In: Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 3 (1986) nr. 2: 1-19.
Formalization and Informalization:
Changing Tension Balances in Civilizing Processes
Cas Wouters 1
1. Informalization Revisited
In the sixties and seventies, there was increasing "permissiveness", together with growing
leniency in codes of social conduct in western societies. Many modes of conduct that had
formerly been forbidden were now allowed, particularly in matters of sexuality, and conduct and
emotions became less formally regulated in such spheres of behaviour as the written and spoken
language, clothing, music, dancing and hair styles.
In an earlier article I attempted to explain the increasing permissiveness in terms of
informalizing processes.2 In these processes more and more of the dominant modes of social
conduct, symbolizing institutionalized power relationships, come to be ignored and attacked,
with the result that the standards of social conduct change towards greater leniency, variety and
differentiation. At the same time this signifies a shift in power relationships between social
superiors and subordinates in favour of the latter.
These developments can be interpreted in terms of Norbert Elias's theory of civilizing
processes as increased varieties or nuances in the codes of conduct.3 Ever since the turn of the
century, the life styles and standards of social conduct of the middle classes and the working
classes of Europe have come to be more and more alike. In that process, the range of differences
in conduct, emotions and morals has been diminished, and the sensitivity to varieties or nuances
in between has been intensified. In one sense this development did not seem to be in accordance
with the theory of civilizing processes: according to some formulations of this theory, more
lenient standards of social conduct go hand in hand with more lenient patterns of self-control,
with lower requirements in regard to emotional controls on the part of the people involved. In
1 This paper was written for a workshop in Bielefeld, Germany, 1984, Joop Goudsblom, Bram van
Stolk and Abram de Swaan read the Dutch manuscript and made valuable comments. Special thanks goes to Sheila Gogol who translated it into English and to Stephen Mennell who helped me to improve my arguments and to "Churchillize" my English.
2 See Cas Wouters, Informalisation and the Civilising Process, in: P. Gleichmann, J. Goudsblom and H. Korte (eds.), Human Figurations, Amsterdam 1977, pp. 437-454.
3 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Volume I and The Civilizing Process: Volume II, New
that case there would be reason to conclude as some people argued – that a change in the very
direction of civilizing processes had occurred.4
In my earlier analysis of these informalizing processes, I attempted to show how the
different pattern of self-restraints that came into being demanded not only greater sensitivity to
varieties and greater flexibility in social conduct, but also a higher level of self-control.
With changes in power relations between parents and children as my main example, I tried to
demonstrate that the new standards of social conduct implied less imperative use of constraints
exercised by others (Fremdzwänge, external constraints) in the relationship between social
superiors and subordinates, inducing a stronger development of constraints exercised by oneself
(Selbstzwänge, self-restraints), especially among the subordinates. Furthermore, according to the
newer, more lenient and differentiated social standards, people from both groups became to a
greater extent able to think about expressing or repressing urges and emotions. They became
more conscious of social and individual options and restrictions, and this heightened
consciousness enabled them more than former generations both to restrain and express their
impulses and emotions. In the course of this development, most of the restrictions became more
flexible and differentiated, although on the other hand, the social ban upon self-aggrandizement
and the social requirement of mutual consent became all the more significant and imperative.5
In recent years, the informalization process seems to have come to a stop, and a process
of formalization has once again come into effect. The sexual revolution has been pronounced
over and done with,6 there is renewed respect for discipline, for law and order, and in order to
help people to orient themselves toward these values, it seems, new etiquette books are now
being published. In this article, I would like to try to comprehend these recent changes within the
framework of two successive phases of civilizing processes since the turn of the century. The
emphasis lies on developments since the close of World War II. First I shall draw attention to the
York 1978 and 1982. 4 In The Civilizing Process Elias said that the "relaxation of morals" in the twenties and the thirties
was limited and temporary (Vol. I, p. 187). In 1970, teaching in Amsterdam, he was beginning to have doubts whether the trend was only temporary and many discussed the implications fo the increasing 'permissiveness' for the theory of civilizing processes, with Elias and with each other. My article on informalization emerged out of these discussions.
5 It was A. de Swaan who noted these conditions to the greater leniency in codes of conduct. They not only specify the borders of this leniency, they also serve as a prerequisite for any degree of permanence on its part. (For whoever is so inclined, the "message" of this development boils down to the old moral, "love your neighbour and do as you please", which in todays more permissive language might be expressed as: "Fuck the rules, watch the traffic.") A. de Swaan, Uitgaansbeperking en uitgaansangst; over de verschuiving van bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding, in: De Gids, vol. 142 (1979), no. 8. pp. 483-510.
6 The cover of the April 9, 1984 issue of Time said: "Sex in the 80's. The Revolution is Over".
question of what informalization amounts to with respect to people's individual emotional life, in
order to clarify its contours as a social process. This process is here mainly described in terms of
movements in collective feelings, images and experiences. After the description of
informalization as a long-term process, I shall give a more detailed account based on a
distinction into phases. This will be followed by an elaboration upon the differences in the ways
in which people perceive themselves and each other in these two phases, and how they view and
feel about their own position in society. Lastly, these differences will be illustrated with
examples from the alterations in written and spoken language, with a view to giving a measure
of insight into the structure of the development of these two phases.
2. Informalization as a Psychological Process
What changes in the pattern of drive and affect control are linked to informalization? In the
psychological make-up of individual people, what this process mainly amounts to is becoming
aware of deeper feelings and learning to surmount hidden fears, a prerequisite for the
"emancipation of feelings." 7 With this new awareness people become conscious of emotions
that, as a rule, in their past were either ignored or concealed, for fear of parents and others on
whom they were dependent. Together with the fears and anxieties linked to them, these more
primary urges, impulses and emotions were muffled up and constrained. Thus, deeper feelings
and hidden fears are closely linked in the mind. Just as they were once excluded from one's
consciousness at the same time, they come out into the open at the same time. Whether or not
they were experienced consciously, these primary urges and impulses were once quite actively
present and gave rise to the fear of not being able to constrain them in accordance with the code
of conduct applied to people growing up. By banishing urges and impulses from one's
consciousness, one also excluded the connected fears and dangers or – in Elias' terms – they
were internalized and transformed into more or less automatically functioning fears and self-
constraints.
The social origin of this banishing process lies in the fact that giving in to these tempting
impulses would provoke social degradation, loss of respect and self-respect. At the extreme
there is the threat of virtually total social expulsion and consequently, the destruction of one's
social existence. In order to eliminate this possibility, and the fear of it, the exclusion of the
7 I use this term, 'emancipation of feelings', with certain reservations. Its charm is that it links the
word emancipation, which refers to social processes, with a term for mental processes. The references to mental processes, however, are so dominant that the term not only does not exclude the limited homo clausus line of thought, it would even somewhat tend to encourage it.
memories of one's inner life as a child from one's consciousness, as well as the banishment of
those primary urges and impulses which to the present day are operative in some unguarded and
secret moments, has become an important and common way of controlling these fears. In this
way many people draw a carefully guarded borderline between their childhood and their life as
an adult. (Sublimation is probably another way of controlling these fears). In this light
informalizing processes are also voyages of discovery into one's own closer or more distant past,
in pursuit of the reasons why and the ways in which impulses and emotions were led into the
paths they took. It is mainly an intermediate generation that ventures towards experiments of this
kind. For their children, the fruits of these expeditions may already be perceived as "normal
procedure". In other words, they are incorporated (formalized) into the modes of conduct which
have become valid at the later time.
