Paper presented to the American Evaluation Association Conference 27 October 2012, Minneapolis, USA
DOI: 10.13140/2.1.3273.5043
Understanding the subjective: eliciting hidden meaning David Roberts
Abstract Understanding the subjective is the key to understanding people’s interactions within a program. However, the subjective tends to be ‘hidden’ especially in the ‘objective’ environment of evaluation interviews. David Roberts has been using projective techniques to reveal the ‘hidden’ subjective meanings for more than 20 years. This paper presents research that explores how an understanding of participants’ cognitive processes might assist us to assess the validity of interview techniques. Extensive debriefing of people who had participated in a photo-‐elicitation exercise showed that their responses and answers were derived from abstract generalizations (or ‘typifications’) and developed afterwards by rationalization. The participants used such typifications to help them to think about the subject of the activity. Identifying the participants’ typifications revealed information about their attitudes towards the topic. Such attitudes are not a predictor of behaviour but may influence, and hence help to explain, their interactions.
Introduction Many evaluators and social researchers treat participants’ reports of behaviour and attitudes as relatively unproblematic. There is an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption (Krosnik personal communication; Tourangeau 1987) that what a person ‘Says About’ a phenomenon in a research context is generally a reasonably accurate reflection of that person’s attitude and behaviour outside the research context.
However, evaluations and social research throw up many examples of differences between what people ‘Say About’ (themselves and their experiences) and what they ‘Do’ (Bell and Buchanan 1966; Brown and Gilmartin 1969; Bryan et al 2009; Dillman 1978; Phillips 1972; Strack & Martin 1987; Schwarz 1987; Tourangeau 1987). An individual will also express different attitudes and descriptions in different interviews (Holloway & Jefferson 2003; Jakobsen 2012; Mannay 2010) and in different surveys (Bryan et al 2009; Dillman 1978; Strack & Martin 1987; Tourangeau 1987).
Moreover, we can all think of many occasions when what individuals ‘Say About’ phenomena, particularly when talking about themselves, is different from what they do.
“I’m going to tell that bully what I think of her!” or even “I told him!”
“I only buy healthy food for my kids.” from a woman with a large case of diet cola in her shopping trolley.
Reports about what people saw or heard are also problematic. Any policeman, court, or lawyer will also tell you that people are very unreliable witnesses. Eyewitness identification of suspects is at best only 50% accurate (Brewer 2012). We generally do NOT report events accurately, even less so when it comes to our own behaviour.
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Projective Techniques In order to address the difference between what we SAY and what we DID or SAW, Haire (1950) borrowed projective techniques from psychology and applied them in market research.
Since then a wide range of projective techniques have been used in evaluation and research (Boddy 2008; Catterall & Ibbotson 2000; Donoghue 2000). Such techniques appear to provide information about the subjective factors that influence behaviour: and hence provide useful insights for evaluators and researchers (Catterall & Ibbotson 2000; Durgee 1988; Jenkins et al 2010; Mannay 2010).
The most common techniques are: ‘picture drawing’ (Mannay 2010, Roberts 2005); Sentence Completion (Jacques 2005); vignettes – story completion (Jenkins et al 2010); photo-‐elicitation (Hurworth ); Thematic Apperception Testing (Donoghue 2000; Jacques 2005); Role Playing (Jacobsen 2012; Jacques 2005); and various forms of association, seeking an immediate response to a stimulus (e.g. words or pictures) (Donoghue, 2000; Jacques 2005).
How do projective techniques work? There are differences between the techniques but they all present participants with a task: e.g. respond to a stimulus, finish a story, act a role. The tasks all have significant elements that are not defined or are ambiguous (Boddy 2008; Donoghue 2000). The absence of concrete information presented to participants appears to require the participant to make sense of the situation and complete the task using their personal knowledge (Catterall & Ibbotson 2000; Kay et al 2008).
Common sense supports the idea that participants use their personal knowledge to complete the task but there is little research in this area. Indeed, there is very little research into any aspect of how projective techniques work (Boddy 2008; Catterall & Ibbotson 2000; Donghue 2000). Unanswered questions include: How do projective techniques work? Why do they sometimes provide different answers to direct questions? Are people lying when there is a difference between what they SAY and what they DO? How can we assess the value of data provided by different evaluation interviews?
