THE MINISTRY OF DRY TAPS?THE DEPARTMENT OF WATERAFFAIRS AND FORESTRY AND THETRANSITION TO MARKET-BASEDSERVICE PROVISION IN SOUTHAFRICA1
Stephen Louw Department of Political StudiesUniversity of the Witwatersrand
e-mail: [email protected]
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ABSTRACT
This article considers critically the underlying premises of the commu
nity water supply and sanitation programme. Although subject to
increasing criticism from a wide range of ideological perspectives, the
conceptual foundations of this policy are sound and compatible with
broader macroeconomic restructuring worldwide. Furthermore, the
emphasis on community participation is a welcome, albeit tentative,
shift towards the empowerment of previously marginalised commu
nities, both in terms of their own ability to help shape development
projects initiated in their name, and in terms of their evolving
relationship to local government. However, for ostensibly political
reasons, the South African government has tended to bypass community
structures and has emphasised rapid delivery at the expense of
sustainability. This suggests that it is not as committed to its own policy
as might reasonably be expected.
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INTRODUCTION: THE `IMPLEMENTATION GAP'
Since 1994, the ability of the South African government to implement its
ambitious development and reconstruction programmes has been sorely, and at
times somewhat embarrassingly, lacking. In terms of general macroeconomic
policy, the overnight abandonment of the highly statist Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP, the ANC's election programme in 1994) in
Politeia Vol 22 No 1 2003 pp 93 118
93
favour of the more market orientated Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) strategy served only to highlight government's own concerns about its
inability to implement core policy, a development exacerbated by recent
admissions about the inability of many state departments to spend (or even
account for) their annual budgets.2 This `implementation gap', that is, this divide
between policy commitment, implementation and ultimate delivery has contributed enormously towards an erosion of (foreign and domestic) confidence in
the South African economy, a loss that the fledging post apartheid economy was
ill prepared to deal with, and which was, in large measure, the ultimate driving
force behind the dramatic `collapse' in the value of the South African rand in
2001.
In all three spheres of government, growing capacity shortcomings pose a
fundamental obstacle to the implementation of policy. In the short term at least,
these problems are likely to be enhanced by a dramatic restructuring of local
government structures and core personnel in the wake of the demarcation of new
municipal structures and the November 2000 local government elections. Coupledto this, the Mbeki government's tendency to politicise the civil service and to
replace or undermine actively independent minded directors general and senior
civil servants, suggests that party loyalty outweighs line function expertise as a
criterion for appointment,3 a development bound to impact negatively on the
ability of the South African government to deliver services and fulfil its
development obligations.
In many cases, government shortcomings are not specifically the fault of bad
policy. On the contrary, well thought out and widely respected policies often fall
flat in the face of capacity shortcomings, as well as the inconsistent support that
they receive from government. An obvious example of this is South Africa'spolicies on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syn
drome (HIV/Aids), widely regarded as amongst the most proactive and
progressive in the world, but negated in large measure by the president's
incredulous views on the HIV's link to Aids. Another example of arbitrary
interference in established policy is the ANC's promise in the 2000 local
government elections by the ANC to provide 6 000 litres of `free' water per
household a month ± a promise that threatens to negate completely (literally
overnight) almost all policy developed for the community water sector since
1994, with all the obvious implications that this has for delivery.4
This last point leads to the core focus of this article: the implementation ofpolicy by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). Here it is clearly
possible to speak of an `implementation gap', namely, a `gap' between the
generally well received Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme and
its somewhat chequered implementation. The focus here is specifically on
community water supply programmes, that is to say, programmes aimed at
providing basic supplies of potable water to poor, primarily rural and peri urban
communities. In nearly all cases, this involves pumping water from a local water
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94
source to a reservoir located in or near the community and then articulating this
water from the reservoir to standpipes located at strategic places within the
community.5 Importantly, and in contrast to the approach taken in other
developing economies, the emphasis here is entirely on the provision of water for
household consumption. No provision is made for agricultural water.
Focusing specifically on the Community Water Supply and Sanitation
Programme, we suggest that policy developed under Minister Kader Asmal's
tenure has the ability to improve the lives of the rural poor meaningfully, and,
albeit in small measure, to strengthen the institutional capacity of otherwise
marginalised communities. However, for the most part, projects set up to deliver
water to peri urban and rural communities have proved to be unsustainable, and it
is this `gap' between policy and implementation, that needs careful consideration.
As is the case with the GEAR macroeconomic policy ± whose underlying
philosophy is shared by the Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme
± we suggest that the South African government's commitment to the
implementation of its core policy commitments is ambiguous, crippled in large
measure by the vicissitudes of political populism as well as critical institutional
and human capacity shortcomings. In the case of community water and
sanitation, this reluctance fully to embrace the paradigm within which policy is
framed has had a devastating impact on delivery. Although the government
denies this, the promise of `free water' is clearly a palliative measure designed to
mask this failure.
Part One of this article introduces the controversy surrounding the performance
of DWAF since 1994. In Part Two we focus and, for the most part, defend
DWAF's policy on community based rural and peri urban water projects. Part
Three then considers briefly some of the capacity problems and political
shortcomings affecting implementation of these policies, after which a brief
conclusion is offered.
PART ONE
1.1 Kader Asmal's `disaster': 1994 to 1999
Prior to 1994, water and sanitation provision reflected the peculiar class and racial
character of power in South Africa. Rural and designated `black areas' were
largely under serviced, if they were serviced at all, contributing to a huge disparity
in access to basic resources. An estimated 12 million South Africans did not have
access to safe drinking water, whilst 20,5 million South Africans did not have
access to adequate sanitation facilities.6 Overcoming such disparities is one of the
greatest challenges facing the nascent democracy in South Africa. Not only does
this require redressing past imbalances, but, significantly, it presupposes the
development of an institutional and social environment propitious for sustainable
water service delivery. These two imperatives, which might loosely be dubbed
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political and socio economic respectively, rest together uneasily. For the student of
political transition, the way in which they articulate provides useful insight into
both the immediate and long term priorities of the South African government, as
well as the tensions within the ruling state apparatus. Clearly, focusing on
delivery offers (short term) political gains, whilst the creation of an environment
likely to promote sustainability is likely to have greater (long term) impact on the
broader socio economic basis of peri urban and rural communities. Worldwide,
electoral and developmental imperatives rest uncomfortably with one another and
South Africa is no exception. The ability of the post apartheid state to juggle these
imperatives and to satisfy at least the basic developmental needs of its populace
(in this case, the previously marginalised and disenfranchised), whilst at the
same time transforming more fundamentally and promoting a sustainable socio
economic basis for service delivery, is one of the key criteria with which the
success of the democratic transition must be measured.7
Against this background, the DWAF, led during the first five years of
democracy in South Africa (1994±9) by Kader Asmal, and more recently by
Ronnie Kasrils, have made enormous strides in seeking to overcome the legacy of
racial capitalism and to create opportunities for all South Africans to claim the
basic resources previously denied them. Although difficult to verify, DWAF
claims, through its capital infrastructure programme, to have delivered potable
water to almost 7 million people, and to an additional 3 million when urban
housing and associated programmes are taken into account (Muller 2001:1).8 It is
hoped that the remainder of the backlog will be addressed within the next three
years.