The discovery and analysis of the channelling of fears, urges and impulses can provide a
more precisely detailed and more systematically elaborated self-image or autobiographical
continuity. From this one may derive a more meaningful and valuable interpretation of one's
own life. But on the other hand, there is always the danger that stirring up such feelings as
violent rage, anxiety, lust, greed or aggrandizement might arouse so much bewilderment that one
may no be able to control them according to the prevailing standards. This particular risk of
loosing (self)control is demonstrated in proverbs like "don't trust the cat to keep the cream", but
also by some people who suffered from acrophobia: their fear of falling had become so
intolerable that they jumped, just to escape from this fear. Nevertheless, with a more realistic and
stronger realization of one's autobiographical continuity, there are increasing chances of bringing
deeper and more concealed feelings up to the surface, along with the fears linked to them, and of
dealing with and controlling these feelings in such a way that one not only learns to express
them verbally, but also ventures to transform them into acts at the appropriate place and time.8 In
so far as this has been put into practice, as it has, on the whole there has also been an increase in
people's knowledge of themselves (and of people in general), and in the varieties of social
conduct and of life styles.
At one time, Norbert Elias referred to what was later to be called the process of
informalization as social experiments towards "controlled decontrolling of emotional controls."9
In this sense, informalization is a factual process as well as an ideal, a guide in individual and
8 See for example the history of a nudist beach as it is described in: Paul Kapteyn, Taboe, Macht en
Moraal in Nederland, Amsterdam 1980, pp. 200-205. 9 Elias used this expression in lectures he gave at the University of Amsterdam in 1970/1971.
social experiments.10 For example, according to this ideal parents provided their children with a
wider scope for living in accordance with the emotional and libidinal urges of the moment,
treating them more as equal human beings. Their attempts to build into children no restraints that
merely have the function of bolstering up the (peremptory) authority of certain ruling groups,
including that of the parents themselves, corresponded with their increased desire also to free
themselves and each other from that kind of restraint. This attempt, or so they hoped, would also
enable them to cope with life in a more open-minded and detached way, at the same time
bringing them more stable and enduring emotional gratification.
3. Informalization as a Long-term Social Process
As an ideal as well as a factual process, informalization has had a long history as an offshoot of
the western civilizing processes. As Norbert Elias showed in his main work, in the course of
several centuries the more basic functions of life, such as eating, drinking and sleeping, and the
more primary urges and impulses have become overlaid with fears- particularly fears for the loss
of respect and self-respect. In this process the basic functions became increasingly regulated
(formalized), while the more primary inner life was increasingly hidden and expressed only at
unguarded moments or behind the scenes. For the rest, impulses and emotions were channelled
into the more and more detailed formal paths of the prevailing modes of social conduct.
Especially since the turn of the century, with Freud as the leading spokesman, successive
generations have come to recognize more and more of these fears in themselves and each other,
and they have had to surmount them in order to allow a less rigid channelling of impulses and
emotions into more varied and informal paths. This informalization was provoked and made
possible by the changes in the interdependencies between people, by rapidly advancing social
differentiation and integration, especially since the 1880s. In these processes were rooted the
conditions for further democratization. They also implied the levelling intermixture of modes of
conduct and life styles. Moreover, with the exception of the violent intervals of the two wars, on
the whole people in Europe gained greater physical safety and material security. These processes
10 In his article on a conference on civilizing processes in Amsterdam, Nico Wilterdink commented on
informalizaton that it involves an ideal "and should be acknowledged as such." Why not. However, besides being an ideal informalization is also a factual process. Bram van Stolk made the following comment on the term women's liberation: "It refers to an ideal as well as to an actual development", and added in a note that this distinction was earlier made by Elias with respect to the term 'civilization'. Nico Wilterdink, Die Zivilisationstheorie im Kreuzfeuer der Diskussion, in: P. Gleichmann, J. Goudsblom, H. Korte (eds.), Macht und Zivilisation, Frankfurt-on-Main, 1984, p. 297. Bram van Stolk, Verlaten Mannen: angsten, eigenwaarde en inschikking, in: Maandblad
Geestelijke Volksgezondheid, 1984, no. 7/8, pp. 755-785.
implied the growing possibility of, as well as the growing social pressure towards, removing
from the prevailing rules of conduct and sentiment those specific modes of conduct whose
function it is to indicate something that is not a personal quality or merit, but a superiority
inherited quite independently of such qualities, and of removing the necessity to distinguish
oneself from other individuals and from lower groups not only by way of individual achieve-
ments, but also by way of instruments of possession and prestige.11
The more people felt constraint to make use of these possibilities from the turn of the
century onwards, and the more people pressed each other in this direction, the higher has
become the scope and the level of fear control and detachment. After all, in the course of this
process the individuals involved have come to constrain themselves and each other increasingly
to curb their desires and fantasies regarding their own superiority, and to restrain their fears of
inferiority and the loss of respect and self-respect.
These developments may help to understand what has been said about the changes in
ideals and practice in the relationship between parents and children. What has been said implies
that the self-respect people (want to) derive from their family life has risen, together with their
respect for women and children. Parents have come to expect more from their family life; the
mutual emotional and moral pretensions and expectations have risen together with the pressure
to treat each other more as equal human beings under conditions of mutual consent. Within the
borders of family life, people gave rein to their fantasies of aggrandizement in the specifically
controlled way of wanting to be "grand" with and for each other: a figuration ideal. The more
this desire to be "grand" with and for each other became widespread and more strongly mutual,
the more immediately was the exertion of authority - in the sense of issuing commands or
expecting special treatment on the grounds of some inherited superiority - experienced and
exposed as an unnecessary humiliation. The growth of (the desire for) closer and emotionally
more satisfying bonds thus heightened the sensitivity to modes of conduct that were not based
upon personal merits and qualities but on some inherited superiority and on the use of violence,
11 This sentence, which is certainly not easy to read, is based on the following passage in Ueber den
Prozess der Zivilisaton, Vol. II, p. 453: "Erst wenn sich diese zwischennstaatlichen und innerstaatlichen Spannungen ausgetragen haben und überwunden sind, werden wir mit besserem Recht von uns sagen können, dass wir zivilisiert sind. Erst dann kann aus der Verhaltenstafel, die dem Einzelnen als Über-Ich eingeimpft wird, mehr von dem abfallen, was die Funktion hat, nicht eine persönliche, sondern eine von ihr unabhängige ererbte Überlegenheit zu markieren, und aus den Zwängen, die sein Verhalten bestimmen, die Notwendigkeit, sich nicht durch die individuelle Leistung von anderen Individuen, sondern durch Besitz- und Prestige-instrumente von minderen Gruppen zu unterscheiden." I think this is a pretty precise formulation and the Enghish translation (p. 332) is so different that I stuck to the German sentences.
possession, sex and other criteria of prestige. With this heightened sensitivity, people also
became able to detect this kind of conduct at an earlier stage, inside the intimate circle of
relatives and friends as well as outside (where, as we shall discuss, numerous injustices were
exposed as such, and were more and more sharply criticized). Moreover, people have developed
a sharper eye for restrictions and for possibilities of expressing their objections to conduct of this
kind. Since parents pass this sensitivity on to their children, this process of social inheritance
seems to be a strong force in collective changes in sentiments and mentality.
