Robust Realism: mind-independent
normative facts exist
Argument for Objectivity:
Impartiality is required in moral
cases, thus morality is objective
Analogy Argument for Existence:
Normative facts are indispensable for
deliberation
Robust Realism:mind-independent
normative facts exist
Argument for Objectivity:
Impartiality is required in moral
cases, thus morality is objective
Analogy fails &mind-independencedoes not follow
Analogy Argument for Existence:
Normative facts areindispensable for
deliberation
Why does a vindication of ‘existence’ differ from a vindication ‘mind-independence’?
3
How does deliberation differ from explanation?2
What does Enoch’s argument rely on?1
If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are epistemically justified in believing that it exists.
The deliberative project is intrinsically indispensable
Irreducibly normative truths are instrumentally indispensable to the deliberative project
So, we are epistemically justified in believing that there are irreducibly normative truths.
P3
P1
P2
C
Objection IIClarification &
Objection I
Instrumentally indispensable
something that cannot be eliminated from an activity without undermining
the very purpose of the activitye.g.
Intrinsically indispensable
some activity that is rationally non-optional
e.g.
If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are epistemically justified in believing that it exists.
Breathing ExplanationMr X /
Scotland YardElectron
belief in existence is vindicated
If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are epistemically justified in believing that it exists.
Explanation
If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are epistemically justified in believing that it exists.
Explanation
Deliberation
X
belief in existence is vindicated
Plenty of differences between, say, electrons and normative facts!
If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are epistemically justified in believing that it exists.
But: in both explanation and deliberation, the
category of ‘being the best ‘gap-filler’’ is
similar – that a gap exists in the
first place matters, not what specifically fills the
gap.
X
„[…] can you think of any reason for grounding ontological commitment in explanatory indispensability that is not really
more general, a reason for grounding ontological commitment in indispensabilities of other kinds as well?“ (Enoch 2011:55)
Why does a vindication of ‘existence’ differ from a vindication ‘mind-independence’?
3
How does deliberation differ from explanation?2
What does Enoch’s argument rely on?1
Why does a vindication of ‘existence’ differ from a vindication ‘mind-independence’?
3
How does deliberation differ from explanation?2
What does Enoch’s argument rely on?1
Even if …
1. there is reliable data to ‘latch on to’2. there is one correct answer to fill the gap3. the sole aim of deliberation is to
reach an answer
…. it is not the case that ‘existence’ needs to be ‘mind-independence’
some reliableinput
Deliberation
X
Robust Realism: mind-independent
normative facts exist
Argument for Objectivity:
Impartiality is required in moral
cases, thus morality is objective indispensable for
deliberation
Analogy fails &mind-independencedoes not follow
• Abstract: David Enoch (2011) analyses why belief in non-observables like electrons is justified. He concludes that it is justified, because the explanatory project, of which science is a part, is indispensable for human beings and that the project essentiality for human nature justifies inference to the best explanation as a valid belief forming method. Further, and more controversially, he proposes that human deliberation qualifies as an intrinsic project, too. In turn, belief in certain normative properties, deemed to be indispensable for the deliberative project, is also justified by inference to the best explanation.
• In my presentation, I want to investigate the differences between the deliberative and the explanatory project, by directly engaging with Enoch’s (2011) argument. I argue two points. First, the explanatory project and the deliberative project are substantially different. The argument from similar cases should not be applied in the case of deliberation and explanation. Second, it is one thing to argue for the significance of deliberation for human beings, but quite another to infer that the indispensable subject matter of such deliberation are ‘irreducibly normative truths’. These considerations spell trouble for Enoch’s argument. Explanation is about potentially verifiable objects, which is not the case in deliberating about normative facts. Thus, I conclude, even the most unyielding deliberation might not justify belief in irreducibly normative truths.
1. Explanation and deliberation are not analogous in a relevant way.
• Instrumental indispensability is fitting for explanation, because it explains a gap
• there is no gap in deliberation
• at least, the vindication of existence is not clearly vindicated.
• But enoch should present his case stronger, as I do. But it seems that we do in fact deliberate for other reasons than that we explicate.
2. Vindication of existence is not vindication of mind-independence.
• no part of the explanation/deliberation story suggests nature of facts
• mind-independece is not thereby argued for