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Lok Sabha Elections, 2014
An analytical study
May 2014
Khan Yasir (Data Analysis)
Bazlul Basid Chaudhry
(Data collection & organisation)
Dr. Hasan Raza
(Project Supervisor)
Central Study Group : Centre for Action Research & Planning CSG
Index
• Opening remarks... 5
• Summary of Lok Sabha Polls (Seats) 6
• Summary of Lok Sabha Polls (% of votes) 7
• Andaman & Nicobar 8
• Andhra Pradesh 10
• Arunachal Pradesh 12
• Assam 14
• Bihar 16
• Chandigarh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, and Uttarakhand 19
• Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, and Goa 23
• Delhi 25
• Gujarat and Rajasthan 27
• Jammu & Kashmir 30
• Jharkhand 32
• Karnataka 34
• Kerala 36
• Lakshadweep 38
• Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh 39
• Maharashtra 40
• Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim, and Tripura 44
• Odisha 51
• Puducherry 53
• Tamil Nadu 55
• Uttar Pradesh 57
• West Bengal 59
• Role of RSS in General Elections 2014 61
• Youth factor in General Elections 2014 64
• Lok Sabha polls 2014 : An Analysis (Urdu) 65
• BJP Govt: What are the challenges? (Urdu) 69
• Abbreviations 73
5
Opening remarks…
If India is too complex a phenomenon to be understood through one
document, its elections are more so. Hence, in this study we do not
claim to have come up with some path-breaking findings about 2014
Lok Sabha polls, this is just an effort to make sense of the same, and
to understand the dynamics that shaped the ultimate choice of the
voter. We have no qualms in admitting that like every human being
we have our choices and biases that may (or may not) have
influenced our inferences.
These elections were contested amidst two extremely strong
undercurrents namely anti-incumbency and Modi. The later, we
argue, was not a ‘choice’ but ‘compulsion’ for the voters. With RSS as
hand-in-glove, BJP was successful in skilfully chiselling a dream of
achche din (good days) out of the clay of Gujarat model of
development and must be given credit for the same.
It is argued that this election was fought and won on the issue of
development. This is half truth. Yes, the major chunk of monologues
that were delivered during election campaign was development-
centric but the fact that Modi and Amit Shah were at the helm of
affairs with full backing of the RSS tells another tale. The very
personality of Modi had communalised the elections and polarised
the voters. While secular and anti-BJP votes were divided, anti-
Congress and communal votes were consolidated behind Modi
leading BJP across the magical figures of 272 – no mean achievement
in itself!
Further scope in research about these elections remain in finding the
truth behind the claims of widespread rigging in elections; in
determining the actual role of AAP; and in identifying the reasons for
the shift of SC, ST and OBC votes towards BJP etc.
––––––– Khan Yasir
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIAGENERAL ELECTION TO LOK SABHA TRENDS & RESULT 2014
Click Here for: Vidhan Sabha Trends and Result 2014
Click links below for
Partywise Constituencywise-All Candidates Constituencywise Trends
Partywise Trends & Result
Select State India
Last Updated at 4:54 PM On 17/5/2014
View vote share
ALL INDIA Result Status
Status Known For 543 out of 543 Constituencies
Party Won Leading Total
Bharatiya Janata Party 282 0 282
Communist Party of India 1 0 1
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 9 0 9
Indian National Congress 44 0 44
Nationalist Congress Party 6 0 6
Aam Aadmi Party 4 0 4
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 37 0 37
All India N.R. Congress 1 0 1
All India Trinamool Congress 34 0 34
All India United Democratic Front 3 0 3
Biju Janata Dal 20 0 20
Indian National Lok Dal 2 0 2
Indian Union Muslim League 2 0 2
Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party 3 0 3
Janata Dal (Secular) 2 0 2
Janata Dal (United) 2 0 2
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 2 0 2
Kerala Congress (M) 1 0 1
Lok Jan Shakti Party 6 0 6
Naga Peoples Front 1 0 1
National Peoples Party 1 0 1
Pattali Makkal Katchi 1 0 1
Rashtriya Janata Dal 4 0 4
Revolutionary Socialist Party 1 0 1
Samajwadi Party 5 0 5
Shiromani Akali Dal 4 0 4
Shivsena 18 0 18
Sikkim Democratic Front 1 0 1
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 11 0 11
Telugu Desam 16 0 16
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen 1 0 1
Apna Dal 2 0 2
Rashtriya Lok Samta Party 3 0 3
Swabhimani Paksha 1 0 1
Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party 9 0 9
Independent 3 0 3
Total 543 0 543
7
Summary of Lok Sabha Polls
(% of votes on national basis)
