Exporting the Northern Ireland peace process: an

exploration of a Northern Ireland model for

conflict resolution in Cyprus and Kosovo

WB Jones

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Disclaimer:

I hope that for other students this MA thesis provide a good starting point, both for the history

of the conflicts and for the key similarities and lessons that can be drawn from and for the

road to the peaceful resolution of the Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Cyprus conflicts and

even beyond. I welcome any thoughts or questions any reader might have, and actively

encourage disagreement with the conclusions I have drawn. Thanks for reading.

` WBJ, Southampton, October 2014

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Contents

Introduction 3

i. Methodology

Chapter 1: A Northern Ireland Model 10

1.1 Origins

1.2 Theory building

1.3 Summary of theoretical framework and expectations

Chapter 2: Kosovo 27

2.1 Origins

2.2 Development of Peace Process

2.3 Application of Model

Chapter 3:Cyprus 37

3.1. Origins

3.2 Development of Peace Process

3.3Application of Model

Conclusion 47

Bibliography 50

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Introduction

For many years ‘a sorry record of frustration and fragmentation’ (Shannon, 1986:

852), the transformation of Northern Ireland (NI) over the last three decades has been

remarkable. Once one of the most protracted conflicts in the world, today NI is a relatively

peaceful society. As one scholar puts it, NI’s major challenges now revolve around class,

gender and identity – not old issues of paramilitary activity or battles over sovereignty

(O’Neill, 2007: 429).

Academics, politicians and diplomats have argued that lessons can be learnt from

successful peace-making initiatives and applied to other conflict situations (Annan in Hume,

Fraser & Murray, 2014: 101). They believe that it is unnecessary to invent peace-making and

conflict resolution methods for each new conflict, but possible to adapt existing approaches

from successful peace processes. Former US President Bill Clinton, a crucial figure in

progressing the NI peace process (Hughes, 2009: 291), mediator George Mitchell and Peter

Hain, the British government’s Northern Ireland secretary have spoken at length of their

belief that NI could be used as a model for peace in other conflict situations (Arthur in Hume,

Fraser & Murray, 2014: 208; Hughes, 2009: 291; Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June

2007). Tony Blair’s Chief Advisor and chief negotiator in NI, Jonathan Powell, believes that

lessons could be applied, with care, to those seeking settlements in other conflicts so that they

could ‘repeat their own mistakes rather than repeating ours.’ (Powell, 2011: 21). Blair

himself, his Irish counterpart, Bertie Ahern, and former United Nations Secretary General

Kofi Annan have also expressed the view that the role of the British and Irish governments

and the wider international community in the peace process could provide principles

applicable to peace settlements in other conflict situations (Blair, 2010:181; Ahern, 2010:

349; Annan in Hume, Fraser & Murray, 2014: 103). Hain, Blair and Powell have each

outlined what they consider to be the criteria that can be applied for general peace-making.

This will be explored in greater depth in the following section on theory building. In terms of

potential case studies, Blair cites the Middle East as a potential beneficiary of NI peace

process principles – possibly because of his role as Envoy of the Quartet on the Middle East

(Blair, 2010: 181-198). Hain also compares Northern Ireland to the Middle East, but

emphasised that NI could inspire peace-makers in existing ethnic conflicts, including Kosovo

(Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June 2007).

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Interestingly, while those involved on a practical level speak freely of a theoretical

framework derived from the peace process, academics, having an abundance of theoretical

studies into the matter, are less convinced of its practical application. James Hughes has

investigated what advocates of a ‘Northern Ireland model’ might mean by the term: analysing

both the model’s feasibility and the political-scholarly debate on its potential characteristics.

His assessment that ‘there is clearly a disjuncture between how the NI model is being framed

by politicians and how it is viewed by academics’ is significant (Hughes, 2009: 291), not

least because it makes a distinction between the focus on dialogue dominant in a lot of

politicians’ analyses, and the focus on the power-sharing structure of governance in Northern

Ireland preferred by many consociationalism oriented academics. There are those who

remain sceptical. John Coakley, for example, states that the level of achievement in reaching

a settlement makes it inevitable that NI will inspire attempts at adaptation elsewhere but

considers that succeeding will be a ‘struggle’ (Coakley, 2003: 51).

On the other hand many, such as Shane O’Neill, express qualified optimism (O’Neill,

2007: 411-412; Pruitt, 2007: 1520). Through mentioning hierarchical relations that privilege

one community over another and the correlation between individual and national identities as

catalysts for political antagonism and conflict, O’Neill successfully addresses the

characteristic causes of conflict that Northern Ireland shares with other ethnic conflicts. He

loosely suggests that through maintaining principles of political pluralism and inclusion the

NI peace process could be of ‘significant relevance to other nationally divided societies’

(O’Neill, 2007: 429) but is broadly reluctant to identify specific criteria that could be

transferred to help resolve other conflicts. Edwina McMahon, a specialist on Northern Ireland

for the National Committee on America Foreign Policy Interests, argued that NI can help to

resolve historic conflicts ‘irrespective of their kind, cause, and duration’ (McMahon, 2007:

353). Identifying time, perceptions, leadership and beliefs as key variables in conflict,

McMahon pointed to the successful use of secret negotiations as an outlet for all variables in

the early stages of the peace process(McMahon, 2007: 355). McMahon’s research suggests a

malleability to the NI peace process that might allow for central themes to be transferred to

other conflicts. This might include the involvement of a third party to stimulate gradual

evolution of the terms of the conflict, changing each side’s long-held perceptions of another,

promoting moderate political leadership or ensuring negotiations are based around an agreed

set of democratic principles – as with the Mitchell Principles in Northern Ireland (McMahon,

2007: 354-56). While valuable, McMahon’s findings were presented only as a five page

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briefing, which given the complexity of the subject, could not realistically provide

comprehensive conclusions. It is specificity and in-depth exploration which these studies

have lacked.

Returning our focus to Hughes, the historian’s study continues by discussing the

feasibility of transferring a NI model to a specific case study: Kosovo. While acknowledging

that the social division presented by Albanian-supermajority in Kosovo and the more equal

sized nationalist and unionist communities in NI were quite different, Hughes argues that the

long-term involvement of Martti Ahtisaari in the NI peace process influenced his

commitment to power-sharing as a means of resolving conflict while UN Special Envoy in

Kosovo (Hughes, 2009: 291 & 299). From this we can infer that there is potential in applying

a NI model to the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. This is a valuable preliminary

conclusion on the feasibility of applying a model, but does not provide much assistance on

which features the model could or should possess. On this issue, Eammon O’Kane’s

summary of academic research into the lessons of the peace process in NI is of use. Through

his research into the feasibility of creating a model, O’Kane identifies five commonly cited

features as significant:

1) an inclusive approach;

2) the promotion of moderate leaders;

3) support and possible intervention by third parties;

4) the importance of bipartisanship;

5) necessity for a prolonged engagement on the conflict.

(O’Kane, 2010: 241-244)

Importantly, O’Kane cites problematic areas in all five features and suggests that more

research is needed to resolve the ‘rather mixed’ conclusions of the existing literature(O’Kane,

2010: 254). O’Kane, along with another scholar John Bew, believes that assessing any NI

model requires looking both at the process and the conflict that preceded it – even if, in

Bew’s words, this involves addressing unpalatable and boring dimensions of the Northern

story (O’Kane, 2010: 251; Bew, 2011: 16). In order to apply any model convincingly,

O’Kane suggests that a practical approach is needed that actively applies the theory of a

model to other conflicts (O’Kane, 2010: 254). In applying likely elements of a NI model to

Kosovo, as suggested by Hughes, and Cyprus, this thesis will address the gap in the existing

literature O’Kane identified, by investigating two specific case studies rather than speaking in

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general terms, as has been previously been the case. Consequently, this thesis aims to answer

the question: ‘Is Northern Ireland a suitable model for conflict resolution elsewhere?’

To answer this question, the first chapter will look in detail at the peace process in

Northern Ireland, the significance of each phase to the peace process and how the themes of

the proposed NI model contributed to overcoming the obstacles to peace. It will draw from a

number of primary political sources and academic studies to create a comprehensive theory.

The second and third chapters will examine in detail the case studies of Kosovo and Cyprus

respectively, under the framework of the model. An analysis of the viability of the model and

its limitations will be offered in each case, before a final report on the study’s overall

conclusions.

Just as the proposed study draws on theoretical and actual data, so too can it have

theoretical and actual significance. In drawing conclusions on why NI is a suitable model for

peace-making, the study will contribute to academic debate not just on this topic but more

widely in the field of conflict-resolution studies. That the model of NI can be demonstrated to

be an appropriate model for peace will support the theory that has developed through the

work of peace studies scholars: that reusing previous strategies is feasible for the resolution

of conflicts and establishment of peace. European Union (EU) Commission President Jose

Manuel Barroso has claimed he found inspiration in the Northern Ireland case while

considering how to move the settlement process between Kosovo and Serbia forward in the

wake of impending independence (Budapest Business Journal, 10 January 2008). Clearly, a

proven road map would be of use in future conflict-resolution cases.

i. Methodology

Having established a gap in the literature and a viable research question, we now turn

to exploring how we might approach the question methodologically.

The basic design of the thesis is to test the viability of a NI model by applying it to

real situations. Where chapter one builds a theory of factors (independent variables) which

have contributed to the peace process, we can write this structure as the formula:

XA + XB = XC

Where XA and XB are factors for peace and XC is successful conflict resolution. This formula,

which is also the basis of the theoretical framework, can then be applied to other cases. The

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end goal in each case must be the same as in Northern Ireland: the creation of a pluralistic

society, free from ethnic violence that provides equal access to economic, social and political

opportunities. Since the important factors for conflict resolution will be developed in the

building of a theory in light of the NI example in chapter one, this final part of the

methodology is devoted to exploring which cases will be appropriate for examination.

Although each case will have unique nuances, there are a number of contemporary

conflicts which might appear to be best suited to the application of a NI model. However, in

order to prove the general applicability and adaptability of the model, such obvious choices

provide only limited results. In order to develop the work of O’Kane, the less immediate

cases of Kosovo and Cyprus have been selected for this thesis, the reasoning for which is set

out below.

There are similarities in the origins and fractious nature of the conflict: all are ethnic

conflicts involving the coexistence of two spatially overlapping, highly politicised ethnic

communities (Coakley, 2003: 50). However, conflict is rarely so simple. Protracted Social

Conflict (PSC) theory, developed primarily by Edward Azar and John Burton, states that

PSCs are formed of interconnected structural factors (often economic, ethnic, linguistic,

political or religious divisions). What makes them difficult to resolve is that the issues are so

interconnected that they are not easily isolated and resolved individually, leaving them prone

to long-term stagnation and sporadic outbreaks of political violence (Azar, 1983: 92; Fisher,

2001: 308).

Azar broke-up into four variable clusters that are the preconditions of PSCs, which are all

pertinent for this study:

1) Communal content of a society, possibly the most important element of PSCs,

relating to the frequent occurrence of a single communal group dominating the multi-

ethnic societies in which they live (i.e. the Protestants in Northern Ireland; formerly

the Serbs and latterly the Albanians in Kosovo; potential for Greek Cypriot

dominance in Cyprus)

2) Human needs, meaning the fulfilment of collective human needs , such as ensuring

access to political, market and decision-making institutions, physical security or the

rights to freedom of religious and cultural expression, are not always met (hence the

challenges of violent resistance or disaffection).

