elections from 1981 to the present makes it clear that the vote for protest
parties has been growing, while the vote for consensual parties has been
decreasing and the rate of participation has also dropped sharply. Combining all
these into a single conclusion, it is clear that the current Israeli Arab political
consensus does not recognize the national parliamentary field as one of the
avenues that have any influence whatsoever on the status of this sector.
Participation is continuously dropping and that indicates a growing alienation
from the Israeli political system. This process is concurrent with the growing
modernization of the Israeli Arab sector, implying that more alienation and
almost full de facto divorce are in the making.
The 2006 campaign as a clear representative of the distinct constituencies
Since 1984, a score of parties have surfaced in the Arab sector, the major ones
being the United Arab List (UAL), the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality
(DFPE) and the National Democratic Assembly (NDA, Balad). In addition, since
1999 a new pattern of Arab voting has emerged that reflects the special niche of
each of the main parties. It should be noted that each party attracts a distinctly
different voting constituency: from the radical Muslim, through the Palestinian
and the pan-Arab, to supporters of joint Jewish–Arab representation.
In 2006, the UAL was able to send four members to parliament after
successfully forming a rather attractive coalition between Muslim and Palestinian
ideologies. The list was based upon the infrastructure laid out by the Arab
Democratic Party (ADP), formed by (the then) MK Abd al-Wahhab Darawshe (b.
1943, MK 1984–1999), who had split from the Labour party in the context of the
Palestinian uprising (1988). Darawshe was quick to identify three main issues
that might affect the way Arab Israelis vote:
. The need to form a wide coalition of Arab groups in order to circumvent
the impossibility, later to be partly overcome, of reaching excess-votes
agreements with other Arab parties.
. The increasing potential of the Bedouin population of the Negev, which
had a large annual growth rate.
. The large potential of the Muslim Movement, which had refrained from
active participation in national parliamentary elections.
After leaving Labour in 1988, Darawshe made his ADP party a coalition-type
alignment rather than a dogmatic closed-ranks party, but within a well-defined
political framework, namely, Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims. Since then, the
ADP has served as the base for growing parliamentary representation of larger
A. Bligh30
circles within the Arab public: the ADP sent one member to the 11th Knesset
(1988) and the 12th Knesset (1988–1992); two members to the 13th Knesset
(1992–1996); four members to the 14th Knesset (1996–1999), as part of the
Arab Democratic Party–United Arab List; five members to the 15th Knesset
(1999–2003), as the United Arab List; two members to the 16th Knesset (2003–
2006); four members to the 17th Knesset (2006–2009), as the United Arab List–
Arab Movement for Renewal; and four members to the 18th Knesset (2009–), as
the UAL.
As a former school principal and an active member of the Labour party,
Darawshe was an obvious choice to be nominated to a slate of candidates for the
1988 campaign. However, contrary to Labour’s hopes of finding a true
companion in their political approach, Darawshe was quick to take private
initiatives in the Palestinian sphere. Thus, his split with the party in 1988 came as
no surprise. Yet, upon leaving the party, he took with him an intimate knowledge
of the Israeli system and the ways to manipulate it politically for the benefit of his
political agenda. Thus, for the first time ever, a member of an Arab party saw
himself as acting as a true bridge between his constituency and the Israeli
establishment. Moreover, even the name he picked for his party had several
constituencies in mind: Arab – attracting both Israeli Arabs and Bedouin Arabs
(in classical Arabic, ‘Arab’ means ‘Bedouin’). The Bedouin dimension was
further reinforced by the selection of Talab El-Sana, a Bedouin lawyer from the
southern Bedouin village of Lagiya, as his running mate and the second MK of
the party (b. 1960, MK since 1992). Selecting El-Sana also initiated a new trend
in the characteristics of Arab MKs who were younger and more educated than
before. This trend peaked in the 2006 elections when, of 10 members
representing the Arab parties, only one held only a high school diploma, while all
the rest had academic degrees. The reasons for this trend are numerous; suffice it
to say here that the ADP was the first to devise a new political outlet for both
Muslim ideology and the political needs and aspirations of the new educated
generation.
Over the years, the ADP also tried to be accepted by the Israeli political
establishment as a legitimate Arab party that might, someday, be fully included in
a coalition government. At first, it was the careful inclusion of the adjective
‘democratic’ in the name of the party that indicated acceptance of the rules of the
political game, and which led Darawshe to become the first Arab MK ever to
meet regularly with the Prime Minister, Shamir, at the time, and his advisor on
Arab affairs. Later, the ADP, along with other Arab parties, was included in the
parliamentary bloc that supported the 1992 Rabin government. Moreover, in line
with its pragmatic approach to Israeli politics, the ADP supported the 2000 state
budget presented by Minister of Finance Meir Shitrit, during its first reading, after
the usual political negotiations that precede budget deliberations in all
democratic countries. And yet the party never ceased to be Arab in that it
supported Arab causes, and obviously, being Arab, Muslim and Palestinian, it
supported the Palestinian side in its confrontation with the Israeli government.
Israel Affairs 31
These attributes led to two other political alliances that expanded the public basis
of the party.
The first was the Muslim Movement, which, on the eve of the 1996 elections,
was split on the issue of participation in the elections. One trend within the
movement strongly opposed participation since it might be interpreted as full
recognition of the Jewish-Zionist state. Another trend read the upcoming 1996
elections as crucial since the right wing under Benjamin Netanyahu stood a
chance of defeating then interim Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Neither was to the
liking of most Arab voters: the former as the leader of a political bloc that was
unacceptable to the Arab voter; the latter because shortly before the election,
while serving as Minister of Defence, he had been held responsible for the
accidental bombing of Palestinians in Lebanon, which led to the death of about
100 civilians. However, Peres was still the lesser of two evils and, beyond that,
the ADP hoped that a large Arab turnout would lead to a significant showing in
terms of Knesset mandates and thus would convince Peres to repeat the 1992
precedent of reaching some coalition-type agreement with Darawshe’s list.