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 31
INC 19.3
BSP 4.1
AITC 3.8
SP 3.4
ADMK 3.3
CPI(M) 3.2
IND 3
TDP 2.5
YSRCP 2.5
AAP 2
SS 1.9
DMK 1.7
BJD 1.7
NCP 1.6
RJD 1.3
TRS 1.2
JD(U) 1.1
CPI 0.8
JD(S) 0.7
SAD 0.7
INLD 0.5
AIUDF 0.4
LJP 0.4
DMDK 0.4
PMK 0.3
RSP 0.3
JMM 0.3
JVM 0.3
MDMK 0.3
AIFB 0.2
SWP 0.2
IUML 0.2
BLSP 0.2
CPI(ML)(L) 0.2
NPF 0.2
AD 0.1
BMUP 0.1
NOTA 1.1
9
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 47.8
INC 43.7
AAP 2
IND 1.8
AITC 1.2
CPI(M) 0.9
NCP 0.6
BSP 0.6
CPI(ML)(L) 0.2
SP 0.2
NOTA 0.8
Analysis
1. Only one constituency, 15 candidates contested.
2. Real contest between INC (83,157 votes) & BJP (90,969 votes).
3. BJP won with the difference of only 7,812 votes.
4. One of the consistent failures of UPA in these elections is its not being
able to develop understanding with its own allies. Here too this
phenomenon is at work as INC, NCP, SP and BSP etc all contested this
seat without any understanding. Though, mathematically, all their
votes too are no match against the BJP’s but it does have an effect on
overall performance of the UPA.
11
Political Party % of Votes
TDP 29.1
YSRCP 28.9
TRS 13.9
INC 11.5
BJP 8.5
IND 2
AIMIM 1.4
BSP 0.8
JaSPA 0.4
CPI 0.4
PPOI 0.4
CPI(M) 0.3
LSP 0.3
AAP 0.2
WPI 0.2
NOTA 0.7
Analysis
1. 42 constituencies.
2. INC came crashing from 31 seats in 2009 to 2 seats.
3. BJP got 3, in 2009 it was nil.
4. AIMIM retained its single seat.
5. Main beneficiaries were TDP (16 seats), TRS (11 seats), and YSRCP (9 seats)
6. Sharp polarisation of votes along Telengana lines is noted.
13
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 46.1
INC 41.2
PPA 7.9
AITC 1.5
NCP 1
AAP 0.6
IND 0.4
LB 0.2
NOTA 1.1
Analysis
1. 2 constituencies, one each won by INC & BJP.
2. Contest mainly between INC & BJP.
3. BJP won Arunachal West by 41,738 votes while INC won Arunachal East by 12, 478 votes
indicating tough fight.
15
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 36.5
INC 29.6
AIUDF 14.8
IND 9.5
AGP 3.5
BOPF 2.2
AITC 0.7
CPI(M) 0.4
CPI(ML)(L) 0.3
SUCI 0.3
CPI 0.2
AAP 0.2
SP 0.2
NOTA 1
Analysis
1. 14 constituencies.
2. INC won 3 seats (6 in 2009).
3. BJP won 7 seats (4 in 2009).
4. AGP that won a seat last time scored nil.
5. Badruddeen Ajmal won Dhubri by a huge margin of 2,29,730 votes indicating
appreciation for his works and goodwill in the public. Thus AIUDF increased its tally from
1 in 2009 to 3 seats this time.
6. The division of votes between AIUDF and INC in areas where share of Muslim population
is significant but not decisive on its own played a crucial role in BJP’s gain. Most visible
example of this phenomenon is Nowgong where BJP won with 4,94,146 votes while INC
and AIUDF got 3,50,587 and 3,14,012 votes respectively.
7. If some kind of political understanding could have been developed between INC and
AIUDF then results could have been different even in Mangaldoi (BJP: 4,86,357 votes;
INC: 4,63,473 votes; AIUDF: 74,710).
8. Naba Kumar Sarania, a former militant, contested independently and won by the
highest margin from Kokhrajhar.
17
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 29.4
RJD 20.1
JD(U) 15.8
INC 8.4
LJP 6.4
IND 4.3
BLSP 3
BSP 2.1
CPI(ML)(L) 1.3
NCP 1.2
CPI 1.2
AAP 0.9
JMM 0.5
SS 0.4
BMUP 0.4
CPI(M) 0.3
SP 0.3
SJPR 0.2
NOTA 1.6
Analysis
1. 40 constituencies.
2. BJP captured 22, increasing its tally from 12 in 2009.
3. JDU is crushed, came down heavily from 20 in 2009 to 2, this is despite appreciable work
in terms of welfare and infrastructure development. Separation from NDA on the issue
of Modi’s leadership proved to be suicidal politically for JDU.
4. RJD’s tally unchanged i.e. 4 however wife & daughter of Lalu Prasad Yadav i.e. Rabri Devi
and Misa Bharti lost.
5. Meira Kumar of INC and Shahnawaz Husain of BJP lost.
6. Newly formed RLSP based on the ideology of socialism won 3 seats entering in alliance
with NDA. This shows how accommodative NDA has been in these elections.
7. On the other hand UPA was not able to contain its allies for example LJP led by Ram
Vilas Paswan who joined NDA in February 2014, a few months before the elections.
8. LJP that couldn’t win a single seat last time won 6 riding on the Modi wave.
9. Shift of LJP at the crucial hour had not only affected Bihar but India as a whole as
significant share of Dalit votes were bagged by the NDA in general and BJP in particular.