The higher level of consciousness and the intensified sensitivity, like the sense of justice,
have given rise to an aversion to claims to authority that are not based upon personal merits. On
the other hand, they also gave rise to and intensify the attractiveness of more personal, informal
and spontaneous ways of dealing with oneself and others. These were the personal merits that
came to be more and more highly appreciated. The behaviour of workers and children for
instance, was clearly more outright, spontaneous, straightforward and direct, all of which were
features that charmed and fascinated the members of the old and new middle classes, the
bourgeoisie. They themselves had learned to behave in a more reserved, inhibited and indirect
manner.12 This attractiveness acted as a catalyst to the "emancipation of feelings", the
psychological counterpart of what on the social level might be referred to as the "proletarization
of the bourgeoisie."13
The attraction of this greater directness, vitality and spontaneity, exerted across the
barriers of established class differences, has been given an extra dimension in Orwell's
description of the "proles" in his 1984: "The proles had stayed human. They had not become
hardened inside. They had held on to the primitive emotions which he himself had to re-learn by
conscious effort."14 Indeed, informalization is also the conscious effort to re-learn more primal
and more concealed impulses and emotions. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the ideal spread
that precisely the more primary impulses and emotions were the ones it was most necessary to
discover and bring to the surface. As the chains of interdependency between the various classes
12 J. Goudsblom, Dutch Society, New York 1968, p. 30: "An important characteristic of the
bourgeois standards of speech and etiquette is that they generally encourage "civility", that is, conduct which never indulges in an open display of emotions, but conceals the actor's innermost feelings behind a restrained observance of conventional forms."
13 The intermixture of life styles not only made the workers more bourgeois, it also worked the other way round. An important part of the new leniency in the middle class form of social intercourse can be attributed not only to 'proletarization' but also to 'Americanization'. After the Second World War, the U.S.A. became a dominant super power, and as such it served more easily as a model.
14 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Penguin Books 1954, p. 135.
had become longer and stronger, in the sixties and seventies the life styles of these classes grew
closer to each other and a growing number of people came to view the discovery and expression
of hitherto concealed emotions as a prerequisite for knowing oneself and (consequently) being
mentally healthy. In some circles, it sometimes looked as if hard battles were taking place in the
competitive struggle for the reputation as the people who had the best and most authentic
knowledge of their inner selves. There was the "culture of narcissism", the "Me Generation" and
so forth. But in all these circles, the inhibition and suppression of feelings were frowned upon
and thought to be harmful; one could get a heart attack that way.
Among sociologists, this kind of manifestation of informalizing processes mainly
manifested itself in an increase in "sociological self-reflection" and in the "sociology of
sociology".15
4. The Spiral Movement of Informalizing Processes: Two Currents
Informalizing processes did not develop in one straight line. Waves of informalization have been
followed by new waves of formalization, but in a long term perspective from the end of last
century onwards a spiral movement can be discerned in which informalizing tendencies had the
upper hand. Since then, social life in general has become less strictly regulated, more
multifarious. In following currents of formalization, apparently not all the informalization from
the previous period was undone, and certain informal modes of conduct and life styles or certain
aspects of them, were formalized. In other words, in one way or another they were incorporated
into an established and dominant code of conduct allowing more behavioural alternatives and
nuances, but with stricter rules as to self-aggrandizement and mutual consent.
The dangers and fears against which the former formal codes were meant to protect had
diminished or could apparently be avoided or controlled in more varied and subtle ways - ways
in which both social superiority and inferiority were less explicitly and less extremely expressed.
Except for calamities such as a third world war or a dramatic decline in wealth, this spiral
movement in the direction of informalization may be expected to last. Anyone who brings to
mind what life was like before the most recent informalization phase might find it difficult even
to imagine that people with today's knowledge, mentality and level of consciousness would ever
again be able to live with the power inequalities of the 1940s and 1950s, the rigid code of
conduct, the inflexible morality with its condemnation and suppression of many of the feelings
that are nowadays accepted as being perfectly normal. The example of the following table may
suffice as evidence:
15 In this specific field, see particularly Johan Goudsblom's Sociology in the Balance, Oxford, 1977.
Freedom in upbringing in 1965 - 1983 (in percentages)16
_________________________________________________________
1965 1966 1970 1975 1980 1983
The time on which a 20 year old
daughter has to return home:
leave that to daughter 17,2 17,0 30,7 29,9 41,6 43,1
determine together 30,0 48,6 51,9 57,6 52,3 47,8
parents fix the time 52,8 34,5 17,4 12,8 6,2 9,1
(1490)(1312) (1891) (1745)(1819)(1716)
Are boys and girls of 18
years old allowed to read
everything ?
Yes, they may 48,4 46,9 71,8 77,9 86,8 85,7
Some books are unsuitable 51,6 53,1 28,2 22,1 13,2 14,3
(1488) (1305) (1879) (1746) (1813)(1723)
_________________________________________________________
The long-term process of informalization is part of the civilizing process. During this century –
as well as before – there was a further differentiation and integration of social functions. Due to
this division of functions, and also to automation, there was a rise in the productivity of labour
and, consequently, in the standard of living of the various social strata of the population. Their
(functional) interdependence increased, directly because all the functions that were now
differentiated also had to be co-ordinated, and indirectly via the state by way of the introduction
of state-organized and subsidized social care. Private and government organizations expanded,
and the increasing differentiation of functions within them made the chains of interpendence
longer and its links shorter. So in general there was a reduction of power differentials between
social strata, the contrasts or more marked differences between their life styles and codes of
16 The table is taken from Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1984, Staatsuitgeverij, 's-Gravenhage 1984,
p. 310. For further evidence see also C. Brinkgreve and M. Korzec, Feelings, Behaviour, Morals in the Netherlands: 1938-1978, Analysis and interpretation of an advice column, in: The
Netherlands' Journal of Sociology, vol. 15, no. 2, Amsterdam, 1979.
conduct diminished, and (sensitivity to) the varieties and subtleties within the modes of conduct
increased, as did the level of consciousness, of detachment, self-knowledge and social
knowledge.
These civilizing processes did not develop in a straight line either: the two phases or
waves of expansion that Elias distinguished within civilizing processes largely coincide with
moments of formalization and informalization. In Elias' terms, there are the following waves of
expansion: In the phase of colonization or assimilation, the lower and broader social strata might
very well rise, but the emphasis is on individual upward social mobility. The (status) differences
between the higher and the lower strata are still clearly acknowledged and accepted and the
members of the lower strata, particularly the individuals with upward aspirations, strongly orient
themselves toward the example of the life styles and modes of conduct of the higher strata.
There is an even greater incentive to do this because of the tendency on the part of the higher
strata to colonize and discipline de haut en bas.17
In the phase of differentiation or emancipation, the upwardly mobile strata have risen in social
strength and self-awareness to such a clear degree that their members orient themselves more
toward each other and toward their own life styles and modes of conduct, and reject attempts
from above to colonize or discipline them as being overly patronizing or imperialistic. Members
of the higher strata are forced to adopt an attitude of greater restraint, and withdraw in joint
defence. In this phase the tensions in society become stronger.18
Elias referred to these phases, but he did not elaborate upon them. I should like to make
an attempt to do so here with respect to the period from the Second World War up to today,
concentrating upon the developments in the west, particularly in the Netherlands.
In our research monograph "Vrouwen in tweestrijd", Bram van Stolk and I distinguished two
phases in the post-war period up to about 1980 that bear a resemblance to the phases
distinguished by Elias with respect to the period ( 1400-1800) his research was focused upon.19
17 Ali de Regt devoted half of her Ph.D. thesis, Arbeidergezinnen en Beschavingsarbeid
(Meppel/Amsterdam, 1984) to the activities of bourgeois groups in an effort to discipline working-class families. In a note she refers to the same Elias phases as I use here, but she does not make further use of them there. See p. 150 and p. 283.