Perhaps more significant in the long term, Asmal proved remarkably adept at
promoting a vision of transformation within the sector ± a vision compatible with
current macroeconomic policy and with the government's desire to promote
reconstruction and development. Whatever its failings, when compared to the
disastrous performance of other core developmental ministries, the achievements
of DWAF should not be forgotten.
1.2 The controversy
Within the water sector the policies pursued by DWAF have long been a source of
considerable tension. Despite widespread public admiration for Minister Asmal's
role in establishing the Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme and
for his success in passing crucial legislation for the sector,9 it is alleged that he has
emphasised rapid delivery for essentially political reasons and that this had
undermined the sustainability of rural and peri urban water supply programmes.
Indeed, on succeeding Asmal in office, Minister Kasrils was quick to distance
himself from some of the criticism directed at his predecessor, suggesting that
`[t]here is more to service provision than counting the number of taps and toilets
delivered' (Source Water and Sanitation Weekly 2000).
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Many of the criticisms that had been expressed privately within the sector for
some time were brought to the fore by a somewhat sensationalist article published
in the Sunday World (9 May 1999). At the crux of this lies the largely
unsubstantiated claim that between 50 and 90 per cent of water projects initiated
by DWAF have failed and that `its delivery of drinking water to over three million
rural people may be nothing more than a pipe dream with more than half ofrecipients no longer getting clean or even regular water'. Central to the criticism is
the claim that DWAF's `success' has involved little more than the installation of
pipes in communities that are ill prepared to take ownership of water projects. An
overemphasis on physical `output' (i.e. the installation of pipes and reservoirs)
has meant that little real work has been done to establish the institutional and
social framework for sustainable service provision (as opposed to delivery per se).Although government emphasises the need for its staff, engineers and consultants
to work closely with community structures at all stages of a water project, in
practice this seldom occurs. As numerous external evaluations now show,10
communities played little if any role in the design phase, were seldom aware ofthe full costs involved in a water project and were not trained to take
responsibility for the project once the implementing agent had left the
community. For these reasons, many water projects had either run to a halt or
relied almost exclusively on expensive and unsustainable government subsidies.
Until recently, no monitoring and evaluation systems were implemented to assist
with the management of community projects,11 a factor which helps explain the
extent to which community based water projects continue to rely on external
intervention and financial support (Breslin 1999a). In the absence of viable local
government structures, community capacity to administer and take ownership of
water projects is critical, which makes this general neglect especially problematic.12
Despite the growing evidence of failings in the community water supply
programme, there is little to suggest that Minister Asmal (or his successor,
Kasrils) was prepared to take corrective action. At least one senior departmental
head resigned in 1997 after Asmal had refused to honour an earlier promise to
allow officials to devote more time and energy to institutional and social, rather
than simple technical, concerns.13 Most of these criticisms were aired within the
sector at a conference held at Roodeplaat Dam outside Pretoria in November 1997
(DWAF 1997b, DWAF 1998a c).14 However, it was the aforementioned article in
the Sunday World that brought this criticism into the public arena. Wellman,drawing on research generated by the Mvula Trust, the largest NGO in the water
and sanitation sector, which works closely with DWAF, from material presented
at a DWAF sponsored conference held in East London in March 1999, and from
interviews with key people in the water sector, reported that more than half of the
water projects initiated since 1994 had collapsed, and that an estimated one and
a half million rural people were not getting clean or regular water as a result of the
policies pursued by Asmal's Ministry. Despite having invested R2,2 billion in
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these schemes, Wellman argued that the government had failed in its objective of
providing people with basic access to potable water. Rural schemes initiated at
great cost had proven to be unsustainable. This was not only because of a culture
of non payment and high levels of vandalism and piracy, but also because of
essential faults in the design of the project. Water projects were usually designed
without any input from the community (the users), were often far too expensivefor rural people to afford, and the Minister himself was accused of over
emphasising delivery for the sake of public relations.
Press speculation in the days that followed focused purely on the dramatic
image of taps running dry, but failed to provoke any real debate over the successes
of the community water supply and sanitation programme (Veotti 1999, Fine
1999, Anon 1999, Moloi 1999, Zondi 1999, Smith 1999). In the run up to the
1999 general election, DWAF was keen to avoid any hint of public criticism. True
to this sentiment, Mike Muller, the Director General of DWAF, suggested that
communities were themselves to blame for these problems (cited in Wellman
1999, see also Muller 1999), whilst Asmal attacked the political motives of theSunday World editors, whom he accused of exaggerating maliciously these
problems for political purposes (Khumalo 1999).
Whilst the Sunday World criticism focused on the department's failure to deliver
sustainable water, `traditional statists'15 saw this as a chance to voice their own
concerns about the 'neo liberal' undertones of government policy (Veotti 1999).
Of particular contention was the department's focus on cost recovery, and their
repeated threats to cut off water supplies to non paying communities. This, it was
argued, reflected yet another attempt to marginalise the rural poor and to make
them carry the burden of transition. Instead of trying to make communities take
responsibility for core operations and maintenance responsibilities, it wassuggested, the state should accept its democratic responsibility to provide services
to the poor and indeed should raise service levels well beyond the pitiful RDP
standard. By contrast, many of the earlier critics upon whose work the SundayWorld article drew, rallied to the minister's defence (Breslin 1999b, Kleinschmidt
1999), insisting that despite some failures on the part of DWAF, the community
based approach to development pioneered in the sector since 1994 had proved a
realistic alternative to both statist and simple `free market' approaches to service
delivery. Failures, they argued, lay at the level of implementation rather than
policy, and it is at the former level that corrective actions should be directed.
