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Others No More: The Changing Representation ofNon-Han Peoples in Chinese History Textbooks,1951–2003

NIMROD BARANOVITCH

This article analyzes the changes in the representation of non-Han peoples intextbooks of premodern Chinese history published in China since the establish-ment of the People’s Republic. Whereas in the early 1950s, these peoples weretreated as non-Chinese others and were even referred to as “foreigners,” bythe beginning of the twenty-first century, they were totally incorporated intothe Chinese historical self through a new narrative claiming that they hadalways been Chinese. Simultaneously, the textbooks exhibit a clear shift from aHan-exclusivist vision of Chinese history to a more inclusive and multi-ethnicone. Based on an analysis of the content, language, and organization of textbooksand other related materials, the article proposes that although the incorporationof non-Han peoples into the Chinese historical subject was gradual, this processaccelerated dramatically as a result of a planned reform launched in the late1970s and early 1980s. The article explains the reasons for the reform and itstiming, and examines its implications for the Chinese nation-state and China’sethnic minorities.

IN DECEMBER 2002, A hot public debate was triggered in China when a front-page article in the Beijing Youth Daily reported that recently published official

guidelines for history teachers prescribed that Yue Fei (1103–42), one of China’smost admired historical heroes, should no longer be called a “national hero”(minzu yingxiong) (Geng 2002a, 2002b; Shanghai Star 2003).1 According tothe Beijing Youth Daily, the problem with referring to Yue Fei as a nationalhero was that this title did not fit the contemporary official definition of theChinese nation. The long-held view that Yue Fei had defended China againstforeign invasion was no longer acceptable because Yue Fei’s enemies, the Jurch-ens (Nüzhen), are considered today to be members of the Chinese nation (Wang2000, 192). Thus, Yue Fei was disqualified as a national hero because he did notrepresent the entire Chinese nation as presently defined, but only one subgroup

Nimrod Baranovitch ([email protected]) is a Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies and Chair of theDepartment of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa, Israel.1For two interesting articles that were published on the Internet in December 2002, see ShanZhengping (2002), and Xu Jinru (2002). For more information on Yue Fei, see HellmutWilhelm (1962), and James T. C. Liu (1972).

The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 69, No. 1 (February) 2010: 85–122.© The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2010 doi:10.1017/S0021911809991598

within the nation. As several sources made clear, the major rationale behind thechange was a concern for China’s “unity of nationalities” (minzu tuanjie), andapprehension that celebrating the legacy of the Han hero, who is known tohave killed many of his non-Han enemies, might hurt the feelings of China’sethnic minority people, especially the descendants of the people he foughtagainst.2

The report in the Beijing Youth Daily created the impression that the strip-ping of Yue Fei’s status as a national hero was totally new. However, a close exam-ination of history textbooks and other related sources that have been published inChina since 1949 reveals that the downgrading of Yue Fei’s status actually datesback many years. Yue Fei was labeled a national hero in Chinese history textbooksonly until the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Then, in the few history books thatwere published toward the end of that period, not only was he not referred to as anational hero, but, in fact, he was severely criticized for being “a general of thelandlord class” and for “suppressing peasant rebellions” (BJJB 1975, 131; SZJB1973, 144–45). In the textbooks that were published after the Cultural Revolu-tion, this class-oriented, revolutionary critique of Yue Fei disappeared, and hewas rehabilitated. Nonetheless, in textbooks from that point on, he was neverreferred to again as a national hero.

In the teaching material of the late 1970s and early 1980s, no explicit pre-scription that Yue Fei should not be called a national hero was made, and noexplanation was given as to why the editors of the postrevolutionary textbooksdecided to delete the title in the discussion of Yue Fei. The prescription andthe explanation appeared, however, in 1996, six full years before the BeijingYouth Daily published its “news” about Yue Fei. In an official study guide forhigh school history teachers, a senior editor named Yu Guiyuan prescribed:

Our country has been a multi-national state (duominzu guojia) since anti-quity. Strengthening the education for the unity of nationalities … isimportant for maintaining the stability and unity of the nation … Welabel as “national heroes” only those outstanding figures, like QiJiguang and Zheng Chenggong, who represented the interests of theentire Chinese nation in resisting foreign invasion. As for outstandingfigures like Yue Fei and Wen Tianxiang, although we acknowledgetheir position and the role that they played in resisting ethnic plunderand ethnic oppression, they cannot be referred to as “national heroes.”(Yu 1996, 116–18)3

The significant point about the stripping of Yue Fei of his national hero title,however, is not so much that it actually took place long before the BeijingYouth Daily published its provocative report. Rather, what is more significant

2For the attitude of contemporary Mongols toward Yue Fei, see Wurlig Borchigud (1995, 293–94).3All of the translations from Chinese in this article are mine.

86 Nimrod Baranovitch

is that this change was only the tip of the iceberg of a comprehensive reform ofthe discourse of ethnicity in Chinese history textbooks that started simultaneouslywith the launching of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s. Although muchhas been written about the changes that have taken place in China in the field ofhistoriography since the end of the Maoist era (see, e.g., Bartlett 2001; Chan1999; Dirlik 2000; Guo and He 1999; Liu 1981; Sullivan 1993; Wang 2004;Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 1987; Wright 1993), to date little has been written aboutthis particular reform.

The aim of this article is to analyze the change in the representation ofnon-Han peoples in Chinese high school history textbooks from 1949 to thepresent, with a particular focus on the reform that has taken place in this rep-resentation since the late 1970s and early 1980s. I will first argue that despitemuch evidence suggesting that at least during the 1950s, the Communistregime wholeheartedly adopted the notion of China as a multi-ethnic state, asmanifested, for example, in the first People’s Republic of China (PRC) consti-tution of 1954 and the “ethnic identification” (minzu shibie) project of themid-1950s, high school history textbooks during that period and the rest of theMaoist era were still extremely Han-centric and treated non-Han peoples as non-Chinese others.4 I will then argue that although the representation of non-Hanpeoples in history textbooks had begun to change by the mid-1950s, it wasonly in the beginning of the reform era that a more comprehensive and systema-tic change in that representation took place. This change was the result of a con-scious effort by several powerful editors, who transformed the non-Han peoplesin Chinese history from non-Chinese others into an integral part of the Chineseself by changing the content, language, and organization of previous textbooks.

The change in the attitude toward non-Han peoples that is evident inChinese history textbooks of the last half century is not completely new. Morethan two thousand years ago, some non-Han peoples who were normallythought of as total others were sometimes represented as kin, an alternativerepresentation that was designed, among other things, to legitimize Chineseexpansion and conquest and to advance the assimilation of these peoples(Hinsch 2004, 81–92, 102–3; see also Di Cosmo 2002, 300). This dual attitudewas revived two thousand years later, when China faced the transition from anempire to a modern nation-state. Chinese intellectuals and nationalist leadersliving at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentiethcentury clearly had a difficult time choosing between “ethnic/racial nationalism”

4The notion that, at least during the 1950s, the Communist state treated the view of China as amulti-ethnic state seriously can be regarded as conventional wisdom (see, e.g., Harrell and Li2003, 362; Heberer 1989, 24–27). The first PRC constitution of 1954, like later constitutions, pro-claimed that China was a “unified, multi-national state” (tongyi duominzu guojia), and the “ethnicidentification” project was closely related to this proclamation. (For more information on thisproject, see Dreyer 1976, 141–46; Fei 1980; Gladney 1996, 66–72; Harrell 1995, 9, 22–24;Mackerras 1994, 140–43; 2004; Mullaney 2004; Tapp 2002).

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(Dikötter 1996; Shen and Chien 2006), that is, a Han-exclusive, monoethnic/racial vision of China and Chinese identity, and a more pluralistic and multi-ethnic “state nationalism” (Chow 1997; Duara 1995, esp. 33–76; Hon 1996;Leibold 2006; Schneider 1971, 258–93; Shen and Chien 2006; Zhang 2002;Zhao 2006, 21–23).

The former was viewed as the best way to unite the majority of the populationin China in order to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and to create a modernnation on which to found a modern nation-state (Chow 1997). Moreover, manynationalist intellectuals and leaders at that time considered a nation-state com-posed of one ethnic group or race to be the ideal form of nationalism (Duara1995, 36–37; Gasster 1969, 78–79; Leibold 2006, 190; Zhang 2002, 107). Onthe other hand, there were those who realized that a multi-ethnic vision ofChina was necessary in order for the new Chinese nation-state to keep theterritory of the Qing, about 60 percent of which was made up of non-Hanregions. Inspired by the modern Western concept of citizenship (guomin) andled by the prominent intellectual Liang Qichao, this group of intellectuals andleaders adopted the notion that all people living within the boundaries of thestate were citizens who not only were to enjoy rights, liberty, and equality, butalso equally belonged to the nation. Indeed, from the turn of the twentiethcentury on, a growing number of Chinese intellectuals and political leadersstarted to think of China as a territorial entity, rather than or in addition tobeing an ethnic/racial or cultural entity, and thus of everyone living within thisterritory as Chinese (Fitzgerald 1996, 67–68; Mackerras 1994, 53; Rhoads2000, 291, 294; Shen and Chien 2006; see also Choe 2006, 90–92; Chun 1996,128–29; Shih 2002a, 1–5, 22–24; 2002b, 234–37). It was in this context thatSun Yat-sen, who originally enthusiastically promoted an ethnic/racial,Han-exclusive vision of the Chinese nation, accepted the more inclusive andpluralistic concept of China as the “Republic of the Five Nationalities” (wuzugonghe), and started to promote the notion of a “greater Chinese nation” (daZhonghua minzu) that included not only the Han but also the non-Hanpeoples inhabiting China (Duara 1995, 76, 142; Leibold 2006, 190, 206, 208).Despite these latter developments, the Nationalists were basically against theconcept of China as a multi-ethnic state, and thus they adopted a policy ofassimilation toward non-Han populations (Dreyer 1976, 15–41; Mackerras1994, 53–78). The multi-ethnic view of China, however, was enthusiasticallyembraced by the Communists, who assumed power in 1949.