The second alliance was initiated before the 2006 elections with the Arab
Movement for Renewal led by Dr. Ahmad Tibi (b. 1958, MK since 1999). With
that alliance, the circle was complete: the ADP had, during the political
processes, lost its name (to be replaced by UAL as of 1999), but it now enjoyed
three main sources of support: the Bedouins in the Negev, the Muslim Movement
(southern branch) and the young and nationalistic intellectuals. As of 2006 and
2009, this proved a winning combination, as will be shown below.
Unlike the ADP, and later the UAL, which attracted only Arab voters as its
names indicated, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality has always
viewed its constituency as comprising a majority of Arabs and a minority of Jews.
The DFPE is an offspring of the Communist party that has been active in Israel
since its creation and even before that. For most of the period until the collapse of
the Soviet Union, it was a rather conservative Communist party in that it
religiously followed the party line coming out of Moscow. However, in 1977 the
Communist party (known at the time as the ‘New Communist List’) created a
political alliance with unaligned Arab political leaders with the aim of
broadening its base of support. The addition to the party included members of the
new generation of young educated Arabs who shared the party’s political views
but did not wish to be identified with its Communist message. At that time, the
party line regarding the final Middle Eastern settlement called for Israel to
completely withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967, recognize the PLO as
the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that a
Palestinian state should be established alongside Israel. Over and above these
Palestinian elements, it also demanded full equality for Israel’s Arab citizens. All
in all, the difference between the ADP/UAL and the DFPE was clear: the former
advocated an Israeli Arab Palestinian agenda and appealed only to Arabs,
whereas the latter gave priority to Palestinian issues over Israeli Arab issues and
appealed to both Jews and Arabs.
A. Bligh32
In 1990/1991, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, the party lost a major
source of income and support. Until then, Communist activists were sought after
in the hope that they could provide scholarships and study opportunities in the
Soviet bloc. The failure of state Communism, and the loss of these incentives,
challenged the party to re-invent itself so that it would not completely fade
away from the Israeli political scene. This was accomplished with some success,
partly by resorting to traditional politics: more activity on the municipal level.
During the 2003 and 2008 municipal campaigns, the DFPE served as the cement
that connected many small families, which could not compete with larger
families. The DFPE facilitated agreements and provided financing to many
such families giving them a fair chance in running for local political offices.
Many of these new activists then served the party during the 2006 and 2009
Knesset campaigns.
All that was not enough to maintain the DFPE as the largest Arab party, but it
did enable it to remain relatively strong and capable of crossing the threshold of
the minimum votes necessary to enter the Knesset. The DFPE was less attractive
and had a less focused message than the UAL and the gradual erosion of its base
of support made the DFPE only the second strongest party among Arab voters.
This status is reflected in the election results after 1990: 13th (1992–1996, four
members), 14th (1996–1999, three members), 15th (1999–2003, three
members), 16th (2003–2006, two members), 17th (2006–2009, three members)
and 18th (2009–, four members). Evidently, even in the post-Communist era, the
party is still a political power to reckon with in the Arab sector.
The National Democratic Assembly is the latest addition to the field of Arab
parties. Unlike the preceding parties, this one was mainly, for most of the period
since its establishment, a one-man show, led by Azmi Bishara (b. 1956, MK
1996–2007). His biography has already been the topic of several studies9 but this
article will deal only with his political activity. His appeal to Arab voters made
for a relatively strong showing since he first ran for the Knesset. In 1996, he was
elected to the Knesset as part of the DFPE–NDA list, and in 1999 he ran with
Ahmad Tibi, head of the Arab Movement for Renewal (see above): 14th (1996–
1999, two – split from the five of the DFPE), 15th (1999–2003, two), 16th
(2003–2006, three), 17th (2006–2009, three) and 18th (did not present his
candidacy, 2009–, three).
The NDA is unique in more ways than one:
. Unlike the other Arab parties, Bishara sees himself as Arab first and
Palestinian second. In that, he is reminiscent of nineteenth and mid-
twentieth century Arab nationalism promoted mainly by Christians in
order overcome the generations-old discrimination by Muslims against
Christians as far as political representation was concerned. Thus, it is no
surprise that while all other Arab parties focus their attention on the fate of
the Palestinian people, Bishara and the NDA focus on pan-Arab causes that
have their base in Damascus, not in the occupied territories.
Israel Affairs 33
. While leaders of the Communist party have been Jewish, Muslim and
Christian and the party declared its devotion to coexistence, the NDA is
clearly a purely Arab party and yet the first ever to be headed by a Christian.
. The party managed to present to its potential voters a loose coalition of
leaders representing a rather pluralistic facade. In addition to Bishara, the
party MKs in the 16th Knesset (who all were re-elected to the 17th Knesset,
and one of the original members, Jamal Zahalka, is in the 18th) include a
former head of the Kafr Kana local council. As the leading figure in a village
divided almost evenly between the northern current of the Muslim
Movement and the radical wing of the DFPE, this MK represents a middle
way between the two. His opposition to the Zionist nature of Israel is the
common denominator of the two trends. Another MK, a PhD in
pharmacology, whose office is decorated with pictures of Martin Luther
King and Nelson Mandela, bears the banner of non-violent resistance to
Israel’s apartheid policies. These two, along with Bishara, believe that Israel
should give up any Zionist and Jewish attributes and become a country of all
its citizens. In that, their line is different from that of the two other parties
since they do not want to see Israel turned into a Palestinian state. The NDA
would like Israel to retain its democratic nature, yet become a non-Zionist,
non-Jewish country. Moreover, in their view, Israel should be subject to the
leadership of Syria as the motherland of Arabism.
Bishara’s controversial political views and their expression over the years,
let alone his wartime engagement in alleged anti-Israel activities and subsequent
flight from the country, have become the subject of numerous attempts by Jewish-
Zionist circles to disqualify him or his party from running for the Knesset. At other
times, his trips to enemy countries in apparent violation of Israeli law were the
subject of Israeli Supreme Court decisions.10 Undoubtedly, these failed attempts
only added to his reputation and that of his party among potential voters. His image
is that of a courageous person who dared to present his candidacy for the prime
ministerial slot in 1999, who travelled to Syria and Lebanon, and who built a belt of
immunity around himself which has so far shielded him from prosecution by Israel.