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3) The role of the state, often limited, through fragility (Kosovo) or rigidity (Northern

Ireland), to meeting the needs of the dominant group. This can be seen in the failure

of civic structures, such as the police, the legal system and the civil service, to reflect

and represent all ethnic groups

4) International linkages, which can mean that a state’s ability to reach a settlement is

compromised by a dependence on a richer or stronger state (while there is potential

for this in Kosovo, Serbia is increasingly moving away from Russia towards the

positive, pro-settlement influence of the EU).

(Reimann, 2002: 4-5)

As previously mentioned these conflicts all involve cross-border communities with ties to

members living in other states: in Northern Ireland, these ties are to Britain and the Republic

of Ireland; in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey; in multi-ethnic Kosovo, to Serbia (Rothman, 1992:

38). Bearing this in mind, international commitment to conflict resolution is necessary. In

Cyprus the peace process could benefit from the committed involvement of Greece and

Turkey; the principle issue has been a lack of goodwill and trust between the Greek Cypriot

and Turkish Cypriot political elites which has further polarised the two communities. The

resulting increase in nationalist outlook has hindered the fifty-year long peace effort. In

Kosovo, the memories of brutality on both sides during the Kosovo War have hindered the

process of reconciliation with Serbia and the Serb-majority enclaves in the north of the

province – even after Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. Like NI,

there is no obvious resolution for either conflict apart from co-operation between the

communities and their kin-states (Bekaj, 2010).

Efforts at forging a settlement have extended beyond kin-states. Northern Ireland,

Kosovo and Cyprus are the three European conflicts which (until recently) have commanded

not only international attention, but also participation. The NI peace process was facilitated

by the Clinton administration and several other political leaders, including former Finnish

president, Martti Ahtisaari. While the presence of UN Special Envoys such as Martti

Ahtisaari and Kai Eide in Kosovo and Cyprus have helped the process in those regions.

The NI, Kosovo and Cyprus conflicts all display several characteristics of intractable

conflict, including economic and ethnic grievances, issues of self-determination and

historically poor community relations - all of which form obstacles to a constructive political

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settlement (Bekaj, 2010: 7; Hadjipavlou, 2007: 350-52). The similarities in the nature of the

conflicts mean there can be identifiable similarities in the factors needed to settle them.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that the peace processes in Kosovo and

Cyprus are at different stages. While the Cypriot has been protracted by the continual failure

of both sides to agree on even basic settlement terms and has only recently begun to move

forwards again, the Brussels Agreement between the Serbian and Kosovar Prime Ministers in

April 2013 suggests that progress is already being made there. This allows for different

phases of the NI peace process to be applied (the early stages to Cyprus and the latter phases

to Kosovo). In examining different parts of the process, the thesis hopes to give a broader

picture of a NI model might be applied over the progression of time and at various stages. In

doing so, it is hoped that the thesis will go beyond the narrower scope of previous studies that

have considered only the end-game.

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Chapter 1

A Northern Ireland Model

1.1 Origins

The origins of the most recent Northern Ireland conflict lie largely in the organised

colonisation, the Plantations, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This settlement

confiscated much of the fertile lowland from the indigenous population and placed it in the

hands of English and Scottish colonists, replacing Gaelic chiefs with an anglicized ruling

class. Thus began a culture of religious and national division between the broadly Protestant

settlers loyal to the British crown and the indigenous Catholic population.

Irish Catholic resistance to the Protestant ruling class was strong as the native Irish were

often discriminated against, oppressed with extortionate rents, exposed to brutal physical

treatment and treated with contempt. By the end of the eighteenth century, Protestant

domination could only be maintained through the submergence of Ireland into a union with

Protestant Britain. The British government, alarmed by an Irish rebellion in 1798 and aware

of the potential for European enemies to use Ireland as a base for invasion, absorbed Ireland

into a centralised state system with the 1801 Acts of Union . (Mulholland, 2003: 8). Union

with the British did not end the violence. Indeed, the Acts of Union crystallised Irish dissent,

with agitation for more civil and political freedom from organisations such as the Repeal

Association. During a period of British political turbulence that resulted in the Reform Act of

1832, nominal rights were gradually conceded to Ireland’s Catholic population. One of these

was that of Catholics to sit as members in Westminster, which allowed the campaign to

repeal the Acts of Union to be taken directly to London (Beckett, 1966: 230 & 323-35).

By the 1880s, dissent had grown into a mass movement for full Irish autonomy led by

the electorally powerful Irish Nationalist Party. Support from William Gladstone’s Liberal

government produced two Home Rule Bills in 1886 (defeated in the House of Commons) and

1893 (passed by the House of Commons, vetoed by the House of Lords). In Ireland,

opposition to Home Rule was strongest in the north-east, where Protestant settlement was

densest. Support for the Ulster Unionist Party’s programme and the emergence of the Ulster

Volunteers demonstrated the strength of their desire to remain a part of the UK.

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A formal granting of limited Irish autonomy came in 1914, but was not realised until

the end of the First World War, when the Irish Nationalist Party was replaced by the more

militant Sinn Fein. A period of civil disobedience from1919-21, fuelled in part by the ruthless

British repression of the Easter Rising of 1916, forced the granting of full autonomy in the

shape of the Irish Free State. In spite of the fact that the majority of the people in Ireland

supported independence, six counties in Ulster were allowed to opt-out. This led to the

partition of the island between the new Irish Free State in the south, and an autonomous

Protestant-majority enclave in the north which remained part of the UK.

Far from resolving the conflict, partition complicated it. Relations between Britain

and Ireland, and their aligned communities in the North, failed to improve. The grievances of

the Catholic minority were exacerbated by the policies of the Protestant majority. The

Catholic community in the north faced job discrimination, brutality at the hands of the largely

Protestant police force and draconian voter requirements, such as ownership of property,

which left them disadvantaged and excluded in a Northern Ireland where the political

dominance of Unionist parties was assured, even in Catholic majority areas (Morrow in

Rothstein ed., 1999: 115).

While the British government maintained its responsibility in governing NI, it

maintained a distance from the conflict. Similarly, the Irish Free State, which left the

Commonwealth and became the Republic of Ireland in 1949, maintained a claim of

sovereignty on NI through its constitution while distancing itself from the difficulties in the

North and forging its own identity.1 Within Northern Ireland, both sides had concerns about

their status as a minority group: Protestants formed the majority in NI, but were easily

outnumbered in Ireland as a whole.

The emergence of an American-inspired civil rights movement within the Catholic

community in the 1960s exacerbated community tensions. The movement’s objectives were

to end discrimination and secure the same basic civil and human rights as Protestants

(Shannon, 1986: 852). Although the campaign did not focus on the nationality question, it

1 Constitution of Ireland (1937) Article 2: “The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its

islands and the territorial seas.” Article 3: “Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without

prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction

over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of

application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect.”

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demonstrated to the Protestant community that there was a ubiquitous threat to the vulnerable

state structure (Coakley, 2003: 29). Forcible resistance to reform from more strident

Unionists, led by the vitriolic Reverend Ian Paisley, defeated the movement, but caused a re-

escalation in the conflict to a level of violence not experienced since partition.

As several republican paramilitary groups, most notably the Irish Republican Army

(IRA), re-emerged as guerrilla forces and engaged in a conflict of retaliatory violence with

Loyalist paramilitaries, the political landscape in NI changed. What remained of the civil

rights movement consolidated to form the moderately nationalist Social Democratic and

Labour Party, which maintained its commitment to peaceful negotiation throughout the

violence of the thirty-year long ‘Troubles’.

The beginning of The Troubles prompted the British Government to re-evaluate their

handling of Northern Ireland. Apart from loose Conservative links with the UUP, none of the

mainstream British political parties operated in NI, and until the outbreak of violence it was

felt there was no political advantage to be gained from extensive involvement in the conflict.

The increase of the inter-communal violence in the late 1960s forced a change, as the British

government suspended the regional Stormont parliament and government in 1972,

introducing direct rule from Westminster for the first time since partition.

Unionist interests were chiefly represented by the Official Unionist Party (later the

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)) and the more hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), as

well as smaller parties such as the Ulster Freedom Fighter’s political wing, the Ulster

Democratic Party. The nationalist community at this time was primarily represented by the

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) whose leader John Hume would work tirelessly

for thirty years to realise peace, and Sinn Fein, the IRA’s political wing, who refused to take

the seats to which they were elected in Westminster because of the required oath of

allegiance to the British monarch. There were also other smaller parties, most notably the bi-

communal, pro-peace Alliance Party.

This, briefly, was the historical background to the origins of conflict in NI. If we are

to identify a model for peace, then it is important to look first at key inter-governmental

agreements – including those that failed – to understand the circumstances in which they

were agreed and what they meant for the peace process.

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The Sunningdale Agreement (1973)

Progressing the Northern Ireland peace process was made both more vital and more

difficult by the radicalisation and resurgence of violence within sections of both

communities. The response was an unprecedented act of cooperation from the British and

Irish government: the Sunningdale Agreement.

The culmination of nine months of negotiations between the two governments and

NI’s main political parties, Sunningdale aimed at solving the crisis in NI on as fundamental a

level as possible (Tannam, 2011: 1210). The Agreement sought to improve both cross

community and cross-border relations and made several important commitments. Most

significantly, the British government, having withdrawn powers from NI, made it clear that

the reestablishment of a government was conditional upon it being based on the principle of

cross-community power-sharing (Coakley, 2003: 37). This included accepting that the

Republic of Ireland had a role in resolving the conflict (Tannam, 2011: 1198) through a

newly established Council of Ireland to help manage policy areas of common interest.

Both governments had accepted the right to self-determination and endorsed a

principle of consent on the future of the province, retaining the current constitutional status of

NI until a majority of its people desired its change (Tannam, 2003: 498), but neither

government accommodated the fears of their representative communities. Unfortunately,

having worked hard to reach an agreement, both London and Dublin failed to provide

sufficient support when Sunningdale came under threat from Unionist opponents. Pro-

Agreement politicians, such as UUP leader Brian Faulkner and the SDLP were left to the

mercy of their parties and voters. When the general strike that would defeat the Agreement

began, the British government showed no resolve to break the strike: no negotiations, no

deployment of the security forces who might have prevented widespread worker intimidation

by hard-line Protestants. The new NI government lasted barely five months. The Agreement

was defeated even before the Council of Ireland was formed.

Analysis

Despite its failure the Agreement introduced two principles vital to the successful

progress of the peace process. Without a system of power-sharing and provision for formal

co-operation with the Republic of Ireland, a lasting peace would have been impossible.

Sunningdale and the later Good Friday Agreement were the only two peace initiatives that

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incorporated both power-sharing and the Irish dimension principles (the Anglo-Irish

Agreement addressed the Irish question, but bypassed the issue of devolution) (Coakley,

2003: 37).

Considering its close resemblance to the GFA, it may reasonably be asked why it

failed. The answer lies in the lack of readiness (ripeness) for such an ambitious agreement. It

was “an agreement too soon” (Farran, 2007: 7). Northern Irish society was still too polarised.

Further advances in human and civil rights, cross-community relations and reduction of

violence were needed before peace would be possible.