China scholars are well aware that it is widely accepted in China today that tobe Chinese does not necessarily mean to be Han. However, much less is knownabout the process by which the multi-ethnic vision of China and Chinese identitywas applied to Chinese historiography, and the process by which this historiographywas canonized in China’s educational system. The aim of this article is to analyzethis process and to examine its implications for China’s ethnic minorities and theChinese state. In this study, I engage in a dialogue not only with scholars of


Chinese historiography, but also with scholars who focus in their research onChina’s ethnic minorities. In the last decade and a half, the latter group hasproduced an impressive body of literature on representations of non-Hanpeoples in contemporary Chinese culture and demonstrated that these represen-tations often tend to overemphasize their otherness (Baranovitch 2001, 2003;Clark 1987; Gladney 1994b, 1995; Louie 1992; Schein 1997). In arguing thatChinese history textbooks in China display a clear evolution from an exclusivisthistoriography, in which the non-Han peoples constitute non-Chinese others,to an inclusive, multi-ethnic historiography, in which these peoples are fullyincorporated into the Chinese self, this article does not necessarily negate thevalidity of the aforementioned studies. However, it hopes to place some of theconclusions that appear in these studies in a broader and more accurate frame-work by demonstrating that in contemporary China, along with representationsthat stress the otherness of minority peoples, there are also contrasting narrativesand representations that stress their belonging to the Chinese self. I propose thatin order to gain a better understanding of China’s ability to maintain its politicalunity, we ought to pay more serious attention to these narratives of belonging,rather than focus exclusively on practices of othering.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The bulk of this article is based on a comparison of three history textbooks forsenior high schools that were published in China from the early 1950s to thepresent and represent three different phases in the evolution of the discourseof ethnicity in Chinese history textbooks. In addition, the article also draws onteaching guidelines, study guides, and reference books for history teachers, aswell as the writings of scholars and editors who played an active role in inspiringand implementing the reform. Most of the sources chosen for analysis were pub-lished by the People’s Education Press (Renmin Jiaoyu chubanshe) in Beijing.Given that this press has dominated the writing and publication of history (andother) textbooks since the founding of the PRC, the texts examined in thisarticle not only represent the mainstream in history writing in China, but alsoconstitute some of the most widely read historical texts in the country.

THE TEXTBOOK OF 1951: NON-HAN PEOPLES AS “FOREIGNERS” (OR CHINESE HISTORY AS

THE HISTORY OF THE HAN PEOPLE)

Despite the fact that since the late nineteenth century and early twentiethcentury the notion of China as a multi-ethnic state had started to gain popularityamong Chinese intellectuals and political leaders, historiographical writingduring the Republican era was dominated by Han-exclusive narratives that

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perpetuated the ethnic/racial nationalism that led to the overthrow of the QingDynasty in 1911. In the earliest history textbooks of the PRC, there is a clear con-tinuity with these narratives, in part because during the early years of the newstate, the new educational system used history texts from former Guomindang-controlled areas (Su 1984, 81). These texts establish a clear dichotomybetween the Han people (referred to in earlier periods as “Hua”), an advanced,agricultural people who inhabited the Central Plains, and all the other ethnicgroups in the region, who are referred to as backward nomads. The texts usethe terms “Han people” (Hanren) and “Chinese people” (Zhongguoren) inter-changeably, so that “China” (Zhongguo) and Chinese culture are associated exclu-sively with the Han, while all the other peoples are referred to as “foreignpeoples” (yizu or waizu). The frequent use of the terms “in” or “internal” (nei)and “outside” or “foreign” (wai) to refer to the Han and the non-Han, respect-ively, reinforces the dichotomy by establishing a clear spatial distinctionbetween us and them. The distinction is further reinforced by the use of theterm “invasion” (qinru or qinlüe) to depict the attacks of the non-Han peopleson the Han, a term that presupposes a clear physical boundary. The dominantrelations between the Han and their neighbors in the 1951 textbook areusually of conflict. The latter are often referred to as “enemies” (di), and thediscussion of their relations with the Han appears under titles such as “TheInter-Ethnic Struggle” (minzu jian de douzheng) or “The Invasion of ForeignPeoples” (waizu de qinru).

The 1951 textbook suggests that China had become a unified nation-state ofthe Han people already by the time of the Qin dynasty. Indeed, the text impliesnot only that the Qin unified China politically, but that the unification of thedifferent states “inside China” was also an “ethnic unification” (minzu tongyi)of the Han people. Hence, when the text suggests that the Qin established a“nation-state” (minzu guojia), it makes clear that this state was monoethnic. Toestablish further the notion that the people who inhabited the territory thatcame under Qin rule were ethnically homogeneous, the text emphasizes thatjust before the Qin unification, the non-Han peoples (read non-Chinese) whoinhabited this territory, and to whom the text refers as “foreign peoples,”almost became extinct (see QHRZJJBW 1951a, 37).

A similar narrative is also found in the discussion of the first and secondmillennia AD. The distinction between the Han, who are interchangeablyreferred to as “Chinese,” and all the other peoples, who are referred to as“foreign peoples,” is used here as an important basis for the organization ofthe text and the chronological division of Chinese history. There are thoseperiods in Chinese history in which China was ruled by the Chinese themselves,and other periods in which it was ruled by “invading” “foreigners”who came fromoutside China (QHRZJJBW 1951a, 61, 101). That Chinese history is seen only asthe history of the Han people is also evident in the fact that, with the exception ofthe Yuan and the Qing, non-Han regimes are normally discussed in brief and only


in the context of the relationship that the contemporaneous Han regime had withthem. Thus, for example, the discussion of the Liao, Xia, and Jin, which the Khitans(Qidan), Tanguts (Dangxiang), and Jurchens established, respectively, appears aspart of the chapter on the Northern Song under a subsection entitled “TheForeign Aggression (waihuan) during the Northern Song” (QHRZJJBW 1951b, 2).

The otherness of non-Han peoples is also constructed in the 1951 textbookthrough extremely negative depictions, in which they appear not just asnomads living a backward life, but also as aggressive and brutal, destructive,and morally inferior. These peoples not only “invade,”5 but also “brutallymassacre” (cansha or tusha), “take masses of captives” ( fulu daliang nannü),“loot” (lüeduo), and “destroy” (pohuai or cuihui). Consistent with this negativerepresentation, the evaluation of the periods in which China was ruled bythese “foreign peoples” is also extremely negative. These periods are depictednot only as periods of extreme suffering for the Han (read Chinese) peoplebut also as periods in which China suffered major objective setbacks in alldomains. The discussion of the Yuan dynasty is representative:

From the point of view of the Mongols, collecting taxes and slaughteringand plundering (shalüe) were activities that were similar in nature andvaried in name only. Therefore, politics was much more corrupt andviolent than in any other period. Not only did the declining economyin the regions of northern China continue to be destroyed, but theeconomy of the south that was in the midst of development [under theSong] also suffered severe destruction (qianglie de cuihui), and sankinto stagnation (tingzhi). The ruling of China by the Mongolian peoplebrought incomparable disaster (wubi de zaihai) to Chinese society.(QHRZJJBW 1951b, 153)

Although there are several points of light in the discussion of the Yuan, theseare mentioned in passing and very briefly and remain extremely marginal inthe comprehensive attack on this “foreign” dynasty.

THE HISTORY TEXTBOOK OF 1956: NON-HAN PEOPLES STILL AS NON-CHINESE OTHERS

DESPITE AMBIGUITIES

The textbook of 1956 was the first to be completely produced under the newCommunist regime (Su 1984, 83), and as such, it reflects the new emphasis on aMarxist worldview and the notion of China as a multi-ethnic state. The emphasison China’s multi-ethnicity derived in part from Soviet influence and the interna-tionalist ethos of Marxism, and in part from the special relationship thatthe Communists developed with the non-Han populations prior to 1949

5Significantly enough, the Han never “invade,” but rather “expand outward” (duiwai kuozhang).

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(Dreyer 1976, 63–92). Another reason for this emphasis may have been the factthat the Communist regime was able to establish de facto Chinese sovereignty inthe large non-Han areas that the Nationalists could only claim as part of the repub-lic without being able to turn such claims into a reality. This new political realityrequired a new approach to non-Han populations, and as a result, in historytextbooks from the mid-1950s on, the otherness of non-Han peoples was weakenedthanks to several important changes that were introduced in the new texts.

Most importantly, the new textbooks seem to have completed their adap-tation to the Marxist paradigm of history, so that class categories and thetheme of class struggle started to dominate the historical narrative at theexpense of all other categories and themes, including those of ethnicity/national-ity and ethnic conflict, which were strongly emphasized in the 1951 textbook.6 Aspart of this change, the new textbooks usually no longer refer to entire ethnicgroups as such, but rather to different social classes within those groups. Alterna-tively, the books may make references to the names of the polities that thesegroups established or to the governments or the armies of those polities. Thus,in the discussion of the Yuan dynasty, for instance, the 1956 textbook nolonger refers to the “Mongols” or the “Mongolian people” (Mengguzu), butrather to the “rulers” or the “ruling class of the Yuan dynasty” (Yuan tongzhizhe,or Yuanchao tongzhi jieji), which according to the text included not onlyMongolian aristocrats but also people from other ethnic groups, among themHan landlords. In a similar vein, references are often made in the new textbooksto the “common people of various ethnic groups” (ge zu renmin), and insteadof “Han resistance” (Hanzu de fankang) (see QHRZJJBW 1951b, 164), thetext refers to multi-ethnic “peasant uprisings” (nongmin qiyi) (Chen et al.1956, 105–6).