18 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Volume II, New York 1982, pp. 311-317. 19 We noted this resemblance, although we did not go into it in any further detail. Not that it would
have been possible, since we had not done any research pertaining to the extent to which these phases could be viewed as an extension of the phases in civilizing processes distinguished by Elias, and because a research monograph is not the proper place for an essay on a question of this type. What I am presenting here constitutes a continuation of what we wrote about these phases in our book, so that to begin with I shall more or less quote from it.
Bram van Stolk and Cas Wouters, Vrouwen in Tweestrijd, tussen thuis en tehuis, Deventer 1983,
We described a phase of stabilization and resignation that went on up to the sixties, after which
there was a phase of emancipation and resistance up to the end of the seventies. In the eighties a
new current of stabilization and resignation seems to be manifesting itself with increasing
clarity. Today members of rising strata again orient themselves stronger toward the example of
the more formal life styles and modes of conduct of higher strata as there new and old
established groups succeeded in stabilizing and asserting their power and their distinctness. In
this process changes in the balance of power and in the social construction of status hierarchies
are accompanied by changes in the general feeling of life: in the dominant perspectives on past,
present and future. This includes the social definition of the most important social dangers and
fears, of the most necessary and aspired social controls and self-controls, as well as the social
definition of human ideals.
5. Figuration Ideals: Harmony Model and Conflict model
In our book, we classified the two phases or waves of emancipation and stabilization mainly on
the grounds of changes in the dominant ideals about how people or groups of people, who are
interdependent and between whom an unequal power balance exists, deal with each other. We
described them as changes in figuration ideals,20 particularly with respect to how husband and
wife deal with each other, the subject of our book. Up to the sixties, we noted a tradition of
harmonious inequality as the figuration ideal. That tradition made for a feeling of social
continuity which served as the basis for an expectation of biographical continuity: people got
engaged, got married, had children, raised them and then grew old together. This was a ready-
made plan and many people viewed it as the "natural order" of social life. This does not mean
that the memory of earlier phases of emancipation and resistance had faded, but any individual
who found himself on the subordinate side in social relations was thought to be a victim of bad
luck rather than of injustice.21 In 1939 the emancipatory struggle of the past as well as the
resignation prevalent at the time was formulated as follows:
"Women's yearning for freedom has been heard throughout the ages like a deep sigh, and
even though the woman of today might have a degree of freedom that she hardly could
particularly pp. 160-170. The book will be published in German by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. 20 The main reason why we introduced the term 'figuration ideal' is to emphasize the fact that the
ideals of both the partners are complementary: for every I-ideal, there is a complementary You-ideal. To a certain degree, in every individual's youth an I-ideal and a You-ideal with respect to a marriage or steady relationship are internalized in one pattern of mutual dependence.
21 The distinction between bad luck and injustice has been taken from Ralph Turner, The Theme of Contemporary Movements, in: British Journal of Sociology, 1969, p. 400 ff.
have dreamt of fifty yaers ago, the acquisition of this freedom has only made the
yearning for even greater freedom increase. ... But ... if you can not have freedom (not a
little bit more freedom within the framework of your subservience, but a more complete
freedom to do as you please), do not let it get you down, because in most cases the
advantages of freedom do not counterbalance the worries and the heavy responsibility
that go hand in hand with it."22
Up to the sixties, the same mentality and similar figuration ideals of harmonious
inequality were also characteristic of all kinds of other relations besides those between men and
women, for example relations between parents and children, between teachers and pupils,
between religious and political leaders and their followers. Even in the more controversial
relations between employers and employees (and their organizations), this ideal of harmonious
inequality was more dominant than the more radical ideals which held (class) struggle to be
inevitable as is evident, for example in the Netherlands, in the emphasis on mutual co-operation
and pride in the relatively peaceful state of the labour market. Of course this does not necessarily
mean that there were no conflicts at all, but ideally speaking, according to the prevailing
figuration ideals, there should not be any. In general, the unequal balances of power between all
kinds of established and outsider groups were accepted. Attempts to bring about any drastic
changes in these relations were virtually non-existent. There was not enough faith in the chances
of such attempts being successful, so there was not yet any pressure on the established groups to
substantiate their authority. That pressure began to build up in the mid-sixties, when the faith in
the chances for success became stronger than the fears of failure, when the strength of the
figuration ideals of harmonious inequality underwent such a rapid decline. Using both old and
new organizations, groups of outsiders took advantage of the increased opportunities of attaining
more power. How this happened is well known. A phase of emancipation and resistance had
commenced.
It is striking that at the beginning of this phase, in the social sciences the distinction was
first drawn between a harmony model and a conflict model, a distinction that rapidly became a
matter of general usage. The two terms became common among politicians, trade union leaders,
the spokesmen of liberation movements and so on, all the way down to schoolchildren. The
distinction gave outsiders the opportunity to formulate the legitimacy of their opposition to
inequality; they were simply "choosing the conflict model", a respectable strategy. The dangers
22 Amy Groskamp-ten Have, Onder vier ogen, gesprekken met vrouwen, Amsterdam, 1939, pp. 114-
115.
and fears that were previously perceived in such conflicts and tensions, a perception reflected in
the figuration ideal of harmonious inequality, diminished and the more rigid and formal ways of
controlling these dangers and fears were attacked as being too stiff, showing conceited
superiority and exaggerated anxiety for loss of power, status and self-control.
In the course of the sixties, it gradually went without saying for more and more groups of
outsiders – women, teenagers, homosexuals, workers – that changes, i.e. changes for the better,
were to be expected. Their position within the existing relations were no longer mainly
perceived as something acquired as a result of a long and hard struggle in the past, as had been
the case in the previous phase. From then on, their positions were subjected to a critical
comparison with more or less utopian images and expectations for the future. For many people,
it became more and more difficult to picture any kind of unequal relation as being harmonious.
In the minds of most of the outsiders who were gradually rising, the figuration ideal of
harmonious inequality was repressed by their preoccupation with humiliation, whereas in the
previous phase they would have tried to repress exactly these feelings of humiliation. Now, on
the grounds of their preoccupation with their humiliating experiences, they put a great deal of
emphasis on the solidarity within their own ranks regarding their "justified demands" pertaining
to "unjust" differences. It appeared to be possible to change the "natural order" of social life and
the dangers of doing so turned out to be small or even non-existent. The success of liberation
and informalization movements led to high hopes for the future in general and to high
expectations of governments to realize and legitimize further changes in particular. The
awareness of the changes that were taking place infringed upon the feeling of social continuity
and, consequently, upon the expectation of biographical continuity. Now the old plan for the
course of a relationship between a man and a woman had become unclear and somehow
questionable. More and more women, and men as well, noted the inequality it implied, and some
of them found it absolutely intolerable. It was no longer true that anyone born a woman was a
victim of bad luck; now she was much more a victim of injustice, and specifically a victim of
injustice on the part of men who held women in a subordinate position, not on the basis of
personal qualities or merits, but of socially inherited superiority.
Ever since the mid-sixties relations between men and women – like those between
parents and children, older and younger people, professors and students, employers and
employees – have been more and more clearly marked by out and out tensions. The lessening of
power inequalities was conducive to greater informality. This lasted until the end of the
seventies, when formalizing tendencies again got the upper hand. A new phase of stabilization
and resignation commenced when old and new established groups became more and more
successful in their attempts to stabilize power balances and to assert their power and their
distinctness through return to greater formality, including forms of accepted informality.
