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Selection, editorial matter, tntroduction O Csaba Mak6 and Chds Warhurst. tndividual chap_rers {in order) O ChJis Warhurst. Dennis Nickson and Eteanor Sbaw; Csaba Mako and Md;cElljng\rad: Lrszlo Arva. Lajos He$)r RodencL Manrn, Asaf Darf, Chr is Warhursr and Terrvwalldce. Bemard Ganne. Jijrg Flecker; Agres Srmonyr;Cyuta Bakacsr; Ecl,iard J Drrb,icirand St€fan Knhl; Deiphine Mercier Fr€deric Sechaud and piene TriDier: Srndor Kerekest999.

All.nghrs '€se'ved. No reproducuon. copy or rransmisqron olrh;s publcarion may be madewrtnout wfltlen Dermrssion,

Published Iaqg by the lnsriture of MaDagemmr Education, Universiiy of cijdi ld and theDep"ruDmr ofManagemenr and Organisarion. Budapest Unr\ ersiry ofEconomic Sciences.ISBN 963 515 0946A catalogue record for this book is available from Szechenyi (National) Library, Budapesr.

Contents

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Not€s on Contr ibutors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '7

Introduct ion . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I

I Globalisation Under Question: Political, Economic and Cultural ConsiderationsChrk Warhuft t , Dennis Nickson and Eleanor Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l7

2 Globalisation, FDI and Modemisjng Management PracticesCsaba Mak6 and Marc E ingstad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

3 Hungary in the Whirlwind ofClobalisation: An Economic and SocialAnalysisL A s z b A n a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 l

4 Clobalisation and Labour Relations: The Hungarian ContextLajas Hathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5 Joint Ventures: clobalisation wirh a Local Face?Rode/kk Ma in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s7

6 lnrematronalfatron and rls Efiec ts on Trade Union ! irms The Case o f thelsraeli Conrnercial Vehicle S€ctorAsaf Dary Chris Warhurst and Terry llrallace .. ....... .. .. . . 69

7 Local Systems in Globalisation: The Metamorphoses of the SME in FranceR e r n a r d G a n n e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 7 9

8 Organisational Change in the lntemational Economy: what Happensto 'Besl Practice' in Local Institutional Settings?Jdry Flecker . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 l

a Labolr dnd Social Wellaie in Compeliuve FirmsApes Simonyi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l0 l

I0 Tte Pend lm Ftrecr: Culture, Transrrron, I eamrngG y u l a B a k r c s i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l l l

I I Against Bueaucracy: Why Flexibility and Decenhalisation CannolSolve Organisational ProblemsE c k h a J . D t t r i c h a n d S t e f a n K i i h l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I l 9

12 Management Tools in the Process ofclobalisationDelphine Merciea FftdAric Sichatd and Pierre Tr ipier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127

13 Environmental hsues and Globalisation: The Hunganan CaseSAndor Kerckes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131

R e f e r e n c c s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 9

llungary in llu tl|hirlwind 0f H0lalhatim:[[ Icom||lic a|ld $ocirlll|alysh

Introduction

Today it has become accepted that the processes ofglobalisation mark the lasi years oftheiwentieth century- But what does globalisation really mean? Is it simply the unprec€dentedbut long observed acceleralion and intensification of the integration of the world economy aprocess which, according to many, has been occuring for a thousand year or at l€ast th€ pastfew ceniuri€s? or is what is bejng expeienced today a new developmeni, an unfolding ofalotally new quality, unobserved before in the economic and cultural processes ofthe world?

Both approaches may be supported with iogical arguments. Evidence can be advancedforthe argument that the process ofglobalisalion cuuentlybeing experienced does not repre-sent a totalLy new quality. Tbe nalier at issue is mereiy the continuance rhough acceleration ofeconomic and cultural int€grativeprocesses ofthe wortd going on for thousand years.lt is thrsacceleration that we conceive ofas a new phenomenon in the unification ofthe world According to rhis approach the economic and cultural inregration oftbe world does not necessar-ily mean a straightforward. unbroken line ofdev€lopment. Over the past thousand yeals orlasi few cenhfies there can be marshalled couniless examples ofsudden lapses and recessionsin the integrative processes ofthe world.

However, the approach viewing the econonic and cultural uni6 cation processes oftheworld from the perspective of thousand years, and which argu€s that what is occurring todayis nothing more than a faster changing, qujckening of the integration process but which is by

aviewpoint the author also shared earlier does not provide a satisfactoryexptanarion ifthe driving forces and prime powen of the economic and cuhural integration oftbe world are analysed.