In this schema, one is presented with an (overly simplistic) image of the watersector in which the forces of good are pitted against the evil `dark side', in the
form of Asmal and his 'neo liberal' cronies in the World Bank. Some statist critics
drew attention to the fact that the first head of the Mvula Trust came from the
World Bank, and has now returned to it. Despite the essentially ad hominem nature
of this attack, there is a rational core to some of this criticism. DWAF has, to date,
focused primarily on delivering basic services to the rural areas. This is defined as
a minimum of 20 to 30 litres of potable water per person daily, delivered by
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standpipes within 200 metres of households (the so called RDP standard).
Tentative evidence suggests that one of the main reasons for non payment is this
low level of service and, in particular, the lack of individual household
connections (Dryer 1998).16 Whether communities would, in fact, pay (or be
able to pay) for higher levels of service remains a moot point, however, as Asmal
refused consistently to countenance debate over differing service levels. This isespecially troubling as lower levels of service are often more affordable, whilst
handpumps can provide potable water, either as a backup or as a supplement to a
more extensive service, with almost no operations and maintenance costs.17
Minister Kasrils suggested to Cabinet (in 2000) that the department provide
handpumps free of charge to communities as a stopgap until articulated water
supplies could be delivered. Despite the fact that government estimates that it will
take 20 years to overcome the backlog in service delivery, this call was rejected
out of hand as reminiscent of apartheid era services.18
Rather than deal with the `bigger question' relating to the design of water
projects and the provision of alternative water supplies, DWAF has (understandably) been preoccupied with the dismal levels of cost recovery in the sector.
As this is allegedly as low as four per cent in some areas, DWAF's response to the
crisis of service delivery has focused very narrowly on this one aspect.`Credit
control' has thus, as one commentator noted, `been intensified against poor
households who cannot afford to pay for increasingly costly water' (Ronnie,
1999) and insufficient thought has gone into establishing who can pay, how
much they can pay, or indeed, into finding out for what type and level of service
people would be willing to pay. In some cases, especially in Northern KwaZulu
Natal, attempts to force expensive water schemes with high registration costs onto
communities have met with fierce resistance and the continued use of alternativewater supplies (unprotected wells and rivers) has contributed to the spread of
cholera.
To be fair, the issue here is not simply the cost of water (water is very scarce in
South Africa), or the widespread culture of non payment, which have had a
crippling effect on infrastructure and service provision in all sectors of the South
African economy. DWAF can hardly be blamed for either of these. The more
serious area of concern, and where the implementation of government policy
needs more careful scrutiny, is the claim that water schemes were foisted onto
communities with little or no attempt at securing community participation in
water projects ex ante. At the opening ceremony for a recent water project inKwaZulu Natal, for example, Minister Asmal admitted without embarrassment
that the question of tariffs and affordability had not yet been broached, but that he
`was sure that an agreement can be reached' in the future (cited in Smith 1999).
Rather than spend time and resources developing the social and institutional
environment needed to empower communities, it seems easier to blame the rural
poor for their own shortcomings. In this context, the lack of any felt sense of
ownership or responsibility for water projects is hardly surprising.
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What makes this insensitivity to public opinion all the worse is that the
community water supply and sanitation programme is a core RDP objective and is
supposedly informed by a `people led' conception of development (Reconstruc
tion and Development Plan 1994, 1995, 1996). Water projects are, in contrast to
this directive, designed consistently in a top down fashion and driven by
technical rather than social considerations.
Despite obviously different motivations, the post 1994 government appears to
share with its predecessor a willingness to plan the lives of its citizens from
above. The government's statist critics have not questioned the inherently
paternalistic basis of this developmental paradigm (see Ruiters & Bond 1999,
Bond et al 2000: esp. 28±33). On the contrary, their alternatives remain trapped
within this framework and boil down to demands for higher service levels,
subsidies, greater state involvement in operations and maintenance, and for the
first 50 litres of water per person per day to be provided free of change. The RuralPeople's Charter (1999) is a good example of this evolving trend.
This debate is, however, unsatisfactory, as most of the critics sidestep the key
issues at stake and focus only on the emotive images of taps running dry. To
avoid this pitfall, it is necessary to take a step back and consider the underlying
assumptions upon which this new developmental paradigm rests. After
considering the conceptual underpinnings of DWAF policy, we review briefly
some of the reasons why this has not always achieved its intended results.
Although our focus is on water, the discussion here is of relevance to broader
developmental debates, it concerns (and pre supposes) a wider transformation of
socio economic relations accompanying the shift towards more market oriented
government in South Africa.
PART TWO
2.1 Shifting development paradigms: the CommunityWater Supply and Sanitation Programme
Outside the former `white towns' and larger administrative centres, service
provision has historically been neglected. In rural and peri urban areas, water
shortages, large distances between remote villages and the relatively small
numbers of people involved make it impossible for government to support
anything other than comparatively low levels of service ± ostensibly on site water
systems. Most water systems installed since 1994 involve some form of
reticulation to communal standpipes, run by either a diesel or an electrically
powered engine. Government carries the capital costs of water projects,19 and
community members are only expected to pay for the operations and maintenance
costs.20 Once the water project is completed and where water supplies permit,
individual households are often given the chance to upgrade these to household
reticulation standard, although here the costs (approximately R700,00 ±
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R1 000,00) are borne by the household concerned, and are in many cases
prohibitive.21
Central to the criticism of DWAF is the claim that, whilst the much publicised
installation of taps and pipes has garnered political kudos for central government,
little thought has gone into how these systems are to be paid for or managed.
Sustainability under such circumstances entails an adaptation to the parameters
of market orientated service delivery ± the provision of an enabling develop
mental environment rather than the satisfaction of `basic needs'22 and might
loosely be defined as the successful maintenance of projects for some time after
completion without an ongoing need for external intervention.23 This implies not
only a substantial recovery of operating (not capital) costs, but also that the
structures responsible for managing the project ± whether they are community
committees or local government ± are able to take appropriate corrective action
when problems emerge. Of the two, it is the ability effectively to impact on the
management of water projects which has received the least attention.
This does not, in any way, mean that the user must necessarily pay for all costs,
or deny the possibility of cross subsidisation where this is possible. Neither does
it mean that the state abandons or even reduces its developmental responsibilities.
Rather, the argument is that the state has a fundamental role to play in creating
the conditions within which development can best be secured and to empower
community structures (or external bodies such as local government, where these
exist) to manage projects effectively.24 This is in accordance with international
best practices, informed by the successful adoption of this paradigm in developing
countries.25 The remainder of this article considers this argument, both in abstract
and with specific reference to the Community Water Supply and Sanitation
Programme in South Africa. It is suggested that people led (or demand led)
development has the potential to overcome most of the problems encountered in
the sector and offers a far more viable basis from which to improve the lives of the
rural poor than the alternatives proposed by Asmal's `state centred' critics.
