Political trends in the Israeli Arab population and its vote inparliamentary elections

Alexander Bligh*

Department of Political Science, Ariel University Centre of Samaria, Ariel, Israel

Full Arab Israeli involvement in the national political system is disappearingfrom the Israeli political scene. A parallel system is being developed by thecommunity’s political leaders. Within this new structure, national electionsand the Knesset are viewed as marginal; they serve mainly as a PR arenaintended to bring the Arab Israeli message to Jewish/Zionist awareness.Judging from the evidence of recent election results among Arab voters, it ispossible to cautiously conclude that the Israeli Arab political stance is lessand less a part of the general Israeli political culture.

Keywords: Israeli Arabs; voting patterns; political participation; elections;Israel; political culture

In 1977 the Israeli political system experienced a change which brought new

parties to power. However, that change also contributed to an inherent systemic

lack of stability which in turn led to more frequent election campaigns than

envisioned by Israeli law. Instead of every four years, elections take place almost

once every three years. This increased frequency gives the researcher a more

accurate tool in verifying the political behaviour of the Arab/Palestinian citizens

of Israel.

For most citizens throughout the democratic world, a routine electoral process

provides an opportunity to manifest solidarity and confidence in the national

political system and its values. Thus, measuring rates of electoral participation

may often indicate the robustness of a political system and the true interests of the

voters and their confidence in their ability to bring about a change through

elections. Moreover, it is a common paradigm that modernizing societies usually

develop increased political awareness and consequently tend to upgrade their

participation in choosing nationally elected political bodies.1 These paradigms

will be analysed in the following pages in relation to the Arab citizens of the State

of Israel.2

This article mainly explores the Arab political behaviour as far as national

elections are concerned. Although most, if not all writers today include the Druze

community within their research frame, this is a mistake since the Druze have

their own voting patterns that are dissimilar from the Arab minority, yet also

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

*Email: director@ariel.ac.il

Israel Affairs, 2013

Vol. 19, No. 1, 21–50, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2013.748286

different from the Jewish electorate. Essentially, though removing the Druze

population from the data, it is clear that the emerging patterns of the Muslim and

Christian Arab population of Israel, which, as of 2010, amounted to 17% of the

total population (non-Jews married to Jews are not included within this study)

tend to defy this modernization–participation supposition in the Israeli national

arena.3 From a quantitative study of representative criteria of modernization, it is

evident that since the mid-1960s the Arab sector has undergone a process of

modernization.4 Parallel to this, there has been a two-pronged political process

reflected in a diminishing rate of participation in national parliamentary elections

and a growing rate of voting for parties that are not potential members of any

Israeli coalition government. The reasons for this apparent paradox are

numerous, but perhaps the most significant is that though this particular segment

of Israeli voters manifests an increasing degree of political involvement, this

involvement is limited to its own Arab Israeli civil society organizations. While

these bodies fill the vacuum between government and grassroots by responding to

the social needs of the population, they also develop a uniquely new kind of

national affiliation, namely Palestinian under Israeli sovereignty, which differs

from Palestinian under occupation in the 1967 territories.5

The outcomes of the Israeli parliamentary elections since the mid-1980s add

to the accumulated evidence that Israel is now home to two distinct peoples: the

Jewish-Zionist-Israeli and the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli. The latter is Palestinian in

its national affiliation and identity, and Israeli in its civil identity. Arab citizens

have not become part of the Israeli-Zionist-Jewish political texture yet neither are

they a fundamental organ of the Palestinian entity in the territories. Moreover,

this law-abiding population within Israel fully shares the values of its Palestinian

brothers residing outside of Israel. Sela, Amara and Schnell, Suleiman and others

all believe that Israeli Arab society has developed into a unique political

community: it is simultaneously all of the above.6 Members of this group have

embarked on a new road: developing a political identity that allows them to enjoy

all the benefits offered to members of all of these communities. This particular

emerging political pattern of behaviour is unique, reminiscent of neighbouring

societies, yet different in many ways.

When identifying the internal elements of the Israeli Arab political behaviour,

its interaction with the central government and other communities should not be

ignored, as indicated by Jamal.7 Each community operates within a larger

political context, friendly at times, hostile at others. The undercurrents

prescribing the public relations between the Arab and the Jewish communities

consist of several elements: the mutual expectations of each player – whether

each believes it can convince the other to reach a common ground or if it will

have to fight for its rights. Thus, political direction may take either path:

conciliatory or confrontational. Moreover, self-assured political behaviour takes

into account the need to find a rational way to separate itself from a neighbouring

or hostile political society that will allow each community to go its own

independent way. Another aspect is the ability of each neighbouring or similar

A. Bligh22

political community to devise a way to form temporary or stable coalitions with

other political/civil societies.

How do these characteristics fit into the political behaviour of the Israeli Arab

community as reflected in the most recent national parliamentary elections?

Clearly, the continued Israeli–Arab tensions since 1948 have been the major

contributing factor to the perceived contradiction between a Jewish Zionist

country and an administration that has been at war with its Arab, mostly Muslim,

neighbours for generations now. The outcome is a mind-set of distrust of the

Jewish government and of parliamentary politics. And, indeed, if since 1948 no

accepted representative of the Arab population (as opposed to candidates

nominated by the central government) has ever served in any position remotely

reminiscent of decision making – why should the system be trusted? This

mistrust is now deeply embedded within Arab Israeli political thinking.

Moreover, these feelings of mistrust have already led to a reality of conflict. It is

not usually a violent conflict, but most Israeli Arabs would not side with Israel in

times of crisis. Quite the contrary: During the two waves of Palestinian violence

in the territories (1987–1992, 2000–2005), Israeli Arabs as a community sided

with their brothers, even helping them with short outbursts of their own violence,

and opposing their country, in any non-violent or violent way they could.

As already noted, an analysis of the development of Israeli Arab political

behaviour needs to be performed concurrently with a study of their modernization.

Clearly, in material terms, their terms of reference are neither the Palestinians in

the territories nor Arabs living in any Arab country; the one and only reference

group is the Jewish Israeli sector. Thus, every indicator selected shows a dramatic

improvement in living conditions of the studied population, attesting to an

accelerated modernization process. Clearly, none of the statistics fully conforms to

the parallel statistics among the Jewish population, but gaps are definitely closing

at an accelerated rate. All in all, the modernizing trend is undeniable. The question

that arises is whether that modernization translates into enhanced political

involvement in the Israeli political system. Put differently, the matter at stake is:

what are the current expressions of Israeli Arab political behaviour?

Two main issues are discussed in this article based on figures taken from raw

material supplied Election results by the Central Election Committee, Jerusalem

(2009) and tabulated from each and every polling station in an Arab village and

town. Mixed towns were not included since it is impossible to ascertain the exact

number of Arab voters out of the total voters:

(1) The rate of Israeli Arab citizens, among the eligible voters, who choose to

exercise their civil rights and go to the polls each time a new Knesset

(Israeli parliament) is elected, and its significance.

(2) The degree of voting for consensual Israeli parties, i.e. parties which have

the potential of becoming members of a coalition government, as

opposed to protest parties that may send great orators to parliament but

that never have any access to the Israeli decision-making process.

Israel Affairs 23

National elections

Before beginning a detailed and comparative analysis of the election results, it is

important to explain that one campaign in Israel was not included in this study:

the direct election of the Prime Minister in 2001 – the only election not held

simultaneously with the elections for the Knesset. The 2001 elections were held

not long after outbreak of the October 2000 riots for which most Arabs held then

Prime Minister Barak and his cabinet responsible. Since the alternative (Ariel

Sharon) was not to their liking either, most Arab voters refrained from voting.

This unique incident cannot be dealt with in this paper since, though it may serve

as a precedent in the future, to date it is a single case, which does not affect the

general tendencies of this voting public.