Anglo Irish Agreement (1985)

The Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA), signed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and

Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald on 15 November 1985, marked the first time both the London

and Dublin governments expressed their shared commitment and desire for closer political

co-operation in working toward a lasting peace settlement (Tannam, 2011: 1204). Although it

consisted of only thirteen articles and was vague on procedure and details, it improved the

working relationship between the national governments, involving the Irish government in

the governance of NI by establishing the Intergovernmental Conference, an institutional

mechanism allowing the Irish government to be consulted on matters of security, law and

cross-border co-operation (Tannam, 2003: 501; AIA 1985, Article 2.a). In a joint statement

both governments expressed a commitment to majority consent on the issue of NI’s

constitutional status.

AIA was solely between the sovereign states of the UK and the Republic of Ireland.

As neither FitzGerald nor Thatcher needed the support of any of the political parties in

Northern Ireland domestically, Northern Irish parties could be excluded from negotiations

and had no power to dilute or defeat it (Ford in The Times, 22 November 1985).

Analysis

Despite Unionist and Nationalist opposition, the AIA marked an understanding that the

future security of the burgeoning peace process would be ensured through continued

cooperation between the British and Irish governments. It marked the first time a British

government allowed the Republic of Ireland to have a role in the governance of NI. This set a

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crucial precedent for cooperation between the two governments that kept the process alive

even at times when negotiations were in gridlock.

Providing the Irish government with formal influence in Northern Ireland helped to

redress long-standing Catholic grievances and contributed to the longevity of the Agreement,

which was only superseded in 1998 by the GFA (Coakley, 2003: 39). By the time of the

Downing Street Declaration in 1993, Anglo-Irish cooperation had evidentially increased

(Tannam, 2003: 502). It acquired a symbolic value because the relationship it forged between

the British and Irish governments and the steps it took to involve nationalists in the governing

of NI were important to the progression of peace.

The Downing Street Declaration (1993)

The principles of the Downing Street Declaration (DSD) opened the way for

negotiations with paramilitaries from both sides of the communal divide (Reynolds, 2009:

356). It followed secret talks between the British government and four of NI’s political

parties (Alliance, DUP, SDLP and UUP) in the early 1990s. Led by two successive

Secretaries of States for NI, Peter Brooke (1989-92) and Patrick Mayhew (1992-97), the

‘Brooke-Mayhew Talks’ convinced both British Prime Minister John Major and Irish

Taoiseach Albert Reynolds of the need to bring extreme parties into the peace process. While

the talks had been successful, Sinn Fein had been excluded and the next step was arranging

their involvement in future negotiations. Reynolds entered into dialogue with John Hume and

Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams around the same time as the Brooke-Mayhew talks were taking

place.

Designed to build on the Anglo Irish Agreement, the DSD upheld many of the

previous commitments: the British government stated it had ‘no selfish strategic or economic

interests in Northern Ireland’ (Principle 4) while the Irish government committed to

respecting British sovereignty over NI until a majority voted for change (Principles 4, 5 & 7).

Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to intergovernmental cooperation and

support for majority consensual governance in NI (Principles 4, 5 & 9).

It differed in the way it approached involving Sinn Fein in the process. As things

stood Sinn Fein’s connection to the IRA was too strong for it to be included, and so the

Declaration made involvement of any party in the peace process conditional upon rejection of

violence (Principle 10). The official policy of Major and Reynolds’ predecessors was not to

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negotiate with terrorists. While there had been secret talks between the British government

and the IRA on a number of occasions during the first two decades of the Troubles, they had

often only taken place after the exhaustion of all alternatives (Bew, 2011: 17). The change in

policy was recognition that the IRA could never be categorically beaten, but also that while

paramilitary groups had once been the biggest threat to peace, the process had now allowed

for paramilitary leaders to be key figures in its achievement.

Nine months after the Declaration, the IRA announced a ceasefire and freed the path

for Sinn Fein to become involved in the peace process. The main loyalist paramilitary groups

declared a cease-fire a few weeks later. The incentive of political inclusion had tipped the

balance in favour of peace. The ceasefires paved the way for further confidence-building

measures, such as the ending of a broadcast ban on Sinn Fein and increased involvement

from the Clinton administration in the USA.

Analysis

Despite having no legal status, the DSD was a significant development in the NI

peace process. While its predecessor, the Anglo-Irish Agreement looked to create an

intergovernmental structure between the British and Irish states, the Downing Street

Declaration represented a further step, based on political inclusion among Northern Ireland’s

political parties. This shifted the focus from stabilising the centre of Northern Irish politics

and protecting it from the extremes to drawing the extremes into the centre. (O’Kane, 2004:

78-9). However, in the process of bringing former extremists on board with the peace

process, care had to be taken not to isolate moderate groups already participating. (Bew,

2011: 19).

The DSD, therefore, established several of the NI model’s core principles. While the

ceasefire of 1994 was breached many times in following years, there were longer periods of

calm. Both John Hume and Bill Clinton argued that the Declaration removed the justification

for violence, and established the principle of non-violence firmly within the peace process

framework set out in the Mitchell Principles widely accepted in 1996. (Mitchell, 1999: 19;

Reynolds, 2009: 363) Without such a clearly defined framework of principles for peace, the

inclusive peace settlement that followed (the Good Friday Agreement of 1998) would not

have been possible (Mitchell, 1999: 106; Clinton, 2005: 784).

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Good Friday Agreement

The negotiation of the Agreement was structured around three strands for settlement:

Strand 1 focused on the central problem of cross-community relations between

Catholics and Protestants,

Strand 2 was concerned with the lesser problem of cross-border relations between the

North and South of Ireland and

Strand 3 dealt with issues still facing British-Irish relations (Coakley, 2003: 43).

One of the key issues within Strand 1 was the lack of trust between the communities.

Overcoming differences required an overhaul of the political and civil structures traditionally

dominated by the Protestant community. The d’Hondt system of proportional representation

was introduced in a reformed power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly, which also utilised

a complex voting procedure that effectively gave both communities veto rights, as well as a

dual prime-ministerial position that effectively guaranteed the First Minister and Deputy First

Minister would come from different communities (GFA Strand 1, Paragraph 5.d.i, 1998: 7-8).

Within Strand 2, a hierarchy of decision-making was created that ensured no decision was

reached without agreement from both communities, the Irish Parliament and the NI Assembly

(Wolff in Wilford, 2001: 5). A new North/South Council, smaller in scale than Sunningdale’s

Council of Europe, provided a mechanism for ‘consultation, cooperation and action’ over

joint areas of interest within the island of Ireland, both through existing transport, agriculture

and tourism structures or newly-established food safety, trade and EU programme bodies

(Tannam, 2003 : 498).

Strand 3 had to strike a balance between guaranteeing the union whilst developing

mechanisms for the ending of partition and dual citizen rights and promoting inter-communal

equality (Coakley, 2003: 47). It created the British-Irish Council, a twice a year meeting

involving the British and Irish governments as well as the devolved institutions in Northern

Ireland, Wales and Scotland, and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which

subsumed the Intergovernmental Conference established by the AIA. Importantly, both

governments agreed to introduce legislative changes to support the Agreement. The British

government formally committed to amending Northern Ireland’s constitutional status if

majority opinion changed, while the Irish government amended Articles 2 and 3 of the

national constitution to confer Irish birthright upon persons born on the island and to formally

18

recognised that a united Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority in both

the north and south jurisdiction (Tannam, 2003: 506-7; Nineteenth Amendment of the

Constitution Act, 1998: xii-xv).

Simultaneous referenda in Northern Ireland and the Republic were held in May 1998,

with 71 per cent approval for the Agreement in NI and 94 per cent agreement in the Republic

of Ireland with the set of constitutional reforms that gave effect to the Agreement (Mullin in

The Guardian, 23 May 1998; Irish Department of Environment, Community and Local

Government, 2013: 58-59). This provided a firm democratic basis on which to build and

enabled the symbolic amending of the Irish constitution to remove the claim of sovereignty

over NI.

An issue with decommissioning caused stalemate until November 1999 and in

October 2002 prompted suspension of institutions (Coakley, 2003: 45) The crisis was

eventually resolved within the British-Irish intergovernmental framework, and direct rule

from Westminster ended after the Assembly elections in November 2003 (Tannam, 2011:

1202). Other lingering issues were with police reforms and prisoner releases. The resolution

of these issues was aimed at winning support for the agreement among more extreme

elements in both communities.

Analysis

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998, whilst being the single most significant

agreement in the peace process, owes much of its longevity to the DSD’s opening

involvement to political parties who retained significant paramilitary support (Maney et al,

2006: 188). Without the involvement of former extremists, it is likely that the GFA would

have gone the same way as the seven failed peace initiatives that preceded it.

Inarguably the most ambitious agreement since Sunningdale, the GFA went further

than its predecessors in providing for the reestablishment of a Northern Assembly committed

to extensively reforming the police force and making changes to how history is taught in

schools (Interview with Northern Irish grammar school teacher, 26 July 2014).

While one scholar has suggested that the Good Friday Agreement was ‘Sunningdale

for slow learners’, the progress made through closer inter-island cooperation meant that both

sides of the conflict were recognised (Powell, 2011: 21-22; Wolff in Wilford, 2001: 4). There

19

were also several procedural differences that ensured no one side could dominate or obstruct

the Assembly (Wolff in Wilford, 2001: 5).

1.2 Theory building

In the years since the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland has become a prolific

exporter of advice to other ethnic conflicts. Lord Alderdice, the former speaker of the NI

Assembly, has become a sought after speaker in troubled countries, such as Nepal and the

Philippines, while the Causeway Institute, chaired by Jeffrey Donaldson (formerly one of the

Good Friday Agreement’s most vehement critics) has taken a sustained interest in brokering

talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban (The Economist, 9 February 2013)

Other figures involved in the peace process have sought to theorise on the basis of a NI

model. Tony Blair, Peter Hain and Jonathan Powell, all identified features in Northern

Ireland that they felt were transferable. Blair suggests ten principles for peacefully resolving

conflict in his 2011 autobiography: 1) a framework based on agreed principles; 2) a

continuous and versatile grasp of the issue at hand; 3) small things can be big things; 4) be

creative; 5) third party assistance is often vital to reaching an agreement; 6) resolving the

conflict is a journey, not an event; 7) the path to peace will be deliberately disrupted by those

who want the conflict to continue (spoilers); 8) leaders matter; 9) external circumstances

must work towards peace; 10) “never give up” (Blair, 2011: 181-199).

Hain’s four transferable components outlined in a speech four weeks after the resumption

of the NI Assembly at Stormont in 2007 were: the role of personalities, aligning of

international influence, political framework, and dialogue (Hain Chatham House Speech, 12

June 2007). In common with Blair, these components made a commitment to agreed

principles, third party involvement and strong and appropriate leadership (Hain Chatham

House Speech, 12 June 2007).

Powell, writing in a London School of Economics pamphlet on the legacy of

peacebuilding in Northern Ireland in 2011, concurs with Blair’s advocating continuous

involvement and his belief in peace as a process not an event. His belief that third party

assistance is a necessity is shared with both Blair and Hain, who also emphasise the need for

suitable leadership and personalities, at the international and domestic level, in order to create

an environment conducive (ripe) for peace.

20

An idea developed by I William Zartman, ripeness is the notion that stalemate in a

conflict can only be broken when certain conditions allow for negotiations (O’Kane, p.244;

Zartman, 1995: 18). These are the infrequent and complex combinations of favourable

circumstances within the conflict society: while a change in political leadership or a new

development in the conflict may make a move towards a settlement more likely, ‘ripening’

also involves shifts in public opinion or improvements in a conflict zone’s economy to gain

the momentum needed. The absence of vital conditions, such as sides failing to recognise

each other’s legitimacy or retaining violent methods, means that the situation is not yet ‘ripe’

for peace, and that radical changes are likely to be met with opposition or disengagement

from the conflict resolution process. The whole process can then collapse, as with the

Sunningdale Agreement.