Throughout the past thousand years, evenup to th€ last few decades, the economic andcultural integration ofthe world, the expansion and i ensification ofeconomic and culiuralrelations among the different pans ofthe world lrad primarily been facjlitated by the expansion ofintemalional tade.lnthis respect, intemational tradewas,with goodreason. regardedas the most impodant driving force jn funheing the integration ofthe world economy Theeconomic and cultural integration oftheworld, in fact, meart lhe increasing intensiry ofeco-nomic and cuLtural €xchange.

ln the pasthundred years, instead ofthe expansion ofinlemational trade, foreign owner'ship and capital export have increasingly become the driving force ofth€ integration oftheworld economy- Nunerous signs indicate that today that the process of globalisation js largelydriven by foreign ownershjp and capital expofi. This statement is not only supported by thefact that over the past twenty-five years the export oi workine capital for investmenl lMsincreased at double the rate of that of the trade ofproducts and goods or the gross domesticincome of the wodd, but also by the formation oftotatly new, unprecedented ownership struclures in the world, resulting from intematioMl ownership andtbeproductionofculnral wealthTlrese qualitative changes in the ownership structure canbe srated in two proposilions:

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o today, the time is approaching when halfofrhe goss outt'ut capaciry ofthe wortd wiInot be owned by domestic firms, but by foreign ownels - namely owned and thereforeconholled by companies regjstered in rhe developed countries ofthe world

o today, the major poltion ofthe consmed total cultual wealth in ihe world is Droduced. or\ produclron rs induecrl) connolled by an even nano$er l]ircte ofbus,ness unir groups

On tbe basis ofall of the above, rhe autho. th€ study reported here is inclined to arguerhar rhe proces\ ofglobdhsalion observed roda) as a trew unpricedented qualir'. and as a n;w.di f ferenr srrge ofworld developmenr. Tle inner qual i r ie\ . rhe mechanics. the iossible routesofdev-elo-pment, and the social consequences oftbis new type ofglobatisarion are very likelyto differ from theprocesses based onrhe extension ofworld trade obsened earlier. wirict. tnorder ro be d15 ngurshed from rhe present lendencres ofglobat'sdrion bdred on rhe worldwrde'ntegraiion ofownership, may be called a .Fe-gtobalisatjon' integrarive plocess.

The Acceleration of Globalisation in the TWentieth Century:Foreign Working Capital I nvestmentsDu€ to expon ofworking capital, there are nore and more economic resions in the wortd inwh'ch rhe major ponion ofrhe gross ourpul value ,s p'odLced nor by domesrrc f i rms. bur b)cornpan'es with foreign control. In tbe developed counr es (except Japan) rhe increase ofmutual foreign ownership acquisitions can be observed, and in ihe devetoping counrdes lheincrease of tbe ratio of foreign ownership is even more striking. However, in some of rhecounlnes olrhe de\eloping world. domesuc p'oducrion is,ncreasrng 0r a retarrrely higherpJce rhan rhe inflos or roreisn capirat because roreign investmenrs aie retared ro d,e u; oflocal subconnacrors and orher lechnolo$ rransfer proc€sses. l hus. rhe ,arto of toreign os nersnrp rs srrgnarrnS or rs Increasrng at a tower rare on rhe oder hand, In mosr Dans oftledevelotrng wo' ld. rhe use of loca I subconrracrors cannor compensale for rhe Innow ot foreigninvestments, and in these regions (first and foremost in Latjn-Amerjca. Afiica. and EastelnEuropel Ihe rarion of toreign o$ nership inc'eases in the economy.

m.'l#r-l*r,:fvrl};;ll;#ii{#il#';#*;;:":lx:nf*t;*t'.'.".iil'i,#:,l:1"#i{lilTi::i'T:::,::T"J[x;:$]lil;ililii:"ll"f]l$'li'irii;ffi;;; ;il"-di';;is *apo-iot grosarr",non when roreign own€d ourp^ul exceeded

iii"i' ..''. *."".a '" 1"o4, while ror rhe economv as a whole ir occuned in lae5 .ln renns oflhe economv. global'sarion primanly means lhdr lhe oMers o' Inucn raaer