Some writers have speculated that classic psychological projection provides the mechanism for projective techniques (Boddy 2008; Donoghue 2000). In this model participants ‘project’ aspects of their personality, attitudes and feelings onto the task; and projection is a defence mechanism that reduces the stress of discussing difficult personal issues. However, there is very little empirical support for the classical theory of projection (Lillienfield et al, 2007). Such a theory is also very difficult to prove or disprove: and offers very few answers to the questions posed in the paragraph above.
Automatic Behaviour and Schema Fortunately, cognitive science, education theory and phenomenology independently provide some clues as to what might be happening in evaluation interviews and surveys (Bodenhausen & Wyer 1987; Hastie 1987; Schutz 1967; Tourangeau 1987). There is very good evidence that our behaviour and thinking is predominantly automatic and below conscious awareness (Kahneman 2011). Such automatic behaviour is rooted in
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our emotions not rationality (Damasio 2008).1 More importantly, this automatic thinking cannot be turned off and exists even when we are consciously and explicitly thinking (Damasio 2008; Kahneman 2011).
In fact very little of our thinking is explicit, conscious thought.2 Instead, for most of our behaviour we respond without conscious thought using mental shortcuts (described variously by Bartlett 1932; Bodenhausen & Wyer 1987; Hastie 1987; Kahneman 2011; Schutz 1967; Tourangeau 1987).3 There are a wide variety of names for such mental shortcuts: ‘heuristics’ (Bodenhauser & Wyer 1987:9-‐10, 21, 28; ), ‘scripts’, ‘frames’ and ‘concepts’ (Tourangeau 1987:154). I will use the term ‘schema’ (plural ‘schemata’) because it has the longest history and broadest application (Bartlett 1932; Conway & Holmes 2005; Hastie 1987; Hitch 2005; Schutz 1967).
Schemata help us manage our world without having to consciously think about such things as how far and how fast to turn the steering wheel so our car goes round the curve (Gladwell 2005); or to speak without considering what we want to say. In any particular situation, our brains provide us with an automatic behaviour, a response, or a ‘recipe for action’ (Schutz 1967) for that situation. Our responses are subjective in that they come from within and are not based on rational thought.
However, schemata are more than simple behavioural responses, they also contain implicit knowledge (assumptions) that allows us to make sense of our situation. Such implicit knowledge is generalised and abstract (Brewer 1987; Rutherford 2005) and it informs and underlies our thinking and speech in that situation (Quenza 2005; Schutz 1967). A schema constrains what details are recalled from memory (McVee et al 2005; Hick 2005; Schutz 1944). Schemata mediate our interactions with the world; what we perceive and how we respond. 4
There is of course a role for conscious reflection. We may choose to test our assumptions and consciously consider alternatives, solve problems and so on. However, our ability to do so is limited (Fischer et al 2008) and our conscious thinking is constrained by the assumptions we are not testing and the memories that can be recalled within the active schemata (Damasio 2008; Kahneman 2011).5
If schemata are present in all our thinking and action, are they present in evaluation interviews? If so, the information presented in evaluation interviews needs to be analysed to identify the schema that is operating, at what level of consciousness and 1 Hence the title of Damasio’s book ‘Descartes’ Error’. ‘Cogito ergo sum’ (“I think therefore I am’) is a fallacy. Fundamentally we are emotional animals not rational beings. 2 It takes far too much effort to question our assumptions and think about what we are doing (Fischer et al 3 The evidence for the use of such mental shortcuts is among the strongest in cognitive science. 4 There is a range of different conceptions of schema (Quenza 2005). At one end schemata are seen as relatively mechanistic, static cognitive structures and at the other end they are seen as fluid, dynamic structures that develop and respond to experiences and interactions underlie all thinking and influence all information processing. The evidence supports the more dynamic formulation (Bartlett 1932; McVee et al 2005; Quenza 2005; Rutherford 2005).
Schema can also be embedded within each other to form multi-layered schemata (McVee et al 2005). 5 One implication of the psychological and cognitive research is that even ‘thoughtful’ ‘considered’ answers may be predicated on the active schemata and the knowledge available within that schema. However, that is a matter for further research.
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how and when that schema might be activated in other situations. The answers to such questions require an extended program of research.
This study is preliminary research only to test whether schemata operate in a projective technique and to explore some ideas about how we might analyse such data.