In his quest for leadership of the Israeli Arab population, until he left Israel
(2007), Bishara was challenged by Ahmad Tibi, MD, another Israeli-born
academic (see above). Fearing that their two parties would not win the minimum
vote necessary to get elected, Tibi and Bishara joined forces on the eve of the
1999 elections in a loose confederation that would later be dissolved. Since 1999,
Tibi has never run alone; he has always been elected as a member of a coalition:
for the 15th Knesset (1999), he ran under the title of the ‘National Democratic
Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal’; for the 16th Knesset (2003) under
‘Hadash-Ta’al’ (DFPE and the ‘Arab Movement for Renewal’) and for the 17th
and 18th Knessets (2006 and 2009) under ‘Ra’am-Ta’al’ (UAL and the ‘Arab
Movement for Renewal’). It is evident that unlike the Christian Bishara, Tibi, a
Muslim and for years a close advisor to Yasir Arafat, provides a slate of
A. Bligh34
candidates with Palestinian endorsement. By joining the UAL on the eve of the
2006 elections, Tibi not only provided Palestinian sanctioning but he himself also
received a radical Muslim vote of approval. Running in the Israeli national
elections only two months after Hamas won the Palestinian elections
undoubtedly helped the list and Tibi himself by exploiting the Muslim
momentum among Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line. Tibi needed that
approval after the death of Arafat and his own attempt to reconstruct his position
among Israeli Palestinians who had viewed Arafat for years as a national symbol
but not as a leader to provide them with their specific needs. That perception
obviously affected Tibi’s position among these voters. Today, his image is of a
Palestinian leader who cares for his brothers across the ‘Green Line’ but he is first
and foremost a spokesman for the Israeli Arabs.
The 2006 and 2009 national elections and the final move to disengagement
from the Israeli political system
As already noted, the 2006 and 2009 votes once more demonstrated the continued
rise in voting for Arab parties and the continued decrease in voting for consensual
parties. Figures 6 and 7 do not include mixed cities since it is impossible to
distinguish between Jewish and Arab votes. However, adding the vote for Arab
parties in these locations would somewhat raise the voting rate for the Arab
parties, bringing it closer to 80% for 2006 and 92% for 2009.
These figures should be complemented along party and geographical lines.
Clearly, the UAL’s message was the most attractive to the Arab voter in both the
2006 and 2009 elections (Figures 8 and 9). The party moved from third place
among Arab parties in 2003 (two seats, 2.1%, Tibi not on the list) to first in 2006
(four seats, 3%, including Tibi) and in 2009 (four seats, including Tibi). DFPE
came second in 2006 and 2009 with three seats and four seats, respectively, after
having won three seats and being first in 2003 (3%, including Tibi). NDA
retained its three seats (2.3%) in all three campaigns.
UAL
The clear winner in both 2006 and 2009 was the UAL but the results were
rather disappointing to the party compared with its expectations. This was not a
Figure 6. Voting for consensual and Arab parties (2006).
Israel Affairs 35
repetition of the party’s past successes in the 1996 and 1999 elections. The
following table relates to the five campaigns since the Muslim movement began
to run with the UAL (1996 and 1999 were held under the split vote system).
Since the change from the split vote back to the one vote system, the obvious
question is whether the change affected the voting patterns of Israeli Arabs. From
Table 2, it seems that neither the DFPE nor the NDA were influenced, and their
power increased in the 2003 elections. However, in 2003 the UAL lost about
50,000 votes (a fall of over 14% compared with its showing in 1999). Most of
these did not turn out to vote. Thus, the two remaining parties won the votes of
only around 12,000 former UAL voters. The rest stayed at home, mainly because
they were confused as to the future course of their party: of the five members
elected in 1999, at the end of the 15th Knesset only two remained part of the
United Arab List. Three broke with the party and declared themselves to be a
different parliamentary faction, the National Arab Party. The three came from
Consensual parties8.62%
Arab parties91.38%
Figure 7. Voting for consensual and Arab parties (2009).
Figure 8. Breakdown by Arab parties and consensual blocs (2006).
A. Bligh36
different backgrounds: one was from the ADP, one had served in the past as a
DFPE MK and the third was a member of the Muslim Movement. That make-up
was identical in nature to the composition of the UAL’s 2003 list and the personal
wrangling that followed the split threw the party’s campaign into disarray and
gave rise to a feeling among potential voters that the party was going to
disappear. The UAL’s recovery in 2006 and 2009 can be attributed primarily to
the votes of the 2003 absentees. This was the result of the fact that Tibi had joined
the list and because of the Hamas victory, as explained above. In a nutshell, the
more Arab voters there are, the more UAL votes can be expected. The lines of the
two are almost identical in Figure 10, which depicts the Arab popular vote
compared with the overall vote for Arab parties.
About 56% of eligible voters went to the polls in 2006 and of these, 37% gave
their vote to the UAL. In addition, about 53% of eligible voters went to the polls
in 2009 and of these about 40% gave their vote to the UAL. As to the main
sources of votes for the UAL, it is clear that the Bedouin population residing in
the southern part of the country is the backbone of the party; 56% of them voted
for the party in 2006 and 71% voted for the party in 2009.
Apparently, the identification of the UAL with the Muslim Movement does
not always work in the party’s favour. Umm al-Fahm is a case in point. This town
of 30,000 is the cradle of the northern faction of the Muslim Movement and home
to Sheikh Ra’id Salah, leader of the northern faction. This may partly explain the
abstention from voting; however, in 2006, 56% of eligible voters went to the polls
(about the same as the state-wide rate). Of these, 90% voted for Arab parties: 57%
for the DFPE, which for years had received a majority in the town; 22% for the
NDA; and only 11% for the UAL. In 2009 about 59% of eligible voters in Umm
al-Fahm went to the polls and of these, about 98% voted for Arab parties: 55% for
Figure 9. Breakdown by Arab parties and consensual blocs (2009).
