书书书
中国、欧盟与拉美:当前议题与未来合作犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶
犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犐狊狊狌犲狊犪狀犱犉狌狋狌狉犲犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
[德]克 敏 牛海彬 主编
上 海
图书在版编目(犆犐犘)数据
中国、欧盟与拉美:当前议题与未来合作/(德)
克敏,牛海彬主编.—上海:上海人民出版社,2011
ISBN978 7 208 09811 4
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中国、欧盟与拉美:当前议题与未来合作[德]克 敏
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!1
犉狅狉犲狑狅狉犱
TheShanghaiInstitutesforInternationalStudies(SIIS)andtheFriedrich
EbertStiftungs(FES)OfficeforInternationalCooperationinShanghaihave
beencooperationpartnerssince1985.Duringthepast25yearsthecollaboration
hasprogressivelydeepened,especiallyinthefieldsofInternationalRelationsand
GlobalGovernance,aswellasClimateandEconomicPolicies.Numerous
conferencesandworkshopsorganisedbySIISandFEShaveprovidedaplatform
forChineseandinternationalexpertstoexchangeviewsandknowledgeonnew
developmentsinthesefieldsofstudy.
On27and28April2009,SIISandFESjointlyhostedaninternational
seminaron “China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFuture
Cooperation”inShanghai.Howthetrilateralcooperationmightbeenhancedand
globalchallengesbedealtwithwasanalysedanddiscussedby32participants
fromtheUN,China,theEUandLatinAmerica.Itwasthe7thinternational
conferenceonGlobalGovernancecoorganisedbythetwocooperationpartners.
ThepreviousseminarsanalysedimportantglobalissuesrelatedtoAsia,Europe
andAfrica.WiththerapiddevelopmentofSinoLatinAmericanrelationsover
thepastdecade,thedeepeningparticipationofLatinAmericainglobalaffairs
andthereadjustmentofEULatinAmericanrelations,theconferencefocusedon
thetrilateralrelationshipbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica,andcame
upwithsomerelevantfutureorientedpolicythinking.
Withthispublication wewouldliketosharetheprofoundanalyses,
considerationsandfindingsrelatedtothetrilateralcooperationwithabroader
2 "#$%&'()*+,-.'/012
audience.Weareconfidentthattheconferenceanditspublicationwillcontribute
tothecommondevelopmentofChina,theEUandLatinAmerica.
Shanghai,December2010
ProfessorJiemianYang,PresidentofSIIS
Dr.RudolfTraubMerz,DirectoroftheFESOfficeinShanghai
!1
犆狅狀狋犲狀狋狊
犉狅狉犲狑狅狉犱 1
犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀牶犃狊狊犲狊狊犻狀犵狋犺犲犈犿犲狉犵犻狀犵犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
NiuHaibinandBirteKlemm 193
犘犪狉狋犐 犆狅犿狆犪狉犻狊狅狀狅犳狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪狊犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆狑犻狋犺犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉1 犃犉狅狉犿犪狋犻狀犛犲犪狉犮犺狅犳犛狌犫狊狋犪狀犮犲—犃狀犗狏犲狉狏犻犲狑
狅犳犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
犻狀犪犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犘犲狉狊狆犲犮狋犻狏犲
GüntherMaihold 203
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉2 犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊狋狅犈犝犘狅犾犻犮犻犲狊狅狀犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋
犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀狑犻狋犺犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
JoséAntonioSanahuja 220
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉3 犃犖犲狑犈狉犪犳狅狉犆犺犻狀犪犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊牶
犕狅狉犲犗狆狆狅狉狋狌狀犻狋犻犲狊狋犺犪狀犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊
NiuHaibin 240
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉4 犜犺犲犈犝,犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪牶犌犲狅犿犲狋狉犻犮犪犾
犘犪狋狋犲狉狀狊犻狀犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犪狀犱犉狌狋狌狉犲犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
ErikaRuizSandoval 253
2 !
犘犪狉狋犐 犐 犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚狊犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆狑犻狋犺狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉5 犈犿狆犻狉犻犮犪犾犃狀犪犾狔狊犻狊牶犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪/犈犝—犜狉犲狀犱狊犪狀犱犉犻犵狌狉犲狊
WelberBarralandGustavoRibeiro 267
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉6 犜狉犪犱犻狀犵狑犻狋犺犌犻犪狀狋狊牶犐狊犜狉犪犱犲犘狅犾犻犮狔狑犻狋犺狋犺犲犈犝
犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪犅犲狀犲犳犻犮犻犪犾狋狅犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚?
CarlosCarvalloSpalding 282
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉7 犗狆狆狅狉狋狌狀犻狋犻犲狊犪狀犱犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犉犪犮犻狀犵犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱
犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犻狀狋犺犲犆狅狀狋犲狓狋狅犳狋犺犲犉犻狀犪狀犮犻犪犾犆狉犻狊犻狊
LuGuozheng 301
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉8 犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犪狀犱犉狌狋狌狉犲犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀狌狀犱犲狉狋犺犲
犈犝犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犃犵狉犲犲犿犲狀狋
KarlBuck 315
犘犪狉狋犐 犐 犐 犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉9 犆犺犻狀犪狊犃狆狆狉狅犪犮犺狋狅犈狀犲狉犵狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲
YuHongyuan 331
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉10 犗犻犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
SunHongbo 347
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉11 犜犺犲犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犘狅犾犻犮犻犲狊
犪狀犱犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔—犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犱犅犲狔狅狀犱
ArnoBehrens 356
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉12 犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犻狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝,犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犕犪犼狅狉
犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犪狀犱犃狉犲犪狊犳狅狉犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
MaríaCristinaSilvaParejas 371
犘犪狉狋犐 犞 犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犪狀犱犛犮狅狆犲犳狅狉犕狌犾狋犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犻狊犿
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉13 犃犖犲狑犔狅狅犽犪狋狋犺犲犜狉犻犪狀犵狌犾犪狋犻狅狀犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝,
犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
JiangShixue 391
Contents 3
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉14 犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀
犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犔犻狋狋犾犲犈狓狆犲狉犻犲狀犮犲,犅狌狋犅犻犵犘狅狋犲狀狋犻犪犾
KarlBuck 405
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉15 犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾
犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犪狀犱犛犮狅狆犲犳狅狉犕狌犾狋犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犻狊犿
MarcelFortunaBiato 423
犃犫狅狌狋狋犺犲犆狅狀狋狉犻犫狌狋狅狉狊 436
书书书
! 193
犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀牶
犃狊狊犲狊狊犻狀犵狋犺犲犈犿犲狉犵犻狀犵犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀
犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
!"# $%"&"' %'( )"*+, -.,//
Asanemergingglobalplayer,Chinaisexpandingitseconomicand
diplomatictiesrapidlywiththedevelopingregions,especiallyAfricaandLatin
America.EuropeanconcernsabouttheimplicationsofChinasenlargedpresence
inAfricaalsoapplywithregardtoChinaspresenceinLatinAmerica.Latin
Americaisbecomingmoreindependentanditsintegrationintheworldeconomy
isdeepening.Chinaisenjoyinganincreasingshareoftheexternaleconomic
relationsofLatin Americancountries,whiletheEU,althoughstillLatin
Americaslargesttradingpartner,isdiminishinginimportanceinthisregard.
Againstthisbackground,itisfairtosaythatboththeEUandChinaarethe
mainexternalplayerswithregardtoLatinAmericasfuturedevelopment.Thus
itisnecessarytoreviewtheperspectivesofbothChinaandtheEUtowardsLatin
America.
LatinAmericaincludesafairnumberofemergingpowers,suchasBrazil,
Mexico,ArgentinaandChile.Theseemergingpowers—plusChina—arebeginning
toexercisemuchmoreinfluenceinglobalaffairs.Brazilhostedthesecond
summitofBRICcountries(Brazil,Russia,IndiaandChina)inApril2010,and
MexicosCancunheldtheUNClimateChangeConferenceinDecember2010.
Brazil,Argentina,Mexico,China,fourEuropeancountriesaswellastheEU
aremembersoftheG20,theworldspremierforumforeconomiccooperation.
Theshareofglobalissuesintheirexternalaffairsisgraduallyrising.Insome
areasofinternationalcooperation,theEUisplayingastrongroleinaddressing
globalchallenges.Inthecontextofpressingglobalchallenges,amongother
multilateralagendas,trilateralcoordinationandcooperationbetweenChina,the
EUandLatinAmericawillcontributetoglobalpublicgoods.
Thechaptersinthisconferencevolumeprovideavarietyofperspectiveson
194 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
trilateralrelations.PartIofferscomparativestudiesoftheEUandChinas
foreignpolicytowardsLatinAmericaandthelattersresponsetotheirLatin
Americanpolicy.PartI Ifocusesonthetransregionalcooperationbetweenthe
SouthernCommon Market(MERCOSUR)andChina,aswellastheEU,
respectively.InPartI I I,thedifferentperspectivesofChina,theEUandLatin
Americawithregardtoissuesofenergysecurityandclimatechangeare
analysed.PartI Vprovidessomefutureorientedthinkingontheprospectsof
trilateralcooperationanditsinfluenceonmultilateralism.Overall,thisvolumeis
aimedatunderstandingthedynamicsoftrilateralcooperationinthecontextofa
pressingglobalagendaandincreasinglyclosetiesbetweenChinaandLatin
America.
1.犖犲狑犈狓狆犲狉犻犲狀犮犲狊狅犳犛狅狌狋犺犖狅狉狋犺犪狀犱犛狅狌狋犺犛狅狌狋犺犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
EnhancingSouthSouthcooperationhasbeenastrategicchoiceforemerging
powerssuchasChinaandBraziltoexplorethepotentialofeconomicglobalisationsince
theriseofmajordevelopingcountrieshaschangedthelayoutoftheworldeconomy.
MostLatinAmericancountrieshaveintegratedthemselveswellintheworld
economy,especiallytheSouthAmericancountrieswithdiversifiedandbalanced
traderelationsworldwide.Chinais,inthisregard,anattractivechoicefor
them;moreover,closertieswithChinahavehelpedthemtosomeextenttodeal
withtheworldeconomicrecessionsince2008.Atthesametime,theEUasa
traditionalpartnerstillmaintainsstrongandcomprehensivelinkageswithLatin
America.Againstthis background,comparing the SinoLatin American
relationshipwiththeEULatinAmericanrelationshipmightbehelpfulforboth
ChinaandtheEUintheireffortstolearnhowtobuildupanddeepenthose
relationships.
1.1!EULatinAmericanRelationship
Accordingto Maihold (Chapter1),theperformanceoftheEULatin
Americanrelationshipislowerthanitspotentialandthusmuchmoreeffort
shouldbeputintoit.SomenewEUmemberslackofpoliticalwillingnessto
engagewithLatinAmerica,thelackofcommonforeignandsecuritypoliciesand
theweakeningoftraditionalsharedvaluesallcontributetothecurrentstagnation
ofEULatinAmericanrelations.Basedonthisanalysis,Maiholdsuggeststhat
bothsidesshouldfocusonconcreteinterestsandpossibilitiesforcooperation,
invitemoreactorstoparticipateininterregionalinteractionandencourageSpain
toplayaconstructiveleadershiprole.InChapter2,Sanahujasystematically
examinesthechallengesfacingtheEUspoliciesondevelopmentcooperationwithLatin
Introduction:AssessingtheEmergingTrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica 195
America.Hearguesthatdevelopmentcooperationisakeyelementofbiregional
relations,andtheEUshouldnotreduceitsaidtotheregion.HesuggeststhattheEU
shouldcooperatewithmiddleincomecountriesinLatinAmericaandprovidegreateraid
inspecificareastoconsolidatedevelopmentalachievements.
Agreeingwiththeargumentthattheregionssufferfromtheirlackofa
singlevoiceinbilateralsummits,RuizarguesinChapter4thatLatinAmericais
evenworseoffbecauseitlacksaregionalinstitutionliketheEU.Althoughthe
bilateralsummitstakeanormativeandjudgmentalapproach,theirunderpinningin
termsofvaluesandinterestsisweakening.LatinAmericawillnotbecometheideal
regiontheEUhasexpectedittobeforthetimebeing,andLatinAmericansalso
shouldnotthinkofEuropesolelyintermsofitsindividualstates,especiallySpain.
1.2!SinoLatinAmericanRelationship
LatinAmericaandChinaareemergingasimportantglobalpartners,
reflectedinthefactthattheyareseekingmorediversifiedandbalancedexternal
economicrelations.Intraderelations,Chinasboomingdemandforraw
materialshascontributedgreatlytothenewcontinuousandstablegrowthof
LatinAmerica.ChinaisalsoincreasingitsFDItotheregioninthesectorsof
energy,agricultureandinfrastructure.ItisoftenarguedthatChinaspresencein
LatinAmericaisdrivenbyeconomicreasonssinceLatinAmericaisahuge
potentialmarketandamajorsupplierofcommodities,aswellasenergy.
However,othervoices,especiallyfromtheChineseperspective,emphasise
Chinasstrengtheningofsocialandculturaltieswiththeregion,whichwas
underlinedinthereleaseofChinasPolicyPaperonLatinAmericaandCaribbean
inNovember2008.
MaiholdarguesinChapter1,therefore,thatthereareafewchallengesfor
theSinoLatinAmericanrelationshipfromtheEUsperspective,including:
(1)Chinaslongtermdemandforrawmaterialswhichreinforcestheroleof
LatinAmericaasasupplierofrawmaterialstotheglobaleconomy;
(2)thecompetitionbetweenChinaandLatinAmericaforexternalinvestments;
(3)thefactthatmostofthetradevolumewithChinaisconcentratedina
fewLatinAmericancountries;and
(4)theTaiwanissue.
AmajorpreoccupationinEuropewithregardtoChinasactivitiesinLatin
Americaistheextenttowhichtheregionwillmanagetodiversifyitseconomic
andpoliticalagendaandexpandintofieldsotherthanrawmaterialsexports.
ConcerningtheinfluenceofChinasLatinAmericanpolicyontheEU,Sanahuja
(Chapter2)pointsoutthatitislimitedbecausetheEUdoesnotwantto
196 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
competewithChinafortheregionsresourcesandChinadoesnotintendtoexert
itspoliticalinfluenceontheregion.NiuHaibin(Chapter3)takesapositiveand
optimisticviewoffutureSinoLatinAmericanrelations.HearguesthatSinoLatin
Americancooperationhasglobalimplicationsintheareasofclimatechange,food
security,energysecurityandtherebuildingoftheinternationaleconomicsystem.
Financialandmutualinvestmentcooperationwillmakethebilateralrelationshipmore
balancedandsustainable.Bothcanlearnfromeachotherwithregardtotheir
developmentexperiences.AstothethirdpartyfactorintheSinoLatinAmerican
relationship,hearguesthatallsidesshouldfollowlogicofglobalisationandwinwin
thinkingratherthancompetitionbetweenspheresofinfluence.
FromtheperspectiveofLatinAmericanscholars,Ruizpointsoutthat
ChinaspresenceinLatinAmericaisbothfearedandneeded(Chapter4).China
hasaclearerunderstandingoftheregionsdiversityandhasmoreincommon
withtheregionthantheEUwithregardtotheinternationalsystem.Besidesthe
economicinfluence,shepointsoutthatChinaspoliticalinfluenceshouldbe
noted.Atthesametime,RuizarguesthatChinawillnotbeasubstituteforthe
USandtheEUbecauserealinterestsandvaluesmustbethebasisforLatin
Americasrelationswithotherregionsandcountries.
2.犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚狊犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊狑犻狋犺狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪
ManyexpertsarguethattheEUstraderelationshipwithMERCOSURhas
a NorthSouthcharacter,butalsounderlinethatthe ChinaMERCOSUR
relationshiphassimilarcharacteristic.BarralandRibeiro(Chapter5)suggest
thatMERCOSURsintegrationintotheChineseeconomyinthefirstdecadeof
thetwentyfirstcenturyseemstobereminiscentofaNorthSouthparadigm
typicalofthe nineteenth century:the exchange ofraw materials and
manufacturedproducts.MERCOSURhaswitnessednotonlyboomingtradewith
China,butalsochallengestotheregionslocalindustriesandcompetitionin
exportstothirdmarkets.However,theauthorsdonotobjecttotradewith
China,andtheyarguethatMERCOSURshouldmaintainthistraderelationship,
whileincreasingthecompetitivenessofitsindustrialproducts.CarvalloSpalding
(Chapter6)agreeswiththeaboveargumentsandfurthersuggeststhatrelations
with Chinaareevolvingintocooperationonvalueaddedproductionand
infrastructure.HesuggeststhatMERCOSURshouldusedesignpoliciesto
enhance education,infrastructure,innovation,a favourable investment
environmentandcooperationbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors.Lu
Guozheng,too,emphasisesthispositiveattitudetothefuturedevelopmentof
MERCOSURChinarelationsinChapter7.
Introduction:AssessingtheEmergingTrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica 197
AlthoughitisakindofNorthSouthtraderelationship,Buckarguesin
Chapter8thataggregatedEUinvestmentinLatinAmericaexceedsitsstocksin
China,IndiaorevenJapan,andthatitisparticularlystronginnonprimary
sectors,whichcontributesmoretolocaladdedvalueandjobs.Healsoargues
thattheEUwouldbenefitgreatlyfromestablishinganFTAwithMERCOSUR,
consideringitshugeserviceeconomy.Whilehepointsoutthattheagriculture
issueisthekeytotheFTA,hethinksthattheproblemiswhethertheworldcan
supplyenoughagriculturalproductsratherthanthelevelofsubsidiesinthis
sector,withrisingglobaldemandforagriculturalproducts.Thepostliberal
agenda—includingenergy,infrastructure,migration,theenvironmentand
healthcare—wouldenjoyhigherpriorityinbilateralcooperation.
3.犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲
InPart3,YuHongyuan(Chapter9)andSunHongbo(Chapter10)provide
Chineseperspectivesonclimatechangeandoilcooperation,respectively.Yu
HongyuanpointsoutthatChinaisseekingamodelthatwillallowittoresolve
theconflictsbetweenenergyconsumptionandenvironmentaldegradationby
meansofinternationalcooperation.Chinasmajorapproachesincludedomestic
capacitybuilding,winwincooperation,commonbutdifferentresponsibilities
andalowcarboneconomy.HearguesthatChinasactiveattitudetowards
climatechangeissueswillhavemanyimplications,whileonlybyadoptingareal
lowcarboneconomycouldChinaplayaleadingroleinthedevelopingworld.
SunHongboarguesthatLatinAmericaisnotyetChinasmainoilsupplier,
butitcouldbeastrategicalternativeallowingChinatodiversifyitsoilsupplyin
thelongrun.ChinasoilstrategytowardsLatinAmericashouldtargetthree
objectives:marketentry,investmentprotectionandoilimports.WhileChina
hasgreatpotentialwithregardtoinvestingintheLatinAmericanoilsector,Sun
HongboproposesthatChinasinvestmentshouldalsotakeintoaccountthe
politicaluncertaintyinsomeLatinAmericancountries,localemploymentandthe
environmentalsituation.
InChapter11,Behrensprovidesacomprehensiveandinsightfulanalysisof
theEUsclimatechangeandenergysecuritypolicychoices,aswellastheir
implicationsforcooperationbetweentheEUandemergingeconomies.Heargues
thatclimatechangepolicyinthecontextofambitiousgreenhousegasreduction
targetsmaybebeneficialtothesecurityofsupply.Concerningthecontradictory
relationshipbetweenrenewableenergyandenergysecurity,hesuggeststhat
internationalcooperationwillbecrucialinachievingacleanandsecureglobal
energysystem.Hepointsoutthatemergingeconomiesarenotonlymajor
198 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
greenhousegasemittersbutalsoproducersofcleanenergytechnologies;theEU
shouldworktogetherwiththemtodevelopcleanenergytechnologiesand
especiallytoimproveenergyefficiency.
SilvaParejas(Chapter12)offersaLatinAmericanperspectiveoninternational
cooperationintheareasofenergysecurityandclimatechange.Shestatesthat
LatinAmericahasastrongerpositiontocompeteintheworldmarketgivenits
effortstodiversifyitsenergygrid,incorporaterenewableenergieswithaviewto
nationalindependenceandadoptsustainableenergystrategies.SilvaParejas
suggeststhattheregionsdiversityshouldbenotedratherthanfocusingon
Brazilalonewithregardtotheregionsclimateissues.Intermsofexternal
dialoguesonenergyandtheenvironment,LatinAmericashouldbetreatedasa
speciallyfavouredpartywithafocusoncooperationandwinwinsolutions.Like
Behrens,sheemphasisestheimportanceoftheInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency
asaleadinginstitutionalframeworkforpossibletrilateralormultilateralcooperation.
4.犐狊犜犺犲狉犲犃狀狔犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀?
Mostexpertsdonotthinkthattherehasbeensubstantialtrilateral
cooperationbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmericatodate,althoughtheydo
havedifferentbutpromisingvisions whenimaginingfuturescenariosfor
trilateralrelations.Amongthefactorswhichaffecttrilateralcooperation,the
expandingroleofChinainLatinAmericaandthepressingregionalandglobal
challenges,especiallyinsocalled“lowpolitics”,willenergisetheemergingtrilateral
cooperation.
InChapter13,JiangShixuearguesthat,unliketheUnitedStates,whichis
uneasyaboutChinasexpandingpresenceintheWesternHemisphere,Europe,
andparticularlySpain,wishestoofferahelpinghandtoChinatofurtherdevelop
itsrelationswithLatinAmerica.BecauseofcommonChineseandEUconcerns
withregardtoenergysecurity,fightingpovertyandinequalityinLatinAmerica
trilateralcooperationmightbedeveloped.TakingSpainasacasestudy,Jiang
ShixueexaminesSpainspossibilitiesasapromoterofSinoLatinAmerican
cooperationintheareaslistedinChinasPolicyPaperonLatinAmericaandthe
Caribbean.HisstudyshowsthatSpaincanbehelpfultoChinaintheeconomic,
culturalandsocialareas—inotherwords,areasbelongingtolowpolitics.
Globalissuesrequireglobalsolutions.InChapter14,addressingglobal
challengesandtreatingtheworldeconomyasawhole,Buckarguesthat
triangularcooperationispromisingevenifthereislittleexperienceinthis
regard.Heliststhefollowingfieldsofcooperation:globalinstitutional
architecture,norms,actionsandsoon;labourandhumanrights;theDoha
Introduction:AssessingtheEmergingTrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica 199
process;educationandinnovation;andnontraditionalsecurityissues.Buckalso
presentsacasestudyofAfricatoexplorethepossibilityoftrilateralcooperation
thereinpositiveterms.Notingthenegativeaspectsoftrilateralcooperation,
suchashighertransactioncosts,hesuggeststhatthefocusshouldbeon
structuralissuesandbuildingpeopletopeoplecontacts,aswellascultural
exchanges.
FortunaBiatoarguesinthelastchapterofthisconferencevolume(Chapter
15)thatthebestwaytoachievetrilateralcooperationistogothrough
establishedbilateralrelationships.Theinstitutionalframeworkisstillnotready
fortrilateralcooperation,andtheregionalintegrationofLatinAmericaasa
wholehasnotbeenaccomplished,butthereisalreadyenoughspacefor
promotingjointprojects.OneapproachistopromotetheparticipationoftheEU
andChinaindevelopingmajorfinancialdevelopmenttoolsinLatinAmerica,
suchastheAmericanDevelopmentBank.Theotherapproachistofindjoint
projectsintheareasofastronavigation,satellites,andcleanenergy.Cooperation
betweenemergingpowersisgraduallyinfluencingtheinternationalsystemand
theglobalagenda,whichdoesnotmeantheycanundertakemajorprojects
withoutcooperationwithdevelopedcountries.TheRioGroupisworkingto
promoteinstitutionaldialoguewithChinaandtheEU,whichhasmadesome
progress.Inthelongrun,abroaderanddeeperglobalagendawillprovidemore
andmoreinstancesforachievingtrilateralcooperationbetweenChina,theEU
andLatinAmerica.
TheShanghaiInstitutesforInternationalStudies(SIIS)andtheFriedrich
EbertStiftung(FES)wouldliketothankalltheauthorsfortheirwillingnessto
cooperateinthispublication.AsallpaperswerewrittenforthejointSIISFES
InternationalConference“China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesand
FutureCooperation”thattookplaceinApril2009,theythereforereflectthe
stateofknowledgeatthisdate.Onlysomeofthepaperswereupdatedduringthe
editingprocess.
Nobilingualvolumeispossiblewithoutknowledgeabletranslators.DrWu
Xiaozhen,DrZhouBaowei,ZhaoRuoyuandLuYangtranslatedtheEnglish
contributionsintoChinese.JamesPattersonrevisedalltheEnglishpapersfor
publication.Wemuchappreciatetheirprofessionalefforts.
! 203
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉1
犃犉狅狉犿犪狋犻狀犛犲犪狉犮犺狅犳犛狌犫狊狋犪狀犮犲—犃狀犗狏犲狉狏犻犲狑狅犳
犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
犻狀犪犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犘犲狉狊狆犲犮狋犻狏犲
0#̈'+1,* 2%"13.(
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
FormerBrazilianPresidentFernandoHenriqueCardosocommentedonhis
lastmeetingwiththepresidentsofLatinAmericaandtheEuropeanUnionas
follows(Maihold2007:149):“Althoughwefeelverycloseinspirit,inreality
wecontinue(tobe)quitedistant.”AlthoughhewasreferringtotheMadrid
SummitbetweenEuropeandLatinAmericain2002,thisalsoappliestothelast
Summit,heldon11and12May2006inVienna.Thismeetingincludedthe
participationofonethirdofthenationsrepresentedinthe UN General
Assembly.Itresulted,ontheonehand,inthecommencementofnegotiations
aimedatconcludingafreetradeagreementwiththeCentralAmericancountries
and,ontheotherhand,inthedecisiontodevelopanegotiationperspectivewith
theAndeanCommunityofNations(ACN).Incontrasttothesepositiveresults,
therewasstillnolightattheendofthetunnelregardingafinalconclusionofthe
ongoingfreetradeagreementnegotiationswithMercosur.Inaddition,Latin
AmericaspartiallossofinterestintheEUduetotherisingpresenceofChinain
theregionwasobvious.
Therefore,itisnecessarytolook morecloselyattwoaspectswhich
currentlydeterminerelationsbetweenEuropeandLatinAmerica:
(1)Traditionally,EuropeandLatinAmericahavebeendefined—andhave
definedthemselves—as“naturalallies”withregardtocommonroots(cultural
IwouldliketothankJrgHusarforhisassistancewiththeresearchforthisarticle.Inthe
followingtexttheterm“LatinAmerica”alsoreferstotheCaribbean.
204 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
valuesandsoon),anapproachlinkedtotheexpectationthatthedevelopmentof
therelationshipwouldbesimilarly“natural”.Inthemeantime,however,ithas
becomeevidentthatthesuccessoftheongoing “diplomacybysummit”is
limited,notonlyintermsofscope,butalsobythelackofcaretakenindefining
anagendaandacoherentstrategyofcooperation.
(2)Anumberoffactors,includingtheformatoftherelationship,the
numberofandqualitativedifferenceswithregardtoactors,andthetimetables
imposedonthe mechanismsinvolvedhaveraiseddoubtsandfosteredthe
deceptionbecauseofthedeficiencyinimplementingtheresults.Insteadofthe
agendaofthepresidentsmeetingsbeingrefocused,however,itwasextended
andaprocessofalternativesummitswiththeirownagenda(BusinessMeeting,
AlternativeSummit)hasbeenputinplace.Thegrowingrivalrybetweenthe
officialandthealternativesummitprocessesnowmakesitevenmoredifficultfor
governmentstoreshapesummitdevelopmentinamoresoberfashion.
2.犜犺犲犉狅狉犿犪狋犻狅狀狅犳犪犆狅犿犿狅狀犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犘狅犾犻犮狔
2.1!TheGlorious?poque:The1980s
EuropesrelationswithLatinAmericaevolvedsignificantlyinthe1980s,a
decademarkedby majorconflictsinCentralAmerica.Atthattime,the
EuropeanUnionhadtodecidewhetheritcouldandshouldarbitrateinaconflict
whichwascharacterisedbyhighlevelsofconfrontationtypicaloftheColdWar.
Withitsdecisiontointerfere,despitetheextremelydifficultscenario,inthe
UnitedStatessbackyard,theEuropeanUnionforthefirsttimeassumedthe
roleofaglobalpowerledbyindividualmembercountries,includingFranceand
Germany.Thus,theSanJoséProcessissometimesconsideredtobethe
beginningoftheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)andwasvery
helpfulfordefiningcommonEuropeanpositionsininternationalpolitics,in
whichLatinAmericawasEuropesfirstcounterpart.TheEuropeanUnion
facilitatedthepeacetalksintheregionandencouragedeachcountrytostartand
toadvanceitsnationaldemocratisationprocesses.
2.2!TheCurrentPhaseofStagnation
LatinAmericasgovernments,aswellasrepresentativesofcivilsocietyhave
startedtofeelacertaindistancefromEurope.Thisfeelingmayinpartberelated
to—butalsoconfusedwith—thefactthatLatinAmericaistodayonlyoneof
thepartnersEuropeisinterestedincultivating,havingplayedthecentralrole
inEUforeignrelationsduringthe1980s.Tosomeobservers,thisfeelingof
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 205
disenchantmentisduetoexaggeratedexpectationswithregardtoEuropes
interestinLatinAmerica;forothersitdemonstratesalossofinterestinLatin
AmericabytheEU.Therefore,thereisgrowingcriticismoftheEuropean
Commissionwhich,fromthestandpointofLatinAmericanpoliticians,isnot
respondingadequatelytothechangesintheirregionandtheneedsoftheir
people.Forinstance,whileEuropeisofferingpoliticaldialoguetoitsLatin
Americancounterparts,thelatterexpectnegotiationsonfreetradeagreements
andaccesstotheEuropeanSingleMarket.Inthiscontext,aclimateofsuspicion
andalossofconfidencehasarisen.
2.3!TheStructureofRelations
FromthepointofviewofLatinAmericangovernments,biregionalrelations
withEuropehavechangedinparticularsincetheEUbegantointegratenew
memberstates.Firstofall,thenew memberstateshavenotshownmuch
interestintheregionandarekeenerondevelopingrelationswithAsia.The
EasternEuropeancountriesconsiderLatinAmericanmarketstobenotvery
interestingornotworthtryingtoconquer.Thereforethetraditionalmember
states,suchasSpain,FranceandGermany,continuetobeLatinAmericas
preferredcounterpartsinEurope,eventhoughitisalsolookingformore
intensivecontactswiththeEast.Inaddition,thegrowingdiversityinthe
EuropeanUnion,thedisparitybetweennewandoldmembersandthedifferent
ratesofintegrationindifferentpolicyareashavecalledintoquestionEuropean
leadershipininternationalpoliticsinLatinAmericaneyes.ForLatinAmerica,
Europeanpoliticslacksinternalconsensus,whiletheEU hasdevelopeda
tendencytodrawitswagonsintoacircleandtointensifyrelationswithitsnear
neighbours,inturnneglectingrelationswithregionsfurtheraway,suchasLatin
America.
SpaincontinuestobethemajorportofentryfortheLatinAmerican
countries,althoughSpainsparticipationinLatin Americanpublicservices
privatisationprocessesoverthepastdecadehasledtoacertaindistancing.The
smallerandmediumsizedcountriesoftheregioninparticularseemtohave
difficultyactingstrategicallyinthefaceofthesocalled“Europeanjungle”,asa
resultofwhichtheyarelookingfora“gatekeeper”inordertocometoterms
withtheEU.
ThereisgrowingconcerninLatinAmericaabouttheEuropeantendencyto
talkaboutthenew“Left”movements,partiesandgovernmentsintheregionas
iftheycomprisedanhomogenousdevelopment.FromtheLatin American
perspectivethissimplifyingandgeneralisingviewseemstoproveonceagainthe
206 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
misinterpretationofrecentchangesintheregiononthepartofEuropeans.
Already,ignoringtheknownlackofcoordinationwithinLatinAmerica,the
EuropeanUnionsuspectedthatthenegotiationswithMercosurwereaclever
movetoputNorthAmericaunderpressureintheFreeTradeAreaofthe
Americas(FTAA)process,andviceversa.Furthermore,theprotracted
negotiationsbetweentheEU and Mercosur,incontrasttothesuccessful
associationagreementswithMexicoin1997andChilein2002,demonstratein
theeyesofLatinAmericangovernmentsthatthebilateralapproachismore
effective.TheEuropeanemphasisonregionalandblocnegotiationsisnot
acceptedbythemajorityofLatinAmericancountries,forseveralreasons.In
response,theEuropeanshave,forexample,takenaparticularstancewith
regardtocountrieswhichhaveaspecificprofilewithregardtosize,levelof
incomeandroleininternationalpolitics,declaringa“strategicpartnership”with
Brasilia.ThemeetingofPresidentsattheEuroLatinAmericanLimaSummitin
2008madeevidenttheEUsnewcommitmenttoBrazil,whichwasafforded
prioritysinceitwasconsideredtobeastrategiccounterpartyfortheEUinthe
bilateralsummitheldwithBrazilinLisbonon4July2007.Thisdecision,which
wassomewhatagainstthegrainoftheinterregionalapproachoftheEUitself,
hadinitiallyraisedconcernsinotherLatin Americancountries,suchas
Argentina,particularlybecauseofEuropesinterestinboostingcooperationwith
Brazilinthesphereofbiofuels.Thissituation,whichinitiallywassomethingof
acomplicationforothermembersofMERCOSUR,hassofarhadnofurther
impactonbiregionalrelations.Infact,Brazilhashadtodirectallitsdiplomatic
effortstowardsensuringthatitsinterestinpromotingbioethanolwasrespected
byotherparticipants.Whilebiofuelswereinitiallyseenasaviablealternativetohelp
achieveenergysecurity,inthepastyearcriticismhasariseninEuropeandLatin
Americawithregardtothesustainabilityofbiofuelproductionanditscompatibility
withvarioussocialandenvironmentalstandards.SotheinitialdynamicoftheEuro
Brazilianrelationhasbeenabating,whereasacorrespondingstrategicpartnership
agreementistobesignedwithMexico(EuropeanCommission2008).
