The Yalta Conference lasted a week, from February 4
until February 11, 1945, and was the second and final face
to face meeting of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston
Churchill, and Josef Stalin, The principal subjects
discussed were Poland’s boarders and future elections,
German boundaries and war reparations, the occupation of
Germany, the conditions of Soviet participation in the war
against Japan, procedure, and voting rights in the future
United Nations organization. Since the conference has taken
place it has been one of the most talked about meetings in
history. There has been both criticism and praise for the
outcomes of this summit, and it is likely that historians
will be debating this topic for the foreseeable future.
David Reynolds addresses the topic of the Yalta
Conference in Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century.
He begins by criticizing the view of “Gaullist France [that]
it was… the moment when the superpowers divided Europe
between them into two blocs.” (Reynolds, 103) and the view
of Republicans in America that this was “another example of
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craven appeasement, in which millions in Poland and Eastern
Europe were consigned to communist oppression.” (Reynolds,
103) Reynolds argues that because the Soviet Union was in
control of Eastern Europe at the time of the Yalta
Conference “it was politically impossible for Britain or
America to turn on their ally in this way. The French and
American myths about Yalta gloss over these realities. If
the Western Allies can be said to have forfeited Eastern
Europe, it was by their strategy in 1942-3 rather than their
diplomacy in 1944-5.” (Reynolds, 108) The strategy he is
referring to is the decision, which he credits to the
British as the then “senior partner”, of delaying a direct
invasion of France in favor of sending troops to North
Africa. (Reynolds, 106)
The “interesting issue” in Reynolds’s view is that
Roosevelt and Churchill “belie[ved] that it was possible to
build a cooperative and durable relationship with the Soviet
leader. As with Munich, this fundamental misjudgment takes
us into the realms of perceptions, politics and also
hubris.” (Reynolds, 108) He describes both Roosevelt’s and
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Churchill’s as view of Stalin before Yalta as someone that
they could deal with, and “prone to blame Soviet displays of
truculence on unfriendly factions in the Politburo or on the
Foreign Ministry or Soviet intelligence to provide the
Kremlin with accurate information.” (Reynolds, 114) Both
Roosevelt and Churchill believed that they could influence
Stalin through getting along well with him personally.
Churchill was reassured by Stalin’s “promise to respect
British predominance in Greece…” (Reynolds, 114) allowing
him to keep the communists from taking power. Roosevelt
didn’t care about the fate of Eastern Europe, saying to his
ambassador “that he didn’t care whether the countries
bordering Russia were communized.” His overriding aim was to
achieve a settlement that would satisfy Stalin and stabilize
Europe without offending American opinion.” (Reynolds, 110)
Much to Churchill’s chagrin, Roosevelt did not even desire
to discuss with him a formal agenda before the summit.
Stalin, on the other hand, had a difference view of his
western allies. Prior to the war he was more afraid of
Britain than Germany. “For Stalin, even more than for his
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partners, the wartime alliance constituted a marriage of
convenience. He never shook off his fear that the British
and Americans might sign a separate pace with Hitler…”
(Reynolds, 115) “Furthermore, as a Marxist-Leninist, Stalin
never abandoned the hope of eventual international
revolution.” (Reynolds, 116) However, he did not want
another war, and “From the documentation now available, it
would seem that Roosevelt and Churchill were right to feel
that Stalin was a man with whom they could conduct
meaningful negotiations.” (Reynolds, 117) Yet, because of
Stalin’s “fundamentally different” world view, “the American
and British leaders were wrong to believe that they were
developing a real rapport with the Soviet leader…”
(Reynolds, 117)
Reynolds concludes that Yalta was neither a total
success nor a failure for all sides involved. “Roosevelt
secured his priorities – agreement on the UN and a Soviet
pledge to enter the war against Japan. Churchill managed to
avoid firm commitments about Poland’s western border, German
dismemberment and reparations – the latter to Stalin’s
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undisguised irritation. The British also secured a larger
role for France in postwar Europe than either of their
partners wanted. Stalin, for his part, gained acceptance of
his main territorial goals in Asia and agreements that
seemed to recognize his predominance in Poland.” (Reynolds,
158) Roosevelt’s “declining health had certainly affected
his diplomacy, but it was not a determining factor.”