At this time conditions are favourable to further compare between these historical
currents and phases. Anyone above 35 is able to compare from his own experiences the former
with the present phase of stabilization and resignation. In this comparison one does not have to
take serious interruptions like a war between two or more of the western countries into account –
as most, maybe all earlier generations had to do.
In the following paragraphs three further general characteristics of the two currents of
development are described.
6. Common and Conflicting Interests: Commercial Climate and Government Climate
In his book The Court Society, Norbert Elias explains the French Revolution from a growing
diversion between rank and power relationships: "In the course of the development of French
society the latent social power of the different social cadres changed in their relation to each
other. The actual distribution of power among them evolved in a way to which the manifest
distribution of power anchored in the ossified institutional shell of the old regime no longer
corresponded."23 A similar, though less revolutionary diversion of actual and institutionalized
power – institutionalized in social hierarchy and in standards of behaviour – had grown in the
fifties and sixties. The process of further differentiation and integration of social functions
created not only a rise in the general standard of living but also in power chances for groups of
relative outsiders. During the last wave of emancipation and resistance these power chances
were realized. This may help to understand why during the phase of stabilization and resignation
there was a greater emphasis on interests that groups of established and outsiders had in
common, while during the phase of emancipation and resistance the emphasis was on the
differences between their interests. In the latter phase, we wrote, an increasing amount of
conflicting interests were "discovered" and more and more of the old figuration ideals were
interpreted as being based on oppression on the one hand and a "slave mentality" on the other.
The institutionalized definition of national and common interests was recognized as too strongly
favouring established groups. Attempts at promoting the individual and group interests of
relative outsiders were more and more expected to be successful, without endangering common
interests. In many negotiation situations where, in the phase of stabilization and resignation, the
23 Norbert Elias, The Court Society, Oxford and New York 1983, p.
established groups used to be able to appeal successfully to such general interests as as national
welfare and national solidarity, in the new phase they were silenced or scorned by
representatives of outsider groups. These representatives demonstrated the partiality of this kind
of appeal by contrasting it with an appeal to a kind of welfare or solidarity that pertains to a
larger number of people more evenly and equally. In this way they repeatedly succeeded in
gaining the "justified" advantage in negotiations and in putting the representatives of
establishments like the business and industrial world in a posture of defence.
In the most important of these negotiations, those on a larger scale, the government was
either directly or indirectly involved: under the continuous upward pressure of rising groups of
outsiders, prosperity was spread to include more and more people and a wide range of (social
and health care) facilities were instituted. This meant that the power range of private enterprise
in the world of commerce and industry was subjected to further limitations, but also that the
power range of the government grew. These conditions made for what can be referred to as a
favourable government climate. Government officials and party politicians were more and more
expected to keep private enterprise within certain morally acceptable borderlines. The exact
location of these borderlines varies to some extent with the degree to which conflicting or
common interests are in the public limelight at the moment. When the public spotlights were
mainly focused upon all kinds of conflicting interests, a great deal of injustice loomed up that the
government was expected to "do something about". The pressure and the temptation to give in to
the interests of the groups of outsiders who were most forcefully and dramatically in the public
spotlight at the moment of decision had grown and continued growing until the government
revenues stopped increasing. It was probably also a result of the limitations that governments
imposed on the commercial and industrial world – in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere in the
west – that the commercial climate declined. In most of these countries businessmen came to
have less confidence in government policies. The decline in the commercial climate went hand
in hand with declining profits and investments, the exodus of capital and a declining supply of
venture capital.24 This was one of the reasons for the stagnation in economic growth and for
governments' shortage of funds. Governments once again clearly referred to general interests
when instituting budget cuts and measures to promote the commercial (and labour)25 climate. In
this process the power chances and the public appeal of trade unions deteriorated. From
24 See for quantitative figures, for example, O.E.C.D. Economic Surveys 1983-1984, Netherlands,
Paris, 1984. 25 The labour climate also deteriorated as a result of automation and the transfer of production
processes requiring large labour forces to countries where labour was cheap and plentiful.
comparing Dutch newspaper front pages in 1972 with those in 1982 it seems that the public
attention for trade unions dropped with more than 50%. Negotiations and consultations between
government officials and representatives of employers' organizations became increasingly
important, for the people involved as well as with regard to public opinion. Politicians and
administrative authorities were (and felt) pressed to win back the confidence of the business
world. Duisenberg, who was once the Dutch Minister of Finance and is now the president of the
Nederlandse Bank, stated it as follows: "But I also put a lot of faith in matters that are not
material ones: the stimulation of confidence on the part of the commercial world in social
continuity and stability."26 Prof. I. van Dam, administrator of the World Bank, made the
following comment: "The new gods are the free market and private enterprise; the new devils
are the governments and the planning agencies."27
If we examine a longer period of time, we see that in the course of the various
fluctuations in "climate", government officials, workers and employers or businessmen have
become more dependent upon each other. One of the ways this interdependence has manifested
itself is in the steadily increasing regulation of the struggle for power and the conflict of interests
they are engaged in. The present "de-regulation" and the alleviation of the financial burdens
borne by the world of commerce, provided by the government, serve to strengthen this picture
rather than weaken it. Greater interdependency also means more common interests. Now that
there is more of emphasis on the common interests shared by the government and the business
world alike, there is also greater emphasis on the special responsibility of individual officials and
on their authority.28 Nevertheless, there has been a decrease in the scope of governmental power,
because in the period of declining economic growth rulers became much more dependent on the
business world and the free market. This means a less favourable government climate.
The stagnation in economic growth and the subsequent decline in prosperity aroused
certain fears. There was also an increasing need for a co-ordinating official agency that could
surmount the discord resulting from conflicting interests. One of the ways to provide for this
kind of co-ordination involved accepting and emphasizing common interests, thus diminishing
fears and enhancing trust or confidence between the government, the business world and the rest
26 Kees Caljé and G. van Benthem van den Bergh, Gesprek met dr. W.F. Duisenberg, president van
de Nederlandse Bank, in: De Gids, vol. 146, no. 6 (1983), p. 427. 27 N.R.C.-Handelsblad, July 1, 1983. 28 One example out of many, taken from an interview with a Dutch Minister: ".. a Minister ought to
have authority. A Minister is not ordinary... the people should see the man who makes decisions. Not Tom, Dick or Harry who is going to rush in and care of things... then I think it becomes more difficult to defend decisions." Vrij Nederland, vol. 44, June 11, 1983, p. 5.
of the employed and unemployed population.29
In terms of the theory of civilizing processes this confidence can be conceptualized as
mutually expected self-restraint (m.e.s.).30 People restrain themselves in the expectation that
others will restrain themselves too, and their mutually expected self-restraint is felt, and may be
expressed, as mutual confidence.