Equally, the windows of time in which multiple conditions apply can be brief, and

need to be recognised and exploited. The combination of a pro-peace Taoiseach and Prime

Minister and a Democratic president with strong American Irish support combined to

improve relations in NI and culminated in encouraging , first the IRA ceasefire in 1994, then

the permanent move from paramilitary violence towards democratic political process

(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2014: 179; Cochrane, 2007: 217). While the

strengthening of relations between nationalists and republicans may have endured, the

coinciding of Reynolds, Major and Clinton as the main political leaders presented an

opportunity to advance the process.

Identifying the conditions of ripeness can be difficult until circumstances present

themselves, and their meeting often relies on a significant shift in the dynamics of the

conflict. Assuming that vital conditions (such as cessation of violence) are already in place,

the conditions for ripeness within the NI model could be:

The Absence of Alternative

Often in conflict resolution, peace is only possible after all other solutions have been

exhausted. The realisation that ‘peace is the only option’ is perhaps the most important step in

the peace process because it has the potential to draw all conflicting parties in to focusing on

a common objective. Without this recognition, other favourable circumstances may be

inconsequential and negotiations unfeasible.

21

In Northern Ireland, the IRA and the British Army gradually recognised that the

stalemate between them might never be broken (Powell, 2011: 21). The British government

and republican paramilitary groups had to review their rigid policies, which made peace more

likely: the British began to negotiate and politically empower former terrorists, while the IRA

began to consider surrendering arms.

Popular desire for peace; political motivation

Clearly, there can be no peace if the general population is insufficiently ‘pro-peace’.

While there may be a majority in favour of peace in principle, a lack of trust or a violent or

intimidating minority risks the process being derailed .This was demonstrated in NI by the

failure of the Sunningdale Agreement, which although welcomed as a positive step by

moderates, lacked the popular support necessary to sustain it and was eventually defeated by

those not ready to negotiate.

Thus, while popular demand may shift towards peace before all other options have

been exhausted, the peace process can only progress if public will is matched by political

will. This is not always automatic. The failure of peace agreements to progress towards a

settlement can end political careers. In Northern Ireland, the zero-sum game style of

negotiation and the insular nature of Northern Irish politics, made peace talks a difficult

prospect until long after popular opinion had shifted. This only changed when public opinion

demanded a shift from the win-lose logic of both sides seeking to dominate, to a win-win

style of cooperative problem-solving (Maney et al, 2006: 183).

Strong leadership

Successful negotiations also rested on commitment from strong political leaders. In

NI, the strong-minded , calculative approach of Thatcher and Fitzgerald – free from concerns

about electoral repercussions – set the peace process back on track with the Anglo-Irish

Agreement, while Reynolds and Major’s Declaration of Principles was a critical step in luring

those from the extremes into the peace process. Specifically, the patience shown by Reynolds

and (admittedly more reluctantly) Major, in allowing Sinn Fein to delay their acceptance of

Downing Street Declaration was important. It allowed Sinn Fein to go through an ideological

transition on the question of Northern Ireland’s sovereign status that was vital to securing a

permanent ceasefire (Reynolds, 2009: 360-61).

22

Also important was political leadership on a local level, where leaders were not only

trusted and respected by their own community, but also by ‘the other side’. The SDLP’s John

Hume was one such figure. He sought to develop a unifying vision for Northern Ireland based

on peaceful negotiation and the rejection of violence, and remained imaginative about

progressing towards peace even in the darkest periods of the Troubles (Smyth, 2005: 79;

Blair, 2011: 196). Hume’s counterpart in the UUP, David Trimble, shared his commitment to

non-violence and reaching peace, and brought the necessary patience and fair-mindedness

that was needed during the more strained periods. (Godson, 2005: x)

Inter-state Cooperation

In conflicts between two distinct ethnic groups, cooperation between their respective

‘mother’ states aids the peace process. The strong leadership of the British and Irish leaders

in the 1980s and 90s forged an effective cooperative British-Irish relationship. As both were

considered guardians of constituent groups in Northern Ireland, there was a degree of

interdependence whilst working towards a peace settlement, but the commonality of purpose

and culture of cooperation through intergovernmental meetings and consensual policymaking

created an environment conducive to peace (Tannam, 2011: 1196; Keohane, 1984: 73; Wolff

in Wilford, 2011: 20).

When British-Irish cooperation stopped, the peace process suffered: during the

sixteenth-month long period of “megaphone diplomacy” in the early 1980s, meetings

between the British and Irish prime ministers stopped, the relationship became antagonistic

and uncooperative (Tannam, 2011: 1199-1200). The “megaphone diplomacy” period was

ended by the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Economic motives

Economics are important to both the problem and solution in conflict. Economic

inequality is often a prime cause in the development of a conflict, while economic

opportunity can incentivise reaching a peace settlement by changing the dynamic of

cost/benefit calculations (Lichbach, 1989: 433; Peterson, 2011:186). In Northern Ireland, the

establishment of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) in 1986 and the EU’s Special

Support Programmes for Peace and Reconciliation iterations have done much to encourage

economic regeneration, social development and community organisation projects in the areas

23

worst affected by the conflict, where unemployment and economic deprivation tended be

highest(Archick, 2014: 17; Hughes, 2013).

There was also the additional factor of the Republic of the Ireland’s economic

transformation in the 1980s and 90s, buoyed by the opportunities of EU membership, which

helped firm up the fledgling peace process and raised expectations of what was possible in

the North if a settlement could be reached (Blair, 2011: 158).

While economic development can encourage peace, so too can peace encourage economic

investment. While trade relationships can disintegrate during times of conflict, Bertie Ahern,

writing in his autobiography, argued that the Good Friday Agreement made Ireland more

attractive to foreign investment (Ahern, 2010: 236).

Common framework of co-operation and agreed principles

Throughout its history the Northern Ireland peace process was most effective when it

involved a common framework of co-operation and shared principles. The most important

were the principles of non-violence, as outlined by the Mitchell Principles in 1996, and of

consent. Blair argued that the principle which underpinned the Good Friday Agreement was

peace in return for power-sharing and equality – a concept accepted by all parties (Blair,

2011: 182). Hain built on this, arguing that a framework must address not only constitutional

issues, but broader issues, such as policing, human rights and, in Northern Ireland, prisoner

releases and decommissioning (Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June 2007). Powell simply

suggests that a having a framework is cause for hope, keeping all parties busy working

towards goals (Powell, 2011: 23).

While they were not always welcomed, the key components of the AIA, DSD and

GFA provided a framework and set goals that shaped and enabled the peace process to

evolve. The AIA overcame what was at the time a weak relationship to create an

Intergovernmental Conference that worked to progress the peace process while the DSD

sought to promote co-operation based on the fundamental principles, namely the principle of

consent (DSD 1993, Principle 2). The Good Friday Agreement was perhaps the best example

of a common framework working effectively. The three strands not only provided a

framework but helped to forge relationships across communities, borders and between states.

Key to the NI framework was fostering a culture of cooperation that produced increasingly

moderate politics and increased the native population’s control of the process.

24

Comprehensive participation

Control for the native population was a key concern. In conflicts like Northern

Ireland, ensuring the entire population has access to levers of power is critical.

Comprehensive participation in decision-making from across the community was a key

concern in the peace process from its beginnings at the Sunningdale negotiations, where the

British government sought to implement a permanent power-sharing executive at Stormont.

Throughout the process, such an executive relied upon dialogue, the development of new

institutions with a representative voting system, and perceived benefits. This was all part of

O’Kane’s ‘inclusive approach’, involving all sections of the community (O’Kane, 2010: 241).

Dialogue in Northern Ireland sometimes involved talking with those on the extremes

in secret (Powell, 2011: 22). Even in the worst years of the Troubles, both the British and

Irish governments had secret contacts within the IRA that provided them with information.

Thatcher’s government talked to paramilitaries during the hunger strike and, while Major

publically expressed disgust at the idea of talks with the IRA, both he and Reynolds,

recognised that a peace settlement could not be reached without communication (Major

statement to the Commons, 1 November 1993, HC Deb 01 November 1993 231:19-37;

Reynolds, 2009: 336). This policy of dialogue eventually succeeded in convincing

paramilitary groups to decommission (O’Kane, 2010: 241).

The development of new institutions, and the updating of old ones, was also important

to ensuring that people from across society were involved. The North/South Ministerial

Council was established. The rebranding of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the Police

Service of Northern Ireland and campaign to recruit more officers from a Catholic

background began to allay fears about Protestant bias (The Belfast Telegraph, 8 November

2013). The new d’Hondt voting and enlarged majority requirements system guaranteed real

political say for both Catholic and Protestant communities.

As the peace evolved, there was a concerted effort to give the people of Northern

Ireland ownership of the process. Beginning with collaboration between national

governments and local parties in devising the Sunningdale Agreement, it continued with the

Downing Street Declaration, which after the imposed Anglo-Irish Agreement, brought those

at the extremes of the political divide back into the process. This reflected the aim of Brooke,

Mayhew, Major and Reynolds to reinstate local participation in the peace process (MacIntyre

in The Independent, 12 July 1992).This process culminated with the referenda on both sides

25

of the border to approve the GFA, which itself included safeguards to ensure that all sections

of the community could participate and work together within the relevant institutions (GFA

Strand 1, Paragraph 5, 1998: 7).

Third Party Mediation

While it was important that the native population had control over the path of the

peace process, it was also clear that they needed outside assistance. Blair, Hain and Powell all

cited the importance of international third party mediators to the success of the Northern

Ireland peace process (Blair, 2011: 188; Hain Chatham House Speech, 12 June 2007; Powell,

2011: 23-24). The work of, among others, George Mitchell, Harry Holkerri and John de

Chastelain was central to the success of the process (Coakley, 2003: 42). The roles of

Mitchell, (who constructed a framework through a set of principles, was a key figure in

brokering the GFA), and de Chastelain (who, with Mitchell’s assistance, chaired the

Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, and monitored the destruction

of the IRA’s armaments) could not conceivably have been carried out by British or Irish

politicians or diplomats. External actors are proved to be sufficiently detached to work on

neutral strategies for resolving the conflict.

The involvement of third parties also helped with the process of bringing all parts of

Northern Irish society into the peace process and provided kin state incentives. The

contribution of the United States, with its large and politically influential Irish diaspora, was

essential to the process, even in its early stages: Ronald Reagan gave political and economic

backing to the AIA by making a $20m per year contribution to the newly established

International Fund for Ireland long before the Clinton administration increased US

involvement as a facilitator of peace in 1993 (Reynolds, 2009: 269).

Where the Clinton administration made a crucial contribution was in garnering Irish

American support for the principles of the DSD. While many were appalled by the violence

in NI, Irish America, through NORAID, was largely responsible for bankrolling the IRA.

One of the most significant confidence building measures was Clinton’s decision to grant

a visa to Gerry Adams to visit the USA in 1994. It was a change in American policy that

many within the British government and the State Department opposed, but helped Sinn Fein

get recognition internationally for its commitment to the peace process. Although it angered

the British government, it was shown to be an important confidence-building measure as a

26

step forward in the peace process (Clinton, 2005: 578-81 & 648). A second visa was later

granted when Sinn Fein agreed to enter discussions with the British government on the issue

of the IRA disarming (Clinton, 2005: 648; McKittrick in The Independent, 21 May 1996).

