Exporting the Northern Ireland peace process: an
exploration of a Northern Ireland model for
conflict resolution in Cyprus and Kosovo
WB Jones
1
Disclaimer:
I hope that for other students this MA thesis provide a good starting point, both for the history
of the conflicts and for the key similarities and lessons that can be drawn from and for the
road to the peaceful resolution of the Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Cyprus conflicts and
even beyond. I welcome any thoughts or questions any reader might have, and actively
encourage disagreement with the conclusions I have drawn. Thanks for reading.
` WBJ, Southampton, October 2014
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Contents
Introduction 3
i. Methodology
Chapter 1: A Northern Ireland Model 10
1.1 Origins
1.2 Theory building
1.3 Summary of theoretical framework and expectations
Chapter 2: Kosovo 27
2.1 Origins
2.2 Development of Peace Process
2.3 Application of Model
Chapter 3:Cyprus 37
3.1. Origins
3.2 Development of Peace Process
3.3Application of Model
Conclusion 47
Bibliography 50
3
Introduction
For many years ‘a sorry record of frustration and fragmentation’ (Shannon, 1986:
852), the transformation of Northern Ireland (NI) over the last three decades has been
remarkable. Once one of the most protracted conflicts in the world, today NI is a relatively
peaceful society. As one scholar puts it, NI’s major challenges now revolve around class,
gender and identity – not old issues of paramilitary activity or battles over sovereignty
(O’Neill, 2007: 429).
Academics, politicians and diplomats have argued that lessons can be learnt from
successful peace-making initiatives and applied to other conflict situations (Annan in Hume,
Fraser & Murray, 2014: 101). They believe that it is unnecessary to invent peace-making and
conflict resolution methods for each new conflict, but possible to adapt existing approaches
from successful peace processes. Former US President Bill Clinton, a crucial figure in
progressing the NI peace process (Hughes, 2009: 291), mediator George Mitchell and Peter
Hain, the British government’s Northern Ireland secretary have spoken at length of their
belief that NI could be used as a model for peace in other conflict situations (Arthur in Hume,
Fraser & Murray, 2014: 208; Hughes, 2009: 291; Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June
2007). Tony Blair’s Chief Advisor and chief negotiator in NI, Jonathan Powell, believes that
lessons could be applied, with care, to those seeking settlements in other conflicts so that they
could ‘repeat their own mistakes rather than repeating ours.’ (Powell, 2011: 21). Blair
himself, his Irish counterpart, Bertie Ahern, and former United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan have also expressed the view that the role of the British and Irish governments
and the wider international community in the peace process could provide principles
applicable to peace settlements in other conflict situations (Blair, 2010:181; Ahern, 2010:
349; Annan in Hume, Fraser & Murray, 2014: 103). Hain, Blair and Powell have each
outlined what they consider to be the criteria that can be applied for general peace-making.
This will be explored in greater depth in the following section on theory building. In terms of
potential case studies, Blair cites the Middle East as a potential beneficiary of NI peace
process principles – possibly because of his role as Envoy of the Quartet on the Middle East
(Blair, 2010: 181-198). Hain also compares Northern Ireland to the Middle East, but
emphasised that NI could inspire peace-makers in existing ethnic conflicts, including Kosovo
(Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June 2007).
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Interestingly, while those involved on a practical level speak freely of a theoretical
framework derived from the peace process, academics, having an abundance of theoretical
studies into the matter, are less convinced of its practical application. James Hughes has
investigated what advocates of a ‘Northern Ireland model’ might mean by the term: analysing
both the model’s feasibility and the political-scholarly debate on its potential characteristics.
His assessment that ‘there is clearly a disjuncture between how the NI model is being framed
by politicians and how it is viewed by academics’ is significant (Hughes, 2009: 291), not
least because it makes a distinction between the focus on dialogue dominant in a lot of
politicians’ analyses, and the focus on the power-sharing structure of governance in Northern
Ireland preferred by many consociationalism oriented academics. There are those who
remain sceptical. John Coakley, for example, states that the level of achievement in reaching
a settlement makes it inevitable that NI will inspire attempts at adaptation elsewhere but
considers that succeeding will be a ‘struggle’ (Coakley, 2003: 51).
On the other hand many, such as Shane O’Neill, express qualified optimism (O’Neill,
2007: 411-412; Pruitt, 2007: 1520). Through mentioning hierarchical relations that privilege
one community over another and the correlation between individual and national identities as
catalysts for political antagonism and conflict, O’Neill successfully addresses the
characteristic causes of conflict that Northern Ireland shares with other ethnic conflicts. He
loosely suggests that through maintaining principles of political pluralism and inclusion the
NI peace process could be of ‘significant relevance to other nationally divided societies’
(O’Neill, 2007: 429) but is broadly reluctant to identify specific criteria that could be
transferred to help resolve other conflicts. Edwina McMahon, a specialist on Northern Ireland
for the National Committee on America Foreign Policy Interests, argued that NI can help to
resolve historic conflicts ‘irrespective of their kind, cause, and duration’ (McMahon, 2007:
353). Identifying time, perceptions, leadership and beliefs as key variables in conflict,
McMahon pointed to the successful use of secret negotiations as an outlet for all variables in
the early stages of the peace process(McMahon, 2007: 355). McMahon’s research suggests a
malleability to the NI peace process that might allow for central themes to be transferred to
other conflicts. This might include the involvement of a third party to stimulate gradual
evolution of the terms of the conflict, changing each side’s long-held perceptions of another,
promoting moderate political leadership or ensuring negotiations are based around an agreed
set of democratic principles – as with the Mitchell Principles in Northern Ireland (McMahon,
2007: 354-56). While valuable, McMahon’s findings were presented only as a five page
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briefing, which given the complexity of the subject, could not realistically provide
comprehensive conclusions. It is specificity and in-depth exploration which these studies
have lacked.
Returning our focus to Hughes, the historian’s study continues by discussing the
feasibility of transferring a NI model to a specific case study: Kosovo. While acknowledging
that the social division presented by Albanian-supermajority in Kosovo and the more equal
sized nationalist and unionist communities in NI were quite different, Hughes argues that the
long-term involvement of Martti Ahtisaari in the NI peace process influenced his
commitment to power-sharing as a means of resolving conflict while UN Special Envoy in
Kosovo (Hughes, 2009: 291 & 299). From this we can infer that there is potential in applying
a NI model to the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. This is a valuable preliminary
conclusion on the feasibility of applying a model, but does not provide much assistance on
which features the model could or should possess. On this issue, Eammon O’Kane’s
summary of academic research into the lessons of the peace process in NI is of use. Through
his research into the feasibility of creating a model, O’Kane identifies five commonly cited
features as significant:
1) an inclusive approach;
2) the promotion of moderate leaders;
3) support and possible intervention by third parties;
4) the importance of bipartisanship;
5) necessity for a prolonged engagement on the conflict.
(O’Kane, 2010: 241-244)
Importantly, O’Kane cites problematic areas in all five features and suggests that more
research is needed to resolve the ‘rather mixed’ conclusions of the existing literature(O’Kane,
2010: 254). O’Kane, along with another scholar John Bew, believes that assessing any NI
model requires looking both at the process and the conflict that preceded it – even if, in
Bew’s words, this involves addressing unpalatable and boring dimensions of the Northern
story (O’Kane, 2010: 251; Bew, 2011: 16). In order to apply any model convincingly,
O’Kane suggests that a practical approach is needed that actively applies the theory of a
model to other conflicts (O’Kane, 2010: 254). In applying likely elements of a NI model to
Kosovo, as suggested by Hughes, and Cyprus, this thesis will address the gap in the existing
literature O’Kane identified, by investigating two specific case studies rather than speaking in
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general terms, as has been previously been the case. Consequently, this thesis aims to answer
the question: ‘Is Northern Ireland a suitable model for conflict resolution elsewhere?’
To answer this question, the first chapter will look in detail at the peace process in
Northern Ireland, the significance of each phase to the peace process and how the themes of
the proposed NI model contributed to overcoming the obstacles to peace. It will draw from a
number of primary political sources and academic studies to create a comprehensive theory.
The second and third chapters will examine in detail the case studies of Kosovo and Cyprus
respectively, under the framework of the model. An analysis of the viability of the model and
its limitations will be offered in each case, before a final report on the study’s overall
conclusions.
Just as the proposed study draws on theoretical and actual data, so too can it have
theoretical and actual significance. In drawing conclusions on why NI is a suitable model for
peace-making, the study will contribute to academic debate not just on this topic but more
widely in the field of conflict-resolution studies. That the model of NI can be demonstrated to
be an appropriate model for peace will support the theory that has developed through the
work of peace studies scholars: that reusing previous strategies is feasible for the resolution
of conflicts and establishment of peace. European Union (EU) Commission President Jose
Manuel Barroso has claimed he found inspiration in the Northern Ireland case while
considering how to move the settlement process between Kosovo and Serbia forward in the
wake of impending independence (Budapest Business Journal, 10 January 2008). Clearly, a
proven road map would be of use in future conflict-resolution cases.
i. Methodology
Having established a gap in the literature and a viable research question, we now turn
to exploring how we might approach the question methodologically.
The basic design of the thesis is to test the viability of a NI model by applying it to
real situations. Where chapter one builds a theory of factors (independent variables) which
have contributed to the peace process, we can write this structure as the formula:
XA + XB = XC
Where XA and XB are factors for peace and XC is successful conflict resolution. This formula,
which is also the basis of the theoretical framework, can then be applied to other cases. The
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end goal in each case must be the same as in Northern Ireland: the creation of a pluralistic
society, free from ethnic violence that provides equal access to economic, social and political
opportunities. Since the important factors for conflict resolution will be developed in the
building of a theory in light of the NI example in chapter one, this final part of the
methodology is devoted to exploring which cases will be appropriate for examination.
Although each case will have unique nuances, there are a number of contemporary
conflicts which might appear to be best suited to the application of a NI model. However, in
order to prove the general applicability and adaptability of the model, such obvious choices
provide only limited results. In order to develop the work of O’Kane, the less immediate
cases of Kosovo and Cyprus have been selected for this thesis, the reasoning for which is set
out below.
There are similarities in the origins and fractious nature of the conflict: all are ethnic
conflicts involving the coexistence of two spatially overlapping, highly politicised ethnic
communities (Coakley, 2003: 50). However, conflict is rarely so simple. Protracted Social
Conflict (PSC) theory, developed primarily by Edward Azar and John Burton, states that
PSCs are formed of interconnected structural factors (often economic, ethnic, linguistic,
political or religious divisions). What makes them difficult to resolve is that the issues are so
interconnected that they are not easily isolated and resolved individually, leaving them prone
to long-term stagnation and sporadic outbreaks of political violence (Azar, 1983: 92; Fisher,
2001: 308).
Azar broke-up into four variable clusters that are the preconditions of PSCs, which are all
pertinent for this study:
1) Communal content of a society, possibly the most important element of PSCs,
relating to the frequent occurrence of a single communal group dominating the multi-
ethnic societies in which they live (i.e. the Protestants in Northern Ireland; formerly
the Serbs and latterly the Albanians in Kosovo; potential for Greek Cypriot
dominance in Cyprus)
2) Human needs, meaning the fulfilment of collective human needs , such as ensuring
access to political, market and decision-making institutions, physical security or the
rights to freedom of religious and cultural expression, are not always met (hence the
challenges of violent resistance or disaffection).