Sectarian participation in election voting can be measured in two ways:

absolute figures – i.e. the percentage of voters out of all eligible voters – or

relative participation – i.e. comparing the Arab participation with the general

participation, meaning that if the general participation equals the Arab

participation, the relative Arab participation equals 1 (or 100%). If the Arab

participation is below the general participation, the descriptive statistic would be

smaller than 1 (or, in percentage points, less than 100%). Measured this way, it is

evident that if the Arab vote is higher than that of the general voting body, they

stand a better chance of being better represented in the Knesset, while lower

voting rates would be translated into smaller representation. Modernizing

societies usually vote in higher numbers as they discover the power of democratic

instruments. Thus, political participation and influence become part and parcel of

their political behaviour. Moreover, an Arab voting rate equal to that of the

general population would indicate political behaviour similar, if not identical, to

the rest of the population. If the Arab vote is proportionately lower than that of

the general population, the gap that necessitates explanation is only that part

which falls below the general rate. Differently put, it is apparent that the general

voting rate has been declining in recent campaigns (see Figure 1) and it is

reasonable to assume that the cause of this particular part of the decline in the

Arab vote can be attributed to reasons similar to those of the decline among the

Jewish public. However, an explanation is needed for the rest of the drop in the

Arab vote.

The Arab Israeli case is atypical of modernizing societies. Right after the

Israeli War of Independence, with all the leadership of the Arab community

outside of the borders of the newly declared state, relative voting was 91%

(see Table 1). This figure reflects the confusion and disorientation of the Arab

community right after the end of hostilities. Between 1948 and 1966, Israel

imposed a military administration on its Arab citizens that gave the state a large

degree of control over the lives of this population. That control was translated

into a high rate of voting, and in most cases for the ruling party, the predecessor of

the current Labour party. Hence, it is no surprise that between 1951 and 1965,

relative Arab Israeli participation was always above 100%. It was still high in the

A. Bligh24

aftermath of the 1966 abolition of the military administration (the 1969 election)

and even higher in the 1973 election held while the guns of the October 1973 war

were still thundering. Since then, these rates have never been repeated even at

those times when outside observers would expect the Israeli Arab community to

vote for their own good in the face of existing or potential threats to their status

Table 1. Arab relative participation in Knesset elections.

Year Relative participation

1949 0.91 Military administration1951 1.14 Highest relative participation

Military administration1955 1.10 Military administration1959 1.09 Military administration1961 1.05 Military administration1965 1.06 Military administration1969 1.00 1966 – Military administration abolished1973 1.021977 0.961981 0.89 First national election after the Likud came to power1984 0.941988 0.951992 0.89 First Labour party victory since 19771996 0.97 Direct election of the Prime Minster1999 0.96 Direct election of the Prime Minster2003 0.912006 0.892009 0.87 Lowest relative participation

Figure 1. Arab, general and Arab relative voting by Knesset.

Israel Affairs 25

within the Jewish state. Thus, when the right-wing Likud first came into power in

1977, the relative Arab vote was less than 1. Even during the very tight race in

1981, when the Arab vote could have undoubtedly swung the leadership from

Likud to Labour, the relative Arab vote dropped to one of its lowest ever Figures

(88.8%, rivalled only by the 2009 figure of 87%). The relative Arab vote

recovered moderately only during the two campaigns (1996, 1999) when Israeli

voters cast two ballots: one for a political party and one for prime minister. Even

then, it did not cross the 100% threshold.

These figures are almost self-explanatory: In spite of the gradual, though

slow, increase in the proportional representation of the Arab population within

the general Israeli population, there was no parallel increase in voting of the Arab

population. Quite the contrary, more Arab representation has translated into less

voting in national elections. This may indicate that with the sectarian self-

confidence that comes with greater presence in Israel, the growing population

feels less a part of the Israeli fabric at large (see Figure 2). Obviously, that

translates into a sharp decrease in the absolute percentage of Arab voters among

eligible Arab voters, and consequently a very small increase in the number of

members of the Knesset who are elected mostly by Arab votes (Figure 3).

According to Ghanem and Mustafa,8 the individual desire to participate in voting

increases as long as there is an increase in the sense of one’s ability to influence

events. However, because the Israeli Arabs do not believe their votes make a

difference, their motivation and desire to vote has been declining.

At all major political junctions since the Likud came to power in 1977 Arab

voters have failed to deliver. With the neck-and-neck competition in 1981

0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 18

Relative ParticipationProportion in Israeli Population

1712

Figure 2. Arab relative participation compared with Arab proportion in general.

A. Bligh26

(ending with a Likud victory), in the 1992 Rabin and Labour victory, and in the

switch from Likud to Kadima in 2006, there was no Arab input. With the

exception of the 1996 and 1999 campaigns, those years were marked by the

lowest relative participation since 1951. The political struggles in those election

years were characterized by issues seen by most Israelis as crucial to the future of

the Jewish state: the Iraqi nuclear reactor bombing and future relations with

Egypt (1981), the feeling that Prime Minister Shamir was not the right leader to

resolve the Palestinian issue (1992) and, finally, the disengagement policy of

Prime Minister Sharon and the future of Israeli–Palestinian relations (2006). Yet

on all these critical occasions, Arab participation rates were the lowest.

Consequently, it is safe to assert that the Arab voters refrained from taking part in

what they saw as internal Jewish or Israeli political affairs. Additionally,

even though most Israeli Jews viewed the issues on the agenda as greatly

influencing the future of the Palestinian people as well, Israeli Arab voters did not

share this view.

The two campaigns of 1996 and 1999 were extraordinary in that they gave the

Israeli voter the opportunity to elect a Prime Minister and parliament in two

separate votes. The system, later to be cancelled, encouraged sectarian voting in

Israel and directly caused the collapse of the two leading parties, Likud and

Labour. Those were the only times when the Israeli voter did not have to vote for

a party in the hope that its leader would be called upon by the president of the

state to form a coalition government. Rather, voters felt that they could elect a

Prime Minster and yet give their representatives the opportunity to speak their

minds. The Arab vote was no exception, raising false hopes of gaining a swinging

Figure 3. Arab absolute participation compared with Arab representation in the Knesset.

Israel Affairs 27

vote in parliament, but once the old system was reinstated and Israeli voters at

large returned to their traditional voting patterns, the Arab voters followed suit

and resumed their absence from the polling stations. That and their

disappointment in the attempt to gain some degree of influence over the system,

contributed to a further decline in the rate of voting among the Arabs.

That abstention raises another issue: is there any correlation between showing

up at the voting booths and the pattern of party voting? Will more voters indicate

more representation for any of the Israeli parties? The statistical data strongly

suggest that there is a manifest correlation between relative participation and the

outcome of the vote of the Israeli Arab community. Larger relative participation

usually translates into more votes for the Israeli consensual parties; the lower the

vote, the more Arab votes go to Arab protest parties (see Figures 4 and 5).

The patterns of voting underwent two formative stages that affected the

emergence of Israeli Arab attitudes in regard to parliamentary politics: after 1966

and in 1981. The abolition of the military administration did not only cause a drop

in the relative participation. Obviously, it was also reflected in the way that Arab

voters used their potential to send members of the Knesset to Jerusalem.

Theoretically, if all eligible Arab voters had cast their vote, they would have sent

10 members to the Knesset in 1960 and 19 in 2000. In fact, after 1966, the votes

cast sent only six members. In other words, after the abolition of the military

administration, the actual vote dropped to below 50% of the potential vote, never

to recover, with only a short interval in the 1996 and 1999 direct elections for

Prime Minister, as already mentioned.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Relative participationVoting for consensual partiesVoting for Arab parties

Figure 4. Arab relative participation compared with voting for consensual and Arab parties.

A. Bligh28

In 1981, another process was added: the disappearance of the unique coalition

created Arab parties. In 1949, the ruling party at the time, today the Labour party,

created several satellite Arab parties. That meant that while Arab citizens were not

admitted to the Labour party, they had the option of voting for parties made up of

Arab citizens which did not however enjoy full rights in the Knesset. In practice,

that meant that elected members of satellite parties had to vote for the Labour

position, but were never admitted as full and legitimate partners in the Labour

coalition. This was only one manifestation of semi-official discrimination that

stripped the Arab voters of full representation within the political parliamentary

system. Indeed, beginning in the first parliamentary elections in 1949, a sizeable

proportion of Israeli Arabs voted for the Labour party and its affiliates. However,

in 1981 these parties were not voted in, and they disappeared. Although the

Labour party absorbed its Arab supporters into the party, it began losing Arab

votes. Thus, instead of the two traditional major blocs getting votes from Arab

Israeli voters, Labour and Communists, four major political blocs emerged:

(1) The Communist party (under various names), which has served as the

major Arab sector protest party since 1949.