36.01%
29.67%
24.13%
3.24%
3.14%
2.11%
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00%
Kadima
Right wing
Left wing
NDA
DFPE
UAL
Israel Affairs 37
Tab
le2
.V
ote
by
par
tysi
nce
19
96
.
Po
pu
lar
vo
teb
yp
arty
Per
cen
tag
eo
ut
of
elig
ible
Ara
bv
ote
s
Kn
esse
t1
41
51
61
71
81
41
51
61
71
8Y
ear
19
96
19
99
20
03
20
06
20
09
19
96
19
99
20
03
20
06
20
09
UA
L8
9,5
14
11
4,8
10
65
,55
19
4,7
86
10
1,9
53
40
.88
42
.85
28
.42
37
.47
40
.09
DF
PE
12
9,4
55
87
,02
29
3,8
19
86
,09
28
4,0
18
59
.12
32
.48
40
.67
34
.04
33
.04
ND
A0
66
,10
37
1,2
99
72
,06
66
8,3
24
24
.67
30
.91
28
.49
26
.87
Ara
bv
ote
rs2
18
,96
92
67
,93
52
30
,69
92
52
,94
42
54
,29
5
A. Bligh38
the DFPE; 24% for the NDA; and 19% for the UAL. Clearly, here the association
between the Muslim Movement and UAL did not benefit the UAL. The collective
message of these voters was that they wanted to be left alone and not be identified
with a radical trend in Israeli politics.
This leads to another observation. In terms of geography, it is evident that the
farther north the voting booth is, the smaller the chance that the voters will flock to
vote for the UAL. This is not only the product of years of investment in the Bedouins
in the south. It is also the result of the isolationist tendencies of UAL, which is purely
Arab and less inclined to cooperate with other Arab parties in the Arab sector.
This does not usually translate into a lack of cooperation on the floor of parliament,
where it is necessary to present a united front in the face of uneasy relations with the
Jewish factions. The lack of cooperation is mainly reflected in the fact that, in the
past, the UAL never signed excess-votes agreements with other Arab parties, while
such agreements began to be signed between the DFPE and the NDA in 2003.11
DFPE
Breaking down the results along party lines tells a more detailed story: the
correlation between lower participation in elections and the rise in voting for
Arab parties is especially strong with regard to the UAL and the NDA; it is less
noticeable in relation to the DFPE. Several factors may explain the shrinking
appeal of the DFPE:
. The DFPE, which has been the traditional protest party since the creation
of the State of Israel, is still branded by many potential voters as an old
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
1996 1999 2003 2006 2009
UALDFPENDATotal votes
Figure 10. Arab popular vote compared with overall vote for Arab parties.
Israel Affairs 39
regime party which has no impact whatsoever on policy making in Israel or
abroad. This is in contrast with the UAL and the NDA, which have
developed avenues to the Palestinian Authority and leadership, and to
Syria, respectively.
. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the DFPE found it difficult to
chart a new path. Since it was not able to carve a new niche, its message is
seen at times as old-fashioned and obsolete. The fact that the party’s main
slogan ‘two states for two peoples’ was adopted by the ‘road map’ and is
the official Israeli approach to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
renders its ideology useless.
. Other Arab parties built their reputation on excluding Jews from their
membership and lists. The UAL is composed only of Muslims, the NDA is
composed of Muslims and Christians, but both include only Arab
members. Including Jewish candidates on a list which aspires to win Arab
votes is no longer acceptable to most Arab voters. Even though Jewish
voters give the DFPE approximately half a Knesset seat, this is not enough
to compensate for the potential loss of votes from the Arab voters.
. The DFPE failed to define its key position during the campaign. Being a
Jewish-Arab party, the DFPE was indecisive regarding the main line of its
campaign. Most Jewish voters perceived the 2006 campaign as
concentrating on social issues. The Palestinian issue, and certainly the
Lebanese situation, was almost totally absent from the Jewish public
debate. Evidently, that was not the right approach to the Arab population,
which had lost any hope that the central government would address its
social grievances. The right approach for DFPE would have been to
discuss Palestinian issues; however, as already mentioned, the DFPE had
no clear or new idea in this area.
. In spite of the causes of the decrease in voting, perhaps the most
noteworthy of which is the lack of a focused message, the DFPE has
retained stable parliamentary representation since 1999. This can be
attributed to a strong organization, which is a holdover from the past. The
party is still capable of identifying most of its potential voters and making
sure that they show up at the polling stations.
NDA
As already stated, the NDA finished third among the Arab parties. In contrast to
the DFPE, its ideas are crystal clear. It aspires to change the nature of Israel and to
merge the Arab citizens of Israel into a larger Arab nation. Though the message is
clear, the NDA is the brainchild of an eloquent academic ideologue lacking an
organizational infrastructure. Differently put, the NDA is almost the mirror
image of the DFPE. Moreover, both try to appeal to all Israeli Arabs, Christians as
well as Muslims, indirectly ignoring solidarity with their Palestinian brothers
across the Green Line or the Muslim nature of the Palestinian national movement.
A. Bligh40
Consequently, the race for parliamentary representation is not a simple three-way
competition. The NDA and DFPE are more policy-oriented parties compared to
the UAL, which is more of a popular ideological Arab Muslim Palestinian party.
Led by a Christian, the NDA is undoubtedly the antithesis to these ideas and
hence it is the first choice of many Christians in the Arab villages (see Table 3).
Moreover, the underlying tone of the party is that of a response to the Muslim
Movement. This is reflected in the inclusion of a candidate from the main power
base of the Muslim Movement in the north (Kafr Kana) on the list and his re-
selection in 2006 (Wasil Taha, b. 1952, MK since 2003).
It is perplexing to note that with the exception of the Christian villages, all
other villages in which the NDA won in 2006 are located on main Israeli roads:
the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem highway (Route 1), the Tel Aviv–Haifa road (Route 2)
and the road mainly adjacent to the Green Line that divides Israel from the
Palestinian Authority (Route 65). Since any electoral success is the result of a
concentrated effort, it is likely that these were Bishara’s focus of attention.
However, in 2009 the NDA only won the majority of the vote within the Christian
population.