2.2 Sustainability and community governance
Perhaps the single biggest shift in the water sector since the so called United
Nations (UN Water) Decade (1980s) is the move away from the idea that the state
should provide water services directly, independent of market forces and
community structures. This lastmentioned point was part of a broader develop
mental focus on satisfying the `basic needs' of the very poor, which prioritised
direct allocation of basic services to individuals as opposed to a focus on
macroeconomic growth.26 The shift away from a `basic needs' approach to
development occurred in the wake of dramatic failures of state sponsored rural
water programmes in the developing world and the realisation that not only did
massive state expenditure on water supply have limited impact on the reliability
or quality of water supplied but, more generally, that by focusing on top down
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expenditure, community structures were disempowered and even when rural
incomes received a boost, this did little to promote local economic development.
The failures (and often intense human suffering) promoted by excessively top
down development is demonstrated amply in the former communist states in
Central Asia throughout the twentieth century (McKinney 1997, O'Hara &
Hannan 1999), and rural India of the 1970s and early 1980s (Bernstein et al.
1992, Roy 1999). Unless the state is willing to continue ad infinitum to subsidise
increasingly costly and otherwise unsustainable schemes ± and this is simply not
possible in most developing countries, including South Africa ± such arguments
are an appeal to state paternalism that undermines, rather than improves, the
chances for rural people to escape the clutches of structurally induced poverty.
In response to this, development theory began to stress the need for community
participation in the projects enacted in their name. In order to promote
sustainability in water projects, it was suggested that communities should cease
to be passive recipients and should instead play an integral part in projects from
their inception (Breslin 1999a). At the very least, communities should help to
determine the type of service that is provided, and should be in a position to
monitor and evaluate the performance of the service provider. Unless this is done,
communities are unlikely to develop a sense of ownership of water projects and
there is little to motivate them to take responsibility for such programmes
(McCommon et al. 1990, DWAF 1998d). Thus, whereas earlier top down
development projects tended to bypass community structures ± their main
objective, it should be remembered, was simply to deliver services ± the argument
here is that unless community ownership and support are assured up front, the
promotion of a sustainable developmental environment becomes almost
impossible. Not only is it necessary to focus on the technical components of
water supply, but it is equally important to develop an appropriate social and
institutional environment within which developmental services such as water can
reliably be assured. Above all, this implies establishing an institutional and
managerial environment appropriate to the community in question and the type
of water project that needs to be managed. To a significant extent (as we point out
later) this means conceiving development projects in market orientated rather
than traditional welfarist terms and professionalising the management of these
projects.
Although there is no single participatory model that is followed, development
projects conceived in these terms typically involve the election and training of a
village water committee. The committee will be responsible for managing the
project, a task likely to involve the collecting and administering of funds as well
as basic operations and maintenance. In many cases, the committee will perform
these tasks directly. In other cases, community structures can choose not to play a
direct role in the provision of services and either local government or an approved
external service provider will fulfil this function. Here it is important that the
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institution responsible for service provision is accountable to community
structures.
Whatever the theoretical options, in peri urban and rural South Africa the
absence of viable local government authorities and the limited opportunity to
profit from service provision to the rural and peri urban poor mean that
community management is a necessity, at least until local government is able
effectively to take on board some of these responsibilities.27 This means not only
that committees have to develop the managerial and technical capacity to run the
project, but also (and this is probably the most neglected aspect of all), it is
necessary to address questions of accountability and institutional incentives if
community participation and long term sustainability are to be assured.28
The post 1994 South African government has clearly been influenced by this
new developmental paradigm. This can be seen as early as the initial drafts of the
RDP ± initially, the main developmental policy guidelines for government ± as
well as the policies adopted by a number of different ministries. However the
market orientated nature of such policies should not be mistaken for a complete
abdication of state responsibility for service provision, or to the introduction of
exploitative cash economies into destitute rural communities.29 Rather, DWAF's
policies imply a constructive attempt to avoid the Scylla of complete 'neo liberal'
privatisation and the Charybdis of excessive state paternalism. Whilst the state is
no longer seen as a simple supplier or dispenser of welfare, it is still seen to have
an active developmental role. Indeed, contrary to the claims of many critics (see
e.g. Bond & Ruiters 2001), the current macroeconomic programme GEAR ±
formulated after, but in many ways anticipated by, the community water supply
and sanitation programme ± envisages a gross increase in expenditure on social
and developmental concerns. In so far as this is geared towards the creation of
social and institutional capacity in underdeveloped areas, policies of this ilk are
indeed a positive response to the challenges of state±market restructuring in an
increasingly commodified world economy.
The key issue at stake, in South Africa as elsewhere in the developing world, is
thus not simply the level of state expenditure, but rather, the manner in which state
intervention and support occurs. In GEAR there is still a strong (neo Keynesian)
focus on demand management (Nattrass 1997), although this occurs through
community based development rather than top down intervention. By examining
the policy developed for the water and sanitation sector it is possible to see how
this new paradigm is expected to operate and also to show just how different this
is from the 'neo liberalism' that the statist left seeks mechanically to uncover
behind every legislative turn of the post apartheid South African government (see
e.g. Bond 2000, Bond 2001, Bond et al. 2000, Bond & Ruiters 2001).
2.3 Demand-led development
In keeping with the aforementioned principle of participatory development, as
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well as the government's wider commitment to the democratisation of South
African society, legislation for the water and sanitation sector gives effect to two
broad policy guidelines, namely, a commitment to institutional redress and equality(captured in the maxim, `some for all' as opposed to `all for some'), and a
commitment to people led or demand driven development. Whilst both of these
raise complex social, political and ethical concerns (ie what exactly is meant byequality?), it is the desire to promote demand led development that has received
the greatest attention from policy makers. Thus the White Paper on Water Policy(RSA 1997) insists that `the motivation for development [must] come from within
the community, not from some outside agency'. This means that it is up to
communities themselves to determine their developmental priorities, and to help
formulate the plans that will further their objectives.30
As ever, translating general principle into policy is a complex and ambiguous
process. Perhaps the key question here is: how exactly are communities expected
to develop and articulate this `demand'? What is it exactly that stimulates
`demand?' Does this presuppose a degree of capacity within the community tomake important decisions, for example, about service levels and technology
choices? And if so, how does one set about building this capacity in order to allow
communities to determine their own demand? This raises a further question:
should the external agents play a role in educating such communities about the
value of water services in order to stimulate demand? If so, does this constitute
artificial `demand stimulation',31 and if so, how will this affect the sustainability
of the project after delivery?