Developments pertaining to formalization and informalization ran parallel to the phases
referred to above. The more 'inner-directed', 'always a gentleman' or 'always a lady' aspects now
seem to manifest themselves somewhat more clearly, although the 'other-directed', 'there is a
time and place for everything' aspect has been largely maintained and has been incorporated into
the more fixed 'lady' and 'gentleman' code.31
7. Upward versus Downward Pressure; Downstairs versus Upstairs Perspective
In view of these two phases of social development, a number of other differences become
evident beside the ones referred to above. One important difference has already been noted in
passing: If the emphasis lies on individual social upward mobility and downward pressure,
exerted by the established groups, is dominant, then most people's ideals for the future are also
more individual and more restricted. These ideals, however, are more collective, with higher
inclinations, if the emphasis is on collective social upward mobility and upward pressure is
29 With respect to the fluctuations in collective trust and distrust, see also: A. de Swaan, Nood en
Deugd: over altruisme en collectieve actie, Deventer, 1984: "... the expectations that people have of each other ... alter ... in accordance with their relations to each other. ... if (false expectations) become widespread enough, they are self-fulfilling. If mutual distrust is general, then this also leads to an unwillingness to participate in collective enterprises: the mutal suspicion is self-fulfilling. But if, for one reason or another, there is the expectation in some minds that most people would be willing to work together in co-operation, then this can give a rise to the expectation that there would be a chance for collective action to succeed, and the willingness to co-operate becomes more widespread." p. 21. In the world of trade and industry this is often expressed, also in advertisements. The following sentences was in an advertisement of the Dresdner Bank in International Herald Tribune on August 22, 1983: "The key to international recovery lies in a return of confidence in economic, monetary, domestic and foreign policies." (my italics)
The chairmain of the Employers Organisation in the Netherlands made the following comment on the present cabinet: ".. the funny thing is that it is now doing exactly what has to be done. And I think that particularly the adjustments and the alleviation of the costs for the business world are the most important thing about this policy. This no-nonsense policy has given rise to a completely different atmosphere in society and arouses confidence in the firms." N.R.C.-
Handelsblad, February 15, 1984 (my italics). 30 The concept 'mutually expected self-restraint' is taken from J. Goudsblom, Morele beesten.
Notities over moraal, De Gids, May 1986, pp. 171-175. 31 For further evidence, see Cas Wouters, Informalisierung und Formalisierung in den
Geschlechterbeziehungen in den Niederlanden von 1930 bis Anfang 1985, in Kölner Zeitschrift
exerted by the rising groups for the acceptance of their own ways of life and codes of conduct. In
the light of their higher expectations for the future, the power that had been gained by workers,
women and so forth was often viewed by them as simply being "token" power rooted in
"repressive tolerance". In the phases of stabilization and resignation, when the expectations for
the future diminish, this aggressive interpretation becomes less attractive and makes way for a
more defensive interpretation of this power gain as being the result of a long and hard social
struggle. Then the dominant tendency is to evaluate existing power relations in terms of
historical developments. Anyone who primarily evaluates relations between established and
outsider groups on the grounds of historical developments can see that, for most groups of
outsiders, there have been advances with respect to (material) living conditions. This perspective
leads more easily to contentment and resignation. Anyone who primarily evaluates these
relations on the grounds of ideals for the future, however, will easily find seeds for discontent
and opposition. Thus the balance between historical and utopian evaluation criteria fluctuates
along with the two phases in the civilizing processes.
The transition in emphasis from upward to downward pressure (and vice versa) is
probably the change that is the most striking. Upward pressure gives rise to certain fears
regarding the loss of status and power (for established), and fears that one won't make the grade
socially and will be slighted (for outsiders). As has been noted before, downward pressure also
gives rise to this kind of fear, but here the threat mainly comes from the opposite direction, from
above, and is experienced to be more severe. Upward pressure stimulates 'identification with the
underdog' and the spread of a downstairs perspective on society. Downward pressure, on the
other hand, stimulates 'identification with the established'32 and the spread of an upstairs
perspective. Then people come to perceive their life conditions as more menacing, and they will
be more restrained and formal.
An example of the "identification with the underdog" and of a downstairs perspective
was given in the sixties and seventies by the identification with psychiatric patients; "anti-
psychiatry" and other similar movements tended to view these patients as people like
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (forthcoming, autumn 1986). 32 The "identification with the established" follows the same emotional logic as the "identification
with the aggressor" (c.f. Anna Freud, Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen, Kindler Verlag, Munich, chapter nine, Die Identifizierung mit dem Angreifer", p. 85 ff.)
In The Civilizing Process, Volume II (see note 3), Elias also refers to this identification with the established: "people rising socially as individuals," he says, "identify to a certain extent with the upper class. (...) People in this situation acknowledge in one part of their consciousness the upper-class norms and manners as binding on themselves without being able to adopt them with the same ease and matter-of-factness." p. 313.
themselves, with feelings that are perfectly understandable, and with an almost 'healthy' reaction
to 'unhealthy' and oppressive social conditions. Not only psychiatric patients but also people
living in relatively unprotected and dangerous social conditions such as hoboes, beatniks and
other non-conformists were granted more prestige and respect. The dynamic vitality of street
sense, the ability to react alertly to the perils and opportunities of the street were praised in many
popular song lyrics and Bob Dylan put it as follows:
"You've gone to the finest school, all right Miss Lonely,
But you know you only used to get juiced in it,
And nobody has ever taught you how to live on the street,
And now you are gonna have to get used to it." (Like a Rolling Stone, 1965)
This downstairs perspective belittled the vitality, the alertness and the spontaneity of the
established groups in their protected living conditions. In the present wave of stabilization and
resignation there has been a sharp rise in the example function of the established groups. Their
more protected living conditions are now more apt to arouse feelings of envy and admiration
than contempt. There is no longer so much interest in street sense or appreciation for it. The
downstairs perspective no longer has much of a following. With the growing tendency to
distinguish oneself downwards and to envy the established groups - identification with the
established rather than the outsiders - there has been a spread of the upstairs perspective. Salon
sense, the subtle intimation that one is not a person of the street, has increasingly become the
focus of interest and appreciation.
However, this change does not mean a relapse into the kind of hierarchic relations,
formal manners and self-constraints that were prevalent in the previous period of stabilization
and resignation. The liberation movements may have lost much of their spirit, but the advances
they made have certainly not disappeared. The identification with such underdogs as psychiatric
patients, children, women and workers may have become less intensive and the downstairs
perspective may have less backing, but all these people do now live in less hierarchic, less
rigidly and formally regulated relations and figurations. In the course of the growing
differentiation and integration of social functions and increasing democratization and
equalization, the people involved have forced themselves and each other to behave with greater
consideration; consideration of the feelings and interests of more people, for more of the time. In
this way, they gradually came to exert more and more pressure on themselves and on each other
in the direction of stronger, more even and all-round self-control, and of greater sensitivity and
flexibility in getting along with each other, with all others. The level of their mutually expected
self-restraint has risen.
This means that the changes form upward to downward pressure and from a downstairs
to an upstairs perspective have had barely any influence on the long term direction of these
civilizing processes. They did have an effect on the moulds into which emotions and self-
controls have been cast and the way they have been channelled. In such a period of transition,
the question of which feelings and interests of which people have to be taken into consideration
and just exactly when and how, is answered in slightly different ways. The direction of the
collective emotional movements may not change, but their rate and shape do. Examined in close
up, people's identifications with each other change and the moulds in which they are cast or are
channelled change too: who are your friends, who are your enemies and how are the implied
feelings expressed? In everyday life, answers to these questions are so important that even small
changes can make a strong impression. The same holds true for the question of whether people
percieve themselves as being on the defensive or on the offensive. With a change in the direction
of the main threat to people's social position - from upstairs to downstairs or the other way
around - they will change their ways of defending their positions and this may alter their self-
image, their we- and they-image and their mentality. Such a change can even make a significant
difference to what they view as the meaning or value of life. Nonetheless, in a more detached
long-term perspective, one can see that in general people's identifications with each other have
been expanding and may be expected to continue to do so as long as intra- national and
international interdependencies continue to expand, as long as processes of social differentiation
and integration continue.