Other parties
As noted, in 2009 the consensual parties continued their slide in the Arab popular
vote (from 34% in 1996 to around 21% in 2006 to less than 9% in 2009). In 2006
the Labour party, headed by a new leader known for his dovish ideas, and with a
list that included two Arab candidates, had high hopes. However, the continued
rise in voting for the Arab parties along with the abstention from voting by people
identified with the government establishment contributed to a major gap between
the hopes of the party and the final outcome. Clearly, the Labour party remained
the largest Zionist party among the Arab voters but in 2006, while the two Arab
members were elected to the House, the overall Arab vote gave the party only
about half a seat in parliament. That obviously means that the hopes reflected in
this composition of the slate of candidates were not justified and that perhaps
including more Jewish sub-sectors on the list may have brought the party better
representation in the Knesset.
A similar mistake, though in the opposite direction, was made by Kadima, a
new party established by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Part of Kadima’s
message was that it had split from the Likud in order to leave behind the
misconduct of the former ruling party. However, even though Kadima was indeed
seen by many potential Arab voters as a possible alternative to other Zionist
parties, and especially to Labour, it did not deliver. Kadima committed three
major mistakes that stripped it of any chances it had among Arab voters.
. The party did not include an Arab candidate in a slot that would potentially
lead to a Knesset seat. Lacking deep roots in the Arab sector, the party
could not convince any significant figure to get on board, while those
Israel Affairs 41
Tab
le3
.M
ino
rity
vo
teb
ysu
b-s
ecto
rs(2
00
6),
no
tin
clu
din
gm
ixed
tow
ns.
Par
tici
pat
ion
Ara
bp
arti
esC
on
sen
sual
par
ties
UA
LD
FP
EN
DA
1N
ort
her
nar
ea–
Mu
slim
loca
liti
es6
5.4
7%
87
.45
%1
2.5
5%
30
.31
%2
6.1
1%
30
.78
%2
Cen
tral
area
–ex
clu
din
gM
usl
imM
ov
emen
tlo
cali
ties
55
.23
%8
1.8
2%
18
.18
%3
7.1
3%
17
.97
%2
5.9
7%
3N
ort
her
nar
ea–
excl
ud
ing
Mu
slim
loca
liti
es5
9.3
5%
81
.71
%1
8.2
9%
25
.69
%3
2.5
3%
23
.09
%4
Cen
tral
area
–M
usl
imM
ov
emen
tlo
cali
ties
68
.49
%8
1.5
9%
18
.41
%2
9.7
8%
37
.41
%1
4.0
6%
5S
ou
ther
nar
ea–
Bed
uin
s4
4.9
7%
74
.72
%2
5.2
8%
56
.34
%7
.30
%1
0.5
3%
6Je
rusa
lem
area
52
.20
%6
4.8
7%
35
.13
%2
7.5
6%
4.9
7%
31
.41
%7
Co
asta
lse
ctio
n2
9.3
0%
63
.13
%3
6.8
7%
29
.89
%1
1.3
9%
21
.61
%8
No
rth
ern
area
–C
hri
stia
ns
56
.29
%5
6.3
0%
43
.70
%2
.85
%1
5.1
6%
38
.11
%9
No
rth
ern
area
–B
edu
ins
45
.32
%4
7.1
8%
52
.82
%2
1.4
3%
8.6
1%
16
.77
%1
0N
ort
her
nar
ea–
Ala
wit
es2
9.6
9%
14
.66
%8
5.3
4%
5.2
1%
3.5
8%
3.9
1%
11
No
rth
ern
area
–D
ruze
61
.59
%1
3.9
5%
86
.05
%0
.82
%3
.00
%9
.99
%1
2N
ort
her
nar
ea–
Cir
cass
ian
s3
9.5
3%
6.2
5%
93
.75
%3
.47
%0
.79
%1
.98
%1
3G
ola
n-D
ruze
34
.56
%0
.50
%9
9.5
0%
00
0
A. Bligh42
interested in joining would have given the list a non-central flavour, which
was not in the interest of the party.
. The party’s campaign was led by a Druze Knesset member, Majalli Whbee
(b. 1954, MK since 2003). The appointment of a Druze, let alone a former
senior officer in the Israeli Defence Forces, could not rally Israeli Arab
activists who prefer, like most of their community, not to serve in the army
and, for the most part, despise the Druze community for its full
identification and solidarity with the state.
. A line of propaganda unique to the needs and interests of the Arab
community was not developed. The party tried to win voters through
messages identical to those given the Jewish community, in spite of the
gulf that separated the two populations. As mentioned above, the 2006
campaign was about economic and social issues for Jewish voters. In the
eyes of Arab voters, it was a referendum on the status of Israeli Arabs. Had
Kadima recognized the distinction, the party could have won more votes.
Finally, the right-wing parties of the Knesset experienced a major defeat. The
former ruling party; the party of the Minister of the Interior, who controlled
municipal budgets; and other religious and Zionist parties on the right managed to
collect only about 1.5% of the total Arab vote. Oddly enough, the novelty in this
arena was the tight race between Likud under former Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and Yisrael Beitenu, led by Avigdor Liberman, which encouraged
Israeli Arabs to leave the country or to be included within a Palestinian state in a
final resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict rather than remain included in
Israel’s sovereign territory. Thus, an Arab vote for Liberman would be
considered a strange phenomenon. The fact that some Arabs voted for Yisrael
Beitenu may suggest that, despite many statements to the contrary, a small
number of Arab Israeli citizens do believe that their homes along the border with
the Palestinian Authority should one day be included in a sovereign Palestinian
territory rather than in Israel.
The implications of the sub-sector vote
Since this article attempts to generalize about the political behaviour of Arab
voters based on detailed results, it is important to try to verify the differences
between the various sub-sectors of this population in Israel. It should be noted
that many observers find it hard not to include the Druze population within the
Arab population of Israel. It is obvious from Tables 3–5 that the Alawites (who
reside in one village on the Lebanese border), the Druze (about a dozen villages
within the sovereign territory of Israel), the Golan Druze (four villages captured
from Syria in the 1967 war) and the two Circassian villages (originally brought to
Palestine by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century; Muslims but not Arabs) do
not conform to the voting patterns of the Arab minority in any way. The
Circassians, the Alawites and the Golan Druze do not usually consider the Israeli
Israel Affairs 43
Tab
le4
.M
ino
rity
vo
teb
ysu
b-s
ecto
rs(2
00
9),
no
tin
clu
din
gm
ixed
tow
ns
(%).