FromthepointofviewofsomeLatinAmericancountriesalltheseelements
showthattheEUisonlyveryslowlydrawingconclusionsfromitsanalysisofthe
regionsheterogeneityandthenewpresenceofpowerssuchasChina,Iranand
Russia.Nevertheless,LatinAmericarespondedtotheEuropeanregionalisation
ideaanditsattendantrequirementsbycreatinginpart(similar)supranational
(regional)institutions,suchastheAndeanParliament.Fromtheirperspective,
however,itisuptotheEuropeanstoreanimatethefreetradenegotiationswiththe
regionandindoingsotofosterrealintegration.WhileinLatinAmericanintellectual
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 207
circlestheregionsidentificationas“thewesternendoftheoccident”isaccepted,major
groupswithinLatinAmericansocietiesarefiercelyopposedtodefiningLatinAmerica
anditspeopleasasortofextensionofEurope.Forallthereasonsoutlinedabove,
LatinAmericansmeasuretheseriousnessofthesocalledstrategiccharacteroftheir
relationstoEuropeonlyintermsofconcreteresults.
2.4!ANewCompetitorintheRegion:China
SinceChineseleaderDengXiaopingextolledthe“Pacificcentury”whenhe
metwiththenArgentinePresidentAlfonsínin1988(Xu2003:99),SinoLatin
AmericanrelationshavebecomeamodelforSouthSouthcooperation.Although
thevolumeoftradeonlygrewfromUSD1.3billiontoUSD1.8billionduring
the1980s,thepoliticalslantthathaddominatedChinasLatinAmericapolicy
untilthengavewaytoamorestronglyeconomicorientation (Mann2005:
139f.).Thephaseofindifference,whenChinarestricteditselftoaweakly
developedculturaldiplomacyandselectivecontactswithrevolutionaryforces,
wasover.However,theoverridingimportanceoftheUnitedStatesforthe
AmericasasawholeimposedlimitsonanyexpansionoftheChinesepresence,
andthedominanceofauthoritarianregimesintheregionalsohinderedthe
initiationof morecomprehensiverelations (Mora1997a:94).Duringthe
1950s—notleastundertheswayofUShegemonyoverthecontinent—broad
supportforTaiwanhadbecomeestablishedinLatinAmerica,asaresultof
whichdevelopingrelationswiththePeoplesRepublicofChinawasnotonthe
agenda.FollowingtheCubanRevolutionof1959Chinapromisedthenewregime
“revolutionarysolidarity”intheantiimperialiststruggle,buttherelationship
remainedinsular,andastheCubancametoconcentrateontheSovietUnionas
hisstrategicpartner,evenCubadroppedoffChinasradar.
Chinasgrowinginternationalrecognitionfollowingarapprochementwith
WashingtonandadmissiontotheUnitedNationsin1971alsoreinvigoratedits
relationswiththestatesofLatinAmerica.Since1970thePeoplesRepublicof
Chinahasexpendedamassiveeffortonestablishingdiplomaticrelationswiththe
countriesoftheregion.Chinesesupportincentralquestionsofinternationallaw
anddiplomacysuitedLatinAmericanpoliticalinterests.Thisappliedtothe
establishmentofthetwohundrednauticalmileexclusiveeconomiczone;the
transferofsovereigntyovertheCanalZonetothegovernmentofPanama;and
thebanonnuclearweaponsinLatinAmerica(Mora1997b:42).Tothatextent,
Chinas“openingup”,whichbeganin1978,alsorepresentedaturningpointin
relationswithLatinAmerica,inthesensethatitusheredintheexportled
developmentoftheChineseeconomyandtheassociatedgrowingdependencyon
208 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
imports.Duringthe1990s,Beijingworkedtobuildcloserrelations,especially
withthoseLatinAmericanstatesthatstronglydefendedthenotionofnon
interventionininternalaffairs.Afterthe1989politicalturmoil,LatinAmerican
governmentswererestrained,whileChinafacedstrongcriticismfrom Western
countries.Inrecentdecades,ChinahassoughtdialoguewiththeRioGroupand
improveditsrelationswiththeCaribbeanstatesinparticular,oneformal
expressionofwhichwasitsjoiningoftheCaribbeanDevelopmentBank(CDB)in
1997andtheInterAmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB)in2009.
TheCaribbeanbasinandtheCentralAmericanisthmusremainamongthe
mainconcernsofChinaspoliticaldiplomacy,giventhat12ofthe26countries
thatcontinuetomaintain“diplomaticrelations”withTaiwanarelocatedinthis
region;in South America,only Paraguay maintainssuchrelations.The
CaribbeanalsorepresentsacrucialbridgeheadforChineseinvestments,because
fromhereChinacanexploitexistingpreferentialaccessagreementstogainaccess
totheUSmarket(Mann2005:136).Alsoduringthe1990s,Chinasteppedup
itspresenceintheSouthandCentralAmericanregionalorganizations,gainingobserver
statusattheInterAmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB),theLatinAmericanIntegration
Association(ALADI),theEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
(ECLAC),andtheAssociationofCaribbeanStates(ACS).
ForChinasLatinAmericanpartnersthenewdynamismofthePacific
dimensionexpandstheiropportunitiestodevelopanewstrandofexternal
relationsalongsidethosewiththeUnitedStatesandwithEurope,wherethey
hadinitiallyconcentratedtheirdiversificationefforts.Theyhopeinparticular
thatexpandinggeoeconomictieswillallowthemtoreducetheironesided
concentrationontheUnitedStates.LatinAmericaregardsbuddingChinese
interestastheamalgamthatcouldfillthegapleftinrecentyearsbyEuropes
lackofinterest.AlthoughtheEuropeanUnionhasconcludedbilateralglobal
agreementswithMexicoandChile,subregionalunitssuchasMercosur,the
AndeanCommunity (CAN),andtheCentralAmericanIntegrationSystem
(SICA)arestillawaitingthesuccessfulconclusionofthenegotiationsonfree
tradeagreementswiththeEuropeanUnion.
ThemajorityofLatinAmericanstateshaveslipped,oftenwithoutserious
analysis,intotheoldroleofraw materialsupplierstotheglobaleconomy,
reinforcedonalongtermbasisbyChinasinterestinrawmaterials(Husarand
Maihold2005).ThepredominanteconomicinterestsdemonstratedsofarbyChinado
notappearlikelytodoanythingforLatinAmericaninitiativestoexpandtheirvalue
addedchaintoencompassproductswithgreatermanufacturingcontent.Onthe
otherhand,fewofthestatesintheregionhaveyetmadeanyseriouseffortsto
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 209
enlargetheirrangeofexportsfortheChinesemarketinsuchawayastoexpand
theirmanufacturingcapacities.
Alongsideimmediateeconomicinterests,theexpectationthatexpanding
tradewithChinawillattractmoreinvestmenttotheregionandleadtointensified
noneconomiccooperationalsoplaysaroleforLatinAmerica.FromtheLatin
Americanperspective,relationswithChinashouldnotonlyhelptointegratethe
regionininternationalraw materialsmarkets,butalsoensurethatChinais
permanentlytiedinto Latin Americasdevelopmenteffortsina “trade
cooperationnexus”thatwouldgeneratecooperationoverandabovethecurrent
tradingrelationshipandopenupajointdimensioninthedesignandorganization
ofdevelopmentprojects.Thatwouldallowfurtherdiversificationawayfromthe
UnitedStatesandEuropeanUnioninthisfield,too.
ChinasarrivalonthescenehascausedworrynotonlyintheUSCongress;
theEUisalsoconcernedaboutthemodalitiesofChinaspresenceintheregion.
Theredoesnotappeartobearealdevelopmentalinterestwhichwouldbevery
importantfortheregion;insomeways,the“nonconditionality”ofChinese
cooperationhasraiseddoubtsaboutitscommercialinterests,insomeway
parallelingtheexperienceswithChinaspresenceinAfrica.
Ultimately,LatinAmericaiscompetinginternationallyforEuropeanforeign
directinvestment,whichisincreasinglyflowingnottoLatinAmericabutto
China,largelyduetothehighgrowthratesthere.Thissourceofcapitalis
indispensablefortheregioninviewofitslowdomesticsavingsratesandis
absolutelycrucialforcountries,suchasBrazil,thatcontinuetosufferfroma
veryhighlevelofdebt.ThedecisivefactorwillprobablybewhetherLatin
Americasucceedsinofferingbetteraccessandguaranteesofgoodgovernanceand
stabilitythanitsAsianrival.
SinoLatinAmericantradeflowshavebeenexpandingatahighratesince
2000,andthereisnootherregioninwhichLatinAmericaregisterssuchhigh
growthrates:thevolumeofforeigntradewithChinarosefrom$2.4billionin
1991to$12.6billionin2000,beforereaching$40billionin2004.Altogether,
ChinasshareofLatinAmericanforeigntradehasrisenfrom1.2to4percent
(althoughtheincreaseisconcentratedinjustafewcountries,includingBrazil,
Mexico,ChileandArgentina),whilethecompositionhasshiftedsomewhatfrom
agriculturaltomineralproducts.Labourintensiveproductsmakeup86.3per
centofChinasexportstoLatinAmerica,whileexportsintheoppositedirection
are76.1percentraw materialsand23.9percentindustrialgoods.North
AmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)memberMexico,whichexports
primarilyelectronicstoChina,mustberegardedasaspecialcase.Thevolumeof
210 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
SinoLatinAmericantradereached$100billionin2007,whichrepresentsmore
thanadoublingoftradebetweentheregionanditsnewAsianpartner(CEPAL
2008:151ff.).
IntherankingsofChinascumulativeforeigninvestmentLatinAmericahas
reachedfifthplace,butonlythreeLatinAmericancountriesareamongthe
twelvelargestrecipients:Peruatseven(notleastduetotheprioritygivento
ironproduction),Mexicoatnine(largelytheconsequenceoftheconstructionof
aChinesetextileplant)andBrazilattwelve.Overthecomingyearsbillionsof
dollarsofChineseinvestmentareexpectedtobedirectedintovariousrawmaterials
sectors:copper(ChileandPeru),ironandsteel(Brazil),nickel(Cuba)and
aluminium(Jamaica),aswellastheenergyresourcesofcrudeoilandnaturalgas.In
termsofagriculturalproducts,Chinasforemostinterestsareinsoyabeansandin
gainingaccesstoBrazilandArgentinaforChineseproducts(CEPAL2008:152).
ThedominanceoftheChineseresourcesecuritystrategyhasbroughtwithit
anadditionalincentivetorestructurethecorrespondingsectorsinthecountries
ofLatinAmerica,atradenexusquitedifferentfromtheEuropeanone.Justas
theexternaltradingentitiesfortheChinesesidearestateownedcompanies,the
leadingLatin American operatorsintheraw materialssectorsarealso
increasinglycompaniesthathavereturnedtostateownership.Thatmeansthat
jointventuresaregenerallybasedoncooperationbetweenstaterunenterprises,
whichgivesthemadirectlypoliticalcharacter.Theoptionsforstatecontrolthat
thisopensup,andconverselytheeconomicvulnerabilityinvolved,givethese
venturesadirectintergovernmentaldimension.Thesameappliestothe
appropriationoftherespectivereturns.Thisisgristtothemillofdomestic
clientelismandbilateraldiplomaticmachinations.Closelyassociatedwiththisis
thequestionofthefuturedevelopmenttrajectoryofsuchcooperativeschemes,
becauseoncethe“Chinahype”hasdieddown,theLatinAmericansidewillhave
toachieveasubstantialdiversificationofexportproductsfortheChinesemarket
ifitistoenjoyasecurefuture.
TheverylimitedsuccesstodateinmakingLatinAmericaeconomically
competitiveandthefactthatrentseekingisembeddedinthestructuresofthe
state(Boeckh2002)providessmallgroundsforhopeinthefuture.Whether
SinoLatinAmericancooperationwilltakeonalongtermcharacterwillprobably
dependdecisivelyontheextenttowhichLatinAmericasucceedsindiversifying
theeconomicandpoliticalagendaandexpandingintofieldsoutsiderawmaterial
exports.If,however,itseffortsfail,itwillhavemissedyetanotherrare
opportunity,apreoccupationquiteprominentinEuropewithregardtoChinas
activitiesintheregion.
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 211
2.5!FearsandHopes
Onthe犲犮狅狀狅犿犻犮犾犲狏犲犾,Latin Americais particularlyinterestedin
commercialrelationswhich,however,haveturnedouttobemoredifficultthan
before,duetotheperceptionthattheEUhasbeenconvertingitselfintoa
“Europeancastle”inordertoprotectitsagriculturalproducers.Themajor
pressureisthereforecomingfromtheagriculturalproducersinLatinAmerica,
whoarekeenonfreetradeagreementswiththeEuropeanUnioninorderto
achievebettermarketaccesstothehugeEuropeanmarket.Atthesametime,
LatinAmericaistryingmoreandmoretoattractEuropeaninvestorsandthusto
triggeranewperiodofEuropeaninvestment,whichinthepastdecadehasbeen
dominatedbySpain.Thegrowingimportanceofmigrationtoandtheremittances
ofLatin American migrantsbasedintheEU haveencouragedinterestin
developingnewideasandprogrammestodeterminehowthismoneycouldalsobe
usedtosatisfydevelopmentneeds.TheEuropeanperceptionthattheFTAA
negotiationsandthenegotiationswiththeEuropeanUnionwouldbemanagedin
acompetitivewaycollapsedinfaceofthesuddenandunexpectedhaltingofthe
continentalFTAAprocessbyLatinAmerica.
Onthe狆狅犾犻狋犻犮犪犾犾犲狏犲犾,afeelingof“alienation”andadivergenceintermsof
basicapproaches—duetodifferingpriorities withregardtotheagenda—
currentlydominate.ForLatinAmerica,themigrationissueandaccesstothe
Europeanmarketarethemostimportantissues.Europe,however,prioritises
suchmattersasdistributionandcohesion,theleveloftaxesanddutiesinstate
income,aswellastheappropriatemodelofregionalintegrationandtheneedfor
securityfor Europeaninvestmentsintheregion—allissues whichevoke
sovereigntyconcernsinLatinAmericancountries.
Regardingthe犱犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犪犻犱犪犵犲狀犱犪,therobustagreementbetween
LatinAmericaandtheEuropeanUniononthebasicquestionsconstitutesasolid
startingpointforthediscussions.TheEuropeanUnioncontinuestobethemajor
donortotheregion,buttheLatinAmericansidecomplainsaboutthelackof
coherencebetweenthebilateralandtheEuropeandevelopmentprogrammes
whicharebasedondifferentandinpartevencontradictorycriteria.Thefactthat
theEuropeanUnionisrepresentedintheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)
andWorldBankbyitsindividualmemberstates,whosepositionsarepretty
muchunpredictable,isalsoaneverendingsourceofconcern.LatinAmericas
governmentsalsocriticisetheconditionalityofEuropeanaid,theconstant
prioritisingofcivilsocietycooperationprogrammes,whichinthelongtermlimit
thecontrolofnationalgovernments,andtheentirelyunresolvedquestionofthe
212 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
handlingofthedrugproblem,theLatinAmericanpositiononwhichconsistsof
askingformoreactiontoreducedemandintheUSandEuropeatnationallevel.
Atthe犵犾狅犫犪犾犾犲狏犲犾,Latin Americahasdiscoveredin Chinaanew
counterpartinitseffortstobroadenitsrangeofexportpartnersandtomatchits
investmentinterests.ThishaschangedtheLatinAmericanattitudetowards
Europewhichisnolongertheonlydiversificationpartnerfortheregion,apart
fromthedominantrelationswiththeUS.Atthesametime,thegovernmentsof
LatinAmericahavestartedtosuspectthattheEuropeanUnionhasdecidedto
sacrificeitsstrategicassociation with Latin Americaifotherimportant
counterpartsatthegloballevelseemmorepromising.
2.6!PerspectivesandNewDynamics
Traditionally,commoninterestsandculturalvalueshavebeenseenasthebasisof
therelationshipbetweentheEuropeanUnionandLatinAmerica.Withtheincreasing
openinguptowardstheUSwayoflife,thebondwithEuropeanculturalvalues
anditsimportanceforpoliticalactionhasdiminished.Inconsequence,theLatin
Americanpartnershaveshownaninterestinreaddressingorevenquestioning
currentpositionsandtodosodemonstrativelyatthegloballevel.
Inthiscontext,manypeoplewouldalsoliketodiscussnewgovernance
issues,especiallytheimprovementofgovernmentsystems,decentralisation
processes,publicprivatepartnershipsandthelike.Recognizingthatgovernance
issuesareofgrowingimportancebeyondthenationallevel,majorcountriesin
LatinAmericahavebecomeleadersandprotagonistsintheprocessesofreformin
internationalregimes.Thus,theglobalagendaisofspecialinteresttothebigger
countries,suchasBrazil,ArgentinaandMexico,whicharetryingtostakea
claimtobetheleadingcountriesintheregion.Inthiscontext,thequestionof
triangularrelationsbetweenthe US,Europeand Latin America maybe
increasinginimportance,whichuptonowhasnotattainedbroadacceptancein
theregion.Ontheotherhand,theLatinAmericangovernmentsareinterestedin
developingtransatlanticrelationsinsuchawaythatSouthAtlanticrelations
mightonedayreachthesamelevelofintensityastheNorthAtlanticones.One
majorstepinthisprocesscouldbethedevelopmentofcommonpositionson
multilateralissuesininternationalpoliticsandinthiswaygiverisetosomesort
ofEuroLatinAmericanallianceininternationalaffairs.
MajorgroupsofLatinAmericanintellectualsstillcontinuetolookatEuropeas
theirmajorsourceofinspirationandarethereforedrivenbythenecessitytorebuildthis
relationship,startingfromcommonvaluesandnorms.Thisfacthassignificant
potentialintheefforttodevelopamorecoherentandsubstantialassociationnotonly
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 213
betweengovernmentsbutalsobetweencivilsocieties,traditionallythemostactive
playerswithregardtoEuropeanLatinAmericanunderstanding.
3.犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犐狀狋犲狉犲狊狋狊犪狀犱狋犺犲犇犲狊犻犵狀狅犳狋犺犲犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆
Thestagnationofitsownintegrationprocessduetothestruggletoachieve
consensusontheConstitutionalTreaty—anessentialelementindeepeningthe
CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)—isaseriouslimitationonthe
EuropeaninterestinexpandingthecooperationwithLatinAmerica.Secondly,
theEuropeanCommissionandEUmemberstatesconsiderthatLatinAmerica
andtheCaribbeannationsareinsufficientlyactiveindevelopingacommon
positionininternationalaffairs,forexamplebyeffectivecoordinationoftheir
foreignpoliciesoratleastbyattemptingtodefineacommonforeignpolicywith
regardtotheEUinthecurrentandupcomingnegotiations.TheRioGrouphas
notprovedtobetheforumforpoliticaldialoguethattheEUexpectedittobe.
Ontheotherhand,theEuropeansaretryingtopromotetheirmodelofeffective
multilateralismasdefinedintheEuropeanSecurityDoctrine.Thisapproach,however,
demandsfromtheEUspartners—withregardtobiregionalrelations—highlevelsof
policycoordinationandtheabilitytocommitthemselvesininternationalconflicts.
TheseareelementswhichuptonowseemunderdevelopedinLatinAmericaand
representamajorchallengeforthecountriesoftheregion.Nevertheless,theEuropean
Unioninsistsonmakingitsconceptofpoliticaldialoguebetweenregionalblocsthe
centralmodalityofinterchangewithitsLatinAmericancounterparts.
ThemajorproblemtheEuropeanUnionisfacinginitspoliticaldialogue
withtheLatinAmericanstatesisthelattersdifferentinterpretationoftheterm
“multilateralism”:whiletheEuropeanstatesarelivingan“effectivemultila
teralism”,intheLatinAmericanstatesasortof“defensivemultilateralism”
predominates,whichmeansthatthereisalackofwilltotransfersovereigntyto
superiorinstitutions,suchasinternationalorganisationsorregimes.The
primaryconcernofmostLatinAmericancountriesisstilltheguaranteeof
nationalsovereignty.The European Union hasnotyetrecognised Latin
Americandifficultieswithitsnewheterogeneityandregionalcohesion.
Lastbutnotleast,theEUisdiscoveringthatLatinAmericahaslost
importanceincomparisontootherworldregions,afactorwhichreducesthe
attractivenessofLatinAmericaasanessentialEUpartner.
Concerningimplementationofitspoliticalinterests,theEuropeanUnion
facesaproblemofdeficientcongruencywiththeLatinAmericansubregion.
ThisisrevealedclearlybyarecentcommunicationoftheEuropeanCommission,
inwhichitstatesthat:
214 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
TheCommissionwishestosendapositivesignalindicatingthatEuropeis
interestedintheregion.Therewouldappeartobeanerroneousperceptionthatthe
EUistooabsorbedbyitsownenlargement,itsimmediateneighboursorproblems
elsewhereintheworld.Thisperceptionalsoraisestheissueofthevisibilityofthe
EUontheground,giventhecomplexityofitsstructuresanditsmeansofaction.
TheCommissionwishestoreaffirmthattheassociationwithLatinAmericaisnot
merelyamatteroffactbutisalsovitalfortheinterestsofbothregions,forboththe
presentandfuture.However,ifEuropeisreadytocommititselffurthertoLatin
America,italsoexpectsafirmcommitmentinreturn(EuropeanCommission2005).
3.1!EuropeanCFSPandNewChallenges
ThereseemtobemajorproblemswiththeCommonForeignandSecurity
Policys(CFSP)structureandtheformatoftherelationship,tothepointofa
growingdisenchantmentonthepartofthepartnersinLatinAmerica.Onthe
onehand,theEuropeanCFSPdemandshighperformingcounterpartsinLatin
AmericawiththeabilitytounderstandandhandlethethreeEuropeanstrandsof
(1)commonand(2)intergovernmentalpartsofforeignpolicyontheEuropean
leveland(3)memberstatesexternalrelationsatthenationallevel.Onthe
otherhand,thestrategyofinterregionalismisopeningupnewroadsofbilateral
arrangementswhichareunderminingtheoriginalconceptofpoliticaldialogue.
Atthesametime,wearewitnessingtheemergenceofnewleadingnationsinthe
regionwhicharetobetheobjectsofmajorattentionfromtheCommissionandin
futurecouldtakeonsomesortofregionalrepresentation.
Nowadays,someobserversarecharacterisingEULatinAmericanrelations
asa“relationshipwithoutemotions”.Thisistrueinsofarastheemotionalparts
ofthisoldbiregionalassociationhavebeensuffocatedatthepoliticalleveland
neglectedatthesociallevelonbothsidesoftheAtlanticforalongtime.
Therefore,newconstitutiveelementsonthepoliticallevelandin(civil)society
arerequiredtogroundandembedthestrategicrelationship.
HerearesomeessentialelementsoftheprojecttoreformtheEuropean
LatinAmericanrelationship:(1)Theimpracticabilityofsummitdiplomacymust
beovercome;(2)TheRioGroupnolongerfunctionsasarepresentativeofall
LatinAmericanpartnersandneedstobereformed;(3)Thereseemstobeaneed
fordifferentiationinEuropesexternalrelations,aswellasinintegrationpolicy;
(4)ThebilateralagendainEuropeandLatinAmericaincludesmostly“soft”
topics,which meansthattopicssuchassecurityarenotcoveredbythe
cooperationagreement;(5)Themixingofthetopicsofthepoliticaldialogue
agendawiththoseofthedevelopmentagendacreatesconfusionbetweenthe
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 215
LatinAmericanpartners;(6)ThevaluesandculturalidentitysharedbyEurope
andLatinAmericaincludeseriousbutoftennotexplicitmattersforpolitical
actionwhichhavetobedefinedandmadeexplicit;(7)TheEuropeanpointof
viewwhichconsidersregionalintegrationastheultimateobjectiveandthe
preferentialwayofcopingwiththeproblemsofinternationalrelationsisbasically
notsharedorlikelytobeadoptedinLatinAmerica;(8)Theselectivityof
contactsandthegrowingimportanceofsecondaryrelationsconfusesthe
partners:explicitly,thespecificrolebeingplayedbySpainintheIbero
AmericancontextisnotorganicallyrelatedtotheEU process;(9)The
potentialsanddangersoftheroleofSpainas“intermediary”,“bridge”or“main
doororchannel”forrelationsbetweenEuropeandLatinAmericahavenotbeen
evaluatedbyeitherside;(10)ThisraisesthequestionoftheEuropeanisationof
Spainsrelationswiththeregionorthe“IberoAmericanisation”ofEULatin
Americanrelations.
3.2!TheChallengeofAsymmetry
Almost10yearsaftertheirdeclarationofstrategicpartnershipinRiode
Janeiro,theHeadsofStateandPresidentsofLatinAmerica/Caribbeanandthe
EuropeanUnion(EU)metinLimaon1617May2008.Sincethismeeting
relationsbetweenthetworegionshavereflectedtheirbasicasymmetry.This
asymmetry,pivotalintheLatinAmericaninterventionsinthelastEULatin
AmericanSummit,notonlyexpressestheinterestinthedifferentiatedtreatment
ofLatinAmericaintradenegotiationsbetweentheEUandCentralAmerica
(SICA),theCommunityofAndeanNations(CAN)andMercosur,butalso
reflectscontradictorypoliticalprioritiesintermsofthematicinterests.The
agendaofthepresidentialmeeting,whichtackled,ontheonehand,poverty,
inequalityandinclusion(attherequestofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean)
and,ontheotherhand,sustainabledevelopment,theenvironment,climate
changeandenergy(whichareofparticularinterestfortheEU)encountered
significantdifficultieswhenitcametofindingacommondenominator.Although
atfirstglance,intheLimaDeclaration,thefoodpricecrisisplayedacentral
role,transverselypermeatingallthemes,theinterestexpressedbyLatin
AmericancountriesinfindinganewframeworkofrelationswiththeEUismuch
morenotable.Inalmostallthethematicagreementsitispossibletoperceivea
livelyinterestinclearlyconveyingtheheterogeneityofthecountriesthatform
thesubcontinent,andtherequestthatthesedifferencesbetakeninto
consideration,withtheEUimplementingmultispeedmechanismsaccordingly.
Thissituationiseven moresignificantconsideringthescantinterest
216 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
expressedinintegrationinthefinaldeclaration;integrationhasindeedallbut
disappearedfromtheofficialdiscourseinbiregionalrelations.If,furthermore,
wetakeintoaccountthepresummitconflictsbetweenthemembersofCANwith
regardtothemethodofnegotiatingtheFreeTradeAgreement(FTA)withthe
EU,wewillclearlyseethecentrifugalforcesinoperationbetweentheposition
ofBolivia,ontheonehand,andthejointpositionofPeruandColombia,onthe
other.Itshouldcomeasnosurprisethat,aheadofthesummit,thePeruvian
PresidentclearlycalledforadecisionbytheEUtoholdtalksbetweenthe
aforementionedcountriesonanindividualbasis,adecisiontheEUsnegotiators
hadtoacceptinordertoadvancefurtherintheprocess.Asimilarfatecould
awaitthecurrentlystallednegotiationswiththeCentralAmericancountries.
GreaterflexibilityonthepartoftheEUisthedominantexpectationinLatin
America.AlthoughthePresidentshaveconfirmedtheirintentionofupholding
thesovereignequalityofallstates,attheLimaSummittheirinterestin
revampingtheirrelationswiththeEU wasvisible.Leavingbehind—atleast
partly—themessageofsocialcohesionusedsincetheGuadalajaraSummitin
2004,theLatinAmericanparticipantshaveshiftedtheirapproachbyasking
Europeforgreaterflexibilityinthedesignofcooperationprogrammesand
compliancewiththeMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,emphasisingthespecific
rolewhichmiddleincomecountries(MICs)mustplay.Thesameistrueof
referencestothequestforeffectivesocialpolicies,whicharebeingdifferentiated
bynationalcapacities,takingintoaccountsuchinstrumentsasthedirectbudget
supportmodalityanddebtcancellationforsocialinvestment.Asforthe
environmentandsustainabledevelopment,thedifferencesinhowthesematters
areperceivedarepatent.
3.3!LookingforNewFormats
Itisnotjustinstitutionalpoliticaldialogueinparliamentary,executiveand
civilianformatsthathasprovedtobeaneffectiveinstrumentinbuildingsystems
forcooperation;industryfocuseddialogueshavealsoflourished.Thepersons
responsibleforissuesrelatingtotheenvironment,drugsandimmigrationmet
aheadoftheSummitandshowedthatthisformatmighthelptoovercomethe
traditionallowproductivityattheseevents,withtheiradhocmultilateralism.
Accordingly,greatercontinuityhasbeenachievedintheperiodsbetween
summits,althoughthematterofsupervisingimplementationoftheagreements
achievedatthepresidentialmeetingsisstillpending.Theproposalofthe
PeruvianhostAlanGarcíatocommissionthesupervisionoftheagreements
achievedinLimabythe狆狉狅狋犲犿狆狅狉犲secretariatsinMadridandBuenosAires
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 217
untilthenextsummitisheldinSpainseemstobeagoodsuggestion,althoughit
doesnotmeettheexpectationsofgeneratingamoreflexibleinstitutionalformat.
Thefollowingpointsshouldappearontheagenda:
(1)EuropeandLatinAmericaneedtodevelopa狀犲狑犮狌犾狋狌狉犲狋狅狊犺犪狆犲狋犺犲犻狉
狉犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆,andthatmeansfocusingonconcreteinterestsandpossibilitiesfor
cooperationinordertomovebeyondthelimitedandgeneralisingpoliticsof“lets
gettogether”or“domeafavour”;
(2)Together,theEuropeansandLatinAmericansmustgeneratea狀犲狑
犱狔狀犪犿犻犮犻狀狋犺犲犻狉狉犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆tothepointthattheyneedless“cafeparatodos”
andmoretheidentificationofrelevantcounterpartsinspecificpolicyareas;
(3)Thereisaneedtocreate犪狀犲狑狅狉犱犲狉狅犳犻狀狋犲狉犪犮狋犻狅狀.Thatmeans
developingnewformatsforinterregionaldialogue,forexampleinthesenseof
the“conventionmethodology”experiencedwithinthecontextoftheEuropean
constitutionalprocessbybringingtogethermembersofParliamentwithfree/
independentpersonalities,businessmenandrepresentativesofcivilsocietyin
ordertopreparethedecisionsandreforminputsforsummitdiplomacy;
(4)Spainmustbeinducedtotakeonanewroleofconstructiveleadership
withrespecttoLatinAmericawhichcouldgiveamoreEuropeandimensionto
thetraditionalbilateralfocusofitsengagementintheregion;
(5)Inaddition,anew agendashouldbedefinedforthebiregional
relationship.Commercialandtradeissues,thepoliticaldialogueandthe
cooperationagendashouldnotbetreatedasdistinctissuesbutmoreintermsofa
majorintegrationwhichpermitsanewsynergy;
(6)Theopenthematicagendashouldbereducedinordertoconcentrateon
specificpriorities;
(7)Impetusshouldbegiventothepoliticalprocessbetweensummitsin
ordertomaketherelationshipmorecontinuousandsubstantive.
Amajorboosthasbeengivenbytheparliamentaryinitiative“EuroLat”.In
comparisontotheLimaDeclaration,whichentails57agreementscovering17
pages,themessagefromthesecondplenarysessionoftheEuroLatinAmerican
ParliamentaryAssembly(EuroLat),addressedtothepresidentialsummitin
Limaon1May,wasmorerefreshing,withmorepoliticalcontentandalonger
termvision.ThismessageadequatelyaccommodatesasymmetryinEuroLatin
Americanrelationsandtheaimistoreflectthisonthebasisofaconceptof
solidarityandcomplementarity.Atthesametime,itproposesaglobalinter
regionalpartnership,whichcould(alongwithprogressinpeaceandsecurity
cooperation)offerawholenewapproachtobiregionalcooperation.
Themessageconciselyandadequatelysetsforththenextstepsforfocusing
218 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
andstrengtheninginstitutionalandcooperationmechanismsbetweentheparties,
starting,forexample,withabiregionalcentreforconflictpreventionanda
centreformonitoringmigration.Theserecommendationsclearlypointtowards
realpossibilitiesforcooperationandcouldformpartofasystemintermsoftheir
institutionalscope withregardtocooperation.Thisshowsthevirtueof
cooperationanddialoguethatisnotobligedtocovereveryarea,withrepetition
ofthevariousglobalinitiativesthatdonotalloworreflectspecificityinEuro
LatinAmericancooperation.Inthisregard,parliamentaryactionseemstoyield
moreresultsthansummitdiplomacy,whichisunabletoshakeofftraditionand
isinevitablyshapedbyinternationalevents.Wemightthereforededucetheneed
toachievegreaterconvergencebetweenthe parliamentaryinitiativesand
executivedynamicstotapthevirtuesofeachoftheprocesses.