,:ffi Hi"T::' ll'.9:;1i;l:".s1i"".11*i"'i"'#::l il ::[.'J':T:,:'.:""l""JJ;:;:lffiili,..i'ili'ri

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43

Cultural Globalisation: The Prerequisite and theConsequence of Global Ownership Dominance

In addition to the unprecedented, worldwide restruchring ofthe ownership and conhot ofthej actor s of producr ion, another ftlndamenh I qualir a live change rn rhe globa iisauon pro."". "-De d iscemed _rD I he I €srructun ng of ideas and cuttures. fhese changeq are much more di mcuh

to quantil, than the modifications of foreign working capital inlvestments or intemationalownershrp srrucrures. Ho$ever. i r is inc,easingty appareDr thar lor more and more counrr ies,nair or r i rerr cuthrrat producls consumed or iginate erther drrecr l) f tom the USA or are pro_ouceo bt domestrc trrms conrolled by companies reeisrered in rhe LSA.

I\or srrrprisrngly. 'r is more d'fljcutr to make fo;casrs about rhe consumprion ofLuhureand rdeo.og).rban fo ' o$nership srucrure. but ar some rrme berween 20 tO.n;2020 rha s,earrer rnan the mrdpornr ot economic dominance more rhan halfofrhe rolal cuku,e andIdeology consumprron In rhe wo'ld w'lt be produced by companies regrsrered in ,r,. Usn o,reSronar and domeslrc companies connoll€d by rhem. Whdr makes rhis lasr poior €ven moremportant is ihat this process precisely coincides with the massive spread oidevices for thepropdgarion ofculruralUait".namely the media oflape and Udeo rec;rding and broadcasring$hrch are more effeLr 've and p'oducrive than ever beiore. an<t hrough whrch rhe i rrerar imasses - makmg up two-thirds ofthe world's population could becone easily within reachand influen.--d

.. Anal)sing dre preseor audience rar ings 01 redture f i tm. rn crnemas and on reter rs ion inwesrem !urope. a considerable Nonh Amerrcan dominance atready exisrs. In rerms ofnun-b_ers, the rate of fi1ms produced in North America is 70 per ceniof all fitns broadcast inW€srem Europe. An e\ en srronge' dominance is indrcared by the size otlhe audience for $s;r'rms As ror Hungary. srmilar propoflions may be noled. The rdre ofNonh Ameflcrn domFndnce olorher culrural producrs broddcasr by non-vrsuat rnedia is mJch towe, rhan rhe abot eborlr in Wesrem E!,rope dnd Hungary. but rherr consuflprion is undoubredt) decreasrng Inrelahon to that oflhe visual media

The abo\ e ruo processes. namety rhe o*Tership ard conFolofnearly hatfofthe $ortd.sourpur capac'rv by companjes registered in rhe morr devetoped counrries, as $e as rhe con_trol ol more rhan.halfol lhe $orld s tobl vatue and culnrre p,oduct ion b) companies or iginaFjng fiom mosrly rhe rame devetoped countries. are closety comecred and murua y reii'ion_rng or each orher The conlrol ofrhe wo, ld s cutrural consumprion b) companies of lne r losrdeveloped countries obviously resulls in a more intensive srandardisation ofculture and vafues. and rh,s cul lural srandardrsarron promores the de\ etopmenl ofd wo, td$ rde unrfom con_sumplron. which jnevirably reinforces rhe devetopmenr and erpansion ofmutr inar iona. com_panes producing uniform goods for worldwide consumplion. Then again, this worldwideuni lbmcuhuralnerwo'kcontrottedbymutrrndrionalcompanres.wirhrrsrerreRect iveoprnron-shdprng rn\trumenrr. dtso help. ro iof luence pubtrc opinion In z way rhdr rhis pubt iaaccepts the control ofa growing share ofnational economies bv foreien owners.