Par
tici
pat
ion
Ara
bp
arti
esC
on
sen
sual
par
ties
UA
LD
FP
EN
DA
No
rth
ern
area
–M
usl
imlo
cali
ties
66
.07
96
.43
3.5
72
5.1
03
6.0
23
5.2
7C
entr
alar
ea–
excl
ud
ing
Mu
slim
Mo
vem
ent
loca
liti
es5
7.4
39
5.1
24
.88
42
.34
21
.38
31
.07
No
rth
ern
area
–ex
clu
din
gM
usl
imlo
cali
ties
57
.85
90
.99
9.0
12
8.8
23
7.3
02
4.6
4C
entr
alar
ea–
Mu
slim
Mo
vem
ent
loca
liti
es6
2.9
09
2.3
67
.64
30
.40
42
.53
19
.26
So
uth
ern
area
–B
edo
uin
s3
5.8
98
5.3
51
4.6
57
1.1
45
.00
8.9
8Je
rusa
lem
area
44
.11
79
.88
20
.12
36
.93
8.2
83
4.2
8C
oas
tal
sect
ion
30
.88
80
.36
19
.64
56
.51
11
.08
12
.49
No
rth
ern
area
–C
hri
stia
ns
46
.80
66
.88
33
.12
5.2
22
6.0
23
5.6
0N
ort
her
nar
ea–
Bed
ou
ins
40
.35
73
.11
26
.89
38
.51
14
.23
20
.12
No
rth
ern
area
–A
law
ites
22
.63
5.9
29
4.0
84
.74
01
.18
No
rth
ern
area
–D
ruze
54
.22
23
.50
76
.50
3.6
31
0.9
18
.78
No
rth
ern
area
–C
irca
ssia
ns
34
.91
11
.59
88
.41
7.4
52
.13
1.8
0G
ola
n-D
ruze
29
.30
0.4
39
9.5
70
00
A. Bligh44
Tab
le5
.C
om
par
iso
no
fm
ino
rity
vo
teb
ysu
b-s
ecto
rs(2
00
6an
d2
00
9),
no
tin
clu
din
gm
ixed
tow
ns
(%).
Par
tici
pat
ion
Ara
bp
arti
esC
on
sen
sual
par
ties
UA
LD
FP
EN
DA
No
rth
ern
Are
a–
Mu
slim
loca
liti
esþ
0.6
þ8
.98
28
.98
25
.21
þ9
.91
þ4
.49
Cen
tral
area
–ex
cludin
gM
usl
imM
ovem
ent
loca
liti
esþ
2.2
þ1
3.3
02
13
.30
þ5
.21
þ3
.41
þ5
.10
No
rth
ern
area
–ex
clu
din
gM
usl
imlo
cali
ties
21
.53
þ9
.28
29
.28
þ3
.13
þ4
.77
þ1
.55
Cen
tral
area
–M
usl
imm
ov
emen
tlo
cali
ties
25
.59
þ1
0.7
72
10
.77
þ0
.62
þ5
.12
þ5
.20
So
uth
ern
area
–B
edo
uin
s2
9.0
8þ
10
.63
21
0.6
3þ
14
.80
22
.30
21
.55
Jeru
sale
mar
ea2
8.0
9þ
15
.01
21
5.0
1þ
9.3
7þ
3.3
1þ
2.8
7C
oas
tal
sect
ion
þ1
.58
þ1
7.2
32
17
.23
þ2
6.6
22
0.3
12
9.1
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ort
her
nar
ea–
Ch
rist
ian
s2
9.4
9þ
10
.58
21
0.5
8þ
2.3
7þ
10
.86
22
.51
No
rth
ern
area
–B
edo
uin
s2
4.9
7þ
25
.93
22
5.9
3þ
17
.08
þ5
.62
þ3
.35
No
rth
ern
area
–A
law
ites
27
.06
28
.74
þ8
.74
20
.47
23
.58
22
.73
No
rth
ern
area
–D
ruze
27
.37
þ9
.55
29
.55
þ2
.81
þ7
.91
21
.21
No
rth
ern
area
–C
irca
ssia
ns
24
.62
þ5
.34
25
.34
þ3
.98
þ1
.34
20
.18
Go
lan
–D
ruze
25
.26
20
.07
þ0
.07
00
0
Israel Affairs 45
electoral process to be their concern. For the Golan Druze, this is understandable
since many of them do not perceive themselves as Israeli citizens and thus would
not participate in a demonstration of Israeli citizenship.
Taking these populations out of the current analysis, there are nine sub-
sectors among the potential Arab voter population that can be compared.12 One of
the most intriguing is villages ruled by Muslim Movement activists or that are
known as bases of popular support for the Movement. These are divided almost
evenly between the central and northern areas. In spite of the distance between
the two, some meaningful similarities are clear: in both areas voters flocked to the
polls giving these two sub-sectors the highest voting rate compared with all other
sub-sectors: 68% and 65% in the central and northern areas, respectively, in 2006
and 63% and 66% in 2009. However, in the central and northern Muslim locality
regions, the UAL, a coalition that included Muslim Movement representatives,
did not receive the majority of the vote in 2006 or 2009. In the central area, in
2006, the clear winner was the DFPE, which gained 37% of the vote, with the
UAL coming in a distant second with only 30%. In 2009, the DFPE gained the
most votes in both the northern and the central Muslim regions, winning almost
36% of the vote in the north and 43% of the vote in the central area. In addition, in
both cases, in 2009 the UAL had at least 10% less of the vote than the DFPE.