8. Language Usage: Nationalization and Regionalization
Since the turn of the century, an informalization process has also taken place with respect to
language usage. The (formal) national languages expanded from above to below to include more
and more social classes and regions, a process in which the contrasts in language usage
diminished and the prevailing code of conduct for language usage became more informal,
flexible and varied. The waves of formalization and informalization also contained eddies in the
development of language usage. I should like to confine myself to the Netherlands here,
although more or less similar developments have also taken place in the other countries of
Europe. (An international comparison would certainly be interesting).
In a perceptive and enlightening article on the development of Algemeen Beschaafd
Nederlands (literally, General Civilized Dutch, the Dutch equivalent to the King's English or
perhaps "BBC Enghlish"), J. Goudsblom wrote in 1964: "Especially since World War II, there
has been more tolerance of words that were still 'unheard of' in civilized circles a generation
ago."33 The same kind of development was also witnessed in the 'roaring twenties' and the 'fin du
siècle'. In these periods – and even more so in the sixties and seventies – informalization
manifested itself in a growing tolerance of swear words, words referring to bodily functions such
as sexuality and excretion or to primary impulses and emotions, and (other) 'vulgar' words and
'slang'. Referring to Elias' comments on the development of bathing manners since 1900,34
Goudsblom commented: "Just as the social order has proved capable of bearing the sight of
bikinis, it can also tolerate a more candid choice of words. ... a spark of the common folk's laxity
has permeated the bourgeois self-discipline."35 The new esteem granted to the modes of conduct
of "the common folk" can to some extent also account for the neutralization of the social
differences and diminishing contrasts in language usage. The movement of modes of conduct
from below to above has been called the "proletarization of the bourgeoisie". In addition the
informalization of bourgeois or middle-class language usage was also furthered by the transfer of
certain words form private life, with its primary and informal contacts, to the secondary and
more formal relations of public life. It did not stop at that "spark of the common folk's laxity".
Especially after 1964, this tendency continued, and it was then that the most recent phase of
emancipation and resistance really got under way. In this phase, the upward pressure of the
emancipating groups expressed itself in even more direct and informal language usage, in a
greater tolerance and appreciation for dialects and regional accents as well as in attempts to
simplify spelling. This reflected the greater self-confidence of these groups, their stronger focus
on their own modes of conduct and their own ways of using the language.
As late as the fifties, unskilled workers rarely spoke Algemeen Beschaafd Nederlands or
ABN and anyone who spoke a dialect in the public sector was assumed to be from a 'simple'
background.36 In the sixties and seventies television played an important role in the rapid spread
of ABN, but it was not long before a counter-movement came into existence; from the early
seventies onward, a wide range of regional movements stood up for their own dialects and
regional accents. The people involved were no longer embarrassed or ashamed of the way they –
'simple' people? – talked; on the contrary, it filled them with warmth and pride: they were
33 J. Goudsblom, Het Algemeen Beschaafd Nederlands, in: Sociologische Gids, vol. 11 (1964), pp.
122-123. 34 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, Volume I, see note 3, pp. 187-188. 35 J. Goudsblom, see note 31, p. 123. 36 See for example Jan Haveman, De Ongeschoolde Arbeider, een sociologische analyse, Assen
speaking their mothers – not their masters – tongue. Precisely these feelings, combined with a
generous dose of nostalgia, might very well account for the boom in books of old photographs
and picture postcards of almost every village or town, as well as books and local newspaper
columns written in the various dialects. In accordance with the new rise in self-assurance,
speaking with a regional accent became a way to play down and defy the social hierarchy, with
the people who speak ABN at the top. Goudsblom has expressed this as follows:
"Speaking one's own dialect .. can evoke an atmosphere of intimacy an mutual trust: in
this way, one gives voice both to the feeling of being different and to that of being
amongst one another."37
The setting up of regional radio broadcasting stations in the seventies was one of the ways in
which 'regionalists' were accommodated. These stations gave the local dialects and accents of
the various regions a respected and established outlet. This encouraged the regionalists in their
battle against the injustice that they felt was implied by the disrespect and contempt for the
dialects and regional languages so many people still showed: by way of the contempt for the
speakers involved, in their view, this led to disdain for their own identity. In other words, lack of
respect stimulates lack of self-respect. Literally as well as figuratively, dialects are to a greater
extent native languages than ABN or any national language. Moreover, ABN originated from
these very dialects, so that their older origins were also put forward as a reason why they deserve
greater respect. Like practically every movement that brings about informalization, the
regionalists also drew attention to the fact that the formal ways have the function of creating or
marking social distinctions. They argued that an important facet of the higher status of ABN as
compared to the dialects is based on its traditional function of granting social distinction to its
speakers. In other words, the humiliating disrespect for the more native tongue was seen as a
form of self-aggrandizement on the basis of inherited superiority. Indeed, formal national
languages express the distinguishing peculiar life style of 'superiors' as opposed to 'inferiors'.
Apparently talking in a dialect or with a regional accent has also come to have a distinguishing
function, this time in opposition to ABN and it expresses the regional self-confidence in their
own peculiar life style.
On the grounds of these ideas, the regionalists demanded that "cultural minorities have a
right to their own identity".38 They stressed their right to be "different but equal", and the
1952, pp. 39-40. 37 J. Goudsblom, see note 31, p. 124. 38 Margo Kool, In de schoenen van het dialect, special supplement of N.R.C.-Handelsblad,
November 15, 1983, p. 2. Also by the same author: ‘Schrijven in Drente’, in: A. van Dis and T.
necessity for "pluralism" rather than "mass uniformity", whereas their opponents avoided these
terms and stressed the fact that the collective or general "clarity" (rather than "uniformity") of the
national language should not be endangered by the "particularism" or the "splintering" (rather
than "pluralism") advocated by the regionalists.
In this miniature language conflict, the greatest victory for the regionalists was that, as of
1985, it has been made possible to have regional languages as a compulsory subject at school.
Their ideal, "a country with a supra-regional standard language, Dutch, and in addition to it a
wide range of languages and dialects of equivalent standing. ...Unity and solidarity, with the
preservation of diversity!"39 was thus granted a legal basis.
In the past few decades, there has been such a rise in respect for the regional accents that
national and generally respected media have also devoted attention to them, and even discussed
the matter of whether it is plausible for a news announcer, for example, to have a regional
accent.40 This question was dealt with after the new phase of stabilization and resignation had
already begun and most of the liberation movements had already lost much of their spirit. This
was evident from the opponents' choice of words: such phrases as "that's just the way it is", the
last word in resignation, and "let everybody just do as they please, then it will really be a
mess."41 In the phase of emancipation and resistance, comments like these would have been
scorned at, if they would have been published at all. That is no longer the case today. The
increased emphasis upon general interests has been accompanied by increased appreciation for
the national language, ABN. The voices against a continuation of regionalization, now referred
to as "provincialism", were and are getting louder and they sound more self-assured. A Dutch
ambassador, for example, wrote a vitriolic article about the provincialism in the news
programmes of the joint television broadcasting companies in the Netherlands. According to
him, the viewers are treated as if they were "sheer imbeciles", and he ascribed this to the policy
of television news programmes: "The most important thing is to avoid anything difficult, don't
give the impression of being in any way superior to the masses. .. So, present the news as simply
as possible, with plenty of attention for everyman's little back yard."42
In the new etiquette books being published during the new phase of stabilization and
Hermans (eds.), Het Land der Letteren, Amsterdam 1982, pp. 194-197. 39 Idem 40 Examples include the popular television programme Sonja op Vrijdag and daily papers like
N.R.C.-Handelsblad. 41 Marc Reynebeau, Nederland der Rechtvaardigen, N.R.C.-Handelsblad, July 1, 1983, p. 14. 42 V.J.J.M. Bruyns wrote: The news programme presented by the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation is
subjective, provincial and does not contain any news, in N.R.C.-Handelsblad, March 2, 1984, p.