4.犉犻狀犪犾犚犲犿犪狉犽狊
ChinaspolicytowardsLatinAmericahashadonlyalimitedimpactonthe
EUspolicy.Firstofall,thetradeinterestsofthesetwopartnersintheregion
arequitedifferentandno“tradewar”hasemergedwithregardtotheregions
resources.TheLatinAmericancountriescoulddiversifytheirexternaltrade
relationsmore,whichhasindeedalwaysbeenoneoftheirmajorendeavours.Up
tonowthereisnoclearsignthatChinaisintentondevelopinganexplicit
politicalroleintheregion,presumablymotivatedmorebyareluctanceto
impingeonUSintereststhanafearofpossibleclasheswithEuropeanones.
USpolicytowardsLatinAmericawascharacterized,uptotherecent
SummitoftheAmericas,byasortof“benignneglect”,especiallywithregardto
SouthAmerica.WashingtonreliedespeciallyonBrazilasthemajorforceinthis
subregion.AnopenconflicthasexistedsincetheEUchangeditscommon
positiononCubaandcommenced,underSpanishleadership,apolicyofdetente,
whichiswhattheObamaadministrationisnowofferingtheCubangovernment.
FortheEuropeansidetheimpactofUSpolicyonitsactionsinLatinAmericahas
beenmoresystematiconcertainissues,forexamplethedrugwarandthe
conceptsusedbytheUSintheimplementationofitsstrategy.Ingeneralterms,
bothsideshavehadtoreconciletheirpositionsinmultilateralorregionalforaand
withintheframeworkoftransatlanticrelations.Withintheframeworkofthe
EUspolicyonLatinAmericatheconceptofatransatlantictrianglebetween
LatinAmerica,theUSandtheEUhasnevergainedmuchpurchase.
ForEuropesCFSP,LatinAmericawasthestartingpoint.Thecompatibilityof
commonandintergovernmentalelementshasthereforealwaysbeenpresentasa
majorchallengeduetotheprominentrolethatSpainhasplayedintheregionand
AFormatinSearchofSubstance"AnOverviewofRelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericainaEuropeanPerspective 219
theinterplaybetweentheIberoAmericanprocessandtheEULatinAmerican
dialogue.WithEUenlargement,theelaborationofaCommonPositiononCuba
hasbeenmoredifficultand,ingeneral,interestinLatinAmericamayhave
diminishedinfavourofthedifferentregionalprioritiesofthenew member
states.UnitywithintheEUonpolicytowardsLatinAmericamaybedifficultto
achieveonsomepoints,butnonewdynamichasemergedtoserveasthegeneral
consensusbuildingmechanismoftheCFSP.Thepossibilitythatgeneralinterest
inLatinAmericamightbemoredifficulttomaintainisadifferentissue.
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犃犳犳犪犻狉狊犲狀犲狊狆犪狅犾,3,95105.
220 !
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉2
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犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀狑犻狋犺犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
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1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
ThischapterexaminesEUdevelopmentcooperationwithLatinAmerica.
First,itconsidersthechangesintheinternationaldevelopmentagendathatare
relevanttotheregion.Thisincludesthedebateoncooperationwithmiddle
incomecountries(MICs),implementationoftheParis Declarationonaid
effectivenessand SouthSouthdevelopmentcooperationin Latin America.
Second,itanalysesEUdevelopmentpolicytowardsLatinAmerica,focusingin
particularonitsregionaldimension,thestrategiesadoptedandthechallenge
representedbyadaptingcooperationtothecreationofa“network”ofAssociation
Agreements.Specialattentionshallbepaidtopolicyproposalstoimprove
developmentcooperationwithintheframeworkofEULatinAmericanrelations.
2.犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犆狅狀狋犲狓狋狅犳犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犘狅犾犻犮犻犲狊狑犻狋犺犚犲犵犪狉犱狋狅
犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
Developmentcooperationandaidpoliciesaregoingthroughintensive
change,withregardtobothideasandpractices.Abroadinternationalconsensus
hasbeenachievedontheobjectivesofpovertyreduction,socialdevelopmentand
theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs),whichforma“socialagendafor
globalisation”.TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals—andGoal8inparticular—
alsoaimtoestablisha“globalpartnershipfordevelopment”withregardtothe
meansneededtoachievethesegoals,particularlymoreandbetteraid,anopen
tradingsystem,debtreliefandaccesstotechnology.Thisagendaisnotonlythe
responsibilityofadvancedcountries,butalsoexpressesthedevelopingcountries
responsibilityforimprovingtheirpovertyreductionpoliciesandgoodgovernance.
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 221
TheEuropeanUnion(EU)hasbeenanimportantdrivingforcebehindthis
consensusandtheestablishmentofglobaldevelopmentgoals.Ithasincorporated
themintoitsowndevelopmentpolicy.Insomerespects,ithastriedtogo
furtherthanwhathasbeenagreedatinternationalsummits.Withregardto
increasingaid,theEUhasmaintaineditsinternationalcommitmenttospend0.7
percentoftheGrossNationalIncomeofthemostadvancedcountries,despite
theresistance ofother countries—such asthe United States—and has
unilaterallyadoptedatimetabletoachievethisfigurenolaterthan2015
(Economist2005;EuropeanUnion2006).
TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsandtheMonterreyConsensus,adopted
in2002attheUNSummitonFinancingforDevelopment,haveleddonorsto
reallocateOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)tobasicneedsandtothe
poorestcountries,includingtheleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)andlow
incomecountries(LICs).ThatmeansfocusingODAonsubSaharanAfrica,as
wellasonEastandSouthAsia,reducingorevenstoppingODAtomiddle
incomecountries(MICs)andespeciallytoupperMICs.ODAisalsobeing
increasedforcountriesinvolvedinthesocalled“GlobalWaronTerror”,suchas
Irag,AfghanistanandPakistan.
ThistrendismorevisibleinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,whereall
countries,exceptHaiti,areclassifiedintheseincomegroups.Datapublishedby
theDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)oftheOrganisationforEconomic
CooperationandDevelopment(OECD)revealthattheODAreceivedbythis
regionhasincreasedinabsoluteterms,fromaboutUSD5billionin1998,to
USD8700billionin2008;butinacontextofstrongaidincreases,theLatin
AmericanshareoftotalODAshrankfrom12.3percentin1998to7.9percent
in2008.Anumberofcountries—USA,Canada,Japan,NetherlandsandItaly—
havereducedtheiraidcommitmentstotheregion;theUKandSwedenhave
closedtheirofficesandcooperationprogrammesthere;andthestrongincreasein
aidfrom SpainandtheEuropean Commissionhasnotbeensufficientto
compensatethesetrends(DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee2010).
Overall,theeffectoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsinLatinAmerica
hasbeentofosteramoreprogressivepatternofaidallocationandthereforeless
aidtoupperMICs,although “donordarlings”and “donororphans”were
included.Between2001and2006,OfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)to
upperMICsfellbyover60percentforCostaRica,MexicoandUruguay,andby
roughly30percentforArgentina,ChileandPanama.LowerMICsexhibitan
unevenpattern,withaidreductionsforsomecountries,suchasBrazil,Ecuador,
ElSalvadorandParaguay.Incontrast,therehavebeenaidincreasestoother
222 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
countries,suchasBolivia,Colombia,CubaandHonduras.Giventhatchanges
inaidamountsarenotdirectlyrelatedtoincomelevels,itcanbeconcludedthat
theyareanoutcomeofdonorpreferencestowardsthesocalled犱狅狀狅狉犱犪狉犾犻狀犵狊to
thedetrimentofthesocalled犱狅狀狅狉狅狉狆犺犪狀狊,aswellasofalackofcoordination
amongdonors.Finally,aidtoNicaragua,theonlylowincomecountry(LIC)in
theregion,alsogrew.In2005,70percentofLatinAmericanODAwentonlyto
Nicaragua,Bolivia,Honduras,ColombiaandPeru;in20062008Colombia,
Nicaragua,Haiti,BoliviaandHondurasreceived45percentoftotalODAfor
LatinAmerica(DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee2010).
Colombiaisaspecialcase.Thiscountryreceived—atmorethan300per
cent—thelargestincreaseinODAduringtheperiod.TheUSled“GlobalWar
onTerror”,albeitunrelatedtothemotivesanddynamicsoftheinternalconflict
inthiscountry,becamethemaindriverbehindthestrongriseofColombias
ODA.AccordingtoOECDdata,from2006to2008Colombiaremainedinfirst
placeintherankingofLatinAmericanaidrecipients,receivingabout1billion
USdollarsperyear,or11percentoftotalODAtoLatinAmericaandthe
Caribbean(DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee2010).
However,itisimportanttorememberthatODAflowsarebecomingless
relevantforLatinAmericanMICsinthewidercontextofdevelopmentfinance.
Privateflows(foreigndirectinvestments,portfolioinvestments,privateloans
andremittances)areincreasinglyimportantforLatinAmerica,movingofficial
flowsdownintosecondplace.Thishassignificantimplicationsfordevelopment
cooperationpolicies.ODAislosingrelevanceasafinancingmechanism,but
gainingimportanceasaninstrumenttofosterpolicychanges.Atthesame
time,itisnecessarytoaddressawiderdevelopmentagendarelatedtothe
financialvulnerabilitycausedbythegreatervolatilityofprivateflowsandthe
riskoffinancialshocks,asseemstobeconfirmedbytheeconomiccrisisof
2009.
FollowingtheMillennium DevelopmentGoalsagenda,intheMonterrey
Consensusof2002,donorsopenlyrecognisedthe needtoimproveaid
effectivenessandchangethewayinwhichitisdistributedthroughanincreasing
numberofbilateraland multilateraldonors,andincreasinglyfragmented
channelsofaiddelivery.Thustheydecidedtoharmonisetheiroperational
proceduresinordertoreducetransactioncosts;tostrengthentheabsorption
capacityandfinancialmanagementofrecipientcountries;tomakeresourceflows
morepredictable;tousemoreappropriateinstruments,inparticular,budget
support;andtoprovideaidfordevelopmentandpovertyreductiondecidedonby
developingcountries,forwhichthelatterwerealsoresponsible.TheHighLevel
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 223
Forum on Aid Effectiveness(HLF),comprising bilateraland multilateral
donors,aswellasanumberofrecipientcountries,hasadoptedimportant
documents,suchastheRomeDeclarationonHarmonisation(2003)andthe
ParisDeclarationontheEffectivenessofAid(2005).Thelatter,inparticular,
definedanewparadigmintherelationshipbetweendonorsandrecipients,calling
thelatter“partnercountries”,inaspiritofcoresponsibility.Thedeclaration,
signedbymorethan100donorsanddevelopingcountries,wasintendedtophase
outrelationshipsbasedonconditionalityandtotackletheproblemsresulting
fromtheproliferationofdonorsandthefragmentationofaid.Furthermore,all
ofthisisbasedontheprinciplesofownership,alignment,harmonisationand
mutualaccountability.
2.1!DevelopmentCooperationPolicieswithMICs:RelevanceforLatinAmerica
Theexistenceof“pocketsofpoverty”hasbeenclaimedasjustificationfor
themaintenanceofaidflowstomiddleincomecountries(MICs).Buttheaid
reductionstoMICshaveoftenbeenjustifiedonthegroundsthattherealproblem
inmanyofthesecountriesisinequality,notpoverty.Itisarguedthatitisnot
justifiabletohandoverexternalresourceswhentheinternalactorsthemselves
rejecttheredistributivepoliciesneededtoreducepovertyandinequality.
However,thisargumentwouldbecorrectonlyifreducingaidwaslikelyto
encourageinternalchangesandpropoorpoliciesindevelopingcountries,butthis
isunlikely.
ThereareotherimportantreasonsformaintainingaidtoMICsandtheyare
particularlyapplicabletothesituationinLatinAmerica.AsAlonso(2007)has
indicated,iftheaimistoeradicatepoverty,progressmustalsobemadeinthe
MICs,giventhenumbersofpoorpeopleinthesecountries.Second,theaid
systemwouldbeestablishingaperversesystemofincentivesandraisingamoral
hazardissueifprogressindevelopmentweretobepenalisedbyareductionin
aid.Third,itisimportanttoavoidbackwardstepsincountrieswhereprogress
hasnotbeenconsolidated,andincountriesathighriskduetotheirexternal
vulnerabilitytofinancialorothercrises.Fourth,thesecountriesalsooftenactas
regional“anchors”intermsofeconomicdevelopmentandregionalstability(for
example,MexicowithregardtoCentralAmericaandBrazilwithregardtothe
AndeanandSouthAmericancountries).Fifth,thefighttoreducepovertyand
promotesustainabledevelopmentpartlydependsontheadequateprovisionand
maintenanceofglobalandregionalpublicgoodsandthesecannotbeensured
withoutthesupportoftheMICs.Finally,inadditiontobeingrecipientsofaid,
thesecountriescanalsobedonorsthroughinnovativeSouthSouthcooperation
224 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
mechanisms.ThismeansthataidtoMICsmaymobilisemoreresourcesand
encouragethedevelopingcountriesthemselvesandtheirregionalorganisationsto
takemoreresponsibilityforattainingthe Millennium DevelopmentGoals.
AttainmentoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,notablyinLatinAmericaand
theCaribbean,requiresconsiderationofspecificfeaturesoftheregionsMICs.
ManyMICshavehadperiodsofstronggrowthbuthavenotbeenabletosustain
itduetoinstitutionalweaknessandthelackofsocialcohesion.Furthermorethe
vulnerabilityoftheirinternationalposition,particularlywithregardtofinance
andtrade,andalackoftechnologicalcapabilitiesintheireconomicsystemshas
hinderedgrowth.Therefore,apervasiveagendaofdevelopmentcooperation
withLatinAmericanMICs,againstthevoicescallingforareallocationofaidto
thepoorestcountriesinAfricaorAsia,mustdealwiththreemajordevelopment
challenges:
(1)犐狀狊狋犻狋狌狋犻狅狀犫狌犻犾犱犻狀犵犪狀犱狊狅犮犻犪犾犮狅犺犲狊犻狅狀:Fragileinstitutionsundermine
thecapacitytoprovidepublicgoods,managedistributiveconflicts,dealwith
externalshocks,regulatemarkets,ensuresocialcohesionandtacklethehigh
levelofinequalitythatcharacterisesLatinAmericancountries.Allthesefactors
contributetoimpairthelegitimacyofinstitutions.Therefore,aneffective
cooperationpolicywithMICsshouldincludeimprovementsinpublicpolicies
throughinstitutionalreform,thereinforcementofspecifichealthandeducation
programmesandsupportforsocialforcesfavourabletochange.Onekeyaspect
thatillustratesbothinstitutionalweaknessandthelackofcohesionisLatinAmerican
countriesfiscalweakness,whichiswhysupportingtaxreformiscrucial.
(2)犉犻狀犪狀犮犻犪犾狊狋犪犫犻犾犻狋狔犪狀犱犮狅狌狀狋犲狉犮狔犮犾犻犮犪犾狆狅犾犻犮犻犲狊:Asthecrisesofrecent
yearshaveshown,thevulnerabilityofMICstofinancialshocksstemsfromtheir
highlyvolatilefinancialsituation.Thisrequiresbetterregulation ofthe
international financial markets through a “new international financial
architecture”;strongernationalfinancialsystems;solutionstotheproblemof
sovereigndebtbyadequateinternationalregulation,whichisstilllacking(InternationalMonetaryFundproposalsonthisaftertheArgentinecrisisof
20012002becameboggeddown);andgreaterautonomyforMICstoapplyanti
cyclicalpoliciestopreservetheprogressmadeinreducingpoverty.Withinthe
frameworkofG20agreementsaddressingthe2009economicmeltdown,a
numberofLatinAmericancountriesareapplyingalreadysuccessfulanticyclical
packageswiththesegoals.
(3)犘狅犾犻犮犻犲狊狋狅犳狅狊狋犲狉犮狅犿狆犲狋犻狋犻狏犲狀犲狊狊犪狀犱犻犿狆狉狅狏犲犪犮犮犲狊狊狋狅犲狓狋犲狉狀犪犾
犿犪狉犽犲狋狊:Investmentsininfrastructure,humancapitalandtechnologytransferto
productionarebettersuitedforMICsthanpoorcountries.Thiswillbreakthe
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 225
“viciouscircle”ofexportinggoodsintensiveinnaturalresourcesandlow
productivityjobs,aswellasfiscalpoliciesthathindermuchneededspendingin
education,research,developmentandinnovation(RDI)capacities.Theregulationof
intellectualpropertyrightsbytheWorldTradeOrganisation(WTO)andregionaltrade
agreementscouldalsobeanobstaclebyreducingthescopefornationalpoliciesinthis
field.Whatcooperationpoliciesmightplayakeyrolehere?First,wellplannedtrade
liberalisationisrequired,throughagreements(bothregionalSouthSouthintegration
or“SouthNorth”tradeagreements)thatensureaccesstoexternalmarkets,increase
externalinvestmentandencourageinnovationandcompetitiveness,butthatalso
recogniseasymmetriesandallowfortheapplicationofactivepoliciestomitigate
thecostsofadjustmentandpromoteatransformationofproductionpatterns.
Thisistrueparticularlyinthecaseof“SouthNorth”agreements,inwhich
asymmetriesaregreater.EUandexternalpartnerscanplayakeyrolein
supportingthesepolicies.Cooperationinscienceandtechnologyprogrammes
thathelptogeneratedomesticcapacitiesandtechnologytransferprogrammesare
alsokeyelementsinthiscompetitivenessagenda.
WithintheframeworkoftheinternationalconsensusontheMillennium
Development Goals,therehavebeen variousinitiativesto promotethe
developmentagendaofMICsandavoidsimplisticapproachestoaid,withthe
backingoftheMICsthemselves,somedonorcountriesandthemultilateral
developmentbanks.TheMICsagendawasincludedinthe犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犆狅狀狊犲狀狊狌狊
狅狀 犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋 of2005 (European Union 2006), which maintained
thepriorityallocationofODAtolowincomecountries,butrecognisesthe
differentapproachesneededtodealwith MICdevelopmentproblems.This
agendahasalsobeenbackedbytheUnitedNations(UN)InterGovernmental
ConferencesonMICs(MadridandSanSalvador2007)andtheIberoAmerican
Conferences.
2.2!"PostliberalRegionalism#and"SouthSouthCooperation#inLatinAmerica
Postliberalregionalism and SouthSouth cooperation(SSC)are both
importantelementsinthedevelopmentlandscapeofLatin Americaatthe
beginningofthetwentyfirstcentury.SSCisnotnewintheregion,butithas
expandedinrecentyears,developedbilaterallybyanumberofcountriesandalso
byregionalorganisations.ThedevelopmentofSSCinLatin Americaisa
responsetoseveralfactors.Itispartofa“postliberal”reinterpretationof
regionalismandregionalintegration.Itshouldalsobeseenastheexpressionof
themoreactiverolebeingplayedbysomecountries,theirleadershipaspirations
226 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
andmoreassertiveforeignpolicy(Sanahuja2010a,2010b),aswellastheir
capacitytocontributetoattainingtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsasdonors
andnotonlyasrecipients.However,asmiddleincomecountries(MICs)arenot
membersoftheOECDsDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC),their
contributionsarenotrecordedanddonotfitintoDACcategories.Thismakesit
difficulttoestimatetheirmagnitude.
SSCisofconsiderablerelevancetotheMICsdevelopmentagenda,asit
generatesbenefitsforbothdonorsandrecipients.TheMICsthemselvesbelieve
thatitmaybeabetterwayofmeetingtheirneeds,makinggreateruseoflocal
resourcesandgeneratingagreatersenseofownership.LatinAmericanSSC
modalitiesinclude “horizontal”and “triangular”SSC.Thehorizontaltype
involvesonlydevelopingcountries,buttriangularSSCalsoinvolvesfinancial
resourcesfromatraditionaldonor(advancedcountryormultilateralagency),
whilethehumanresourcesandknowhowcomefromdevelopingcountries.
RecognisingtheimportanceofSouthSouthcooperation,someDACdonors—
especiallyGermany,Japan,Belgium,theUnitedKingdomand multilateral
agencies(FAO,UNFPA,IICA)—havepromotedtriangulararrangements.
Mexico,Chile,Argentina,BrazilandColombiahavebeenactivelyinvolvedin
implementationandthemainrecipientshavebeenthepoorestCentralAmerican
andAndeancountries,ParaguayandtheDominicanRepublic(Xalma2007).
SomemodalitiesofSSCareconstructed withintheframeworkofregional
policies.Thisisexplainedbytheappearanceofnewregionaliststrategies
sometimescalled “postliberal”(Mottaetal.2007;Sanahuja2010),in
particulartheVenezuelanBolivarianAlternativefortheAmericas(ALBA)and
theattempttoredesignSouthAmericanintegrationwithintheframeworkofthe
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). These proposals are
characterisedbytheprimacyoftheirpoliticalagenda,theirfocusonstateactors
ratherthantheliberalstrategiesofthesocalled “openregionalism”,more
emphasison common policiesin energy orinfrastructurethanintrade
liberalisationandconcernsforsocialissuesandasymmetriesofdevelopment.
Financialcooperationisalsopartofthisagenda,asillustratedbythe“South
Bank”.Additionally,regional“structuralfunds”areemergingtotackleregional
asymmetries,suchastheMercosurStructuralConvergenceFund(FOCEM).
DifferentpatternsofSSCcouldbeseenintheregion:
(1)Technicalassistanceandhighereducationcooperationfocusingonthe
poorercountriesofLatinAmerica(ArgentinaandChile).
(2)Technicalassistance,infrastructureandoilfinancingonpreferential
termsforCentralAmericancountries(Mexico)throughtheSanJoséoil
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 227
agreementandthe“PlanPueblaPanam”.
(3)TheBraziliandecentralisedmodelofcooperationbasedonsemipublic
actorsandfocusingon Africaand Asia,particularly Portuguesespeaking
countries.Thisprogramme,whichservestheforeignpolicygoalsofBrazilas
botharegionalandaglobalplayer,includestechnicalassistancefromthe
BrazilianCooperationAgency,preferentialloansfromtheNationalEconomicand
SocialDevelopmentBank (BNDES)and HIV/Aidsdrugsprovidedbythe
OsvaldoCruzFoundation(Economist2010).
(4)The“Bolivarianproject”ofVenezuelaandCuba (Petrocaribeand
ALBA)isthemostextensiveprogrammeofSSCinLatinAmericaandopenly
linkedtoforeignpolicygoals.ItrepresentsanSSCframeworkbasedon
ideologicalaffinity ratherthan economiccomplementarity and would be
inconceivablewithoutVenezuelanoil.Therearesixareasofcooperation:(a)oil
financing(Petrocaribe);(b)socialcooperation,includingCubandoctorsmissions,
literacyandculturalinitiatives;(c)economiccooperationthroughjointventuresand
thePeoplesTrade Treaty (TCP);(d)aframeworktofosterbartertrade;
(e)infrastructureandcommunications(TeleSurandtheCubaVenezuelasubmarine
cable);and(f)monetaryandfinancialcooperationviatheALBAFundand
Bank.
3.犜犺犲犈犝,狋犺犲犃狉犮犺犻狋犲犮狋狌狉犲狅犳犃犻犱犪狀犱犚犲犳狅狉犿狅犳犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犘狅犾犻犮狔
TheEUhastriedtodevelopacommondevelopmentstrategy,sharedbythe
CommunityandtheMemberStatesalike,inaccordancewiththecoordinationand
complementarityof EU development policy. The European Development
Consensusof2005,whichconfirmstheEUscommitmenttotheMillennium
DevelopmentGoals(MDGs)andtheRomeandParisDeclarationson Aid
Effectiveness,establishescommonobjectives,definescommonprioritiesand
reaffirmstheneedforadifferentiatedapproachto middleincomecountries
(MICs)andlowincomecountries(LICs).Itestablishesthefollowingninepriority
areas:(1)tradeandregionalintegration;(2)theenvironmentandthesustainable
managementofnaturalresources;(3)infrastructure,communicationsand
transport;(4)waterandenergy;(5)ruraldevelopment,territorialplanning,
agricultureandfoodsecurity;(6)governance,democracy,humanrightsand
supportforeconomicandinstitutionalreform;(7)conflictpreventionand
fragilestates; (8)human development;and (9)socialcohesion and
employment.
TheEU,whichaccountsformorethanhalftheworldsOfficialDevelopment
Assistance(ODA),hasspecificallycommitteditselftotheprinciplesofalignment,
228 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
ownership,harmonisation,mutualresponsibilityandmanagementbyresults,as
wellastotheParisDeclaration.Inaddition,throughtheEuropeanDevelopment
Consensus,theEUhasundertakentoplayaleadershiproleinthisprocess,with
commitmentsadditionaltothoseadoptedbytheOECDsDevelopmentAssistance
Committee(DAC).Inordertoachievethis,Commissionproposalsassume50
percentoftotalODAthroughnationalsystemsandthedoublingofbudgetaid.
Thisinvolvesasignificantchange withregardtocooperation with Latin
America,especiallywithLICs,whichhavehardlyreceivedanybudgetaidfrom
theEU(Ayuso2006).InMay2007,theCounciladoptedanewpolicyonthe
divisionoflabourbetweentheEuropeanCommissionandtheMemberStates
which,inaccordancewiththeParisDeclarationandtheEuropeanDevelopment
Consensus,willencouragegreatercomplementarities,aswellasgeographicand
sectorspecialisation.
Since1998,theEUhasalsoundertakenanambitiousagendaofadministrative
reformthathastriedtoovercomeadysfunctionalorganisationalstructure,alack
ofpersonnelandbureaucraticbottlenecks.Therehasbeena“deconcentration”of
CommissionservicesandpersonneltowardsDelegationsindevelopingcountries
andimprovementsinstaffing.Anotherimportantaspecthasbeentheadoptionof
new budgetaryinstruments,which hasrationalisedthe wideranging but
fragmentedpanoplyofbudgetlinesandrulesthatwereinforcehitherto.1
ThenewDevelopmentCooperationInstrument(DCI)replacestheprevious
“geographicalbudgetarylines”andatleasttenthematicbudgetarylines.Ithas
anindicativebudgetofEUR16897millionfortheperiod20072013,ofwhich
EUR2690million(16percent)hasbeenallocatedtoLatinAmericatofinance
thefollowingpriorities:
(1)狆狉狅犿狅狋犻狀犵狊狅犮犻犪犾犮狅犺犲狊犻狅狀:throughtaxandsocialwelfarepolicies,
employment,thefightagainstillegaldrugs,educationandhealth;
(2)狉犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犻狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀,includingtheinterconnectionofinfrastructuresin
coordinationwiththeEuropeanInvestmentBank(EIB);
(3)犻狀狊狋犻狋狌狋犻狅狀犫狌犻犾犱犻狀犵,goodgovernanceandprotectionofhumanrights,
includingtherightsofindigenouspeopleandminorities;
(4)supportingthecreation ofa犮狅犿犿狅狀 犈犝犔犪狋犻狀 犃犿犲狉犻犮犪 犺犻犵犺犲狉
犲犱狌犮犪狋犻狅狀犪狉犲犪;
(5)狆狉狅犿狅狋犻狀犵狊狌狊狋犪犻狀犪犫犾犲犱犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋,particularlytheprotectionofforestsand
biodiversity.TheDCIalsohasanindicativebudgetofEUR5596millionfor
“thematicprogrammes”2coveringallregions,includingLatinAmerica.
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 229
4.犜犺犲 “犛狋狉犪狋犲犵犻犮犘犪狉狋狀犲狉狊犺犻狆”牶犘狅犾犻犮狔犇犻犪犾狅犵狌犲,犪狀犱犈犝犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀
犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
Fromitsinceptioninthe1980s,theEULatinAmericanpoliticaldialoguehas
evolvedinanumberofregionalandsubregionalsettings,withtheministerialdialogue
betweentheEUandtheRioGroupasthemostsignificant.In1999,a“Strategic
Partnership”waslaunched,includingbiannualsummitsofheadsofstateand
government.ThisStrategicPartnershiphastoitsnamesuchnotableachievementsas
theEUassociationandfreetradeagreementswithMexico(2000)andChile(2002).
Sinceitwasestablished,theStrategicPartnershiphashadtodealwithan
unfavourableinternationalcontext,andLatinAmericaseemstohaveslipped
downtheEUsforeignrelationsagenda.Thisisduetofactorssuchasthe
demandsofEU enlargement,andthedisplacementofEuropeanpriorities
towardstheeastandtheBalkans.Anotherimportantfactoristheprimacythat
securityandthewaronterrorhaveacquiredininternationalrelationssincethe
11Septemberattacks,pushingdevelopmentissuesintothebackground.
Moreover,withregardtotrade,theEUandsomeLatinAmericancountries
gavepreferencetotradetalksintheWTOwhich,withtheenlargementofthe
EU,meanttacklingthedifficultreformoftheCommonAgriculturalPolicy(CAP).Thisreform,whichtookplacein2002and2003,hinderedtheECs
bargainingpositionbymaintaininga“productivist”agriculturalmodel.The
difficultiesposedbytheagriculturalchapterandthe“WTOoption”meantthat
negotiationswithMercosurhavebeengoingonformorethantenyearswithout
success.ByprioritisingMexicoandChile,thecountriesthatoptedforfree
tradewiththeUnitedStates,theEUfostered,albeitinvoluntarily,the
perceptionthatthoseagreementswerea“reactive”movefollowingonfromUS
policy.
Beyondpoliticaldialogue,akeyelementbehindtheStrategicPartnershipis
EUpolicytowardsLatinAmerica,asdraftedbytheEuropeanCommissionand
endorsedbytheCouncilandtheEuropeanParliament.Sincethefirstadoptionof
astrategyonrelationswithLatinAmericain1994(CounciloftheEuropean
Union:1994),3theEU—andinparticulartheEuropeanCommission—hasset
outitsregionalstrategyforLatinAmericainaseriesofdocuments.4The
Communication犃犛狋狉狅狀犵犲狉犘犪狉狋狀犲狉狊犺犻狆犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀
犃犿犲狉犻犮犪,adoptedonDecember2005,wasendorsedbytheCouncilConclusions
ofFebruary2006,andsetoutprioritiesadaptedtothenewpoliticalcycleandto
changesinLatinAmerica.AccordingtothisCommunication,theEUaimsto
stepuppoliticaldialogue.Italsoproposestocompletethe “network”of
230 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
associationagreementswiththerestofLatinAmericaandtosupportregional
integrationprocesses.Alsoonthetableis moreintensedialogueonthe
environment,andamoreactiveroleoftheEuropeanInvestmentBankinsupport
ofregionalinfrastructure.Itstatesthatsocialcohesionisa“priorityarea”of
EULatinAmericanrelationsandcallsforthecreationofaEuroLatinAmerican
ParliamentaryAssembly—laterapprovedattheViennabiregionalsummitin
2006,andanEULatinAmericahighereducationarea.
TheCommunicationadoptedin2009,犜犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀 犝狀犻狅狀犪狀犱 犔犪狋犻狀
犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犌犾狅犫犪犾犘犾犪狔犲狉狊犻狀犘犪狉狋狀犲狉狊犺犻狆,whichcallsforamorefocusedpolitical
dialogue,concerningnotonlybiregionalissues,butglobalones,andforthe
firsttimetheECstatesthataspecificdialoguecouldbeestablishedwiththe
UnionofSouthAmericanNations(UNASUR).Italsosuggestscomplementing
EUsupportandcooperationwithregionalgroupings,aswellasastronger
bilateralrelationshipwithcountriesintheregion.Newcooperationinstruments
areenvisaged,suchastheLatinAmericaInvestmentFacility(LAIF).This
initiative,inspiredbytheNeighbourhoodInvestmentFacility(NIF),willpool
grantresourcesfromtheCommunityandpossibleadditionalgrantsfromthe
MemberStatesinordertofinanceinvestmentprojectsinthethreeareasof
infrastructure,socialcohesionandadaptationtoclimatechange.A new
instrumenthasalsobeenproposed,namelyanEULatinAmericanFoundationto
fostertheparticipationofcivilsociety,academicactorsandmutualknowledge.
5.犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犪狀犱犛狌狆狆狅狉狋犳狅狉犐狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀,犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犻狊犿犪狀犱犛狅犮犻犪犾
犆狅犺犲狊犻狅狀
TheEuropeanCommunityisoneofthefewsupportersofregionalcooperationin
LatinAmericaandtheonlyoneinvolvedinbiregionalcooperation.Thebudget
frameworkexclusivelyforregionalcooperationwithLatinAmericaduringthe
period20022006amountedtoEUR264millionforregionalprogrammes(see
Table1).TheCommunityhasalsoestablishedtheEuropeanInvestmentBank
(EIB)fundinglinesofEUR40millionfortheAndeanDevelopmentCorporation
(CAF),andEUR35millionwiththeCentralAmericanBankforEconomic
Integration(BCIE).Regionalcooperationhasbeenlopsidedbecauseofthe
seriousandongoingproblemofdefiningacounterpart,sincethereisnoLatin
Americawideintegrationorganisation.ThustheEUhasoptedforregional
programmesbasedonthematic“networks”andconsortialargelymadeupof
decentralisedstakeholdersthatpromote“bottomup”regionalisationratherthan
formalisedandinstitutionalised“topdown”regionalism.