Methods The research consisted of eight cognitive interviews with experienced evaluators. Each interview had two parts: an ‘originating interview’ and a ‘debrief.’ In the originating interview I used a technique known as Thematic Apperception Testing (or TAT) (Donoghue 2000; Jacques 2000)6 , though I prefer to see it as a variation of photo-‐elicitation (Hurworth 2005). The technique was chosen to provide a null hypothesis because it encouraged participants to use a schema. I argue if could not see evidence of schema using this technique then the theory of schema probably does not apply.
The reason I chose experienced evaluators was I believed their experience of interviews would make them less susceptible to using schema and they would provide valuable insights in the cognitive debrief process.
Each participant was shown a range of 16 portrait photographs (See Figure 1). Each participant was asked to select one photograph that represented the person who had commissioned an evaluation and was most likely to use the results of the evaluation well: and an evaluation commissioner who was least likely to make good use of the evaluation. Each participant was then asked to describe the two persons represented in the photographs and how those persons would behave when they received an evaluation report.
Figure 1. Example of photograph
6 The term ‘Thematic Apperception Testing’ is misleading in this context (cf. psychology) because its use in evaluations, market research and social research is not ‘testing’ in any meaningful sense of the term.
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Each interview was videoed. After a short break at the conclusion of each interview7 the video was used to conduct a cognitive debrief with the participant (Beatty & Willis 2007). 8 The video was replayed on a laptop computer. I moved so I was sitting next to the participant and we could watch the video together. I stopped the video at different points to ask the participant what s/he had been thinking or how s/he had made the judgements expressed in the interview. I also instructed the participant to stop the video whenever they wanted to discuss what was happening in the interview. The cognitive interview was also videoed.
Results Some participants selected the two photographs in less than 20 seconds. Other participants sometimes appeared to take some time to settle on the two portrait photographs. However, in the debrief six participants reported either that they actually made the decision very quickly (in seconds) and then spent some time ‘testing’ the judgement, or that they had very quickly narrowed the decision down to one or two photographs.
7 The break was necessary to load the video onto the computer so it could be replayed: and I usually offered the participant a drink in the break. The combination of the break, the change in my position were all designed to create a different context and minimize the influence of the previous interview context on the cognitive interview. 8 The use of video offered me the opportunity to conduct the originating interview without disruption and to recreate graphically for the participant what actually happened in the originating interview, rather than relying on the participants’ memory of the interview (cf. Beatty & Willis 2007).
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Some participants selected the same portraits as each other but generally they chose different portraits. In two instances, a portrait selected as ‘best’ commissioner of an evaluation by one participant was selected as the ‘worst’ by another participant.
The participants’ rationales for selecting the photographs were often phrased as intuitive judgements (“I felt …”): and explained in terms of specific, sometimes very subtle, attributes of the portrait. For example, it was suggested that the man portrayed in Figure 1 had limited ability or desire to pay attention to the report or to what the evaluator had to say. Phrases used to describe him included: ‘limited bandwidth’; ‘busy’ and ‘the computer is a barrier.’ Comments about the ‘best commissioner’ similarly referred to subtle cues in the portrait. For example, a photograph of a woman on a park bench was reportedly selected because ‘she is relaxed’; ‘wearing a casual jacket’; ‘I felt a connection’; and the setting was characterised as ‘away from distractions’. One participant also referred to the physical attractiveness of the person portrayed in the photograph.
One participant reported that she had a specific set of characteristics in mind when choosing the photograph and saw them in the photographs. However the characteristics were quite subtle. One portrait was selected because it reminded her of a person of a different gender. In fact most participants reported that the selection (and later the description) was based on details that reminded them of one or more of their own personal experiences. In some cases, one experience with a strong emotional impact drove the selection. In other cases participants reported that it was an amalgam of repeated experiences: and in other cases the participants’ referred to recent experiences.
When asked to describe the behaviour and motives of the person depicted in the photograph, some participants expressed discomfort at ‘stereotyping’. Nevertheless they all did as they were asked and described the character and behaviour of the person portrayed in the photograph. The descriptions were quite specific and included comments on attitudes and management style. Most participants picked up the photograph of the person they were describing and pointed to details in the photograph that supported the participant’s interpretation of the portrayed person’s behaviour.
Similarly, in the cognitive debrief all participants referred to specific details in the photograph to support their descriptions of behaviour.
Discussion It is important to note that there was reasonable variation between participants in the selection of photographs. Even when participants described similar characteristics they usually chose different photographs to represent the persons described. The sample is too small to draw any definite conclusions but there is no evidence that there might be a shared understanding of what the two ‘types’ of people might look like: or indeed, that some quality intrinsic to a photograph stimulated the participants’ selection of that photograph. Instead each participant appears to have had their own individual interpretation of what characteristics most closely represented the ‘types’ they were asked to select.