The artificial creation of `demand' is likely to remain a factor for as long as
there is advantage to be gained by outside agents. Numerous examples of
communities who have had water projects installed, but who are subsequently notwilling to support the project once the full social and economic costs are revealed,
can be cited. Reasons offered include the fact that they would rather continue to
walk long distances to collect water ± which in practice means that the women
fetch water ± and use their money to satisfy what they regard as more pressing
needs. In other cases, people are not willing to pay for services, as they feel that
the technology choice or service level is inappropriate. Alternatively, because the
project was initiated and effectively managed by outsiders, the community feels
little sense of ownership of, and therefore little sense of obligation to, the project
in question (Breslin 1999a).
This takes one back to the question of how one conceives development in thefirst place? If the emphasis is on the duty of the state physically to supply
services, then, clearly, demand led development is little more than a slogan. If,
however, one's focus is on developing an environment within which commu
nities can make informed developmental choices and take responsibility for
developmental projects, then clearly demand led development becomes impor
tant. In public, all actors in the water sector support the idea of demand led
development. In practice, however, most place insufficient emphasis on the roles
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104
and responsibilities of community structures and, similarly, most ignore the need
to create supportive lines of accountability between the community, community
structures and local government.
One of the reasons for this neglect is the fact that many actors in the sector,
especially technical staff, are deeply suspicious of community structures and
doubt their capacity to manage projects effectively. Moreover, it is fair comment
to say that working with community structures is a time consuming, frustrating
and, at times, an expensive task. In the short term, this approach often means
delivering water to fewer communities; although it is hoped that this will be offset
by the fact that projects operating within a propitious institutional and social
environment will prove sustainable over time. This is what community based
development is all about. It is neither a top down `statist' or a strictly laissez faire(in which communities are either bypassed or left to the mercy of market forces)
approach to development.
However, as noted earlier, political and socio economic imperatives are often
bad bedfellows. The South African government is (understandably) concerned to
be seen to deliver quickly, and does not want to be accused of dragging its heals
and not getting on with the job of providing water, whether it was `demanded' or
not.32 The quote by Minister Asmal reproduced above, in which he admitted that
the water project he was opening had yet to determine appropriate tariffs for
users, is a good example of this obviously `political' neglect.
2.4 Self-financing and sustainability
As has been noted, a central assumption underpinning current government policy
is the idea that water must be treated as an economic resource, not a welfare
responsibility. In language that signifies clearly the extent to which the
government has accepted the move toward market orientated service provision,
DWAF insists that service payments are to be understood as `integral to a
demand driven approach'. Although the possibility of cross subsidisation or
other forms of financial support are not ruled out, `demand' is understood here in
explicitly neo classical economic terms, that is, as user willingness and ability to
pay, as opposed to social need.Those who support the principle of self financing raise two arguments in its
defence. Firstly, the government clearly lacks the funds necessary to meet
community needs out of the current budget. Although the government is prepared
to cover most start up and infrastructure costs (and sees this as its social duty), it
is neither able nor prepared to continue to subsidise ongoing operating and
maintenance costs.33
The second component of this defence is more controversial. Increasingly,
many actors in the water sector have come to accept that the benefit of making
communities pay for services goes well beyond simple cost recovery. This is
particularly true of projects drawing water from a local source, which rely on a
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105
significant degree of community support during all phases of the project. Some
form of cost recovery increases communities' sense of ownership and, by
implication, enhances their commitment to the success of the project (this is spelt
out in DWAF 1997a:13).
In practice, both DWAF and local government are significantly less committed
to cost recovery (or, at least, to enforcing cost recovery) than these statements
suggest. For one thing, DWAF does not require communities to make significant
upfront contributions to water projects, and has prevented NGOs working within
the sector from doing so. As a result, communities have little if any vested interest
in any capital expenditure that is made and it is difficult to develop community
structures that take long term responsibility for the success of what they have
come to regard as their own project.34 Enforcement of policy is thus not only
arbitrary but also subject to the vagaries of political sentiment. In the period
leading up to the general election in 1999, for example, a senior Cabinet minister
known for his animated public defence of cost recovery (in all sectors, including
education) privately chastised DWAF field staff for threatening to enforce this in
non paying communities.35
This brings to mind the political problems raised earlier in this discussion of
`demand led' development. This implies a shift away from the idea that the state
provides community water services within a welfare framework to an approach
that sees such services being offered within a market orientated environment.
This parallels broader shifts within development discourse away from a `meeting
basic needs' approach to a focus on promoting sustainability within an
increasingly liberalised domestic and world economy (cf. Ebrahim 2001).
Although the medium to long term benefits of this approach are accepted by
all, in the short term it makes it difficult for the government to be seen to deliver
on its election promises. As the political pressure for rapid delivery increases,
politicians are less likely to embrace an ethic of community ownership if this is
seen to stand in the way of short term delivery.
Two examples of political interference can be offered to illustrate this point.
Firstly, in a late 1990s Mvula water project, a community agreed to contribute to
the running costs of a diesel engine used to pump water. Within a short period,
however, the community stopped paying for the diesel, as a result of which the
water pump was turned off. The community leaders then approached DWAF,
who arranged to have a tank of diesel sent to the community free of charge.36 This
undermined completely the operating principles of the project and made it
difficult for Mvula to insist on payments in neighbouring community projects.
Similar reports have been made about water projects throughout Mpumalanga
Province, where attempts to force communities to take responsibility for the
operations and maintenance of water projects were thwarted by DWAF'S
consistent tendency to subsidise (or cover in full) these costs. Although DWAF
has written repeated letters to communities, warning them that subsidies would
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106
be cut, each successive deadline is ignored and communities now take these
subsidies for granted.37
Secondly, it is important to mention the (2000) election promise to provide the
first 6 000 litres of water `free' to households.38 In the urban areas, the operations
and maintenance costs involved in the provision of this water will, it is hoped, be
funded through cross subsidisation and sliding tariff structures, whereas a
percentage of the equitable share transfer payments (made by central government
to help support local governments) will be used in the peri urban and rural areas.