Consistent with this change was the creation of a new narrative, according towhich the “oppression” during the Yuan dynasty that was described in detail inthe 1951 textbook was not so much “ethnic oppression” (minzu de yapo;QHRZJJBW 1951b, 149) of the Han people by the Mongols, but rather classoppression, in which an ethnically mixed ruling class “oppressed the commonpeople of the various ethnic groups” (zhenya ge zu renmin) (Chen et al. 1956,102). This crisscrossing of class and ethnicity resulted in the weakening of themutually exclusive ethnic categories and boundaries that prevailed in the 1951

6The new emphasis in the historical narrative on class struggle, and the concomitant tendency todeemphasize ethnic categories did not mean, however, that ethnicity in China during that periodwas necessarily deemphasized, as I have already made clear. The reality, in fact, was much morecomplex and often contradictory. Indeed, during the very same period in which the 1956 textbookwas published, the new regime simultaneously invested a great deal of effort in promoting new pol-icies, knowledge, and institutions that not only amplified but often also encouraged ethnic differ-ences. One of the best examples of such efforts was the “ethnic identification” project that wasmentioned earlier, which not only recognized and institutionalized multiple ethnic identities, butin many cases invented them, and thus did exactly the opposite of what the 1956 textbook was doing.


textbook and blurred the clear-cut distinctions between the Han and thenon-Han that were strongly emphasized in it.

Another major change in the new textbooks is that in most cases, the terms“Han” (or Hua) and “Chinese” are not used interchangeably anymore, andnon-Han peoples are no longer referred to as “foreigners.” Similarly, the clear-cutspatial dichotomy between the “domestic” (or “internal”) and the “foreign” (or“external”) that was so prevalent in the 1951 textbook whenever referenceswere made to the Han people and their territory as opposed to the non-Hanpeoples and their territories, respectively, often becomes blurred and ambiguous.Consistent with these changes, Chinese history in the new textbooks is no longerdivided, as it was in the 1951 textbook, into periods in which China was ruled bythe Han/Chinese themselves and other periods in which it was ruled by non-Han/foreign peoples.

In another related contrast to the 1951 textbook, the textbook of 1956 doesnot attempt to establish that the Qin unification of China in the third century BCE

resulted in the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous nation-state of theHan people. The new textbook not only avoids such an assertion, and avoidsreferring to the Qin as a “nation-state” (minzu guojia), but also chooses insteadto acknowledge the existence of various non-Han peoples in Qin territory. None-theless, it still attempts to diminish the differences between the Han and thenon-Han peoples and to establish that they all shared a common writingsystem and “more or less the same culture” (Qiu, Chen, and Wang 1956, 74).

Along with these changes, the 1956 textbook also tends to soften the extre-mely negative depictions of non-Han peoples that were found in abundance inthe earlier textbook. For example, whereas the 1951 textbook claimed that“when the Mongolian soldiers attacked cities … [they] massacred the people,and kept only the craftsmen alive” (QHRZJJBW 1951b, 163), in the 1956 text-book, the part about the massacre is deleted. Instead, the text reads that“when the Mongolian army attacked a city, they captured and took away thecraftsmen and made them work [for them]” (Chen et al. 1956, 103).

Finally, in another striking change, in several cases in the 1956 textbook,non-Han peoples receive more serious attention compared with earlier text-books. Their history and culture are discussed in more detail, and more namesof the polities that they established appear in the table of contents and in thetitles of parts and chapters of the book, alongside the names of polities estab-lished by the Han. For example, whereas in the 1951 textbook, the Liao,Western Xia, and early Jin were completely absent from the table of contentsand were mentioned only briefly in the main text in a section entitled “ForeignAggression during the Northern Song” (Bei Song waihuan), they now appearin the main title of the relevant part (part 6 in the 1956 textbook) alongsidethe Song in the following way: “Song, Liao, Xia, Jin, Yuan” (without commas inthe original)(Chen et al. 1956, 1). This new representation not only symbolicallyupgraded the non-Han polities, but also, more importantly, implied that these

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polities were accepted, at least more than before, as part of Chinese history andnot just as external others with whom the Song, as the only Chinese polity, hadto deal.

Nonetheless, the Song is clearly still privileged even in this title, as it appearsfirst in the list despite the fact that it was established more than half a centuryafter the Liao (960 and 907, respectively). Moreover, in the title of the firstchapter in part 6, there is a clear perpetuation of the earlier distinctionbetween the Han polity and the non-Han polities. In this title, which reads“Northern Song—–The Relations of the Northern Song with the Liao, Xia andJin” (the hyphen represents a space in the original) (Chen et al. 1956, 1), theSong is set apart graphically by a space from the names of the non-Han polities,all of which are lumped together at the end of the title. This title delivers a con-tradictory message to the one communicated in the previous title (of part 6). Itnot only diminishes the importance of the Liao, Western Xia, and Jin, andmakes it clear that history is still told from the point of view of the Song, andthat the non-Han polities are interesting only as far as their relationship withthe Song is concerned, but also positions the former as categorically differentfrom the Song.

The different representations of the Song, Liao, Western Xia, and Jin in thetable of contents of the 1956 textbook illustrate the many ambiguities and incon-sistencies that prevailed in the treatment of non-Han peoples in history textbooksfrom the mid-1950s on. However, despite these ambiguities and the blurring ofthe ethnic divide between the Han and the non-Han, in the final analysis, Chinaand Chineseness are still identified in these texts with the Han, even if less expli-citly, whereas the non-Han peoples still constitute the non-Chinese others. Con-sider, for example, the following sections from the discussion of the Manchuconquest of China in the seventeenth century. These sections illustrate the con-tinuing unequivocal Han subjectivity that dominates the text and the continuingothering of the non-Han peoples:

Shi Kefa died heroically for the country (zhuanglie xunguo)… [He] dedi-cated his own life to defending the motherland (baowei zuguo). [In thishe] demonstrated the noble national moral courage (minzu qijie) andplayed an inspiring role in the development of the struggle of resistanceagainst the Qing. (Chen et al. 1956, 148)

The Qing army… ordered the shaving of [peoples’] heads… Leaving allthe hair on one’s head was the practice of the Han people. Shaving thehair from all sides of the head and leaving a pigtail in the middle wasthe style of the Manchu people. Thus, forcing the shaving of heads actu-ally meant forcing the Han people to obey the rule of the Manchu aristo-crats … The people rose up everywhere in revolt against the rule of theQing army. (Chen et al. 1956, 148)


The peasant army of the southwest resisted the Qing persistently fortwenty years … and demonstrated the strong and indomitable will ofthe Chinese people (Zhongguo renmin) to resist invasion. (Chen et al.1956, 150)

Although, unlike the 1951 text, the textbook of 1956 avoids referring to the Qingas a “foreign” regime by name, it still represents the Manchu dynasty as such byassociating it with “invasion” (third passage), a term suggesting that this regimecame from outside China. That the Qing was indeed a foreign dynasty, eventhough it is not referred to as such explicitly, is further established in the samepassage in the statement that “the Chinese people” resisted its invasion. The non-Chinese identity of the Qing is also communicated in the first passage. Shi Kefawas a Han general of the Ming dynasty who fought against the Qing, and insuggesting that he defended “the motherland” rather than the Ming dynasty,the text implies that the Ming was in fact China, whereas the Qing was not.Unlike the 1951 textbook, the 1956 textbook does not refer to the Qingdynasty as the “Qing of the Manchu” (Man Qing; QHRZJJBW 1951b, 235)and does not speak about the “invasion of the Manchu people and the resistanceof the Han people” (QHRZJJBW 1951b, 5). Yet, because the text does make clearthat the Qing was established and ruled by the Manchus, the latter become, byimplication, non-Chinese and strangers to “the motherland,” just like thedynasty that they established.

That Chinese history was still perceived by the editors of the 1956 textbook asthe history of the Han people is also implied by the continuing positive represen-tation of the Han and the negative representation of the non-Han. Although the1956 textbook deleted the most extremely negative elements from its depictionsof the non-Han peoples, the latter are still often demonized. In addition to beingdescribed as “invaders,” thus suggesting that they were not only outsiders but alsoaggressors, they continue to be described as brutal savages who kill masses ofpeople, behave “cruelly and ferociously” (canbao), and “pillage” (lulüe) and“destroy.” The Han, on the other hand, are not only referred to repeatedly as“patriots” (aiguo) who “defend the motherland” and have “national moralcourage,” but are also depicted as “heroes” (yingxiong) who fight “heroicallyand bravely” (yingyong) while demonstrating “perseverance” ( jianchi), and asthose who “sacrifice their lives” (xisheng) to protect “the motherland.”

The discussion of the war between the Southern Song and the Jin illustratesthe diametrically opposed ways in which the Han and the non-Han arerepresented. After describing how “in 1129, the Jin army … invaded thesouth,” how the south “suffered the most severe destruction ( ji yanzhong depohuai) by the Jin army,” and how, as a result, “everywhere people rose up tolaunch a counterattack against the ferocious enemy (xiong’e de diren)” (Chenet al. 1956, 85), the text proceeds to describe the heroic deeds of Yue Fei. YueFei and his struggle of “resistance against the Jin” (kang Jin) are described in

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no less than one and a half pages, and he is awarded the rare privilege of havinghis portrait added to the text. The text introduces Yue Fei in the following words:“His hometown suffered cruel destruction (canku pohuai) at the hands of the Jinarmy, creating in him unparalleled furious resentment” (Chen et al. 1956, 86). Itthen goes on to describe how Yue Fei fought “heroically” against the Jin (Chenet al. 1956, 86), and after referring to him and two other generals as “patriotic”generals, the discussion ends by labeling Yue Fei a “national hero.”7

In the 1956 textbook, as in the text from 1951, the otherness of non-Hanpeoples also manifests itself in the negative evaluation of the influence thattheir regimes had on the development of Chinese history. The depiction of theYuan dynasty is representative of this tendency. As part of the changes mentionedearlier, the 1956 senior high textbook gives more credit to the Mongolian dynastythan its 1951 predecessor. The text mentions, for example, that the Yuan unifiedChina and that it established several important administrative systems andorgans. It also suggests that during that period there was “progress” ( jinbu) inthe handicraft industry, and, in complete contrast to the 1951 text, it alsostates that commerce “developed” ( fada), especially foreign trade via the sea(Chen et al. 1956, 100–4). However, these positive developments are stilldeemphasized, being mentioned in brief and most often in passing in thecontext of an overall extremely negative assessment, which is still very similarto the one found in the 1951 textbook. The very first section in the discussionof the Yuan, for example, is entitled “The Oppression of the People by theYuan Rulers,” a title that already sets the negative tone for the rest of the discus-sion. This title is followed by frequent references to the “corruption” (tanwu) ofthe “Yuan rulers,” but more importantly, the discussion suggests several timesthat during the Yuan reign, Chinese society suffered oppression that was “unpre-cedented in its cruelty” (kongqian canku), and that economics in general andagriculture in particular suffered “the most severe destruction in [Chinese]history” (wo guo lishi shang shengchan shoudao zui yanzhong pohuai) (seeChen et al. 1956, 105–6, 109, 117–18). Because agriculture has always beenone of the most important markers of Chinese identity, as opposed to thenomadic way of life of China’s barbaric neighbors, the emphasis on the destruc-tion of agriculture during the Yuan helped establish the otherness of this dynasty.