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3) The role of the state, often limited, through fragility (Kosovo) or rigidity (Northern
Ireland), to meeting the needs of the dominant group. This can be seen in the failure
of civic structures, such as the police, the legal system and the civil service, to reflect
and represent all ethnic groups
4) International linkages, which can mean that a state’s ability to reach a settlement is
compromised by a dependence on a richer or stronger state (while there is potential
for this in Kosovo, Serbia is increasingly moving away from Russia towards the
positive, pro-settlement influence of the EU).
(Reimann, 2002: 4-5)
As previously mentioned these conflicts all involve cross-border communities with ties to
members living in other states: in Northern Ireland, these ties are to Britain and the Republic
of Ireland; in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey; in multi-ethnic Kosovo, to Serbia (Rothman, 1992:
38). Bearing this in mind, international commitment to conflict resolution is necessary. In
Cyprus the peace process could benefit from the committed involvement of Greece and
Turkey; the principle issue has been a lack of goodwill and trust between the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot political elites which has further polarised the two communities. The
resulting increase in nationalist outlook has hindered the fifty-year long peace effort. In
Kosovo, the memories of brutality on both sides during the Kosovo War have hindered the
process of reconciliation with Serbia and the Serb-majority enclaves in the north of the
province – even after Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. Like NI,
there is no obvious resolution for either conflict apart from co-operation between the
communities and their kin-states (Bekaj, 2010).
Efforts at forging a settlement have extended beyond kin-states. Northern Ireland,
Kosovo and Cyprus are the three European conflicts which (until recently) have commanded
not only international attention, but also participation. The NI peace process was facilitated
by the Clinton administration and several other political leaders, including former Finnish
president, Martti Ahtisaari. While the presence of UN Special Envoys such as Martti
Ahtisaari and Kai Eide in Kosovo and Cyprus have helped the process in those regions.
The NI, Kosovo and Cyprus conflicts all display several characteristics of intractable
conflict, including economic and ethnic grievances, issues of self-determination and
historically poor community relations - all of which form obstacles to a constructive political
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settlement (Bekaj, 2010: 7; Hadjipavlou, 2007: 350-52). The similarities in the nature of the
conflicts mean there can be identifiable similarities in the factors needed to settle them.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the peace processes in Kosovo and
Cyprus are at different stages. While the Cypriot has been protracted by the continual failure
of both sides to agree on even basic settlement terms and has only recently begun to move
forwards again, the Brussels Agreement between the Serbian and Kosovar Prime Ministers in
April 2013 suggests that progress is already being made there. This allows for different
phases of the NI peace process to be applied (the early stages to Cyprus and the latter phases
to Kosovo). In examining different parts of the process, the thesis hopes to give a broader
picture of a NI model might be applied over the progression of time and at various stages. In
doing so, it is hoped that the thesis will go beyond the narrower scope of previous studies that
have considered only the end-game.
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Chapter 1
A Northern Ireland Model
1.1 Origins
The origins of the most recent Northern Ireland conflict lie largely in the organised
colonisation, the Plantations, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This settlement
confiscated much of the fertile lowland from the indigenous population and placed it in the
hands of English and Scottish colonists, replacing Gaelic chiefs with an anglicized ruling
class. Thus began a culture of religious and national division between the broadly Protestant
settlers loyal to the British crown and the indigenous Catholic population.
Irish Catholic resistance to the Protestant ruling class was strong as the native Irish were
often discriminated against, oppressed with extortionate rents, exposed to brutal physical
treatment and treated with contempt. By the end of the eighteenth century, Protestant
domination could only be maintained through the submergence of Ireland into a union with
Protestant Britain. The British government, alarmed by an Irish rebellion in 1798 and aware
of the potential for European enemies to use Ireland as a base for invasion, absorbed Ireland
into a centralised state system with the 1801 Acts of Union . (Mulholland, 2003: 8). Union
with the British did not end the violence. Indeed, the Acts of Union crystallised Irish dissent,
with agitation for more civil and political freedom from organisations such as the Repeal
Association. During a period of British political turbulence that resulted in the Reform Act of
1832, nominal rights were gradually conceded to Ireland’s Catholic population. One of these
was that of Catholics to sit as members in Westminster, which allowed the campaign to
repeal the Acts of Union to be taken directly to London (Beckett, 1966: 230 & 323-35).
By the 1880s, dissent had grown into a mass movement for full Irish autonomy led by
the electorally powerful Irish Nationalist Party. Support from William Gladstone’s Liberal
government produced two Home Rule Bills in 1886 (defeated in the House of Commons) and
1893 (passed by the House of Commons, vetoed by the House of Lords). In Ireland,
opposition to Home Rule was strongest in the north-east, where Protestant settlement was
densest. Support for the Ulster Unionist Party’s programme and the emergence of the Ulster
Volunteers demonstrated the strength of their desire to remain a part of the UK.
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A formal granting of limited Irish autonomy came in 1914, but was not realised until
the end of the First World War, when the Irish Nationalist Party was replaced by the more
militant Sinn Fein. A period of civil disobedience from1919-21, fuelled in part by the ruthless
British repression of the Easter Rising of 1916, forced the granting of full autonomy in the
shape of the Irish Free State. In spite of the fact that the majority of the people in Ireland
supported independence, six counties in Ulster were allowed to opt-out. This led to the
partition of the island between the new Irish Free State in the south, and an autonomous
Protestant-majority enclave in the north which remained part of the UK.
Far from resolving the conflict, partition complicated it. Relations between Britain
and Ireland, and their aligned communities in the North, failed to improve. The grievances of
the Catholic minority were exacerbated by the policies of the Protestant majority. The
Catholic community in the north faced job discrimination, brutality at the hands of the largely
Protestant police force and draconian voter requirements, such as ownership of property,
which left them disadvantaged and excluded in a Northern Ireland where the political
dominance of Unionist parties was assured, even in Catholic majority areas (Morrow in
Rothstein ed., 1999: 115).
While the British government maintained its responsibility in governing NI, it
maintained a distance from the conflict. Similarly, the Irish Free State, which left the
Commonwealth and became the Republic of Ireland in 1949, maintained a claim of
sovereignty on NI through its constitution while distancing itself from the difficulties in the
North and forging its own identity.1 Within Northern Ireland, both sides had concerns about
their status as a minority group: Protestants formed the majority in NI, but were easily
outnumbered in Ireland as a whole.
The emergence of an American-inspired civil rights movement within the Catholic
community in the 1960s exacerbated community tensions. The movement’s objectives were
to end discrimination and secure the same basic civil and human rights as Protestants
(Shannon, 1986: 852). Although the campaign did not focus on the nationality question, it
1 Constitution of Ireland (1937) Article 2: “The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its
islands and the territorial seas.” Article 3: “Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without
prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction
over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of
application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect.”
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demonstrated to the Protestant community that there was a ubiquitous threat to the vulnerable
state structure (Coakley, 2003: 29). Forcible resistance to reform from more strident
Unionists, led by the vitriolic Reverend Ian Paisley, defeated the movement, but caused a re-
escalation in the conflict to a level of violence not experienced since partition.
As several republican paramilitary groups, most notably the Irish Republican Army
(IRA), re-emerged as guerrilla forces and engaged in a conflict of retaliatory violence with
Loyalist paramilitaries, the political landscape in NI changed. What remained of the civil
rights movement consolidated to form the moderately nationalist Social Democratic and
Labour Party, which maintained its commitment to peaceful negotiation throughout the
violence of the thirty-year long ‘Troubles’.
The beginning of The Troubles prompted the British Government to re-evaluate their
handling of Northern Ireland. Apart from loose Conservative links with the UUP, none of the
mainstream British political parties operated in NI, and until the outbreak of violence it was
felt there was no political advantage to be gained from extensive involvement in the conflict.
The increase of the inter-communal violence in the late 1960s forced a change, as the British
government suspended the regional Stormont parliament and government in 1972,
introducing direct rule from Westminster for the first time since partition.
Unionist interests were chiefly represented by the Official Unionist Party (later the
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)) and the more hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), as
well as smaller parties such as the Ulster Freedom Fighter’s political wing, the Ulster
Democratic Party. The nationalist community at this time was primarily represented by the
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) whose leader John Hume would work tirelessly
for thirty years to realise peace, and Sinn Fein, the IRA’s political wing, who refused to take
the seats to which they were elected in Westminster because of the required oath of
allegiance to the British monarch. There were also other smaller parties, most notably the bi-
communal, pro-peace Alliance Party.
This, briefly, was the historical background to the origins of conflict in NI. If we are
to identify a model for peace, then it is important to look first at key inter-governmental
agreements – including those that failed – to understand the circumstances in which they
were agreed and what they meant for the peace process.
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The Sunningdale Agreement (1973)
Progressing the Northern Ireland peace process was made both more vital and more
difficult by the radicalisation and resurgence of violence within sections of both
communities. The response was an unprecedented act of cooperation from the British and
Irish government: the Sunningdale Agreement.
The culmination of nine months of negotiations between the two governments and
NI’s main political parties, Sunningdale aimed at solving the crisis in NI on as fundamental a
level as possible (Tannam, 2011: 1210). The Agreement sought to improve both cross
community and cross-border relations and made several important commitments. Most
significantly, the British government, having withdrawn powers from NI, made it clear that
the reestablishment of a government was conditional upon it being based on the principle of
cross-community power-sharing (Coakley, 2003: 37). This included accepting that the
Republic of Ireland had a role in resolving the conflict (Tannam, 2011: 1198) through a
newly established Council of Ireland to help manage policy areas of common interest.
Both governments had accepted the right to self-determination and endorsed a
principle of consent on the future of the province, retaining the current constitutional status of
NI until a majority of its people desired its change (Tannam, 2003: 498), but neither
government accommodated the fears of their representative communities. Unfortunately,
having worked hard to reach an agreement, both London and Dublin failed to provide
sufficient support when Sunningdale came under threat from Unionist opponents. Pro-
Agreement politicians, such as UUP leader Brian Faulkner and the SDLP were left to the
mercy of their parties and voters. When the general strike that would defeat the Agreement
began, the British government showed no resolve to break the strike: no negotiations, no
deployment of the security forces who might have prevented widespread worker intimidation
by hard-line Protestants. The new NI government lasted barely five months. The Agreement
was defeated even before the Council of Ireland was formed.
Analysis
Despite its failure the Agreement introduced two principles vital to the successful
progress of the peace process. Without a system of power-sharing and provision for formal
co-operation with the Republic of Ireland, a lasting peace would have been impossible.
Sunningdale and the later Good Friday Agreement were the only two peace initiatives that
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incorporated both power-sharing and the Irish dimension principles (the Anglo-Irish
Agreement addressed the Irish question, but bypassed the issue of devolution) (Coakley,
2003: 37).
Considering its close resemblance to the GFA, it may reasonably be asked why it
failed. The answer lies in the lack of readiness (ripeness) for such an ambitious agreement. It
was “an agreement too soon” (Farran, 2007: 7). Northern Irish society was still too polarised.
Further advances in human and civil rights, cross-community relations and reduction of
violence were needed before peace would be possible.