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Selection from implicit knowledge Participants were asked to select two portraits from an array of 16 photographs. Each photograph contained an enormous amount of detail. Yet the initial judgements, on which the selections were based, were made very quickly. When asked to explain their judgements, the participants referred to subtle similarities between the portrait and participants’ and experiences of ‘people like that’. Importantly, the experiences cited were all salient experiences though the reason for such saliency varied.
The participants could not possibly have been consciously aware of all the details in each photograph in the time they took to make those judgements. Nor did they need to do so. Instead the participants used implicit knowledge to make those judgements (see Damasio 2005; Kahneman 2011; Rutherford 2005; Schutz 1967).
Such judgements were an expression of their subjective understandings about ‘people like that:’ about types of people. In this case, the type of person is a group of people who is not like the participant. Schutz (1967) talks about such types as the ‘generalised other’ or ‘They’: people who are known to exist but who are believed to have a set of understandings different from oneself. 9 The participants in this research used such typifications because it allowed them to respond to the task they had been given.
The participants’ responses to their task occurred before explicit thinking. They are part of a class of thinking (and behaviour) known variously as ‘pre-‐suppositional” (Mead 1912); ‘pre-‐phenomenal’ and ‘pre-‐predicative’ (Schutz 1967) and ‘System 1’ thinking (Kahneman 2011). Such responses are ‘Doing’ in the present moment (now) and in the current context (here).10
In other words the selection process had all the characteristics of schema thinking. Participants identified a ‘type’ very quickly based on very little information and sometimes very subtle cues (posture, situation, etc.). The participants could only have made the judgements using implicit knowledge (subjective perceptions), they simply did not have time to consciously reflect on all the details in the all the portraits. The knowledge they used to make the judgements was what Schutz (1967) called a ‘typification,’ generalised knowledge (in this case about people) of a type.
Description developed in interview The descriptions people gave of the person represented in the photograph had a different quality. In the descriptive stage of the interview, participants looked at the
9 Other techniques and interviews trigger may trigger other orientations. Jenkins et al (2010) suggest that vignettes may lead to a participant placing himself or herself in the position of the protagonist (a ‘person like me’) and then use that knowledge to complete the story. However, if the participant does not identify with the circumstances of the protagonist, they may not see themselves as similar to the protagonist.
Jenkins et al (2010) uses Schutz’s (1967) notion of ‘Thou’ to explain how participants relate to the protagonist in a vignette. For Schutz (1967) a ‘Thou’ orientation occurs when a person is aware of another but the other is unaware of them. Jenkins et al (2010) argues both that such a situation pertains in a vignette: and that the participant places himself or herself in the position of the protagonist. I think the two orientations are incompatible. In any case I think it is more informative to recognize that the participants may see the protagonist as a ‘person like me’ and at other times might see a protagonist as a ‘person I know’, or even as a ‘They’ a ‘person like that.’ 10 ‘Doing’ can be contrasted with Talcott Parsons’ notion of ‘Action’ as intentional and explicit behavior.
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interviews to find and refer to details that supported their initial judgements. Some of the participants indicated that they had used their existing judgements as the basis for developing their descriptions and that they developed their descriptions in the course of the interview. I suspect that all participants did so.
The idea that the descriptions are socially constructed in interviews is a fundamental tenet of post-‐modernist thinking (Kvale 1996; Schostak 2006). There is strong evidence from other fields to support such a notion. Brockmeier (2010) shows that memory is not like a data store where specific information is waiting to be retrieved: instead memory is constructed when it is needed. Specific memories are constructed from generalised memories and the details filled in as needed for the specific context (Rutherford 2005).11 Analysis of video ethnography and interviews also supported the notion that explicit description is constructed at the time it is required (Knoblauch & Schnettler 2012; Mondada 2012). Schwarz and Hippler (1987) show that respondents glean information about social norms from the questions asked and then use that information to construct their responses. In other words conscious, or explicit, thinking and memory are constructed in the moment; and follow on and may be based on the initial schema (Hitch 2005; Kahneman 2011; Schutz 1967).12
Different Thinking Systems It seems clear that there were two distinct ways of thinking reflected in the interview. In the selection of photographs, the participants were responding before explicit thinking. They were expressing subjective perceptions and using implicit knowledge to make the judgements about which photographs to choose.