That the Yuan dynasty was seen as a foreign regime is also implied by the factthat much of the chapter dealing with it is dedicated to positive depictions of

7Perpetuating the more radical representation of the non-Han peoples as others that was found inhigh school textbooks from the early 1950s, the textbook for junior high schools from 1957 discussesthe Jin in the following way: “When the Jin army invaded northern China, they slaughtered people,plundered property, and destroyed cities and villages everywhere” (Wang and Chen 1957, 47;emphasis added). The same text describes Yue Fei as follows: “Yue Fei ardently loved the mother-land (re’ai zuguo) and furiously resented the ferocious behavior of the enemy … The Chinesepeople will forever commemorate the national hero Yue Fei” (Wang and Chen 1957, 44, 46; empha-sis added).


Han resistance. While Kublai Khan, the Mongolian founder of the dynasty, isnoted only in passing, as the leader of the “enemy” (Chen et al. 1956, 98),without even a mention of the years in which he lived or reigned, Wen Tianxiang,the famous “general of the Southern Song,” by contrast, is discussed in a lengthyparagraph that extols his “patriotism” and “unyielding bravery” (yingyong bu qu).Moreover, like Yue Fei, he is also awarded the privilege of having his portraitadded to the text together with a mention of the years in which he lived (Chenet al. 1956, 99). This differential representation suggests that Wen Tianxiangwas one of us, while Kublai Khan and the dynasty that he established (the estab-lishment of which is mentioned only in passing) were not Chinese even thoughthey ruled China.

REFORMING THE REPRESENTATION OF “MINORITY PEOPLE” IN THE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

OF THE POST-MAO ERA: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The textbooks of old China called the Khitan and Jurchens “foreignpeoples” and “outside peoples” and called the war that they startedwith the Song the “invasion of China.” But today’s textbooks considerthe Khitan and the Jurchens members of the Chinese nation (Zhonghuaminzu). The two states of Liao and Jin are two dynasties in the history ofChina. Therefore the wars between the Liao and Jin and the Song areinternal disputes (neibu zhengduan) among ethnic groups who are partof the Chinese nation. They are disputes among several politicalpowers that existed simultaneously inside China’s territory.—Wang Hongzhi, senior editor at People’s Education Press (Wang

2000, 192)

The reform of the discourse on ethnicity in Chinese history textbooks was awell-planned project that involved the most senior editors at People’s EducationPress. In addition to writing and editing the textbooks themselves, these editorshave also published articles and books describing the rationale for the reform,their intentions and aims, as well as the guiding principles that underpinnedtheir revisions. The writings of the vice general editor of the press, WangHongzhi, whom I quote at the beginning of this section, are particularly illumi-nating. Wang has participated in the editing and writing of many of the textbooksproduced since the late 1970s, and also edited parts of the 2003 history textbookthat will be discussed in detail later.

Wang traces the origin of many of the new ideas that relate to ethnicity, whichshe and her colleagues applied in the writing of the new textbooks, to an articlewritten in 1961 by the famous historian Jian Bozan (1898–1968), under whomshe studied at Beijing University (Wang 2000, 218). The most basic amongthese ideas is the notion that China “has been a multi-national state sinceantiquity (zigu yilai)” (emphasis added). Another related idea is that all the

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ethnic groups in China are, and have always been, Chinese, despite the fact thateach of them is a different nationality:

Our country has been a multi-national state since antiquity. Besides theHan nationality, there are also many other nationalities. As a nationality,each of them is a nationality, but as members of a multi-national statethey are all Chinese. Therefore, when we write the history of China,we have to be careful not to separate the history of the people of theHan nationality from the history of all other nationalities. (Jian 1961;cited in fragments in Wang 2000, 219, 223)

In the early 1980s, inspired by Jian’s 1961 article, Wang began to develop theideas discussed in that article and to rearticulate them in her own words:

Our country is historically a multi-national state. All the nationalities havemade contributions to the development of the history of the motherland.(Wang 2000, 180)

In Chinese history, besides describing the history of the Han nationality,one should also describe the history of minority nationalities, and showthat the history of the motherland was created together by the peopleof all nationalities. (Wang 2000, 188)

Without the history of minority nationalities, one cannot speak aboutChinese history … The teaching of history must include the history ofthe nationalities; otherwise the students will not be able to learn thetrue history of China. (Wang 2000, 201)

One major problem that the historians and editors of history textbooks faced intheir effort to construct an inclusive, multi-ethnic concept of Chinese history wasthe question of what exactly constituted China at each given point in history. Thisquestion was crucial because it determined which ethnic groups should beincluded in the historical narrative as part of the national self and whichshould not. The solution to this problem was offered by another importantsource of inspiration that Wang and other editors repeatedly cite in their writings,namely, the prominent historian Fan Wenlan (1891/3–1969), who wrote some ofthe most widely used and influential history books in China after 1949. Explain-ing why a certain history textbook included a discussion of the Tibetans (Tufan/Tubo) in its chapter on the Tang dynasty, despite the fact that Tibet was not partof Tang territory, Wang cites Fan, who wrote, “The historical territory of Chinaincludes both the dynasties of the Central Plains and the states that minoritiesestablished independently” (cited in Wang 2000, 224).

This statement is of great importance, and it has been generally understoodby the editors of history textbooks and other Chinese historians to mean that


historical China should be regarded as everything that existed in the past on theterritory that is China today. This point is made clear by Jian Bozan, who wrote,“Do not treat all the nationalities that are not Han as foreign peoples (waiguoren).[We] have to acknowledge that all the ancient nationalities that ever lived andwere active within the present-day territory of China ( jinri Zhongguo lingtuyinei) were all Chinese, no matter what relations they had at that time withthe dynasties of the Central Plains” (Jian 1997, 63). In the late 1970s and early1980s, the notion that everything that existed in the past on the territory ofpresent-day China should be regarded as Chinese became central to thehistorical narrative in high school textbooks, thus implying that it became acentral component in the contemporary Chinese nation-building project.

This concept of historical China is a typical example of the tendency ofnationalist historians to project the present into the past in order to legitimizethe state and the nation as they exist today. Like many other nationalist historicalnarratives, this concept assumed a simplistic, linear continuity and treated Chinaas an ancient entity that had existed almost unchanged from time immemorial(zigu) to the present. It ignored the fact that “China” was and meant differentthings at different times, and suppressed many uncomfortable historical eventsand facts that challenged the new narrative. Most importantly, the vision ofChina as always having been what the PRC is now, territorially and ethnically,ignored the crucial fact that, with a few exceptions, the territorial boundariesof the PRC were based on those established by the Qing empire after its exten-sive conquests of the mid-eighteenth century. The new vision also ignored thedisturbing question of whether the Qing was indeed China. Some Western scho-lars have suggested recently that the Qing was actually a Manchu empire in whichChina (defined as the territory occupied predominantly by Chinese speakers)constituted only one component (Elliott 2001, 5; Rawski 1996, 832, 841). It isimportant to emphasize that this understanding of the Qing and its relationshipto China is not new and certainly not confined to contemporary Western scholars.The same understanding was also shared by prominent Chinese revolutionariesin the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of whom promotedthe notion that the territory of the new republic should be confined to Chinaproper, or more specifically, only to the territory of Han-ruled dynasties inChina’s past. Some also promoted the idea that the alien Manchus should beexpelled from China and establish their own nation-state in Manchuria(Rhoads 2000, 293; Shen and Chien 2006, 57; Zhang 2002). The largestnon-Han populations who were incorporated into the Qing empire had similarreservations regarding the equation of the new republic with the Qing. Thesecommunities did not consider themselves to be part of Zhongguo (China), andthus after the fall of the Qing sought independence from the new republic(Duara 1995, 76, 142; Rawski 1996, 840; Rhoads 2000, 294).

Another major problematic claim included in the vision of China as alwayshaving been what it is in the present is the idea that China has always been a

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multi-ethnic state. Again, similar to the claim regarding China’s territory, thisclaim ignored the relatively recent origins of the concept of a multi-ethnicstate in the Chinese context and the fact that it derived from mid-Qing ideologyand policy, being intimately connected to the Qianlong emperor and his particu-lar vision of universal rulership (Crossley 1989, 64–65; 1990, 22, 29; Rawski 1996,834–35; Rhoads 2000, 293–94; Zhao 2006).

Ignoring all these uncomfortable historical and historiographical complex-ities, from the late 1970s and early 1980s on, history textbooks began todiscuss all the non-Han ethnic groups that in the past had inhabited the territorythat was China at the present as Chinese, and the main effort became to push thelinks between the Han and the non-Han peoples further and further back intime. The claims that historical China was a reflection of present-day Chinaand that non-Han regions and their native non-Han populations had been “inse-parable parts of our [Chinese] motherland since antiquity” were not totally new(see Bovingdon 2001, 116; Feuerwerker 1968, 24; Schneider 1971, 260).However, it was only from the beginning of the reform era that these claimswere fully and systematically incorporated into Chinese history textbooks aspart of a new, coherent, multi-ethnic master narrative of Chinese history.