10. Yadavs, the traditional vote-bank of RJD, too shifted in significant numbers towards BJP.
This shift is more spectacular where RJD has fielded Muslim candidates.
18
11. Backward and ST youths went with BJP instead of RJD and JD(U) especially where the
later parties fielded Muslim candidates.
12. Maulana Asrarul Haq of INC won from Kishanganj. This was mainly due to sacrifice of
Akhtarul Iman of JD(U) or else there was every chance of BJP’s Dr. Jaiswal to inflict a
surprise victory. According to the reports Jaiswal was able to capture even 10% Muslim
votes and would have won if Akhtarul Iman had contested and divided the votes.
13. What Akhtarul Iman averted in Kishanganj happened in Madhubani. In the contest
between RJD (3,37,505) and BJP (3,58,040 votes), later won as Ghulam Ghous of JD(U)
bagged 56,392 crucial votes.
19
Chandigarh
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 42.2
INC 26.8
AAP 24
BSP 3.5
IND 1.9
CPI(ML)(L) 0.4
IVD 0.1
NOTA 0.7
Haryana
20
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 34.7
INLD 24.4
INC 22.9
HJCBL 6.6
BSP 4.6
AAP 4.2
IND 1.7
CPI 0.2
CPI(M) 0.2
NOTA 0.3
Himachal Pradesh
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 53.3
INC 40.7
AAP 2
IND 0.9
CPI(M) 0.8
BSP 0.7
SP 0.3
SS 0.2
NOTA 0.9
21
Punjab
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 53.3
INC 40.7
AAP 2
IND 0.9
CPI(M) 0.8
BSP 0.7
SP 0.3
SS 0.2
NOTA 0.9
Uttarakhand
22
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 55.3
INC 34
IND 1.7
AAP 1.5
SP 0.4
CPI(ML)(L) 0.3
CPI(M) 0.1
CPI 0.1
NOTA 1.1
Analysis
1. Total 33 constituencies. 13 in Punjab, 10 in Haryana, 4 in Himachal Pradesh, 5 in
Uttarakhand and 1 of Union Territory Chandigarh.
2. Chandigarh – BJP won emphatically claiming 42.2% votes. Pawan Kumar Bansal (INC)
lost.
3. Punjab – INC restricted to 3 (8 in 2009) with a vote share of 33%.
4. Punjab – BJP won 2 seats (1 in 2009) with a vote share of only 8.7%, Arun Jaitley lost
from Amritsar by a huge margin.
5. Punjab – SAD’s tally unchanged on 4.
6. Punjab – AAP gained 4 seats.
7. Haryana – BJP 7 out of 10 seats (were 0 in 2009).
8. Haryana – INC from 9 in 2009 to 1.
9. Haryana – INLD polled 24.4% of votes, won 2 seats (from 0 in 2009, 2004 & 1999).
10. Haryana – communal polarisation of votes went in favour of BJP as Jats voted
overwhelmingly in favour of BJP in the background of Muzaffarnagar riots. The
sustained efforts of RSS in communalising Jats, it seems, has finally borne fruits.
11. Himachal Pradesh – BJP won all the 4 seats (3 in 2009) claiming 53.3% votes.
12. Uttarakhand – clean sweep of BJP here too, INC had done the same in 2009.
23
Dadra & Nagar Haveli
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 48.9
INC 45.1
IND 1.7
NCP 1
BSP 0.6
AAP 0.4
SS 0.2
BMUP 0.2
JDU 0.1
NOTA 1.8
Daman & Diu
24
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 53.8
INC 43.3
AAP 0.8
BSP 0.6
NOTA 1.5
Goa
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 53.4
INC 36.6
AAP 3.3
IND 2.1
AITC 1.5
CPI 1.2
SJP(R) 0.4
NOTA 1.2
Analysis
1. Total 4 constituencies. 1 each in Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu and 2 in Goa.
2. Clean sweep of BJP in all four constituencies polling 48.9%, 53.8% and 53.4% of votes
respectively.
3. All these constituencies except South Goa were also won by BJP in 2009.
26
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 46.4
AAP 32.9
INC 15.1
IND 3.2
BSP 1.2
NOTA 1.5
Analysis
1. 7 constituencies.
2. Clean sweep by BJP a complete reversal from 2009 when INC did the same.
3. Huge disappointment for INC and AAP.
4. Clear case of division of votes between INC and AAP leading to BJP victories.
5. AAP were the runners up in all the seats followed by INC. It seemed that after
commendable performance in Assembly polls AAP took Delhi lightly concentrating more
on Varansi and Punjab leading to the debacle in Delhi. Besides, the groundwork of RSS in
favour of BJP has also affected AAP. Another reason of AAP’s failure is its
unceremonious resignation that has not got down well with the voters.