resignation, the sections on dialects or regional accents are written in such a way that the
influence of the regionalists is acknowledged and, to a certain extent, respected, but their
language usage is subsequently rejected as being a passing "fashion" and a "degeneration of the
language". Acknowledgement and respect are expressed in the following passage:
"And the use of our dialect? Our dialects are a subject of scientific study, so no one can blame us
for mastering them. If the company we are in is of mixed regional descent, we speak ABN,
although it is perfectly all right for our intonation to let people know where we come from!"43
However, the tone is usually less benevolent. A different book of etiquette put it as follows:
"This is nothing but a trend in the field of language, like affecting a working-class accent
to hide the fact that you have been to the university or come from a good family. The
struggle for simplified spelling also attests to this desire for a candid way of life without
any frills. .. Affecting a working-class accent has gone out of fashion again, as is
apparently also the case with simplified spelling."44
Another etiquette book had even less sympathy for this phenomenon:
"There is a strange tendency toward ordinariness, a desire to adapt oneself to the
language usage and the vocabulary of the masses. As long as there is nothing more
behind it than the desire to be understood by the masses, to a certain extent there is
nothing really wrong with it; it is a form of democratization. Unfortunately it is too
frequently overdone, and easily degenerates into the deliberate use of vulgar language,
coarse words and an abundance of expressions that happen to be in fashion at the
moment."45
The author continues to reject this "degeneration" by also calling it "language decay", and then
she seems to pull herself together with the firm words:
"The etiquette of 1980 requires of me ... that I use the very language that has been so
often maligned, Algemeen Beschaafd Nederlands."46
The kind of far-reaching emancipation of regional language usage that has taken place in the
Netherlands would tend to indicate a strong development of regional identity within the
framework of a highly developed national identity. The integration or unification of Dutch
society was sufficiently advanced and established to allow the composite dialects of the national
7. 43 Frans Grosfeld, Zo hoort het nu. Etiquette voor de jaren tachtig, Amsterdam/Brussels 1983, p. 91. 44 Inez van Eijk, Etiquette vandaag, Utrecht/Antwerp 193, p. 34. 45 Netty Bakker-Engelman, Etiquette in de jaren '80, Utrecht 1983, p. 111. 46 Idem, p. 112.
language to once again function more autonomously.47 If national integration and identification
are not firmly enough established, regional identification is easily considered a threat. Any
regional identification that goes outside the framework of the national identity is usually
combated with violence. It is not until a certain moment in the process of national unification
and identification that there can be a revival of this kind of strong sub-national identification
without its being branded as treason and, as such, suppressed. When national identification and
integration are weak, the humiliating effect of this kind of treason can go so far as to evoke
incentives that might lead to genocide.48
A less extreme but still striking example was presented by the Turkish ambassador to the
Netherlands. He was so offended by the term "Kurdisch East" in a Dutch newspaper that he
publicly expressed his "surprise" that such a thing had been possible. In a letter to the editor he
wrote "This term is not only erroneous, but it is also extremely misleading", and then went on to
note that the population of Turkey constitutes "an indivisible whole" and that it "absolutely could
not be tolerated" that Turkey should be divided into regions "with arbitrary names".49
Just as every informalization is preceded by formalization, the regionalization described
above was preceded by nationalization. Apparently the fears and dangers accompanying any
kind of identification on less than a national level first have to be brought under firmer, more
even and all-round control before there can be enough confidence or m.e.s. to allow for greater
relaxation, flexibility and more variations.50 It seems necessary to first surmount more fears of
47 In the closing sentences of his article on ABN (see note 31), J. Goudsblom implicitly referred to
this balance between nationalization and regionalization and, in a more abstract sense, between formalization and informalization. First he expressed the expectation that "the pronunciation and vocabulary of Dutch, no matter who is speaking it and under whatever circumstances, are growing closer and closer to those of the ABN model." He then concludes: "The more dominant ABN becomes, the more it will loose its specific functions; the few remaining functions, however will become functionally all the more significant." p. 124. There is a striking similarity here to what Elias wrote on "Diminishing Contrast, Increasing Varieties" in The Civilizing Process Volume II (see note 3), pp. 251-258.
48 Compare the comments made by Norbert Elias on the uncertain (Christian) German national identity to explain the violence against Jewish Germans and other Jews with a sub-national identity; Norbert Elias, ‘Notizen zum Lebenslauf’, in: P. Gleichmann, J. Goudsblom, H. Korte (eds.), Macht und Zivilisation, pp. 51, 55 and 56.
49 A letter to the editor published in N.R.C.-Handelsblad, May 30, 1984. 50 Paul Kapteyn (see note 7) gives a fine example of this in connection with training small children
to control their violent impulses. At a kindergarten, the parents and teachers decided to allow the children to bring their "weapons" to school. There was a veritable arms race and fighting, that did not reach the point of saturation that the parents and teachers were waiting for. Kapteyn drew the following conclusion: "The breaking of the taboo, whereby parents and teachers have a more flexible attitude toward violence on the part of children, could only be copied by these children if and when the restrictions had first been well implanted in their personalities and they had first learned the things that, to a certain extent, they would later be able to unlearn. In other words,
each other as well as fears of a wider solidarity before – as a counter-balance and complementary
to the confidence, the solidarity and mutual identification that has been growing – processes of
individualization can continue to proceed. In the course of this process, fear of one another is
transformed into a more or less automatically functioning fear of oneself, for instance fear of too
much conformity and of mass mentality.
8. Concluding remark
The study of the developments in civilizing processes on the basis of the phases described above
implies an investigation of the social conditions underlying collective movements of feeling,
alterations in conduct and changes in the level of moral consciousness. Comprehensive social
changes and strong collective movements are accompanied by an alteration in the dominant
attitude toward life. They involve a revision of the prevailing social and autobiographical
continuity, self-images, we- and they-images, and images of the collective past. In the course of
the transition from informalization to formalization (and vice versa) there was a change in the
dominant images of past and present. These images came to be increasingly viewed in terms of
the people who actively embodied these processes. In the last phase of emancipation and
resistance, the image of what was happening at the time was predominantly based on a "minority
of the best"51 participating in social experiments and liberation movements. Today, in this phase
of stabilization and resignation, the image of the sixties and seventies is more and more based on
a "minority of the worst", the 'hedonists', 'softies' and 'profiteers' of those years. Some people
might see the most drastic offshoots in one direction or the other as representing radical changes
in the prevailing mentality, but if these offshoots are examined within a broader, more
comprehensive social framework, they prove to be quite a bit less radical. Then one may see the
changes more in terms of tension balances and of the successive phases of civilizing processes
which, in a more long-term perspective, develop in a specific direction.
breaking taboos is a typical adult problem. They partially unlearn the things that children have yet to learn." p. 179.
51 cf. N. Elias and J.L. Scotson, The Established and the Outsiders, London 1965, pp. 81, 104, 159.
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