As part of the effort to incorporate non-Han peoples and their historiesinto the Chinese self and its history, Wang Hongzhi and her colleagues atPeople’s Education Press adopted another central idea of Fan Wenlan, namely,that wars fought in the past between the different peoples that inhabited theterritory that was now China were like “a quarrel between brothers, and ascuffle in the family” (xiongdi xiqiang jiali dajia). Fan’s metaphor not onlyaffirmed that non-Han peoples were insiders, or part of China’s “big familyof many nationalities” (duominzu de jiating), but also had the effect ofbelittling these historical conflicts. Indeed, in the reform era, it became amajor principle in the writing of history textbooks to deemphasize conflictsbetween the Han and the non-Han and instead to emphasize cooperation,peace, and merging.

Fan Wenlan’s metaphor also made the interethnic conflicts between the Hanand the non-Han categorically different from conflicts that the Han had withthose who were not members of the “family.” This new distinction became thebasis for an important change in the terminology of the textbooks of thereform period. From this point on, the word “invade” was strictly avoidedwhen references were made to the military attacks that the non-Han peopleslaunched against the Han. Given that the term suggests two distinctentities and an outsider who is entering a territory not of its own, and thatusing it would imply that the non-Han peoples were foreigners, the term wasavoided in order not to subvert the notion that the Han and the non-Hanbelonged to the same “family.” This rationale is explained in detail in the follow-ing paragraph by another senior editor at People’s Education Press, namedZang Rong:


We ought to pay special attention to making a clear-cut distinctionbetween the wars among the various nationalities in the history of ourcountry and the wars in which the various nationalities of our countryjointly fought against foreign invasion. The former is an internal matteramong the various nationalities in our country, exactly as comrade FanWenlan said in those years: “a quarrel between brothers, a scuffle inthe family” … [I]n defining and narrating [the former] one absolutelycannot use the words “invade” and “resist invasion.” The latter is amatter in which the people of the various nationalities in our countryresisted a foreign invading power, and is essentially different from theinternal struggles among the various nationalities within our country.(Zang 1992, 76)

Another important principle that guided the construction of the new discourse onethnicity was the “principle of equality” (Wang 2000, 206). Wang suggests thatthe new textbooks avoid the tendency, found in earlier textbooks, to narratehistory exclusively from the point of view of the Han while ignoring the perspec-tive of the non-Han peoples (Wang 2000, 180–81, 188–90, 206–9, 231–32). Shealso observes that the new textbooks pay more attention to the history ofnon-Han peoples, their heroes, and their contributions to Chinese history:

In the history teaching of old China, the majority of the patriots andnational heroes were of the Han people and there were very few oralmost no minority ones. This kind of patriotic education is not complete.The patriotic education that we want to practice today with students isthat which would make them love wholeheartedly the unified, multi-national, socialist motherland. In order to reach this goal, [we] have tospeak about the history of the nationalities. By speaking about the brilli-ant history of the various nationalities, their heroes and inventions, andby speaking about the contribution that the various nationalities madein every regard to the creation of the great motherland, [we] make thestudents understand that the unified, multi-national, flourishing mother-land of today did not come easily. Thereby, they will love the motherlandeven more deeply. (Wang 2000, 202)

Considering that no new factual data are presented in the new textbooks or in thearticles of the editors who produced them to justify any of the revisions, itbecomes clear that it was ideology that constituted the major driving forcebehind the reform. Indeed, articles written by the editors of People’s EducationPress together with teaching guidelines and other related material, all make clearthat the main aim in producing the new discourse on ethnicity in the history text-books was to foster “unity among the nationalities” and a sense of belonging andloyalty to the Chinese state among China’s minority nationalities.

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THE HISTORY TEXTBOOK OF 2003: MAKING THE NON-HAN PEOPLES PART OF THE

CHINESE SELF (OR TOWARD A UNIFIED, MULTI-ETHNIC CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY)

The textbook of 2003 represents the most recent stage in the ongoingreform of history textbooks. In this textbook, ethnicity constitutes one of themajor themes, as evidenced by the prominence of the term minzu in its tableof contents; the term appears in the titles of three out of the six chapters thatmake up the book. This new emphasis on ethnicity replaced the focus on classstruggle and peasant rebellions that was found in the history textbooks of theMaoist era.

The discussion of ethnicity in the 2003 textbook is centered around two mainmotifs: the notion of “ethnic merging” (minzu ronghe), and the concept of Chinaas a “multi-ethnic/multi-national state” (duominzu guojia). The “ethnic merging”motif appears right at the beginning in chapter 1, thus communicating the notionthat different peoples have always existed in China, and that “ethnic merging”began in the earliest periods of Chinese history. The abstract that precedeschapter 2 states that “the Qin and the Han dynasties … were … the period inwhich a foundation was laid for a unified, multi-ethnic state” (RJCL 2003, 25).This statement stands in total opposition to the discussion of the Qin dynastyin the 1951 textbook, which suggested that the Qin established an ethnicallyhomogeneous “nation-state” (minzu guojia, as opposed to duominzu guojia) ofthe Hua/Han people.

Another striking feature in the 2003 textbook is a renewed emphasis on theinside–outside (nei and wai) dichotomy that was so important in the 1951 text-book, but was weakened in later textbooks of the Maoist era. This dichotomy,however, is now completely redefined, and it immediately becomes clear thatthe outsiders in the 2003 textbook are very different from those in the textbookof 1951. With the exception of one chapter, each chapter in the 2003 textbook isdivided into seven or eight sections. In four out of the six chapters, the theme ofethnicity is discussed in the fifth or sixth section under titles such as “ethnicrelations” (minzu guanxi) or “the development of a unified multi-ethnic state”(tongyi duominzu guojia de fazhan). Following this section, the next section ineach chapter discusses China’s “foreign relations” or “foreign contacts” (duiwaiguanxi, duiwai jiaoliu, or duiwai jiaowang) during the same period. This organ-ization implies that all the peoples and polities discussed in the previous sectionare insiders, or in other words, Chinese. In sharp contrast to the 1951 textbook, inwhich the Xiongnu, Sienpi (Xianbei), Tibetans, Uyghurs (Huihe/Huihu), Khitans,Jurchens, Mongols, and Manchus, to name only the most prominent ethnicgroups, were all considered and labeled “outsiders,” these peoples are now dis-cussed in the section that deals with ethnic relations within China, and thusthey have become insiders. The only outsiders in the 2003 textbook are Japanese,Russians, and other Westerners, and other peoples who did not live in what istoday Chinese territory.


The new discourse on ethnicity manifests itself throughout the 2003 text-book. Let us consider, for example, chapter 5, which is titled “The FurtherStrengthening of Ethnic Merging and the Continuing Development of the Feud-alist Economy—The Five Dynasties, Liao, Song, Xia, Jin, and Yuan.” Theabstract of this chapter reads as follows:

In our country, the period between the tenth century and the mid-fourteenth century was the period of the Five Dynasties, the Liao, theSong, the Xia, the Jin, and the Yuan … the two Song regimes, whichrelied mainly on the Han people, and the Yuan Dynasty, which the Mon-golian people established, strengthened the centralized authority further.The regimes of the Khitan, Tanguts, Jurchens, and other minoritypeoples (shaoshu minzu) existed one after another simultaneously withthe two Songs. Although wars were frequent for some time during thatperiod, the exchange in politics, economics, and culture among thevarious ethnic groups was intense. The various regimes of the ethnic min-orities were influenced to one degree or another by the advancedeconomy and culture of the Han people … The various ethnic groupstook a step further in their merging. (RJCL 2003, 97)

This abstract illustrates vividly how in the 2003 textbook all those ethnic groupsthat in 1951 were labeled “foreigners” and were still treated as such in 1956,albeit without being explicitly referred to as “foreigners” anymore, are nowfully incorporated into the Chinese self and are treated as completely Chinese.The incorporation manifests itself in the fact that these ethnic groups are referredto as “minority peoples,” a term that helps establish the idea that they were alwaysan integral, even if only a small part, of a large Chinese whole. This approach isalso evident in the fact that the regimes that these groups established are dis-cussed together and on an equal level with those established by the Han. Insharp contrast to the Han-centric representation of non-Han regimes in the1956 textbook, in which the Song was set apart graphically by a space from thenon-Han polities to suggest that it was categorically different, and was listedfirst in the list of the names of the polities despite the fact that it was establishedafter the Liao, it is now not only listed together with the non-Han regimes, butalso appears second in the list after the Liao in accordance with the chronologicalorder in which the two polities were established.

Consistent with this new inclusive and less Han-centric approach, althoughthe abstract still insists on the superiority of the Han, it nevertheless suggeststhat the non-Han peoples contributed to the development of Chinese history.Thus, the strengthening of a centralized authority is attributed to both the twoSongs and the Yuan. This acknowledgment of the contribution of non-Hanpeoples contrasts with the strikingly negative value judgment of these peoplesin textbooks from the Maoist era.

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The abstract of chapter 5 also illustrates the centrality of the concept of“ethnic merging.” In history textbooks published during the reform era, theterm “merging” (ronghe) replaces all other terms with close meanings thatwere used in earlier textbooks, such as “assimilation” (tonghua) or “Hanization”(Hanhua). Clearly, this term was found to be a better fit with the new historicalnarrative because it communicates the idea that China and Chinese culture havedeveloped through a constant mixture of different ethnic cultures, in which allpeoples contributed to a pluralistic whole, rather than through the swallowingof all ethnic cultures by the culture of the Han.