These figures may indicate that the Muslim Movement’s active encouragement of
its followers to vote caused their opponents to act out of fear of a Muslim
takeover of their towns and villages and vote for parties other than the UAL. The
difference between the northern and the central areas is explained by the make-up
of the villages in the north, in which there are significant numbers of Christians
who fear for their future in the case of a decisive Muslim victory and therefore
vote in large numbers for the Christian-led NDA. In the central area on the Green
Line – or the fence these days – which is also in close proximity to Jewish areas,
the more acute issue on the local agenda of Arab voters is not alienating their
Jewish neighbours, and thus risking their jobs. Having said this, it must be made
clear that job concerns do not radically change the political inclinations of this
population, as reflected in the vote for Arab parties in these areas: 87% and 82%
in the northern and central areas, respectively, in 2006 and 96% and 92% in 2009.
The Palestinian dimension of the UAL was the main reason for preferring this
party to its rivals in the towns and villages of the central area which are not
usually perceived as leaning toward the Muslim Movement. There, the UAL won
37% of the vote in 2006 and almost 42% of the vote in 2009, making it the
undisputed winner in both cases. Second in power in both 2006 and 2009 was
the NDA, which, as mentioned above, has unambiguous views regarding the
future course of relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Here the voters’
message was that they wished to elect leaders who do not seek any compromises
with the Israeli government regarding political solutions to the conflict. It is also a
non-radical Muslim message, if at all Muslim (in the case of NDA).
In four sub-sectors, the Arab parties gained more than 80% of the vote in
2006: the northern area, both in areas under Muslim influence and those not under
A. Bligh46
such influence, and in the central area where the same holds true. In 2009 in the
northern area and the central area, both in areas under Muslim influence and those
not under such influence, the Arab parties received at least 90% of the vote. In
addition, in the Southern Bedouin sector the Arab parties received over 85% of
the vote (up over 10% from 2006). However, the fact that the UAL did not win in
three of the four sectors in both 2006 and 2009 indicates that in the north, with its
Christian population, the NDA was able to build an anti-UAL, i.e. anti-Muslim
Movement, opposition; and in the central area, the DFPE filled the same slot even
in Muslim Movement areas. This resistance to the UAL was not noticeable in the
non-Muslim Movement localities in the central area, where the UAL was able to
collect 37% of the vote in 2006 and about 42% of the vote in 2009 because of its
strong Palestinian dimension. In the northern area, the non-Muslim Movement
localities are traditional strongholds of the DFPE and the party maintained its
leading position with 33% of the vote in 2006 and 37% of the vote in 2009.
Clearly, the Arab voters in the north gave their votes overwhelmingly to Arab
parties. Similar tendencies are identified in other Arab voting areas in Israel. The
most noticeable are the Bedouins of the south, dealt with extensively above.
However, combining a low turnout (45%) with a strong vote for Arab parties
(75%) in 2006 and an even lower turnout (36%) with an even stronger vote for
Arab parties (85%) in 2009 indicates a process of disinterest in the democratic
mechanism of the country together with strong alienation, as reflected in the
swing away from Zionist parties. Successive Israeli governments have praised the
high rate of Bedouins who volunteered for service in the Israeli military forces.
The election results seem to suggest that this tendency is going to slow down until
it finally stops in the near future. Similar tendencies are also present in the
Bedouin population of the northern area. This population, the backbone of the
Arab rank and file of the IDF, also had a low voting rate: 45% (similar to the
Southern Bedouins) but, unlike their southern brothers, only 47% voted for Arab
parties in 2006. However, in 2009 the Northern Bedouins had an even lower
voting rate of 40% but 73% (26% more than in 2006) of these voters voted for
Arab parties. Clearly, the alienation process has accelerated in this area.
Moving away from the Israeli consensus is also noticeable in two critical
areas: the Jerusalem area and the coastal section. Most villages in these two areas,
as mentioned above, overlook strategic highways. Here also, the picture is one of
indifference or alienation: only 29% of the eligible voters in the coastal areas cast
their votes in 2006, giving 63% to Arab parties; in addition only 31% of the
eligible voters voted in the coastal areas in 2009, giving 80% to Arab parties;
whereas in the Jerusalem area in 2006 52% voted and 65% gave their votes to
Arab parties and in 2009 44% voted and 80% gave their votes to Arab parties.
Although the voting percentage increased from 2006 to 2009 in the coastal areas,
it was only by 2% and was less than the national average. In addition, while the
vote for Arab parties increased by more than 17% from 2006 to 2009 to 80% in
this same sector, it was still less than the national Arab vote for these parties. In
Jerusalem, voting participation went down by 8% from 2006 to 2009, reflecting a
Israel Affairs 47
sense of indifference within the region. However, similar to the results in the
coastal areas, the vote for Arab parties in the Jerusalem area increased to almost
80%, but was still less than the national average. It is probable that in spite of
growing alienation, a significant minority still sees its future relations with the
Jewish neighbours as the most viable political alternative at this point.
Finally, the vote among the Arab Christians once again illustrates their
predicament as part of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people, sharing, inter
alia, its grievances along civil and political lines. Only 56% voted for Arab
parties, with the NDA, led by a Christian, gaining 38% of the vote in 2006.
However, the participation rate was equal to that of the Arab community at large
(56%). In 2009, 67% voted for Arab parties, with the NDA receiving almost 36%
of the vote.
Conclusion
If anything, the 2006 and 2009 parliamentary elections once again added a
measure of the degree of emerging alienation between the minority of Arabs
holding Israeli citizenship and the Jewish majority in Israel. It is almost self-
evident that the continued trends in the voting patterns of this particular segment
of the Israeli social and political fabric is strongly indicative of a marginalization
process that is making national elections less and less significant for this
population. This raises serious questions regarding the possible future break
between the two. These concerns are probably reflected in the fact that only
ideologically devout potential voters go to the polls and vote in large numbers for
Arab parties, which stand no chance of becoming members of any coalition
government, thus rendering their vote ineffective in terms of decision-making.