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 231
犜犪犫犾犲1 犅狌犱犵犲狋犉狉犪犿犲狑狅狉犽犈狓犮犾狌狊犻狏犲犾狔犳狅狉犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀狑犻狋犺犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪,20022006
Nameandtimespan Budget Aim
AlInvest
19932007
EUR53millionin
stageI I I
ProvisionofservicestoEUandLatinAmeri
canbusinesstofostertradeandinvestment
URBAL
19962006
EUR 50 million(stageI I)
Localgovernment and local development
exchangeandcooperation
ALFA
19942005
EUR 54 million(stageI I)
EULatinAmericaacademicnetworks
ALBAN
20022010
EUR88million ScholarshipsforLatinAmericanstudentsto
undertakepostgraduatestudiesintheEU
@LIS
20022006
EUR77million LatinAmericaInformationSociety:toreducethe“digitaldivide”betweenthetworegionsandto
promotedialogueonstandardsandrules
EuroSocial(since2006)
EUR30million Thematicnetworkstoexchangegoodprac
ticesineducation,taxation,health,justiceandemployment
OBREAL/EULARO20042007
EUR1.3million EULatinAmericaRelationshipsObservato
ry:Researchandexchangestomonitorbi
regionalrelations
Source:EuropeanCommission2002,2007.
Subregionalprogrammeswith Mercosur,the AndeanCommunityand
CentralAmericahavebeenallottedmoreimportancewithregardtotheprovision
ofsupportforintegration and regionalism.Theyinvolvedtheregional
institutionsasacontactpoint,althoughthefinancialcommitmentwasfairly
low:from1996to2003,LatinAmericareceivedatotalofEUR3480million,
whichincludesbothallocationsfromtheRegulationconcerningaidtoLatin
AmericanandAsiandevelopingcountries(socalledRegulationPVDALA,to
useitsFrenchacronym)andhorizontalbudgetlines.Ofthesefunds,72percent
correspondtobilateralactions,17percenttoregionalprogrammesand12per
centtosubregionalprogrammes.5Althoughsomearenotrelatedtospecific
integrationagreements,EuropeanCommunity(EC)projectsinareassuchas
crossbordercooperationorwaterbasinnavigationalsomeetthatobjective
(DevelopmentResearchersNetwork2005).
Abasicpremisewhichwillhelpregionalcooperationtoproducepositive
resultsisthedegreeofintragroupcohesionandthecommitmentofLatin
Americangovernmentsthemselvestoregionalintegrationanditsinstitutions.
TheEChasneverthelessprovidedsupportduringaperiodofseriouscrisisfor
integration,whichhasconditionedtheresultsofECprojects.Thefailureof
232 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
regionalintegrationnotonlydamagesthereputationofthesegroupsandits
members,butalsoaffectstheEC.
Therelationshipbetweensocialcohesionandfreetradeagreementsalso
raisesanimportantissueofpolicycoherencefortheEUasitconcernsthe
treatmentofasymmetriesandthelinksbetweentrade,employmentandthe
environment.Itisdoubtfulwhetherthistypeofagreementfostersapositive
relationshipbetweenfreetrade and socialcohesion,a crucialissuein
developmentandthepovertyreductionagendainLatinAmerica.Inparticular,
thepossiblenegotiationofassociationagreementswithCentralAmericanand
Andeancountriesraisesmajorproblemsregardingthetreatmentofasymmetries
andtheirimpactonsocialcohesion.
6.犚狅犪犱狊犃犺犲犪犱牶犚犲犾犲狏犪狀狋犛狋狉犪狋犲犵犻犲狊犳狅狉犈犝犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
ThischapterhashighlightedtheprincipalchangesarisingintheEUs
developmentcooperationwithLatinAmerica,includingtheadoptionofan
internationaldevelopmentandantipovertyagendadominatedbytheMillennium
DevelopmentGoals(MDGs).Moreover,ithashighlightedthestrategiesfor
achievingthosegoalsinthemiddleincomecountries(MICs),theincreasing
involvementofthelatterindevelopmentcooperationbymeansof“postliberal
regionalism”policiesandthegrowthof“SouthSouth”cooperation,aswellas
thenewprinciplesoftheParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness.
Againstthisbackground,EUdevelopmentcooperationoverthepastten
yearshaschangedpositivelyandsignificantlytoadaptitselftotheabove
requirements,particularlyinitsstrategicorientationtowardstheMillennium
DevelopmentGoalsandpovertyreduction,administrativereform,planningand
programming.Ithasalsoadaptedthethree“Cs”(coordination,complementarity
andcoherence)andtherationalisationofbudgetinstrumentsandlines.6
AgreatefforthasbeenmadeintheareaofcooperationwithLatinAmerica
toadapttotheabovedemands,notablyintermsofnationalandsubregional
programming.Significantchallengesremain,however,partlyduetothechange
intheeconomicandpoliticalcycletakingplaceintheregion.Thesechallenges
areespeciallyvisibleinregionalcooperation.Throughthestrategydevisedby
theEUfor“strongerpartnership”andthecommitmentsassumedattheVienna
Summitin2006,EULatinAmericarelationsaremovingtowardsthebuildingof
a“network”ofassociationagreementsthatwillrequiresignificantchangesinthe
yearstocome.Inthiscontext,thefollowingstrategiesandproposalsare
relevanttoEULatinAmericacooperation:
(1)犕犪犻狀狋犪犻狀犃犻犱狋狅犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犕犐犆狊:Developmentcooperationisa
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 233
keyelementofbiregionalrelations,andtheEUsanditsmemberstates
commitmenttotheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsshouldnotleadtoareduction
inaidtotheregion,sincethatwouldhaveanegativeeffectonpovertyand
inequalityreduction,theachievementofotherdevelopmentgoals,democratic
governanceanditscontributiontotheprovisionofregionalandglobalpublic
goods.Thisalsomeansplayinganactiveroleinachievinganinternational
consensusoncooperationwiththeMICs,asdescribedabove.
(2)犌狉犲犪狋犲狉犃犻犱犆狅狀犮犲狀狋狉犪狋犻狅狀犻狀犃狉犲犪狊犚犲犾犲狏犪狀狋狋狅狋犺犲犛狆犲犮犻犳犻犮犖犲犲犱狊狅犳
犕犐犆狊:AccordingtotheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment,theEU must
continuetodirectresourcestowardstheregionslowincomeandlowerMIC
countries,particularlyintheAndeanareaandCentralAmerica,usingtoolssuch
asbudgetsupportthroughnationaldevelopmentandpovertyreductionstrategies.
Atthesametime,cooperationwithupperMICsshouldcontinuetofocusonareasin
whichitcanbemosteffective,suchas:macroeconomicandinternationalfinancial
stability;institutionalcapacitybuildingand/orpolicydesign,inparticulartomake
publicpolicy moreeffectiveandefficient;taxreformsensuringsustainable
redistributivepoliciesandinvestmentsinhumancapital;policiesforimproving
international competitiveness, particularly investment in infrastructure,
research,developmentandinnovationsystems(R+D+I);andsupportfor
socialstakeholderspromotingpolitical,institutionalandlegislativechangesat
bothnationalandinternationallevel,andthosewiththecapacitytomobilise
additionalfunding,suchasmultilateralorsubregionalbanks.
(3)犐犿狆狉狅狏犻狀犵犃犻犱 犈犳犳犲犮狋犻狏犲狀犲狊狊:EU Leadership.Accordingtothe
EuropeanConsensusonDevelopment,theEUandtheEuropeanCommissionin
particularmusttaketheleadinapplyingtheParisDeclarationandinternational
commitmentsonaideffectiveness,whichinLatin Americaareparticularly
relevantforlowerMICsandLICs.Improvingcoordinationandcomplementarity
withMemberStatesisparticularlyimportant,avoidingtheriskofoverlooking
civilsocietystakeholders,whocontinuetoplayanimportantroleinnational
developmentagendasanddemocraticgovernance.
(4)犓犲狔犚狅犾犲狅犳犃狊狊狅犮犻犪狋犻狅狀犃犵狉犲犲犿犲狀狋狊:Whengeneratingdevelopment
opportunitiesforMICs,associationagreementscanplayanevenmoreimportant
rolethanaidtransfers,sincetheyensureaccesstoexternalmarkets,promote
externalinvestmentandfosterinnovationandcompetitiveness.Iftheyareto
playapositiveroleindevelopment,however,asymmetriesmustalsobeduly
recognisedandtheymustbedesignedtodealwithadjustmentcostsandthe
transformationofproductionpatterns,particularlyinthecaseofagreements
withtheAndeanCommunityandCentralAmerica.
234 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
(5)犃狊狊狅犮犻犪狋犻狅狀犃犵狉犲犲犿犲狀狋狊,犛狅犮犻犪犾犆狅犺犲狊犻狅狀犪狀犱犘狅犾犻犮狔犆狅犺犲狉犲狀犮犲:As
already mentioned,therelationshipbetweensocialcohesionandthefreetrade
componentofassociationagreementsraisesasignificantproblemofpolicycoherencefor
theEU.Concerningtrade,ensuringthattheseagreementshaveapositiveimpact
onsocialcohesionrequirestheappropriatetreatmentofasymmetries,supportfor
policiestoimprovecompetitivenessandtheestablishmentofincentivesconnected
tolabourandsocialrights,goodgovernanceandtheenvironment.7
(6)犈狀犺犪狀犮犲犱犛狋狉犪狋犲犵狔犛狌狆狆狅狉狋犻狀犵犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犐狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀:Supportfor
regionalismandintegrationisakeyelementofthedevelopmentagendaofLatin
AmericanMICsbecauseofitspotentialandactualcontributiontodevelopment,
employment,competitiveness,governanceandinstitutionalcapacitybuilding,
andtotheprovisionofregionalpublicgoods.TheEU mustmaintainthis
supportthroughabroaderstrategy,notlimitedtotrade.Itisimportanttobe
awareofthechangesoccurringintheregionalintegration“map”,particularlyas
regards Andean CommunityMercosur convergence,the enlargement of
Mercosurandtheformation ofthe Union ofSouth American Nations
(UNASUR).Cooperationwithsubregionalgroupsmustalsoadapttothe“post
liberal”integrationagendas,whichgobeyondtradeliberalisationandextendto
regionalpoliciesinfieldssuchaspeaceandsecurity,transportandenergy
infrastructure,andcrossbordercooperation;environmentandclimatechange,
disasterriskreductionand mitigation;“bottomup”regionalisationbythe
formationofregionalcivilsocietynetworksthatcanplayanactiveroleinthe
process;and the correction ofregionalasymmetries to ensureincome
convergenceas wellassocialandterritorialcohesion.Thenew program
“Euroclima”,launchedatthe2008ViennaSummit,andalsothenewLatin
AmericaInvestmentFacility(LAIF)couldplayanimportantroleinthesefields.
(7)犌狉犲犪狋犲狉犃狋狋犲狀狋犻狅狀狋狅犛狅狌狋犺犛狅狌狋犺犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犫狔犕犲犪狀狊狅犳犜狉犻犪狀犵狌犾犪狉
犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犕犲犮犺犪狀犻狊犿狊:TheincreaseinSSCconfirmsthegrowingroleofthe
moreadvancedLatinAmericancountriesintheregionsintegrationprocessesand
development.SuchcooperationprovidesopportunitiesfortheEUintermsofthe
following:the mobilisationofadditionalresources,financial,humanand
technical;adaptationtotheregionsneeds;greaterinvolvementofLatin
Americanstakeholders;andthestrengtheningoftheinstitutionalcapacitiesof
donorsandrecipientsalike.Insomerespects,theregionalprogrammesandtheir
methodologyofworkingwith“networks”ofdecentralisedstakeholdersmaybe
anappropriatebasisforpromotingthistypeofcooperation.
(8)犐犿狆狉狅狏犲犿犲狀狋狅犳犕狌狋狌犪犾犓狀狅狑犾犲犱犵犲犪狀犱犛狅犮犻犪犾犘犪狉狋犻犮犻狆犪狋犻狅狀犻狀犅犻
狉犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊:Apermanentbiregionalorganisationmustbeestablished
ChallengestoEUPoliciesonDevelopmentCooperationwithLatinAmerica 235
whoseprioritiesincludeexpandingtheparticipationofthemanystakeholders
involvedinbiregionalrelationsandmonitoringthebiregionalagenda.This
organisation,alreadyproposedasaEuroLatinAmericaFoundation,wouldbea
publicprivateinitiative,withtheCommissionandtheEuropeanParliamentplayingan
importantroleinitsimplementation,strategicorientationandfunding.
(9)犆狅犿狆狉犲犺犲狀狊犻狏犲犛狋狉犪狋犲犵狔犳狅狉犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犻狀犛犮犻犲狀犮犲犪狀犱犜犲犮犺狀狅犾狅犵狔:
Theincreasingimportanceofresearch,developmentandinnovation(R+D+I)
forLatinAmericanandCaribbeanMICsrequiresacomprehensivestrategythat
encompasses EULatin American/Caribbean(LAC)relations as a whole.
Politicaldialogueat ministeriallevelhasalready begun,andsignificant
developmentcooperationinitiativesexist.Itisneverthelessimportanttoensure
theconsistencyoftechnologytransfercommitmentsadopted withinsuch
dialogue,thecurrentdesignoftheassociationagreementsregardingrulesfor
protectingintellectualpropertyrightsandtheneedtointroducepoliciesfor
improvingcompetitiveness.ThecurrentdispersalofECinstrumentsmustbe
correctedinordertoensurethattheyhelptostrengthennationalR+D+I
capacities.
(10)犜狅狑犪狉犱狊犪犈狌狉狅犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犪狀犱犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀犎犻犵犺犲狉犈犱狌犮犪狋犻狅狀
犃狉犲犪:ThebuildingofanEULACcommonareaofhighereducationandresearch
ispartofthebiregionalagendaofsocialcohesion,regionalintegrationand
mutualknowledgeofthe “strategicpartnership”.A broadprogrammeof
academicmobilitybetweenthetworegionsmustbedesigned,anditcouldbe
basedonexistingeducationalandresearchinstitutionsandnetworks.Itis
thereforeimportanttoensuretheconvergencebetweenaccreditationsystems.
Morethanofferingindividualscholarships,thisprogrammemustfosterand
developresearchbasedcentresofexcellenceandmustbringmobilityintoboth
partiesresearchprojects.
Notes
1.Thesenewinstrumentsare:theEuropeanNeighbourhoodandPartnershipInstrument;the
InstrumentforPreAccessionAssistance;and,coveringLatinAmerica,theFinancial
InstrumentforDevelopmentCooperation (DCI);theFinancialInstrumentforthe
PromotionofDemocracyandHumanRights(whichreplacesthepreviousEuropean
InitiativeforDemocracyandHumanRights);aswellastheInstrumentforStability(whichreplacesthepreviousRapidReactionMechanism).Themostimportant,because
ofitscoverageandresources,isthenewDCI.
2.犐狀狏犲狊狋犻狀犵犻狀狆犲狅狆犾犲(socialandhumandevelopment)withabudgetofEUR1,060million;
狀狅狀狊狋犪狋犲犪犮狋狅狉狊犪狀犱犾狅犮犪犾犪狌狋犺狅狉犻狋犻犲狊犻狀犱犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋(cofinancingwithNGOsandlocal
governments),withabudgetofEUR1,639 million;犲狀狏犻狉狅狀犿犲狀狋犪狀犱狊狌狊狋犪犻狀犪犫犾犲
236 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
犿犪狀犪犵犲犿犲狀狋狅犳狀犪狋狌狉犪犾狉犲狊狅狌狉犮犲狊犻狀犮犾狌犱犻狀犵犲狀犲狉犵狔,withfundingamountingtoEUR804
million;犳狅狅犱狊犲犮狌狉犻狋狔(MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsonhungerandmalnutrition),with
abudgetofEUR1,709million;and犿犻犵狉犪狋犻狅狀犪狀犱犪狊狔犾狌犿 (managementofmigration
flows),withabudgetofEUR384million.
3.Thispolicydocument,albeitnameda“strategy”,isnota“CommonStrategy”,themost
relevantpolicyplanningdocumentintheframeworkoftheEuropeanCommonForeignand
SecurityPolicy(ECFSP).Sofar,therehavebeenonlythreeCommonStrategies:forthe
Mediterraneanregion,RussiaandUkraine.
4.TheyincludeCommissionCommunicationstotheCouncilandtheEuropeanParliament
definingEuropeanCommunitypolicytowardsLatinAmerica,andarethereforepartofthe
Communitysdecisionmakingprocess.Inaddition,thereareprogrammingdocumentsfor
developmentcooperationcalledRegionalandSubregionalStrategyPapers(RSPs)and
CountryStrategyPapers(CSPs).Infact,theexistenceofacoherentprogramming
frameworkisrelativelyrecent.Theperiod20072013isthefirstin whichthese
programmingframeworks have beenfully setout.Thetwolatest Commission
Communicationssettingpoliticalprioritieswerepublishedin2005and2009(European
Commission2005a,2005b,2009).
5.Thesumisslightlyhigherthan100percentbecauseofroundingup.
6.Thesechangeshavebeenrecognisedbythe Development Assistance Committees
evaluationofECcooperation(DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee2007).
7.SomeoftheseincentiveswerealreadybuiltoninthetradepreferencesoftheGSPplus,
coveringbothregionalgroupings.
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犈狌狉狅狆犲犪犃犿é狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪狆狉狅狆狌犲狊狋狅狆狅狉犲犾犘犪狉犾犪犿犲狀狋狅犈狌狉狅狆犲狅,Brussels:European
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犈狌狉狅狆犲犪犮狅狀犃犿é狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪狔犲犾犆犪狉犻犫犲(adoptedbytheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion
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犃犿é狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪.犈狏犪犾狌犪犮犻ó狀狆犪狉犪犾犪犆狅犿犻狊犻ó狀犈狌狉狅狆犲犪,犐狀犳狅狉犿犲犱犲狊í狀狋犲狊犻狊,Brussels:
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犃犿é狉犻犮犪犆犲狀狋狉犪犾.犈狏犪犾狌犪犮犻ó狀狆犪狉犪犾犪 犆狅犿犻狊犻ó狀 犈狌狉狅狆犲犪,犐狀犳狅狉犿犲犱犲狊í狀狋犲狊犻狊,
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犪狀犱犘狉狅狊狆犲犮狋狊犳狅狉犆犾狅狊犲狉犘犪狉狋狀犲狉狊犺犻狆19962000.犆狅犿犿狌狀犻犮犪狋犻狅狀犳狉狅犿狋犺犲犆狅犿犿犻狊狊犻狅狀狋狅狋犺犲
犆狅狌狀犮犻犾犪狀犱狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犘犪狉犾犻犪犿犲狀狋,Brussels:COM(95)495,23October.
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犐狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀 犈犳犳狅狉狋狊 犪犿狅狀犵 犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犻狀犵 犆狅狌狀狋狉犻犲狊. 犆狅犿犿狌狀犻犮犪狋犻狅狀 犳狉狅犿 狋犺犲
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犝狀犻狅狀犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犘犪狉狋狀犲狉狊犺犻狆狅狀狋犺犲犈狏犲狅犳狋犺犲21狊狋犆犲狀狋狌狉狔,Brussels:COM(99)
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犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犘犪狉犾犻犪犿犲狀狋狅狀狋犺犲犆狅犿犿犻狊狊犻狅狀狊犗犫犼犲犮狋犻狏犲狊,犻狀狋犺犲犉狉犪犿犲狑狅狉犽狅犳狋犺犲
犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪,犻狀犞犻犲狑狅犳狋犺犲3狉犱犛狌犿犿犻狋
狅犳犎犲犪犱狊狅犳犛狋犪狋犲犪狀犱犌狅狏犲狉狀犿犲狀狋狅犳狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犪狀犱狋犺犲
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238 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
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犌狅狏犲狉狀犿犲狀狋狊狅犳狋犺犲 犕犲犿犫犲狉犛狋犪狋犲狊 犕犲犲狋犻狀犵 狑犻狋犺犻狀狋犺犲犆狅狌狀犮犻犾,狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀
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240 !
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉3
犃犖犲狑犈狉犪犳狅狉犆犺犻狀犪犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊牶
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1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
SeparatedbythePacificOceanandculturaldifferences,hithertoLatin
AmericaandChinahavehadlittleknowledgeofoneanotherandonlylooseties.
Inanincreasinglyglobalworld,however,thedistanceseemstoberapidly
diminishingandtransPacificcountriesarebecominggoodneighbours.Chinas
integrationintotheworldeconomyistransformingitfromaregionalplayerinto
anemergingglobalplayer.LatinAmericaandotherdevelopingregionsare
becomingnewforefrontsofChinasglobalreach.GeneralBantzCraddock,
formerheadoftheUSSouthernCommand,hassaidthatChinasinfluencein
LatinAmericaisanemergingdynamicthatcannotbeignored(Bachelet2005).
Withtheirincreasingeconomicanddiplomaticindependence,countriesinLatin
Americahavealsoexpandedtheirrelationswithoutsiders,includingChinaand
India.ManypeopleinLatinAmericalooktoChinaasaneconomicandpolitical
alternativetoUShegemony(Hakim2006).Inthecourseofglobalisation,China
andLatinAmericahavebecomeclosepartners.
Thisbilateralrelationshiphaswitnessedrapidgrowthintradevolume,but
alsoinculturalexchangesandpoliticalinteractionoverthepastdecade.The
bilateraltradevolumeincreasedfromjustUSD12.2billionin2000toUSD102
billionin2007(ChineseMinistryofCommerce2007).Attheregionallevel,
Chinahasbeeninvolvedinthemostimportantregionalinstitutionsaseitherfull
memberorobserver.Chinascontributiontoregionalinfrastructureandother
publicgoodsishighlyvaluedbyLatinAmericancountries.Chinaissuedapolicy
paperonLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanon16November2008,afterissuing
papersontheEUandAfrica(ChineseGovernment2008).Atthegloballevel,
ANewEraforChinaLatinAmericanRelations:MoreOpportunitiesthanChallenges 241
bothsidesareworkingtogethertopromotereformofthecurrentinternational
systemandeffectivegovernanceonglobalissues.Therelationshipbetween
BrazilandChinahasbeenthemodelforSouthSouthcooperationandhas
increasingglobalimplications.
Asanewcomerandanemergingglobalplayer,Chinaalsofacesspecial
challengesin Latin America.Issuessuchastradecompetition,Taiwan,
development modelsand geopoliticalfactorscomplicate bilateralrelations
significantly.Howthesechallengesaredealtwith willbecrucialinthe
developmentoffutureSinoLatinAmericanrelations.
2.犆犺犻狀犪狊犔犪狋犻狀犔犲犪狆犉狅狉狑犪狉犱
Chinas30yearsofgrowthhavebeenheavilyreliantonforeigninvestments
andoverseasmarkets,whichhavehelpedittobecomeanactiveinternational
player.Motivatedprimarilybyitseconomicdevelopment,theeconomiclinkages
betweenChinaandLatinAmericahavebecomemuchstronger.Chinahas
improveditsrelationswithAfricaandLatinAmericagreatlysincetheendofthe
ColdWar.Whiletheserelationshavemainlyinvolvedeconomicactivities,a
comprehensiveengagementisdevelopingatvariouslevels.Itisfairtosaythat
SinoLatinAmericanrelationshaveenteredanewphase.
2.1!ComprehensiveBilateralCooperation
In2004,PresidentHuJintaooutlinedthreeobjectivesinthedevelopmentof
SinoLatinAmericanrelations:first,supportingeachotherpoliticallyand
buildinganallroundfriendship;second,complementingeachothereconomically
andbuildingamutuallybeneficial,winwinpartnershiponanewbasis;and
third,enhancingculturalexchangesandservingasamodelfordialoguebetween
differentcivilisations(Hu2004).WhatChinaispursuingisacomprehensive
relationshipwithLatinAmerica.
Inthepoliticalsphere,ChinaandmanyLatinAmericancountriesmaintain
closetiesandconsiderablepoliticaltrust.Therehavebeenunprecedentedand
intensivehighlevelofficialvisitsbyChinatoLatinAmericaoverthepast
decade.Regularcommunicationsbetweenparliamentswereestablishedbetween
ChinaandBrazil,aswellasbetweenChinaandChile.Suchpoliticalvisitshavenot
onlyenhancedbilateralpoliticaltrustbuthavealsopromotedeconomiccooperation.
ChinahasestablishedstrategicpartnershipswithBrazil,Argentina,Mexico,
VenezuelaandPeru.Allpartnerssharethevisionofamultipolarworldorder.
Amongthem,Brazilisaccordedspecialimportance:PresidentHucalledthe
bilateralrelationshiponeofglobalinfluencewhenhemetwithhiscounterpart
242 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
PresidentLuladuringtheG20LondonSummitinApril2009.Besidesthesebig
countries,Chinaalsovaluesitsrelationswithsmallerones,suchasCostaRica,
inalongtermperspective.
Intheeconomicarena,bilateralcooperationhasbeenwinwin.Chinahas
emergedasthesecondbiggesttradingpartnerofLatin Americaandthe
Caribbean.Inhis2004visittoLatinAmerica,PresidentHuJintaocommitted
ChinatoattainingUSD100billioninbilateraltradevolumeby2010:however,
thefigurewassurpassedasearlyas2007,whichshowsthegreatpotentialof
bilateraltrade(ZhouWenzhong2009).ChinasurpassedtheUSAasBrazils
largesttradepartnerin2009 (Xinhuanet2009).TheBilateralFreeTrade
Agreement(FTA)withChileisworkingwell,andsimilarFTAnegotiations
withCostaRicaandPeruaresettobeconcluded.Chinaisthemostfrequent
userofthePanamaCanalaftertheUSAandJapan.Chinasdirectinvestmentin
LatinAmericatotalledUSD24.8billionin2008 (Moxley2010).Chinas
investmentintheexplorationofBrazilsnewfounddeepseaoilfieldisamore
recentexampleofwinwincooperation.Financialcooperationhasalsogained
momentuminrecentyears.Againstthebackgroundofthecurrentinternational
financialcrisis,ChinasboomingeconomicrelationshipwithLatinAmericasendsouta
hopefulmessagetothecurrentlyunbalancedandvulnerableworldeconomy.
Intheculturalarena,bothsidesvaluethedevelopmentofpeopletopeople
links.Bilateraltourismandculturalexchangehavebeenpromotedbythe
Chinesegovernmentaspartofpublicdiplomacy.Chinahasdesignatedmorethan
16countriesintheregionasapproveddestinationsforChinesecitizenstotravel
astourists.ConfuciusInstitutesandlanguageandculturalinstituteshavebeen
establishedatselecteduniversitiesacrosstheregion.Learning Mandarinis
becomingincreasinglypopularinLatinAmerica,notleastforthebusiness
opportunitiesitbringswithit(Forero2006).Networksofinformalsummitsand
meetings,eitherinChinaorinLatinAmerica,havebeenestablishedtobring
opinionformerstogether(Kurlantzick2006).Chinasdevelopmentexperiences
andvisionsofpeacefuldevelopmentandaharmoniousworldhaveaverystrong
culturalandhistoricalbackground.Buttounderstandthem properly,an
adequateknowledgeofChinesecultureisrequired.Suchpersonallinkages,
includingbilateralexchangesbetweenacademiaandthinktanks,areplayinga
positiveroleindeepeningmutualunderstanding.
2.2!InstitutionalisingRegionalInvolvement
Withdeepeningandbroadeningcooperation,increasingimportanceisbeing
giventoregionalinstitutions.Institutionaliseddialoguethroughvariouschannels
ANewEraforChinaLatinAmericanRelations:MoreOpportunitiesthanChallenges 243
hasbeenestablishedbetweenLatinAmericaandChina,whilesimilarbilateral
channelsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericaarelacking.Amongthemthemost
notableareChinasbecomingapermanentobserverattheOrganizationofAmerican
States(OAS)in2004andamemberoftheInterAmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB)in
2009.Inaddition,ChinaisanobserverattheLatinAmericanParliamentandhas
tieswiththeRioGroup,theAndeanCommunityandCaricom,aswellas
Mercosur.Obviously,strongsupportfromthemajorityofLatinAmerican
countriesisthekeytoChinasinvolvementintheseinstitutionalplatforms.
Chinaattachesconsiderableimportancetothisinstitutionalcooperation.
TheChineseleadershipseesjoiningmultilateralgroupsasawayofreducing
possibleapprehensionofChinaandalsoasaplatformforinstitutionalisedand
predictableinteractions.ChinabecamethefortyeighthmemberoftheInter
AmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB)in2009,thethirdfromEastAsia,following
JapanandSouthKorea.ZhouXiaochuan,governorofthePeoplesBankof
China,highly praisedtheIDBseffortstoreducepovertyand promote
developmentintheregionandsaidthattheIDBhasbecome“themostimportant
platform”forChinascollaborationwiththisregionwhenheparticipatedinthe
annualgovernorsassemblyoftheIDBheldinMedellinin2009(ZhouXiaochuan
2009).ChinasfinancialcommunityisreadytoexpandcooperationwithLatin
AmericafollowingChinasjoiningofIDB.ChinahascontributedUSD350
millionthroughtheIDBtofundinitiativestohelpLatinAmericancountriescope
withthecurrentglobaleconomicslowdown(IDB2009).
2.3!CooperationonaGlobalAgenda
ChinahighlyvaluesLatinAmericasoverallimportanceintheinternational
system.In1988,MrDengXiaopinghadtheforesighttostatethatthetwenty
firstcenturyshouldbethecenturyofboththePacificandLatinAmerica.Latin
AmericaenjoysamuchhigherstatusinChinasforeignstrategythanasaraw
materialssupplier,assomeobserversbelieve.ChinaseesLatinAmericaasan
importantpartnerindealing withglobalissuesandreformingthecurrent
internationalsystem.
Buildingaprosperousdomesticeconomyinaglobalisingworldisacommon
taskforbothChinaandLatinAmericancountries.Indoingso,bothsidesshould
seektomaketheestablishedinternationaleconomicsystemmorereasonableand
favourablefordevelopingcountries.Thecurrentworldrecessionhasmadeit
clearthateventheUSAisvulnerabletothelimitationsoftheinternational
financialsystem,while mostdevelopingcountriesaresurelyina weaker
position.LearninglessonsfromtheAsianfinancialcrisisin1997,mostLatin
244 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Americaneconomieshaveaccumulatedsizeableforeignexchangereserves,
makingthemstrongerandsaferinthecurrentsituation.Evenso,amore
responsibleandaccountableUScurrencypolicyisnecessarytomaintainthevalue
oftheirforeignexchangereserves.Inthisconnection,ChinaandLatinAmerican
countriesshouldjoin handsto makethe currentinternationalfinancial
architecturegraduallymoreaccountable.
Institutionalcooperationisincreasingbetweenemergingpowers,including
ChinaanditsLatinAmericancounterparts.BrazilandChinaarekeymembersof
theemergingG/O51,BRICandtheG20.Mexico,amemberoftheNorth
AmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)andtheOrganisationforEconomic
CooperationandDevelopment(OECD),playsanimportantroleincoordinating
relationsbetweentheG5andtheG8.Argentinaalsoplaysavisibleroleinthe
increasinglyimportantG20.Cooperationofthiskindcancultivatesharedvisions
ofafutureinternationalsystemandenhancemutualpoliticaltrustandcommon
interests.BothChinaandLatinAmericanemergingpowersneedtoenhance
cooperationindealingwithglobalissuessuchasclimatechange,energysecurity
andDoharoundnegotiations.TransregionalarrangementssuchasAPECandthe
ForumforEastAsiaLatinAmericaCooperation(FEALAC)alsohavetheir
function.ChinaalsoworksthroughUNpeacekeepingmissionstofacilitate
regionalstability,andbothChinaandBrazilhaveamajorsayinimplementing
UNtasksinHaiti.
3.犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犻狀犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犛犻狀狅犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
Theleapforwardinthisrelationshipdoesnotmeanthattheroadwillalways
besmooth.Halfthecountrieswhichhave“diplomatic”relationswithTaiwanare
locatedinLatinAmerica.Thewinwinstrategymustalsosurvivethetestof
tradedeficitsandeconomiccompetition.AsanewcomerinLatin America
comparedtotheWesterncountries,Chinamustpayattentiontotheconcernsof
theUSAandtheEU,butalsoavoidthemistakesthattheUSAandtheEUhave
made.Trade competition,the Taiwan issue,development models and
geopoliticalfactorsareissueswhichcouldhaveasignificantinfluenceonfuture
SinoLatinAmericanrelations.
3.1!SharedGainsandAsymmetricHopes
Theboomingeconomiccooperationhasgeneratedsharedandmutualgains
forChinaandLatinAmerica.Atthesametime,reactionsdifferacrossLatin
Americaandthereareevenhigherexpectationsinsomecountries.Feelingswith
regardtoChinasgrowingpresenceintheregionaremixed.WhilemostSouth
ANewEraforChinaLatinAmericanRelations:MoreOpportunitiesthanChallenges 245
AmericancountriesseeChinaasa majorpotentialpartnerfornewtradeand
investments,MexicoandmostoftheCentralAmericanandCaribbeancountriessee
Chinamoreasacompetitor,enteringtheUSmarketwithsimilarlabourintensive
products.BlamefortheprivatesectorspoorperformanceinsomeLatinAmerican
countriesoftenfallsonthegrowingpresenceofChinainworldmarkets(Lederman,
OlarregaandPerry2009).SomethoughtthatbygrantingChinafreemarketstatus
theywouldautomaticallygainmoretradeandinvestments(Wu2007).Furthermore,
ChinahasoftenencounteredsevereantidumpingmeasuresinsomeLatinAmerican
countrieswhichofferedChinafreemarketstatus.Thesedifficultiessuggestthatboth
sidesfacetheurgenttaskofthinkingofmoreeffectivewaysofmaintainingthe
momentumofbilateraleconomiccooperation.