In the descriptive part of the originating interview, participants ‘talked about’ two different ‘people like that’. They were consciously reflecting on the judgements they had already made and ‘rationalising’ their judgements. In doing so they were treating the phenomena they were describing as cognitive objects and manipulating those objects in their conscious thinking (Kahneman 2011). The participants assumed a particular orientation towards those others as ‘They’ (Jenkins et al 2010; Schutz 1944; 1967). The explicit conversations about ‘They’ occurred separately from, but used as a base, the subjective responses elicited in the selection phase of the interview.
Nature of data What then is the nature and value of the data obtained in this research. The data tells us nothing about the people represented as ‘They’. It only tells us:
• what decisions the participants made about ‘They’ and • what the participants ‘Say’ they perceived about ‘They’ at that moment in the
context of the interview.
11 One can of course probe and foster more detailed recall by using associations (Geiselman et al 2003). It is not at all clear how the detailed memories are stored or retrieved but it is clear that such recall is secondary to the immediate generalized memory. 12 This is not to suggest that individuals cannot go beyond the initiating schema when they think explicitly. In fact we clearly can and do (Kahneman 2011). However our ability to question assumptions and test the underlying schema is severely constrained and we tire quickly when we do such mental work (Fischer et al 2005; Kahneman 2011)
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The first is about what participants ‘DID’ and the second is what they ‘SAID.’ There may in fact be layers of both implicit and explicit thinking between what the participants DID and what they SAID. There can be a distinction between what people think explicitly and what they express to a particular audience (e.g. Briggs 1986; Jakobsen 2102; Kvale 1996; Schostak 2006).13 Even in surveys, people will exaggerate or enhance the image they present (Fisher 1993; Jakobsen 2012; Tourangeau & Yan 2007). What people “Say” is mediated by the presentation of self and the social context (Jakobsen 21012; Mead 1912; Kvale 1996; Schostak 2006). Though interestingly Fisher (1993) shows that projective techniques reduce social desirability bias on issues that relate to social outcomes.
Multiple stocks of knowledge The expressed presentations are not necessarily deliberate misrepresentations but a consequence of our limited capacity for conscious thought (Hicks 2005).
“We are aware of only a few ideas at once” (Hastie 1987:53)
As a result we are often unaware of the differences and contradictions between behaviours and memories (Bodenhausen & Wyer 1987; Rutherford 2005). We can and do hold and express a number of quite different and contradictory attitudes and opinions (Tourangeau 1987). Our ‘knowledge’ of ourselves and the world around us is,
“… not homogenous; it is (1) incoherent, (2) only partially clear, and (3) not at all free from contradictions.” (Schutz, 1944:500)
In other words one cannot assume that what an individual ‘Says’ in one context is consistent with what that person might ‘Say’ in another context, or that it is likely to be consistent with what they might ‘Do.’ Indeed, if one accepts that ‘Doing’ is situational (Mead 1912) one cannot even assume that behaviour will be consistent across contexts.
Behavioural Preferences However, it is a truism of psychology that the best indicator of a person’s behaviour is that person’s past behaviour, especially when that person is under pressure and has little time to consciously choose or modify their behaviour. People tend to repeat behaviours across different contexts. If so, one might ask if those behavioural preferences are the result of certain schemata being preferred.
For evaluators, the question might become ‘How can we identify preferred schema?’ ‘What techniques are most likely to reveal such preferred schema?’
Conclusion This preliminary research indicates that participants exhibited two different thinking systems in the interview. The choice of photograph portraits has the characteristics of schema thinking. Participants used implicit knowledge or intuition to make the selections. In the second phase of the interview participants developed an explicit explanation of their selections. The explicit knowledge was created in the interview and developed from the implicit knowledge reflected in the original judgement.
13 Jakobsen (2012) cogently argues that people make different representations in different types of social context, especially when being asked to make judgements
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Both systems of thinking related to a ‘generalised other’ a ‘They’. The participants’ had no information about the person depicted in the photograph. Nevertheless the participants’ ascribed characteristics and behaviour to that ‘person’ based on the participants’ experience of other people. Such data tells us very little about how those others’ might behave but it does provide information about how the participants’ perceive such ‘others.’
The study suggests that understanding how participants generate answers to questions is an important step in understanding and analysing the information provided in evaluation interviews.
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