Anglo Irish Agreement (1985)
The Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA), signed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and
Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald on 15 November 1985, marked the first time both the London
and Dublin governments expressed their shared commitment and desire for closer political
co-operation in working toward a lasting peace settlement (Tannam, 2011: 1204). Although it
consisted of only thirteen articles and was vague on procedure and details, it improved the
working relationship between the national governments, involving the Irish government in
the governance of NI by establishing the Intergovernmental Conference, an institutional
mechanism allowing the Irish government to be consulted on matters of security, law and
cross-border co-operation (Tannam, 2003: 501; AIA 1985, Article 2.a). In a joint statement
both governments expressed a commitment to majority consent on the issue of NI’s
constitutional status.
AIA was solely between the sovereign states of the UK and the Republic of Ireland.
As neither FitzGerald nor Thatcher needed the support of any of the political parties in
Northern Ireland domestically, Northern Irish parties could be excluded from negotiations
and had no power to dilute or defeat it (Ford in The Times, 22 November 1985).
Analysis
Despite Unionist and Nationalist opposition, the AIA marked an understanding that the
future security of the burgeoning peace process would be ensured through continued
cooperation between the British and Irish governments. It marked the first time a British
government allowed the Republic of Ireland to have a role in the governance of NI. This set a
15
crucial precedent for cooperation between the two governments that kept the process alive
even at times when negotiations were in gridlock.
Providing the Irish government with formal influence in Northern Ireland helped to
redress long-standing Catholic grievances and contributed to the longevity of the Agreement,
which was only superseded in 1998 by the GFA (Coakley, 2003: 39). By the time of the
Downing Street Declaration in 1993, Anglo-Irish cooperation had evidentially increased
(Tannam, 2003: 502). It acquired a symbolic value because the relationship it forged between
the British and Irish governments and the steps it took to involve nationalists in the governing
of NI were important to the progression of peace.
The Downing Street Declaration (1993)
The principles of the Downing Street Declaration (DSD) opened the way for
negotiations with paramilitaries from both sides of the communal divide (Reynolds, 2009:
356). It followed secret talks between the British government and four of NI’s political
parties (Alliance, DUP, SDLP and UUP) in the early 1990s. Led by two successive
Secretaries of States for NI, Peter Brooke (1989-92) and Patrick Mayhew (1992-97), the
‘Brooke-Mayhew Talks’ convinced both British Prime Minister John Major and Irish
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds of the need to bring extreme parties into the peace process. While
the talks had been successful, Sinn Fein had been excluded and the next step was arranging
their involvement in future negotiations. Reynolds entered into dialogue with John Hume and
Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams around the same time as the Brooke-Mayhew talks were taking
place.
Designed to build on the Anglo Irish Agreement, the DSD upheld many of the
previous commitments: the British government stated it had ‘no selfish strategic or economic
interests in Northern Ireland’ (Principle 4) while the Irish government committed to
respecting British sovereignty over NI until a majority voted for change (Principles 4, 5 & 7).
Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to intergovernmental cooperation and
support for majority consensual governance in NI (Principles 4, 5 & 9).
It differed in the way it approached involving Sinn Fein in the process. As things
stood Sinn Fein’s connection to the IRA was too strong for it to be included, and so the
Declaration made involvement of any party in the peace process conditional upon rejection of
violence (Principle 10). The official policy of Major and Reynolds’ predecessors was not to
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negotiate with terrorists. While there had been secret talks between the British government
and the IRA on a number of occasions during the first two decades of the Troubles, they had
often only taken place after the exhaustion of all alternatives (Bew, 2011: 17). The change in
policy was recognition that the IRA could never be categorically beaten, but also that while
paramilitary groups had once been the biggest threat to peace, the process had now allowed
for paramilitary leaders to be key figures in its achievement.
Nine months after the Declaration, the IRA announced a ceasefire and freed the path
for Sinn Fein to become involved in the peace process. The main loyalist paramilitary groups
declared a cease-fire a few weeks later. The incentive of political inclusion had tipped the
balance in favour of peace. The ceasefires paved the way for further confidence-building
measures, such as the ending of a broadcast ban on Sinn Fein and increased involvement
from the Clinton administration in the USA.
Analysis
Despite having no legal status, the DSD was a significant development in the NI
peace process. While its predecessor, the Anglo-Irish Agreement looked to create an
intergovernmental structure between the British and Irish states, the Downing Street
Declaration represented a further step, based on political inclusion among Northern Ireland’s
political parties. This shifted the focus from stabilising the centre of Northern Irish politics
and protecting it from the extremes to drawing the extremes into the centre. (O’Kane, 2004:
78-9). However, in the process of bringing former extremists on board with the peace
process, care had to be taken not to isolate moderate groups already participating. (Bew,
2011: 19).
The DSD, therefore, established several of the NI model’s core principles. While the
ceasefire of 1994 was breached many times in following years, there were longer periods of
calm. Both John Hume and Bill Clinton argued that the Declaration removed the justification
for violence, and established the principle of non-violence firmly within the peace process
framework set out in the Mitchell Principles widely accepted in 1996. (Mitchell, 1999: 19;
Reynolds, 2009: 363) Without such a clearly defined framework of principles for peace, the
inclusive peace settlement that followed (the Good Friday Agreement of 1998) would not
have been possible (Mitchell, 1999: 106; Clinton, 2005: 784).
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Good Friday Agreement
The negotiation of the Agreement was structured around three strands for settlement:
Strand 1 focused on the central problem of cross-community relations between
Catholics and Protestants,
Strand 2 was concerned with the lesser problem of cross-border relations between the
North and South of Ireland and
Strand 3 dealt with issues still facing British-Irish relations (Coakley, 2003: 43).
One of the key issues within Strand 1 was the lack of trust between the communities.
Overcoming differences required an overhaul of the political and civil structures traditionally
dominated by the Protestant community. The d’Hondt system of proportional representation
was introduced in a reformed power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly, which also utilised
a complex voting procedure that effectively gave both communities veto rights, as well as a
dual prime-ministerial position that effectively guaranteed the First Minister and Deputy First
Minister would come from different communities (GFA Strand 1, Paragraph 5.d.i, 1998: 7-8).
Within Strand 2, a hierarchy of decision-making was created that ensured no decision was
reached without agreement from both communities, the Irish Parliament and the NI Assembly
(Wolff in Wilford, 2001: 5). A new North/South Council, smaller in scale than Sunningdale’s
Council of Europe, provided a mechanism for ‘consultation, cooperation and action’ over
joint areas of interest within the island of Ireland, both through existing transport, agriculture
and tourism structures or newly-established food safety, trade and EU programme bodies
(Tannam, 2003 : 498).
Strand 3 had to strike a balance between guaranteeing the union whilst developing
mechanisms for the ending of partition and dual citizen rights and promoting inter-communal
equality (Coakley, 2003: 47). It created the British-Irish Council, a twice a year meeting
involving the British and Irish governments as well as the devolved institutions in Northern
Ireland, Wales and Scotland, and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which
subsumed the Intergovernmental Conference established by the AIA. Importantly, both
governments agreed to introduce legislative changes to support the Agreement. The British
government formally committed to amending Northern Ireland’s constitutional status if
majority opinion changed, while the Irish government amended Articles 2 and 3 of the
national constitution to confer Irish birthright upon persons born on the island and to formally
18
recognised that a united Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority in both
the north and south jurisdiction (Tannam, 2003: 506-7; Nineteenth Amendment of the
Constitution Act, 1998: xii-xv).
Simultaneous referenda in Northern Ireland and the Republic were held in May 1998,
with 71 per cent approval for the Agreement in NI and 94 per cent agreement in the Republic
of Ireland with the set of constitutional reforms that gave effect to the Agreement (Mullin in
The Guardian, 23 May 1998; Irish Department of Environment, Community and Local
Government, 2013: 58-59). This provided a firm democratic basis on which to build and
enabled the symbolic amending of the Irish constitution to remove the claim of sovereignty
over NI.
An issue with decommissioning caused stalemate until November 1999 and in
October 2002 prompted suspension of institutions (Coakley, 2003: 45) The crisis was
eventually resolved within the British-Irish intergovernmental framework, and direct rule
from Westminster ended after the Assembly elections in November 2003 (Tannam, 2011:
1202). Other lingering issues were with police reforms and prisoner releases. The resolution
of these issues was aimed at winning support for the agreement among more extreme
elements in both communities.
Analysis
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998, whilst being the single most significant
agreement in the peace process, owes much of its longevity to the DSD’s opening
involvement to political parties who retained significant paramilitary support (Maney et al,
2006: 188). Without the involvement of former extremists, it is likely that the GFA would
have gone the same way as the seven failed peace initiatives that preceded it.
Inarguably the most ambitious agreement since Sunningdale, the GFA went further
than its predecessors in providing for the reestablishment of a Northern Assembly committed
to extensively reforming the police force and making changes to how history is taught in
schools (Interview with Northern Irish grammar school teacher, 26 July 2014).
While one scholar has suggested that the Good Friday Agreement was ‘Sunningdale
for slow learners’, the progress made through closer inter-island cooperation meant that both
sides of the conflict were recognised (Powell, 2011: 21-22; Wolff in Wilford, 2001: 4). There
19
were also several procedural differences that ensured no one side could dominate or obstruct
the Assembly (Wolff in Wilford, 2001: 5).
1.2 Theory building
In the years since the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland has become a prolific
exporter of advice to other ethnic conflicts. Lord Alderdice, the former speaker of the NI
Assembly, has become a sought after speaker in troubled countries, such as Nepal and the
Philippines, while the Causeway Institute, chaired by Jeffrey Donaldson (formerly one of the
Good Friday Agreement’s most vehement critics) has taken a sustained interest in brokering
talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban (The Economist, 9 February 2013)
Other figures involved in the peace process have sought to theorise on the basis of a NI
model. Tony Blair, Peter Hain and Jonathan Powell, all identified features in Northern
Ireland that they felt were transferable. Blair suggests ten principles for peacefully resolving
conflict in his 2011 autobiography: 1) a framework based on agreed principles; 2) a
continuous and versatile grasp of the issue at hand; 3) small things can be big things; 4) be
creative; 5) third party assistance is often vital to reaching an agreement; 6) resolving the
conflict is a journey, not an event; 7) the path to peace will be deliberately disrupted by those
who want the conflict to continue (spoilers); 8) leaders matter; 9) external circumstances
must work towards peace; 10) “never give up” (Blair, 2011: 181-199).
Hain’s four transferable components outlined in a speech four weeks after the resumption
of the NI Assembly at Stormont in 2007 were: the role of personalities, aligning of
international influence, political framework, and dialogue (Hain Chatham House Speech, 12
June 2007). In common with Blair, these components made a commitment to agreed
principles, third party involvement and strong and appropriate leadership (Hain Chatham
House Speech, 12 June 2007).
Powell, writing in a London School of Economics pamphlet on the legacy of
peacebuilding in Northern Ireland in 2011, concurs with Blair’s advocating continuous
involvement and his belief in peace as a process not an event. His belief that third party
assistance is a necessity is shared with both Blair and Hain, who also emphasise the need for
suitable leadership and personalities, at the international and domestic level, in order to create
an environment conducive (ripe) for peace.
20
An idea developed by I William Zartman, ripeness is the notion that stalemate in a
conflict can only be broken when certain conditions allow for negotiations (O’Kane, p.244;
Zartman, 1995: 18). These are the infrequent and complex combinations of favourable
circumstances within the conflict society: while a change in political leadership or a new
development in the conflict may make a move towards a settlement more likely, ‘ripening’
also involves shifts in public opinion or improvements in a conflict zone’s economy to gain
the momentum needed. The absence of vital conditions, such as sides failing to recognise
each other’s legitimacy or retaining violent methods, means that the situation is not yet ‘ripe’
for peace, and that radical changes are likely to be met with opposition or disengagement
from the conflict resolution process. The whole process can then collapse, as with the
Sunningdale Agreement.