(2) The Labour party.

(3) Other non-consensual Arab parties (since 1984).

(4) Other Zionist parties (since 1984 – mainly Shas – the party of the former

Minister of the Interior, the Likud and others).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Arab Absolute VotingVoting for consensual partiesVoting for Arab parties

Figure 5. Arab absolute participation compared with voting for consensual and Arabparties.

Israel Affairs 29

In terms of national party politics, 1981 marked the change away from Labour

and the beginning of new Arab protest parties. Even the right wing Likud began to

be perceived as a semi-legitimate party as it was the party that formed the

coalition and put together the country’s budget. A comparison of the outcomes of

national elections from 1981 to the present makes it clear that the vote for protest

parties has been growing, while the vote for consensual parties has been

decreasing and the rate of participation has also dropped sharply. Combining all

these into a single conclusion, it is clear that the current Israeli Arab political

consensus does not recognize the national parliamentary field as one of the

avenues that have any influence whatsoever on the status of this sector.

Participation is continuously dropping and that indicates a growing alienation

from the Israeli political system. This process is concurrent with the growing

modernization of the Israeli Arab sector, implying that more alienation and

almost full de facto divorce are in the making.

The 2006 campaign as a clear representative of the distinct constituencies

Since 1984, a score of parties have surfaced in the Arab sector, the major ones

being the United Arab List (UAL), the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality

(DFPE) and the National Democratic Assembly (NDA, Balad). In addition, since

1999 a new pattern of Arab voting has emerged that reflects the special niche of

each of the main parties. It should be noted that each party attracts a distinctly

different voting constituency: from the radical Muslim, through the Palestinian

and the pan-Arab, to supporters of joint Jewish–Arab representation.

In 2006, the UAL was able to send four members to parliament after

successfully forming a rather attractive coalition between Muslim and Palestinian

ideologies. The list was based upon the infrastructure laid out by the Arab

Democratic Party (ADP), formed by (the then) MK Abd al-Wahhab Darawshe (b.

1943, MK 1984–1999), who had split from the Labour party in the context of the

Palestinian uprising (1988). Darawshe was quick to identify three main issues

that might affect the way Arab Israelis vote:

. The need to form a wide coalition of Arab groups in order to circumvent

the impossibility, later to be partly overcome, of reaching excess-votes

agreements with other Arab parties.

. The increasing potential of the Bedouin population of the Negev, which

had a large annual growth rate.

. The large potential of the Muslim Movement, which had refrained from

active participation in national parliamentary elections.

After leaving Labour in 1988, Darawshe made his ADP party a coalition-type

alignment rather than a dogmatic closed-ranks party, but within a well-defined

political framework, namely, Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims. Since then, the

ADP has served as the base for growing parliamentary representation of larger

A. Bligh30

circles within the Arab public: the ADP sent one member to the 11th Knesset

(1988) and the 12th Knesset (1988–1992); two members to the 13th Knesset

(1992–1996); four members to the 14th Knesset (1996–1999), as part of the

Arab Democratic Party–United Arab List; five members to the 15th Knesset

(1999–2003), as the United Arab List; two members to the 16th Knesset (2003–

2006); four members to the 17th Knesset (2006–2009), as the United Arab List–

Arab Movement for Renewal; and four members to the 18th Knesset (2009–), as

the UAL.

As a former school principal and an active member of the Labour party,

Darawshe was an obvious choice to be nominated to a slate of candidates for the

1988 campaign. However, contrary to Labour’s hopes of finding a true

companion in their political approach, Darawshe was quick to take private

initiatives in the Palestinian sphere. Thus, his split with the party in 1988 came as

no surprise. Yet, upon leaving the party, he took with him an intimate knowledge

of the Israeli system and the ways to manipulate it politically for the benefit of his

political agenda. Thus, for the first time ever, a member of an Arab party saw

himself as acting as a true bridge between his constituency and the Israeli

establishment. Moreover, even the name he picked for his party had several

constituencies in mind: Arab – attracting both Israeli Arabs and Bedouin Arabs

(in classical Arabic, ‘Arab’ means ‘Bedouin’). The Bedouin dimension was

further reinforced by the selection of Talab El-Sana, a Bedouin lawyer from the

southern Bedouin village of Lagiya, as his running mate and the second MK of

the party (b. 1960, MK since 1992). Selecting El-Sana also initiated a new trend

in the characteristics of Arab MKs who were younger and more educated than

before. This trend peaked in the 2006 elections when, of 10 members

representing the Arab parties, only one held only a high school diploma, while all

the rest had academic degrees. The reasons for this trend are numerous; suffice it

to say here that the ADP was the first to devise a new political outlet for both

Muslim ideology and the political needs and aspirations of the new educated

generation.

Over the years, the ADP also tried to be accepted by the Israeli political

establishment as a legitimate Arab party that might, someday, be fully included in

a coalition government. At first, it was the careful inclusion of the adjective

‘democratic’ in the name of the party that indicated acceptance of the rules of the

political game, and which led Darawshe to become the first Arab MK ever to

meet regularly with the Prime Minister, Shamir, at the time, and his advisor on

Arab affairs. Later, the ADP, along with other Arab parties, was included in the

parliamentary bloc that supported the 1992 Rabin government. Moreover, in line

with its pragmatic approach to Israeli politics, the ADP supported the 2000 state

budget presented by Minister of Finance Meir Shitrit, during its first reading, after

the usual political negotiations that precede budget deliberations in all

democratic countries. And yet the party never ceased to be Arab in that it

supported Arab causes, and obviously, being Arab, Muslim and Palestinian, it

supported the Palestinian side in its confrontation with the Israeli government.

Israel Affairs 31

These attributes led to two other political alliances that expanded the public basis

of the party.

The first was the Muslim Movement, which, on the eve of the 1996 elections,

was split on the issue of participation in the elections. One trend within the

movement strongly opposed participation since it might be interpreted as full

recognition of the Jewish-Zionist state. Another trend read the upcoming 1996

elections as crucial since the right wing under Benjamin Netanyahu stood a

chance of defeating then interim Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Neither was to the

liking of most Arab voters: the former as the leader of a political bloc that was

unacceptable to the Arab voter; the latter because shortly before the election,

while serving as Minister of Defence, he had been held responsible for the

accidental bombing of Palestinians in Lebanon, which led to the death of about

100 civilians. However, Peres was still the lesser of two evils and, beyond that,

the ADP hoped that a large Arab turnout would lead to a significant showing in

terms of Knesset mandates and thus would convince Peres to repeat the 1992

precedent of reaching some coalition-type agreement with Darawshe’s list.

The second alliance was initiated before the 2006 elections with the Arab

Movement for Renewal led by Dr. Ahmad Tibi (b. 1958, MK since 1999). With

that alliance, the circle was complete: the ADP had, during the political

processes, lost its name (to be replaced by UAL as of 1999), but it now enjoyed

three main sources of support: the Bedouins in the Negev, the Muslim Movement

(southern branch) and the young and nationalistic intellectuals. As of 2006 and

2009, this proved a winning combination, as will be shown below.

Unlike the ADP, and later the UAL, which attracted only Arab voters as its

names indicated, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality has always

viewed its constituency as comprising a majority of Arabs and a minority of Jews.

The DFPE is an offspring of the Communist party that has been active in Israel

since its creation and even before that. For most of the period until the collapse of

the Soviet Union, it was a rather conservative Communist party in that it

religiously followed the party line coming out of Moscow. However, in 1977 the

Communist party (known at the time as the ‘New Communist List’) created a

political alliance with unaligned Arab political leaders with the aim of

broadening its base of support. The addition to the party included members of the

new generation of young educated Arabs who shared the party’s political views

but did not wish to be identified with its Communist message. At that time, the

party line regarding the final Middle Eastern settlement called for Israel to

completely withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967, recognize the PLO as

the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that a

Palestinian state should be established alongside Israel. Over and above these

Palestinian elements, it also demanded full equality for Israel’s Arab citizens. All

in all, the difference between the ADP/UAL and the DFPE was clear: the former

advocated an Israeli Arab Palestinian agenda and appealed only to Arabs,

whereas the latter gave priority to Palestinian issues over Israeli Arab issues and

appealed to both Jews and Arabs.