27
Gujarat
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 59.1
INC 32.9
IND 2.1
AAP 1.2
BSP 0.9
NCP 0.9
JD(U) 0.4
BMUP 0.2
NOTA 1.8
29
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 54.9
INC 30.4
IND 6.7
BSP 2.3
NPP 1.2
AAP 1
NUZP 0.5
CPI(M) 0.3
CPI 0.3
BMUP 0.1
BYS 0.1
NOTA 1.2
Analysis
1. Total 51 constituencies. 26 in Gujarat & 25 in Rajasthan.
2. Clean sweep of BJP in both states. Polled 59.1% & 54.9% of votes respectively.
3. Gujarat model of development, despite all its lacunas, mesmerised people even in
Gujarat. Some analysts think that it is not development but communal agenda that is
the reason behind the success of BJP especially in Gujarat.
4. INC won 11 seats from Gujarat and 20 seats from Rajasthan in 2009. Scored big zero in
both the states this time. Stalwarts like Sachin Pilot lost too.
31
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 32.4
INC 22.9
PDP 20.5
NC 11.1
IND 6.3
JPC 2
BSP 1.5
JKNPP 1.2
SP 0.2
AAP 0.2
SDP 0.2
GaAP 0.2
NOTA 0.9
Analysis
1. 6 constituencies.
2. INC and NC couldn’t win a single seat. They won 2 & 3 seats respectively in 2009. Even
Farooq Abdullah lost from Srinagar.
3. BJP won 3 seats from 0 last time with a whopping 32.4% of votes.
4. PDP won remaining 3 seats.
5. Results are clear indication that people are not happy with Omar Abdullah’s
government. National Conference polled only 11% votes behind BJP, INC (22.9%) and
PDP (20.5%).
6. Results of J&K also highlight the fact that Muslim parties have not developed the
political sense to keep their differences at bay and develop some electoral
understanding to fight the bigger enemy. Lack of any such understanding was crucial in
BJP’s gain of 3 seats.
33
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 40.7
INC 13.3
JVM 12.1
JMM 9.3
AJSUP 3.7
IND 3.3
CPI(ML)(L) 2.5
AITC 2.2
JBSP 1.7
RJD 1.6
JKP 1.6
BSP 1.1
MCO 0.8
AAP 0.7
JD(U) 0.7
CPI 0.6
CPI(M) 0.5
SP 0.4
JDP 0.3
BMUP 0.3
RADP 0.3
AIFB 0.3
IUML 0.2
NOTA 1.5
Analysis
1. 14 constituencies.
2. BJP increased its tally of 8 seats in 2009 to 12 seats.
3. JMM won remaining 2 seats as in 2009.
4. Muslim votes crucial in the victory of JMM from Dumka and Rajmahal. In both these
constituencies Muslims are in sizeable chunk, the reason that Muslim votes didn’t get
divided is the fact that these constituencies are reserved for STs.
5. The saga of division of votes played a significant role here as well. In Lohardaga BJP’s
Sudarshan Bhagat (2,26,666 votes) defeated Rameshwar Oraon of INC (2,20,177 votes)
as a significant chunk of votes (i.e. 1,18,355) were polled in favour of Chamra Linda of
AITC. A ground level study of who is going to defeat BJP lacked resulting in confusion nd
thereby victory of a veteran RSS activist.
6. Such confusion and division of votes is also noted in Giridih where JMM lost to BJP by
40,313 votes and Godda where INC lost to BJP by 60,682 votes.
7. JVM performed well getting 12.1% votes but failed to capture a seat.
35
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 43
INC 40.8
JD(S) 11
IND 1.6
BSP 0.9
AAP 0.8
NOTA 0.8
Analysis
1. 28 constituencies.
2. BJP won 17 as compared to 19 in 2009. Perhaps Karnataka is the only state where the
tally of BJP has declined however marginally.
3. INC won 9 as compared to 6 in 2009.
4. JDS won 2 as compared to 3 in 2009.
5. If vote percentages are taken into account this is one of the most closely contested state
with BJP and INC getting 43 and 40.8% of votes respectively.
37
Political Party % of Votes
INC 31.1
CPI(M) 29.6
IND 11.4
BJP 10.3
CPI 7.6
IUML 4.5
KEC(M) 2.4
RSP 2.3
SJD 1.7
JD(S) 1.7
SDPI 1.5
AAP 1.4
BSP 0.4
WPI 0.4
RSP(B) 0.2
NOTA 1.2
Analysis
1. 20 constituencies.
2. INC declined to 8 from 13 seats in 2009, still largest party in the state both in terms of
seats & votes.
3. CPI won 1 (0 in 2009) and CPI(M) won 5 (4 in 2009). Kerala is the only remaining left
bastion in India after the fall of the left in West Bengal this time.
4. IUML retained its 2 seats but its vote share declined by half percent (from 5.07% to
4.5%)
5. BJP despite attaining 10.3% of votes couldn’t get a seat. No Modi magic in this state as
in rest of India.
6. SDPI is emerging as a political force to reckon with. In contrast WPI’s performance is
dismal except in Mallapuram where it polled around 29,216 votes (5th
position) but here
too SDPI bagged 47,853 votes. Whether WPI needs to compete with SDPI or develop an
understanding with the same is a question that needs dispassionate analysis.