(Reynolds, 151) There was misreading on both sides, for
example, “that image of Stalin balancing between shadowy
power blocs was a Western delusion.” (Reynolds, 154) After
Yalta, Stalin established exclusive spheres of influence in
Eastern Europe, in what Churchill saw as inconsistent with
the percentages deal the two leaders made, which were
supposed to guarantee a certain level of influence of
Britain and the Soviet Union in these countries, and
Roosevelt saw as a violation of The Declaration on Liberated
Europe. The “need for some degree of political pluralism and
openness in order to persuade domestic opinion made no sense
to this ruthless dictator [Stalin].” (Reynolds, 160) Because
of the limiting factor of the presence of Soviet troops on
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the ground in Eastern Europe, “Yalta was less significant
than American and French stereotypes have made it out to
be.” (Reynolds, 161) The long term effect the summit did
have, in Reynolds’s view, was to bring about “a sense of
betrayal on both sides.” (Reynolds, 161) The Soviets viewed
subsequent leaders as less cooperative than Roosevelt, and
for Americans Stalin’s reversal on the issue of and free and
fair elections in Poland served to deter them from a summit
to end the Cold War (Reynolds, 161).
De Senarclens’s Yalta gives a full account of what
happened at the Yalta Conference, in line with his goal of
“offering the interested reader as clear and precise an
account as possible of the manner in which the negotiations
were actually conducted at Yalta by Roosevelt, Churchill and
Stalin.” (de Senarclens, viii) He begins by discussing the
relationship between the allies leading up to the
conference, starting with the formation of the alliance in
1941, and including the various goals of the allies, the
strategies they used in war, the events of the first meeting
between the three leaders at the Tehran conference, and the
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military and political circumstances right before the Yalta
Conference took place. Although critical of both Roosevelt’s
and Churchill’s performance, “this book refutes the thesis
according to which the Yalta conference amounts to a great
occidental capitulation to the Soviets. It demonstrates that
the division of the world into blocs is not the effect of
honoring the Yalta agreement but of the failure to do so,
and that, consequently” (de Senarclens, viii) Yalta marks
the line between the wartime alliance and the Cold War which
followed.
De Senarclens, one important aspect of this conference
is that there was no formal agenda laid out. “As at Tehran,
Roosevelt had ruled out an agenda; he hoped for free, frank
and informal discussions. He liked to improvise solutions
and did not like to feel himself helmed in by rigid forms of
negotiation.” (de Senarclens, 47) Roosevelt also sought “to
convince Stalin that there was no collusion between
Churchill and himself. In pursuance of this objective, he
refused all preparatory talks with the prime minister, held
him at arm’s length, was pleased when he could adopt the
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role of conciliator and arbitrator, and gladly discussed
with Stalin his own points of dissension with Churchill.”
(de Senarclens, 48) “By avoiding joint consultations with
Churchill, by refusing to assume the constraints of a
rigorous and complete agenda, by constantly seeking in vague
and extensible phrases the path to a compromise with Stalin,
by making a show of an absence of any direct interest in the
destiny of Central Europe and the Balkans, Roosevelt
displayed a lack of political judgment.” (de Senarclens, 86)
He criticizes Churchill by saying that he liked to hear
himself talk too much, he was not firm enough in his
demands, and “in spite of his political misgivings, [he] let
himself be carried away by the euphoric atmosphere of the
conference.” (de Senarclens, 86) In particular, Churchill
put aside his doubts that Stalin would honor his agreement
on free elections in Poland. “Stalin was a matchless
negotiator at Yalta. Skillful at dodging issues… he almost
invariably remained calm… When he took up difficult
questions, such as the Polish one, upon which he did not
intend to make any concessions, he dissimulated
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consummately, played for time, and lied without batting an
eyelid.” (de Senarclens, 49) Although he praises Stalin’s
strategy and criticizes Roosevelt and Churchill’s, the
author acknowledges that the Yalta agreement “was compatible
with the aims of the Western Allies.” (de Senarclens, 86)
They had agreed on The Declaration on Liberated Europe,
participation of France in the control commission of
Germany, a Soviet promise to join the war against Japan, the
guarantee of the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and
“setting up of a world organization founded upon liberal
principles and aimed at ensuring the harmonious evolution of
the postwar international community.” (de Senarclens, 87)
Like Reynolds, de Senarclens argues that it was not the
Yalta agreement that limited the Western Allies ability to
influence circumstances in Eastern Europe, but it was “By
deferring until 1944 the decisive moment of their
intervention on the Continent…” (de Senarclens, 87) which
left them with no choice but to cooperate sincerely with the
Soviet Union.
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as National Security
Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, writes in an article
titled The Future of Yalta that “The myth is that at Yalta the
West accepted the division of Europe. The Fact is that
Eastern Europe had been conceded de facto to Josef Stalin by
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill as early as the
Teheran Conference (in November-December 1943), and at Yalta
the British and American leaders had some halfhearted second
thoughts about that concession.” (Brzezinski, 279) De
Senarclens criticizes Brzezinski’s article on several
points, arguing he “reduced the matters negotiated at Yalta
– which on his reading were already settled at Tehran – to
essentially just one problem, the Polish one, but he fails
to lay bare all the facts even of that problem and in
particular to mention the ethnological justification of some
of the Russian claims.” (de Senarclens, 86) By reducing the
Yalta conference to this one issue, Brzezinski “neglects the
context of these negotiations and… underestimates the
importance… [of] Soviet participation in the United Nations
organization and to the whole range of United States and
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British interests throughout the world…” (de Senarclens, 86)
I agree with de Senarclens’s criticism, and he and Reynolds
agree that the facto of Soviet military presence in Eastern
Europe prevented any possibility of Western influence.