Equally, the windows of time in which multiple conditions apply can be brief, and
need to be recognised and exploited. The combination of a pro-peace Taoiseach and Prime
Minister and a Democratic president with strong American Irish support combined to
improve relations in NI and culminated in encouraging , first the IRA ceasefire in 1994, then
the permanent move from paramilitary violence towards democratic political process
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2014: 179; Cochrane, 2007: 217). While the
strengthening of relations between nationalists and republicans may have endured, the
coinciding of Reynolds, Major and Clinton as the main political leaders presented an
opportunity to advance the process.
Identifying the conditions of ripeness can be difficult until circumstances present
themselves, and their meeting often relies on a significant shift in the dynamics of the
conflict. Assuming that vital conditions (such as cessation of violence) are already in place,
the conditions for ripeness within the NI model could be:
The Absence of Alternative
Often in conflict resolution, peace is only possible after all other solutions have been
exhausted. The realisation that ‘peace is the only option’ is perhaps the most important step in
the peace process because it has the potential to draw all conflicting parties in to focusing on
a common objective. Without this recognition, other favourable circumstances may be
inconsequential and negotiations unfeasible.
21
In Northern Ireland, the IRA and the British Army gradually recognised that the
stalemate between them might never be broken (Powell, 2011: 21). The British government
and republican paramilitary groups had to review their rigid policies, which made peace more
likely: the British began to negotiate and politically empower former terrorists, while the IRA
began to consider surrendering arms.
Popular desire for peace; political motivation
Clearly, there can be no peace if the general population is insufficiently ‘pro-peace’.
While there may be a majority in favour of peace in principle, a lack of trust or a violent or
intimidating minority risks the process being derailed .This was demonstrated in NI by the
failure of the Sunningdale Agreement, which although welcomed as a positive step by
moderates, lacked the popular support necessary to sustain it and was eventually defeated by
those not ready to negotiate.
Thus, while popular demand may shift towards peace before all other options have
been exhausted, the peace process can only progress if public will is matched by political
will. This is not always automatic. The failure of peace agreements to progress towards a
settlement can end political careers. In Northern Ireland, the zero-sum game style of
negotiation and the insular nature of Northern Irish politics, made peace talks a difficult
prospect until long after popular opinion had shifted. This only changed when public opinion
demanded a shift from the win-lose logic of both sides seeking to dominate, to a win-win
style of cooperative problem-solving (Maney et al, 2006: 183).
Strong leadership
Successful negotiations also rested on commitment from strong political leaders. In
NI, the strong-minded , calculative approach of Thatcher and Fitzgerald – free from concerns
about electoral repercussions – set the peace process back on track with the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, while Reynolds and Major’s Declaration of Principles was a critical step in luring
those from the extremes into the peace process. Specifically, the patience shown by Reynolds
and (admittedly more reluctantly) Major, in allowing Sinn Fein to delay their acceptance of
Downing Street Declaration was important. It allowed Sinn Fein to go through an ideological
transition on the question of Northern Ireland’s sovereign status that was vital to securing a
permanent ceasefire (Reynolds, 2009: 360-61).
22
Also important was political leadership on a local level, where leaders were not only
trusted and respected by their own community, but also by ‘the other side’. The SDLP’s John
Hume was one such figure. He sought to develop a unifying vision for Northern Ireland based
on peaceful negotiation and the rejection of violence, and remained imaginative about
progressing towards peace even in the darkest periods of the Troubles (Smyth, 2005: 79;
Blair, 2011: 196). Hume’s counterpart in the UUP, David Trimble, shared his commitment to
non-violence and reaching peace, and brought the necessary patience and fair-mindedness
that was needed during the more strained periods. (Godson, 2005: x)
Inter-state Cooperation
In conflicts between two distinct ethnic groups, cooperation between their respective
‘mother’ states aids the peace process. The strong leadership of the British and Irish leaders
in the 1980s and 90s forged an effective cooperative British-Irish relationship. As both were
considered guardians of constituent groups in Northern Ireland, there was a degree of
interdependence whilst working towards a peace settlement, but the commonality of purpose
and culture of cooperation through intergovernmental meetings and consensual policymaking
created an environment conducive to peace (Tannam, 2011: 1196; Keohane, 1984: 73; Wolff
in Wilford, 2011: 20).
When British-Irish cooperation stopped, the peace process suffered: during the
sixteenth-month long period of “megaphone diplomacy” in the early 1980s, meetings
between the British and Irish prime ministers stopped, the relationship became antagonistic
and uncooperative (Tannam, 2011: 1199-1200). The “megaphone diplomacy” period was
ended by the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
Economic motives
Economics are important to both the problem and solution in conflict. Economic
inequality is often a prime cause in the development of a conflict, while economic
opportunity can incentivise reaching a peace settlement by changing the dynamic of
cost/benefit calculations (Lichbach, 1989: 433; Peterson, 2011:186). In Northern Ireland, the
establishment of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) in 1986 and the EU’s Special
Support Programmes for Peace and Reconciliation iterations have done much to encourage
economic regeneration, social development and community organisation projects in the areas
23
worst affected by the conflict, where unemployment and economic deprivation tended be
highest(Archick, 2014: 17; Hughes, 2013).
There was also the additional factor of the Republic of the Ireland’s economic
transformation in the 1980s and 90s, buoyed by the opportunities of EU membership, which
helped firm up the fledgling peace process and raised expectations of what was possible in
the North if a settlement could be reached (Blair, 2011: 158).
While economic development can encourage peace, so too can peace encourage economic
investment. While trade relationships can disintegrate during times of conflict, Bertie Ahern,
writing in his autobiography, argued that the Good Friday Agreement made Ireland more
attractive to foreign investment (Ahern, 2010: 236).
Common framework of co-operation and agreed principles
Throughout its history the Northern Ireland peace process was most effective when it
involved a common framework of co-operation and shared principles. The most important
were the principles of non-violence, as outlined by the Mitchell Principles in 1996, and of
consent. Blair argued that the principle which underpinned the Good Friday Agreement was
peace in return for power-sharing and equality – a concept accepted by all parties (Blair,
2011: 182). Hain built on this, arguing that a framework must address not only constitutional
issues, but broader issues, such as policing, human rights and, in Northern Ireland, prisoner
releases and decommissioning (Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June 2007). Powell simply
suggests that a having a framework is cause for hope, keeping all parties busy working
towards goals (Powell, 2011: 23).
While they were not always welcomed, the key components of the AIA, DSD and
GFA provided a framework and set goals that shaped and enabled the peace process to
evolve. The AIA overcame what was at the time a weak relationship to create an
Intergovernmental Conference that worked to progress the peace process while the DSD
sought to promote co-operation based on the fundamental principles, namely the principle of
consent (DSD 1993, Principle 2). The Good Friday Agreement was perhaps the best example
of a common framework working effectively. The three strands not only provided a
framework but helped to forge relationships across communities, borders and between states.
Key to the NI framework was fostering a culture of cooperation that produced increasingly
moderate politics and increased the native population’s control of the process.
24
Comprehensive participation
Control for the native population was a key concern. In conflicts like Northern
Ireland, ensuring the entire population has access to levers of power is critical.
Comprehensive participation in decision-making from across the community was a key
concern in the peace process from its beginnings at the Sunningdale negotiations, where the
British government sought to implement a permanent power-sharing executive at Stormont.
Throughout the process, such an executive relied upon dialogue, the development of new
institutions with a representative voting system, and perceived benefits. This was all part of
O’Kane’s ‘inclusive approach’, involving all sections of the community (O’Kane, 2010: 241).
Dialogue in Northern Ireland sometimes involved talking with those on the extremes
in secret (Powell, 2011: 22). Even in the worst years of the Troubles, both the British and
Irish governments had secret contacts within the IRA that provided them with information.
Thatcher’s government talked to paramilitaries during the hunger strike and, while Major
publically expressed disgust at the idea of talks with the IRA, both he and Reynolds,
recognised that a peace settlement could not be reached without communication (Major
statement to the Commons, 1 November 1993, HC Deb 01 November 1993 231:19-37;
Reynolds, 2009: 336). This policy of dialogue eventually succeeded in convincing
paramilitary groups to decommission (O’Kane, 2010: 241).
The development of new institutions, and the updating of old ones, was also important
to ensuring that people from across society were involved. The North/South Ministerial
Council was established. The rebranding of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the Police
Service of Northern Ireland and campaign to recruit more officers from a Catholic
background began to allay fears about Protestant bias (The Belfast Telegraph, 8 November
2013). The new d’Hondt voting and enlarged majority requirements system guaranteed real
political say for both Catholic and Protestant communities.
As the peace evolved, there was a concerted effort to give the people of Northern
Ireland ownership of the process. Beginning with collaboration between national
governments and local parties in devising the Sunningdale Agreement, it continued with the
Downing Street Declaration, which after the imposed Anglo-Irish Agreement, brought those
at the extremes of the political divide back into the process. This reflected the aim of Brooke,
Mayhew, Major and Reynolds to reinstate local participation in the peace process (MacIntyre
in The Independent, 12 July 1992).This process culminated with the referenda on both sides
25
of the border to approve the GFA, which itself included safeguards to ensure that all sections
of the community could participate and work together within the relevant institutions (GFA
Strand 1, Paragraph 5, 1998: 7).
Third Party Mediation
While it was important that the native population had control over the path of the
peace process, it was also clear that they needed outside assistance. Blair, Hain and Powell all
cited the importance of international third party mediators to the success of the Northern
Ireland peace process (Blair, 2011: 188; Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June 2007; Powell,
2011: 23-24). The work of, among others, George Mitchell, Harry Holkerri and John de
Chastelain was central to the success of the process (Coakley, 2003: 42). The roles of
Mitchell, (who constructed a framework through a set of principles, was a key figure in
brokering the GFA), and de Chastelain (who, with Mitchell’s assistance, chaired the
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, and monitored the destruction
of the IRA’s armaments) could not conceivably have been carried out by British or Irish
politicians or diplomats. External actors are proved to be sufficiently detached to work on
neutral strategies for resolving the conflict.
The involvement of third parties also helped with the process of bringing all parts of
Northern Irish society into the peace process and provided kin state incentives. The
contribution of the United States, with its large and politically influential Irish diaspora, was
essential to the process, even in its early stages: Ronald Reagan gave political and economic
backing to the AIA by making a $20m per year contribution to the newly established
International Fund for Ireland long before the Clinton administration increased US
involvement as a facilitator of peace in 1993 (Reynolds, 2009: 269).
Where the Clinton administration made a crucial contribution was in garnering Irish
American support for the principles of the DSD. While many were appalled by the violence
in NI, Irish America, through NORAID, was largely responsible for bankrolling the IRA.
One of the most significant confidence building measures was Clinton’s decision to grant
a visa to Gerry Adams to visit the USA in 1994. It was a change in American policy that
many within the British government and the State Department opposed, but helped Sinn Fein
get recognition internationally for its commitment to the peace process. Although it angered
the British government, it was shown to be an important confidence-building measure as a
26
step forward in the peace process (Clinton, 2005: 578-81 & 648). A second visa was later
granted when Sinn Fein agreed to enter discussions with the British government on the issue
of the IRA disarming (Clinton, 2005: 648; McKittrick in The Independent, 21 May 1996).