Despitecompetitivepressures,Chinasrapidgrowthshouldbeseenasan
opportunity,whichhasactuallybeenhelpingregionaleconomies,notonly
becauseoftherapidgrowthinpurchasingpower,butalsobecauseofthe
growingforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)andfinancialflows.Inthepastdecade,
SouthAmericancountrieswithacomparativeadvantageincommoditieshave
benefitedalotfromChinasgrowingdemandforoilandothercommodities.
LatinAmericarankssecondasarecipientofChineseFDI,whichhasgonemainly
intoenergy,commoditiesandinfrastructure.Ithasgreatpotentialforexpansion
toothersectors,suchasmanufacturing,however.Innovationcooperationin
scienceandtechnologyhasbeenheavilypromoted—forexample,thecooperation
betweenChinaandBrazilonsatelliteprojects.Chinaspotentialforbecomingan
importantsourceoffinancingforLatinAmericaisconsiderable.Argentinahas
alreadysignedacurrencyswapdealtotallingaboutRMB70billionwithChinain
April2009,makingitthebiggestfinancialdealinbothChineseandLatin
Americanhistory(Turner2009).Withitssizableforeigncurrencyreservesand
increasinglyactiveprivatesector,Chinawillbeoneofthetopcreditornations
withglobalreach.AfavourableinvestmentclimateinLatinAmericawillbevery
helpfulinattractingFDIfromChina.
ChinaspresenceinLatinAmericatosomeextentputspressureonthe
regionsspecialisationpatterns,shiftingtowardhighernaturalresourceand
knowledgeintensiveactivitiesandproducts (Lederman,OlarregaandPerry
2009).Nationsmustfurtherexploretheircompetitiveadvantagesinahighly
segmentedglobalmarket.ItisthereforenaturalforLatinAmericancountries
withrichresourcestofocusonnaturalresourcerelatedindustry.However,
relyingonasingleindustrywillinevitablyleadtovulnerabilityinthefuture.
JustasChinasplentifullaboursupply,nowmainlydevotedtomanufacturing,
couldbeusedtobuildaknowledgeeconomyinthefuture,LatinAmerican
246 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
countriescanimprovetheirnaturalresourcesector,whilestrengtheningknow
howandinnovation.IfLatinAmericancountriescandoso,ChinaandLatin
Americacanavoidcompetitioninmanufacturingindustrieswhilebeingpartners
inbuildingaknowledgeeconomy.Ifwelookfurtherintothefuture,strong
ChinaLatinAmericaneconomicrelationswillbeapositivefactorinahealthyand
balancedinternationaleconomicsystem.
3.2!TheTaiwanIssue
TaiwanisasensitiveissueincurrentandfutureSinoLatin American
relations.Firstofall,mostcountriesinLatinAmericaadheretoa“OneChina
policy”,whichisthemainstream policystance.Taiwaninthepasttook
advantageof “chequebook diplomacy”,FTA negotiations andloansto
consolidate“diplomaticrelations”withtheCaribbean,CentralAmericaand
Paraguay,respectively.Theabsenceofformaldiplomaticrelationswiththese
countriestosomeextentpreventsChinafrom developingacomprehensive
regionalrelationship.Recently,thetwosidesdividedbytheTaiwanStrait
achievedacommonpolicyframeworkofpeacefuldevelopment,andculturaland
economicintegrationarebeingdevelopedrapidly.Withinthepolicyframework
ofpeacefuldevelopmentforcrossStraitrelations,Beijing willcontinueto
developnormalcommercialandculturalrelationswiththosecountrieswithwhich
itdoesnothavediplomaticrelations.ConsideringtheneedsofTaiwans
economicdevelopmentandthepracticalinterestsofTaiwanscompatriots,the
Chinesegovernment willnotobjecttothesecountries maintaining non
governmentalculturalandeconomictieswithTaiwan.
Againstthisbackground,Taiwansleaderscameupwiththeideaofa
diplomatictruce,towhichthemainlanddidnotreactdirectly,althoughthe
strivingfordiplomaticrelationsin Latin Americaclearlydecreased.Itis
thereforefairtosaythatthepolicyadjustmenthasdeepenedeconomicintegration
acrosstheTaiwanStraitandhasmadecompetitionlessintensiveinLatin
America.Meanwhile,Chinasbasicstanceon Taiwan willneverchange,
regardlessofthesocalleddiplomatictruce.Doublerecognitionofbothsides
acrosstheTaiwanStraitisnotanacceptableoptiontoChina.TheChinese
governmentdeclaredin2008thatChinais“willingtoestablishanddevelopstate
tostaterelationswiththecountriesinLatinAmericaonthebasisoftheOne
Chinaprinciple”initsfirstpolicypaperonLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
(ChineseGovernment2008).
Assomeresearchershaveobserved,thefactthatamajorityofthecountries
thatstillrecogniseTaiwanarelocatedintheAmericasreflectsthesphereof
ANewEraforChinaLatinAmericanRelations:MoreOpportunitiesthanChallenges 247
influenceoftheUnitedStates(Tokatlian2008).Withthedevelopmentof
ChinaseconomyandcrossStraitrelations,however,theUSinfluenceonthe
Taiwanissueisdeclining.ToseizetheopportunityofChinasdynamicgrowth
andadapttotherisinginternationalinfluenceofChina,themotivationto
establishformalrelationswithChinaisgrowingintheregion.CostaRica,an
influentialsubregionalcountry,inJune2007becamethefirstCentralAmerican
nationinthepostColdWareratoswitchitsdiplomaticrecognitionfromTaiwan
tomainlandChina.AndevenLatinAmericanstatesthatrecogniseTaiwan
frequentlyadheretothecommonLatinAmericanvotingstanceintheUN
GeneralAssembly.
3.3!TheChineseDevelopmentModelandItsImplications
SincetheWashingtonConsensusenteredroughseasduringtheinternational
financialcrisisfrom2008to2009,therehavebeengrowingconcernsaboutthe
emergingcompetitionbetweendevelopmentmodelsinLatin America.The
WashingtonConsensus,theBeijingConsensusandtheSantiagoConsensusare
probablythemostinfluentialdevelopmentmodelsinLatinAmericacurrently.
TheturntothecentreortheleftofLatinAmericanpoliticsoverthepast
decadeisaremarkablepoliticaldevelopment.Itisalsoanimportantpartofthe
backgroundforunderstandingthedevelopment modeldiscussionin Latin
America.Inthe1990s,mostcountriesintheregionadoptedtheWashington
Consensusformulaasafreemarketrecipeforrestructuringtheircrisishit
economies,whichhelpedthemtoimproveefficiency,whileexacerbatingmany
socialproblems,suchaspoverty,inequalityandpublicsecurity.Nearly37per
centofthepopulationoftheregionstilllivesinpoverty,anditremainsoneof
themostunequalintheworldintermsofwealthandincome.Thewidelycited
“turntotheleft”inLatinAmericanelectionsin20052007reflectedtheeconomic
realitiesandconcernsoftheaveragevoter(ONeil2008).Citizensneednotonly
democracytoachievetheirpoliticalrights,butalsoastrongandeffective
governmenttoaddresssocialissues,includingunemployment,publicsafety,
educationandqualityoflifeforthemajorityofcitizens.
Inthesecircumstances,theparticipantsintheWorldEconomicForumon
LatinAmericain2007reemphasisedandshapedtheSantiagoConsensus,
introducedin1998.Theyagreedonfiveprioritiesfortheregion,aimedat
achievingandsustaininghigherproductivityandgrowthwithequity:education,
theenvironment,R&Dinvestment,efficienttaxationandinfrastructure.These
prioritiesareintendedtoimproveincomedistributionaseconomiesgrowandto
takefulladvantageoftheopportunitiesandinnovationpotentialaffordedbythe
248 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
globalisationoftrade,culturalandfinancialflows.Taketheexampleof
infrastructure.IfLatinAmericaistosecureitsplaceintheglobalsupplychain
andtoimproveregionalenergysecurity,itmustinvestinupgradingits
infrastructure.TheSantiagoConsensusrepresentsanewpolicyparadigmshiftin
theregion.ChileisthebestexampleoftheSantiagoConsensussofar:ithas
achievedthehighestpercapitaincomegrowthintheregion.
WhileLatinAmericahasachievedrapideconomicgrowthinrecentyears,it
hasstillbeenmuchslowerthanotherregions,especiallyAsia,intermsofGDP
growthrate.Inthiscontext,ChinahasbeenamodelforLatinAmerican
countriestodiscuss.Whilethesocalled“BeijingConsensus”isanattemptto
sumupChinasgrowthexperience,Chinastillhasnoofficialdescriptionofwhat
theBeijingConsensusis.AccordingtoChinasowndevelopmentexperience,it
wouldbewrongtofollowthesamepaththatothershavetaken without
consideringacountrysownsituation.Inreality,bothsideshavebeenworking
hardtolearnfromeachothersdevelopmentexperience.AlargepartofChinese
developmentstudiesfocusedonLatinAmericasdevelopmentexperience,includingits
economictakeoff,the“lostdecade”,neoliberalreformandthecurrentleftturn(Xu
andZhang2006).SomeLatinAmericancountriesarealsoveryinterestedinChinas
successfuldevelopmentstory.Suchmutuallearningcandeepenourunderstandingof
developmentandconsolidatediversedevelopmentmodels.
ItshouldbenotedthateventheleftleaninggovernmentsinLatinAmerica
aredividedintotwogroups,“rightleft”and“wrongleft”,asanumberofUS
scholarshaveobserved(Castaneda2006).Thiscolourfulleftwingpoliticswarns
usnottotrytosimplifytheworldtoomuch.AstheObamaadministrationhas
foundout,theroleofgovernmentbecomesenlargedindealingwitheconomic
recession.TheWorldBanksleadershavealsoarguedthattheWashington
ConsensusshouldbefollowedbytheSantiagoConsensus(WorldBank1999).In
dealingwiththechallengeofglobalisation,therewillbemoreconsensusor
convergenceamongthesethreemodelsinthelongrun.
3.4!GeopoliticalThinkingversustheLogicofGlobalisation
Lastbutnotleast,geopoliticalfactorsconferatrilateralaspectonSino
LatinAmericanrelations.WhetherChinaisathreatinAmericasbackyardor
LatinAmericahasbecomeChinasbackyardarequestionsbeingdiscussedbyUS
scholarsandreflectastrong geopoliticalapproachtocurrentSinoLatin
Americanrelations.CloserSinoLatinAmericantieshaveresultedinmixed
reactionsinUSpolicycircles.MostanalystsappeartoagreethatChinas
primaryinterestintheregionistogaingreateraccesstoneededresourcesand
ANewEraforChinaLatinAmericanRelations:MoreOpportunitiesthanChallenges 249
marketsbymeansoftradeandinvestment.TheyhaveconfidenceinAmericas
economicandgeographicaladvantageoverChina.Meanwhile,someanalysts
arguethatChinasinvolvementintheregioncouldposeafuturethreattoUS
influence.TheyevenarguethatsomeLatinAmericancountrieslooktoChinaas
aneconomicandpoliticalalternativetothe WashingtonConsensusandUS
hegemony.Chinastiestothosecountriesruledbyleftleaningpoliticianswith
anantiAmericancharacterhavealsobeencriticised.ThesemixedUSreactions
towardChinaspresenceinLatinAmericareflectthecompetingperspectivesof
globalisationandgeopolitics.
Chinesescholarshavealsoarguedthatitisnecessarytoexplainandclarify
byallmeansthatChinawillnotharmthirdpartyinterestsandwilllookonthe
confrontationwiththeU.S.whenitentersLatinAmerica(ZhuandLiu2008).
BecauseofChinaslowprofilediplomacy,neutralpoliticalpositionandregular
dialogueswiththeUSAonLatinAmericanaffairs,Washingtoniswatchfulbut
notalarmed(Hakim2006).TheUSAisconfidentthatitwillcontinuetobethe
longtermpartnerofpreferencefortheregion.
ToassesstrilateralrelationsbetweentheUSA,ChinaandLatinAmericain
apositivelight,weneedtoclarifywhattheircommoninterestsare.Forthe
USA,LatinAmericaisthelargestforeignsupplierofoil,astrongpartnerin
developingalternativefuelsandoneofthefastestgrowingtradingpartners.Ifit
istoproperlyaddressitsownconcerns,includingillegalmigrationanddrug
trafficking,the USA needstohelptheregiontodealwithpovertyand
inequality,publicsecurity,migrationandenergysecurity.China,ontheother
hand,needsaccesstoregionalenergyand markets,andtoensurethe
cooperationoftheregioninreformingthecurrentinternationalsystem.Latin
Americaneedsinvestment,tradeandtechnologytomeetthechallengesof
developmentandglobalisation.Basedontheseindividualinterests,anumberof
sharedinterestscanbederived.Chinasinvestmentsintheenergysectorcan
increasetheenergysupplytoall,stabiliseworldenergypricesandboostregional
development.Andasalreadymentioned,aprosperousLatinAmericawillalso
sendoutagoodmessagefortheglobaleconomy,whichbenefitsall.
ThisissimilartothesituationinAfrica,whereboomingChinaAfrica
relationshaveencouragedtheEUtoimproveitsrelationswithAfrica.Acloser
ChinaLatinAmericarelationshipwillalsopersuadetheUSAtopay more
attentiontotheregionsneedssinceitsfocushasshiftedtootherregionssince
September11.AcomprehensiveapproachonthepartofboththeUSAandthe
EUtothesetwodevelopingregionswillalsohelptodevelopChinasforeign
policy.TheChinesegovernmentattachesimportancetolocaljobcreationand
250 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
environmentalprotection.Inordertominimisemutualsuspicionsandenhance
mutualcooperation, moreinclusive trilateral dialogue forms should be
established.Leadershipmatters.Inthelongrun,howChinausesitsinfluence
andhowtheUSAandtheEUseeChinasincreasingroleinLatinAmericawill
haveimplicationsforthefuturedirectionoftheinternationalsystem.
4.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
BothChinaandLatinAmericarepresentakeyfocusoftheirrespective
foreignpolicies.Bothsidesareengagingwiththeotherinacomprehensiveway
andatvariouslevels.Economiccooperationhasgreatpotentialnotonlyintrade
butalsoininvestmentandfinance.ChineseinvestmentinLatinAmericacould
helptoupgradethelattersindustryacrosstheboardandminimisethetrade
deficitinLatinAmerica.Incomparisontotraditionalculturalandmigrationties
betweentheEU,theUSAandLatinAmerica,Chinasculturallinkageswith
LatinAmericaareveryweak.Morepublicdiplomacy,culturalexchangesand
educationalcooperationareneeded.Bothsidesshouldencouragetheircitizensto
gettoknowoneanotherbetterinordertoachievesharedgainsandrealise
symmetricalratherthanasymmetricalhopes(Dominguez2006).Mutualpolitical
trustandculturalunderstandingcouldhelptodevelopcooperationopportunities
andtoimproveeconomiccooperation.
ItisnotablethatSinoLatinAmericanrelationshavereachedtheregional
andgloballevel,beyondthebilateraldimension.犆犺犻狀犪狊狆狅犾犻犮狔狆犪狆犲狉狅狀犔犪狋犻狀
犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犪狀犱狋犺犲犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀furtherclarifiesthegoalsofChinaspolicytowards
theregionandoutlinesguidingprinciplesforfuturecooperation.Itmarksan
importantmilestoneinSinoLatinAmericanrelationsbecauseittreatsLatin
Americaasawholeandcoversmanyglobalissues.Chinaaimstoparticipatein
dynamicregionalintegration by providing public goodsthrough regional
institutions,whichcanpromoteChinassoftpowerintheregionandmake
bilateralrelationsmoresustainable.Globalissuessuchascombatingclimate
change,disasterreduction,povertyalleviationandnontraditionalsecurityissues
wereincludedinthepolicypaper,whichmeansthatLatinAmericancountries
willbetreatedasimportantpartnersindealingwithglobalchallenges.As
emergingeconomies,Mexico,Argentina,BrazilandChinashouldbecomemoreactive
andcooperativeinshapingamorefavourableworldfordevelopingcountries.
Obviously,ChinasexpandingpresenceinLatinAmericawillaffectthird
partyintereststosomeextent.Whatismostimportant,however,istoregard
trilateralrelationsaswinwinratherthanaszerosum.Chinasinvolvementin
theregionsinstitutionalnetworkswillmakeitsbehaviourmorepredictableand
ANewEraforChinaLatinAmericanRelations:MoreOpportunitiesthanChallenges 251
acceptable.ChinasparticipationinregionalinstitutionsledbytheUSAwillalso
helpittoreduceUSsuspicions.Chinaspoliticallyneutralpositionandeconomic
focusinitsengagement with Latin America willnotthreaten regional
democracy,prosperityorintegrity.Inaddition,Chinaspositiveengagement
withLatinAmericawillpromoteregionalprosperityandsocialcohesion,which
willnotonlybenefittheregionbutalsoservetheregionalinterestsoftheUSA
andtheEU.
Notes
1.G/O5istheabbreviationofthesocalled“outreach5”countries,namelyChina,Brazil,
India,SouthAfricaandMexico.Leadersfromthesefivecountrieshaveregularlybeen
invitedbyG8leaderstoengageindialogueduringG8summitsinrecentyears.
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! 253
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉4
犜犺犲犈犝,犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪牶犌犲狅犿犲狋狉犻犮犪犾
犘犪狋狋犲狉狀狊犻狀犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犪狀犱犉狌狋狌狉犲犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
9*":% ;#"< 7%'(3=%.
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
Thedebateonwhattheworldorderwilllooklikeinthenotsodistant
futureisnotonlypertinent,butalsourgent.Globalgovernanceandfuture
cooperationschemesdependonwhatkindofstructuretheinternationalsystem
willtakeaftertheeconomiccrisistriggeredbythecollapseofLehmanBrothers.
However,atthispointitisnoteasytopredicteither whatshapethe
internationalorderwillassumeorwhattypeofcooperationschemeswillbebest
suitedfortheworldtocomeandtheinterestsofthedifferentplayers.Despite
thisinabilitytomakeaccuratepredictions,certainfeaturescanalreadybe
distinguishedthroughthefoginwhichweareendingthefirstdecadeofthe
twentyfirstcentury.
Themainpurposeofthischapteristoreflectonthecurrentissuesand
futurecooperation opportunities betweenthreeimportantplayersin the
internationalcommunity:theEuropeanUnion(EU),LatinAmericaandChina.
Eachoftheseplayersseemstobeinadifferentpositiontofacethechallengesof
theworldorderthatisgraduallytakingshape.Potentialcooperationschemes
willdependonhoweachplayerrespondstothesechallenges,accordingto
countryspecificcharacteristics.Ifapredictionmustbemade,Chinawillbeina
muchbettershapetoparticipatefullyinthe “new worldorder”thanthe
EuropeanUnionand,therefore,LatinAmericashouldbeplanningitsfuture
alliancesrightnow.
2.犜犺犲犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犛狔狊狋犲犿牶犃犾狋犲狉犲犱犛狋犪狋犲狊
Atthispoint,itishardtospeakwithmuchcertaintyaboutthestateofany
254 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
foreignpolicyorofanybilateral,biregionalormultilateralrelationship.The
problemliesinthefactthattheinternationalsystemisinfluxor,ifImaysay
so,inan“alteredstate”,inwhichnothingthatweknewbeforeseemstohold
trueanylonger,atleastnotwithoutconsiderablemodification.
However,thereareatleastsomefactsthatwecanbesureof:
(1)Chinahasbecomeamajorworldpower,notonlybecauseofits
outstandingeconomic growthin recentyears,butalso because ofthe
attractivenessofitsdevelopmentmodel.
(2)Europehaslostpartofitssoftpowerduetoenlargementandthe
constitutionaldebacle.IthascertainlylostitsascendancyoverLatinAmerica,
givenitsinabilitytoactonissuesofparticularconcernintheregion,its
obstinateadherencetosocalledsharedprinciplesandvaluesanditsadhoc
solutionswhenpushcomestoshove,asseeninthelatestchangeofpositionvis
visthe pending agreements with the Andean Community members.
Furthermore,despitebeingthemostsuccessfulintegrationschemeintheworld,
thecurrenteconomiccrisisiscertainlyputtingallEUinstitutionsunderstrain,
evenitscoreprincipleofsolidarity,asshownbythediscussionssurroundingthe
Greekdebacle.
(3)LatinAmericahasbecomemorediverseandismovingfartherand
fartherawayfromaunifiedpositionorvoiceoninternationalaffairs,despitethe
recentattemptstocreateaLatinAmericancommunity.Atthesametime,ithas
resumedapreexistingroleasaproducerofrawmaterials,whichhasgivenita
temporaryandsomewhatartificialrelevanceintodaysworld,includingits
apparentresilienceduringthecurrenteconomiccrisis.Nonetheless,the
challengesfacingtheregionarestillmanyanddiverse.
(4)AnyreflectiononrelationsbetweentheEU,LatinAmericaandChina
cannotexcludethe“elephantintheroom”,namelytheUnitedStates.Despiteits
apparentlossofsteamanditsdifficultiesduringthecurrentcrisis,theUSAis
stillaworldpowerthatwillinfluencetheformationofanytypeofnewworld
order.Therefore,perhapsitwouldbebettertotalknotofatrianglebutofa
rhomboidthatincludestheUSA.
(5)Theworldisbecomingmultipolar.However,thismeansnotonlythat
powerwillbedistributedmoreevenlyamongstates,butalsothatotheractors
mustbeconsideredintheequation.Inthatsense,whateverpredictionsaremade
now,itwillbenecessarytotakeintoconsiderationthefactorofpower
fragmentationandredistributionamongdifferentactors,includingstates,
marketsandother,morediffuseplayers,suchasratingagencies,whichhave
demonstratedtheircapacitytomakeorbreakstates.
TheEU,LatinAmericaandChina:GeometricalPatternsinCurrentandFutureRelations 255
(6)Lastbutnotleast,theeconomiccrisisweareinthemiddleofwill
certainlyhaveanimpactonallactorsandwillredefinemanyoftheserelationsin
termsofprioritiesandscopeofaction.Atpresent,theneedforcooperationis
obvious.However,itdoesnotseemtobetakingplaceasmighthavebeen
expected,regardlessoftherecentlyacquiredprofileoftheG20anditspotential
tobecomethebasisofanewinternationalfinancialarchitecture.Upuntilnow,
boththeEUandtheUSAseemtohavebeenhardesthitbythecrisisandthat
hasbeggedthequestionoftheirabilitytoremainatthehelmoftheinternational
order.However,thereisstillhope.JeanMonnet,thefatheroftheEuropean
integrationprocess,oncesaidthatcrisescanmakepeopledowhattheywould
notdootherwise.Canthatbethecasethistimearound?
3.犉狅狌狉犐犿狆狅狉狋犪狀狋犃犮狋狅狉狊犻狀狋犺犲犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犛狔狊狋犲犿
3.1!TheEuropeanUnion:ATroubledProcessandanInternationalActorintheMaking
TheEuropeanUnionhaschangeddramaticallyinrecentyears,notonly
becauseofitsenlargementtotheeast,whichhascertainlyhadaneffectonits
foreignpolicypriorities,butalsobecauseofthetroublesexperiencedbythe
integrationprocessitselfinthewakeoftheconstitutionaldebacleandthe
traumaticapprovaloftheLisbonTreaty.Today,theseverityoftheeconomic
crisisisprovingtobeatoughtestforthemostadvancedintegrationschemein
theworld.Despitetheadvancesineconomicintegration,theGreekdebaclehas
pushedtheEUontotheropes,revealingthatthisimportanteconomicactorstill
hasalongwaytogointermsofeconomicgovernanceandthatevenitsmost
basicprinciplesaremootwhenshortterminterestsareatstake.Itishardto
imaginehowtheinnovationsoftheLisbonTreatywithregardtoforeignpolicy
willbeabletoovercomethesechallengesbythemselvesandtomaketheEUa
strongandcoherentinternationalactor.
Inrecentyears,astheworldunderwentaperiodofrecalcitrantrealismin
internationalaffairspromotedbytheBushadministration,Europewasunableto
takeadvantageofthesituationtopositionitself,notasanalternativebutasa
wiservoicethatcouldguidethereformofinternationalinstitutions.TheUnions
ownissuesvisvisitsinternationalrelationspreventitfrombeingtheworld
poweritshouldbe.
Evenworse,theEUislosinggroundontheinternationalstage.Regardless
ofitsbeingthelargestmarketintheworld,itisbeingsaidmoreandmore
frequentlythatEuropewillbealessimportantplayerintheworldtocome,
256 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
especiallygivenitsincapacitytoactasasingleinternationalactorandits
diversityandcomplexity.Otherspointtowardstheimminentarrivalofanew
bipolarsystem,inwhichthemainactorswillbeChinaandtheUSA,tothe
exclusionoftheEU.
Seenfromtheoutside,theUnionisaverycomplexactorthatfewunderstand.
Thereisapermanentfeelingthatnooneisinchargeandif,atanygivenpoint,
someonedoesseemtobeincharge,therearecriesonallsidesthatitshouldhave
beensomeoneelse,ashappenedwiththeappointmentofMrVanRompuyas
PresidentinNovember2009.ThesamecanbesaidofBaronessAshton.Inthat
sense,theEuropeanmodelseemstobetoocomplexandtootaxingforoutside
observers.
Furthermore,Europehasnotyetlostitsimageasapaternalisticactorin
termsofitscooperationschemes.Itsselfassignedroleasa“normativepower”is
noteasytoselltolessdevelopedpartners,whohavetheconstantfeelingofbeing
judgedonthebasisofunfairorunattainablestandards.This,intheend,leads
totheperceptionthattheUnionclearlyhasdoublestandards.Evenifthisisnot
thecase,itsforeignpolicy,basedonprinciplesandvalues,lackscredibility.
3.2!LatinAmerica:ARegioninSearchofItself
LatinAmericahasundergoneanenormoustransformationinthepastfew
years.Politically,thecontinentisbarelyrecognisable.TheswitchtotheLeft—
ortomanyLefts—hasperplexedmanyobservers.Nonetheless,theLeftdoes
notgovernallofLatinAmerica,aswecanseeinthecasesofMexicoand
Colombia.
Theissuesthataffecttheregionarediverse.Drugtraffickingandthe
associatedeffectsoforganisedcrimeinMexico,Colombiaandsomepartsofthe
CaribbeancanscarcelybecategorisedtogetherwithenergyplansinBrazilor
politicalturmoilinArgentina.Ifoneissueiscommontothewholeregion,itis
migration.Theeffectsoftheveritablehaemorrhagingofpopulationinrecent
decadesareyettobeseen,butwillcertainlyimposeacostonthefuture
developmentoftheregion.
Intermsofvalues,LatinAmericahasalsosufferedmanychanges.The
regionislettingslidemanyformervalues,buthasadoptedmanynewonesfrom
theoutsideworld.Thatiscertainlythecasewithregardtotheconfigurationof
itssocietiesandtheinfluenceofmigration,forexample,ontraditionalwaysof
life.However,anoteofcautionisinorder:thesocalled“Americanisation”of
valuesinLatinAmericavariesdependingonthecountryandtheregion.Ifwe
lookattheAndeancountries,“Europeanisation”mightwellbeintheworks
TheEU,LatinAmericaandChina:GeometricalPatternsinCurrentandFutureRelations 257
giventheintensemigratoryflowsbetweenthetworegionsinthepastdecade.
Nonetheless,“LatinAmerica”remainsaconceptualshortcutandapolitical
tool,giventhatmostLatinAmericancountriesontheirownwouldhaveno
significanceinanalteredinternationalsystem.However,theneedtorecurtothe
globalconceptofLatinAmericamisleadspartnersandgivesthewrongideato
outsideobservers.
Asalreadynoted,thingsinLatinAmericahavechanged,notallofthemfor
thebetter.Inthatsense,itisunderstandablethatsomeofourpartners,
specificallytheEuropean Union,seem permanentlydisappointed withthe
regionsinequalityindicators,forexample.Theregionwentfrombeingthe
posterchildofWesternpoliciestobeingthechildleftbehind,especiallyinthe
wakeoftheAsianboom.Politically,althoughmanypollsseemtoconfirmthat
democracyishealthyinLatinAmerica,thetruthisthatthisishardlythecasein
mostcountries.Traditionalpartysystemsaregraduallydeterioratingand
democraticgovernmentsarelessabletosolvethemainproblemsaffectingtheir
populations.Thereturnofpopulismorneopopulism,whichisastyle,nota
formofgovernment,hassettheregionbackanumberofdecades.
Thesamehashappenedwithregardtotheraw materialsboominthe
internationaleconomy.LatinAmerica,whichseemedtohavemovedfaraway
fromwhattheauthorsofthedependencytheorylamenteddecadesago,has
returnedtoitsroleofcommodityprovider.Thiswouldnotbeaproblemifit
werenotfortheartificialgrowthprovokedbythesaleoftheserawmaterialsand
theconsequencesofsuchgrowthforthepoliticalenvironment.Venezuelaisa
caseinpoint.
Despiteallthesechallengingissues,thereisstillhopeinLatinAmerica.
Brazilhasdefinitelybecomethenew posterchildfortheregionandits
aspirationstorisefromthestatusofregionalpowertothatofworldpowermust
betakenintoaccountinanyfuturecooperationschemes.ThroughtheUnionof
SouthAmericanNations(UNASUR),butalsothroughSouthSouthcooperation
schemes,Brazilisstartingtopositionitselfasapowerfulandinfluentialactor,
notonlyinLatinAmerica,butworldwide.AsamemberoftheG5,theG20and
theBRICs,Brazilwillcertainlyhavearoletoplayintheformationofthecoming
worldorder.
3.3!China:TheUnknownActorwithaDifferentVisionandthePowertoProduceChange
Inthepastfewyears,Chinahasmadeoverwhelmingprogressonthe
internationalscene.Wenowfaceamodern,wealthyandstrongChinathatis
258 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
eonsawayfromtheformerimageofthisAsiancountry.Chinahaspresented
itselfasaverydifferentinternationalactor.Inmanyways,itdoesnotseemto
havetheunavoidableneedtheEuropeanshavetosugarcoatitspoliciesand
interests.JustasEuropeonceexporteditsownsystemofinternationalrelations
amongstatestotherestoftheworld,itseemsthatitisnowtheturnofAsiato
reconfiguretheinternationalsystem.Theconditionswithintheinternational
systemarechanginginfavouroflargecountrieswithstrongstates,andChinais
definitelyplayinganimportantroleinthisprocess.
AnimportantcharacteristicofmanyAsiancountriesisthattheirgovernmentsare
willingtointerveneextensivelyintheinternationaleconomytoachievepoliticalgoals
thatdirectlyservetheirownstrategicinterests.Asthesecountries,ledbyChina,
emergeaspowerfulplayersinthesystem,theyarechangingtherulesofthe
game.Smallercountriesandcountrieswithopeneconomieshavemoredifficulty
beingheard.TheascentofthelargeAsiancountries,therefore,hasaccelerated,
asEuropeancountriesloseinfluence.Europecanonlykeepupwiththese
changesifitdevelopsacoherentstrategythatintegratespoliticalandeconomic
goalsinpoliciesdirectedtowardsthenewemergingpowers.
Chinaseconomicinfluenceisglobal,somethingthatisevidentinmany
fields,includingtradeandfinancialrelations.Developingand developed
countriesalikebenefitfromtheascentofChina,whetheritisintermsofmarket
access,theavailabilityofcheaplabour,ChineseimportsorChineseinvestments
andcapital.
Europeangovernmentsalsouseeconomicmeanstoachievepoliticalgoals,
forexample,throughtradeandaidprogrammes,regardlessofwhethertheyare
bilateralormultilateral.ThemaindifferenceisthatEuropeansdepend,overall,
ontheirestablishedpositionwithininternationalinstitutions,insteadofusing
theirinternationaleconomicrelationsastoolstogaininfluence.Moreover,the
potentialof Western governmentsto practiceeconomicrealism is more
restricted,giventhattheirstatesinterferemuchlessinthedomesticeconomy
thanisthecaseinAsia.Thus,whentheEuropeansuseeconomicmeansto
achievepoliticalgoals,theytypicallyseektoachieveanormativechangeina
thirdcountry.Byemphasisingtheirattractivenessintermsofculture,political
idealsandpublicpolicies,theyseek,forexample,toadvancetheirpolitical
interestsandideals,includingdemocratisation,thepromotionofrespectfor
humanrightsandgoodgovernance.
ThepoliticalgoalsofAsiancountriesforeignpoliciestendtobemore
specificandmoredirectlyrelatedtotheirsecurityandeconomicinterests.In
consequence,atleastintheshortandmediumterms,theEuropeanstrategy
TheEU,LatinAmericaandChina:GeometricalPatternsinCurrentandFutureRelations 259
cannotcomparewithorbeacounterweighttothatofAsia.
ThesechangesandEuropesrelativelossofpowerarefeltstronglyinLatin
America,wheretherearealsoindividualactorspursuingstrategiesthataremore
similartothoseofAsiathantothoseofEuropeintermsoftheirsearchforpower
andhegemony,firstregionalandthenglobal,asmightbethecasewithregard
toBrazilorVenezuela.Inthesecircumstances,LatinAmericaisalsolookingfor
aplaceinthenewinternationalsystemandistakingadvantageofsomeofthe
newrulesofthegamebeingputforwardbyAsia.
3.4!TheElephantintheRoom:TheUSA
ItbecamecustomarytodismisstheUSAasapartnerothercountriescould
talktoduringtheBushera.NowweareatthebeginningofanewepochinUS
foreignpolicy.PresidentObamasfirstvisitstoEuropeandLatinAmericahave,
ifnothingelse,changedthetoneoftheseveryimportantrelations,evenif,in
retrospect,theydidnotproducefundamentalchangesintermsoftheimportance
ofthesepartnersfortheUSA.Likewise,USlinkswithChina,giventhatitis
dependentonChinesecredit,areoftheutmostimportance.