This has a number of implications, perhaps the most important of which being
the fact that as nearly all rural households consume less than 6 000 liters of water
per month, by implication this implies that users are no longer required to pay for
water consumed. Whilst DWAF is quick to paint this as `a logical outcome of
policy processes launched in 1994' (Muller 2001: 2), this is clearly not the case at
all. Instead, `free' water is a fundamental challenge to the development principles
to which DWAF has repeatedly professed allegiance and has implications for the
entire development sector.
Clearly, in cases such as this, a political calculation has been made. It is easier
for the state to continue to provide services free of charge than it is to force
communities to take responsibility for their own development. Actions such as
this blur the distinction between market orientated development and welfare, and
make it very difficult to understand just how committed DWAF is to community
orientated development. The point here is simple: unless DWAF can afford to
subsidise operating costs on an ongoing basis (which it clearly is not able to do),
ad hoc interventions of this ilk are counter productive and are motivated purely by
short term political expediency. It is here that the greatest potential danger of the
promise to provide `free' water lies: unless the South African state is able to show
how it is able to afford to do this, how and who is going to manage the provision
of such water, and which alternative services will be cut to pay for the `free' water,
such promises run the serious risk of becoming a cruel joke at the expense of the
rural poor. Furthermore, the government needs to explain how the provision of
free services affects its widely professed commitment to the user pays principle.
This is the conflict between political and socio economic objectives referred to earlier,
which rest uneasily with one another and in their own way impact negatively on
government's capacity to implement its policies.
PART THREE
3.1 Capacity shortcomings
One of the primary functions of the DWAF is to assist local and provincial
government in developing the competencies needed to provide adequate water
and sanitation services. According to the Water Services Act, 1997 (108 of 1997),
this responsibility for service provision lies with local government. More
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107
generally, the ambit of local government responsibility has been increased
progressively since 1994, and councils are now required to develop ongoing
systems of community participation and to involve a variety of relevant
stakeholders in the formulation of council policy and Integrated Development
Plans (IDPs).39 To this end, local government functions as a water services
authority. The institution or body involved in the actual supply of water is thewater services provider, which is accountable to the water services authority. In
many former `white towns' and developed areas, the water services provider is
either the local government itself, or a separate institution such as a water board
or, more recently, a private sector company.
For the first few years (roughly 1994±1996), DWAF assisted rural communities
by implementing projects itself, but this simply bypassed the problem as councils
were given an excuse to avoid building the critical competencies they now
desperately require. As responsibility for these projects is transferred to local
government, their viability is being threatened by these shortcomings. Despite the
tremendous advances that have been made in the establishment of rural localgovernment structures (especially through district/regional councils), little
institutional capacity exists at this level, and neither rural nor peri urban councils
are able to fulfil the functions of either a water service authority or water service
provider. For the most part, local government structures are still hopelessly weak
and ineffective, run by hugely inexperienced councillors and apartheid era
bureaucrats,40 and are hamstrung by a combination of a chronic lack of support
from provincial and central government and crippling service boycotts.
In general, most smaller local councils lack the capacity either to formulate or
implement developmental plans. In many cases, a majority of the long serving
officials have either left the council or are likely to leave once their pensions aredue. This skills flight will undoubtedly increase with the enforcement of the
Employment Equity Act (although in the long term this will expand the pool of
skilled professionals) and with the lifting of the (1995±2000) moratorium on civil
service retrenchments. In nearly all rural and smaller urban councils, the bulk of
the councillors lack financial and administrative skills, and are often at the mercy
of officials unsympathetic to their policies. To date, councils have had little
success in addressing these shortcomings, whilst opportunities for career
advancement in the private sector and at higher levels of government contribute
to a steady out flow of competencies. These problems are getting worse.
A related problem is that many officials and councillors are disinclined to thinkof development in anything other than technical terms and are accordingly loath
to embrace the community orientated ethos of the community water supply and
sanitation programme. Thus water supply and sanitation are conceived narrowly
as engineering problems involving the laying of pipes and building of dams rather
than developmental challenges which require the council to build relations with
community structures, and to put into place plans that are indeed `demand led'.
For example, it is clear that councils have limited budgets with which to satisfy
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108
ever expanding needs. By involving communities directly, it becomes possible to
make informed choices about community preferences, desired (and affordable)
service levels and technology choices, among other things. A community that
understands the financial implications of choosing a VIP sanitation system, for
example, is less likely to refuse to accept a non water borne sanitation system, as
is often the case and more likely to accept its responsibility for the costs entailed.
This is precisely what is implied by the switch to `demand led' development, both
in terms of the formulation of informed choices and in terms of the taking of
important developmental decisions.
This poses a key problem, in that until councillors come to accept the basic
assumptions informing the community water supply and sanitation programme,
there is little chance that local government will play a meaningful role in
delivering water and sanitation services to underdeveloped areas. The author's
interviews with a variety of councillors and community leaders suggest that, even
when councils are committed to this objective, there is considerable uncertainty
as to how their responsibilities should be discharged, or where the lines of
responsibility between Council and community are to be drawn.41 Councils in
rural and peri urban areas have very little (if any) information as to what is
actually happening on the ground in water and sanitation projects. Interviews
with development practitioners and government officials present a similar
picture.42
Finally, in a very real sense, local government councillors are often one of the
biggest obstacles to the community water supply and sanitation programme.
Councillors, eager to impress their constituencies and get re elected, often raise
false expectations by promising high service levels and sophisticated water and
sanitation systems, which are seldom feasible or practical, and are seldom willing
to take action against people who refuse to pay for services. In many cases,
councillors have actually told communities not to make contributions to
developmental projects, as `government will pay'.43 This makes it extremely
difficult to pursue an approach to development based on the principles of cost
recovery and community ownership.
CONCLUSION
The implications of recent policy commitments
In summary, it is clear that the government intends to involve communities more
actively in development. Not only are they expected to initiate water projects, but
the management of these projects is supposed to involve close relationships
between the service authority, service provider, and community structures.
However, the concept of demand led development has clearly not been under
stood in the same terms, or embraced with equal enthusiasm, by all actors in the
sector. Understandable pressures on government to overcome the inequities of the
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109
past in as short a period as possible, as well as a continued tendency to confuse
development in the water and sanitation sector with the provision of welfare,
often mitigate against the acceptance of demand led development as a principle
and contribute to an over emphasis on top down delivery. Throughout the
country, politicians continue to promise communities that they will receive high
levels of service at a minimal charge; whilst local government structures are
seldom willing or able to disconnect water supply for non payment. These and
other related practices fly in the face of stated government policy towards the
sector, and mitigate against the success of the community water supply and
sanitation programme. In a broader context, they also cast aspersions on the
government's commitment to fiscal austerity and sound commercial manage
ment.