Clinton also made more visits to Ireland than any other sitting president, and the encouraging
phone calls he made to all sides in the final hours of the GFA negotiations have been cited by
both Ahern and Blair as important to reaching the Agreement and, later, sharing the burden of
implementing it (Ahern, 2010: 233-34; Blair, 2011: 193; Joint Statement of Ahern, Blair and
Clinton, 18 March 1999).
1.3 Summary of theoretical framework and expectation
Having explored the opinions of the politicians involved and the conclusions of
several academics, the most common themes are ripeness (strong and appropriate leadership,
trade and economic benefit), a common framework for settlement, a system of
comprehensive participation, and neutral third party assistance. All are present in the criteria
outlined by O’Kane, Blair, Powell and Hain.
As the above features are common elements in conflict resolution and peace-making
strategy the implementation of complete and comprehensive cross-community involvement
in the process through a system of power-sharing (a principle that evolved through the peace
process) will also be included, as well as ripeness markers like the absence of alternative,
inter-state cooperation and popular desire. Thus it is the NI model being tested, and not
simply a general method for conflict resolution.
Testing of the model will be done largely through applying the principles expressed in
peace agreements, policy statements and public speeches, as well as considering the
historical, social, economic and political similarities and parallels between Northern Ireland
and Kosovo and Cyprus, as highlighted by the work of peace scholars, historians and other
scholars. Articles from newspapers and specialist magazines will also be used.
27
Chapter 2
Kosovo
2.1 Origins
Kosovo’s history, like that of Northern Ireland, is dominated by the hostile
relationship between its two largest ethnic groups, the Albanian majority and Serb minority.
Kosovo has long held significance within the Serbian national psyche as the site of the Battle
of Kosovo Polje, a Serb Orthodox heroic defeat to the invading Turks in 1389 (The Times, 18
October 2012). Only recently have hostilities developed, however, and the origins of the
modern conflict lie chiefly in Serbia’s annexation of Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire in
1912 and Serb colonisation (Bekaj, 2010: 7). Independence from Serbia has been a desire of
Kosovar Albanians more or less ever since.
For much of the twentieth century and through several transformations from the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Socialist Yugoslav Federation, Serbia and
Montenegro, and finally Serbia, Kosovo was part of Serbia. Several amendments to the 1963
Yugoslav constitution throughout the 1960s granted increasing autonomy to Kosovo (Ivlevs
and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 204), and by 1974 Kosovo (now the Socialist
Autonomous Province of Kosovo) had equal rights within the Federation, but not the republic
status that Kosovars wanted (Bekaj, 2010: 43).
Throughout this period, Kosovo was a multi-ethnic region. While ethnic Albanians
constituted the majority (77.4% at the 1981 census); there were also sizeable Serb, Bosniak,
Romani and Turkish minority populations. Despite the increased political clout of the
Albanian majority provided by amendments to the constitution, privilege in 1960s and 70s
still fell mainly on the Serb community (the second largest ethnic group in Kosovo), who
enjoyed better access to education, jobs, higher wages and better standards of living, housing
and healthcare (Pavlović in Ingrao & Emmert (ed.), 2012: 54; Judt, 2010: 670). This led
ethnic Albanians and members of other non-Serb minority groups to deeply resent the Serb
population – even within the context of the muted ethnic tensions of Tito’s Yugoslavia.
President Tito’s death in 1980 marked the beginning of the Yugoslav Federation’s
political and economic decline and revived Kosovo Albanian hopes for full independence as
28
a constituent republic of Yugoslavia. In 1981, protests took place demanding greater
autonomy. They were suppressed by forceful Serb police action, killing several people. As in
1960s Northern Ireland, the protests and their suppression produced an escalation of Kosovar
resistance and swelled support for independence. The People’s Movement of Kosovo
(predecessor of the Kosovo Liberation Army) was formed in 1982 and ethnic divisions
between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs deepened.
In 1989 tension rose further when Serb President, Slobodan Milosevic, annulled
Kosovo’s autonomy and absorbing it into Serbia. Kosovo’s leaders were dismissed, its
institutions closed, and its people subjected to harsh Serb policing. After violent clashes
between police and protestors, the Kosovo Assembly was closed and Kosovo placed under
direct rule from Belgrade. A proclamation of independence in 1990 and a referendum in
1991, showing 90% in favour of independence, failed to gain recognition from Yugoslavia or
the international community (Bekaj, 2010: 43; Ivlevs and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.),
2013: 205).
The collapse of the Yugoslav Federation amidst Milosevic’s failed campaign to create
a “Greater Serbia” through the Yugoslav Wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia raised hopes
in Kosovo of independence through diplomacy. But while those other republics emerged
from war with their independence internationally guaranteed, Kosovo was reinstated as an
autonomous part of the new state, Serbia and Montenegro (Sletzinger & Gelazis, 2005: 36-
7). A split then developed in domestic Kosovo politics between the peaceful resistance of the
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the armed struggle of Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA). The crushing of non-violent student protests by Serb police in 1997 showed that
passive political resistance was ineffectual and many young oppositionists congregated
around the emerging KLA (Bekaj, 2010: 19).
Rising dissent drew intervention from the Serbian police and military forces in early
1998, and served the KLA argument for greater armed resistance. The KLA violent response,
although futile, began the Kosovo War, during which its population was subjected to a
campaign of expulsion, rape and murder by the Serbian military. Several thousand people
were killed and a half million driven from their homes (The Guardian, 13 March 2000; The
Times, 30 November 2012).
Initially, the international community, still heaping praise upon Milosevic for his role
in brokering the Dayton Accords in 1995 and reluctant to re-involve itself in the Balkan
29
conflicts, treated the fighting as an internal matter (Bekaj, 2010: 16). Excessive, brutal force
against Kosovar civilians in the villages of Qirez and Likoshane, however, demanded the
attention of the reluctant international community, who then sought to bring an end to the
conflict (Judt, 2010: 680). After a proposed NATO peace agreement (The Rambouillet
Agreement) was rejected by Serbia in February 1999, international intervention in the war
commenced. A three-month campaign of NATO airstrikes - the organisation’s first
intervention into a sovereign state’s internal affairs - brought the Kosovo War to an end in
June 1999.
The international community then continued its involvement in ‘winning the peace’.
The situation in Kosovo after the war was initially desperate: Over 50,000 houses were
completely destroyed, half a million people were left homeless and the provision of public
utilities, such as water and electricity, had virtually collapsed. Many ethnic Serbs, fearing
retribution, fled to Serbia.2
The improvements in Kosovo in the past fifteen years have largely been due to the
heavy involvement of the international community at every level of Kosovar society. The
road to peace began with the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR
1244) placing Kosovo under the temporary administration of the United Nations (UN), which
assumed all legislative, executive and judicial powers. The Resolution also provided the
mandate for the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which sought to
protect and promote human rights. A UN police force (UNMIK police) and NATO peace-
keeping force (KFOR) were also dispatched two days after the adoption of UNSCR 1244
((Ivlevs and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 205). The Resolution and its
provisions led to progress in Kosovo, and many of UNSCR 1244 terms remain in force today,
but the international community has been slow to improve physical conditions in Kosovo or
address its final status settlement.
As the bodies put in place by the Resolution began the process of reinstating or
creating important political and civil institutions in Kosovo, many Kosovo Serbs who
remained chose not to participate, deciding instead to maintain parallel social structures
(including health, education, security and the judiciary) funded by the Serbian state
government (Eide in UNSC Report, 2005: 2; Andric in Balkan Insight, 11 September 2013).
2 At the 1981 census, Serbs were estimated to make up 13.2% of the population. The Statistical Office of
Kosovo estimated this had dropped to 6% of the population in 2005 (Pavlović in Ingrao & Emmert (ed.), 2012:
52; Ivlevs and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 205)
30
2.2 Development of Peace Process
Serbia’s approach to Kosovo and its refusal to acknowledge its own role in the
region’s tragic recent past at first held up the peace process. Attempts at normalising relations
were not feasible immediately after the war and were delayed further by Kosovo’s unilateral
declaration of independence in February 2008 which, while not provoking violence, was
initially met with opposition from Serbs on both sides of the new border (Gowan, 2008: 8).
With Serbia’s progress towards EU membership stalling, Belgrade agreed to enter into talks
with Kosovo for the first time since its declared independence in September 2010 (UNGA
A/64/PV.21: 1-2)
When talks between the two sides commenced in March 2011 there was a noticeable
increase in willingness to cooperate, if not accept Kosovo’s independence. While there has
not been an official change in either Kosovo or Serbia’s official position, agreements such as
the Agreement on Regional Co-operation, allowing Kosovo to represent itself in regional
meetings and sign agreements on its own account, suggested that Serbia has begun to accept
Kosovo’s independence (EU Press Statement, 24 February 2012).
One reason for the increased cooperation is the EU’s increased role in mediating
negotiations since 2008. Both Kosovo and Serbia harbour hopes of one day joining the EU,
and while Serbia does not have to accept Kosovo’s independence to accede, a ‘normalisation
of relations’ between Kosovo and Serbia is a requirement. Only since Serbia’s accession to
the EU became a realistic prospect has the peace process gained momentum. EU-led
negotiations have brought Serbia and Kosovo closer to resolving the conflict. The ‘Pristina-
Belgrade’ negotiations brought progress through ‘The Agreement on Regional Co-operation’
which allowed Kosovo to participate and represent itself at regional meetings and sign its
own agreements. This suggested that Serbia had begun to come to terms with Kosovo’s
autonomy, if not its independence (Koeth, 2013: 139-41; EU Press Statement, 24 February
2012). A critical step followed soon after, with talks between the Prime Ministers of Serbia
and Kosovo, Ivica Dacic and Hasim Thaci, for the first time in October 2012. This led to the
signing of the Brussels Agreement by both men in April 2013.
Consisting of fifteen deliberately vague principles that covered mainly the Serb-
majority regions in northern Kosovo, the Agreement was made possible through a
compromise whereby Serbia, while not recognising Kosovo as an independent state,
conceded its claim of legal authority over the whole of Kosovo. In return Kosovo provided
31
guarantees that its Serb population would be given extensive autonomy and protection. An
Association of Serb-majority municipalities was established (Principle 1-3) with
responsibilities in economic development, education, health, and urban and rural planning
(Principle 4). Significantly, both sides agreed that “neither side will block or encourage
others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths” (Principle 14). The
Agreement was the first formal basis for normalised relations between Kosovo and Serbia
(The Guardian, 30 April 2013).
While the Brussels Agreement undoubtedly represents progress, resolving the long-
term conflict in Kosovo remains a difficult task. Just three weeks before the Brussels
Agreement was reached Dacic refused to accept a deal on the grounds that it did not grant
enough to the Serb minority in Kosovo (The Economist, 3 April 2013)
2.3 Application of Model
Ripeness
The Absence of Alternative
The geopolitical situation and heavy involvement of the UN and EU mean that a
return to violent conflict is unlikely. Kosovo Serb opposition to the peace process will
probably continue, but is unlikely to derail it, especially if Kosovo’s leaders are happy to
grant greater autonomy and be patient about independence (The Economist, 9 November
2013; Koeth, 2013: 142; Wall Street Journal, 29 September 2013). Certainly, there is no
alternative to a normalisation of relations if Kosovo and Serbia are to gain EU membership in
the future, the expressed goal of both parties, so a serious deviation from the existing plan is
unlikely.