TheObamaAdministrationwillprobablycontinuetoconcentrateondomestic
politics.Certainly,theeconomiccrisishasforcedhisgovernmenttofocusonthe
domesticagenda,beforereachingouttooldornewinternationalpartners.
Nonetheless,itcanbesaidthatUSrelationsarenotparticularlysmootheither
withtheEUorwithLatinAmerica,anddefinitelynotwithChina.Despitethis,
theUSAwillremainanactortobereckonedwithintheyearstocome,evenifit
isstillimpossibletopredictwithcertaintywhatkindofroleitwillplay.Onthe
onehanditwouldbegoodtohaveaUSAthatdoesnotseemallpowerful,
becauseitcouldadoptahumblerattitudeandpolicyandmightbemorewillingto
listentoothers.However,iftheUSAemergesterriblydebilitatedfromthe
crisis,theworldwilllackaleader.Itisacaseof“cantlivewithem,cantlive
withoutem”.
4.犛狆犲犮犻犳犻犮犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犕犪犻狀犃犮狋狅狉狊
4.1!LatinAmericaEuropeanUnion
Theyear2009markedthetenthanniversaryoftheestablishmentofthe
socalled“strategicbiregionalassociation”,whichstartedwiththefirstEU
LatinAmerica/Caribbean(LAC)SummitinRiodeJaneiroinJune1999.The
EULACschemeprofessestomaintainapoliticaldialogueatthehighestlevel
amongpartnersthat,inpracticalterms,areconsideredtobetwohomogeneous
260 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
regions;henceitscharacterisationas“biregional”.Ontheonehand,itis
assumedthatLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanformasingleregionthatspeaks
withonevoice—anassumptionthatcanonlybeconsideredpurepolitical
fiction—and,ontheotherhand,thatthereisanEUof27membersthat,even
thoughitisthemostadvancedintegrationprocessintheworld,isnotalways
capableofspeakingwithonevoiceaboutinternationalissues.
Ultimately,EULACsummitsaremeetingsof60representativesofvery
differentstates,withdiverseagendasandinterests which,althoughheld
dutifullyeverytwoyears,producefewconcreteresults,beyondtheobligatory
declarationsbasedonthesharedvaluesthesetworegionsaresupposedto
uphold.ThetenthanniversaryoftheEULACmechanismwascelebratedduring
thelastEUPresidencywiththeformatthatprevailedbeforetheentryintoforce
oftheLisbonTreatyinDecember2009,whichmeantthatitwasinthehandsof
Spain,acountryforwhichtieswithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanarevery
importantandwhichhasservedasthemainpromoterofsuchrelationswithintheEU.
Ifthetruthbetold,aftertenyearsofthesocalled“strategicbiregional
association”,theformathasprovedtobeawkwardandisnowoldandobsolete.
Thetwolevelstrategy—valuesandinterests—doesnotseemlikelytoholdfor
muchlonger.Itisnotastrategicrelationship,itisnotabiregionalrelationship
anditishardlyatrueassociation.Asthingsstand,the“naturalalliance”isno
longerarealityinthispartnershipanditisalsosafetosaythatEuropesregionalisation
strategyinLatinAmericahasfailed,onlyaddingtowhatisperceivedtobeanormative
andjudgmentalapproach,basedondoublestandards.
Themainissueisstillthesame:EuropewantsLatinAmericatobewhatit
cannotbe:asingleregion,aregionwithnoinequality,aregionwithdeveloped
democracies,aregionthatrespectstheenvironment,aregionthathaseconomic
sustainabilityandsoon.Mostofthesethingsareunattainableforthetime
being,oratleastthey willnotbeachieved viaforeign pressureand
conditionality.LatinAmericaisdiverse,unequallydeveloped,nevertoopoor,
nevertoorich,withmanyconflictsbutofadifferentnaturefromthosewhocall
forintervention.Theconversation,then,islopsided.Lastbutnotleast,even
thoughtheUSApaidlittleattentiontoitstraditionalbackyardundertheBush
administration,itsstrategyofsigningbilateralagreementswithmanycountries
intheregionbasicallykilledtheEuropeanregionalisationandgrouptogroup
negotiationstrategyforgood.Inthatsense,whenLatinAmericansdemandfrom
EuropeansfreetradeagreementsandaccesstotheEuropeansinglemarket,it
meansthattherestofthemanybeautifulinstitutions—asortof“mobile”that
TheEU,LatinAmericaandChina:GeometricalPatternsinCurrentandFutureRelations 261
looksprettybutjusthangsthere,withouttouchingtheground—andpractices
thattherelationshipseemstohaveareirrelevantfortheregionscountries.
Moreover,as with China,buteven worsegiventhehistoryofthe
relationship,thereisadeeplackofunderstandingofhowtheEuropeanUnion
worksandfunctions.LatinAmericanskeepthinkingofEuropeintermsofits
individualstates,especiallySpain.Spainhashadacontroversialroleinthis
relationshipthathasbecomeevidentinthepastfewyears.Itiscertainlythe
memberstatethathasinsistedmostthattheEuropeanUnionmaintainsstrong
relationswithLatinAmerica.However,ithasstartedtoactmoreasaproxyof
theEuropean Unionthanasatrueambassador,bridgeorwhateverother
metaphoronemightchoose.Thishasbecomeparticularlyevidentontheissueof
migration.ItistruethatSpainhasbeenthemaindestinationofmostLatin
Americanflows.However,whenevertheEuropeanUnionhaslaunchedcommon
initiativesintherealm ofmigrationpolicy,suchastheinfamousReturn
Directive,SpainhasfailedtoactastheUnionsrepresentativeand,toprevent
itsrelationswithLatinAmericafromsuffering,hasevendeclaredthatthe
DirectivewouldnotapplyinSpain.
Evenifforpoliticalreasonsthatcouldbeconsideredacceptable,intermsof
thefutureofEULACrelationsthisisaheavyblowtomutualunderstandingand
thestrategicbiregionalassociationbased,supposedly,onpoliticaldialogueat
thehighestlevel.Moreover,ithaspreventedatruedialoguebetweenboth
regionsonmigrationissuesthatcouldbetakentothemultilaterallevelonthe
basisofgenuinelysharedinterests.Intheend,itcallsintoquestiontheneedor
therelevanceofthesocalledbiregionalstrategicassociation.Woulditbebetter
tokeepdealingwiththeseissuesandothersofasimilarcharacterwithinthe
IberoAmericanfora?Overall,then,Spainishardlyrepresentativeofthecurrent
EuropeanUnion,whileLatinAmericansaredeceivingthemselvesbytaking
SpainspositionsandpoliciesasequivalenttothoseofEurope.
4.2!ChinaLatinAmerica
ChinaspresenceinLatinAmericaisbothfeared,intermsofitsstrengthas
atradepower,andneeded,giventhatitisthesolesurvivoroftheinternational
crisisactuallyabletoprovidemuchneededcashtoLatinAmericaneconomies
thatareindireeconomicstraits,suchas Venezuela.TheChinesehave
establishedabridgeheadinLatinAmericaandtheywillnotwanttoleavefor
quiteawhile.Theyhavecomewithaclearerunderstandingoftheregion,vis
visthecommonmisconceptionsofEuropeansandAmericans,whostillwantto
talkaboutasingleLatinAmerica.PerhapsChinasrelationswiththeregions
262 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
countrieswillhavethesameresultasitdidfortheEuropeans:itwillcement
Chinasroleasamajorglobalpower.Afterall,LatinAmericansandChinese
sharemanymorethingsthanEuropeansandLatinAmericans:perhapsnotfrom
thepointofviewoftraditionalcultureandvalues,butasmembersoftheG5and
G20,forexample.Theinternationaleconomiccrisiswillcertainlybealitmus
testfortheserelationsandthecoincidenceofinterests.Nonetheless,Chinahas
totakebabystepsintermsofitsrelationswithLatinAmerica.Providingcash
starvedgovernmentswithresourcesmaybeadoubleedgedsword.
FromtheLatinAmericanperspective,itwouldbeamistaketothinkthat
ChinaisasubstituteforitsrelationswitheithertheUSAortheEU.Noneof
theseactorscansubstituteforoneanother.Trueinterests—andsomewould
say,valuestoo—mustbeatthebasisofrelations,beyondthesempiternalneed
todiversify.
Iffactsmustbetakenintoaccount,itshouldbenotedthatChinawill
displaceEuropeandwillbeclosebehindtheUSAasadestinationofLatin
Americanexportsinaboutadecade,accordingtoarecentstudypublishedbythe
UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
(ECLAC),“ThePeoplesRepublicofChinaandLatin Americaandthe
Caribbean:TowardsaStrategicRelationship”.Ifthecurrentgrowthrateof
LatinAmericanexportstoitsmainmarketsismaintained,Chinasparticipation
willrisefrom7.6percentin2009to19.3percentin2020.Inthesameperiod,
theEUwillmaintainparticipationofaround14percentandwillbesurpassedby
Chinain2015.
Accordingtothisreport,thegrowthofChinaasadestinationofLatin
Americanexportswillbeachievedasaresultofthepersistentfallintheregions
exportstotheUnitedStates,from38.6percentofthetotalin2009to28.4per
centin2020.TheECLACdoessay,however,thattheimportanceofChinaasan
exportmarketvariesnotablyamongLatinAmericancountries,giventhatitisa
keydestinationforChile,PeruandArgentina,forexample,butnotforCentral
America,withthenotableexceptionofCostaRica.InthecaseofMexico,its
exportstoChinarepresentedlessthan1percentofthetotalin2009.
IntermsofChinasimports,thestudypredictsasimilarevolution,oran
evenmoreradicalone,giventhatChinacouldsurpassboththeEUandtheUSA
in2020andbecomethemainoriginofLatinAmericanimports.Thegrowthin
Chineseimportswillconcentrateonthesamecapitalgoodsthatalreadyhavea
presenceintheregion.Thesechanges,predictedtotakeplaceinthenext
decade,willcertainlyaltertherangeofoptionsavailableforconstructing
triangularrelationseitherwiththeUSAortheEU,LatinAmericaandChina.
TheEU,LatinAmericaandChina:GeometricalPatternsinCurrentandFutureRelations 263
However,beyondChinasextraordinaryeconomicpower,itmustbenoted
thatitcanhaveahugepoliticalinfluenceintheregion.TheChinesedevelopment
modelisprovingtobeextremelyattractiveforLatinAmericancountrieshungry
forhighgrowthratesandfastindustrialisation.Moreover,sincethemodeldoes
notincludethesamevalueledagendathathasbeenpushedbytheEU,focusing
ondemocracy,socialcohesionandhumanrights,itcertainlycouldbeattractive
forLatinAmericanelitespronetoauthoritarianismandpopulismandinsearchof
apoliticaldiscoursebasedonastrongstateandthedefenceofsovereignty.
4.3!USALatinAmerica
RegardlessofhowtheUSAemergesfromtheeconomiccrisis,itwillremain
afundamentalpartnerforallthreeactors:LatinAmerica,EuropeandChina.It
isyettobeseenhowthechangeinUSleadershipwillaffectitsrelationswiththe
outsideworld.Nonetheless,thefutureofallthreeactorswill,inmanyways,be
determinedbytheinvolvementwiththeUSA,eventothepointofbeing
demographicallyintertwined,asisthecasewith manycountriesinLatin
America,andespeciallyMexico,giventhesharedhistoryofmigratoryflows.
Nonetheless,thefutureofUSLatinAmericanrelationswillcertainlybe
differentfrominthepast.Today,LatinAmericaseemstobemorecapableof
standingitsgroundand,especiallytheSouthernCone,givenitssuccessful
diversificationstrategy,tospeakwithitsownvoice.TheyearstheUSAhasbeen
absentfromtheregionorpresentonlythroughmilitarisedrelations—ashasbeenthe
casewithColombia,forexample—willbecostlyforthefutureofUSpowerinthe
region.Likewise,thestrongcompetitiontheUSAwillfacefromactorssuchasChina
willcertainlyimposeadifferentcharacterontheserelations.
5.犉犻狀犪犾犚犲犿犪狉犽狊牶犗犳犜狉犻犪狀犵犾犲狊犪狀犱犚犺狅犿犫狅犻犱狊—犐狋犇犲狆犲狀犱狊狅狀狋犺犲犔犲狀狊犢狅狌
犝狊犲
Inconclusion,eveniftheseallpredictionsprovefalse,theimportanceof
Chinaisunequivocal.Likewise,theimportanceoftheUSAoroftheEuropean
Unioncannotbetotallydismissedyet.LatinAmericawillremainwhereitis,
neitherthepoorestofregionsnorthemostdeveloped.Itwillprobablybe,yet
again,thetestinggroundofthemanypoliciesthatemergeaftertheeconomic
debacle.
Howdifferentorhowsimilararetheseactors?Itdependsonthetypeoflens
weuse,whetheramicroscope,atelescopeortintedglass.Addressingthesame
questionagainintenyearstime,itcannotbesaidwhetherwewillbespeaking
oftrianglesorrhomboids.Nonetheless,geometrywillstillmatter.
264 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
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! 267
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉5
犈犿狆犻狉犻犮犪犾犃狀犪犾狔狊犻狊牶犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪/犈犝—犜狉犲狀犱狊犪狀犱犉犻犵狌狉犲狊
>,.&,* )%**%. %'( 0#5+%=3 ;"&,"*3
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
Inthispaperweconductanempiricalanalysisofthetradebetween
MERCOSURandChina(Section3)aswellasMERCOSURandtheEU(Section
4).Ourinquiryfocusesonbilateraltradedata,exportandimporttrendsandthe
compositionofMERCOSURexportstothosemarkets.Thereisacritical
analysisattheendofSection3and4.Tradedatawerecompiledbeforethe
adventoftheglobalcrisis.
Someremarksaboutthemethodologyandsourcesofdatadeserveattention
attheoutset.Wegathereddatafromthefollowingsources:Aliceweband
AlicewebMERCOSUR(Braziliandata),SICOEX (MERCOSUR members,
exceptBrazil),COMTRADE(worldtradedata)andEurostat(EU).Export
andimportfiguresareexpressedinUSdollars(USD)andfreeonboard(FOB)
andreferonlytotradeingoods.
Chinasforeigntradefiguresdonotinclude HongKong,Taiwanand
Macau.TheEUfiguresincludethecurrent27members.EUaggregateddataare
compiledfromEurostatandareinaccordancewiththeCommunityGuidelines,
whichmeansthattheymaydifferfromnationaldata.EUfiguresweregathered
ineurosandconvertedtoUSDusingannualaverageratesavailablefromtheUS
FederalReserveBank.1
2.犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚牶犃狀犗狏犲狉狏犻犲狑
MERCOSURistheSouthernCommonMarket,occasionallyreferredtoasthe
CommonMarketoftheSouthernCone.2TheoriginsofMERCOSURlieinthebroader
processofpoliticalrealignmentbetweenBrazilandArgentinathatoccurredinthe
268 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
1980s.TheprocessreacheditsclimaxinJuly1990,whenBrazilandArgentinasigned
theProtocolofBuenosAiresaimingattheestablishmentofacommonmarket.
Atthesametime,negotiationswereinitiatedtoincludeUruguayand
Paraguay.Eventually,on26March1991,theTreatyofAsunciónestablished
MERCOSURandexpandedtheprojecttoincludethosecountries.TheOuro
PretoProtocol,signedinDecember1994,broughtintegrationastepforward
withtheestablishmentofacommonexternaltariff(knownas“TEC”)andthe
launchofacustomsunion.
AcommonmisapprehensionwithregardtoMERCOSURconcernsthestatus
ofVenezuela,BoliviaandChileinrelationtothebloc.Althoughonecanfind
sourcespointingoutthatVenezuelaandBoliviaarealreadyfullMERCOSUR
members,thisisnotaccurate.3VenezuelaappliedforMERCOSURmembership
in2009anditsrequestispendingapprovalbyParaguaysNationalCongress.
Boliviasrequesthasnotevenachievedofficialformulationandonlyinformal
meetingshavebeenconvened.ChileisnotafullmemberofMERCOSUR,but
onlyanassociatemember.
Asthe2007figuresillustrate,MERCOSURcomprisesapopulationof
approximately241million(BrazilandArgentinaaccountfor96percentofthe
totalpopulation).MERCOSURsGDPreachedUSD2.4trillion,withBrazils
andArgentinaseconomiesdominating(accountingfor76percentand22per
centoftotalMERCOSURGDP,respectively).Bywayofcomparison,Chinasand
theEUspopulationsare5.5and2.0timesbiggerthanMERCOSURs,respectively,
whiletheirGDPsare2.9and6.1timeslarger,asshowninTable1.
犜犪犫犾犲1 犘狅狆狌犾犪狋犻狅狀犪狀犱犌犇犘(2007)
Population GDP(USD),PPPGNI(USD)
percapita(PPP)
Brazil 191.6million(5) 1.83trillion(8) 9,370(98)
Argentina 39.5million(31) 523billion(22) 12,990(77)
Uruguay 3.3million(130) 37.3billion(92) 11,040(86)
Paraguay 6.1million(101) 26.5billion(103) 4,380(133)
MERCOSUR 240.5million(≈4) 2.4trillion(≈6) 9,979(≈94)
China 1.32billion(1) 7.0trillion(2) 5,370(≈122)
EU27 497million(≈3) 14.8trillion(≈1) 33,400(≈34)
Note:Numbersinparenthesesrefertotherankofthecountry(orbloc)inthestatistics.The
symbol“≈”indicatesanestimate.
Source:WorldBankforGDPandGNI,CIAWorldFactBookforpopulationandEurostatfor
Europeanfigures.
EmpiricalAnalysis:TradebetweenMERCOSURandChina/EU"TrendsandFigures 269
3.犅犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪
WhileChinaseconomicimportanceforLatinAmerica,andforMERCOSUR
inparticular,hasincreasedexponentiallyoverthepastfewyears,countriesin
theregionshouldbewaryofpotentialcompetitionintheirdomesticmarkets.
SincetheopeningupoftheChineseeconomyandthereductionofexportand
importcontrols,BrazilsandArgentinasforeigntradehasshownsustained
growth,whichacceleratedafterChinaundertooktradereforms—including
significanttariffcuts—inthe1990s.ChinasaccessiontotheWTOin2001
furthercontributedtothisdynamic.
FromtheChineseperspective,however,MERCOSURremainsarelatively
unimportantexportdestination.In2007,MERCOSURsimportsfrom China
representedaround1.3percentoftotalChineseexports.Infact,ifweaggregatesome
ofthedestinationsofChineseexports(LatinAmerica,CIS,AfricaandtheMiddle
East),eachofthemrepresents,onaverage,3.8percentofChineseexports.Thebulk
ofChinesegoodsarechannelledtoAsia,NorthAmericaandEurope.Individually,the
UnitedStatesandJapanareChinasmaintradepartners.
犜犪犫犾犲2 犆犺犻狀犪狊犈狓狆狅狉狋狊,犫狔犚犲犵犻狅狀犪狀犱犛犲犾犲犮狋犲犱犈犮狅狀狅犿犻犲狊,20062007(犝犛犇犫犻犾犾犻狅狀)
2006 % 2007 %
World 968.9 100 1,220.1 100
NorthAmerica 219.3 22.6 252.5 20.7
UnitedStates 203.8 21.0 233.2 19.1
Europe 215.4 22.2 288.4 23.6
EuropeanUnion 190.0 19.6 245.6 20.1
CIS 28.0 2.8 48.1 3.9
LatinAmerica 32.8 3.3 48.1 3.9
MERCOSUR 10.1 1.0 16.1 1.3
Africa 26.6 2.7 37.4 3.0
MiddleEast 36.9 3.8 54.8 4.5
Asia 410.7 42.3 501.0 41.0
Japan 91.6 9.4 102.1 8.3
Notes:TheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS)comprisesArmenia,Azerbaijan,
Belarus,Georgia,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Moldova,RussianFederation,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,UkraineandUzbekistan.
South,EastandSouthEastAsia.
Source:PreparedbytheauthorsbasedondatafromCOMTRADEstatistics.
270 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
AsfarasMERCOSURmembersareconcerned,themajordestinationsfor
Brazilianexportswere(2008,2007):theUnitedStates(14percent,15.8per
cent),Argentina(8.9percent,9percent),China(8.3percent,6.7percent)
andtheNetherlands(5.3percent,5.5percent).TheEUisrankedfirst,ifits
membersfiguresareaggregated(theNetherlands,Germany,ItalyandBelgium
arethemainmarkets,inthatorder),basedon MinistryofDevelopment,
IndustryandForeignTradestatistics(Alicewebdata).Ontheotherhand,the
majorcountriesforArgentinasexportswere(2008/2007):Brazil(18.6per
cent,18.7percent),China(9.3percent,9.4percent),theUS(7.4percent,
7.4percent)andChile(7.5percent,6.6percent).TheEUranksfirstin2008
ifits membersfiguresareaggregated,basedon MERCOSUR statistics
(Aliceweb Mercosurdata).Takenasabloc,MERCOSURsmajorexport
partners(2008/2007)weretheEU(26percent,27percent),theUS(13.9per
cent,15.9percent)andChina(9.8percent,8.5percent)(Gambini2008:32;
AlicewebMercosuldata).
3.1!ExportandImportTrends
Inthe1980sandearly1990s,bothBrazilianandArgentineanexportsto
Chinarepresentedlessthan3percentofthosecountriestotalforeignsales
(BarralandPerrone2007).Althoughtradeincreasedsteadilyinthemidandlate
1990s,trulyspectaculargrowthoccurredonlyinthefollowingdecade,as
presentedinFigure1,Figure2andFigure3.
犉犻犵狌狉犲1 犅狉犪狕犻犾/犆犺犻狀犪犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲2002/2008(犝犛$犿犻犾犾犻狅狀狊)
犉犻犵狌狉犲2 犃狉犵犲狀狋犻狀犪/犆犺犻狀犪犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲2002/2008(犝犛$犿犻犾犾犻狅狀狊)
EmpiricalAnalysis:TradebetweenMERCOSURandChina/EU"TrendsandFigures 271
犉犻犵狌狉犲3 犕犲狉犮狅狊狌狉/犆犺犻狀犪犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲2002/2008(犝犛$犿犻犾犾犻狅狀狊)
Source:PreparedbytheauthorsbasedondatafromAlicewebandSICOEX.
Intheperiod20022007,forinstance,BrazilianexportstoChinaroseby326
percent(551percentfortheperiod20022008).Importgrowthratessoaredto
fourdigitfigures—around1,200 percent—duringtheperiod20022008.
ArgentinastradewithChinafollowedasimilarpatternofgrowthintheperiod
20022007,whenexportsandimportsgrew by372and1,442percent,
respectively(seeTable3).
犜犪犫犾犲3 犈狓狆狅狉狋狊犪狀犱犐犿狆狅狉狋狊,犃狀狀狌犪犾犆犺犪狀犵犲(%)
YearBrazilChina ArgentinaChina MERCOSURChina
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
2003/2002 79.8 38 127 118 91 49
2004/2003 20.0 73 6 95 15 79
2005/2004 25.6 44 21 60 24 48
2006/2005 22.9 49 9 40 18 51
2007/2006 27.9 58 49 63 33 50
2008/2007 52.6 59 -58 -47 16 20
2007/2002 326.4 712.2 372 1,442 332 792
2008/2002 550.7 1,190 97 720 401 974
Source:PreparedbytheauthorsbasedondatafromAlicewebandSICOEX.
Nonetheless,thegrowthratesoftradebetweenBrazil/ArgentinaandChina
differedsignificantlyin2008.Ontheonehand,BrazilianexportstoChina
272 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
reachedUSD16.8billionandimportsUSD20billion(up53percentand59per
cent,respectively,incomparisonto2007).Argentina,ontheotherhand,
exportedUSD2.2billionandimportedUSD2.7billion(fallsof58percentand
47percent,respectively,incomparisonto2007).Argentinasdeclinecanbe
explainedbyseveralchangesinimportpolicy,suchasnonautomaticlicensing
procedures,implementedinthesecondsemesterof2008.
WithregardtoMERCOSURstradebalance,asonemightexpect,thedifference
betweenthelowergrowthratesofexportsincomparisontoimportscaused
MERCOSURtoregisterthefirstdeficitinitstradebalancein2006 (USD875
million).Thatyearrepresentstheinflectionpointofthecurveaftermanyyearsof
positivesurplus:subsequently,thedeficitreachedroughlyUSD3billionin2007and
USD5billionin2008.AcontributoryfactorinthisreversalisthatimportsfromChina
areconcentratedinproductsofhigheraggregatevalue,whilebasicproductsrepresent
mostofMERCOSURsexports.Inthewakeoftheworldfinancialcrisis,basic
productssufferedmorefromthefallininternationalpricesformineralandagricultural
commodities,especiallyinthesecondsemesterof2008.
Ingeneral,thetwosmallerMERCOSURpartners,UruguayandParaguay,
donotsignificantlyaffectMERCOSURexportfigures.Intheperiod20022008,
UruguaysaverageexportstoChinaamountedto USD126 millionayear
(approximately1to2percentofMERCOSURsexports).Paraguaysaverage
wasevenlowerin20022008:USD23million,accountingforlessthan0.5per
centof MERCOSURs exports. The impact of the two partners on
MERCOSURsimportsismoresignificant,however.Asshownbelow,Uruguay
andParaguayareresponsibleforanenduringdeficitinMERCOSURstrade
balance,withapeakof14.1percentoftotalimportsin2006(USD1.6billion).
犜犪犫犾犲4 犆狅狀狊狅犾犻犱犪狋犲犱犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犝狉狌犵狌犪狔/犘犪狉犪犵狌犪狔犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪,20022008(%)
Exports % Imports % Surplus
2002 111,304 3.0 286,679 12.0 -175,375
2003 112,108 1.6 361,660 10.6 -249,552
2004 157,407 1.9 661,181 10.8 -503,774
2005 189,222 1.9 958,451 10.6 -769,229
2006 184,794 1.5 1,825,514 13.5 -1,640,720
2007 214,119 1.3 2,163,477 10.3 -1,949,358
2008 264,590 1.1 3,379,310 10.5 -3,114,720
Source:SICOEX.
EmpiricalAnalysis:TradebetweenMERCOSURandChina/EU"TrendsandFigures 273
3.2!CompositionofMERCOSURExports
Between2001and2003,primaryproductsmadeup55.5percentof
BrazilianshipmentstoChina,doubletheproportionofsuchproductsinthe
countrystotalexports.Semimanufacturedgoodsrepresented20.1percentof
exportstoChinacomparedto14.7percentinoverallforeignsales.While
shipmentsoffullyprocessedmanufacturesaccountedfor55.1percentofBrazils
totalexports,theyamountedtoonly24.1percentofgoodsshippedtoChina.
AsBarralandPerronepointout:“[i]naddition,Brazilianexportswere
concentratedinjusteightsectors,withagrifoodandextractive minerals
representing47percentofthetotal.Interestingly,thisratioisvirtually
unchangedsince1985.”(BarralandPerrone2007)
Particularlysince2004,primaryproductsparticipationinBrazilianexports
toChinahasincreasedevenmore.Intheperiod20042008,basicproductsmade
up72.5percentofBrazilianshipmentstoChina(reachingapeakof77.5per
centin2008).Ironoreandsoybeanswerethemainproductsshipped.
Intheperiod20012003,thelevelofexportconcentrationwasalsohighfor
Argentina:threeproducts—soyaseeds(41percent),unprocessedpetroleumoil
(25percent)andsoyaoil(18percent)—accountedfor84percentofallgoods
exportedtoChina.Industrialmanufacturesrepresentedonly4percentofthe
total.Intheperiod20032006,theshareofagrifoodshipmentsreached72
percent.Theseproductsinvolvedno(orverylittle)processing,afigurefar
higherthanthe49percentthatprimaryagriculturalandindustrialproducts
(excludingfuels)representinthecountrystotalexports(BarralandPerrone
2007).Recentdatafrom2007and2008appeartocorroborateArgentinean
primaryexportstoChinaatthe80percentlevels:soyaseedsaccountedforan
averageof50.5percent,whileunprocessedpetroleumandsoyaoiltogether
representedanaverageof31.2percentofthoseexports(SICOEX,aggregated
byNCMchapters).
3.3!TradeBarriers
InaccordancewithChinastradepolicyreview (TPR)carriedoutbythe
WTO,Chinassimpleaverageappliedtariffis9.7percent(thesameasin
2005).Theaveragemostfavourednation(MFN)tariffratesforagriculturaland
manufacturedproductswere15.3percentand8.8percent,respectively(also
thesameas2005)(WTO2008:43).Thehighestappliedtariffsareleviedon
footwear,processedfoodandvegetableproducts(WTO2008:50).
AsBarralandPerroneemphasise,“[t]heChinesetariffstructurecontains
274 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
significantpeaks.Whilethesearemorepronouncedinthesectorofindustrial
goods,theyremainrelevantintheagrifoodsector.Forinstance,hightariffsare
leviedonunprocessedagriculturalproducts,suchasstrawberries(30percent),
plums(25percent),wheatandrice(65percent)andsugar(60percent).In
contrast,marketaccessformineralsandfuelsislargelydutyfree,ortariffsare
verylow”(BarralandPerrone2007).
Overall,tradeandtraderelatedmeasures,bothattheborderandinternally,are
stillusedasinstrumentsofChineseindustrialpolicy.TariffsremainoneofChinas
maintradepolicyinstruments.Inadditiontohightariffsforprocessedfoodproducts,
ArgentinasandBrazilsexportstoChinacontinuetofaceconsiderablenontariff
barriers,includingtaxes,subsidiesandphytosanitarymeasures.
3.4!CriticalAnalysis
MERCOSURprovidestheAsiangiantwithproductsthatareimmediately
processedandeitherexportedtothirdmarketsorconsumedlocally.Tosome
extent,MERCOSURsexportfrenzytowardsChinacanbeexplainedbythe
phenomenalgrowthoftheChineseeconomy,aswellascertaincomplementarities
betweentheindividualeconomiesinvolved.Indeed,importsfromChinahave
registeredtheirhighestgrowthinsectorsinwhichArgentinaandBrazilhave
majorcompetitiveadvantages.ThistrendcanalsobeexplainedbyChinas
strategyofenlargingthelistofitstradepartnersandreducingitsdependencyon
commoditiessuppliers.
AsimilarstrategyisbeingpursuedbyChinatowardsAfrica,whichalso
involvesmassiveinvestmentsintheinfrastructureofthatcontinent.
AlthoughbilateraltradebetweenMERCOSURandChinais,atleastin
theory,basedoncomparativeadvantages,intraindustrialtraderemainsalmost
nonexistent.ThisisnotthecasewithotherAsiandevelopingcountries,where
thetradepatternreflectsthepartnersspecialisationanddivisionoflabouratthe
globallevel(BarralandPerrone2007).
ThereisnodoubtthattheprincipalchallengeMERCOSURisfacingisto
maintainandimproveitsintegrationintotheChineseeconomy,whileatthesame
timepreservingthecompetitivenessofitsindustrialproductsandeventually
increasingthevalueaddedcontentofitsexports.TheBraziliangovernment,for
instance,haslaunchedaspecificprogramme (“AgendaChina”)aimingat
enhancingBrazilianexportsoftechnologicalproductsandhighervalueadded
productstotheChinesemarket(AgendaChina2008:17).4
Ontheimportsside,theBraziliangovernmentisfrequentlypressuredby
localproducerswithregardtotheopeningupoftheBrazilianmarkettoallegedly
EmpiricalAnalysis:TradebetweenMERCOSURandChina/EU"TrendsandFigures 275
unfairChinesecompetition,forinstanceinsectorssuchassteel,textilesand
electronics.In2010,thepressureescalatedinthewakeofglobalclaimsthat
Chinahasbeenkeepingitscurrencyundervalued,whichamountstounfair
competition.
Asforexternaltrade,theInterAmericanDevelopmentBank(IADB)has
estimatedthatonly2percentofArgentineanexportstothirdmarketsarelikely
tobedisplacedbyChinesecompetition.Brazilappearstohaveslightlymore
causeforconcern:overthepastdecade,thecountryhaslost4percentofits
exportstothirdmarketstoChina(BarralandPerrone2007).
Anotherstudyestimatesin moredetailBrazilianexportlossesdueto
Chinesecompetitioninrelevantmarkets(PereiraandSouza2008:4445).The
studycomparestheoverlappingofBrazilianexportsandChineseexportsintwo
periods:20032004and20062007.ItaffirmsthatBrazillost,intotal,USD2
billionintheArgentineanmarket,USD10billioninUSmarketsandUSD7.8
billioninEUmarkets.TheChinese“effect”onthoselossesisestimatedtobe
51.5percent(Argentina),31.6percent(US),and35.7percent(EU),which
amountstoroughlyUSD7billionintwoyears(approximately2.4percentof
Brazilstotalexports).ItisnoteworthythatChineseexportsevenmanagedto
displaceBrazilianproductsthataregivenpreferentialtreatmentinArgentina,
suchasmotorcycles,organicinorganiccomplexes,colouredbulbs,televisions
andrubberfootwear(PereiraandSouza2008:45).