The Winners and Losers of GlobalisationThe most important wimers ofglobalisation are iiom rhe developed countries: those .whocon'rol I obalrra[on. those who organ,se rhe rmnsrer of producno;. rhe heads ofcompanre.enrenng 'nlo rorergn markers b) market acqurs ion investrnenrs. and rhe rn"estors ouninethese compames. But th€re are winners of this process in the under-developed countries aiwelt: local managers and businessmen organising the aansfer of production.'and locat work

ers receiving higher wages or at ieast employmeDt opportunities du€ to the transfer ofproduc,

In the developed countries, among the losers are rhose workers who become unem-ployed due to the export of inv€stments and the transf€r ofproduction, and those lower edu-cated workers who accept lower real wages out of necessity. Likewise in the under-developedcouni es, amongst the losers are lhe national bourgeoisie, for whom foreign investments bringabout considenble competilion, with the rsult that more and more oftbem are squeezedout

The wimers ofthe cultural aspect of globalisation are the same production organisinggoups in the developed regions who dump the world market wjth soap operas and rathershallow films. While mostprobably, besides the interest groups involved in the rapidly fadingnational cultural production, the losers are themiilions ofconsumers ofculture who are sup-plied with more and more substandard and uniform products instead of a diverse cultural

The Effect of Globalisation on Economic Growth

Since several other factors define the rate of economic growth, it is almost impossible todefine accurately in nurnbers, whether the progr€ss ofglobalisation influences the economicdevelopment of the world in a positive or negative way. N€irher can it be said with any cer-tainty how globalisation affects the underdeveloped countries on rhe periphery in terms oftheir economic growth- ln obsening for example the 60 less developed counties in the world,rt may be undoubt€dly stated that from 1960 to the present, the economic gap betwee. themand the developed countries has widened in the case of65 per cent oflhem. In 20 per cent ofcas€s, the gap has remained static, and only in less than 15 per cent of cases has th€ gapdecreased between Ihern and rhe developed Lounmies.

It is also indicative ofthe ambiguous connecrion between globalisation, foreign invest-menls and economic growth, that large scale working capital transfers in some cases lead tolhe inrensification ofglobal economic dependenc€ indicat€dby the growing rate of alien con-kolled production. While in the case of other countries, despite large scale foreign investments, the output bf compa €s with foreign control did not jncrease significantly in theirnanufacturing indusrry. Af€w examples illustrate tbis paradox.

lnthe South EastAsian countries, d€spite large scale foreign capital investmeDts in themanulacturing industry during the 1980s, the rate of foreign owrership was relatively low,not reaching 20 per cent and by 2000 this rate is expected 1o fall to around l0 per cenl. Thisprradoxical result may be primarily explained by the fact that these countdes absorbed for-eign working capital very well and thus, using the in1puis€ provided by foreign capjtal, theyset out on the route of lake-off in the sense of Rostow, as a cons€quence ofwhich, theythemselves became capable of a significant internal capital accumulation. As a resull, theotherwise enormous volume of foreign capital investrnent in tbese countries pales in comparLson to the volume ofnational capital invested from domestic accumulative sources.

In the case of Latin America the situation is not quite the sain€. In fte LathAmericancountries, despite the fact that on the whole ihe total stock of invested foreig:n capital wassnaller than in Asia (in 1992 it was only $145 billion), by the rum ofthe millennium the rateof foreign controlled production in the manufactuing industry will reacb as high as 50 percent. This rat€ indicates that in Lalin America the orocess of inner caDital accumulation was$ eaker. Ihar rs. loreign working caprtar rmpon couli nor provrde the same economic recover)lhat can be observed inAsia.

In Africa, although rhe volume of capitai impof was far behind ihe rate of both Latin

EU USA

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l? lo Mrnufa . tu rc o i t r \ r les dFssnA, lc . rher20-22 Marufaciure ofwood, paper ahd publishing 5 1 0 52 552l-25 Merfactu.e of chemicals, rclihed, petroleum 7 t . 9 18 8526 Manuthcrure of.on-metallic nineal poducls 5 8 9 65 1527 28 Manufactule ofbsic nelals a.d prcducrs 33.3 3529-35 Manulactuie of nachinery and €quipneht 67.1 30l6-lt Olhcr manufacurios lDd recycling t6 .9I, Eleclncily, gas, srcam a.d water supply 15

30.1 l 7c, wholesale md Etail trade, repanofnotorvehicl6,motorcycles and pcsonal household goodsH, Hotels and rcsraura.b 15.9I, Tanspon, storaee a.d conhunEalion 1 8 4J, Fi.ancial intcrmediation 13.9 85K, Real e$are, ren tins s.d business ..ti! i lies l 5

20.5 2 l 15N, H€allh and social wort 52O Other cofrnunny, social ddpesonal senice aclivitios 2 1 3 23 25

55 65Sonrce' Central Statistical Oafi ce, Hunsary (199?).