In addition, in accordance with the new principle that non-Han peoplesshould be represented as part of the “family,” the 2003 textbook completelyavoids using the term “invade” when discussing the military actions of thesepeoples in their wars against the Han. The following paragraph, describing thewar between the Northern Song and the Liao, is representative of the newdiscourse:

After the Northern Song stopped its northern expedition, the rulers ofthe Liao constantly sent troops to go down to the south (nanxia) andthreatened the security of the Song. In 1004, the Liao army went on alarge scale expedition to the south (nanzheng). (RJCL 2003, 107; emphasisadded)

Significantly enough, this paragraph comes after several lines that describe twoattacks that the Northern Song launched against the Liao, lines suggesting thatthe Song was not an innocent victim, and that the Liao was not the only aggressorin the conflict. The relative neutrality that characterizes the description of theconflicts between the Han and their non-Han neighbors is also evident in thedeletion of the extremely negative depictions that were used as a matter ofcourse in textbooks from the Maoist era to describe the latter. The non-Hanpeoples not only cease to be the “invaders,” but with a few exceptions, alsocease to be the “brutal” and “cruel” “enemy” who “slaughters,” “plunders” and“destroys” indiscriminately. Similarly, again with a few exceptions, also goneare the many references to the “brave” “resistance” of the Han, their lofty“patriotism,” and their exclusive association with “the motherland.”

The adoption of a more neutral narrative and avoidance of the harshdepictions of the wars between the Han and the non-Han that dominatedearlier textbooks were closely associated with the new effort to emphasize apeaceful exchange and cooperation while downplaying conflicts when discussinginterethnic relations in Chinese history. After describing in brief the militaryconfrontation between the Northern Song and the Liao, the text continues:

In the beginning of the second year, the two sides reached a peace agree-ment. Every year the Song gave the Liao “suibi” and the Liao withdrew


their troops. The two sides agreed to be brother countries (xiongdi zhiguo) that keep to their own boundaries. In history this was called theTreaty of Chanyuan. After the Treaty of Chanyuan, the Song and theLiao existed side by side. In the course of one century, the two sides basi-cally maintained the peace. The borders of the Song and the Liao werequiet and stable and the trade between the two sides flourished. Envoyscame and went constantly. These strengthened the friendly relationsbetween the Khitan people and the Han people and advanced themerging of [the two] nationalities. (RJCL 2003, 107)

This paragraph constitutes a significant change from the 1956 textbook. Althoughthe latter mentioned the “peace treaty” that the Song and Liao signed, the treatywas downplayed and treated negatively, as the discussion implied that it wasimposed on the Song. Moreover, the treaty was not referred to by any name,and the text suggested that it was “humiliating” (quru) for the Song, a descriptionthat immediately evoked the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century. Consist-ent with this negative view of the treaty, the description of the situation betweenthe Song and the Liao after the war was mainly technical, consisting of a list ofnames of places and the objects that were traded between the two sides (seeChen et al. 1956, 73).

In the 2003 textbook, by contrast, the peace treaty is no longer said to be“humiliating,” and this, together with the fact that it is now mentioned byname, present it as a significant treaty that succeeded in bringing about realpeace. The new view is communicated even more explicitly in the lengthy, posi-tive description of the relations between the Song and the Liao after the treatywas signed. The statements that the two sides agreed to be “brother countries,”that the borders were “quiet and stable,” and that the trade between the two sides“flourished” are all new. Also new are the references to the envoys that “came andwent constantly,” the “friendly relations” between the two polities, and, mostimportantly, the suggestion that the peace treaty advanced the “merging” ofthe Han and the Khitan.

Consistent with the downplaying of the wars between the Han and thenon-Han, the 2003 textbook also contains a much softer visual image of YueFei when discussing the war between the Southern Song and the Jin. In sharpcontrast to the grand, masculine, and militant portrait of the Han general inthe 1956 textbook, in which Yue Fei was shown in close-up from his chest up,wearing a fancy cap, with an impressive beard and a mustache, broad shoulders,and what appears to be a breastplate (see figure 1), in the 2003 textbook, he isshown in full figure, which makes him look much smaller and considerably lesssignificant because the new portrait occupies only a tiny portion of the page.Moreover, in the new portrait, there is nothing that suggests Yue Fei’s militaryrole and heroism. Instead, with a chubby face, no facial hair, and very tinyfeet, dressed in a plain gown and wearing a simple cap, he looks more like an

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ordinary, even humble, civil official (see figure 2). One can only speculatethat the editors of the 2003 textbook chose this new portrait in the hope thatit would be less offensive to minority people and would present the Han asless militant. Moreover, this new image is clearly more consistent with the factthat history textbooks published since the late 1970s stripped Yue Fei of hisgrand, “national hero” status, as well as with the general tendency in thesebooks to present more softened descriptions of both Jin brutality and Songresistance.

The changing representation of non-Han peoples and their relationshipwith China is also manifested in maps. Whereas the 1951 textbook had nomaps at all, maps of the same historical periods from the 1956 and the 2003textbooks differ considerably and nicely illustrate how non-Han peoples werecartographically represented as others in the earlier textbook while made partof the Chinese self in the later one. In its map that depicts the “NorthernSong, Liao, and Western Xia,” for example, the 1956 textbook shows onlythe territory of these three polities, which together constitute a small portionof the territory of present-day China. The boundaries between the polities aredrawn in bold, solid lines, which communicate that the Northern Song, Liao,and Western Xia were three separate entities. Although small parts of today’sTibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia are shown in the margins of the map, these terri-tories are not identified by name and appear as totally irrelevant to Chinesehistory. Moreover, consistent with the focus in the text on the dynasties of theHan people, the Song appears first in the title of the map, and graphic marks

Figure 1. Image of Yue Fei in the 1956 textbook(Chen et al. 1956, 86).


that represent additional information are drawn only on Song territory (see figure3, left map).

By contrast, the parallel map in the 2003 textbook (see figure 3, right map)looks much more similar to the map of present-day China, showing, in fact, mostof the territory of the Qing empire at the height of its territorial expansion afterthe large conquests of the mid-eighteenth century. Although titled “The Liao,Northern Song, and Western Xia” (note the change in the order of the names),the map also includes the territories of the Kingdom of Dali, the “variousparts/tribes of Tibet” (Tufan/Tubo zhu bu), and the “Uyghurs of the Western pre-fecture/state” (Xizhou Huihu).8 All these territories (including Taiwan) appear inwhite, and are clearly distinguished from the rest of the world, which appears ingrey (and on which no single character is printed). This contrast in colors com-municates the sense that all the polities and territories that appear on the mapin white actually constitute one unit. This sense is further enhanced by the factthat the boundaries between the different polities and peoples whose territoriesappear in white are now marked with a line of dashes, as opposed to the bold,solid line in the earlier map. The 2003 map thus communicates visually the

Figure 2. Image of Yue Fei in the2003 textbook (RJCL 2003, 110).

8The territory of the Liao actually goes well beyond today’s China and includes present-dayMongolia and parts of southeast Russia. The map also includes Taiwan and the islands in theSouth Sea.

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founding concept of Fan Wenlan that historical China should be regarded aseverything that existed in the past on the territory that is China today.

As noted earlier, the reformed representation of non-Han peoples also revealsitself in a new, positive evaluation of their regimes. The discussion of the Yuandynasty in the 2003 textbook provides a good example. Whereas textbooks fromthe Mao era contained a comprehensive denunciation of the Mongolian dynasty,and treated the Mongols as foreigners who invaded China, annihilated theSong, brought unprecedented misery to the Han (read Chinese) people, andinflicted unparalleled destruction on the Chinese economy, particularly in agri-culture, the 2003 textbook clearly turns the narrative upside down. Titled “TheEstablishment of the Yuan Dynasty and the Development of a Unified, Multi-Ethnic State,” the chapter on this non-Han dynasty praises it for many achieve-ments, especially, as suggested by the title of the chapter, for unifying China andfor advancing the “ethnic merging” in the country. Moreover, in a total reversal ofthe negative historical verdict in textbooks from the Mao era regarding thedestructive effects that the dynasty had on the Chinese economy and agriculture,the text now reads, “In the period of the Liao, Song, Xia, Jin, and Yuan, theeconomy of our country continued to develop … The Liao, Xia, Jin, and Yuan …

attached importance to agricultural production” (RJCL 2003, 113).The 2003 textbook also suggests that during the Yuan period, the handicraft

industry developed, traffic and communications saw “unparalleled development”(kongqian fada), commerce was “prosperous to an unprecedented extent”(kongqian fansheng), and the ports for foreign trade “became very famousworld wide” (zai shijie shang dou hen youming) (RJCL 2003, 113). Althoughsome of these achievements were mentioned in the 1956 textbook, they were

Figure 3. Depiction of the Song, Liao, and Xia in the 1956 and 2003 textbooks (Chenet al. 1956, 72; RJCL 2003, 106).


clearly downplayed—not once, for example, were any of them described as“unparalleled”—and relegated to the margins of an extremely negative narrative.Conversely, the only trace found in the 2003 textbook of the extremely negativedepictions of earlier textbooks are several softened remarks that are summarizedin two lines, appear in the very end of the chapter in small print, and suggest thatthe negative phenomena mentioned existed only in the middle and later period ofthe dynasty (RJCL 2003, 113).9

The conscious effort to incorporate the non-Han peoples into the Chineseself reveals itself also in a much more positive treatment of their leaders.These individuals are now discussed at greater length, are often praised fortheir talent and achievements, and are referred to by titles that were previouslyreserved only for Han emperors. While the 1956 textbook referred to prominentnon-Han leaders only by name, the 2003 textbook, by contrast, often adds power-ful superlatives. Chinggis Khan and the Jurchen leader Wanyan Aguda, forexample, are referred to as “outstanding leader[s]” ( jiechu shouling) (RJCL2003, 108, 111). Similarly, just as the text now recognizes the Liao and the Jinas two legitimate Chinese dynasties and refers to them as such (chao), theirnon-Han founders, Yelü Abaoji and Wanyan Aguda, are referred to, like theHan founders of other dynasties, as Liao Taizu and Jin Taizu, respectively (2003,106, 108–9). The more respectful treatment of non-Han leaders also manifestsitself visually. In the chapter on the Yuan, for example, whereas the 1956 textbookonly had a portrait of Chinggis Khan, a leader of universal stature who was tooimportant to be ignored, the 2003 textbook, by contrast, also has a portrait ofKublai Khan (see RJCL 2003, 111). Along with this new addition, in another con-trast to the 1956 textbook, the book from 2003 has no portrait of the Han heroWenTianxiang, who played an active role in resisting the Mongols.