However, there were some salient points made in the
Brzezinski article, particularly about “Roosevelt’s well-
meaning vagueness about arrangements for Europe’s postwar
future and Stalin’s studied vagueness about the extent of
Russia’s desire to dominate that future.” (Brzezinski, 287)
I think Roosevelt was being intentionally vague with the
goal of preserving the alliance, and Stalin was being
intentionally vague in order to mask his goal of dominating
Europe.
The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II contains two articles
on the Yalta conference. The first, by William Henry
Chamberlin, is very critical of Roosevelt’s handling of the
situation, calling it “the high point of Soviet diplomatic
success and correspondingly the low point of American
appeasement.” (Chamberlin, 107) He mentions Roosevelt’s
failing health, his lack of a “prepared agenda and no
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clearly defined purpose, except to get along with Stalin at
any price…” (Chamberlin, 107) as well as neglecting to look
at State Department reports that contained recommendations
for the conference. He says that in exchange for promises
which were to soon prove worthless, Stalin got his way in
Poland, reassigning territory to the Soviet Union from
Poland and to Poland from Germany, which was in violation of
the Atlantic Charter. He also suggests that Roosevelt “gave
implied American sanction to the large-scale exploitation of
German war prisoners as slave labor…” (Chamberlin, 109) He
contends that it was not a military necessity to comply with
Stalin’s demands because the Soviet Union was not as strong
at this point as is claimed by defenders of the Yalta
agreements. As an alternative, he suggests that the Western
Allies could have gotten into Poland and Yugoslavia first,
or continued to recognize the Polish government in exile,
rather than acceding to Stalin’s wishes. He also argues that
the U.S. should not have agreed to give Stalin rights to a
port and the railroad system in Manchuria because they did
not need Stalin’s help to defeat Japan. According to the
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author, the Japanese were already trying to surrender to the
U.S. before Soviet involvement or the dropping of the atomic
bombs. “MacArthur recommended negotiations on the basis of
the Japanese overtures. But Roosevelt brushed off this
suggestion with the remark: “MacArthur is our greatest
general and our poorest politician.” (Chamberlin, 113)
Stalin’s involvement in Manchuria was a violation of Chinese
sovereignty, and allowed him to help the Chinese Communists
defeat the nationalist government, thereby weakening the
U.S. government’s position in Asia.
Sidney Warren’s article tries to counter the criticism
of Churchill and other critics of Roosevelt’s handling of
the Yalta Conference. Against the charge that Roosevelt’s
poor health adversely affected his performance, Warren says
“While he was worn and exhausted… the records of the
conference show conclusively that his mental acuteness was
unimpaired.” (Warren, 116) To the charge that Roosevelt was
unprepared, he counters that “A comparison of the pre-
conference briefing papers prepared by the State Department
with the minutes of the Yalta proceedings reveals that
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Roosevelt was thoroughly familiar with the major policy
statements contained in those documents.” (Warren, 116) He
also paints a much less favorable military position for the
Western Allies in relation to the Red Army, who where in
possession of most of Eastern Europe. “It was, therefore,
not a question of what Churchill and Roosevelt would permit
Stalin to do, but what they could persuade him to accept.”
(Warren, 116) The need to bring the Soviets into the war
against Japan is also defended by Warren, since it was
expected that brining down Japan could cost up to 1 million
American lives, adding “The atom bomb had not yet been
tested.” (Warren, 117) He also mentions Soviet security
concerns in relation to the issue of Poland and Germany.
Stalin wanted to extend Soviet territory to the Curzon Line,
which “had been made in 1919 by Clemenceau and the Americans
at Versailles, a conference to which the Russians had not
been invited. Then he added passionately, “Now some people
want that we should be less Russian than Curzon… and
Clemenceau… You would drive us into shame… I could not take
such a position and return to Moscow with an open face.””
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(Warren, 117) It would have been infeasible to have tried to
deny Stalin’s demand when considering his military position
and the line of argument he took. In regard to free
elections in Poland, he argues that the promise of free
elections was all that could have been hoped for with the
Red Army already in possession of the country (Warren, 118).