38
Lakshadweep
Political Party % of Votes
NCP 50.1
INC 46.6
SP 1.1
CPI(M) 1.1
BJP 0.4
CPI 0.4
NOTA 0.3
Analysis
1. Single constituency. 6 candidates, all Muslims, contested.
2. Main contest between NCP & INC.
3. NCP won with a marginal difference of 1,535 votes.
40
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 54
INC 34.9
BSP 3.8
IND 1.9
AAP 1.2
SP 0.7
GGP 0.6
CPI 0.3
NOTA 1.3
Chhattisgarh
41
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 48.7
INC 38.4
IND 4.2
BSP 2.4
AAP 1.9
GGP 0.8
APoI 0.6
CPI 0.5
CSM 0.2
SP 0.2
NOTA 1.8
Analysis
1. Total 40 constituencies. 29 in Madhya Pradesh & 11 in Chhattisgarh.
2. BJP swept both the states with 27/29 seats (54% votes) and 10/11 seats (48.7% votes)
respectively.
3. INC could only muster 1 seat in Chhattisgarh despite being polled 38.4% votes and 2
seats in Madhya Pradesh with 34.9% votes.
43
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 27.3
SS 20.6
INC 18.1
NCP 16.1
IND 3.3
BSP 2.6
SWP 2.3
AAP 2.2
MNS 1.5
PWPI 1
RSPS 0.9
BBM 0.7
BVA 0.6
BMUP 0.4
CPI(M) 0.4
RPI 0.2
SP 0.2
RPI(A) 0.1
NOTA 0.9
Analysis
1. 48 constituencies.
2. INC drastically declined from 17 in 2009 to 2. Sushil Kumar Shinde, Sanjay Nirupam,
Milind Deora, Priya Dutt and several other stalwarts lost their seats.
3. NCP declined from 8 in 2009 to 4.
4. BJP increased its tally from 9 in 2009 to 23 emerging as the strongest party in the state.
5. SS too gained momentum by acquiring 18 seats as compared to 11 in 2009. Riding high
on this success SS is planning to project Party Supremo Uddhav Thackeray as the next
CM.
6. Biggest disappointment was the dismal performance of MNS led by Raj Thackeray that
failed to win a single seat, even their vote share was a miserable 1.5%. However, despite
this failure, it is difficult to write out Raj from Maharashtra’s politics.
7. Sharp polarisation of votes along communal lines is noted.
44
Manipur
Political Party % of Votes
INC 41.7
NPF 19.9
CPI 14
BJP 11.9
NCP 4.4
AITC 3.7
IND 0.3
AAP 0.5
MDPF 0.1
NOTA 0.5
45
Meghalaya
Political Party % of Votes
INC 37.9
NPEP 22.2
IND 16.8
UDP 9.9
BJP 8.9
AAP 0.8
CPI 0.7
NOTA 2.8
50
IND 0.9
AAP 0.5
TPGC 0.4
CPI(ML)(L) 0.4
SUCI 0.4
AMB 0.3
JMBP 0.3
NOTA 1.2
Analysis
1. 9 constituencies.
2. Manipur – INC won both the seats claiming 41.7% votes, BJP is nowhere in the picture
with a dismal 11% votes.
3. Meghalaya – INC and NPP won a seat each.
4. Mizoram – INC won a closely contested election against R.R. Royte who stood
independent and was defeated only by 6,154 votes.
5. Nagaland – NPF won with a whopping 68.7% of votes.
6. Sikkim – SDF won. The main contest was between SDF and SKM
7. Tripura – CPI(M) registered two massive victories in Tripura acquiring 64% votes.
8. Issues and concerns are visibly different from the so-called mainland of the nation.
52
Political Party % of Votes
BJD 44.1
INC 26
BJP 21.5
IND 1.5
BSP 0.1
JMM 0.8
AOP 0.7
AAP 0.7
CPI 0.3
API 0.2
OJM 0.2
CPI(M) 0.2
AITC 0.1
NOTA 1.5
Analysis
1. 21 constituencies.
2. Here BJP was nil in 2009 but won a single seat this time around.
3. All the other seats were captured by BJD as compared to 14 in 2009.
4. INC completely routed, it had won 6 seats in 2009.
5. Assembly elections too were held simultaneously in Odisha and BJD won for the fourth
consecutive term 117/147 Assembly seats. The key to success of Naveen Patnaik and his
BJD is his pro-poor schemes, improved transportation & communication network and a
transparent administration.
54
PMK 3.6
CPI 1.7
AAP 1.1
BSP 0.3
NOTA 0.3
Analysis
1. Single constituency, 30 candidates contested.
2. Formed in 2011 AINRC defeated INC by 60,854 votes.
3. In 2009 this seat was won by INC.
56
Political Party % of Votes
ADMK 44.3
DM 23.6
BJP 5.5
DMK 5.1
PMK 4.4
INC 4.3
MDMK 3.5
IND 2.1
VCK 1.5
PT 0.66
CPI(M) 0.5
CPI 0.5
IUML 0.5
AAP 0.5
BSP 0.4
NOTA 1.4
Analysis
1. 39 constituencies.