Amencai and Asia, the proportion of manufacturing indusay Foduction conrrolted by foreign owne$ is even higher than in Latin Ameica. The extensiv€ dependence on foreign own-els indicates serious problems of adaprabiliry in Afiica. This very high foreign o$,,rlenhipcontrol, and the stagnating rather than improving GDP of the Afijcan countnes indicate thatthe economic boost resulting fiom foreign investmenrs did not stdt to say the very least,neither did the processes of intemal accumulation, or investments predominantly financedfron national resouces-

Atl the above indicates thar today only a very small minority of lhe less d€velopedcountries have the chance to 'board the train ofglobalisation', and thus rry to catch up with thedeveloped comtries. Therefore, the slogan which proclairns rha. the extension of forejgnwo.king capital expon and the intensification ofglobalisationFomotes wortd wide economicgrowth, and thus the capacity for all partjes are to win in the end, camot be verified. Onlythose countries which are capable of boosting iheir economic growth ttuough globalisarionwith a strong national economic poiicy are those who can benefir ftom globalisarion. For iheimplementation of a deliberate economic policy, a strong and active stare isneeded ofcoursebut, as we will see larer, this contradicts efiods to eradicate the nation stare. a develoDmentshich is rega'ded as one of lne p'ocesses ofg.obal isar ion

The Demise of the Nation State: A Further Prerequisiteand Consequence of GlobalisationTbe present form ofglobalisation - namely the expansion ofglobal doninance - may beobstrucied by the defensive reactions of regions or counties suffering ftom globalisarion.Such reactions may take the folm ofr€ligious rejection. as in the Islamic worLd, or culruralrefirsal, as in many areas in Asia, or be manifest in religious and revolurionary ideologicaladventures, as in several countries jn Latin America. But initiatives to hinder globalisarion, aswe have seen, appear in tbe developed regions as weil, wbere the widening disparity ofin-come and theincrease in unemplo),nent resulting ftom globalisation create tensions. As suchrqections appear agaiNt globalisation, wbat becomes importanr is ihe reacrion ofnationaLgovemments and pincipally whether ihese govemments are for or againsr them.

Keeping all this in mind, it is probably not by accident that in ihe fields ofeconomics,political science and sociology, demands for a reduction in the state have gained rnore andmore gound as the processes ofglobalisation intensify. Obviously, this d6 €tatisation prima-Iily serves the interesis ofthose business units, and groups affilialed with tbem. who are thewiDnen within globalisation. These groups are not only th€ circles of senior and middl€managenent, andtheholden ofcapital withinfi€ developed counrries,but, as we lrave seen,there ar€ smaller groups in the under-developed countries who are aiso keen to suppr€ss rheslate in order to do awaywith obstacles in the way ofglobalisation.

Th€ planned Multilateral Agrcement on Investments (MAI) may be interpreted as an-otherstep in the demise of nation-state, since by accepting this agreement the signatory Gov,€mments und€rtake to surrender a considerable capacity to undertake national economic policymeasures, and to accept an intemational courtinwhich multinational companies may contestgovemmenml measures.

The suppression of the state undoubtedly has positive effects. Fixt and foremost, itwould reduce the economic power ofthe stare, which may entail the short-rerm growrh ofeconomic efliciency in countries where there exists high state ownership. However, the reduction and repression of a few important basic tasks of the state pave the way for longer termprocesses, which ir tum endanger economic growth irself, and whose €ffects already go againsr

r: the interests of rhe groups who are for the intensification of globalisation. These facrors are

the followjng;O The slate has very imponant duti€s concemiry education, but ifrhese tasks are not

supported by appropriate budgetary benefits, in the long run economic efficiency wjllsuffer. Experience proves that the market can tulfil the duries of educarion onlv to aresncred exrenl. and lhe sotuces ofrhe state budget are ind'spensable for il

o The spread ofculture, in particular national culturi, is also a very important govemmen-tal duty related to education, and, as with educarion, is a factor in lons-term €conomicgro$1h. The experiences ofrhe rapidly dereloping economies show rnal Lhe educanonaland cultural investments in human capital may boost the economy ro a greater extentihan jnvestments in physical capital which also d€preciate much faster ihan human capi-

a Besides investments in human capital, the development of inftastructure in rhe longrunalso defines a country's potenrial for economic growth. Th€ development of infrasruc-ture on a purcly market-oriented basis is nor satisfactory, especially for a oountry in thecatch-up stage. In comparison to the present level ofeconomic d€velopment, a detiber-ate oveFd€velopment must be canied out both in the fields ofeducation and culture, andinfiastructure.

a The safeCuarding ofthe country's law and order, and rh€ secuity of its citizens (borhrnside and ouiside the country) are also factors effeciing €conomic groMh in rhe longrun. This duty caDnot be handed over to the self-jnitiative ofthe citizens or to securirybusrnesses, instead it must be tulfilledbythe state.

t Besides the above mentioned duiies, irlfilling the duri€s ofpublic healih is also veryrmponant. It is a state responsibility that not only shows its effects in the public weltbeing, bot also in the growth ofrhe economy as well.