A. Bligh32

In 1990/1991, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, the party lost a major

source of income and support. Until then, Communist activists were sought after

in the hope that they could provide scholarships and study opportunities in the

Soviet bloc. The failure of state Communism, and the loss of these incentives,

challenged the party to re-invent itself so that it would not completely fade

away from the Israeli political scene. This was accomplished with some success,

partly by resorting to traditional politics: more activity on the municipal level.

During the 2003 and 2008 municipal campaigns, the DFPE served as the cement

that connected many small families, which could not compete with larger

families. The DFPE facilitated agreements and provided financing to many

such families giving them a fair chance in running for local political offices.

Many of these new activists then served the party during the 2006 and 2009

Knesset campaigns.

All that was not enough to maintain the DFPE as the largest Arab party, but it

did enable it to remain relatively strong and capable of crossing the threshold of

the minimum votes necessary to enter the Knesset. The DFPE was less attractive

and had a less focused message than the UAL and the gradual erosion of its base

of support made the DFPE only the second strongest party among Arab voters.

This status is reflected in the election results after 1990: 13th (1992–1996, four

members), 14th (1996–1999, three members), 15th (1999–2003, three

members), 16th (2003–2006, two members), 17th (2006–2009, three members)

and 18th (2009–, four members). Evidently, even in the post-Communist era, the

party is still a political power to reckon with in the Arab sector.

The National Democratic Assembly is the latest addition to the field of Arab

parties. Unlike the preceding parties, this one was mainly, for most of the period

since its establishment, a one-man show, led by Azmi Bishara (b. 1956, MK

1996–2007). His biography has already been the topic of several studies9 but this

article will deal only with his political activity. His appeal to Arab voters made

for a relatively strong showing since he first ran for the Knesset. In 1996, he was

elected to the Knesset as part of the DFPE–NDA list, and in 1999 he ran with

Ahmad Tibi, head of the Arab Movement for Renewal (see above): 14th (1996–

1999, two – split from the five of the DFPE), 15th (1999–2003, two), 16th

(2003–2006, three), 17th (2006–2009, three) and 18th (did not present his

candidacy, 2009–, three).

The NDA is unique in more ways than one:

. Unlike the other Arab parties, Bishara sees himself as Arab first and

Palestinian second. In that, he is reminiscent of nineteenth and mid-

twentieth century Arab nationalism promoted mainly by Christians in

order overcome the generations-old discrimination by Muslims against

Christians as far as political representation was concerned. Thus, it is no

surprise that while all other Arab parties focus their attention on the fate of

the Palestinian people, Bishara and the NDA focus on pan-Arab causes that

have their base in Damascus, not in the occupied territories.

Israel Affairs 33

. While leaders of the Communist party have been Jewish, Muslim and

Christian and the party declared its devotion to coexistence, the NDA is

clearly a purely Arab party and yet the first ever to be headed by a Christian.

. The party managed to present to its potential voters a loose coalition of

leaders representing a rather pluralistic facade. In addition to Bishara, the

party MKs in the 16th Knesset (who all were re-elected to the 17th Knesset,

and one of the original members, Jamal Zahalka, is in the 18th) include a

former head of the Kafr Kana local council. As the leading figure in a village

divided almost evenly between the northern current of the Muslim

Movement and the radical wing of the DFPE, this MK represents a middle

way between the two. His opposition to the Zionist nature of Israel is the

common denominator of the two trends. Another MK, a PhD in

pharmacology, whose office is decorated with pictures of Martin Luther

King and Nelson Mandela, bears the banner of non-violent resistance to

Israel’s apartheid policies. These two, along with Bishara, believe that Israel

should give up any Zionist and Jewish attributes and become a country of all

its citizens. In that, their line is different from that of the two other parties

since they do not want to see Israel turned into a Palestinian state. The NDA

would like Israel to retain its democratic nature, yet become a non-Zionist,

non-Jewish country. Moreover, in their view, Israel should be subject to the

leadership of Syria as the motherland of Arabism.

Bishara’s controversial political views and their expression over the years,

let alone his wartime engagement in alleged anti-Israel activities and subsequent

flight from the country, have become the subject of numerous attempts by Jewish-

Zionist circles to disqualify him or his party from running for the Knesset. At other

times, his trips to enemy countries in apparent violation of Israeli law were the

subject of Israeli Supreme Court decisions.10 Undoubtedly, these failed attempts

only added to his reputation and that of his party among potential voters. His image

is that of a courageous person who dared to present his candidacy for the prime

ministerial slot in 1999, who travelled to Syria and Lebanon, and who built a belt of

immunity around himself which has so far shielded him from prosecution by Israel.

In his quest for leadership of the Israeli Arab population, until he left Israel

(2007), Bishara was challenged by Ahmad Tibi, MD, another Israeli-born

academic (see above). Fearing that their two parties would not win the minimum

vote necessary to get elected, Tibi and Bishara joined forces on the eve of the

1999 elections in a loose confederation that would later be dissolved. Since 1999,

Tibi has never run alone; he has always been elected as a member of a coalition:

for the 15th Knesset (1999), he ran under the title of the ‘National Democratic

Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal’; for the 16th Knesset (2003) under

‘Hadash-Ta’al’ (DFPE and the ‘Arab Movement for Renewal’) and for the 17th

and 18th Knessets (2006 and 2009) under ‘Ra’am-Ta’al’ (UAL and the ‘Arab

Movement for Renewal’). It is evident that unlike the Christian Bishara, Tibi, a

Muslim and for years a close advisor to Yasir Arafat, provides a slate of

A. Bligh34

candidates with Palestinian endorsement. By joining the UAL on the eve of the

2006 elections, Tibi not only provided Palestinian sanctioning but he himself also

received a radical Muslim vote of approval. Running in the Israeli national

elections only two months after Hamas won the Palestinian elections

undoubtedly helped the list and Tibi himself by exploiting the Muslim

momentum among Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line. Tibi needed that

approval after the death of Arafat and his own attempt to reconstruct his position

among Israeli Palestinians who had viewed Arafat for years as a national symbol

but not as a leader to provide them with their specific needs. That perception

obviously affected Tibi’s position among these voters. Today, his image is of a

Palestinian leader who cares for his brothers across the ‘Green Line’ but he is first

and foremost a spokesman for the Israeli Arabs.

The 2006 and 2009 national elections and the final move to disengagement

from the Israeli political system

As already noted, the 2006 and 2009 votes once more demonstrated the continued

rise in voting for Arab parties and the continued decrease in voting for consensual

parties. Figures 6 and 7 do not include mixed cities since it is impossible to

distinguish between Jewish and Arab votes. However, adding the vote for Arab

parties in these locations would somewhat raise the voting rate for the Arab

parties, bringing it closer to 80% for 2006 and 92% for 2009.

These figures should be complemented along party and geographical lines.

Clearly, the UAL’s message was the most attractive to the Arab voter in both the

2006 and 2009 elections (Figures 8 and 9). The party moved from third place

among Arab parties in 2003 (two seats, 2.1%, Tibi not on the list) to first in 2006

(four seats, 3%, including Tibi) and in 2009 (four seats, including Tibi). DFPE

came second in 2006 and 2009 with three seats and four seats, respectively, after

having won three seats and being first in 2003 (3%, including Tibi). NDA

retained its three seats (2.3%) in all three campaigns.

UAL

The clear winner in both 2006 and 2009 was the UAL but the results were

rather disappointing to the party compared with its expectations. This was not a

Figure 6. Voting for consensual and Arab parties (2006).

Israel Affairs 35

repetition of the party’s past successes in the 1996 and 1999 elections. The

following table relates to the five campaigns since the Muslim movement began

to run with the UAL (1996 and 1999 were held under the split vote system).