2. ADMK increased its tally phenomenally from just 9 in 2009 to 37 with 44.3% of vote
share.
3. BJP bettered its tally of 0 in 2009 by acquiring a single seat this time. (5.5% votes)
4. DMK (18 seats in 2009) and INC (8 seats in 2009) are totally routed. This is despite the
fact that DMK has acquired 23.6% of the total votes polled.
58
Political Party % of Votes
BJP 42.3
SP 22.2
INC 7.5
IND 1.7
AAP 1
AD 1
RLD 0.9
PECP 0.6
QED 0.4
BMUP 0.2
CPI 0.2
NOTA 0.7
Analysis
1. 80 constituencies.
2. Greatest surprises were in store in Uttar Pradesh where BJP acquired 71/80 seats with
42.7% of votes. It increased its tally from a pathetic show of 10 seats in 2009.
3. INC managed just 2 seats as its tally declined all the way from 21 it had acquired in 2009.
The 2 seats are that of Amethi & Rae Bareilly from where Rahul Gandhi and Sonia
Gandhi contested.
4. SP that emerged largest party with 23 seats in 2009 was restricted to just 5 seats. 2
among these 5 seats are won by Mulayam Singh himself.
5. The elephant size zero that BSP scored in the state in comparison to 20 in 2009 is one of
the biggest upsets of 2014 Lok Sabha polls. This clearly indicates a shift in a major chunk
of Dalit and Bahujan votes away from BSP towards BJP. Decline of SP also indicates the
similar pattern in Yadav and other OBC castes.
6. BJP in general and Modi in particular had targeted UP for some special attention for
quite some time. Modi had even appointed his close aide Amit Shah as In Charge of
BJP’s election campaign in UP. Modi even contested from Varansi and won by a huge
margin.
7. One important reason in the gigantic victory of BJP is bifurcation of Muslim and other
anti-communal and secular votes in four pieces i.e. SP, BSP, INC, and AAP. While anti-BJP
vote were thus divided, Hindu votes were consolidated behind Modi leaving all the four
opposing forces in the lurch. This phenomenon is especially notable in Aaonla, Bareilly,
Barabanki, Bulandshahr, Meerut, Moradabad, Rampur, Saharanpur, Sambhal, and
Varansi etc.
60
Political Party % of Votes
AITC 39.3
CPI(M) 22.7
BJP 16.8
INC 9.6
RSP 2.4
CPI 2.3
AIFB 2.1
IND 0.9
SUCI 0.7
BSP 0.5
AIUDF 0.2
NOTA 1.1
Analysis
1. 42 constituencies.
2. BJP won 2 (1 in 2009), CPI(M) won 2 (9 in 2009), and INC won 4 (6 in 2009).
3. AITC emerged as the biggest success with 34 seats (19 in 2009).
4. The decision not to have a pre-poll alliance with AITC proved fatal for INC.
5. The decisive victory of Mamta Bannerjee’s AITC is a cause of great concern for the left
especially CPI(M). The popular verdict is a clear indicator that for the youths,
communism and revolutionary politics is not as appealing as it was a generation ago.
6. West Bengal too is one of those rare states where Modi magic did not work despite the
fact that magicians like P.C. Sorcar Jr. contested on the BJP ticket and lost.
61
Role of RSS in Lok Sabha Elections 2014
Based on his field study of UP and newspaper reports, Badri Narayan in his article “Modi’s
Modus Operandi in the 2014 Elections” published in EPW May 17, summarises the role of RSS in
the recently concluded Lok Sabha Elections. According to him, “various arms of the Sangh
Parivar, the RSS itself, the BJP cadre and a team of technically-equipped workers, ‘the blue
brigade’” had been working “round the clock for the success of Narendra Modi’s personality-
oriented campaign.”
He highlights the following points.
• The role of RSS in providing perspective and structure for the entire campaign of the BJP
in 2014 Lok Sabha Elections has not been duly emphasised or researched.
• BJP is the political wing of RSS. RSS claims that it would never work for a political party.
But ever since the candidature of Narendra Modi was announced, the RSS had taken
over the entire organisational activities of electing and projecting Narendra Modi into its
own hands.
• The difference between the words and deeds of the RSS can be grasped by the public
statement of Mohan Bhagwat, the chief of RSS, who said in Bangalore that projecting
Narendra Modi is not their agenda. In Bhagwat’s opinion “their agenda is to bring issues
in front of the people. Since the RSS is not a political party we have our own limitations.”
• Nearly one lakh RSS group leaders and six lakh swayamsevaks from 42,000 units spread
across the country were working full time to ensure the BJP’s victory. A high level team
of Sangh leaders has set up a control room in Varanasi from where it kept an eye on all
the party workers round the clock. The team was being led by Amit Shah, Narendra
Modi’s right hand man, assisted by Anil Bansal, a top RSS leader.
• One of the methods of campaigning adopted by the RSS was to visit remote villages
using carriages termed “Namorath”. According to reports, nearly 400 such carriages had
been gathered and they have been used (or at least targeted) to reach a majority of
villages in UP, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. These carriages are inscribed with
large portraits of Narendra Modi and go about campaigning with loud advertisement
jingles promoting him. The carriages halt at road crossings and chaupals screening films
and entertaining crowds.