Insum,inthefirstdecadeofthetwentyfirstcentury,MERCOSURs
integrationintotheChineseeconomyseemstobereminiscentofaNorthSouth
paradigmtypicalofthenineteenthcentury:theexchangeofrawmaterialsand
manufacturedproducts,althoughnotfrom NorthtoSouth,geographically
speaking.Thistrendwasparticularlyaccentuatedintheperiod20062008,as
observedintheempiricalanalysis.Withoutenteringintoadetaileddiscussionof
thelongterm effects ofa trade strategy based on naturalresources,
MERCOSURChinamarketsrevealopportunitiesforbothsides.Atthesame
time,the overallpicture presentstougherchallengesto MERCOSURs
members,sinceimportsfromChinahavesoaredandChinaisemergingasa
potentialthreattoMERCOSURsexportsaroundtheworld.
4.犅犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犪狀犱狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀
TheEU representsanimportanttradingpartnerfor MERCOSUR,with
approximately26percentoftheblocsexports(AlicewebMercosur).Nonetheless,
fromtheEU perspective,MERCOSURremainsarelatively minorexport
destinationforgoods.Intheperiod20062007,MERCOSURsimportsfromthe
276 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
EU represented approximately 2.7 percentoftotal European exports.
Individually,theUnitedStates(24.5percent),Switzerland(7.5percent),
Russia(7.2percent)andChina(6.7percent)arethemaindestinationofEU
exports.
犜犪犫犾犲5 犈犝犈狓狆狅狉狋狊犫狔犚犲犵犻狅狀犪狀犱犛犲犾犲犮狋犲犱犈犮狅狀狅犿犻犲狊,20062007(犝犛犇犿犻犾犾犻狅狀)
2006 % 2007 %
World 1,270 100 1,465 100
North
America373 29.4 395 27.0
UnitedStates 340 26.8 359 24.5
LatinAmerica 76 6.0 95 6.5
MERCOSUR 30 2.4 39 2.7
CIS 132 10.4 175 12.9
Africa 115 9.1 141 9.6
MiddleEast 177 13.9 205 14.0
Asia 311 24.5 363 24.8
China 80 6.3 98 6.7
Notes:WeexcludedintraEU27and“OtherEurope”fromtheoriginalstatistics.
Source:PreparedbytheauthorsbasedonCOMTRADEstatistics.
AmongindividualEUmembers,Germany(18percent),theNetherlands
(15.7percent)andItaly(13.1percent)werethemostimportantdestinations
forMERCOSURsexports.Notably,asanEUentrypoint,theNetherlands
(theportofRotterdam)accountsforanimportantshareofimportsonentry(suchasironorefromBrazil).Germany(30percent),France(15percent)and
Italy(15percent)arethemainexporterstoMERCOSUR.
4.1!ExportandImportTrends
Intheperiod19901998,MERCOSURregisteredatradedeficitwiththe
EU.From1998on,thisstartedtogointoreverse.Inthe2000s,asshown
below,acontinuoustradesurplusinfavourofMERCOSURcanbeidentified.
Indeed,thefigureindicatesarelativelystabledevelopment:anaverageofUSD
10.4billion/yearintheperiod20032008.
EmpiricalAnalysis:TradebetweenMERCOSURandChina/EU"TrendsandFigures 277
犉犻犵狌狉犲4 犅狉犪狕犻犾/犈犝犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲2002/2008(犝犛$犿犻犾犾犻狅狀狊)
犉犻犵狌狉犲5 犃狉犵犲狀狋犻狀犪/犈犝犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲2002/2008(犝犛$犿犻犾犾犻狅狀狊)
犉犻犵狌狉犲6 犕犲狉犮狅狊狌狉/犈犝犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲2002/2008(犝犛$犿犻犾犾犻狅狀狊)
Source:PreparedbytheauthorsbasedondatafromAlicewebandSICOEX.
Despitethisfairlystablesurplus,inthepastfiveyears MERCOSUR
exportsandimportsgrewby144percentand136percent,respectively,
reachingUSD59billionandUSD52billion,respectively.Thismeansanaverage
increaseof20percentand25percent,respectively,peryear.Theyear2008is
anexception,sincetherewasadeviationfromthisoveralltrend,mainlydueto
theworldfinancialcrisisand Argentinasfigures.WhileBrazilmaintained
growthinbothexportsandimports,Argentinasexportsweresteadybutits
importsdecreasedbyaround23percent.
278 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
犜犪犫犾犲6 犈狓狆狅狉狋狊犪狀犱犐犿狆狅狉狋狊,犃狀狀狌犪犾犆犺犪狀犵犲(%)
YearBrazilEU ArgentinaEU MERCOSUREU
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
2004/2003 33.3 22 3 51 25 27
2005/2004 9.3 14 12 14 9 14
2006/2005 25.4 16 16 21 23 18
2007/2006 29.5 44 31 54 30 44
2008/2007 14.5 35 0 -23 12 22
2007/2003 136.6 132.1 75.0 221.4 117.9 145.8
2008/2003 170.9 212.6 75.1 63.1 144.2 136.4
Source:PreparedbytheauthorsbasedondatafromAlicewebandSICOEX.
ComparisonoftheparticipationofUruguayandParaguayinMERCOSUR
EUandMERCOSURChinatraderevealstwoimportantpoints.First,Uruguay
andParaguaytogetherrepresent,onaverage,3.5percentofMERCOSURs
exports(andlessthan1percentwithregardtoMERCOSURChina).Asimilar
degreeofparticipationoccursontheimportside,withthetwocountries
accountingforanaverageof3.2percentoftotalimports(vs.11percentwith
regardtoMERCOSURChina).Inotherwords,UruguayandParaguaydonot
depress MERCOSURstradebalance,butadd positivelytotheverified
MERCOSURsurplusinallanalysedyears.
犜犪犫犾犲7 犆狅狀狊狅犾犻犱犪狋犲犱犜狉犪犱犲狑犻狋犺犈犝,犝狉狌犵狌犪狔/犘犪狉犪犵狌犪狔,20022008(犝犛犇犿犻犾犾犻狅狀)
Exports % Imports % Surplus
2003 1,023 4.2 606 3.5 417
2004 1,179 3.9 699 3.2 480
2005 1,087 3.3 763 3.1 325
2006 1,261 3.1 1,235 4.2 26
2007 1,671 3.2 1,259 3.0 412
2008 2,155 3.7 1,432 2.8 723
Source:SICOEX.
4.2!CompositionofTradeExports
WithregardtoBrazil,in2008theEUimportedprimaryproducts(47per
EmpiricalAnalysis:TradebetweenMERCOSURandChina/EU"TrendsandFigures 279
cent),semimanufactured(15percent)andmanufacturedproducts(38per
cent).Thesenumbersarenearlythesameasin2003(50percent,13percent
and36percent,respectively).Interestingly,asalsoobservedwithregardto
BraziliantradewithChina,thereislittlediversificationintermsofexport
compositionovertwodecades(Aliceweb).ItshouldbenotedthatBrazilisthe
thirdlargestagriculturalexporterintheworld,andtheEUhasbeen,and
remains,thetopdestinationforBrazilianagriexports(ICONE2007:75).At
thesametime,theEUcontinuestobeamajorconcernintradenegotiationssince
BrazilregardsEuropeanagriculturalprotectionismasimproper.
IncomparisontoBrazil,theremainingMERCOSURmembershaveahigher
concentrationofexportsintheagriculturalsector.In2007,agrirelatedproducts
represented76percent,72percentand85percentofArgentinas,Uruguays
andParaguaysexportstotheEU,respectively(Eurostat).Takenasabloc,
MERCOSURsexportscomprisefoodproducts(35percent),rawmaterials(26
percent)andmachineryandtransportequipment(25percent).AsregardsEU
exportstoMERCOSUR,manufacturedgoodsarethemainrepresentativeitems
(93percent),withmachineryandchemicalsasthemainEUproducts.
Insum,mostofMERCOSURsexportstotheEUarebasicproducts,with
aconcentrationonagrirelateditems.Intheoppositedirection,theEUexports
mainlymachinery,transportequipmentandchemicals.
4.3!CriticalAnalysis
Overall,Brazilis,byfar,themajorMERCOSURplayerintheMERCOSUREU
traderelationship(around75percentofexportsandimportsto/fromtheEU)
(Gambini2008).TheMERCOSUREUtradebalancemakesthisevident(notice,
forinstance,theoverlappingofthetradesurpluscurves).Itshouldbenoted
thattheEUisalsothebiggestforeigninvestorinBrazil,accordingtothe
BrazilianCentralBank.
Anotherinterestingfeatureofthisrelationshipisthattherehasbeenlittle
diversificationintheproductcategoriesofMERCOSURsexports.Forinstance,
inthecaseofBrazilsexports,acomparisonofthe1988and2008figures
indicatesthefollowingcomposition:basicproducts(49percent/47percent),
semimanufactured(14percent/15percent)andmanufacturedproducts(37per
cent/38percent)(Aliceweb).
Finally,itshouldbenotedthat,in1995,MERCOSURandtheEUsigned
theEUMERCOSURInterregionalFrameworkCooperationAgreement.The
negotiationswereformallylaunchedinJune1999andtariffandservices
negotiationsstartedinJuly2001.Marketoffersfrombothsides,including
280 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
goods,services,governmentprocurementandinvestment,wereexchangedin
September2004,butwerenotdeemedsufficientforanagreement.Sincethen,
MERCOSURandtheEUhavemetanumberoftimesatministerialandsenior
officiallevels.Negotiationswereformallyresumedatthebeginningof2010and
theyareongoing.
5.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
Thischapterdevelopsanempiricalanalysisofthetradepatternsbetween
MERCOSURChina and MERCOSUREuropean Union. With regard to
MERCOSURChina,thedatashowthatbilateraltradehasboomedinrecent
years,trackingChinasemergenceasamajorglobalplayer.However,thetrade
patternthatemergesseemstohaveconsolidatedMERCOSURsroleasasupplier
ofbasicproductsandarecipientofmanufacturedproductsfromChina.Two
otherdimensionscanbeobserved:ontheonehand,thesurgeinChineseimports
toMERCOSUR (972percentintheperiod20022008)andtheconsequent
challengesto MERCOSURslocalindustries;and,ontheotherhand,the
potentialof Chinese productsto displace MERCOSUR exportstothird
countries.
MERCOSUREUtraderevealsaconsistentsurplusinfavourofMERCOSURin
theperiod20042008(onaverage,USD10billion).Thisfairlysteadysurpluscannot
bemisinterpreted,sinceexportsandimportsbetweenthoseregionsincreased,on
average,by20percentand25percent,respectively.Moreover,similartothe
MERCOSURChinapattern,MERCOSUREU bilateraltraderepresentsa
paradigmoftheexchangeofprimarymanufacturedproducts,althoughnotinthe
sameproportionasobservedinthefirstsetofdataanalysed.
Notes
1.Inchronologicalorder,USD/EUR:0.945(2002);1.132(2003);1.244(2004);
1.245(2005);1.257(2006);1.371(2007);and1.473(2008).Thesefiguresare
availableat:http://www.federalreserve.gov.
2.TheacronymisacontractionoftheSpanish“MercadoComúndelSur”.InPortuguese,
theblocisknownas“Mercosul”.
3.TheaccessionofnewmembersisgovernedbyDecision28/05oftheCommonMarket
Council(CMC),anorganofMERCOSUR.
4.Also,BrazilandChinahaveinitiatedtalksonalocalcurrencypaymentsystemforforeigntrade
operations.ItisworthnotingthatBrazilandArgentinaalreadyhaveasimilarsystem.
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HasChanged?)in:犆狅狀犼狌狀狋狌狉犪犈犮狅狀犿犻犮犪[EconomicConjuncture],December,4445.
Rocha,Janes(2009),BarreirasArgentinasJPreocupamEmpresriosLocais(Argentineans
BarriersAlready WorryLocalBusinessman),in:犑狅狉狀犪犾犞犪犾狅狉犈犮狅狀犿犻犮狅[Valor
Newspaper],17April,A5.
SICOEX,online:http://www.aladi.org (follow “Estadisticas”,then “Comerciode
Bienes”).
UnitedNations,COMTRADEdatabase,犐狀犳狅狉犿犪狋犻狅狀犪狀犱犇犪狋犪狅狀犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犕犲狉犮犺犪狀犱犻狊犲
犜狉犪犱犲犛狋犪狋犻狊狋犻犮狊,online:http://comtrade.un.org/db/.
WTO(2008),犜狉犪犱犲犘狅犾犻犮狔犚犲狏犻犲狑犆犺犻狀犪,ReportbytheSecretariat,April16,online:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s19900_e.doc.
282 !
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉6
犜狉犪犱犻狀犵狑犻狋犺犌犻犪狀狋狊牶犐狊犜狉犪犱犲犘狅犾犻犮狔狑犻狋犺狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱
犆犺犻狀犪犅犲狀犲犳犻犮犻犪犾狋狅犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚?
?%*.35 ?%*=%..3 7@%.("'A
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
TheSouthernCommonMarket(MERCOSUR)wassetupin1991bythe
signingoftheAsunciónTreaty.Itisanambitiousregionalintegrationproject
bringingtogetherArgentina,Brazil,ParaguayandUruguaywiththeultimate
objectiveofestablishing a Common Market.Although various bilateral
agreementsalreadyexistedamongthememberstates,atthetimetherewere
severaleconomic,politicalandsocialincentivesthat madetheagreement
desirable.
TheMERCOSURintegrationprocesshasnotbeenstraightforwardor
simple.Inadditiontothealreadycomplexinternalagenda,MERCOSUR,asan
openregionalprocess,hasmaintainedabusynegotiationagendawiththird
countries.Withinthisframework,MERCOSURmembercountrieshavesigned
FreeTradeAgreements(FTAs)withallSouthAmericanSpanishspeaking
countriesand with othercountries beyondtheregion,such asIsrael.
MERCOSURhasalsosignedPreferentialTradeAgreements(PTAs)withLatin
AmericanIntegrationAssociation(ALADI)memberstates,suchasCubaand
Mexico1,andwithIndiaandtheSouthernAfricanCustomsUnion(SACU).
Notwithstandingthisprogress withregardtoagreements withthird
countries,andafterdiscontinuingFreeTradeAreaoftheAmericas(FTAA)
negotiations,theonlypendingNorthSouthnegotiationswerethosewiththe
EU.Thesenegotiationsalsohadthepeculiarityofbeinganegotiationprocessfor
anagreementbetweentwoblocsofcountries,whichintroducednewcomplexities
arisingfromthepeculiaritiesoftheproductionandtradestructuresofthe
participatingcountriesandfromthecharacteristicsoftherespectiveblocs
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 283
socioeconomicdevelopmentpolicies.Atpresent,theprocesshasgroundtoahalt
andnoagreementhadbeenreachedbythedateagreedfor2004.However,the
learningcurveinitiatedinthiswayhasproveduseful.
Withinthisframework andtakinginto accounttheabovementioned
negotiationexperiencesandtheemergenceofChinaasaglobalplayer,itis
importanttoanalysetheprospectsofincreasingtradewiththisother“giant”of
theworldeconomy.Theobjectiveofthischapteristoreflectonthepotential
opportunitiesand challenges ofstrengthenedtraderelationships between
MERCOSUR,theEUandChina.Forsuchpurposes,inSection2ofthischapter
themaincharacteristicsofMERCOSURarepresentedandthemostimportant
restrictivefactorswithregardtoreachingagreementwiththeEUanalysed.
Furthermore,tradingpatternsareidentifiedandgenerallytheprospectsof
increasedtradewithChinaareexamined.Thechapterendswithsomegeneral
reflectionsonMERCOSURsnegotiatingexperienceswiththeEU,whichmay
proveusefulforaneventualstrengtheningoftraderelationswithChina.
2.犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚牶犕犪犻狀犆犺犪狉犪犮狋犲狉犻狊狋犻犮狊
MERCOSURisanintegrationprocessbetweenfourSouthAmericancountries
withtheobjectiveofestablishingaCommonMarket.The1991TreatyofAsunción
wasthelegalconstitutiveinstrumentforthecreationofMERCOSURandits
mainobjectivesincluded:theintegrationofthefourmemberstatesthroughfree
circulationofgoods,servicesandproductionfactors;theestablishmentofa
commonexternaltariff;andtheadoptionofacommontradepolicytowardsthird
parties;thecoordinationofmacroeconomicandsectoralpolicies;andthe
harmonisationofthecountrieslegalframeworksinkeyareas.
MERCOSURhasapopulationofabout247.4million,aGDPofUSD1,200
billionandanexportvolumeofapproximatelyUSD190billion(2006).Thesize
oftheterritories,theirpopulationsandtheparticipationofthefourmembersin
theeconomicandcommercialactivitiesoftheblocshowlargeasymmetries.
Brazilaccountsfor67percentofthetotalproductionoftheblocand80percent
oftheinhabitants.Althoughthefoureconomiesinthegrouphavebeenclassified
asmiddleincomepercapita,ArgentinahasaGNIpercapitaofUSD12,990,
UruguayofUSD11,040,BrazilofUSD9,370andParaguayofUSD4,380(2007
adjustedbyPPP).
In2006,MERCOSURexportedgoodsworthatotalofUSD190billion,
whichrepresents1.6percentofworldgoodsexports.Nonregionalmarkets
captured87percentoftheblocsexports(threequartersbymid1990s).These
marketshaveincreasedtheirparticipationinrecentyearssinceexportstothese
284 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
destinationsgrewby10percentayearonaverage,equivalentto2.5times
quickerthanexportstotheregion.Exportmarketsareconcentratedtosome
extent:66percentoftotalblocexportsgotothetop10markets(withthe
USA,theEUandChinaontop,accountingfor20.7percent,18.3percentand
7.6 per cent,respectively).Import markets of origin are even more
concentrated,ledbytheEU,theUSAandChina(20.7percent,20.0percent
and8.7percent,respectively,incurrentdollars,2007).Overthepastfew
yearstheMERCOSURexportstructurehasseenincreasedparticipationfrom
lesstraditionalmarketsoutsidetheregion(perhapsinfluencedbysubstantial
changesinrelativeprices).ExportstoChinaandRussiarosetoanannual
averageof27percentbetween2002and2006,whileexportstotheUSAandEU
grewby9percentand13percent,respectively.
RegardingtherelativeimportanceofMERCOSURasanexporter,wecan
seethatitisthetenthrankingEUsupplier(2.5percentoftotalEUimports)
andamongthetop15USsuppliers(2percentoftotalUSimports).Ithasa
similarshareofChineseimports(2percent).Theblocsexportbasketis
concentratedontheagriculturalsector,especiallyfood.Animalandvegetable
productsandfoodrepresentedmorethanonethirdofthetotalamountexported
tocountriesoutsidetheregionin2006.Mineralsandfuelsrepresented16per
cent,commonmetals(10percent),machinery(9percent)andvehiclesand
transportequipment(9percent).Itisworthmentioningthestrongregional
positionofsoyaoil(74percentofworldtrade),orangejuice(65percent),
flourandsoyapellets(54percent),soyagrains(44percent),bovinefrozen
meat(43percent),ethylalcohol(37percent)andsugarcane(33percent),
amongotherthings(Garbarinoetal.2008).
Regardingtheintegrationprocess,in1995theconstructionoftheCustoms
UnionstartedwiththesigningoftheOuroPretoProtocolandthedefinitionofa
CommonExternalTariff,afterafirststageofacceleratedtariffcutsamongthe
fourmemberstates,duringwhichtheFreeTradeAreawasconsolidated.Ouro
PretoalsolaiddownthepresentinstitutionalstructureofMERCOSUR.
WorkingoutaCommon TradePolicyisnotasimpletaskandthe
MERCOSURprocesscouldnotavoidcomplexity.Nevertheless,MERCOSUR
hasmadeprogressinthenegotiationprocesstowardseliminatingthedouble
collectionoftheCommonExternalTariffthroughtheapprovalofDecisionCMC
54/04andDecisionCMCNo37/05,andhasmaintainedthedefinitionofSpecial
CommonRegimensandaCommonCustomsCodeintheregionalnegotiationagenda.In
additiontocustomsandcommercialissues,MERCOSURhasmadeprogressinother
social,politicalandproductionareas.Forinstance,MERCOSURhasconstituteda
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 285
Parliament,aSocialInstituteandaPermanentRevisionTribunal.
3.犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犪狀犱狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀
3.1!PotentialGainsandRisks
AlthoughabilateralapproachbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheLatin
AmericancountriesstartedwiththeSanJosémeetingsin1984,itisinthe1990s
thattheEuropeanCommunityassumedamoreactiveroleinthesearchfor
cooperationandassociationagreementswithvariousLatinAmericanintegration
processes.Thisinterestcoincidedwiththestrengtheningintegrationprocesses
alreadyexistingintheregionandwiththeconstitutionofpromisingnew
initiatives,suchasMERCOSUR.Italsotookplacewithintheframeworkofthe
socalled“GlobalEuropeanIntegrationModel”thatpromotedcountryrelations
beyondcommercialconsiderationsandinthedirectionofpoliticaldialogue,as
wellascooperation.
ItiswithinthisframeworkthattheEU and MERCOSURsignedan
InterregionalFrameworkCooperationAgreementinDecember1995,inwhich
theyexpressedtheirintentiontoformalisecooperationagreementsandto
advanceinthenegotiationsinordertoestablishatradepartnershipagreement
contemplatingreciprocaltradeliberalisationinaccordancewithGATTArticle
24.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatin1995MERCOSURstarteditstransitional
processtowardsaCustomsUnionaftertheOuroPretomeeting.Althoughthere
wereexpressionsofinterestonthepartoftheEUaboutsigningagreementswith
MERCOSURimmediatelyafterthesigningoftheTreatyofAsunción1991,thesigning
oftheInterregionalAgreementwasmadepossiblebytheinternationallegalpersonality
conferredonMERCOSURbyArticle34oftheProtocolofOuroPerto.
ThenegotiationsbetweentheEU and MERCOSURstartedin1999,
coincidingwithanotherhistoricaleventintheEU,theestablishmentofthe
MonetaryUnion.Thesenegotiationswerecomplicatedbythefactthatthey
involvedtwoCustomsUnions,withtheirowninternalconflictsofinterest
concerningtheestablishmentofacommontradepolicy,andalsobecauseofthe
NorthSouthaspect.Althoughtheagreementwasgivenconsiderableemphasis,
itwasnotthefirstagreementbetweentwoCustom Unions:theEuropean
CommunityandtheAndeanCommunityhadalreadyestablishedanarrangement
ofsimilarnatureinApril1993.
Fromaneconomicpointofview,inparticulartradeopportunities,the
agreementwaspromotedbecausethetwomarketsareimportanttooneanother.
TheEuropeanUnionisamarketofover490millionpeople,thethirdmost
286 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
populousmarketintheworldafterIndiaandChina,withaGDPpercapitaof
overUSD22,000inPPP(EU27).Atthesametime,itisMERCOSURssecond
largesttradepartner,aftertheUnitedStates.Morethan19percentoftotal
worldtrade(importsandexports)iscarriedoutfromandtotheEU.Exportsto
theEUrepresentmorethan18percentofMERCOSURstotalexportsand
almost21percentofitsimports.Inturn,theEUisoneofthemostimportant
investorsinMERCOSUR (Eurostat2007).Morethan70percentofgoods
exportedtotheEUareprimarygoods,mainlyagriculturalproductsandenergy.
AlthoughMERCOSURhasanattractiveconsumermarketofabout247million
people,ithasnotyetpassedthethresholdof2.5percentoftotalEUexports,which
areconcentratedonmachinery,chemicalsandtransportequipment,whichrepresent
about70percentoftotalEUimports.However,theEUsinterestinMERCOSURis
alsogeopolitical,besidesthefactthatitisanimportantcommoditysupplierandanEU
ForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)destination.
Fromatheoreticalperspective,andasitisaNorthSouthagreement
betweeneconomieswithrelativelycomplementaryproductivestructures,itwas
expectedthatanEUMERCOSURregionalliberalisationagreementwouldcause
arealignmentofbloc membersproductionstructures,includingsectoral
contractionsandexpansions,andthatitwouldpromotea moreefficient
allocationofproductionfactors.Thiswouldstimulateregionalproductionand
tradespecialisationinaccordancewiththerespectivecomparativeadvantages.
Thiswouldimproveefficiencyasaconsequenceofeconomiesofscale,besides
moredynamicgains.
Allthingsbeingequal,itwasexpectedthatstaticgains(tradecreation)and
dynamicgains(efficiencyandproductivitygains,moreeconomicgrowthand
attractionofinvestments)wouldexceedthepossibleeconomiccostsofthe
process (tradediversionsamongthem),andthatadequatepoliciescould
compensatethepossiblelossesofsomecountriesorgroupsaffectedbythe
integrationprocess,witharesultingincreaseofglobalwellbeing.
SomeempiricalfindingsaboutthepossibleimpactsofanFTAbetween
MERCOSURandtheEUsupportthistheory.Mostimpactanalyseshavebeen
carriedoutusingmodelsofcomputablegeneralequilibrium (CGE)basedon
optimisationmethods.Ingeneral,studieshaveobtainedpositiveresultsforboth
blocs.InthecaseofMERCOSUR,theSIAMERCOSUR(2007)researchfinds
thatfullliberalisation—ofbothgoodsandservices—betweentheblocswould
haveapositivestaticeconomicresultof0.5percentofGDPforArgentina,1.5
percentforBrazil,2.1percentforUruguayandupto10percentforParaguay.
Inthisstudy,gainsofastaticcharactercamefromtheexpansionofsectorsin
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 287
whichMERCOSURhascomparativeadvantages,incontrasttotheEU,asa
consequenceofthecomplementaritybetweentheblocs.However,decreases
wouldbeobservedintextiles,thecelluloseindustry,thechemicalindustry,
metals,automobilesandmachineryingeneral.Thepositiveeffectsofefficiency
asaconsequenceofopeninguptocompetitionandattractionofinvestmentwould
generateaglobalwelfaregainforbothblocs.
Otherstudies,such as Diao,Díaz Bonilla and Robinson (2001),
MonteagudoandWatanuki(2001),aswellasGiordanoandWatanuki(2001)—
despiteusingdatafrompriortothecrisisbywhichsomeMERCOSURcountrieswere
affectedbetween1999and2001andnotincludingtheEU25—showsimilarresults.
Themethodologyemployedalsoreferstomultiregionalandmultisectorgeneral
equilibriummodels,asconstitutingtheclassicstructureofastaticCGEmodel.
Althougheachstudyintroduceddifferentadaptationstothebasicmodel,
globalresultsgointhesamedirection,andshowanincreaseinrealGDPof
between0.7percentand7.7percentforArgentinaandbetween1.3percent
and4percentforBrazil.Inturn,exportstotheEUwouldincrease,dependingon
theparticularstudy,bybetween4percentand13percentforBrazilandArgentina
jointly.SpecificstudiesforParaguayandUruguayshowsimilarresults.
Accordingtotheresultsofsimulations,arangeofimpactsonMERCOSURsectors
maybeexpected.Wewouldobtainpositiveresultsinprimaryagriculturalgoods
sectors(vegetablesandfruits,cerealsandsugar,amongothers)andinthefood
industry(especiallymeatanditsderivatives,aswellasdairyproducts).Amongthe
mainpotentialnegativeeffectswecanexpectpotentialjoblossesinseveralareas
ofmanufacturing(forexample,automobiles,chemicals,electronicandcomputer
products)andofheavyindustry(capitalgoods),mainlyinBrazilandArgentina.
Inthelongterm,theseeffectsmightbebeneficialintermsofjobsandincome,
aslongasthemarketsoperatewithacertainflexibilityandgovernments
implementpoliciestosupportthedecliningsectors.
TheresultsareconsistentwiththecurrentNorthSouthtradestructure
whichinvolveslittleintraindustrialtradeandinwhichEUexportgoodsare
concentratedintechnologyandskilledlabour,andMERCOSURiscompetitivein
agriculturalandprimarygoodsingeneral.
Inanycase,themotivesforsigningtheagreementwerenotconfinedto
marketaccessforthetwoblocsstrategicproducts.Otheraspectsshouldbe
highlighted.Forexample,beforesigningtheFrameworkAgreementwiththe
EuropeanUnion,theUnitedStateshadalreadyproposedanagreementwith
MERCOSURalongsidethedecisiontostartnegotiationsforahemispheric
agreementtakenattheMiamiSummitin1994.Thisinitiative,thefirstofits
288 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
kindinvolvingMERCOSURinaNorthSouthcontext,mightpartlyexplaina
certain“dominoeffect”(Baldwin1993).Inthissense,thedesiretosigntrade
agreementsarisesfromtheinternalpoliticalbalancewithineachcountryortrade
bloc,wherethebalancebetweenforcesfavouringoragainsttheagreementmight
determineadecisiontoseekprogressinregionalliberalisation.Tradeagreements
signedbythirdcountriesmayleadtoasituationinwhichthedamageperceived
byproagreementexportersisstrongenoughtoalterthebalanceofforces,as
theyperceiveacommercialdisadvantageinagrowingnumberofmarkets,
withoutobviatingthegeopoliticalincentivesinthedevelopmentofinternational
policy,especiallyinlargecountries.OntheMERCOSURside,thesigningof
theFrameworkAgreementbetweentheEUandtheAndeanCommunitycreated
ariskoftradedeviationwithregardtosomeMERCOSURgoods.
Ontheotherhand,takingintoaccountMERCOSURsstructureandprotection
levels,thehemisphericfreetradeagreementgeneratedtheriskoftradedeviationto
goodswithregardtowhichtheUnitedStateshadaregional,althoughnotaglobal
comparativeadvantage.Thus,anFTAwiththeEUmay,tosomeextent,promotea
positiveeffectoftradecreationandreducethenegativeeffectsofthetransferenceof
protectiontogoodsfromtheNorthAmericaneconomies.
Besidestheseeconomicarguments,andasBouzas(2004)mentions,the
agreementwiththeEU meantthatthe MERCOSUR wouldhaveexplicit
CustomsUnionrecognitionasakeyplayerintheinternationaltradesystem.
Secondly,theMERCOSURcountriesfelttheysharemorevalueswiththesense
ofCommunity with which Europehaspromoteditseconomicandsocial
integrationthanwithamorecommerciallyorientedarrangement,liketheone
promotedbytheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)andFTAA.
Regardlessoftheimportanceoftheseandotherincentives,theyshowed
thatimportantproblemsandtensionstypicalofanagreementbetweentwo
regionalblocsexistedandthatthey wouldhaveemergedassoonasthe
negotiationswereinitiated.
3.2!SensitiveIssuesandtheSituationofthePotential"Losers#
Inordertochecktheresultsforecastbyneoclassicalinternationaltrade
theoryitisnecessaryalsotoverifythemarketequilibriumhypotheses.Models
basedonneoclassicaltheoryassumethatmarketsworkefficiently,whichmeans
thatnoinformationasymmetriesexistbetweeneconomicagents,andthatprices
andreturnsfromproductionfactorsmustbeflexibleenoughtoadjustsupplyto
demand,whilemarketsofgoods,productionfactorsandfinance mustbe
“complete”andadjustinstantly.However,theseconditionsarefarfrom
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 289
observablereality.Marketflawsaremuchmorethanexceptionstothegeneral
rulesofeconomics,andnationaleconomicpolicydecisions,aswellasthe
characteristicsofnationalinstitutionsaffecttheresultsofeconomicdecisionsina
varietyofways.Withinthisframework,theresultsautomaticallyexpectedfrom
anintegrationprocessmaynotoccur.Furthermore,eveninputativeperfectly
competitivemarkets,thedistributionofcostsandbenefitsduringanintegration
processisnothomogeneous,eitheramongparticipatingcountriesoramongthe
variouseconomicplayers.Thepossibilityofcorrectingthissituationbymeansof
interregionalcompensationpoliciescollideswiththerealityofinstitutional
constraintsandthelegitimateinterestsofthedifferentpressuregroupswithin
thecountriesconcerned.Therefore,conclusionsobtainedbypositiveeconomic
analysisconflictwiththelimitationsofpoliticaleconomy.
However,thepositiveimpactpredictedbyneoclassicalmodelswithregardto
economicgrowthandglobalexportsafterbilateralliberalisation,donotspecifically
accountforthecostsoftheadjustmentstobemadeinthelabourmarketandother
factorscausedbychangesintheproductionstructuresandgeneratedbythenewtrade
patternthatemergedfromliberalisation.Theseadjustmentcostswouldapplyaslong
asinstitutionalandstructuralmarketrigiditiesexist.
Thecomplexityoftheseprocessesandthemultiplicityofinterestsimplya
needtointerpretdifficultiesandconflictsintermsofpoliticaleconomy.Inthis
sense,regionalintegrationgoesbeyondthemaximisationofpotentialgainsand
amountstoastrategicprocessinwhichaspectsofpoliticaleconomyconcerning
adjustmentcostsandthestructuraltransformationoftheeconomiesconcerned
mustbetakenintoaccount.Amongthetensionslikelytoarise,wemight
mentiontheadjustmentoflabourmarketsandpoliticallobbyingcarriedoutby
sensitiveeconomicsectors,whichfunctionasimportantpressuregroups.
Tradebetweenthe EU and MERCOSUR showspatternsofclassic
comparativeadvantage;italsohasa markeddegreeofcomplementarity.
Analysisofthecharacteristicsofproductionsectorsandtradewithinthetwo
blocksshowsthatinsomeareastherearenoglobalcomparativeadvantages,due
toprotectionwithintheregionalmarket.Thatistosay,thesearegoodsor
sectorswhosetradehasdeviatedfromtherestoftheworldandwhoseinterest
groups(countriesandsectors)perceivetheregionalmarketasparticularly
important.Suchsectors,togetherwithseveralsectorsthatsubstituteimports,
havestrategicimportanceingovernmentdevelopmentpoliciesandaresupported
byimportantpoliticalandsocialgroups.