Once again, it is important to stress that the community water supply and
sanitation programme does not celebrate cost recovery tout court, and there is
nothing in the terms of either it or the GEAR macroeconomic programme which
forbids subsidies and other forms of ongoing state support for developmental
projects. Neither do these policies reject state intervention in emergency
circumstances, for example, through the provision of a certain amount of free
water in drought stricken areas or in areas with a high cholera risk. The issue is
that policies must be carried out consistently, free from opportunistic electioneer
ing and political interference. A very large part of the `gap' between the policy
commitments of government and the failures in implementation can be traced to
this dangerous populism.
Any assessment of the South African government's performance since 1994
must take this criticism into account. Unlike `developing countries' elsewhere,
South Africa is starting to recover from the tremendous setbacks of the `Asian
crises' of 1997 and 1998, although mounting international concerns about the
Mbeki government's commitment to good governance and the rule of law means
that this recovery is tentative at best. In this context, the ability of the South
African state to create conditions which are propitious for development, on the
one hand, but which do not crowd out investment and undermine investor
confidence on the other, is the cruel yardstick against which government
performance will be measured. Within these narrow confines, the idea of
demand led development offers the space to explore ways of empowering
ordinary people and to ensure that whatever resources the state spends are used in
a manner that gives them the social and institutional capacity to formulate and act
on their own `demand'. The evidence to date suggests that the South African
government is committed theoretically to the developmental paradigm shift upon
which this policy rests, but that it lacks the political will to carry this out in a
consistent manner.44 This gap, between the proclaimed policy of DWAF and its
implementation needs to be addressed urgently if the benefits of post apartheid
transformation are to be enjoyed by anyone other than the urban e lite.
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110
NOTES
1 In preparing this article, I have benefited greatly from the assistance and
advice of Ned Breslin, Bethuel Netshiswenze and Ilse Wilson.
2 The South African Human Rights Commission has identified `gross
ineptitude among heads of government departments' as the primary factor
hampering service delivery, a finding based in part on the fact that only 15
out of 68 government departments were able to submit annual protocol
reports to the commission last year. One department (of Health, in the
Eastern Cape), was found to have fraudulently re submitted their 1998±1999
report in an effort to hide its lack of capacity (Esbend:2001:34). Protocol
reports are used to determine provincial budget allocations.
3 The politicisation of the civil service and its impact on government
performance deserves a separate study. A startling example of this trend is
provided by the Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza,
who has sidelined or attempted to transfer to menial jobs nearly all of the
senior appoints made by her predecessor, Derek Hanekom.
4 Although the promise of `free water' is discussed here, it is, at the time of
writing, too early to know what the actual policy implications of this are.
Until full details of how this is to operate are announced, it is assumed that
DWAF remains committed to the market orientated principles outlined in
the text.
5 In some communities, it is possible for individual households to purchase a
`household connection', that is to say, a standpipe located within their own
garden. Although this is a popular option, it has not taken off in a big way
yet, due largely to constraints on the amount of available water and
household budgets.
6 Defined as a ventilated improved pit, or VIP, toilet.
7 The point, it is worth noting, is not to try and refashion the electoral or the
socio economic system so as to isolate government from popular pressures,
as is proposed, for example, by F A Hayek in his critique of the electoral
political cycle (Hayek 1960). This `anti politics' is at the heart of what is
often described as 'neo liberalism' (Mouffe 1981). Rather, government has to
steer a delicate balance between resisting populist pressures for greater
special interest group spending, whilst at the same time retaining sufficient
electoral support to implement the longer term programmes needed to satisfy
both domestic and international developmental requirements. This latter
concern, which is structural ± integration into a world economy (globalisa
tion) the structure of which is determined increasingly by the commodity
form ± means that the conception of politics and democracy advanced here is
not strictly Schumpeterian.
8 The DWAF annual review (1999±2000) cites a more modest 4 847 451 users
in 236 completed projects, having created 323 764 jobs (DWAF 2000).
Stephen Louw
111
9 Notably the Water Services Act, 1997 (Act 108 of 1997) and the National
Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998). Legislation on sanitation is less developed
and the 1996 draft National Sanitation White Paper is still under review.
10 This is documented extensively in a series of AusAid evaluations, and by the
Mvula Trusts `revisiting' project. See also DWAF (1997b).
11 The Mvula Trust and DWAF have recently developed, with the support of the
European Union, a community based monitoring and evaluation programme
that will, it is hoped, assist community structures in managing more
efficiently existing water schemes and in facilitating information flows
between community structures and local government (Mvula 2000).
12 For a useful study on the `impact of local government on rural development
in South Africa', see Galvin (1999).
13 Personal communication with the senior person concerned. Name kept
confidential for obvsious reasons.
14 At this conference DWAF made it very clear that, although it accepted some
of the criticism, it was not going to change its modus operandi. Minister
Asmal, after drawing attention to his critics' racial background, made it clear
that he would continue to fast track technical delivery and skip crucial
community empowerment stages of water projects in order to deliver rapidly
(personal recollection). For a brief overview of the material presented to the
conference, see Lodge (1999:34±35).
15 This unsatisfactory term is used to denote a category of what might broadly
be called the `socialist left' whose `alternatives' to existing government policy
reduce very quickly to a call for simple state paternalism rather than
community initiative. The South African Municipal Workers Union is
perhaps the best examples of this approach.
16 Despite this sentiment, research suggests that the users in these schemes are
unwilling (or unable) to pay for more than seven to ten litres of water per
person per day.
17 Generally, communities are encouraged either to close down or remove
existing handpumps so as to force `users' to rely on new government water
schemes. In at least three villages known to the author, DWAF actually
removed the handpumps themselves so as to enforce compliance with the
new project. In the absence of safe alternative sources, the indigent are
effectively forced to use unprotected water sources.
18 Anonymous informant, 2000.
19 The Mvula Trust initially required communities to contribute 82 per cent
towards the start up costs, but they were forced by DWAF to abandon this
approach.
20 The main cost involved is the payment for electricity or fuel, as well as (at
least in bigger schemes) the salaries of core pesonnel responsible for running
and maintaining the project. In most cases, this includes a technical operator,
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112
as well as the core of the committee (e.g. chairperson, secretary and
bookeeper).