• Volunteers of the RSS have also spread out to many villages to engage in aggressive
door-to-door campaigning.
• The RSS has also instructed volunteers to keep tabs on BJP workers and other people to
prevent anti-party activities. Sangh sources say that the volunteers and workers of RSS
have been provided video cameras so that they can record the activities of leaders and
workers of BJP who are under suspicion.
62
• The RSS was engaged in collecting feedback on the impact of Narendra Modi’s speeches
during his electoral rallies prior to the 2014 elections. In November 2013, Badri Narayan
visited Bahraich with a research team to study a rally organised by the BJP and
addressed by Narendra Modi. As the rally ended, a group of 50 people started taking
feedback from the audience about Narendra Modi’s speech by questioning them in their
local language. They were asking questions like “How did you like Modiji’s speech? What
is your opinion on what he said about Muslim terrorists? He has also challenged the
‘Muslim mafi a’ of this region. What is your opinion about it?” Through these and
several such questions they were trying to obtain feedback from different people by
adopting different styles of questioning about Modi’s speech. Some of them had audio
tapes in their hands while some were just interacting orally. It appeared that their aim
was to understand the reaction of Hindus to the aggressive speech challenging “Muslim
terrorists” which later went on to address Muslims in general, besides to seek the
opinion of the people in the audience about Modi’s plans for development. (It should be
noted that this speech was delivered just days after the bomb blast that took place
during his Patna rally). Similar feedback gathering volunteers were noticed at other
rallies and they later found to be going to RSS office together.
• They were also seen to be interacting with the common people at tea stalls who did not
necessarily come to the rally.
• One local RSS volunteer at the condition of anonymity told the researchers that a group
of local volunteers of RSS collect information about the impact of the main issues of
Modi’s speech from the listeners at the rally. This information was then presented at
rally review meetings held at the local RSS office. The main issues that emerge from the
reactions of the common people are then presented at the RSS shakhas held in big cities
and towns. This feedback is then taken to the top brass of the RSS. Through these
shakhas, Narendra Modi’s image was recreated and disseminated. Alongside, insights
were gathered for Modi’s future speeches and the mobilisational strategies of the BJP
were then chalked out.
• In the context of the 2014 elections, Modi’s speeches are considered the most infl
uential and effective mobilisational tool of BJP, which is why so much importance is
being given to organising his rallies and then gauging the impact of his speeches.
• Both the RSS and BJP had formed booth management committees at the ground level
across villages and small towns. The committees formed by RSS comprised of 10 to 20
highly empowered volunteers depending on the place and its situation. For example if a
place was dominated by dalits and backward castes, the committee members are
selected from within their communities.
• In order to reach out to women, the RSS has trained women leaders and supporters of
BJP with whom they were constantly in touch.
63
• If any household is found to be unsatisfied with Modi’s persona or the politics he
represents, they softly try to convince it about the positive aspects of Modi’s rule and
his “leadership”.
• The most important task of the committee members was to ensure that the people, to
whom this outreach was extended, were brought to vote in the respective booths on
election days. The organising team of the RSS which was supervising Narendra Modi’s
electioneering had adopted a very strict attitude and the volunteers who fail to reach
the selected families in and around the booth were held accountable by the members.
• A team of highly skilled professionals had spread out across the districts and cities of UP
with the mission of keeping a watch on the local teams working in each district to
campaign for Modi and to report directly to Amit Shah. Since the trademark dress code
of the team is a blue kurta and blue jeans this team is known as the “blue brigade”.
Most of the members of this team are graduates in professional courses from reputed
colleges and universities both in India and in the United States.
• Using technological tools and know-how, this set of technical professionals are
masterminding various aspects of campaigns such as the “Chai pe Charcha”
(conversations over “tea”, either in physical locations or internet chats), Modi 3D rallies
(featuring holographic technology enabling “simulcasting” of Narendra Modi’s rallies),
etc.
• This team, has been divided into two-member units which have been sent to each Lok
Sabha constituency. These units have been entrusted with the task of judging the
activities of the local teams and where the local teams are not very effi cient, the
members of the technical team themselves form campaign teams. The technical team
members regularly update the central unit of Modi’s team about their activities.
• This team functions independently of the district and city committees of BJP but is in
touch with all the candidates of BJP, has contact numbers of the officers of booth
management committees. It is reported the technical team has changed nearly two
dozen booth committees.
• The technical team monitors the needs of the local candidates and the input is sent to
the central team, which provides the necessary support to the local BJP candidates. This
team also works in coordination with the RSS and they exchange information and inputs
to form strategies for electoral mobilisation.
64
Youth factor
in General Elections 2014
In his meeting with Convener CSG on 30 May, Hilal Ahmed of
CSDS has underscored the youth factor in determining the
electoral sweep in the favour of BJP. He argued that ironically
youth of the nation have identified themselves with the high
profile campaign of BJP centring upon the strong image of
Modi and his rhetoric of development. In this regard role of
new social media and its effective utilisation by saffron forces
cannot be ignored.