THE REASONS FOR THE REFORM OF HISTORY TEXTBOOKS AND ITS TIMING

While it is well known that the multi-ethnic vision of China had alreadybecome an accepted notion among a growing number of Han intellectuals andpolitical leaders by the beginning of the twentieth century, few have acknowl-edged that this vision had to wait until the last quarter of the twentiethcentury to be developed and translated into a coherent and comprehensive multi-ethnic Chinese historiography and to be canonized in high school textbooks. Whydid this development have to wait for so long, and how can we explain the obviousdiscrepancy between the exclusive historical narrative in high school textbooks of

9Like many of the ideas and tendencies described here, the positive reevaluation of the Mongolianconquest of China had its origins several decades earlier, and can be traced back to at least as earlyas 1962 (see Farquhar 1968, esp. 184–85). However, it was only in the post-Mao era that this posi-tive assessment was incorporated into the master narrative of Chinese history and was canonized inhistory textbooks.

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the first three decades of the PRC and the massive efforts that the Communistgovernment made during that time to integrate the non-Han peoples into thenew Chinese state?

One major reason that must have contributed to the “delay” in the reform ofhistory textbooks is the ideological milieu in post-1949 China. It is quite possiblethat during the Maoist period, the editors of textbooks were so preoccupied withthe project of rewriting Chinese history according to the Marxist paradigm, withits focus on class struggle (Feuerwerker 1968, 15–18, 34; Harrison 1969), thatissues of ethnicity simply received less attention. After all, according to Marxisttheory, ethnic conflicts are a form of class struggle, and it was believed thatethnicity would disappear as China advanced toward communism. Seen from aslightly different perspective, it is also possible that the editors of textbooksfelt that the rewriting of Chinese history according to Marxist ideas wasalready enough to construct a sense of a nation (and a state) and there was noneed to pay much attention to issues of ethnicity. Indeed, after 1949, in orderto be a member of “the [Chinese] people” (renmin), it did not matter, at leastnot theoretically, to which ethnicity one belonged, but rather to which class.Those who belonged to the right classes belonged to the nation, and thosewho did not belong to those classes were excluded from the nation (Fitzgerald1996, 78–79). In other words, class was actually made the most powerful unifyingforce that was supposed to help overcome China’s ethnic (and regional) diversity(Fitzgerald 1996, esp. 73–83).

Thus, since the late 1970s, the decline of the revolutionary paradigm of histor-iography with its emphasis on class categories (Dirlik 2000, esp. 125–36), created avacuum in the nationalist narrative, and this vacuum had to be filled with a new nar-rative that would legitimize the Chinese state. It was at this point that a space wasopened once again for ethnicity to become the dominant theme in the historical nar-rative. In fact, the decline of class-oriented solutions to the problem of ethnic diver-sity in China, combined with the realization that the problem of ethnicity was notgoing to disappear in the near future, left editors with few other options but to con-front the problem of ethnicity in themost direct way and to look for a new historicalnarrative that would offer a solution to this problem. It was at this point that theeditors of history textbooks must have realized that a multi-ethnic historical narra-tive that would fully incorporate China’s non-Han peoples into Chinese historysince its very early beginning had to be invented.

Another possible explanation for the timing of the change in the represen-tation of non-Han peoples is that during the first decades of the PRC, those incharge of writing history textbooks actually chose to represent non-Hanpeoples as others. At first glance, this explanation may seem to contradict thefirst explanation, but it can also be understood as complementary. Consideringthat in post-1949 China, the nation-building project was still in its very beginning,it seems probable that, like their predecessors of the late nineteenth century andearly twentieth centuries, those involved in the project were still primarily


concerned with the “making of a majority” (Gladney 1998) that would constitutethe core of the newly established nation-state to make it a viable polity. Thus, inthe first decades after 1949, the nation-building project in China still focused onconsolidating national consciousness among the Han, the majority nationalitythat, as several scholars have suggested, was invented not long before(G. V. Efimov, cited in Feuerwerker 1968, 21; Chow 1997; Gladney 1994a,180–82; 1996, 85), and among whom national consciousness was still very weak(Gladney 1994a, 179). The othering of non-Han peoples was an excellent meansto achieve that goal (Gladney 1994b), because throughout Chinese history, itwas most often in relation to these peoples that Han identity and Chinesenesshad been constructed. Nonetheless, this primary concern with the unity of theHan majority did not prevent the new regime from simultaneously makingmany public declarations about China being a multi-ethnic state in order toadvance the integration of non-Han peoples and regions into the new state.

The notion that the othering of China’s minorities has been helpful in conso-lidating the unity of the Han majority was introduced by Dru C. Gladney in themid-1990s (Gladney 1994a, 179–82; 1994b). This theory, which stresses theconscious othering of China’s minorities, is very useful in explaining the represen-tation of non-Han peoples as others in history textbooks of the first three decadesof the PRC. However, unlike Gladney, whose studies suggest that the othering ofnon-Han peoples increased in the post-Mao era, this essay proposes that at leastwhere history textbooks are concerned, the opposite is true, and this otheringactually weakened significantly.

This disagreement notwithstanding, the effort to incorporate the non-Hanpopulation into the Chinese self that is evident in history textbooks of thereform era could still be explained using Gladney’s theory. The switch that onecan find in these textbooks from an emphasis on the otherness of non-Hanpeoples to an emphasis on their belonging to the Chinese self can be interpretedas an indication that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the editors of these text-books felt that the identity and unity of the Han were already strong enough.Now that the core of the new Chinese nation-state had been consolidated, itwas possible to move on to the next stage of the nation-building project, toshift the emphasis to incorporating the periphery.

The shift from an exclusive, monoethnic narrative of Chinese history to amore inclusive and multi-ethnic one, however, was not affected only by thedegree of unity among the Han majority. Another factor that must have playedan important role in that process was the growing agency and power of ethnicminority people, especially the minority educated elite, who started to asserttheir ethnic identity in public much more forcefully than ever before in thehistory of the PRC. These new assertions were in part a reaction to the “civilizingproject” (Harrell 1995) of the Maoist era, which on one hand created strongminority identities among non-Han groups, many of whom did not identify them-selves as “nationalities” before the 1950s (Diamond 1995; Harrell 1996; Kaup

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2000; Litzinger 1995), and on the other hand aimed to assimilate them (some-times by force) into the homogeneous socialist order (Heberer 1989, 23–29).The growing assertiveness among the minority elites was also a result of theirlong-term training and work in state institutions, where they acquired the theor-etical and discursive abilities to challenge the Han-centric discourse (Harrell andLi 2003, 364–65). Another reason for the new trend was the general liberalizationin China since the late 1970s and the rise of ethnicity world wide.

The growing agency of the minority elite manifested itself in the field of his-toriography in the emergence of new, minority-centered historical narratives thatstarted to challenge the hegemonic, Han-centric discourse of Chinese historio-graphy (Bovingdon 2004; Harrell and Li 2003; Litzinger 1995, 122, 136–38;Rudelson 1996; 1997, 121–75; Yang 2001, 144–49). Although with very fewexceptions, the editors responsible for the writing of history textbooks werestill Han, these editors were well aware of the risk of ignoring the new trend.The new minority voices had to be co-opted, and the reform of the represen-tation of non-Han peoples in history textbooks was one important way ofco-optation. The new historical narratives gave unprecedented representation,albeit still extremely marginal, to non-Han peoples and their histories, presentedthem in a very positive light, and recognized their difference and the particularityof their histories. But simultaneously, and most importantly, the texts incorpor-ated these histories into a new, inclusive, and multi-ethnic single master narrativeof Chinese history, according to which the non-Han peoples have always beenChinese and their different histories have always been a part of Chinesehistory. Indeed, the examination of history textbooks that were published inpost-Mao China suggests that the stronger ethnonationalism became amongChina’s minorities during the 1980s and 1990s, the more powerfully they wereincorporated in these texts.10

A fourth possible reason for the changing representation of non-Han peoplesin Chinese history textbooks considers the objective limits of national and histor-iographical imagination. In his book Imagined Communities (1991), BenedictAnderson established the idea that a nation is an imagined community.Another well-established idea in the study of nationalism is that national historiestend to project the present of a nation into the past. This projection seeks to nat-uralize and thus legitimize the nation as it exists or as it is perceived in the presentby “proving” that it has existed as such since ancient times (Duara 1995, 4). Theidea of national history being a projection of the present into the past providesan excellent example of Anderson’s thesis because it implies that nationalist

10One poignant example of the close link between the rise in ethnic nationalism in China and thestrengthening of narratives of belonging that stress the Chineseness of China’s minorities isprovided by Barry Sautman (1997, 92), who points out that the propagation of the thesis thatthe Tibetans are the descendants of Peking Man, which implies a common origin for the Hansand the Tibetans, started in 1989, immediately after a series of pro-independence riots tookplace in Lhasa.


reconstructions of the past are a work of imagination. Yet, at the same time, thisidea also implies that the imagining of a particular national past has to begrounded at least to some extent in a real present, on which the imagined pastis modeled.

If we follow this logic, then the representation of non-Han peoples as others inthe history textbooks of the Maoist era derived in part from the objective reality ofthat particular time. Considering, for instance, that as late as 1947, Xinjiang wasexplicitly recognized as a colony even by senior officials in the Nationalist govern-ment (Bovingdon 2001, 112), it is quite reasonable to assume that at least some ofthe editors who wrote the early history textbooks of the PRC were also far fromconvinced, to say the least, that the non-Han people in Xinjiang or in otherremote “frontier areas” were Chinese. Indeed, the fact that in the early 1950s,major non-Han regions had just recently been taken over by the People’s Liber-ation Army, that some of these regions had only a tiny Han Chinese population,that communication and transportation between those regions and China properwere poor, and that Chinese culture lacked influence in many of those regions,all made it extremely difficult for the Han Chinese editors at that time toimagine many of the non-Han peoples as Chinese. The “ethnic identification”project of the mid-1950s, combined with the decision of the new regime togrant autonomy to non-Han peoples in many areas, must have also contributedto perpetuating the notion that these people were indeed others. To be sure, itwas one thing to order the military takeover of non-Han territories such as Xinjiangand Tibet and to claim sovereignty over them, and even to declare that China was amulti-ethnic state, and a totally different thing to create a comprehensive andcoherent historical narrative that would make the peoples who inhabited thoseregions and other non-Han regions Chinese since antiquity. The scant knowledgethat the Han Chinese editors had about minority regions and peoples at that time(Fan 1950, 46) made the task even more impossible.