Clinton also made more visits to Ireland than any other sitting president, and the encouraging

phone calls he made to all sides in the final hours of the GFA negotiations have been cited by

both Ahern and Blair as important to reaching the Agreement and, later, sharing the burden of

implementing it (Ahern, 2010: 233-34; Blair, 2011: 193; Joint Statement of Ahern, Blair and

Clinton, 18 March 1999).

1.3 Summary of theoretical framework and expectation

Having explored the opinions of the politicians involved and the conclusions of

several academics, the most common themes are ripeness (strong and appropriate leadership,

trade and economic benefit), a common framework for settlement, a system of

comprehensive participation, and neutral third party assistance. All are present in the criteria

outlined by O’Kane, Blair, Powell and Hain.

As the above features are common elements in conflict resolution and peace-making

strategy the implementation of complete and comprehensive cross-community involvement

in the process through a system of power-sharing (a principle that evolved through the peace

process) will also be included, as well as ripeness markers like the absence of alternative,

inter-state cooperation and popular desire. Thus it is the NI model being tested, and not

simply a general method for conflict resolution.

Testing of the model will be done largely through applying the principles expressed in

peace agreements, policy statements and public speeches, as well as considering the

historical, social, economic and political similarities and parallels between Northern Ireland

and Kosovo and Cyprus, as highlighted by the work of peace scholars, historians and other

scholars. Articles from newspapers and specialist magazines will also be used.

27

Chapter 2

Kosovo

2.1 Origins

Kosovo’s history, like that of Northern Ireland, is dominated by the hostile

relationship between its two largest ethnic groups, the Albanian majority and Serb minority.

Kosovo has long held significance within the Serbian national psyche as the site of the Battle

of Kosovo Polje, a Serb Orthodox heroic defeat to the invading Turks in 1389 (The Times, 18

October 2012). Only recently have hostilities developed, however, and the origins of the

modern conflict lie chiefly in Serbia’s annexation of Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire in

1912 and Serb colonisation (Bekaj, 2010: 7). Independence from Serbia has been a desire of

Kosovar Albanians more or less ever since.

For much of the twentieth century and through several transformations from the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Socialist Yugoslav Federation, Serbia and

Montenegro, and finally Serbia, Kosovo was part of Serbia. Several amendments to the 1963

Yugoslav constitution throughout the 1960s granted increasing autonomy to Kosovo (Ivlevs

and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 204), and by 1974 Kosovo (now the Socialist

Autonomous Province of Kosovo) had equal rights within the Federation, but not the republic

status that Kosovars wanted (Bekaj, 2010: 43).

Throughout this period, Kosovo was a multi-ethnic region. While ethnic Albanians

constituted the majority (77.4% at the 1981 census); there were also sizeable Serb, Bosniak,

Romani and Turkish minority populations. Despite the increased political clout of the

Albanian majority provided by amendments to the constitution, privilege in 1960s and 70s

still fell mainly on the Serb community (the second largest ethnic group in Kosovo), who

enjoyed better access to education, jobs, higher wages and better standards of living, housing

and healthcare (Pavlović in Ingrao & Emmert (ed.), 2012: 54; Judt, 2010: 670). This led

ethnic Albanians and members of other non-Serb minority groups to deeply resent the Serb

population – even within the context of the muted ethnic tensions of Tito’s Yugoslavia.

President Tito’s death in 1980 marked the beginning of the Yugoslav Federation’s

political and economic decline and revived Kosovo Albanian hopes for full independence as

28

a constituent republic of Yugoslavia. In 1981, protests took place demanding greater

autonomy. They were suppressed by forceful Serb police action, killing several people. As in

1960s Northern Ireland, the protests and their suppression produced an escalation of Kosovar

resistance and swelled support for independence. The People’s Movement of Kosovo

(predecessor of the Kosovo Liberation Army) was formed in 1982 and ethnic divisions

between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs deepened.

In 1989 tension rose further when Serb President, Slobodan Milosevic, annulled

Kosovo’s autonomy and absorbing it into Serbia. Kosovo’s leaders were dismissed, its

institutions closed, and its people subjected to harsh Serb policing. After violent clashes

between police and protestors, the Kosovo Assembly was closed and Kosovo placed under

direct rule from Belgrade. A proclamation of independence in 1990 and a referendum in

1991, showing 90% in favour of independence, failed to gain recognition from Yugoslavia or

the international community (Bekaj, 2010: 43; Ivlevs and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.),

2013: 205).

The collapse of the Yugoslav Federation amidst Milosevic’s failed campaign to create

a “Greater Serbia” through the Yugoslav Wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia raised hopes

in Kosovo of independence through diplomacy. But while those other republics emerged

from war with their independence internationally guaranteed, Kosovo was reinstated as an

autonomous part of the new state, Serbia and Montenegro (Sletzinger & Gelazis, 2005: 36-

7). A split then developed in domestic Kosovo politics between the peaceful resistance of the

Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the armed struggle of Kosovo Liberation Army

(KLA). The crushing of non-violent student protests by Serb police in 1997 showed that

passive political resistance was ineffectual and many young oppositionists congregated

around the emerging KLA (Bekaj, 2010: 19).

Rising dissent drew intervention from the Serbian police and military forces in early

1998, and served the KLA argument for greater armed resistance. The KLA violent response,

although futile, began the Kosovo War, during which its population was subjected to a

campaign of expulsion, rape and murder by the Serbian military. Several thousand people

were killed and a half million driven from their homes (The Guardian, 13 March 2000; The

Times, 30 November 2012).

Initially, the international community, still heaping praise upon Milosevic for his role

in brokering the Dayton Accords in 1995 and reluctant to re-involve itself in the Balkan

29

conflicts, treated the fighting as an internal matter (Bekaj, 2010: 16). Excessive, brutal force

against Kosovar civilians in the villages of Qirez and Likoshane, however, demanded the

attention of the reluctant international community, who then sought to bring an end to the

conflict (Judt, 2010: 680). After a proposed NATO peace agreement (The Rambouillet

Agreement) was rejected by Serbia in February 1999, international intervention in the war

commenced. A three-month campaign of NATO airstrikes - the organisation’s first

intervention into a sovereign state’s internal affairs - brought the Kosovo War to an end in

June 1999.

The international community then continued its involvement in ‘winning the peace’.

The situation in Kosovo after the war was initially desperate: Over 50,000 houses were

completely destroyed, half a million people were left homeless and the provision of public

utilities, such as water and electricity, had virtually collapsed. Many ethnic Serbs, fearing

retribution, fled to Serbia.2

The improvements in Kosovo in the past fifteen years have largely been due to the

heavy involvement of the international community at every level of Kosovar society. The

road to peace began with the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR

1244) placing Kosovo under the temporary administration of the United Nations (UN), which

assumed all legislative, executive and judicial powers. The Resolution also provided the

mandate for the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which sought to

protect and promote human rights. A UN police force (UNMIK police) and NATO peace-

keeping force (KFOR) were also dispatched two days after the adoption of UNSCR 1244

((Ivlevs and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 205). The Resolution and its

provisions led to progress in Kosovo, and many of UNSCR 1244 terms remain in force today,

but the international community has been slow to improve physical conditions in Kosovo or

address its final status settlement.

As the bodies put in place by the Resolution began the process of reinstating or

creating important political and civil institutions in Kosovo, many Kosovo Serbs who

remained chose not to participate, deciding instead to maintain parallel social structures

(including health, education, security and the judiciary) funded by the Serbian state

government (Eide in UNSC Report, 2005: 2; Andric in Balkan Insight, 11 September 2013).

2 At the 1981 census, Serbs were estimated to make up 13.2% of the population. The Statistical Office of

Kosovo estimated this had dropped to 6% of the population in 2005 (Pavlović in Ingrao & Emmert (ed.), 2012:

52; Ivlevs and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 205)

30

2.2 Development of Peace Process

Serbia’s approach to Kosovo and its refusal to acknowledge its own role in the

region’s tragic recent past at first held up the peace process. Attempts at normalising relations

were not feasible immediately after the war and were delayed further by Kosovo’s unilateral

declaration of independence in February 2008 which, while not provoking violence, was

initially met with opposition from Serbs on both sides of the new border (Gowan, 2008: 8).

With Serbia’s progress towards EU membership stalling, Belgrade agreed to enter into talks

with Kosovo for the first time since its declared independence in September 2010 (UNGA

A/64/PV.21: 1-2)

When talks between the two sides commenced in March 2011 there was a noticeable

increase in willingness to cooperate, if not accept Kosovo’s independence. While there has

not been an official change in either Kosovo or Serbia’s official position, agreements such as

the Agreement on Regional Co-operation, allowing Kosovo to represent itself in regional

meetings and sign agreements on its own account, suggested that Serbia has begun to accept

Kosovo’s independence (EU Press Statement, 24 February 2012).

One reason for the increased cooperation is the EU’s increased role in mediating

negotiations since 2008. Both Kosovo and Serbia harbour hopes of one day joining the EU,

and while Serbia does not have to accept Kosovo’s independence to accede, a ‘normalisation

of relations’ between Kosovo and Serbia is a requirement. Only since Serbia’s accession to

the EU became a realistic prospect has the peace process gained momentum. EU-led

negotiations have brought Serbia and Kosovo closer to resolving the conflict. The ‘Pristina-

Belgrade’ negotiations brought progress through ‘The Agreement on Regional Co-operation’

which allowed Kosovo to participate and represent itself at regional meetings and sign its

own agreements. This suggested that Serbia had begun to come to terms with Kosovo’s

autonomy, if not its independence (Koeth, 2013: 139-41; EU Press Statement, 24 February

2012). A critical step followed soon after, with talks between the Prime Ministers of Serbia

and Kosovo, Ivica Dacic and Hasim Thaci, for the first time in October 2012. This led to the

signing of the Brussels Agreement by both men in April 2013.

Consisting of fifteen deliberately vague principles that covered mainly the Serb-

majority regions in northern Kosovo, the Agreement was made possible through a

compromise whereby Serbia, while not recognising Kosovo as an independent state,

conceded its claim of legal authority over the whole of Kosovo. In return Kosovo provided

31

guarantees that its Serb population would be given extensive autonomy and protection. An

Association of Serb-majority municipalities was established (Principle 1-3) with

responsibilities in economic development, education, health, and urban and rural planning

(Principle 4). Significantly, both sides agreed that “neither side will block or encourage

others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths” (Principle 14). The

Agreement was the first formal basis for normalised relations between Kosovo and Serbia

(The Guardian, 30 April 2013).

While the Brussels Agreement undoubtedly represents progress, resolving the long-

term conflict in Kosovo remains a difficult task. Just three weeks before the Brussels

Agreement was reached Dacic refused to accept a deal on the grounds that it did not grant

enough to the Serb minority in Kosovo (The Economist, 3 April 2013)

2.3 Application of Model

Ripeness

The Absence of Alternative

The geopolitical situation and heavy involvement of the UN and EU mean that a

return to violent conflict is unlikely. Kosovo Serb opposition to the peace process will

probably continue, but is unlikely to derail it, especially if Kosovo’s leaders are happy to

grant greater autonomy and be patient about independence (The Economist, 9 November

2013; Koeth, 2013: 142; Wall Street Journal, 29 September 2013). Certainly, there is no

alternative to a normalisation of relations if Kosovo and Serbia are to gain EU membership in

the future, the expressed goal of both parties, so a serious deviation from the existing plan is

unlikely.