Some of the important points noted by Sanjay Kumar,
Director CSDS, on youth factor influencing polls 2014
mentioned in his opinion-article “Higher turnout in youth
vote” (The Hindu, 28 May) are as follows:
• These elections witnessed much higher participation
of first-time voters compared to past elections.
• Though all the first-time voters didn’t go in favour of
BJP but even a marginal shift in the votes of first-
time voters in its favour was enough to help the
party register an impressive victory because first-
time voters were in large numbers in most
constituencies.
• In some States, the BJP seemed to have more votes
among ‘other young voters’ (23-25 years of age) or
among middle-aged voters.
• Compared to the average national turnout of 66.6
per cent, the turnout among first-time voters (18-22
years) and ‘other young voters’ was 68 per cent. It
should be noted that the turnout among young
voters has always been lower compared to the
average national turnout.
• The turnout among first-time voters was much
higher than the average turnout in Chhattisgarh,
Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Punjab and
Rajasthan.
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73
Abbreviations:
AAP – Aam Aadmi Party
ADMK – All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
AGP – Asom Gana Parishad
AIFB – All India Forward Block
AIMIM – All India Majlis e Ittehadul Muslimeen
AINRC – All India N.R. Congress
AITC – All India Trinamool Congress
AIUDF – All India United Democratic Front
AJSUP – AJSU Party
AOP – Aama Odisha Party
API – Ambedkarite Party of India
BBM – Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangh
BJD – Biju Janata Dal
BJP – Bhartiya Janata Party
BLSP – (Not Available)
BMUP – Bahujan Mukti Party
BOPF – Bodoland Peoples Front
BSP – Bahujan Samaj Party
BVA – Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi
BYS – Bharatiya Yuva Shakti
CPI – Communist Party of India
CPI(M) – Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPI(ML)(L) – Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation
CSM – Chhattisgarh Swabhiman Manch
DMDK – Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam
DMK – Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
GaAP – Gareeb Aadmi Party
GGP – Gondwana Ganatantra Party
HJCBL – Haryana Janhit Congress (BL)
INC – Indian National Congress
IND – Independent
INLD – Indian National Lok Dal
IUML – Indian Union Muslim League
IVD – Inqalab Vikas Dal
JaSPA – Jai Samaikyandhra Party
JBSP – Jai Bharat Samanta Party
JDP – Jharkhand Disom Party
JDS – Janata Dal (Secular)
JDU – Janata Dal (United)
JKNPP – Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party
JKP – Jharkhand Party
JMM – Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
74
JPC – Jammu & Kashmir People Conference
JVM – Jharkhand Vikas Morcha
KEC(M) – Kerala Congress (Mani)
LB – Lok Bharati
LJP – Lok Jan Shakti Party
LSP – Lok Satta Party
MCO – Marxist Co-ordination Committee
MDMK – Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
MDPC – Manipur Democratic Peoples's Front
MNS – Maharashtra Navnirman Sena
NC – Jammu & Kashmir National Conference
NCP – Nationalist Congress Party
NOTA – None Of The Above
NPEP – National Peoples Party
NPF – Naga Peoples Front
NUZP – National Unionist Zamindara Party
OBC – Other Backward Class
OJM – Odisha Jan Morcha
PDP – Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party
PECP – Peace Party of India
PMK – Pattali Makkal Katchi
PPA – Peoples Party of Arunachal
PPOI – Pyramid Party of India
PT – Puthiya Tamilagam
PWPI – Peasants & Workers Party of India
QED – Quami Ekta Dal
RADP – Rashtriya Deshaj Party
RJD – Rashtriya Janata Dal
RLD – Rashtriya Lok Dal
RLSP – Rashtriya Lok Samta Party
RPI – Republican Party of India
RPI(A) – Republican Party of India (Athvale)
RSP – Revolutionary Socialist Party of Kerala
RSP(B) – Revolutionary Socialist Party of Kerala (Bolshevik)
RSPS – Rashtriya Samaj Paksha
RSS – Rashtriya Swayemsevak Sangh
SAD – Shiromani Akali Dal
SC – Scheduled Castes
SDF – Sikkim Democratic Front
SDP – Socialistic Democratic Party
SDPI – Social Democratic Party of India
SJD – Socialist Janata (Democratic)
SJPR – Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)
SKM – Sikkim Krantikari Morcha
75
SP – Samajwadi Party
SP(I) – Socialist Party (India)
SS – Shiv Sena
ST – Scheduled Tribes
SUCI – Socialist Unity Centre of India
SWP – Swabhimani Paksha
TDP – Telugu Desam Party
TRS – Telengana Rashtra Samiti
UDP – United Democratic Party
VCK – Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi
WPI – Welfare Party of India
YSRCP – Yuvajana Sramika Raithu Congress Party
Note:
• All the data used in this study has been taken from the site of Election Commission of India.
http://eciresults.ap.nic.in/
• All the maps are used from the site www.mapsofindia.com.
• This study is intended for private circulation only, no commercial use or copyright violation is
intended.
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