To the charge that Roosevelt had given too much away by
allowing the Soviet Union to take control of Manchuria, he
argues that by securing China a seat in the U.N. Security
Council, China’s international prestige is heightened
(Warren, 120). Warren does criticize Roosevelt as more
“conciliatory than the others. Exaggerating Allied
dependence on the Soviets, he was apprehensive about
jeopardizing the alliance… Perhaps Stalin, who mistook
friendliness for weakness, might even have yielded to
firmness on one point or another.” (Warren, 121) However, I
think Roosevelt had in mind the goal of maintaining the
peace after the war had concluded, so he wanted cordial
relations with Stalin.
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Russell Buhite’s Decisions at Yalta: an Appraisal of Summit
Diplomacy gives a thorough description of the settings,
personalities and the issues at stake at the Yalta
Conference. He takes a different approach than de
Senarclens, not going back to the start of the alliance in
1941, but discussing the setting for the meeting and
personal traits of the three leaders first, then taking on
each of the main issues that were discussed at Yalta. This
book includes a section on the issue of Palestine, an issue
not addressed in the other sources I discuss here. His final
chapter is titled “An Appraisal”, and in it he discusses
some of the theories about the Yalta Conference. On the
issue of Roosevelt’s health, he says “That President
Roosevelt suffered from a high degree of mental impairment
during the conference now appears beyond dispute; that he
was incapable of understanding the implications of his
actions, given the help and preparation of his assistants,
is not. His failures were generally not those of mental
capacity.” (Buhite, 130) He also supports the thesis “that
the Soviet Union held most of the military cards at Yalta,
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and thus the agreements simply reflected a realistic
assessment of conditions on the part of all participants.”
(Buhite, 130) He also poses questions which the other
sources did not, such as “whether wartime summit conferences
represented the proper forums for the conclusion of Allied
agreement; whether summit conferences generally are
defensible; whether the West had a chance to gain anything
at the Crimean Conference; and, assuming that President
Roosevelt knew vaguely what he wanted, whether what he
desired could be achieved.” (Buhite, 131) Buhite argues that
“No American president, not Wilson at Versailles, Roosevelt
at Tehran or Yalta, Eisenhower at Geneva, or Kennedy at
Vienna, has bee well prepared for the give and take of
complex negotiation.” (Buhite, 132) This is because the
nature of the presidency does not allow one the time needed
to prepare because so many other matters need attention. He
also says that the nature of summitry “is the emphasis on
mythmaking and the creation of illusion that emanates from
conferences of heads of state. At Yalta, Churchill and
Roosevelt were desirous of achieving at least the appearance
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of cooperation and agreement because they feared that
otherwise public opinion in their respective countries would
fore reactive policies toward the Soviets.” (Buhite, 132)
Buhite argues that it is far more productive to have
subordinate negotiators thrash out compromises than to have
heads of state do it because it allows experts to conduct
negotiations at greater length, and if a mistake is made it
can be referred to the head of state. He actually agrees
with Stalin, that it would have been better not to have this
meeting, but would rather have left most of what was done to
foreign secretaries (Buhite, 133). The trip could have been
detrimental to the health of Roosevelt and Churchill, both
of whom were not well.
Conclusion
I agree with David Reynolds’s argument in Summits. I
think that the argument that due to the military situation
on the ground, with the Soviet Union in control of most of
Eastern Europe, the Yalta agreement is the best that the
Western Allies could have hoped for. The promises of
democratic election for Poland and recognition on the
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Declaration on Liberated Europe were really the only thing
that Roosevelt and Churchill could have gotten out of
Stalin.
I also think there is something to Buhite’s argument
that the summit should not have taken place at all.
Roosevelt’s belief in his own charm and powers of persuasion
did not justify the need for this meeting. Buhite is right
to say that subordinate negotiators for each side could have
come up with a more favorable agreement for the West. Stalin
did not see a need for this meeting. It is quite possible
that the trip to Yalta hastened the death of Roosevelt, who
was quite ill the entire time, and probably not the best
person to be negotiating for the U.S., because by all
accounts Stalin was the best negotiator of the three. The
shape of Europe would likely have been the same, but I doubt
whether experienced negotiators would have given the Soviets
the concession in Manchuria.
I liked the approach taken by de Senarclens. His was a
nicely detailed description of the relationship between the
big three, and was somewhat distanced from ideology.
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Bibliography
Buhite, Russell D. 1986. Decisions at Yalta: an Appraisal of Summit
Diplomacy. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1984. “The Future of Yalta”. Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, p 279-302. Council on Foreign
Relations.
Chamberlin, William H. 1962. “A Pro-Russian Fiasco”. In The
Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II, ed. Robert Dallek, 107-
114. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Reynolds, David. 2007. Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth
Century. New York: Basic Books.
Senarclens, Pierre de. 1988. Yalta. Translated by Jasmer
Singh. New Brunswick, New Yersey: Transaction, Inc.
Warren, Sidney. 1962. “A Realistic Response to International
Conditions”. In The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II, ed.
Robert Dallek, 107-114. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
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