Popular desire for peace; political motivation

Heavy EU lobbying and involvement in settlement negotiations has helped shape a

peace process at a political level, but it remains to be seen whether the civil structure and

public in Kosovo can accept and maintain a settlement (Ban in UNSC S/2014/305: 2). The

bitter Kosovo War is within the living memory of many Kosovars, and the process of

reconciliation between the two communities is likely to be long and arduous (Ban in UNSC

S/2014/558: 9).

32

Public opinion in Serbia is generally committed to closer relations with the EU

sovereignty, and so the Brussels Agreement has broadly been accepted amongst Serbs living

in Serbia. Pro-EU, Brussel Agreement-support political parties fared well at the 2014 general

election, while the hard line anti-EU Democratic Party of Serbia, a staunch defender of

Serbia’s territorial claim over Kosovo, lost all twenty-one of its seats (Balkan Insight, 16

March 2014). The new government formed in April 2014 has reaffirmed its commitment to

continuing EU facilitated dialogue and full implementation of the Brussels Agreement (Ban

in UNSC S/2014/558: 2)

The majority of Kosovo Serbs believe Kosovo to be unviable as an independent state

in the long term, and are less likely than Albanians to support the Brussels Agreement (Ivlevs

and King in Varnav & Faustmann (ed.), 2013: 207-15). At the Kosovo general election in

2014, turnout in Serb-majority municipalities averaged just under 26% roughly the same as

for the Serbian general election, but still to be far below the 42.6% average for the rest of

Kosovo (Ban in UNSC S/2014/558: 2). This was despite an appeal by the new Serbian Prime

Minister, Aleksander Vucic, that to vote was in the interests of Serbs living in Kosovo

(Nikolic in Balkan Insight, 3 June 2014). Both Kosovo’s premier political parties, the

Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo, support the Brussels

Agreement as a means of gaining EU membership. This would suggest a political motivation

that possibly exceeds that of the public.

Strong leadership

Given Kosovo’s recent history and the manner in which the KLA’s political

incarnation, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, has dominated the post-independence political

landscape, Kosovar leadership in the peace process is likely to remain with ex-militants. As

Northern Ireland has demonstrated, this is vital provided that they are committed to non-

violence and political dialogue.

Ivica Dacic, himself a Kosovo Serb, notably changed his position from initially

opposing Kosovo’s independence to accepting its potential permanence during the

negotiations that led to the Brussels Agreement (BBC News, 27 July 2012). Commitment to

the principles of the Brussels Agreement can be expected both from new Prime Minister

Vucic, and Dacic, now the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

33

Inter-state Cooperation

The Brussels Agreement is based on inter-state co-operation between Serbia and Kosovo,

and probably sits somewhere between the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Downing Street

Declaration in terms of its position in the overall peace process. Unresolved issues remain,

such as the future of Kosovo’s sovereignty, but since the Agreement was reached, both sides

have shown willingness to deliver on its principles. Serbia withdrew financial support for the

four municipalities it funded in September 2013, and cooperation between Belgrade and

Pristina in dealing with recent tensions in northern Kosovo helped to reinstate calm raising

hopes of eventually settling differences there (Ban in UNSC S/2014/305: 1 and UNSC

S/2014/558: 4; EEAS Statement, 22 July 2014). (Andric in Balkan Insight, 11 September

2013).

This commitment is probably motivated by the determination to progress towards EU

membership, which was helped by the opening of accession talks for Serbia and negotiation

of Stabilisation and Association Agreement for Kosovo (Ban in UNSC S/2014/558: 10;

Council of Europe Statement, 21 January 2014; EU Press Statement, 6 May 2014).

The withdrawal of parallel civil structures in northern Kosovo must be followed by

respect for the autonomy of Serb-majority municipalities. Further cooperation will then be

needed: Serbian support in reintegrating ethnic Serbs into the relevant Kosovo’s social and

political structures must be met with Kosovo’s cooperation in allowing Kosovo Serbs to

retain a connection with the motherland whilst ensuring they have a place in an inclusive

multi-ethnic Kosovar society.

Economic motives

With a 35% unemployment rate and an economic output at around 10% of the EU

average, Kosovo desperately needs economic prosperity (Bloomberg, 6 June 2014).

Economic advancement relies on foreign investment replacing foreign aid - at around €116

per head in 2011, Kosovo is the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the world

(Appendix I, European Court of Auditors Special Report 18/2012: 1; Statement by President

Barroso, 20 May 2011: 2). Greater stability could bring an influx of foreign investment –

both from the Kosovar diaspora in Western Europe and North America and from those that

want Kosovo to succeed.

34

Serbia needs economic growth as it seeks to reach the standards required for EU

membership. The promise of economic reform was a key factor in Vacic’s Progressive Party

surprise landslide victory in March 2014, as he seeks to tackle an unemployment rate of 26%

(The Guardian, 16 March 2014; The Economist, 22 March 2014). Relations with Kosovo

may have an impact on economic growth if they deteriorate to a level where potential

investors are discouraged. Having a stronger economy than Kosovo, Serbia has managed to

secure more foreign direct investment, mainly from EU states and the Middle East (The

Economist, 19 June 2012).

Common framework of co-operation

The Brussels Agreement is the main framework for a future settlement. It compares to

the AIA or DSD in that it makes a general commitment to a more cooperative relationship

without explicit detail. It should be a stepping stone to the next phase, centred on the

principle of not impeding each other in seeking EU accession.

This framework will not last forever. While the EU membership incentive is currently

effective, it could cause issues in the future. The EU has not yet demanded that Kosovo’s

status be settled, and while this does not necessarily have repercussions for Serbia, Kosovo

cannot hope to accede to the EU while the question remains open. This central issue needs to

be resolved.

On this matter, the principle of majority consent used in Northern Ireland is not

applicable because ethnic Albanians make up the overwhelming majority of the population.

Partition would also not work. As in NI, it would simply cause issues in the future (the Serb-

majority municipalities have sizable populations of Albanians and other ethnic groups).

The most likely lesson from Northern Ireland could be a cross-border council similar

to the North/South Ministerial Council to work on areas of mutual interest, centring on a

trade and economic partnership.

Comprehensive participation

Unlike Northern Ireland, ex-paramilitaries are already at the centre of the political

landscape. Indeed, Thaci, a former political leader of the KLA and Dacic, a former close

associate of Slobodan Milosevic, are old adversaries who have put their differences aside.

Rather, the problem lies in ensuring that Kosovo Serbs participate in a society they feel they

35

have a stake in. Several features for comprehensive electoral participation are already in

place, including a system that guarantees representation of minorities in both parliament and

government. 3

A more nuanced system is still needed: a dispute between the Albanian

majority and Serbs over the establishment of a Kosovo Army prompted the dissolution of the

Assembly, and there is potential – if ever it engages in Kosovo’s political system – for the

northern municipalities to hold the balance of power (Robert Schumann Foundation, 8 June

2014; Ban in UNSCS/2014/558: 2; The Economist, 3 April 2013). Here NI cannot provide

many lessons, besides possibly a system of proportional representation to allow for the

minority vote to deliver above the number of seats guaranteed by the Constitution, which did

not happen at either the 2010 or 2014 general elections. This would mean that Kosovo Serbs

in northern municipalities could potentially be represented by people from their own region,

rather than by the Serbs minority in the south.

There are other signs for a greater level of participation. The Brussels Agreement

made several commitments, including the appointment of a Kosovo Serb police commander,

ensuring the ethnic composition of the force is representative in all Serb-majority

municipalities (Principles 7-9, Brussels Agreement 2013) and the appointment of a new

permanently representative Serb judiciary (Principle 10). The integration of Serbian security

structures into the equivalent Kosovo institution has already begun. 30 Kosovo Serb

firefighters have signed contracts in Mitrovica North, while a new, ethnically representative

police team has already contributed to increased effectiveness in northern Kosovo (Ban in

UNSC S/2014/558: 16-17). Turnout for the November 2013 municipal elections in the Serb-

majority northern areas was poor, overall no higher than 22% (The Guardian, 14 November

2013). In some areas Albanian candidates were elected to represent Serb enclaves.

The provisions of the Brussels Agreement alone are unlikely to be enough, and more

work is needed develop a system that includes everyone in political, civil and social decision-

making and mapping Kosovo’s future. As UN Special Envoy to Kosovo Kai Eide put it, “a

stable and multi-ethnic society will only succeed if they [Kosovo’s leaders and population]

are combined with an increasing degree of ownership of this society.” (Eide in UNSC

S/2004/932: 16).

3 The 120 member Kosovar Assembly reserves twenty seats for minorities: 10 for Serbs, 4 each for Roma,

Ashkali and Egyptians, 3 for Bosniaks, 2 for Turks and 1 for Gorani, (Robert Schuman Foundation, 8 June

2014)

36

Third parties

The EU is likely to continue supporting the implementation of the Brussels Agreement

through EULEX (Ban in UNSC S/2014/305: 2). This will move the process forward, and help

strengthen Kosovo’s weak civil and legal institutions. However, there needs to be acceptance

that international third party involvement in Kosovo’s internal affairs is only beneficial to a

certain point – in some areas it has been a hindrance. While reconciliation between ethnic

Albanians and Serbs can be mediated and supervised by the international community,

momentum must ultimately come from the two communities themselves. The international

community is obliged to maintain a degree of neutrality that can at times be unrealistic and

disproportionate. For instance, some have speculated whether the trial of former Kosovo

Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj at the ICTY in The Hague in 2012 was simply an attempt

to counter-balance the number of prosecutions against Serb perpetrators (The Guardian, 25

November; The Times, 30 November 2012).

37

Chapter 3

Cyprus

3.1 Origins

Cyprus, too, suffers a centuries old conflict that has re-erupted in the last fifty years.

Many, including most Greek Cypriots, regard Cyprus’ problems as beginning in 1974, when

a Greek-backed coup, aimed at establishing union between Cyprus and Greece, (enosis) was

met with violence in Turkish Cypriot enclaves and the north of the island was invaded by

Turkish troops. However, the seeds of the conflict lie much deeper.

Under the Ottoman Empire the demographic of Cyprus changed significantly,

introducing a sizable Turkish settlement among the indigenous Greek population. The two

distinct communities continued to feel a keen sense of kinship with Greece or Turkey.

Following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Cyprus was placed under British administration,

with sovereignty passing from the Turkish Republic to Britain in 1925. Both Ottoman and

British rule had allowed for the Greek and Turkish communities to function separately but

harmoniously. Although this created a peaceful environment, it did not encourage a sense of

Cypriot identity: integration was limited as society was divided by language, culture and

religion, both groups retaining attachment to their ‘mother state’.

Violent Greek-Cypriot nationalism re-emerged in 1955 with the emergence of the

terrorist group EOKA committed to ending British colonial rule and establishing enosis with

Greece. The uprising made British rule increasingly difficult to maintain and soured relations

between the communities (Fisher, 2001: 310). Many Greek Cypriots gave up their jobs in the

government and police and the colonial authorities became reliant on the Turkish-Cypriot

community to fill their place (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 11).

As decolonisation gained momentum, the British government looked to reduce its

responsibility for Cyprus whilst maintaining an interest in the region. In the final three years

before Cypriot independence in 1960, Britain made multiple attempts to ease the tensions on

the island through negotiation with Greece and Turkey.