Since the change from the split vote back to the one vote system, the obvious

question is whether the change affected the voting patterns of Israeli Arabs. From

Table 2, it seems that neither the DFPE nor the NDA were influenced, and their

power increased in the 2003 elections. However, in 2003 the UAL lost about

50,000 votes (a fall of over 14% compared with its showing in 1999). Most of

these did not turn out to vote. Thus, the two remaining parties won the votes of

only around 12,000 former UAL voters. The rest stayed at home, mainly because

they were confused as to the future course of their party: of the five members

elected in 1999, at the end of the 15th Knesset only two remained part of the

United Arab List. Three broke with the party and declared themselves to be a

different parliamentary faction, the National Arab Party. The three came from

Consensual parties8.62%

Arab parties91.38%

Figure 7. Voting for consensual and Arab parties (2009).

Figure 8. Breakdown by Arab parties and consensual blocs (2006).

A. Bligh36

different backgrounds: one was from the ADP, one had served in the past as a

DFPE MK and the third was a member of the Muslim Movement. That make-up

was identical in nature to the composition of the UAL’s 2003 list and the personal

wrangling that followed the split threw the party’s campaign into disarray and

gave rise to a feeling among potential voters that the party was going to

disappear. The UAL’s recovery in 2006 and 2009 can be attributed primarily to

the votes of the 2003 absentees. This was the result of the fact that Tibi had joined

the list and because of the Hamas victory, as explained above. In a nutshell, the

more Arab voters there are, the more UAL votes can be expected. The lines of the

two are almost identical in Figure 10, which depicts the Arab popular vote

compared with the overall vote for Arab parties.

About 56% of eligible voters went to the polls in 2006 and of these, 37% gave

their vote to the UAL. In addition, about 53% of eligible voters went to the polls

in 2009 and of these about 40% gave their vote to the UAL. As to the main

sources of votes for the UAL, it is clear that the Bedouin population residing in

the southern part of the country is the backbone of the party; 56% of them voted

for the party in 2006 and 71% voted for the party in 2009.

Apparently, the identification of the UAL with the Muslim Movement does

not always work in the party’s favour. Umm al-Fahm is a case in point. This town

of 30,000 is the cradle of the northern faction of the Muslim Movement and home

to Sheikh Ra’id Salah, leader of the northern faction. This may partly explain the

abstention from voting; however, in 2006, 56% of eligible voters went to the polls

(about the same as the state-wide rate). Of these, 90% voted for Arab parties: 57%

for the DFPE, which for years had received a majority in the town; 22% for the

NDA; and only 11% for the UAL. In 2009 about 59% of eligible voters in Umm

al-Fahm went to the polls and of these, about 98% voted for Arab parties: 55% for

Figure 9. Breakdown by Arab parties and consensual blocs (2009).

36.01%

29.67%

24.13%

3.24%

3.14%

2.11%

0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00%

Kadima

Right wing

Left wing

NDA

DFPE

UAL

Israel Affairs 37

Tab

le2

.V

ote

by

par

tysi

nce

19

96

.

Po

pu

lar

vo

teb

yp

arty

Per

cen

tag

eo

ut

of

elig

ible

Ara

bv

ote

s

Kn

esse

t1

41

51

61

71

81

41

51

61

71

8Y

ear

19

96

19

99

20

03

20

06

20

09

19

96

19

99

20

03

20

06

20

09

UA

L8

9,5

14

11

4,8

10

65

,55

19

4,7

86

10

1,9

53

40

.88

42

.85

28

.42

37

.47

40

.09

DF

PE

12

9,4

55

87

,02

29

3,8

19

86

,09

28

4,0

18

59

.12

32

.48

40

.67

34

.04

33

.04

ND

A0

66

,10

37

1,2

99

72

,06

66

8,3

24

24

.67

30

.91

28

.49

26

.87

Ara

bv

ote

rs2

18

,96

92

67

,93

52

30

,69

92

52

,94

42

54

,29

5

A. Bligh38

the DFPE; 24% for the NDA; and 19% for the UAL. Clearly, here the association

between the Muslim Movement and UAL did not benefit the UAL. The collective

message of these voters was that they wanted to be left alone and not be identified

with a radical trend in Israeli politics.

This leads to another observation. In terms of geography, it is evident that the

farther north the voting booth is, the smaller the chance that the voters will flock to

vote for the UAL. This is not only the product of years of investment in the Bedouins

in the south. It is also the result of the isolationist tendencies of UAL, which is purely

Arab and less inclined to cooperate with other Arab parties in the Arab sector.

This does not usually translate into a lack of cooperation on the floor of parliament,

where it is necessary to present a united front in the face of uneasy relations with the

Jewish factions. The lack of cooperation is mainly reflected in the fact that, in the

past, the UAL never signed excess-votes agreements with other Arab parties, while

such agreements began to be signed between the DFPE and the NDA in 2003.11

DFPE

Breaking down the results along party lines tells a more detailed story: the

correlation between lower participation in elections and the rise in voting for

Arab parties is especially strong with regard to the UAL and the NDA; it is less

noticeable in relation to the DFPE. Several factors may explain the shrinking

appeal of the DFPE:

. The DFPE, which has been the traditional protest party since the creation

of the State of Israel, is still branded by many potential voters as an old

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

1996 1999 2003 2006 2009

UALDFPENDATotal votes

Figure 10. Arab popular vote compared with overall vote for Arab parties.

Israel Affairs 39

regime party which has no impact whatsoever on policy making in Israel or

abroad. This is in contrast with the UAL and the NDA, which have

developed avenues to the Palestinian Authority and leadership, and to

Syria, respectively.

. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the DFPE found it difficult to

chart a new path. Since it was not able to carve a new niche, its message is

seen at times as old-fashioned and obsolete. The fact that the party’s main

slogan ‘two states for two peoples’ was adopted by the ‘road map’ and is

the official Israeli approach to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

renders its ideology useless.

. Other Arab parties built their reputation on excluding Jews from their

membership and lists. The UAL is composed only of Muslims, the NDA is

composed of Muslims and Christians, but both include only Arab

members. Including Jewish candidates on a list which aspires to win Arab

votes is no longer acceptable to most Arab voters. Even though Jewish

voters give the DFPE approximately half a Knesset seat, this is not enough

to compensate for the potential loss of votes from the Arab voters.

. The DFPE failed to define its key position during the campaign. Being a

Jewish-Arab party, the DFPE was indecisive regarding the main line of its

campaign. Most Jewish voters perceived the 2006 campaign as

concentrating on social issues. The Palestinian issue, and certainly the

Lebanese situation, was almost totally absent from the Jewish public

debate. Evidently, that was not the right approach to the Arab population,

which had lost any hope that the central government would address its

social grievances. The right approach for DFPE would have been to

discuss Palestinian issues; however, as already mentioned, the DFPE had

no clear or new idea in this area.

. In spite of the causes of the decrease in voting, perhaps the most

noteworthy of which is the lack of a focused message, the DFPE has

retained stable parliamentary representation since 1999. This can be

attributed to a strong organization, which is a holdover from the past. The

party is still capable of identifying most of its potential voters and making

sure that they show up at the polling stations.

NDA

As already stated, the NDA finished third among the Arab parties. In contrast to

the DFPE, its ideas are crystal clear. It aspires to change the nature of Israel and to

merge the Arab citizens of Israel into a larger Arab nation. Though the message is

clear, the NDA is the brainchild of an eloquent academic ideologue lacking an

organizational infrastructure. Differently put, the NDA is almost the mirror

image of the DFPE. Moreover, both try to appeal to all Israeli Arabs, Christians as

well as Muslims, indirectly ignoring solidarity with their Palestinian brothers

across the Green Line or the Muslim nature of the Palestinian national movement.

A. Bligh40

Consequently, the race for parliamentary representation is not a simple three-way

competition. The NDA and DFPE are more policy-oriented parties compared to

the UAL, which is more of a popular ideological Arab Muslim Palestinian party.

Led by a Christian, the NDA is undoubtedly the antithesis to these ideas and

hence it is the first choice of many Christians in the Arab villages (see Table 3).

Moreover, the underlying tone of the party is that of a response to the Muslim

Movement. This is reflected in the inclusion of a candidate from the main power

base of the Muslim Movement in the north (Kafr Kana) on the list and his re-

selection in 2006 (Wasil Taha, b. 1952, MK since 2003).