Popular desire for peace; political motivation
Heavy EU lobbying and involvement in settlement negotiations has helped shape a
peace process at a political level, but it remains to be seen whether the civil structure and
public in Kosovo can accept and maintain a settlement (Ban in UNSC S/2014/305: 2). The
bitter Kosovo War is within the living memory of many Kosovars, and the process of
reconciliation between the two communities is likely to be long and arduous (Ban in UNSC
S/2014/558: 9).
32
Public opinion in Serbia is generally committed to closer relations with the EU
sovereignty, and so the Brussels Agreement has broadly been accepted amongst Serbs living
in Serbia. Pro-EU, Brussel Agreement-support political parties fared well at the 2014 general
election, while the hard line anti-EU Democratic Party of Serbia, a staunch defender of
Serbia’s territorial claim over Kosovo, lost all twenty-one of its seats (Balkan Insight, 16
March 2014). The new government formed in April 2014 has reaffirmed its commitment to
continuing EU facilitated dialogue and full implementation of the Brussels Agreement (Ban
in UNSC S/2014/558: 2)
The majority of Kosovo Serbs believe Kosovo to be unviable as an independent state
in the long term, and are less likely than Albanians to support the Brussels Agreement (Ivlevs
and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 207-15). At the Kosovo general election in
2014, turnout in Serb-majority municipalities averaged just under 26% roughly the same as
for the Serbian general election, but still to be far below the 42.6% average for the rest of
Kosovo (Ban in UNSC S/2014/558: 2). This was despite an appeal by the new Serbian Prime
Minister, Aleksander Vucic, that to vote was in the interests of Serbs living in Kosovo
(Nikolic in Balkan Insight, 3 June 2014). Both Kosovo’s premier political parties, the
Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo, support the Brussels
Agreement as a means of gaining EU membership. This would suggest a political motivation
that possibly exceeds that of the public.
Strong leadership
Given Kosovo’s recent history and the manner in which the KLA’s political
incarnation, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, has dominated the post-independence political
landscape, Kosovar leadership in the peace process is likely to remain with ex-militants. As
Northern Ireland has demonstrated, this is vital provided that they are committed to non-
violence and political dialogue.
Ivica Dacic, himself a Kosovo Serb, notably changed his position from initially
opposing Kosovo’s independence to accepting its potential permanence during the
negotiations that led to the Brussels Agreement (BBC News, 27 July 2012). Commitment to
the principles of the Brussels Agreement can be expected both from new Prime Minister
Vucic, and Dacic, now the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
33
Inter-state Cooperation
The Brussels Agreement is based on inter-state co-operation between Serbia and Kosovo,
and probably sits somewhere between the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Downing Street
Declaration in terms of its position in the overall peace process. Unresolved issues remain,
such as the future of Kosovo’s sovereignty, but since the Agreement was reached, both sides
have shown willingness to deliver on its principles. Serbia withdrew financial support for the
four municipalities it funded in September 2013, and cooperation between Belgrade and
Pristina in dealing with recent tensions in northern Kosovo helped to reinstate calm raising
hopes of eventually settling differences there (Ban in UNSC S/2014/305: 1 and UNSC
S/2014/558: 4; EEAS Statement, 22 July 2014). (Andric in Balkan Insight, 11 September
2013).
This commitment is probably motivated by the determination to progress towards EU
membership, which was helped by the opening of accession talks for Serbia and negotiation
of Stabilisation and Association Agreement for Kosovo (Ban in UNSC S/2014/558: 10;
Council of Europe Statement, 21 January 2014; EU Press Statement, 6 May 2014).
The withdrawal of parallel civil structures in northern Kosovo must be followed by
respect for the autonomy of Serb-majority municipalities. Further cooperation will then be
needed: Serbian support in reintegrating ethnic Serbs into the relevant Kosovo’s social and
political structures must be met with Kosovo’s cooperation in allowing Kosovo Serbs to
retain a connection with the motherland whilst ensuring they have a place in an inclusive
multi-ethnic Kosovar society.
Economic motives
With a 35% unemployment rate and an economic output at around 10% of the EU
average, Kosovo desperately needs economic prosperity (Bloomberg, 6 June 2014).
Economic advancement relies on foreign investment replacing foreign aid - at around €116
per head in 2011, Kosovo is the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the world
(Appendix I, European Court of Auditors Special Report 18/2012: 1; Statement by President
Barroso, 20 May 2011: 2). Greater stability could bring an influx of foreign investment –
both from the Kosovar diaspora in Western Europe and North America and from those that
want Kosovo to succeed.
34
Serbia needs economic growth as it seeks to reach the standards required for EU
membership. The promise of economic reform was a key factor in Vacic’s Progressive Party
surprise landslide victory in March 2014, as he seeks to tackle an unemployment rate of 26%
(The Guardian, 16 March 2014; The Economist, 22 March 2014). Relations with Kosovo
may have an impact on economic growth if they deteriorate to a level where potential
investors are discouraged. Having a stronger economy than Kosovo, Serbia has managed to
secure more foreign direct investment, mainly from EU states and the Middle East (The
Economist, 19 June 2012).
Common framework of co-operation
The Brussels Agreement is the main framework for a future settlement. It compares to
the AIA or DSD in that it makes a general commitment to a more cooperative relationship
without explicit detail. It should be a stepping stone to the next phase, centred on the
principle of not impeding each other in seeking EU accession.
This framework will not last forever. While the EU membership incentive is currently
effective, it could cause issues in the future. The EU has not yet demanded that Kosovo’s
status be settled, and while this does not necessarily have repercussions for Serbia, Kosovo
cannot hope to accede to the EU while the question remains open. This central issue needs to
be resolved.
On this matter, the principle of majority consent used in Northern Ireland is not
applicable because ethnic Albanians make up the overwhelming majority of the population.
Partition would also not work. As in NI, it would simply cause issues in the future (the Serb-
majority municipalities have sizable populations of Albanians and other ethnic groups).
The most likely lesson from Northern Ireland could be a cross-border council similar
to the North/South Ministerial Council to work on areas of mutual interest, centring on a
trade and economic partnership.
Comprehensive participation
Unlike Northern Ireland, ex-paramilitaries are already at the centre of the political
landscape. Indeed, Thaci, a former political leader of the KLA and Dacic, a former close
associate of Slobodan Milosevic, are old adversaries who have put their differences aside.
Rather, the problem lies in ensuring that Kosovo Serbs participate in a society they feel they
35
have a stake in. Several features for comprehensive electoral participation are already in
place, including a system that guarantees representation of minorities in both parliament and
government. 3
A more nuanced system is still needed: a dispute between the Albanian
majority and Serbs over the establishment of a Kosovo Army prompted the dissolution of the
Assembly, and there is potential – if ever it engages in Kosovo’s political system – for the
northern municipalities to hold the balance of power (Robert Schumann Foundation, 8 June
2014; Ban in UNSCS/2014/558: 2; The Economist, 3 April 2013). Here NI cannot provide
many lessons, besides possibly a system of proportional representation to allow for the
minority vote to deliver above the number of seats guaranteed by the Constitution, which did
not happen at either the 2010 or 2014 general elections. This would mean that Kosovo Serbs
in northern municipalities could potentially be represented by people from their own region,
rather than by the Serbs minority in the south.
There are other signs for a greater level of participation. The Brussels Agreement
made several commitments, including the appointment of a Kosovo Serb police commander,
ensuring the ethnic composition of the force is representative in all Serb-majority
municipalities (Principles 7-9, Brussels Agreement 2013) and the appointment of a new
permanently representative Serb judiciary (Principle 10). The integration of Serbian security
structures into the equivalent Kosovo institution has already begun. 30 Kosovo Serb
firefighters have signed contracts in Mitrovica North, while a new, ethnically representative
police team has already contributed to increased effectiveness in northern Kosovo (Ban in
UNSC S/2014/558: 16-17). Turnout for the November 2013 municipal elections in the Serb-
majority northern areas was poor, overall no higher than 22% (The Guardian, 14 November
2013). In some areas Albanian candidates were elected to represent Serb enclaves.
The provisions of the Brussels Agreement alone are unlikely to be enough, and more
work is needed develop a system that includes everyone in political, civil and social decision-
making and mapping Kosovo’s future. As UN Special Envoy to Kosovo Kai Eide put it, “a
stable and multi-ethnic society will only succeed if they [Kosovo’s leaders and population]
are combined with an increasing degree of ownership of this society.” (Eide in UNSC
S/2004/932: 16).
3 The 120 member Kosovar Assembly reserves twenty seats for minorities: 10 for Serbs, 4 each for Roma,
Ashkali and Egyptians, 3 for Bosniaks, 2 for Turks and 1 for Gorani, (Robert Schuman Foundation, 8 June
2014)
36
Third parties
The EU is likely to continue supporting the implementation of the Brussels Agreement
through EULEX (Ban in UNSC S/2014/305: 2). This will move the process forward, and help
strengthen Kosovo’s weak civil and legal institutions. However, there needs to be acceptance
that international third party involvement in Kosovo’s internal affairs is only beneficial to a
certain point – in some areas it has been a hindrance. While reconciliation between ethnic
Albanians and Serbs can be mediated and supervised by the international community,
momentum must ultimately come from the two communities themselves. The international
community is obliged to maintain a degree of neutrality that can at times be unrealistic and
disproportionate. For instance, some have speculated whether the trial of former Kosovo
Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj at the ICTY in The Hague in 2012 was simply an attempt
to counter-balance the number of prosecutions against Serb perpetrators (The Guardian, 25
November; The Times, 30 November 2012).
37
Chapter 3
Cyprus
3.1 Origins
Cyprus, too, suffers a centuries old conflict that has re-erupted in the last fifty years.
Many, including most Greek Cypriots, regard Cyprus’ problems as beginning in 1974, when
a Greek-backed coup, aimed at establishing union between Cyprus and Greece, (enosis) was
met with violence in Turkish Cypriot enclaves and the north of the island was invaded by
Turkish troops. However, the seeds of the conflict lie much deeper.
Under the Ottoman Empire the demographic of Cyprus changed significantly,
introducing a sizable Turkish settlement among the indigenous Greek population. The two
distinct communities continued to feel a keen sense of kinship with Greece or Turkey.
Following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Cyprus was placed under British administration,
with sovereignty passing from the Turkish Republic to Britain in 1925. Both Ottoman and
British rule had allowed for the Greek and Turkish communities to function separately but
harmoniously. Although this created a peaceful environment, it did not encourage a sense of
Cypriot identity: integration was limited as society was divided by language, culture and
religion, both groups retaining attachment to their ‘mother state’.
Violent Greek-Cypriot nationalism re-emerged in 1955 with the emergence of the
terrorist group EOKA committed to ending British colonial rule and establishing enosis with
Greece. The uprising made British rule increasingly difficult to maintain and soured relations
between the communities (Fisher, 2001: 310). Many Greek Cypriots gave up their jobs in the
government and police and the colonial authorities became reliant on the Turkish-Cypriot
community to fill their place (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 11).
As decolonisation gained momentum, the British government looked to reduce its
responsibility for Cyprus whilst maintaining an interest in the region. In the final three years
before Cypriot independence in 1960, Britain made multiple attempts to ease the tensions on
the island through negotiation with Greece and Turkey.