. Although €xperience slrows that rhe state is nor an ideal own€r, and thus. it is usetul ifitwilhdraws as much as possible fiom ihe economy in a capaciry as an owner, severaleconomic development activities still remain th€ dury ofthe stare, such as research anddevelopment grants, pdvate enterprise development, and dev€lopment subsidies for eco-nomically less developed regions. Sunende ng these duries may resutt in a very contro-versial economic structure in the long runHowever, ell these limdametrtal and non-rransferable aovemmental duties suffe. dam-

age when rhe slogan of rhe minimal stare is accomplished r; lhe 'nreresrs of lhe undrsturbedexpansion of globalisation. The reduction of these duties, however, uttimately works againstthe rDierests ofthose groups advancing globalisation as well, since a lower educaled wo*force,a worsening pnblic security, an under-dev€lop€d inftastructure, or an asyrffnerric develop-ment ofeconomy in te.ms ofterritory sector, and scale are not attractiv€ to foEjgn investonand to groups in the targe!counhies related to foreign investments.

Globalisation: The Bright Future of Humankind or aTemporary Deadlock?

In the traditjonal fonress ofeconomics in the developed countries, a majodty now existswho predict a bright tuture for humanldnd wirh tbe advent of globalisatior. Nevertheless,there are some who have lately drawn attention to the harmtul sides ofglobalisation., As wehav€ seen earlier, besides world tendencies of globalisation, in some courries and regionsthere are strong €conomic and govemmental counter,powers trying to resrrain the locomoliveof globalisation. On rhe basis ofpower relations it is probable that over the nexr couple ofdecades the processes ofglobalisation will conquer any resistanc€ to ir. However, no intellr-

t

gent and well-established for€casi may be made as to whether globalisation wili conqu€rthose forces raging againsl it in the long run, or whether those faclon resisting it wili ultimately win. lfit is to be the latter, then jnstead ofglobalisation it might b€ that, in the lorgrun, an alternative development model bas€d on regional characreristics will be accomplishedin the world.

All responsible national politicians and business units should take into consideraiion theevidence of long-term unFedictabilitX and while it also must be noted that in the shon runHungary cannot stay out of the process ofglobalisaiion, it also must be realised dut in thelong nm it is uncertain that the world is being diiven to an udimited and inmeasurable inten-sification ofglobalisation. The wituing strategy for Hungary thereiore, is not resistance agains!globalisation at all costs, but rather a sensible short{erm adaptation by which the counlrymaDages to change its los€r position and becomes awinnerofglobalisation. In the long run, itwould then succeed in preserving ai much of its own Car?athian and European identity aspossible agains' !he de!aslarion oi globalisalion.

In the shon run this strategy pdmarily means that instead ofpassively acceptjng theprocesses ofglobalisation, we must rather fight our way to more and more becoming an activeorganiser ofit. By now it must be clear to ail that the winners ofglobalisation are first andforemost those who organise intemational capital movem€nts, and the losers (the loss is usu-ally considerable) are those who passively accept these Focesses. lt is very unlikely, however,that Hungary can become a wimer of globalisation by rneans of satisrying the needs andwishes ofthe globalisers without the latterhaving a say in this development. MostFobably amuch more conplex and farsighted strategy should be selected. There is not much time left lowork out such strategies. These saategies should alrady be drawn up and deliberately appliedin Hungary now if we do not intend to totally become the passive victims ofglobali$iion.

Endnotes

I The share ol lne outptrt of the panially o. toblly for€isl oMed @npeies in the lolal manufrcturing oltpur.: See, for€xamDle, the work ofKonen (1996) ed Manin and Scl'trnmh (1998), bolhofwhich be.ane lbe b€sl

sellers on ihe subject in fie last rew yen.