It is perplexing to note that with the exception of the Christian villages, all

other villages in which the NDA won in 2006 are located on main Israeli roads:

the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem highway (Route 1), the Tel Aviv–Haifa road (Route 2)

and the road mainly adjacent to the Green Line that divides Israel from the

Palestinian Authority (Route 65). Since any electoral success is the result of a

concentrated effort, it is likely that these were Bishara’s focus of attention.

However, in 2009 the NDA only won the majority of the vote within the Christian

population.

Other parties

As noted, in 2009 the consensual parties continued their slide in the Arab popular

vote (from 34% in 1996 to around 21% in 2006 to less than 9% in 2009). In 2006

the Labour party, headed by a new leader known for his dovish ideas, and with a

list that included two Arab candidates, had high hopes. However, the continued

rise in voting for the Arab parties along with the abstention from voting by people

identified with the government establishment contributed to a major gap between

the hopes of the party and the final outcome. Clearly, the Labour party remained

the largest Zionist party among the Arab voters but in 2006, while the two Arab

members were elected to the House, the overall Arab vote gave the party only

about half a seat in parliament. That obviously means that the hopes reflected in

this composition of the slate of candidates were not justified and that perhaps

including more Jewish sub-sectors on the list may have brought the party better

representation in the Knesset.

A similar mistake, though in the opposite direction, was made by Kadima, a

new party established by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Part of Kadima’s

message was that it had split from the Likud in order to leave behind the

misconduct of the former ruling party. However, even though Kadima was indeed

seen by many potential Arab voters as a possible alternative to other Zionist

parties, and especially to Labour, it did not deliver. Kadima committed three

major mistakes that stripped it of any chances it had among Arab voters.

. The party did not include an Arab candidate in a slot that would potentially

lead to a Knesset seat. Lacking deep roots in the Arab sector, the party

could not convince any significant figure to get on board, while those

Israel Affairs 41

Tab

le3

.M

ino

rity

vo

teb

ysu

b-s

ecto

rs(2

00

6),

no

tin

clu

din

gm

ixed

tow

ns.

Par

tici

pat

ion

Ara

bp

arti

esC

on

sen

sual

par

ties

UA

LD

FP

EN

DA

1N

ort

her

nar

ea–

Mu

slim

loca

liti

es6

5.4

7%

87

.45

%1

2.5

5%

30

.31

%2

6.1

1%

30

.78

%2

Cen

tral

area

–ex

clu

din

gM

usl

imM

ov

emen

tlo

cali

ties

55

.23

%8

1.8

2%

18

.18

%3

7.1

3%

17

.97

%2

5.9

7%

3N

ort

her

nar

ea–

excl

ud

ing

Mu

slim

loca

liti

es5

9.3

5%

81

.71

%1

8.2

9%

25

.69

%3

2.5

3%

23

.09

%4

Cen

tral

area

–M

usl

imM

ov

emen

tlo

cali

ties

68

.49

%8

1.5

9%

18

.41

%2

9.7

8%

37

.41

%1

4.0

6%

5S

ou

ther

nar

ea–

Bed

uin

s4

4.9

7%

74

.72

%2

5.2

8%

56

.34

%7

.30

%1

0.5

3%

6Je

rusa

lem

area

52

.20

%6

4.8

7%

35

.13

%2

7.5

6%

4.9

7%

31

.41

%7

Co

asta

lse

ctio

n2

9.3

0%

63

.13

%3

6.8

7%

29

.89

%1

1.3

9%

21

.61

%8

No

rth

ern

area

–C

hri

stia

ns

56

.29

%5

6.3

0%

43

.70

%2

.85

%1

5.1

6%

38

.11

%9

No

rth

ern

area

–B

edu

ins

45

.32

%4

7.1

8%

52

.82

%2

1.4

3%

8.6

1%

16

.77

%1

0N

ort

her

nar

ea–

Ala

wit

es2

9.6

9%

14

.66

%8

5.3

4%

5.2

1%

3.5

8%

3.9

1%

11

No

rth

ern

area

–D

ruze

61

.59

%1

3.9

5%

86

.05

%0

.82

%3

.00

%9

.99

%1

2N

ort

her

nar

ea–

Cir

cass

ian

s3

9.5

3%

6.2

5%

93

.75

%3

.47

%0

.79

%1

.98

%1

3G

ola

n-D

ruze

34

.56

%0

.50

%9

9.5

0%

00

0

A. Bligh42

interested in joining would have given the list a non-central flavour, which

was not in the interest of the party.

. The party’s campaign was led by a Druze Knesset member, Majalli Whbee

(b. 1954, MK since 2003). The appointment of a Druze, let alone a former

senior officer in the Israeli Defence Forces, could not rally Israeli Arab

activists who prefer, like most of their community, not to serve in the army

and, for the most part, despise the Druze community for its full

identification and solidarity with the state.

. A line of propaganda unique to the needs and interests of the Arab

community was not developed. The party tried to win voters through

messages identical to those given the Jewish community, in spite of the

gulf that separated the two populations. As mentioned above, the 2006

campaign was about economic and social issues for Jewish voters. In the

eyes of Arab voters, it was a referendum on the status of Israeli Arabs. Had

Kadima recognized the distinction, the party could have won more votes.

Finally, the right-wing parties of the Knesset experienced a major defeat. The

former ruling party; the party of the Minister of the Interior, who controlled

municipal budgets; and other religious and Zionist parties on the right managed to

collect only about 1.5% of the total Arab vote. Oddly enough, the novelty in this

arena was the tight race between Likud under former Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu and Yisrael Beitenu, led by Avigdor Liberman, which encouraged

Israeli Arabs to leave the country or to be included within a Palestinian state in a

final resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict rather than remain included in

Israel’s sovereign territory. Thus, an Arab vote for Liberman would be

considered a strange phenomenon. The fact that some Arabs voted for Yisrael

Beitenu may suggest that, despite many statements to the contrary, a small

number of Arab Israeli citizens do believe that their homes along the border with

the Palestinian Authority should one day be included in a sovereign Palestinian

territory rather than in Israel.

The implications of the sub-sector vote

Since this article attempts to generalize about the political behaviour of Arab

voters based on detailed results, it is important to try to verify the differences

between the various sub-sectors of this population in Israel. It should be noted

that many observers find it hard not to include the Druze population within the

Arab population of Israel. It is obvious from Tables 3–5 that the Alawites (who

reside in one village on the Lebanese border), the Druze (about a dozen villages

within the sovereign territory of Israel), the Golan Druze (four villages captured

from Syria in the 1967 war) and the two Circassian villages (originally brought to

Palestine by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century; Muslims but not Arabs) do

not conform to the voting patterns of the Arab minority in any way. The

Circassians, the Alawites and the Golan Druze do not usually consider the Israeli

Israel Affairs 43

Tab

le4

.M

ino

rity

vo

teb

ysu

b-s

ecto

rs(2

00

9),

no

tin

clu

din

gm

ixed

tow

ns

(%).

Par

tici

pat

ion

Ara

bp

arti

esC

on

sen

sual

par

ties

UA

LD

FP

EN

DA

No

rth

ern

area

–M

usl

imlo

cali

ties

66

.07

96

.43

3.5

72

5.1

03

6.0

23

5.2

7C

entr

alar

ea–

excl

ud

ing

Mu

slim

Mo

vem

ent

loca

liti

es5

7.4

39

5.1

24

.88

42

.34

21

.38

31

.07

No

rth

ern

area

–ex

clu

din

gM

usl

imlo

cali

ties

57

.85

90

.99

9.0

12

8.8

23

7.3

02

4.6

4C

entr

alar

ea–

Mu

slim

Mo

vem

ent

loca

liti

es6

2.9

09

2.3

67

.64

30

.40

42

.53

19

.26

So

uth

ern

area

–B

edo

uin

s3

5.8

98

5.3

51

4.6

57

1.1

45

.00

8.9

8Je

rusa

lem

area

44

.11

79

.88

20

.12

36

.93

8.2

83

4.2

8C

oas

tal

sect

ion

30

.88

80

.36

19

.64

56

.51

11

.08

12

.49

No

rth

ern

area

–C

hri

stia

ns

46

.80

66

.88

33

.12

5.2

22

6.0

23

5.6

0N

ort

her

nar

ea–

Bed

ou

ins

40

.35

73

.11

26

.89

38

.51

14

.23

20

.12

No

rth

ern

area

–A

law

ites

22

.63

5.9

29

4.0

84

.74

01

.18

No

rth

ern

area

–D

ruze

54

.22

23

.50

76

.50

3.6

31

0.9

18

.78

No

rth

ern

area

–C

irca

ssia

ns

34

.91

11

.59

88

.41

7.4

52

.13

1.8

0G

ola

n-D

ruze

29

.30

0.4

39

9.5

70

00

A. Bligh44

Tab

le5

.C

om

par

iso

no

fm

ino

rity

vo

teb

ysu

b-s

ecto

rs(2

00

6an

d2

00

9),

no

tin

clu

din

gm

ixed

tow

ns

(%).