In a similar vein, the multi-ethnic historical narrative that was constructed inthe reform era reflects important objective developments that took place inChina in the preceding decades. In other words, it required several decades ofstrong Chinese control over and presence in non-Han territories, the massiveimmigration of millions of Han Chinese into those areas, the integration ofnon-Han peoples and their cultural expressions into China’s mainstreamculture, and the strong influence of Chinese culture among China’s non-Hanpeoples, before it was possible to imagine these peoples as Chinese andproject such a vision into the remote past.

THE POLITICS OF INCORPORATING THE OTHER: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This article has shown how the representation of non-Han peoples inChinese high school textbooks of premodern Chinese history has changed

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dramatically since the establishment of the PRC. Whereas in the textbooks of theearly 1950s, the non-Han peoples were treated as non-Chinese others, and initiallywere even called “foreigners,” by the beginning of the twenty-first century, theywere totally incorporated into the Chinese self through a new narrative thatclaimed that they had been, in fact, always Chinese. The article has suggestedthat although certain important changes in the representation of non-Hanpeoples were already introduced during the Maoist period, the most significantpoint in the process of their transformation from others to part of the Chineseself occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when a comprehensive reformthat aimed to create a new discourse of ethnicity in history textbooks was launched.

The article has also demonstrated how the incorporation of non-Han peoplesinto the Chinese self was accompanied by a new representation of the Chinesenation, the Chinese state, and Chinese history. Whereas earlier textbooks propa-gated a monoethnic view of the Chinese nation and Chinese history, identifyingChina exclusively with the Han, later textbooks adopted an inclusive, multi-ethnicview of the Chinese nation and advanced the idea that China had always been amulti-ethnic state, and that “ethnic merging” constituted a major historicalpattern and driving force in Chinese history.

The change in the representation of non-Han peoples in Chinese history text-books can be viewed in two very different ways. On the one hand, it can be seen asa positive development that reflects a more pluralistic policy, gives more voice andrepresentation to the ethnic diversity within China, and offers some of China’sminorities a share in the national narrative. Indeed, although still extremelyHan-centric, the new historiography adopts a more positive attitude and rhetorictoward non-Han peoples than in the past. It tells more about their cultures,histories, heroes, and achievements, and about their contributions to the historyof China. The change in the representation of non-Han peoples may be viewedas particularly impressive if one considers that for the sake of creating a multi-ethnic Chinese historiography, the Han editors of the new history textbookswere even willing to sacrifice the most celebrated historical heroes of the Hanmajority, such as Yue Fei and Wen Tianxiang.

On the other hand, the new representation of non-Han peoples and their his-tories can also be seen as an oppressive “historiographical colonialism” in whichthe Chinese state and its privileged Han majority “claim the past” (Bovingdon2001, 96) of non-Han peoples. Indeed, as Barry Sautman, inspired by EtienneBalibar, has suggested, “the ‘inclusive’ can also be the oppressive” (1997, 94–95).Considering that among some minority nationalities today in China there existstrong aspirations to achieve more autonomy and even independence, and thatthese aspirations are based on notions and well-established narratives of separateand independent histories, the incorporation of the histories of these peoplesamounts to suppressing the historical narratives of these minorities, suppressingtheir national aspirations, and attempting to strip a crucial element of theircollective identities from them.


In a 1997 article, Barry Sautman depicts the efforts made by the Chinesestate during the reform era to advance the notion that China’s different ethnicgroups share a common ancestry.11 Sautman, however, questions the usefulnessof propagating myths of common descent as “tools for sustaining state nationalismamong ethnic minority peoples” (1997, 95), observing that “the constructionof racial nationalism has alienated important segments of ethnic minorities,undercuts the effort to build Chinese state nationalism, and may ultimatelyjeopardize the integrity of the state itself” (76).12 The myths of commondescent that the Chinese media started to propagate enthusiastically in the1980s are part of the general trend depicted in this article. And indeed, asSautman suggests, there are quite a few expressions of resistance amongChina’s minorities to the efforts of the Chinese state and its privileged Hanmajority to incorporate their histories into China’s national history. The mostnotable expression of such resistance can be found among the Uyghurs,where there has been a continuous effort by intellectuals belonging to thisethnic group to assert its separate origin and independent history (Baranovitch2003, 739–40, 743, 749–50; Benson 1996; Bovingdon 2004; Rudelson 1996;1997, 121–75). Another important expression of resistance comes from the Tibe-tans, particularly the Tibetan government in exile. In its official Web site andmany publications, this government has repeatedly claimed that the Tibetansare an independent nation, that Tibet was “occupied” by China in the early1950s, and that prior to this, Tibet was an independent state (see http://www.tibet.com; Powers 2004).13

Nonetheless, Sautman’s conclusion about the impact and implications of thenew trend for China’s minorities and for the Chinese state seems to overestimateresistance. While there is evidence that the new historical narrative is beingrejected by some minority people, there are also important indications thatthis narrative is being accepted by other minority people, and that some ofthese people have even contributed to its development. In a recent article aboutthe new Yi historiography that has developed since the early 1980s, ahistoriography that for the first time was written by the Yi themselves ratherthan by others, Stevan Harrell and Li Yongxiang point out that although the newYi-centered narratives pose a challenge to the historical narratives of the Hanmajority, they nevertheless aim to “consolidate the position of Yi in China and inChinese history” (Harrell and Li 2003, 363–64, 366; emphasis added).

11Although this notion has its origins in the Republican era (Leibold 2006; Schmalzer 2004), Saut-man’s article suggests that it was only from the 1980s on that this notion was promoted in China infull force by the official media.12Sautman’s warning echoes a similar warning made in the mid-1930s by the historian Gu Jiegang(see Schneider 1971, 261).13Another expression of resistance was manifested in the recent controversy between China and thetwo Koreas over the identity of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo (Chinese, Gaogouli) (37 BCE–668 AD)and its relationship with ancient China (see Ahn 2006; Byington 2004a, 2004b).

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Another example of a positive reaction by minority people to the state’s effortto incorporate their histories involves the Mongols. This example is even moresignificant than the first because, unlike the Yi, among the Mongols there havealways existed claims for an independent history and an independent state,which in several cases have even led to violent clashes (Jankowiak 1988, 270–73, 1993, 45–46; Kaup 2000, 2; see also Citizens Against Communist ChinesePropaganda’s Free Inner Mongolia Web page at http://caccp.freedomsherald.org/im/index.html). Among the Mongols both in and outside China, ChinggisKhan has been by far the most powerful symbol of Mongolian nationalism(Khan 1995). The Chinese government has always recognized the powerfulsymbolism associated with this historical figure and the potential threat that itposed to Chinese rule, and therefore since the founding of the PRC has madeimportant efforts to pay respect to his memory on the local level (Farquhar1968, 176; Khan 1995, 266–67). These efforts have reached a climax in recentyears, when the Mongolian national hero was transformed into a Chinese heroand became the object of a Chinese cult (Bulag 2003). One would expect thatsuch efforts would provoke angry reactions from the Mongols, who would feelthreatened by the attempts of the dominant Han majority to claim ownershipover their most revered symbol. However, in a recent paper, Uradyn E. Bulagproposes that this is not necessarily the case, and in fact there are Mongolswho comply with the “Chinese worship of Chinggis Khan.” Explaining thiscompliance, Bulag observes that these Mongols “are blithely content that theirancestor is at long last worshipped by the Chinese … and [that] Mongols notonly need not be harassed because of their history but can take pride in it”(2003, 3).

In conclusion, no matter what angle one chooses to emphasize, thechanging representation of non-Han peoples in Chinese history textbooks isclearly helpful in understanding the mechanisms of the “psychological inte-gration” (Benson 1996, 116) and “ideological incorporation” (Bovingdon 2001,97) of China’s minorities that have been at work in the PRC since 1949.Despite evidence of continuing resistance to the hegemonic ideas that the newhistory textbooks propagate, there is little doubt that China’s success in maintain-ing its political unity in an era of rising ethnic nationalism owes much to its abilityto incorporate the otherness of China’s minorities on the ideological and discur-sive level. The creation of a comprehensive and coherent multi-ethnic narrativeof Chinese history and its canonization in high school history textbooks clearlyaim to naturalize China as it is in the present and to lend it legitimacy bysuggesting that it has basically been the same since antiquity. Though from an aca-demic point of view, this version of Chinese history is just another case ofhistoriographical invention, it is hard to deny that it is a powerful one. This narrativecertainly provides a more solid basis than ever before for the imagining of a multi-ethnic China that existed since antiquity, and as such it is likely to render any futureresistance to the legitimacy of Chinese rule in minority areas more difficult.


Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Yuri Pines for sending me the news about the reevaluation of Yue Feiin China, which triggered the research for this article; to Natalia Roitman, Avital Pollak,Noam Urbach, and several individuals in China for their assistance in collecting impor-tant materials for the article; to Michal Biran for her clarifications regarding non-Hannames; and to two anonymous readers for the Journal of Asian Studies for their valuablecomments on an earlier draft of the article. The research for this article was supported bythe Israel Science Foundation (Grant no. 903/03). Every effort has been made to securenecessary permissions to reproduce copyright material in this work, though in some casesit has proved impossible to trace copyright holders. If any omissions are brought to ournotice, we will be happy to include appropriate acknowledgements on reprinting in anysubsequent edition.

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