38
3.2 Development of Peace Process
The process that eventually led to independence began with the Radcliffe Proposal
(1956), granting full internal self-rule and right of self-determination, with Britain retaining
foreign and defence responsibilities. This was accepted by Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by
Greek Cypriots. The subsequent MacMillan Plan (1958) proposed a bi-communal
constitution with separate municipalities and a division of sovereignty between Turkey,
Greece and Britain, but was rejected by the Greek government on the grounds that Greek
Cypriots would prefer independence (Erdemir, 2001; Fisher, 2001: 313).
Subsequent violent clashes on the island and a cooling in Greco-Turkish state
relations demonstrated that a division of sovereignty was not possible. Britain moved towards
independence for Cyprus, with a number of security measures. A new power-sharing
constitution outlined in the London-Zurich Accords (1959) provided for a presidential system
with national legislature, two autonomous communal chambers and a system that ensured
Turkish Cypriot representation in government and the public and security services at a rate of
70:30, with the security services balanced at 60:40 (the proportions of the population as a
whole were approximately 78:18) (Paragraphs 11 & 14, London-Zurich Accords; Ker-
Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.) 2009 : 12). Separate majorities were required among
the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives for legislation to carry
(Paragraph 7, London-Zurich Accords). As an agreement could not be reach on forming
armed forces, Britain, as a guarantor power, was granted the establishment of two military
bases and allowances were made for a military presence from the two other guarantors,
Greece and Turkey.
When independence arrived, however, suspicion between the two communities
caused the Accords to unravel. In November 1963 Greek Cypriot President Makarios
proposed thirteen constitutional amendments (in contravention of the Accords) that would
have increased Greek Cypriot authority and relegated Turkish Cypriots to a minority status.
Turkey rejected the amendments immediately. In 1964, conflict broke out in several
traditionally Greek-Cypriot towns which had seen recent Turkish Cypriot migration from
their traditional enclaves in the north of island. Several hundred people were killed, and
peace-keeping forces were dispatched, first from Britain and then a formal UN Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP) which established a buffer zone. The legacy of 1964: the grief over
39
unlocated bodies of the dead and the presence of the peacekeeping force remain dominant
features of the conflict today (UNSC S/RES/2135).
The UNFICYP drew the international community into a mediation role on the island
as a solution was sought. The first serious attempt at solving the conflict came with the USA-
led Acheson Plan (1964), under the leadership of the former Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson. It proposed enosis but with concessions of a sovereign base for Turkey and some
self-administrative rights for Turkish Cypriots. Despite having the support of the guarantor
powers, it was rejected by President Archbishop Makarios as granting too much to Turkey
and Turkish Cypriots. A second, amended Plan was then rejected by both the Greek Cypriots
and Turkey.
A period of stalemate followed. When talks resumed in 1968, a resumption of
violence and the formation of a military government in Greece had effectively killed enosis
as a practical option. Again, intercommunal talks failed when Makarios refused to make vital
concessions on constitutional issues or Turkish-Cypriot autonomy. While the governmental
talks were failing, tensions were again rising. A new pro-enosis terrorist group, EOKA B,
emerged with the goal of uniting Cyprus with Greece. The presence of UNFICYP was unable
to prevent an escalation in violence, and in July 1974 Turkey invaded. This intervention
sparked violence that killed several thousand people and drove over 150,000 Greek Cypriots,
a quarter of the whole Greek-Cypriot population, out of their homes in the north as they
escaped to the south. Some 40,000 Turkish Cypriots swiftly left the south, either moving
north or seeking sanctuary on the British military bases (Camp, 1980: 58). Emergency peace
talks in Switzerland failed, effectively leaving a de facto political and geographical division
of the island into two self-administrating ethnically-homogenous zones.
When high-level meetings resumed after three years in 1977, under the guidance of the
UN, there was a brief hope of positive results. Having spent two years trying to forge
negotiations without sign of progress UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim convinced both
Greek Cypriot President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to sign the
vague four point High Level Agreement which confirmed that any future settlement would be
based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation of two states (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava &
Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 15).
Since 1977, the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation has been the model for settlement and
formed the basis for subsequent frameworks for peace. Further proposals for advancing
40
towards a settlement from Waldheim (1979 & 1981) and his successors, Javier Perez de
Cuellar (1986) and Kofi Annan (2004) have largely been proportionate to the circumstances
of the conflict, but have made little progress. A proposed Ten Point Agreement (1979),
building on the 1977 Agreement and including additional provisions on principles of
demilitarisation and mutual stability, was defeated by the failure of both sides to agree on the
most fundamental principles (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 16). This
was followed by negotiations in 1981, based on an Interim Agreement focussing on four
areas: improving community relations, the return and settlements of displaced Greek
Cypriots, constitutional issues and territorial disputes. This also collapsed due to lack of
cooperation between Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Denktash, whose
legitimacy Kyprianou refused to acknowledge. The two also differed over the shape a federal
system should take: Denktash wanted a decentralised, weak federation which would
gradually evolve into a customs union and eventually a centralised economic and fiscal
union. Kyprianou preferred a strongly centralised government (Mirbagheri, 1998: 124).
Hopes for reunification were dashed by the decision of Denktash to declare unilateral
independence in 1983 to form the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The international
community’s response was strong, judging the declaration to be legally invalid and calling for
its withdrawal (Paragraph 2, UNSC S/RES/541, 1983). The UN’s response, De Cuellar’s
Draft Framework Agreement (1986) of confidence-building measures based around a united
bi-zonal, bi-communal non-aligned federal republic initially gained some support from the
new Turkish Republic, but the cool response of Greek Cypriot leaders, who felt the
Framework did not adequately address key issues regarding Turkish settlement and the
presence of Turkish troops killed negotiations once more and the Turkish Republic took on a
degree of permanence (de Cuellar in UNSC S/18102/Add.1, 1986; Fisher, 2001: 315).
De Cuellar, exhausted by two years of negotiation on the same points, saw no way to
proceed. In his final report to the Security Council he stated that further progress was made
impossible by Denktash’s demand that the two zones had equal sovereignty and right of
secession (de Cuellar in UNSC S/23121). Another period of stagnation followed.
During this period the gulf between the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and
TRNC widened. The RoC gained international recognition and was able to progress
politically and economically, the TRNC lagged behind. An attempt by Boutros Boutros-Ghali
to establish a bi-communal federation in 1992 and a series of confidence building measures in
41
the following years were defeated by disagreements over the return of displaced persons and
the extent and characteristics of territorial adjustment. The two zones polarised further when
the RoC submitted a formal application for EEC membership in 1990.
When EU accession negotiations for the RoC began in 1998, escalating in 2001, it
prompted the most recent and significant attempt at reaching a settlement. While Denktash
had previously rejected a federation, the imminent accession of Cyprus to the EU and a
change of government in Turkey prompted him to call for renewed negotiations.
Seeing an opportunity UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pursued joint EU membership
for both zones on the island as an incentive to a long-term settlement through the Annan Plan
(2004), the first comprehensive attempt to treat almost all aspects of life in a proposed bi-
communal, bi-zonal Cyprus. By reflecting the interests of the two communities, the Plan
sought to bring them together and into the EU at the same time (The Economist, 10 May
2009a). Acceptance of the Plan, which was supported by all existing EU member states,
would have meant that the TFSC enjoying the social, economic and political benefits of EU
membership, whilst also providing displaced Greek Cypriots either with an opportunity to
return to their homes or compensation (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009:
10).
When the Plan was put to a referendum on 24 April 2004, it received strong support from
Turkish Cypriots (64.9% in favour with an 87% turn-out), but was rejected by Greek Cypriots
(75.8% against with an 88% turn-out) (Introduction in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 1).
The lack of Greek Cypriot support owed something to President Tassos Papadopoulos’s
sustained campaign of rhetoric against accepting the Plan (The Economist, 29 April 2004). A
subsequent poll found that a majority of Greek Cypriots would have supported the Plan if
their concerns about security and implementation had been sufficiently met (Loizides in
Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 80). Rejection of the plan meant that hopes of EU
membership for the whole island were scuppered, and the Republic of Cyprus acceded alone
on 1 May 2004.
After the Annan Plan, there were no serious negotiations for several years. While
Denktas, who had opposed the Plan, lost to the moderate pro-settlement Mehmet Ali Talat in
April 2005, Papadopoulos remained Greek Cypriot President until 2008. Only with the
election of Demetris Christofias as Papadopoulos’ successor in February 2008 were hopes
reignited. In contrast to Papadopoulos, Christofias had supported the Annan Plan and was
42
committed to reaching a permanent settlement for reunification of the island, having pledged
throughout his election to restart talks with Turkish Cypriots (The Economist, 28 February
2008). With committed moderate political leaders on both sides it seemed there was a
possibility of establishing a lasting peace. When talks commenced in September 2008, the
agenda was split into six headings: economy, the EU, governance, territory, security and
property (Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, 2008; The Economist, 10
December 2009). With two meetings a week, significant progress was made on four areas,
with property and security proving the hardest to resolve. The subject of property was
particularly complicated and focussed on the claims of Greek Cypriots forced from their
homes in 1974 who still held the property deeds. While Christofias wanted assurances for
these property claims in the envisioned Turkish Cypriot state, Talat favoured an independent
commission similar to the Annan Plan’s proposed Property Board that would rule individual
cases.
The relationship was broken by Talat’s defeat at the Turkish Cypriot elections in
2010, before any significant agreement was struck. Far from seeking to reunify the island,
Talat’s successor, Dervish Eroglu, wanted the creation and international recognition of
separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot states. The gulf between Christofias and Eroglu meant
that negotiations on a settlement eventually came to a standstill in 2012 (The Economist, 31
March 2011; Smith in The Guardian, 11 February 2014). However, the very fact that talks
were taking place has moved the process forwards on the civic level. Cross-communal
projects have been running for several years with UNFICYP support. Based on sport,
culture, religion and education the projects have brought notable breakthroughs, including the
opening of Islamic holy sites in the Republic, a provisional agreement on an all-island
football league and the bi-communal Committee on Missing Persons, which in 2008 began
exhuming, identifying and returning the remains of people killed in the 1964 violence (Ban in
UNSC S/2013/781: 4 & 6 and in UNSC S/2014/461: 4 & 7).
The discovery of the Aphrodite gasfield off Cyprus gave greater urgency to reaching a
settlement because both parts of the island claim ownership of the waters. International
interest, having abated after the failure of the Annan Plan, revived with the possibility of the
gasfield lessening Europe’s energy dependence on Russia (Smith in The Guardian, 11
February 2014). On 11 February 2014, after five months of intense negotiations, Greek
Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, made a joint
declaration marking the official relaunch of negotiations on a comprehensive settlement for
43
the reunification of Cyprus, with Anastriades calling the chance of peace a “win-win
situation” (Ban in S/2014/461: 1; Smith in The Guardian, 11 February 2014). In the
declaration, both sides pledged to respect democratic principles, human rights and
fundamental freedoms in pursuit of a bi-communal, bi-zonal united Cyprus (Paragraphs 1 &
3, Joint Declaration, 11 February 2014).
3.3 Application of Model
Ripeness
The Absence of Alternative
The Annan Plan represented a relatively straightforward alternative to continuing the
conflict, with the incentive of EU membership for the whole island. Since then, the legal
situation has become more complex. As the Republic of Cyprus acceded in 2004,
membership for the whole island would require any peace settlement to be incorporated into
EU law – a complicated issue that to date remains unresolved (Ban in UNSC S/2012/149: 3).