Par

tici

pat

ion

Ara

bp

arti

esC

on

sen

sual

par

ties

UA

LD

FP

EN

DA

No

rth

ern

Are

a–

Mu

slim

loca

liti

esþ

0.6

þ8

.98

28

.98

25

.21

þ9

.91

þ4

.49

Cen

tral

area

–ex

cludin

gM

usl

imM

ovem

ent

loca

liti

esþ

2.2

þ1

3.3

02

13

.30

þ5

.21

þ3

.41

þ5

.10

No

rth

ern

area

–ex

clu

din

gM

usl

imlo

cali

ties

21

.53

þ9

.28

29

.28

þ3

.13

þ4

.77

þ1

.55

Cen

tral

area

–M

usl

imm

ov

emen

tlo

cali

ties

25

.59

þ1

0.7

72

10

.77

þ0

.62

þ5

.12

þ5

.20

So

uth

ern

area

–B

edo

uin

s2

9.0

8þ

10

.63

21

0.6

3þ

14

.80

22

.30

21

.55

Jeru

sale

mar

ea2

8.0

9þ

15

.01

21

5.0

1þ

9.3

7þ

3.3

1þ

2.8

7C

oas

tal

sect

ion

þ1

.58

þ1

7.2

32

17

.23

þ2

6.6

22

0.3

12

9.1

2N

ort

her

nar

ea–

Ch

rist

ian

s2

9.4

9þ

10

.58

21

0.5

8þ

2.3

7þ

10

.86

22

.51

No

rth

ern

area

–B

edo

uin

s2

4.9

7þ

25

.93

22

5.9

3þ

17

.08

þ5

.62

þ3

.35

No

rth

ern

area

–A

law

ites

27

.06

28

.74

þ8

.74

20

.47

23

.58

22

.73

No

rth

ern

area

–D

ruze

27

.37

þ9

.55

29

.55

þ2

.81

þ7

.91

21

.21

No

rth

ern

area

–C

irca

ssia

ns

24

.62

þ5

.34

25

.34

þ3

.98

þ1

.34

20

.18

Go

lan

–D

ruze

25

.26

20

.07

þ0

.07

00

0

Israel Affairs 45

electoral process to be their concern. For the Golan Druze, this is understandable

since many of them do not perceive themselves as Israeli citizens and thus would

not participate in a demonstration of Israeli citizenship.

Taking these populations out of the current analysis, there are nine sub-

sectors among the potential Arab voter population that can be compared.12 One of

the most intriguing is villages ruled by Muslim Movement activists or that are

known as bases of popular support for the Movement. These are divided almost

evenly between the central and northern areas. In spite of the distance between

the two, some meaningful similarities are clear: in both areas voters flocked to the

polls giving these two sub-sectors the highest voting rate compared with all other

sub-sectors: 68% and 65% in the central and northern areas, respectively, in 2006

and 63% and 66% in 2009. However, in the central and northern Muslim locality

regions, the UAL, a coalition that included Muslim Movement representatives,

did not receive the majority of the vote in 2006 or 2009. In the central area, in

2006, the clear winner was the DFPE, which gained 37% of the vote, with the

UAL coming in a distant second with only 30%. In 2009, the DFPE gained the

most votes in both the northern and the central Muslim regions, winning almost

36% of the vote in the north and 43% of the vote in the central area. In addition, in

both cases, in 2009 the UAL had at least 10% less of the vote than the DFPE.

These figures may indicate that the Muslim Movement’s active encouragement of

its followers to vote caused their opponents to act out of fear of a Muslim

takeover of their towns and villages and vote for parties other than the UAL. The

difference between the northern and the central areas is explained by the make-up

of the villages in the north, in which there are significant numbers of Christians

who fear for their future in the case of a decisive Muslim victory and therefore

vote in large numbers for the Christian-led NDA. In the central area on the Green

Line – or the fence these days – which is also in close proximity to Jewish areas,

the more acute issue on the local agenda of Arab voters is not alienating their

Jewish neighbours, and thus risking their jobs. Having said this, it must be made

clear that job concerns do not radically change the political inclinations of this

population, as reflected in the vote for Arab parties in these areas: 87% and 82%

in the northern and central areas, respectively, in 2006 and 96% and 92% in 2009.

The Palestinian dimension of the UAL was the main reason for preferring this

party to its rivals in the towns and villages of the central area which are not

usually perceived as leaning toward the Muslim Movement. There, the UAL won

37% of the vote in 2006 and almost 42% of the vote in 2009, making it the

undisputed winner in both cases. Second in power in both 2006 and 2009 was

the NDA, which, as mentioned above, has unambiguous views regarding the

future course of relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Here the voters’

message was that they wished to elect leaders who do not seek any compromises

with the Israeli government regarding political solutions to the conflict. It is also a

non-radical Muslim message, if at all Muslim (in the case of NDA).

In four sub-sectors, the Arab parties gained more than 80% of the vote in

2006: the northern area, both in areas under Muslim influence and those not under

A. Bligh46

such influence, and in the central area where the same holds true. In 2009 in the

northern area and the central area, both in areas under Muslim influence and those

not under such influence, the Arab parties received at least 90% of the vote. In

addition, in the Southern Bedouin sector the Arab parties received over 85% of

the vote (up over 10% from 2006). However, the fact that the UAL did not win in

three of the four sectors in both 2006 and 2009 indicates that in the north, with its

Christian population, the NDA was able to build an anti-UAL, i.e. anti-Muslim

Movement, opposition; and in the central area, the DFPE filled the same slot even

in Muslim Movement areas. This resistance to the UAL was not noticeable in the

non-Muslim Movement localities in the central area, where the UAL was able to

collect 37% of the vote in 2006 and about 42% of the vote in 2009 because of its

strong Palestinian dimension. In the northern area, the non-Muslim Movement

localities are traditional strongholds of the DFPE and the party maintained its

leading position with 33% of the vote in 2006 and 37% of the vote in 2009.

Clearly, the Arab voters in the north gave their votes overwhelmingly to Arab

parties. Similar tendencies are identified in other Arab voting areas in Israel. The

most noticeable are the Bedouins of the south, dealt with extensively above.

However, combining a low turnout (45%) with a strong vote for Arab parties

(75%) in 2006 and an even lower turnout (36%) with an even stronger vote for

Arab parties (85%) in 2009 indicates a process of disinterest in the democratic

mechanism of the country together with strong alienation, as reflected in the

swing away from Zionist parties. Successive Israeli governments have praised the

high rate of Bedouins who volunteered for service in the Israeli military forces.

The election results seem to suggest that this tendency is going to slow down until

it finally stops in the near future. Similar tendencies are also present in the

Bedouin population of the northern area. This population, the backbone of the

Arab rank and file of the IDF, also had a low voting rate: 45% (similar to the

Southern Bedouins) but, unlike their southern brothers, only 47% voted for Arab

parties in 2006. However, in 2009 the Northern Bedouins had an even lower

voting rate of 40% but 73% (26% more than in 2006) of these voters voted for

Arab parties. Clearly, the alienation process has accelerated in this area.

Moving away from the Israeli consensus is also noticeable in two critical

areas: the Jerusalem area and the coastal section. Most villages in these two areas,

as mentioned above, overlook strategic highways. Here also, the picture is one of

indifference or alienation: only 29% of the eligible voters in the coastal areas cast

their votes in 2006, giving 63% to Arab parties; in addition only 31% of the

eligible voters voted in the coastal areas in 2009, giving 80% to Arab parties;

whereas in the Jerusalem area in 2006 52% voted and 65% gave their votes to

Arab parties and in 2009 44% voted and 80% gave their votes to Arab parties.