38

3.2 Development of Peace Process

The process that eventually led to independence began with the Radcliffe Proposal

(1956), granting full internal self-rule and right of self-determination, with Britain retaining

foreign and defence responsibilities. This was accepted by Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by

Greek Cypriots. The subsequent MacMillan Plan (1958) proposed a bi-communal

constitution with separate municipalities and a division of sovereignty between Turkey,

Greece and Britain, but was rejected by the Greek government on the grounds that Greek

Cypriots would prefer independence (Erdemir, 2001; Fisher, 2001: 313).

Subsequent violent clashes on the island and a cooling in Greco-Turkish state

relations demonstrated that a division of sovereignty was not possible. Britain moved towards

independence for Cyprus, with a number of security measures. A new power-sharing

constitution outlined in the London-Zurich Accords (1959) provided for a presidential system

with national legislature, two autonomous communal chambers and a system that ensured

Turkish Cypriot representation in government and the public and security services at a rate of

70:30, with the security services balanced at 60:40 (the proportions of the population as a

whole were approximately 78:18) (Paragraphs 11 & 14, London-Zurich Accords; Ker-

Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.) 2009 : 12). Separate majorities were required among

the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives for legislation to carry

(Paragraph 7, London-Zurich Accords). As an agreement could not be reach on forming

armed forces, Britain, as a guarantor power, was granted the establishment of two military

bases and allowances were made for a military presence from the two other guarantors,

Greece and Turkey.

When independence arrived, however, suspicion between the two communities

caused the Accords to unravel. In November 1963 Greek Cypriot President Makarios

proposed thirteen constitutional amendments (in contravention of the Accords) that would

have increased Greek Cypriot authority and relegated Turkish Cypriots to a minority status.

Turkey rejected the amendments immediately. In 1964, conflict broke out in several

traditionally Greek-Cypriot towns which had seen recent Turkish Cypriot migration from

their traditional enclaves in the north of island. Several hundred people were killed, and

peace-keeping forces were dispatched, first from Britain and then a formal UN Force in

Cyprus (UNFICYP) which established a buffer zone. The legacy of 1964: the grief over

39

unlocated bodies of the dead and the presence of the peacekeeping force remain dominant

features of the conflict today (UNSC S/RES/2135).

The UNFICYP drew the international community into a mediation role on the island

as a solution was sought. The first serious attempt at solving the conflict came with the USA-

led Acheson Plan (1964), under the leadership of the former Secretary of State, Dean

Acheson. It proposed enosis but with concessions of a sovereign base for Turkey and some

self-administrative rights for Turkish Cypriots. Despite having the support of the guarantor

powers, it was rejected by President Archbishop Makarios as granting too much to Turkey

and Turkish Cypriots. A second, amended Plan was then rejected by both the Greek Cypriots

and Turkey.

A period of stalemate followed. When talks resumed in 1968, a resumption of

violence and the formation of a military government in Greece had effectively killed enosis

as a practical option. Again, intercommunal talks failed when Makarios refused to make vital

concessions on constitutional issues or Turkish-Cypriot autonomy. While the governmental

talks were failing, tensions were again rising. A new pro-enosis terrorist group, EOKA B,

emerged with the goal of uniting Cyprus with Greece. The presence of UNFICYP was unable

to prevent an escalation in violence, and in July 1974 Turkey invaded. This intervention

sparked violence that killed several thousand people and drove over 150,000 Greek Cypriots,

a quarter of the whole Greek-Cypriot population, out of their homes in the north as they

escaped to the south. Some 40,000 Turkish Cypriots swiftly left the south, either moving

north or seeking sanctuary on the British military bases (Camp, 1980: 58). Emergency peace

talks in Switzerland failed, effectively leaving a de facto political and geographical division

of the island into two self-administrating ethnically-homogenous zones.

When high-level meetings resumed after three years in 1977, under the guidance of the

UN, there was a brief hope of positive results. Having spent two years trying to forge

negotiations without sign of progress UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim convinced both

Greek Cypriot President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to sign the

vague four point High Level Agreement which confirmed that any future settlement would be

based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation of two states (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava &

Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 15).

Since 1977, the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation has been the model for settlement and

formed the basis for subsequent frameworks for peace. Further proposals for advancing

40

towards a settlement from Waldheim (1979 & 1981) and his successors, Javier Perez de

Cuellar (1986) and Kofi Annan (2004) have largely been proportionate to the circumstances

of the conflict, but have made little progress. A proposed Ten Point Agreement (1979),

building on the 1977 Agreement and including additional provisions on principles of

demilitarisation and mutual stability, was defeated by the failure of both sides to agree on the

most fundamental principles (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 16). This

was followed by negotiations in 1981, based on an Interim Agreement focussing on four

areas: improving community relations, the return and settlements of displaced Greek

Cypriots, constitutional issues and territorial disputes. This also collapsed due to lack of

cooperation between Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Denktash, whose

legitimacy Kyprianou refused to acknowledge. The two also differed over the shape a federal

system should take: Denktash wanted a decentralised, weak federation which would

gradually evolve into a customs union and eventually a centralised economic and fiscal

union. Kyprianou preferred a strongly centralised government (Mirbagheri, 1998: 124).

Hopes for reunification were dashed by the decision of Denktash to declare unilateral

independence in 1983 to form the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The international

community’s response was strong, judging the declaration to be legally invalid and calling for

its withdrawal (Paragraph 2, UNSC S/RES/541, 1983). The UN’s response, De Cuellar’s

Draft Framework Agreement (1986) of confidence-building measures based around a united

bi-zonal, bi-communal non-aligned federal republic initially gained some support from the

new Turkish Republic, but the cool response of Greek Cypriot leaders, who felt the

Framework did not adequately address key issues regarding Turkish settlement and the

presence of Turkish troops killed negotiations once more and the Turkish Republic took on a

degree of permanence (de Cuellar in UNSC S/18102/Add.1, 1986; Fisher, 2001: 315).

De Cuellar, exhausted by two years of negotiation on the same points, saw no way to

proceed. In his final report to the Security Council he stated that further progress was made

impossible by Denktash’s demand that the two zones had equal sovereignty and right of

secession (de Cuellar in UNSC S/23121). Another period of stagnation followed.

During this period the gulf between the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and

TRNC widened. The RoC gained international recognition and was able to progress

politically and economically, the TRNC lagged behind. An attempt by Boutros Boutros-Ghali

to establish a bi-communal federation in 1992 and a series of confidence building measures in

41

the following years were defeated by disagreements over the return of displaced persons and

the extent and characteristics of territorial adjustment. The two zones polarised further when

the RoC submitted a formal application for EEC membership in 1990.

When EU accession negotiations for the RoC began in 1998, escalating in 2001, it

prompted the most recent and significant attempt at reaching a settlement. While Denktash

had previously rejected a federation, the imminent accession of Cyprus to the EU and a

change of government in Turkey prompted him to call for renewed negotiations.

Seeing an opportunity UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pursued joint EU membership

for both zones on the island as an incentive to a long-term settlement through the Annan Plan

(2004), the first comprehensive attempt to treat almost all aspects of life in a proposed bi-

communal, bi-zonal Cyprus. By reflecting the interests of the two communities, the Plan

sought to bring them together and into the EU at the same time (The Economist, 10 May

2009a). Acceptance of the Plan, which was supported by all existing EU member states,

would have meant that the TFSC enjoying the social, economic and political benefits of EU

membership, whilst also providing displaced Greek Cypriots either with an opportunity to

return to their homes or compensation (Ker-Lindsay in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009:

10).

When the Plan was put to a referendum on 24 April 2004, it received strong support from

Turkish Cypriots (64.9% in favour with an 87% turn-out), but was rejected by Greek Cypriots

(75.8% against with an 88% turn-out) (Introduction in Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 1).

The lack of Greek Cypriot support owed something to President Tassos Papadopoulos’s

sustained campaign of rhetoric against accepting the Plan (The Economist, 29 April 2004). A

subsequent poll found that a majority of Greek Cypriots would have supported the Plan if

their concerns about security and implementation had been sufficiently met (Loizides in

Varnava & Faustmann (ed.), 2009: 80). Rejection of the plan meant that hopes of EU

membership for the whole island were scuppered, and the Republic of Cyprus acceded alone

on 1 May 2004.

After the Annan Plan, there were no serious negotiations for several years. While

Denktas, who had opposed the Plan, lost to the moderate pro-settlement Mehmet Ali Talat in

April 2005, Papadopoulos remained Greek Cypriot President until 2008. Only with the

election of Demetris Christofias as Papadopoulos’ successor in February 2008 were hopes

reignited. In contrast to Papadopoulos, Christofias had supported the Annan Plan and was

42

committed to reaching a permanent settlement for reunification of the island, having pledged

throughout his election to restart talks with Turkish Cypriots (The Economist, 28 February

2008). With committed moderate political leaders on both sides it seemed there was a

possibility of establishing a lasting peace. When talks commenced in September 2008, the

agenda was split into six headings: economy, the EU, governance, territory, security and

property (Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, 2008; The Economist, 10

December 2009). With two meetings a week, significant progress was made on four areas,

with property and security proving the hardest to resolve. The subject of property was

particularly complicated and focussed on the claims of Greek Cypriots forced from their

homes in 1974 who still held the property deeds. While Christofias wanted assurances for

these property claims in the envisioned Turkish Cypriot state, Talat favoured an independent

commission similar to the Annan Plan’s proposed Property Board that would rule individual

cases.

The relationship was broken by Talat’s defeat at the Turkish Cypriot elections in

2010, before any significant agreement was struck. Far from seeking to reunify the island,

Talat’s successor, Dervish Eroglu, wanted the creation and international recognition of

separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot states. The gulf between Christofias and Eroglu meant

that negotiations on a settlement eventually came to a standstill in 2012 (The Economist, 31

March 2011; Smith in The Guardian, 11 February 2014). However, the very fact that talks

were taking place has moved the process forwards on the civic level. Cross-communal

projects have been running for several years with UNFICYP support. Based on sport,

culture, religion and education the projects have brought notable breakthroughs, including the

opening of Islamic holy sites in the Republic, a provisional agreement on an all-island

football league and the bi-communal Committee on Missing Persons, which in 2008 began

exhuming, identifying and returning the remains of people killed in the 1964 violence (Ban in

UNSC S/2013/781: 4 & 6 and in UNSC S/2014/461: 4 & 7).

The discovery of the Aphrodite gasfield off Cyprus gave greater urgency to reaching a

settlement because both parts of the island claim ownership of the waters. International

interest, having abated after the failure of the Annan Plan, revived with the possibility of the

gasfield lessening Europe’s energy dependence on Russia (Smith in The Guardian, 11

February 2014). On 11 February 2014, after five months of intense negotiations, Greek

Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, made a joint

declaration marking the official relaunch of negotiations on a comprehensive settlement for

43

the reunification of Cyprus, with Anastriades calling the chance of peace a “win-win

situation” (Ban in S/2014/461: 1; Smith in The Guardian, 11 February 2014). In the

declaration, both sides pledged to respect democratic principles, human rights and

fundamental freedoms in pursuit of a bi-communal, bi-zonal united Cyprus (Paragraphs 1 &

3, Joint Declaration, 11 February 2014).

3.3 Application of Model

Ripeness

The Absence of Alternative

The Annan Plan represented a relatively straightforward alternative to continuing the

conflict, with the incentive of EU membership for the whole island. Since then, the legal

situation has become more complex. As the Republic of Cyprus acceded in 2004,

membership for the whole island would require any peace settlement to be incorporated into

EU law – a complicated issue that to date remains unresolved (Ban in UNSC S/2012/149: 3).