Each of the three Arab parties, as protest bodies, has carved a unique niche for
itself. Seen from this angle, they usually complement one another and only slightly
overlap. Thus, the competition among the three is actually for a small number of
potential voters not exceeding the 2006/2009 figure of 15–20,000. Consequently,
it is safe to assume that given no major changes in the make-up of the Israeli
political parties, insofar as they relate to the Arab population, all three will
continue to struggle to cross the 2% threshold necessary for representation in the
Knesset, and eventually all three will succeed. Perhaps the only party that can
avoid that traditional struggle is the UAL, which appears to be becoming the party
of the southern Bedouins who have the highest birth rate of all Israeli population
groups. Having said that, it should also be mentioned that while the Muslim
Movement is capable of bringing voters to the polling stations, it is not successful
at convincing them to vote for the UAL. That also means that the northern faction
of the Muslim Movement is unable to deter potential NDA voters from taking part
in the election, judging from the strong showing of the NDA in villages and towns
ruled by, or having strong political influence of, the Muslim Movement.
One last word concerning the vote for Zionist/consensual parties: This is a
dying phenomenon. The right-wing parties gained marginally in 2009 but, all in
A. Bligh48
all, the vote for Zionist parties is dwindling and is likely to become a poor
reminder of the past. This is probably the last and most powerful indication of the
completion of the alienation process.
Full involvement in the national political system is disappearing from the
Israeli political scene. It is gradually being replaced by three major elements:
. Municipal leadership elected in democratic elections and increased voting
in municipal elections.
. Representative national organizations.
. Civil society organizations along the lines described by Salamon and
Anheier.13
A parallel system is being developed by Israeli Arab leaders. Within this new
structure, national elections and the Knesset are viewed as marginal; they serve
mainly as a public relations arena intended to bring the Arab Israeli message to
Jewish Zionist awareness.
Judging from the evidence that stems from this examination of the 2006 and
2009 election results among Arab voters, it is possible to cautiously conclude that
the Israeli Arab political stance is less and less a part of the general Israeli
political culture.
Notes on contributor
Alexander Bligh is Associate Professor of Middle East Studies at Ariel University Centreand director of its Centre for Middle East Studies.
Notes
1. As’ad Ghanem and Muhammad Mustafa, “The Palestinians in Israel and the 2006Knesset Elections: Political and Ideological Implications of Election Boycott,” HolyLand Studies 6, no. 1 (2007): 51–73.
2. Many more pertinent elements will not be analysed here due to the limit on the lengthof the paper. A sample of these studies: Orit Ichilov, “Pride in One’s Country andCitizenship Orientations in a Divided Society: The Case of Israeli Palestinian Araband Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Jewish Israeli Youth,” Comparative EducationReview 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 44–61; Yossi Yonah, “Israel as a MulticulturalDemocracy: Challenges and Obstacles,” Israel Affairs 11, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 95–116; Majid al-Haj, “Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of thePalestinians in Israel and the Territories,” Israel Affairs 11, Issue 1 (Winter 2005):183–206; Amal Jamal, “The Ambiguities of Minority Patriotism: Love forHomeland versus State among Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” Nationalism andEthnic Politics 10, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 433–71; Muhammad Amara and Izhak Schnell,“Identity Repertoires among Arabs in Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and MigrationStudies 30, no. 1 (January 2004): 175–193; Hillel Frisch, “Positions and Attitudes ofIsraeli Arabs Regarding the Arab World, 1990–2001,” Middle Eastern Studies 39,Issue 4 (October 2003): 99–120; Amal Jamal, “Beyond ‘Ethnic Democracy’: StateStructure, Multicultural Conflict and Differentiated Citizenship in Israel,” NewPolitical Science 24, no. 3 (September 2002): 411–31.
Israel Affairs 49
3. http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa¼2011111014. Consult http://www1.cbs.gov.il/ts for the Israeli official figures.5. Alexander Bligh, “The Intifada and the New Political Role of the Israeli Arab
Leadership,” Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (January 1999): 134–64.6. Avraham Sela, “Politics, Identity and Peacemaking,” Israel Studies 10 (Summer
2005): 15–71; Muhammad Amara and Izhak Schnell, “Identity Repertoires amongArabs in Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (2004): 175–193”;Alexander Bligh, “The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position ofthe Israeli Arab Leadership,” Israel Affairs 9 (January 2003): 290–308; RamziSuleiman, “Perception of the Minority’s Collective Identity and Voting Behaviour:The Case of the Palestinians in Israel,” Journal of Social Psychology 142 (December2002): 753–66.
7. Jamal, “The Ambiguities.”8. Dr. As’ad Ghanem and Muhammad Mustafa, “The Palestinians in Israel and the
2006 Knesset Elections: Political and Ideological Implications of Election Boycott,”Holy Land Studies 6, no. 1 (2007): 51–73.
9. Falk, Richard. “Azmi Bishara, the right of resistance, and the Palestinian ordeal.”Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 19; Fraser, Abigail, and AviShabat. “Between Nationalism and Liberalism: The Political Thought of AzmiBishara.” Israel Affairs 9, nos. 1&2 (Autumn/Winter 03): 16-36; Diskin, Abraham.“Israel.” European Journal of Political Research 47, no. 7/8 (November 2008):1019–1024; Ram, Uri. “Tensions in the “Jewish Democracy”: The ConstitutionalChallenge of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel.” Constellations: An InternationalJournal of Critical & Democratic Theory 16, no. 3 (September 2009): 523–536.
10. See, for example, Supreme Court cases 50/03; 651/03; .11225/0311. Any party is entitled to add the votes it received beyond the qualifying threshold that
is not sufficient for a whole seat to another competing party on condition that thereceiving party got more votes than the donating.
12. Kennedy, R. S. “The Druze of the Golan: a case of non-violent resistance.” Journalof Palestine Studies 13 ii, no. 50 (1984): 48–64; Kirrish, Fadwa N. “Druze ethnicityin the Golan Heights: the interface of religion and politics.” Journal, Institute ofMuslim Minority Affairs 13, no. 1 (1992): 122–135; Hajjar, Lisa. “Making identitypolicy: Israel’s interventions among the Druze.” Middle East Report 200, no. 26(1996): 2–6;10; “A would-be happy link with Syria.” Economist 390, no. 8619(February 21, 2009): 48–49.
13. Lester M. Salaman and Helmut K. Anheier, Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-national Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).
A. Bligh50