Although the voting percentage increased from 2006 to 2009 in the coastal areas,

it was only by 2% and was less than the national average. In addition, while the

vote for Arab parties increased by more than 17% from 2006 to 2009 to 80% in

this same sector, it was still less than the national Arab vote for these parties. In

Jerusalem, voting participation went down by 8% from 2006 to 2009, reflecting a

Israel Affairs 47

sense of indifference within the region. However, similar to the results in the

coastal areas, the vote for Arab parties in the Jerusalem area increased to almost

80%, but was still less than the national average. It is probable that in spite of

growing alienation, a significant minority still sees its future relations with the

Jewish neighbours as the most viable political alternative at this point.

Finally, the vote among the Arab Christians once again illustrates their

predicament as part of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people, sharing, inter

alia, its grievances along civil and political lines. Only 56% voted for Arab

parties, with the NDA, led by a Christian, gaining 38% of the vote in 2006.

However, the participation rate was equal to that of the Arab community at large

(56%). In 2009, 67% voted for Arab parties, with the NDA receiving almost 36%

of the vote.

Conclusion

If anything, the 2006 and 2009 parliamentary elections once again added a

measure of the degree of emerging alienation between the minority of Arabs

holding Israeli citizenship and the Jewish majority in Israel. It is almost self-

evident that the continued trends in the voting patterns of this particular segment

of the Israeli social and political fabric is strongly indicative of a marginalization

process that is making national elections less and less significant for this

population. This raises serious questions regarding the possible future break

between the two. These concerns are probably reflected in the fact that only

ideologically devout potential voters go to the polls and vote in large numbers for

Arab parties, which stand no chance of becoming members of any coalition

government, thus rendering their vote ineffective in terms of decision-making.

Each of the three Arab parties, as protest bodies, has carved a unique niche for

itself. Seen from this angle, they usually complement one another and only slightly

overlap. Thus, the competition among the three is actually for a small number of

potential voters not exceeding the 2006/2009 figure of 15–20,000. Consequently,

it is safe to assume that given no major changes in the make-up of the Israeli

political parties, insofar as they relate to the Arab population, all three will

continue to struggle to cross the 2% threshold necessary for representation in the

Knesset, and eventually all three will succeed. Perhaps the only party that can

avoid that traditional struggle is the UAL, which appears to be becoming the party

of the southern Bedouins who have the highest birth rate of all Israeli population

groups. Having said that, it should also be mentioned that while the Muslim

Movement is capable of bringing voters to the polling stations, it is not successful

at convincing them to vote for the UAL. That also means that the northern faction

of the Muslim Movement is unable to deter potential NDA voters from taking part

in the election, judging from the strong showing of the NDA in villages and towns

ruled by, or having strong political influence of, the Muslim Movement.

One last word concerning the vote for Zionist/consensual parties: This is a

dying phenomenon. The right-wing parties gained marginally in 2009 but, all in

A. Bligh48

all, the vote for Zionist parties is dwindling and is likely to become a poor

reminder of the past. This is probably the last and most powerful indication of the

completion of the alienation process.

Full involvement in the national political system is disappearing from the

Israeli political scene. It is gradually being replaced by three major elements:

. Municipal leadership elected in democratic elections and increased voting

in municipal elections.

. Representative national organizations.

. Civil society organizations along the lines described by Salamon and

Anheier.13

A parallel system is being developed by Israeli Arab leaders. Within this new

structure, national elections and the Knesset are viewed as marginal; they serve

mainly as a public relations arena intended to bring the Arab Israeli message to

Jewish Zionist awareness.

Judging from the evidence that stems from this examination of the 2006 and

2009 election results among Arab voters, it is possible to cautiously conclude that

the Israeli Arab political stance is less and less a part of the general Israeli

political culture.

Notes on contributor

Alexander Bligh is Associate Professor of Middle East Studies at Ariel University Centreand director of its Centre for Middle East Studies.

Notes

1. As’ad Ghanem and Muhammad Mustafa, “The Palestinians in Israel and the 2006Knesset Elections: Political and Ideological Implications of Election Boycott,” HolyLand Studies 6, no. 1 (2007): 51–73.

2. Many more pertinent elements will not be analysed here due to the limit on the lengthof the paper. A sample of these studies: Orit Ichilov, “Pride in One’s Country andCitizenship Orientations in a Divided Society: The Case of Israeli Palestinian Araband Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Jewish Israeli Youth,” Comparative EducationReview 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 44–61; Yossi Yonah, “Israel as a MulticulturalDemocracy: Challenges and Obstacles,” Israel Affairs 11, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 95–116; Majid al-Haj, “Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of thePalestinians in Israel and the Territories,” Israel Affairs 11, Issue 1 (Winter 2005):183–206; Amal Jamal, “The Ambiguities of Minority Patriotism: Love forHomeland versus State among Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” Nationalism andEthnic Politics 10, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 433–71; Muhammad Amara and Izhak Schnell,“Identity Repertoires among Arabs in Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and MigrationStudies 30, no. 1 (January 2004): 175–193; Hillel Frisch, “Positions and Attitudes ofIsraeli Arabs Regarding the Arab World, 1990–2001,” Middle Eastern Studies 39,Issue 4 (October 2003): 99–120; Amal Jamal, “Beyond ‘Ethnic Democracy’: StateStructure, Multicultural Conflict and Differentiated Citizenship in Israel,” NewPolitical Science 24, no. 3 (September 2002): 411–31.

Israel Affairs 49

3. http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa¼2011111014. Consult http://www1.cbs.gov.il/ts for the Israeli official figures.5. Alexander Bligh, “The Intifada and the New Political Role of the Israeli Arab

Leadership,” Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (January 1999): 134–64.6. Avraham Sela, “Politics, Identity and Peacemaking,” Israel Studies 10 (Summer

2005): 15–71; Muhammad Amara and Izhak Schnell, “Identity Repertoires amongArabs in Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (2004): 175–193”;Alexander Bligh, “The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position ofthe Israeli Arab Leadership,” Israel Affairs 9 (January 2003): 290–308; RamziSuleiman, “Perception of the Minority’s Collective Identity and Voting Behaviour:The Case of the Palestinians in Israel,” Journal of Social Psychology 142 (December2002): 753–66.

7. Jamal, “The Ambiguities.”8. Dr. As’ad Ghanem and Muhammad Mustafa, “The Palestinians in Israel and the

2006 Knesset Elections: Political and Ideological Implications of Election Boycott,”Holy Land Studies 6, no. 1 (2007): 51–73.

9. Falk, Richard. “Azmi Bishara, the right of resistance, and the Palestinian ordeal.”Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 19; Fraser, Abigail, and AviShabat. “Between Nationalism and Liberalism: The Political Thought of AzmiBishara.” Israel Affairs 9, nos. 1&2 (Autumn/Winter 03): 16-36; Diskin, Abraham.“Israel.” European Journal of Political Research 47, no. 7/8 (November 2008):1019–1024; Ram, Uri. “Tensions in the “Jewish Democracy”: The ConstitutionalChallenge of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel.” Constellations: An InternationalJournal of Critical & Democratic Theory 16, no. 3 (September 2009): 523–536.

10. See, for example, Supreme Court cases 50/03; 651/03; .11225/0311. Any party is entitled to add the votes it received beyond the qualifying threshold that

is not sufficient for a whole seat to another competing party on condition that thereceiving party got more votes than the donating.

12. Kennedy, R. S. “The Druze of the Golan: a case of non-violent resistance.” Journalof Palestine Studies 13 ii, no. 50 (1984): 48–64; Kirrish, Fadwa N. “Druze ethnicityin the Golan Heights: the interface of religion and politics.” Journal, Institute ofMuslim Minority Affairs 13, no. 1 (1992): 122–135; Hajjar, Lisa. “Making identitypolicy: Israel’s interventions among the Druze.” Middle East Report 200, no. 26(1996): 2–6;10; “A would-be happy link with Syria.” Economist 390, no. 8619(February 21, 2009): 48–49.

13. Lester M. Salaman and Helmut K. Anheier, Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-national Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

A. Bligh50

Copyright of Israel Affairs is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple

sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print,

download, or email articles for individual use.