However, this should prove surmountable.

The only alternative to a settlement is ‘the security of status quo’. As the international

community is increasingly keen on settlement, this is becoming a less feasible alternative,

particularly given the economic benefits that settlement would bring.

Popular desire for peace; political motivation

Possibly the greatest hindrance to the creation of a ripe environment is the scepticism

and apathy that have discouraged political determination. Among the Cypriot population,

there are two generations who have spent entire lives living within conflict and have little

confidence of a breakthrough (Ban in UNSC S/2012/149: 4). However, new communal

projects and regular negotiations are bringing people from the two sides together and, with

the added incentive of a political agreement, a settlement seems more likely than at any time

in the last decade.

Strong leadership

As Christofias and Talat demonstrated, there is potential to make progress in Cyprus

if both sides work together. The two leaders enjoyed a good relationship, no doubt aided by a

similar left-wing perspective and their ability to converse without interpreters. Both are now

44

out of office, with Christofias citing a lack of progress in the peace process as a key factor in

his decision not to seek re-election in 2012 (Ban in S/2012/507: 1), but Anastaiades and

Eroglu seem committed to regular meetings and speeding up progress. A key factor is

ensuring that this approach is maintained at every diplomatic level - public statements

demonising the opposite side have undermined the process in the past (Ban in UNSC

S/2011/112: 4).

Inter-state Cooperation

While cooperation between the three guarantor powers has not always been strong,

there are signs of improvement. Turkey remains committed to working towards a settlement,

involving itself in negotiations with the leaders of the British, Swiss, Swedish and Danish

governments as well as interested parties within the European Commission (Ban in UNSC

S/2012/149: 2) while remaining strong in defending the economic and social interests of

Turkish Cypriots (Ban in UNSC S/2012/507: 3).

Cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Chambers of Commerce led to the

establishment of the four-way Nicosia Economic Forum in June 2014. The Forum will

involve the Greek, Turkish, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Chambers of Commerce

working together for first time since 1974, to develop initiatives that will support continuing

negotiations on a settlement (Joint Nicosia Economic Forum Statement, 2 June 2014; Özer in

Hurriet Daily News Online, 7 June 2014; Ban in UNSC/S/2014/461: 5).

Economic motives

The economic motives for a reunification settlement are strong, with independent

analysis suggesting that a settlement could boost the island’s economy by as much as three

percent per annum (The Economist, 27 April 2013). Much of this boost would come from the

gas field (inviting comparisons between what gas could potentially do for cross-border co-

operation in Cyprus, with what coal and steel did for early European cooperation), but greater

stability would also allow for improved intercommunal business cooperation, stronger trade

links, and an expansion in the existing tourism industry (The Economist, 23 March 2013; Ban

in UNSC S/2013/781: 4). With the support of the Turkish and Greek governments, the new

Nicosia Economic Forum should help to deliver on these opportunities, as well as

encouraging joint private sector initiatives (Ban in UNSC/S/2014/461: 5).

45

Of course, with such opportunities there is potential for fresh disputes, and care needs

to be taken to ensure that economic incentives work in favour of peace. The UN Secretary

General has repeatedly expressed his view that it is important that wealth gained from

exploiting the gasfield is distributed evenly and further steps need to be taken to encourage

intercommunal trade (Ban in UNSC S/2012/507: 7, in UNSC S/2013/781: 4-6 and in UNSC

S/2014/461: 8).

Common framework of co-operation

In many ways, the Joint Declaration of February 2014 is encouragingly vague.

Identifying specific principles or points of co-operation is potentially hazardous in Cyprus

and an affirmation of principles, like the Downing Street Declaration, is a good platform from

which to continue. Long-term, the framework must address the issues of resettlement of

displaced peoples, property and territory and this will involve confronting the shared history.

An independently mediated Property Board and considerable mutual cooperation will be

required in the future. The Nicosia Economic Forum, not dissimilar to the North/South

Ministerial Council in NI, could help in ensuring even distribution of the wealth of the

Aphrodite gasfield.

Comprehensive participation

Previous attempts at ensuring representation at all levels of society – the London-

Zurich Accords being the most noteworthy – have failed because dialogue broke down and,

ultimately, because both sides sought to gain advantage. But dialogue, the development of

new institutions and the perceived benefits of a settlement are now in place in Cyprus. In

trying to create an environment conducive to comprehensive participation across both the

Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities there needs to be a framework to ensure that

decisions affecting both sides are agreed upon. In the event of a single legislature, the

requirement for a simple majority in both communities could be reinstated. This would mean

there would be no need for the negative veto. Another provision of the London-Zurich

Accords – that the positions of President and Deputy President are guaranteed to be filled by

representatives from both communities – could also be reinstated in knowledge that it has

helped maintain the political process in NI.

46

Third parties

The continued involvement of UN mediators, as well as the rejuvenated commitment

of the three guarantor powers will be important to continued success in the peace process, as

Cyprus will not be able to a close a deal by itself.

It is important that the international community does not disrupt the UN’s policy of

allowing Cypriot leadership and ownership of the peace process (Ban in UNSC S/2011/112:

3).

47

Conclusions

The thesis has shown that the example of NI is suitable as a conflict resolution model;

firstly by compiling factors to create such a model, and secondly by exploring its application

in two contemporary conflicts. It is clear that no model will fit new conflict situations

perfectly. Each conflict has its own culture-based complexities and peculiarities and no

successful peace process in one conflict could ever be transferred completely to another.

Having said this, the Northern Ireland peace process was largely successful, and that the likes

of Blair, Hain and O’Kane have tried to draw principles for other conflicts demonstrates a

belief that it has lessons to teach.

The broad criteria examined in this paper are useful tools for analysis and diagnosis; a

template that helps to identify ripeness for peace and issues that remain unresolved. In this

sense, there is an applicable NI model that is suitable for helping to resolve other conflicts,

provided that peacemakers are prepared to be flexible in their approach to the process and do

not seek a rigid application of Northern Ireland’s resolutions to problems elsewhere. Each

conflict’s complex problems require their own complex solutions (Coakley, 2003: 49).

Looking briefly at the four criteria outlined, none is unique to NI. It is obvious that there

must be readiness for peace, which cannot be forced. A common framework is the best basis

for all successful negotiations. In order for peace to be stable it must include all members of

society. Third party assistance is required in conflicts because, ultimately, if the parties

involved in the conflict could resolve it by themselves, they would have done so.

What Northern Ireland helped to establish was how important having all these strands in

place is. The Sunningdale Agreement failed because Northern Irish society was not ready for

peace. The kin-states accord over the future of NI sovereignty removed some of the

validation of extremist groups’ grounds for violence and dissent. Negotiations with the

political parties of the centre would never bring a lasting peace as long as they excluded the

extreme elements of society. The assistance of the Clinton administration and the informal

British/Irish forum that the EU provided allowed for issues to be aired and resolved without

deepening the conflict.

Kosovo and Cyprus now appear to be learning from these lessons. Both situations are ripe

for a settlement thanks to the good offices of the EU and UN. While the details of the

48

common framework may be different, the peace process in Kosovo has sped up since the

principles for the normalisation of relations were agreed between Serbia and Kosovo.

Participation in the political, social and civil institutions from across all communities will

continue to be a key consideration in Kosovo, as it struggles to find a way of engaging the

autonomous northern municipalities in the evolving Kosovo state. Serbian-Kosovo

cooperation will be critical to the process, but the precedent of British-Irish cooperation

shows it is possible. Finally, EU agency will continue to be required for a positive outcome.

In Cyprus, the oilfield discovery also contributed to ripeness, leading to the recent

agreement in July 2014 between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and a common framework.

They too may draw on ambitious but failed agreements of the past, as with the GFA and

Sunningdale. The planned settlement of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation means that

further accommodation by the two sides will be needed, but the increase in cross-community

activities suggests that this is more likely than before. As in Kosovo, third party assistance is

likely to remain a fixture for the foreseeable future.

In Northern Ireland, the EU’s Special Support Programme for Peace and

Reconciliation continues to sustain parts of the economy and funds community organisations

and peaceworkers. This too could be exported to Kosovo and Cyprus, thus addressing

‘ownership’ and economic issues.

Although the international community has been responsible for enforcing the peace in

Cyprus and Kosovo, it will be the responsibility of those living in Cyprus, Kosovo and Serbia

to take ownership of maintaining it. Ownership remains important. The people of these

regions must look to reframe themselves within the EU vision of good neighbourliness. Here

there may be further lessons to learn from NI, in terms of continuing cross-border

cooperation and sharing the work of democratic governance without loss of the sense of

national identity - in effect, like a microcosm of the EU itself.

Perhaps it is best to look at the resolution of any conflict as requiring a complex

combination of skill and art. The NI model can provide the required skills but without the art

of strong, subtle, well-informed leadership there is no prospect of peace. NI, in the latter

stages of the peace process, benefitted from Major and Reynolds’ steady commitment,

Clinton’s charisma, Ahern and Blair’s persistent determination, Trimble’s pragmatism,

Adams’ realism and perhaps above all Hume’s integrity and indefatigability. Without them,

peace would not have been possible. This dependence on the personal qualities of actors in

49

the process is the main weakness in the use of the NI process as a model – the difficulty of

finding the winning combination of effective personalities in leadership roles. This cannot be

relied upon.

It is to be hoped that Vucic and Thaci in Kosovo and Anastasiades and Eroglu in Cyprus

can display similar characteristics so that a peaceful future can be assured.

50

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Interviews/Speeches

Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Hashim Thaci, Prime Minister of

Kosovo (20 May 2011) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-360_en.pdf 1-2

Peter Hain at Chatham House (12 July 2007) “Peace-making in Northern Ireland: A Model for

Conflict Resolution”. Transcript available at:

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/ph120607.pdf (Accessed 25 May 2014)

Interview with a former History teacher at The Royal Belfast Academical Institution, b. 1950 (26

July 2014)

John Major speech to the Commons, 1 November 1993 (HC Deb 01 November 1993 vol. 231 cc19-

37) Transcript available at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1993/nov/01/

european-council-special-meeting#S6CV0231P0_19931101_HOC_173

Joint Statement by Bill Clinton, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, 18 March 1999

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/js18399.htm

Chris Patten at UK Conference on Organised Crime (2 November 2002) “Organised Crime”

europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-586_en.pdf (Last accessed: 25 May 2014) 1-4

Albert Reynolds Post-Downing Street Declaration Speech (15 December 1993) “Statement by the

Taoiseach on the Joint Declaration on Peace”. Transcript available at

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ar151293.htm (Last accessed: 25 May 2014)

Margaret Thatcher at 12 Downing Street (19 November 1984) “Post Anglo-Irish Summit Press

Conference” http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105790 (Last accessed 9 June 2014)

European External Action Service: “Statement by the Spokesperson on the first meeting of the

Working Group on Mitrovica bridge” (22 July 2014)

http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140722_05_en.pdf

European Union Press Statements

“EU facilitated dialogue: Agreement on Regional Cooperation and IBM technical protocol” (24

February 2012) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/

128138.pdf (Last accessed: 4 June 2014)

“EU starts the Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with Kosovo”

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-938_en.htm (28 October 2013)

“First Accession Conference with Serbia” (21 January 2014) http://www.consilium.europa.eu

/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/140676.pdf

“EU-Kosovo: Formal negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement concluded”

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-358_en.htm (6 May 2014)