21 The author's fieldwork in various successful and unsuccessful water projects
suggests that residents place an extremely high value on household
reticulation and are willing to prioritise this expenditure over nearly all
other expenses and possible improvements to their living environment. The
benefit of this to the water supply committees in each village is that cost
recovery is much greater when there are household connections.
22 For a critical account of some of these assumptions and their impact on
infrastructure investment decisions, see Hosking and Bond (2000).
23 I owe this definition to Mr Charles Reeve, Team leader, European Union
Support Programme Team for Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.
Personal communication, 2000.
24 This conception of the role of the state is analogous to that set out in the
seminal World Bank development report of 1997. This marked a dramatic shift
within the World Bank, away from a simplistic laissez faire conception of state
policy towards a more dynamic model of state±market relations. Sadly, the
report is not always representative of World Bank opinion, although see
Wolfensohn (1999:4±5) for an emphatic defence of the need for the state to
develop the social relations within which markets can best function.
25 The author's own field work in four rural villages and three urban slums in
South India confirms this.
26 The periodisation of development discourse here and below is taken from
Ebrahim (2001).
27 The inability of local government to fulfil these functions is one of the main
reasons why DWAF initially played a role as implementing agent on water
projects. This is in the process of changing, and local government is being
expected to take this responsibility on board.
28 In two successful projects visited by the author ± Lekubu village and
Leeufontein village ± the implementing agent (then the North West Water
Supply) built offices from which the committee could work. This has paid
enormous dividends in terms of developing a culture of institutional
accountability (they are always accessible to the community, whose monies
they administer) and in terms of promoting professional management (they
see themselves as part of a formal, professional organisation, are able to keep
proper files and records, etc.) There are no magic formulas for success and in
both villages the committees (or water authorities, as they call themselves)
are run by exceptionally dedicated people and are supported in positive ways
by the traditional authorities. However, the small cost of the office, when
offset against the fact that both projects are recovering costs and are
sustainable, is an important lesson to be learnt.
29 The most influential adherent to this position is the South African Municipal
Stephen Louw
113
Workers Union (SAMWU). For an argument along similar lines, see Ruiters
and Bond (1999).
30 This requirement is not restricted to the water and sanitation sector.
Increasingly, local government is expected to play an active role in assisting
all South African communities, urban and rural, to assess and prioritise their
needs. Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) drawn up by councils must
incorporate these assessments.
31 In effect, this last mentioned concern has become a moot point, as
communities have been inundated with politicians and consultants, each
promising to help deliver water services as quickly and as cheaply as
possible. Several Mvula staff officers reported that soon after the introduction
of the Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme they found that
community representatives would arrive at their offices, presenting detailed
accounts of why their community wanted a particular water project and
providing much of the information necessary to justify selection of the
project. Such information clearly did not emerge from within `the com
munity'. Instead, consultants had approached the community, told them
about the possibility of obtaining developmental support and offered to help
secure this (at a price!).
32 On central government interference in large scale water projects, see Emmett
and Hagg (2001).
33 In theory, this means that service charges will be levied at all points in the water
cycle, and water services are expected to become self financing. However, an
exception is made (but never spelt out clearly) for communities too poor to
make even a minimal contribution towards the provision of basic services.
34 Evidence gathered in many communities suggests that projects delivering
potable water to community standpipes (as opposed to individual household)
connections) are not always an immediate priority. Given a choice,
respondents (particularly male respondents) suggests that they would prefer
to collect water from communal hand pumps, and spend their money on
other things.
35 Two independent sources have confirmed this story.
36 Interview with Ned Breslin, Mvula Trust, Johannesburg, January 1998.
37 Information gathered in field visit to Thulani Water Project, Mpumalanga
Province, 15±16 March 1999.
38 See note 4 above.
39 See, for example, chapters 4 and 5 of the Local government municipal system Bill(RSA 2000), and the White Paper on local government (1998).
40 The mere fact that officials were appointed in the apartheid era is not in itself
an indication of political dissidence on their part, as is often quite
simplistically alleged. The concern is rather that these officials were part of
the homeland apparatus, performed ill defined jobs on an ad hoc basis and
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114
worked for government structures lacking any real business plan or
managerial expertise. Since 1994, the `redeployment' of such officials, many
of whose jobs were protected under the terms of the constitution until 2000,
has constituted a major headache for government. For the most part, these
officials lack the skills required to perform their jobs properly.
41 The field work was conducted over a period of two and a half years (1998±
2000) in the following villages: Mashilane and Nhlazatshe (Mpumalanga);
Lekuba, Leeufontein and Kabe (North West); Rotterdam and Fairley
(Northern Province). Additional field work was conducted in the Winterveld
(Gauteng) in 2001. This was supplemented with a number of interviews with
councillors and officials in the aforementioned areas.
42 Bokgupa, Lebogang. Field Worker, Operation Hunger, Mafikeng, 16 February
1999; Fernandez, Placid. Chief Engineer, DWAF: North West Province,
Mafikeng, 15 February 1999; Jackson, Barry. Development Bank of SouthernAfrica, Midrand, November 1997; Kleinschmidt, Horst. Director, Mvula Trust,
Johannesburg, 26 January 1998; Madgwick, Tim. Head: Training, UmgeniWater, Pietermaritzburg, 20 October 1997; Magashlela, Ignatus. Monitoring
and Evaluation Coordination, DWAF Northern Province, Pietersburg, 10 March
1999; Masibi, Gadifele. Community Trainer and Evaluator, Copad Engineering, Mafikeng, 15 February, 1999; Matabule, Jabulani. Sanitation Coordina
tion, DWAF Northern Province, Pietersburg, 11 March 1999; Mkize,
Nonhlanhla. Training Specialist and Materials Developer, Rand Water
Community Water Based Projects Department, Johannesburg, 11 December
1997; Nkuna, Vusi. Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Mvula Northern
Province, Pietermaritzburg, 11 March 1999; Nkunea, Gibson. CEO, Bushbuck
ridge Water Board, Bushbuckridge, 18 March,1999; Peto, Tselane. Trainer and
Evaluator, Independent Consultant, Mafikeng, 16 February 2000. (Interview
conducted jointly with Bethuel Netshiswinzhe).
43 This has been reported to the author in several communities, notably in the
Northern and Mpumalanga provinces.
44 The same point can be made about privation and deregulation, central
components of GEAR upon which most of the government's developmental
programmes now depend. Much of the decline in investor confidence in
South Africa stems from the reluctance of government to carry out the
politically unpopular components of its own policy commitments. The
damage done to the South African economy by the failure timeously to
deregulate the telecommunications industry, for example, is inestimable.
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