However, this should prove surmountable.
The only alternative to a settlement is ‘the security of status quo’. As the international
community is increasingly keen on settlement, this is becoming a less feasible alternative,
particularly given the economic benefits that settlement would bring.
Popular desire for peace; political motivation
Possibly the greatest hindrance to the creation of a ripe environment is the scepticism
and apathy that have discouraged political determination. Among the Cypriot population,
there are two generations who have spent entire lives living within conflict and have little
confidence of a breakthrough (Ban in UNSC S/2012/149: 4). However, new communal
projects and regular negotiations are bringing people from the two sides together and, with
the added incentive of a political agreement, a settlement seems more likely than at any time
in the last decade.
Strong leadership
As Christofias and Talat demonstrated, there is potential to make progress in Cyprus
if both sides work together. The two leaders enjoyed a good relationship, no doubt aided by a
similar left-wing perspective and their ability to converse without interpreters. Both are now
44
out of office, with Christofias citing a lack of progress in the peace process as a key factor in
his decision not to seek re-election in 2012 (Ban in S/2012/507: 1), but Anastaiades and
Eroglu seem committed to regular meetings and speeding up progress. A key factor is
ensuring that this approach is maintained at every diplomatic level - public statements
demonising the opposite side have undermined the process in the past (Ban in UNSC
S/2011/112: 4).
Inter-state Cooperation
While cooperation between the three guarantor powers has not always been strong,
there are signs of improvement. Turkey remains committed to working towards a settlement,
involving itself in negotiations with the leaders of the British, Swiss, Swedish and Danish
governments as well as interested parties within the European Commission (Ban in UNSC
S/2012/149: 2) while remaining strong in defending the economic and social interests of
Turkish Cypriots (Ban in UNSC S/2012/507: 3).
Cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Chambers of Commerce led to the
establishment of the four-way Nicosia Economic Forum in June 2014. The Forum will
involve the Greek, Turkish, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Chambers of Commerce
working together for first time since 1974, to develop initiatives that will support continuing
negotiations on a settlement (Joint Nicosia Economic Forum Statement, 2 June 2014; Özer in
Hurriet Daily News Online, 7 June 2014; Ban in UNSC/S/2014/461: 5).
Economic motives
The economic motives for a reunification settlement are strong, with independent
analysis suggesting that a settlement could boost the island’s economy by as much as three
percent per annum (The Economist, 27 April 2013). Much of this boost would come from the
gas field (inviting comparisons between what gas could potentially do for cross-border co-
operation in Cyprus, with what coal and steel did for early European cooperation), but greater
stability would also allow for improved intercommunal business cooperation, stronger trade
links, and an expansion in the existing tourism industry (The Economist, 23 March 2013; Ban
in UNSC S/2013/781: 4). With the support of the Turkish and Greek governments, the new
Nicosia Economic Forum should help to deliver on these opportunities, as well as
encouraging joint private sector initiatives (Ban in UNSC/S/2014/461: 5).
45
Of course, with such opportunities there is potential for fresh disputes, and care needs
to be taken to ensure that economic incentives work in favour of peace. The UN Secretary
General has repeatedly expressed his view that it is important that wealth gained from
exploiting the gasfield is distributed evenly and further steps need to be taken to encourage
intercommunal trade (Ban in UNSC S/2012/507: 7, in UNSC S/2013/781: 4-6 and in UNSC
S/2014/461: 8).
Common framework of co-operation
In many ways, the Joint Declaration of February 2014 is encouragingly vague.
Identifying specific principles or points of co-operation is potentially hazardous in Cyprus
and an affirmation of principles, like the Downing Street Declaration, is a good platform from
which to continue. Long-term, the framework must address the issues of resettlement of
displaced peoples, property and territory and this will involve confronting the shared history.
An independently mediated Property Board and considerable mutual cooperation will be
required in the future. The Nicosia Economic Forum, not dissimilar to the North/South
Ministerial Council in NI, could help in ensuring even distribution of the wealth of the
Aphrodite gasfield.
Comprehensive participation
Previous attempts at ensuring representation at all levels of society – the London-
Zurich Accords being the most noteworthy – have failed because dialogue broke down and,
ultimately, because both sides sought to gain advantage. But dialogue, the development of
new institutions and the perceived benefits of a settlement are now in place in Cyprus. In
trying to create an environment conducive to comprehensive participation across both the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities there needs to be a framework to ensure that
decisions affecting both sides are agreed upon. In the event of a single legislature, the
requirement for a simple majority in both communities could be reinstated. This would mean
there would be no need for the negative veto. Another provision of the London-Zurich
Accords – that the positions of President and Deputy President are guaranteed to be filled by
representatives from both communities – could also be reinstated in knowledge that it has
helped maintain the political process in NI.
46
Third parties
The continued involvement of UN mediators, as well as the rejuvenated commitment
of the three guarantor powers will be important to continued success in the peace process, as
Cyprus will not be able to a close a deal by itself.
It is important that the international community does not disrupt the UN’s policy of
allowing Cypriot leadership and ownership of the peace process (Ban in UNSC S/2011/112:
3).
47
Conclusions
The thesis has shown that the example of NI is suitable as a conflict resolution model;
firstly by compiling factors to create such a model, and secondly by exploring its application
in two contemporary conflicts. It is clear that no model will fit new conflict situations
perfectly. Each conflict has its own culture-based complexities and peculiarities and no
successful peace process in one conflict could ever be transferred completely to another.
Having said this, the Northern Ireland peace process was largely successful, and that the likes
of Blair, Hain and O’Kane have tried to draw principles for other conflicts demonstrates a
belief that it has lessons to teach.
The broad criteria examined in this paper are useful tools for analysis and diagnosis; a
template that helps to identify ripeness for peace and issues that remain unresolved. In this
sense, there is an applicable NI model that is suitable for helping to resolve other conflicts,
provided that peacemakers are prepared to be flexible in their approach to the process and do
not seek a rigid application of Northern Ireland’s resolutions to problems elsewhere. Each
conflict’s complex problems require their own complex solutions (Coakley, 2003: 49).
Looking briefly at the four criteria outlined, none is unique to NI. It is obvious that there
must be readiness for peace, which cannot be forced. A common framework is the best basis
for all successful negotiations. In order for peace to be stable it must include all members of
society. Third party assistance is required in conflicts because, ultimately, if the parties
involved in the conflict could resolve it by themselves, they would have done so.
What Northern Ireland helped to establish was how important having all these strands in
place is. The Sunningdale Agreement failed because Northern Irish society was not ready for
peace. The kin-states accord over the future of NI sovereignty removed some of the
validation of extremist groups’ grounds for violence and dissent. Negotiations with the
political parties of the centre would never bring a lasting peace as long as they excluded the
extreme elements of society. The assistance of the Clinton administration and the informal
British/Irish forum that the EU provided allowed for issues to be aired and resolved without
deepening the conflict.
Kosovo and Cyprus now appear to be learning from these lessons. Both situations are ripe
for a settlement thanks to the good offices of the EU and UN. While the details of the
48
common framework may be different, the peace process in Kosovo has sped up since the
principles for the normalisation of relations were agreed between Serbia and Kosovo.
Participation in the political, social and civil institutions from across all communities will
continue to be a key consideration in Kosovo, as it struggles to find a way of engaging the
autonomous northern municipalities in the evolving Kosovo state. Serbian-Kosovo
cooperation will be critical to the process, but the precedent of British-Irish cooperation
shows it is possible. Finally, EU agency will continue to be required for a positive outcome.
In Cyprus, the oilfield discovery also contributed to ripeness, leading to the recent
agreement in July 2014 between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and a common framework.
They too may draw on ambitious but failed agreements of the past, as with the GFA and
Sunningdale. The planned settlement of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation means that
further accommodation by the two sides will be needed, but the increase in cross-community
activities suggests that this is more likely than before. As in Kosovo, third party assistance is
likely to remain a fixture for the foreseeable future.
In Northern Ireland, the EU’s Special Support Programme for Peace and
Reconciliation continues to sustain parts of the economy and funds community organisations
and peaceworkers. This too could be exported to Kosovo and Cyprus, thus addressing
‘ownership’ and economic issues.
Although the international community has been responsible for enforcing the peace in
Cyprus and Kosovo, it will be the responsibility of those living in Cyprus, Kosovo and Serbia
to take ownership of maintaining it. Ownership remains important. The people of these
regions must look to reframe themselves within the EU vision of good neighbourliness. Here
there may be further lessons to learn from NI, in terms of continuing cross-border
cooperation and sharing the work of democratic governance without loss of the sense of
national identity - in effect, like a microcosm of the EU itself.
Perhaps it is best to look at the resolution of any conflict as requiring a complex
combination of skill and art. The NI model can provide the required skills but without the art
of strong, subtle, well-informed leadership there is no prospect of peace. NI, in the latter
stages of the peace process, benefitted from Major and Reynolds’ steady commitment,
Clinton’s charisma, Ahern and Blair’s persistent determination, Trimble’s pragmatism,
Adams’ realism and perhaps above all Hume’s integrity and indefatigability. Without them,
peace would not have been possible. This dependence on the personal qualities of actors in
49
the process is the main weakness in the use of the NI process as a model – the difficulty of
finding the winning combination of effective personalities in leadership roles. This cannot be
relied upon.
It is to be hoped that Vucic and Thaci in Kosovo and Anastasiades and Eroglu in Cyprus
can display similar characteristics so that a peaceful future can be assured.
50
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Interviews/Speeches
Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Hashim Thaci, Prime Minister of
Kosovo (20 May 2011) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-360_en.pdf 1-2
Peter Hain at Chatham House (12 July 2007) “Peace-making in Northern Ireland: A Model for
Conflict Resolution”. Transcript available at:
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/ph120607.pdf (Accessed 25 May 2014)
Interview with a former History teacher at The Royal Belfast Academical Institution, b. 1950 (26
July 2014)
John Major speech to the Commons, 1 November 1993 (HC Deb 01 November 1993 vol. 231 cc19-
37) Transcript available at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1993/nov/01/
european-council-special-meeting#S6CV0231P0_19931101_HOC_173
Joint Statement by Bill Clinton, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, 18 March 1999
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/js18399.htm
Chris Patten at UK Conference on Organised Crime (2 November 2002) “Organised Crime”
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-586_en.pdf (Last accessed: 25 May 2014) 1-4
Albert Reynolds Post-Downing Street Declaration Speech (15 December 1993) “Statement by the
Taoiseach on the Joint Declaration on Peace”. Transcript available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ar151293.htm (Last accessed: 25 May 2014)
Margaret Thatcher at 12 Downing Street (19 November 1984) “Post Anglo-Irish Summit Press
Conference” http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105790 (Last accessed 9 June 2014)
European External Action Service: “Statement by the Spokesperson on the first meeting of the
Working Group on Mitrovica bridge” (22 July 2014)
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140722_05_en.pdf
European Union Press Statements
“EU facilitated dialogue: Agreement on Regional Cooperation and IBM technical protocol” (24
February 2012) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/
128138.pdf (Last accessed: 4 June 2014)
“EU starts the Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with Kosovo”
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-938_en.htm (28 October 2013)
“First Accession Conference with Serbia” (21 January 2014) http://www.consilium.europa.eu
/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/140676.pdf
“EU-Kosovo: Formal negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement concluded”
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-358_en.htm (6 May 2014)
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