Pressure(lobby)groupsconstitutedaroundthesesectorsareusuallysmall,
butwellorganisedandinformedandhavethecapacitytoinfluencepolitical
290 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
decisionsandshapepublicopinion,sometimesmakinganationalcauseoutof
theirinterests.Inturn,therestofthepopulation,basicallycomprising
consumers,isdispersedandlacksselfconsciousnessasaninterestgroup,
althoughitisofcoursefarmorenumerous.Therefore,nationalprotection
policiesgenerallyfocusonsectorswhichhavenocomparativeadvantages.Thisis
tosomeextentthecasewithEuropesagriculturalsectors.
Negotiationsbetween MERCOSURandtheEUformallycommencedin
1999,oncetheInterregionalAgreementwasratified,andafter16negotiating
roundswerestillexperiencingdifficultieswhichhavehamperedfurtherprogress.
Theagreementcanbedividedintothree“pillars”(Torrent2005):political
dialogue,cooperationandtrade.Withoutenteringintodetailsabouttariffcut
proposalssubmittedbytheEU,theseproposalswerefounddifficulttoacceptbythe
MERCOSURcountries.Thisrefers,amongotherthings,tothelackoffull
liberalisationoftariffsforsomesensitiveagriculturalgoods,subjecttospecifictariffs
and/orminimumentrypricestotheEUmarket.Thesegoodsareofkeyconcernto
MERCOSUR,suchascereals,rice,dairyproducts,bovinemeat,poultry,sugarand
tobacco.MERCOSURisaworldleaderintheproductionofmanyofthesegoodsandit
hasglobalcomparativeadvantagesformostofthem(seeTable1).
犜犪犫犾犲1 犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犘狉狅犱狌犮狋狊狑犻狋犺犚犲犾犪狋犻狏犲犆狅犿狆犪狉犪狋犻狏犲犃犱狏犪狀狋犪犵犲狊
Harmonised
Standard(HS)
Product
World
participation
2006
RCAI
12+15+23 Grains,oilsandpellets(sunflowerandsoya) 49.6 31.24
0201+0202 Bovinemeat 23.1 14.56
17 Sugarandconfectionersarticles 22.7 14.32
09 Coffee,tea,herbsandspices 14.6 9.19
26 Minerals,slagsandashes 12.2 7.69
41 Skinsandleathers 10.9 6.84
24 Tobaccoandelaboratedtobacco 7.9 5.01
10+11 Cereals,flours,etc. 7.3 4.62
44+47+48 Wood,woodpaste,paperandcardboard 2.9 1.82
Source:Garbarinoetal.2008:46.
Inthissense,accordingtoQuijano(2008:178),“thefourMERCOSUR
countriesexportfoodtothe EU,whereinexchange,importantglobal
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 291
distortionsoccurasaconsequenceofEuropeanagriculturalpolicies”.Therefore,
theproblemisnotonlymarketaccess,butalsosubsidiesandinternalsupport,
whichtendtodistortworldmarkets,sincetheEUoperatesasonebigcountry
andMERCOSURisapricetaker.
犜犪犫犾犲2 犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚狊犘狅狊犻狋犻狅狀犪狊犪狀犈狓狆狅狉狋犲狉
Product Worldtradeposition Productionposition
Food Bovinemeat 1st 1st(20%ofworldstocks)
Flourand
soyapellets
1st(54%ofworldexports) 1st(51%ofworldproduction
and41%ofworldsownarea)
Soyaoil 1st(74%ofworldexports) 1st(and1stinsoyaflour),
34%ofworldproduction
Sugar 33%ofworldexports 1stcoffeeandsugar
Coffee 19%ofworldexports
Orangejuice 1st(65%ofworldexports) 1st
Sunfloweroil 19%ofworldexports 4th(14%ofworldproduction)
Bioenergy Bioethanol 1st 2nd(42%ofworldproduction)
Source:Garbarinoetal.2008:48.
Althoughtheagriculturalissueisakeyproblem,theremaybeother
difficultiesbeforeagreementisreached.Thesemayinclude:
(1)NewcountriesenteringtheEU:countriesthataremainlyagricultural
producersandMERCOSURscompetitorsforEUfinancialresources,which
havefewculturallinkswiththeregion.
(2)Issuesbeyondthescopeoftariffcutsshoweddivergences,suchas
governmentpurchasing,geographicaldenominationandintellectualproperty.
Furthermore,theexistenceoftariff“peaks”andtariffcontingents,export
subsidiesandothermeasuresofsectoralprotectionmadenegotiationsdifficult,
mainlybecausetheyarenotusedbyMERCOSUR,andsoinanyofferoftariff
reliefitsmarketswillremainfullyopen,establishingaschemecharacterisedby
an“asymmetriclackofprotection”.
(3)The“singleundertaking”negotiationmodality:onedissentingissue
alonehamperstheprogressofthewholeagreement.
(4)ThedemiseofFTAA,lessprospectofprogressonaMERCOSURUS
agreementandthefailureoftheDohaRound,allofwhichmightreduceinterest
intheEUMERCOSURagreement.
(5)AccordingtoCienfuegos(2008),adebateisgoingonconcerningtheEUs
292 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
InterregionalForeignPolicyDoctrine(regiontoregionrelations)intermsofwhichthe
negotiationofagreementswithstrategicsubregionalblocs(MERCOSUR,CAN,
SICAandsoon)isgivenpreference.Anumberofvoicesarestartingtodefendthe
optionofbilateralnegotiationwithselectedstrategiccountries.
(6)AmongtheEUinstitutionstherearemultipledissentingplayers.For
instance,theEuropeanParliamentsupportedthecessationofnegotiationswith
MERCOSUR,settingitapartfromtheDohaRound,whiletheDirectorate
General(DG)onTradedefendedDohamultilateralnegotiationsasapriority.
DGAgriculturesupportedthemaintenanceoftheCommonAgriculturalPolicy
(CAP)without modifications,whilethe GD Relex (ExternalRelations)
proposedthestrengtheningofcooperationpillarsandpoliticaldialogue.There
arealsoimportantdifferencesbetweenthememberstates(Cienfuegos2008).
ThefourMERCOSURmemberstatesarenothomogeneouseither,making
bloctoblocnegotiationsdifficult,sincelegitimateinterestsdonotnecessarily
coincide.Thishappens,amongotherreasons,becauseinSouthSouthagreementsthe
costsoftradediversiontendtofocusonthelessdevelopedcountries(inrelationtothe
mostdevelopedpartner),whichsufferdeindustrialisationasaconsequenceof
openingtheirmarketstomanufacturedproductsfrommoredevelopedcommercial
partners.Thosepartnershavearelativelyhighercapitallabourendowment.
Lessdevelopedcountriestendtoexperiencetradediversiontowardstheimports
ofitslargerpartnerandbecomelesscompetitiveintheseproducts(Venables
2003,2005).Inthissense,thesecountriessufferatwofoldcost:thelossof
theirlimitedmanufacturingsectorsandtradediversion.Inpart,thisiswhat
MoncarzandVaillant(2006)showafteranalysinginterregionaltradepatterns.
Accordingtothisanalysis,incentivestothesmallerpartnersmayoperateinaNorth
Southagreement,whichwouldhelptoreducethetradediversioncostswithinthebloc,
butitwouldreducepartoftheimplicitprotectionforsomeofthemoreindustrialised
regionalproductswhichbenefitfromtheprotectionoftheagreement.
4.犜犺犲犈犿犲狉犵犲狀犮犲狅犳犆犺犻狀犪犪狊犪犌犾狅犫犪犾犘犾犪狔犲狉犪狀犱犐狋狊犜狉犪犱犲狑犻狋犺犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
Atthispointinthetwentyfirstcentury,therecanbenodoubtaboutthe
globalriseoftheChineseeconomy,intermsofbothproductionandtrade,FDI,
innovationandparticipationinglobalfinancialmarkets.
MERCOSURisincreasinglybeingaffectedbyChinasincreasingeconomic
influence.Whilein1990MERCOSURexportedtoChinaabout1.5percentof
itstotalexports,by2007theChinesemarketcapturedaround11.2percentof
totalexports.Likewise,MERCOSURimportsfromChinarosefrom0.8per
centin1990to15percentin2007.However,theeffectofChinabeingthe
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 293
secondlargestworldeconomyintermsofforeigntradevolumegoesbeyondthese
figures,becauseitsgrowingimportanceinthirdmarketshasgeneratedeffectson
globalaggregateddemandwhichhaschangedexportpricesandaffectedtermsof
traderelationshipsinLatinAmerica.
Fromtheperspectiveofdynamicanalysis,theChinesemarketisstill
smallerthantheEUmarketasadestinationforMERCOSURexports,butinthe
pastfewyearsthebalancehasbeguntochangeinthedirectionofChina,which
hasbecomethemostrapidlygrowingmarketforMERCOSURexports.
犉犻犵狌狉犲1 犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋狅犳犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犈狓狆狅狉狋犇犲狊狋犻狀犪狋犻狅狀狊
Source:Garbarinoetal.2008:45.
Forthepurposeoforderingtheanalysisandfocusingontradelinks,wecan
trytounderstandtheimportanceoftrade with Chinainthreedifferent
dimensions:(1)ChinasincreasingdemandforMERCOSURexports;(2)
ChinasincreasingexportstoMERCOSURcountries;(3)Chinasdisplacement
ofMERCOSURexportstothirdmarkets.
WhiletheincreaseinChinesedemandpresentsanopportunityforgrowthto
certainMERCOSURsectors,ontheotherhand,importsfromChina,although
theybenefitconsumersandsomeproductionsectors,alsorepresentathreatto
localcompanies.Likewise,theemergenceofChinaasaglobalplayerin
internationalmarketstendstoaffectMERCOSURexportpatterns.Thissimple
andpreliminaryoutlookissufficienttomakeitclearthatthestrengtheningof
currenttrendswouldgenerateascenariooflosersandwinners,whichcallsfora
moredetailedimpactassessment.
BasedonaWorldBankstudybyLedermanetal.(2007b:Chapter12),we
canidentifyanumberofimpactsonproductionsectorsandproductionfactors,as
wellasatthesubregionallevel.TheWorldBankstudytriestoassesstheextent
294 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
towhichChinasandIndiasgrowthareaffectingthetradespecialisationpatterns
ofLatin Americaandthe Caribbean,basedona Revealed Comparative
Advantage(RCA)index(Vollrath1991).Theauthorsexaminesubregionsand
distinguishtheSouthernCone(SC),whichincludesBrazil,Argentina,Uruguay
andChile.AlthoughthisdoesnotreferspecificallytoMERCOSURassuch,the
aggregationisusefultohelpinfertheblocsbroadertendencies.
First,theresultsofthisstudyshowthatChinasandtheSouthernCones
tradespecialisation patternsbetween1990 and2004 evolvedin opposite
directions,which wouldindicatesomeprogresstowardsagreaterexport
complementarityinsteadofmorecompetitioninthesameproducts.Inthis
sense,theWorldBanksstudyshowsthat,in1990,ChinaandtheSouthern
Conehadrelativecomparativeadvantageinnineandeightsectors,respectively,
groupedatthreedigitsfromtheInternationalStandardIndustrialClassification
(ISIC),andwerematchedinfoursectors:logging,fishing,crudepetroleumand
foodmanufacturing.Aftera15yearterm,duringwhichthespecialisationpatterns
changedandprogressivelyshowedaclearnegativecorrelation,wecanseethat,while
thechangeswererelativelysmallintheSouthernCone,Chinachangedsignificantly,
losingrelativecomparativeadvantageinprimarysectorcommodities(agriculture,
fishing,loggingandmining)andgainingitinmanufacturing.
Seekingthefactorsthatproducedtheseresults,theauthorsanalysed
productionsectorsandreachedsomeinterestingconclusions.WhiletheSouthern
Conespecialisedinnaturalresourceexports,Chinaspecialised mainlyin
manufacturing.AgroupofsectorsemergesinwhichtheSouthernConedidnot
improveitspositioningininternationalmarkets,whileChinawaslosingrelative
comparativeadvantageinparticularareas.ThiswouldindicatethattheSouthern
Conelostoutinrespectoftheopportunitiespresentedinthisnewscenario.For
othersectors,therelativecomparativeadvantagecorrelationwouldbepositive
(roomforcompetition)orneutral(doesnotshowadefinitetendency).
犜犪犫犾犲3 犆犺犪狀犵犲狊犻狀犛狅狌狋犺犲狉狀犆狅狀犲犛狆犲犮犻犪犾犻狊犪狋犻狅狀犘犪狋狋犲狉狀狊
SCRCAIIncreases
ChinaRCAIstableovertime ChinaRCAIdecreasesovertime
none
220CrudePetroleum&Gas
311FoodManufacturing1
313BeverageIndustries
385Professionalandscientific
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 295
Positivetrendorabscenceofatrend
121Forestry 353Petroleumrefineries
122Logging 354Miscell.petroleumpr
130Fishing 355Rubberproducts
210CoalMining 356Plasticproducts
323Leatherandproducts 362Glassandproducts
324Footwear 369Nonmetallicmineralps
331Woodandproducts 372Nonferrousbasicind.
341Paperandproducts 383Electricalmachinery
351Industrialchemicals 384Transportequipment
352Otherchemicalprod. 390Otherindustries
ChinaRCAIIncreases
SCRCAIstableovertime SCRCAIdecreasesovertime
332Furnitureandfixtures 312FoodManufacturing2
342Printingandproducts 314Tobacco
361Pottery,china&earthenware 321Textiles
381Fabricatedmetalproducts 322WearingApparel
382Machineryexceptelectric 371Ironandsteelbasic
ChinaRCAIdecreasesovertime
SCRCAIstableovertime
111Agriculture&livestock
113Hunting&trapping
230Metaloremining
290OtherMining
Source:BasedonLedermanetal.2007b:chapter12,table2.
Analysingthedevelopmentoftherelativecomparativeadvantageindexby
meansofeconometricregression,thestudyconcludesthatbilateraltradebetween
Chinaandtheregionhasnotbeensignificantenoughtoexplainthechangein
specialisationpatterns(possiblybecausethisbilateraltradehasnotyetreacheda
significantvolume,comparedtototaltrade).Inaddition,inthiseconometric
regressionthereweresomesignsofimpactonregionalproductionfactors.
Themostconclusiveaspectinthisrespectisthatlabour (theonly
statisticallysignificantvariable)—inparticular,lessskilledlabour—hasbeen
mostnegativelyaffectedbythechangesintradepatterns.Thisresultturnsout
296 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
tobeintuitivelyreasonable,sinceamongthemost“displaced”sectorsislabour
intensivemanufacturing(forexample,textilesandclothing),whichutilises
considerableunskilledlabour.
SomedescriptionsoftradeinthesesectorsshowstronggrowthinChinese
exportstoMERCOSURintextiles,clothingandfootwear,whichreinforcedthe
resultsmentionedabove.Inthefootwearsector,in1999,importstotheregion
accountedfor93percentoftotalChineseimports,whilein2006they
representedonly71percent.Intheclothingsector,in1999,importstothe
regionexceededChineseimportsby1.8times,whilein2006theybarelytotalled
72.7percentofChineseimports.Themostdramaticcase,however,istextiles,
sinceimportstotheregionexceededtheimportsofChinesefabricsby8.5times
in1999,butin2006theyweredowntoonly94percentofthem.Thetrendis
clear(SATSM2008).
Ontheotherhand,accordingtoUNCTAD (2005),intermsofdemand
composition,Chinasgrowth—withtheresultingincreaseinpercapitaincome
andstrongmigrationtothecities—hasprovokedachangeinfoodpreferences,
causingafurtherriseindemandforlivestockproducts,oilcrops,vegetableoils,
fruitandvegetables,aswellasariseintheuseofenergy,productsinwhich
LatinAmericaishighlycompetitive.
5.犆狅狀犮犾狌犱犻狀犵犚犲犿犪狉犽狊
Inlightofthegeneralconsiderationsabouttraderelationsbetween
MERCOSURandtheEUpresentedabove,whichemphasisednegotiationsonan
FTAandthecharacteristicsoftradepatternsbetweenMERCOSURandChina,
itispossibletodrawanumberofconclusions.
AslongasthespecialisationofChineseexportsadvancestowards more
comparativeadvantagesinsectors with morevalueadded (ahighdegreeof
transformation)andleavesmoreroomforsectorsmoreintensiveinnaturalresources,
theEU,duetoitsdevelopmentstrategy(littlerelatedtoitsresources),hasbeen
inclinedtoprotectthissectorofitseconomy.InEurope,therearenoticeable
differencesbetweentheproductionpatternsofitsmemberstates,andthusto
onepartofitsagriculturalproduction(concentratedincertaincountries)the
intraregionalmarketisveryimportant.Ontheotherhand,theCAPandits
basiscontinuetobeimportanttoEUsocioeconomicpolicyandtoits“collective
consciousness”.ThiselementisnotpresentwithregardtoChina,where,onthe
contrary,theneedtoensurecertainminimumlevelsoffoodprovision,raw
materialsandenergymaygeneratetradeopportunitiesandchancesforthe
creationofproductionchainsbetweentheMERCOSURcountriesandChina.
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 297
Inthisrespect,awidevarietyofchallengesandopportunitieswouldarise
fromanytraderelationship,sincethegroupoflosersandwinnersisdifferent,
andtherefore,potentialnegotiatingagendaswouldcorrespondtodifferent
objectivesandrestrictions.MERCOSURsnegotiationswiththeEUhavethe
additionaldifficultyoftryingtoreconciletheinterestsofmultiplepartnerswith
differentlevelsofsocioeconomicandtechnologicaldevelopment.Inthissense,
theMERCOSUREU negotiationexperienceisnotadirectreferencefora
possiblenegotiationprocessbetweenMERCOSURandChina.
Despitethis,andbeyondthedifferencesinthetraderelationshippatterns
between MERCOSURandChinaandtheEU andtheparalysingofEU
MERCOSURnegotiations,thereismuchtobelearntfromthisnegotiation
experience.Onefactorwasthatitwasanegotiationprocesswithaneconomy
manytimeslargerthanthatofMERCOSURinsizeandinexports.Itwasalsoa
processinwhichthepartnersaregeographicallydistantandverydifferent
culturallyspeaking,andinwhichasignificantpartofthereasonsfornegotiating
thistypeoftradeagreementistoavoidtradediversionsofthekindwhichmight
occurifthepartnersignedtradepreferenceagreementswiththirdcountries.
Moreover,andbeyondthedefinitionofMERCOSURsexternalagenda,
tradestatisticsshowthatEUpoliciesandtheemergenceofChinaintheglobal
marketarealreadychangingMERCOSURpatternsoftradespecialisationand
production.
WhatdoesthedeepeningoftraderelationswithChinameanforMERCOSUR?
TheChineseeconomysexponentialgrowthduringthepast15yearsandthestill
relativelyveryhighgrowthin20092010inthecontextofrecessioninthe
developedcountrieshasmaintainedahighlevelofdemandforrawmaterials,and
partlyrevaluedthe MERCOSUR exportprofile.Ithasalsostrengthened
MERCOSURspositionforothertradenegotiationprocesses,includingfurther
processeswiththeEU.
Similarly,Chinassignificantgrowthhasledtochangingtradepatterns
towardsthecreationofcomparativeadvantagesformanufacturedgoods,which
hasfosteredgreatercomplementarity withthe MERCOSUR countries.A
strengtheningoftradewithChinamayincreasegainsforMERCOSURsectors
whichhavetraditionallyhadcomparativeadvantageswithregardtoChina.
Likewise,a strongerrelationship with the Chinese market may enable
MERCOSURtotakeadvantageofopportunitiesincertainsectorsthatChinais
graduallyabandoningasitentersmoreadvancedstagesofproduction,atleast
duringtheperiodinwhichChinasaccelerateddevelopmentgeneratesgradually
higherlabourcosts.
298 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Thisscheme wouldbringtotheregionatendencytowardsgreater
specialisationingoodsforsectorsstronglycommittedtotheuseofnatural
resources,suchasrawmaterials,foodandfuels.Butisthisthepatternthat
MERCOSURdesires?Asthedatashow,thestrongRCAsectorsoftheSouthern
Conearelowintensiveintermsoflabour,andthemorethreatenedsectorsare
thoserequiringmoreunskilledlabour,suchassectorsinwhichChinaisstilla
worldleaderandwhicharerelativelyjobsensitiveintheregion,suchastextiles
andclothing,automobilesandspareparts.Therefore,inapassivescenario,
therewouldbenegativepressureonthelabourmarketandnegativeimpactson
povertyindices.Likewise,thefactthattradespecialisationisbasicallylocatedin
thefoodsectormakesthissectortradableandexposesittointernationalprice
volatility.Aslongasinternationalpricesincreasetherewillbeanegativeimpact
onthecostofthebasicconsumptionbasketandthiswouldnegativelyaffectthe
mostunprotectedsocialgroups.
Whatshouldbedone?JustasinlessthantwodecadesChinastoppedbeingan
economybasedonarelativeabundanceoflabourandlowrealwages(andthereforea
highrealexchangerate),similarlyMERCOSURshouldpursuemediumtolongterm
policiestoenhancetheglobalcompetitivenessofsectorswithhighervalueadded,
thoughwithoutabandoningitsinternationalinsertionbasedontherelativeabundanceof
naturalresources.Thesestrategieswouldhavepositiveeffectsonthelabourmarket,
socialindicators,thebalanceofpayments(giventheinternationalpricevolatilityof
commodities)andtheenvironment.
Chinasexperienceprovidessomeinterestingreferences:productivitygains
arenotgeneratedbyclosinganeconomy,butbygraduallyandorderlyexposing
thetradesectortocompetition.Buttheproductivesectorsmustbepreparedfor
thischallenge.Improvingproductionfactors,designingadequateeducation
policies,anddevelopinginnovationandFDIattractionpoliciesareonlyafewof
themorerelevantfactors.Aneconomyscompetitivenessisalsoimprovedby
publicprivate,publicpublicand privateprivate cooperation (clusters and
productivevaluechains,forinstance,areanefficienttoolforimproving
competitiveness,togetherwiththeconditionsforlocaldevelopment).Such
policiesmayinvolveanationalbutalsoaregionaldimension,andthereforethe
articulationofproductionnetworksamongpublicinstitutionsseemsrelevantfor
themembersofMERCOSUR.
Finally,thereismuchroomforChinaandMERCOSURtocooperateand
shareexperiences.Therefore,cooperationisanotherstrategylikelytoproduce
significantresultsinthemediumterm.
TradingwithGiants:IsTradePolicywiththeEUandChinaBeneficialtoMERCOSUR? 299
Notes
1.WiththeexceptionofUruguaywhichhassignedanFTAwithMexico.
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犐狊犫犲犺犻狀犱狋犺犲犔犪狌狀犮犺狅犳狋犺犲犛狋狉犪狋犲犵犻犮犘犪狉狋狀犲狉狊犺犻狆狑犻狋犺犅狉犪狕犻犾犪狀犱 犠犺犪狋犃狉犲犐狋狊
犆犺犪狀犮犲狊狅犳犅犲犻狀犵犈犳犳犲犮狋犻狏犲? Saarbruecken:SaarlandUniversity/FacultyofLawand
Economics.
Moncarz,P.andM.Vaillant(2006),犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚狊犚狅犾犲狅狀狋犺犲犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犘犪狋狋犲狉狀狊狅犳
犐犿狆狅狉狋狊狅犳犻狋狊犆狅狌狀狋狉狔犕犲犿犫犲狉狊:犃犇狔狀犪犿犻犮犘犪狀犲犾犇犪狋犪犃狆狆狉狅犪犮犺,ResearchPaper
Series,UniversityofNottingham.
Monteagudo,J.andM.Watanuki(2001),犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犜狉犪犱犲犃犵狉犲犲犿犲狀狋狊犳狅狉犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚:狋犺犲
犉犜犃犃犪狀犱狋犺犲犉犜犃狑犻狋犺狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀,IADBseminar.
Quijano,J.M.(2008),MercosurylaUniónEuropea:balanceyperspectivas.犈狏犪犾狌犪犮犻ó狀,
犇犲狊犪犳í狅狊狔 犘狉狅狆狌犲狊狋犪.V Cumbre AméricaLatinayelCaribe—UniónEuropea,
Evaluación,desafíosypropuestas,Lima:CentroLatinoamericanoparalasRelaciones
conEuropa(CELARE).
Snchez,D.(2006),犈犾犻犿狆犪犮狋狅犱犲犆犺犻狀犪犲狀犃犿é狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪:犗狆狅狉狋狌狀犻犱犪犱狅犪犿犲狀犪狕犪?,
Madrid:AnlisispublicadoporelRealInstitutoElcano.
SAT—SM(2008),犐犿狆狅狉狋犪犮犻狅狀犲狊犐狀狋狉犪狔犈狓狋狉犪犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犱犲犆狅狀犳犲犮犮犻狅狀犲狊,犆犪犾狕犪犱狅狊狔
犜犲犼犻犱狅狊,SextoInformeSemestraldelaSecretaríadelMERCOSUR,5566.
SIAEUMERCOSUR(2007),犜狉犪犱犲犛犐犃狅犳狋犺犲犃狊狊狅犮犻犪狋犻狅狀犃犵狉犲犲犿犲狀狋狌狀犱犲狉犖犲犵狅狋犻犪狋犻狅狀
犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犆狅犿犿狌狀犻狋狔犪狀犱犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚,UniversityofManchester.
Torrent,R.(2005),犔犪狊犚犲犾犪犮犻狅狀犲狊犝狀犻狅狀犈狌狉狅狆犲犪—犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪犲狀犾狅狊犾狋犻犿狅狊犇犻犲狕
犃狀狅狊:犈犾犚犲狊狌犾狋犪犱狅犱犲犾犪犐狀犲狓犻狊狋犲狀犮犻犪犱犲狌狀犪犘狅犾犻狋犻犮犪:犝狀犪狀犾犻狊犻狊犲犿狆í狉犻犮狅狔
犲狊狆犲狉犪狀狕犪犱狅,OBREAL/EULARO.
UNCTAD(2005),犜狉犪犱犲犪狀犱犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犚犲狆狅狉狋2005,UnitedNationsConferenceon
TradeandDevelopment.
Vaillant,M.(2007),Howto Rescuethe Trade AgreementbetweentheEU and
MERCOSUR,in:犜犺犲犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犆犺犪犻狉犃狀狀狌犪犾犛犲犿犻狀犪犾,Paris:MERCOSURChair
ofSciencePo.
Venables,A.J.(2003),WinnersandLosersfromRegionalIntegrationAgreements,in:
犈犮狅狀狅犿犻犮犑狅狌狉狀犪犾,113,747761.
Venables,A.J.(2005),犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犇犻狊狆犪狉犻狋犻犲狊犻狀犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犅犾狅犮狊:犜犺犲狅狉狔犪狀犱犘狅犾犻犮狔,
Brazil:IADB.
! 301
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉7
犗狆狆狅狉狋狌狀犻狋犻犲狊犪狀犱犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犉犪犮犻狀犵犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
犻狀狋犺犲犆狅狀狋犲狓狋狅犳狋犺犲犉犻狀犪狀犮犻犪犾犆狉犻狊犻狊
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1.犗狏犲狉狏犻犲狑狅犳犈犮狅狀狅犿犻犮犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
1.1!BilateralTradeRelations
TraderelationsbetweenthePeoplesRepublicofChinaand member
countriesoftheSouthAmericanCommonMarket(MERCOSUR)datebackto
the1950s.Intheearly1960s,whenChinawasexperiencinggreatdifficulties,
grainmerchantsinArgentinadefiedtheeconomicembargoimposedbyWestern
countriesonChinatoconductconsiderablegraintransactionswithChina,
showingcouragewhichhassincebecomeafamiliartaleintheSinoLatin
Americantradecommunity.
Forhistoricalreasons,suchasalackofformaldiplomaticrelations,the
isolationofChinaseconomy,andthesufferingsoftheGreatLeapForwardand
theCulturalRevolutionbeforetheadoptionofamoreopenpolicy,tradebetween
ChinaandSouthAmericancountriesremainedatalowlevelforalongtime.As
lateastheearly1990s,tradebetweenChinaandMERCOSURstoodatamere
USD800million(1991).Despitetheaccelerationingrowth,itwasstillless
thanUSD5billionin2000.Inthelastdecadeofthetwentiethcentury,average
annualtradebetweenthetwopartieswasamereUSD2.7billion.Inthefirst
twoyearsofthetwentyfirstcentury,LatinAmericasufferedfromtheUS
economicrecession,whichkeptthegrowthrateofbilateraltradebetweenChina
andMERCOSURonaparwiththepreviousdecade.Itisonlyinthepastsix
yearsthattradebetweenChinaandMERCOSURhasgrownsubstantially.1
Between2003and2008,tradebetweenChinaandMERCOSURgrew
rapidly.In2003,bilateraltradeexceededUSD10billionforthefirsttime.
302 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Afterthat,itgrewatanannual49.7percenttoreachUSD65billionin
2008,7.9percenthigherthantheaveragetradegrowthbetweenChinaand
LatinAmerica.Duringthisperiod,ChinasexportstoMERCOSURgrewfrom
lessthanUSD3billiontoapproximatelyUSD25.6billion,atanannual
growthrateof48percent,7.6percenthigherthanChinasaverageannual
exportstoLatinAmerica.Chinasimportsfrom MERCOSURalsoshotup,
fromlessthanUSD9billiontooverUSD39billion,atanannualgrowthrate
of47.2percent,2.5percenthigherthanChinasaverageannualimports
fromLatinAmerica.
犜犪犫犾犲1 犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚20032008(犝犛犇100犿犻犾犾犻狅狀)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ExportsfromChina 28.46 49.71 66.88 101.14 160.2 255.59
ImportsintoChina 86.62 121.07 140.21 169.44 250.3 397.54
Totaltradevolume 115.08 170.78 207.09 270.58 410.5 653.13
Source:GeneralAdministrationofCustomsofPRChina2009.
Accordingtothe GeneralAdministrationofCustomsofthePeoples
RepublicofChina,sincethebeginningofthenewcentury,Chinasexportsto
MERCOSURhaveaccountedforanaverageof32percentofitstotalexportsto
LatinAmerica,andChinasimportsfrom MERCOSURhaveaccountedforan
averageof58 percentofitsimportsfrom Latin America.Therefore,
MERCOSURconstitutesamajorsourceofimportsforChina.
ChinaslargesttradepartnersinMERCOSURarethetwolargestmember
countries:Braziland Argentina.In2008,Chinasexportsto Braziland
Argentinaaccountedfor73percentand20percentoftotalexportsto
MERCOSUR,respectively,oratotalof93percent.ChinasimportsfromBrazil
andArgentinaaccountedfor75percentand23percentoftotalimportsfrom
MERCOSUR,respectively,oratotalof98percent.
Trade between China and the two smallest member countries of
MERCUSORislow,however.In2008,Chinasexportsto Uruguayand
ParaguaystoodatUSD1.012billionandUSD759million,respectively,or4per
centand3percentofChinastotalexportstoMERCOSUR.Inthesameyear,
ChinasimportsfromUruguayandParaguaywereUSD624millionandUSD25
million,respectively,or1.6percentand0.1percentofChinastotalimports
fromMERCOSUR.
Chinasmainexportsto MERCOSUR areelectromechanicalproducts,
OpportunitiesandChallengesFacingChinaandMERCOSURintheContextoftheFinancialCrisis 303
chemicalproducts,basemetalsandmanufacturedgoods.Themainimportsinto
Chinaareminerals,forestryproductsandanimalhusbandryproducts.According
itsofficialstatistics,BrazilmainlyexportstoChinamineralsandplantproducts,
andimportsfromChinamainlyelectromechanicalproducts,chemicalproducts,
basemetalsandmanufacturedgoods.Chinaismaintainingitsleadershipinthe
exportoflabourintensiveproducts.Itstextileproductsandraw materials,
furnitureandtoys,lightindustryproductssuchasshoes,bootsandumbrellas
rank,respectively,fourth,ninthandtenthinBrazilsHarmonisedSystem(HS)
categoryofimportsfromChina,accountingfor36.6percent,45.2percentand
70.5percent,respectively.
AccordingtoofficialArgentinestatistics,ArgentinaexportstoChinamainly
plantproducts,especiallyoilseeds,plantandanimalgrease,mineralsand
leatherproducts.Argentinaimportsfrom China mainlyelectromechanical
products,chemicalproducts,transportationequipment,textileproductsandraw
materials.
Sincethebeginningofthetwentyfirstcentury,theshareofSinoLatin
AmericantradeinChinasforeigntradehasrisensignificantly,fromabout3per
centto6percent.LatinAmericahasbecomeoneofChinasmostimportant
tradingpartners.Mutualcomplementarity,mutualbenefitsandreciprocity
characterisethepartnership.MERCOSURhascontributedgreatlytotherapid
growthinSinoAmericantrade.BrazilisChinaslargesttradingpartnerinLatin
America,andinApril2009ChinabecameBrazilslargesttradingpartnerforthe
firsttime.ArgentinaisChinasfourthlargesttradingpartnerinLatinAmerica.
ChinaisArgentinaslargesttradingpartner,secondlargestexportmarketand
thirdlargestsourceofimports.
1.2!SubstantialProgressinEconomicandTechnologicalCooperationwithChina:TheCasesofBrazil,ArgentinaandUruguay
犛犻狀狅犅狉犪狕犻犾犻犪狀犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
Chinaisthemostpopulousdevelopingcountryintheworld,whileBrazilis
the mostpopulousdevelopingcountryinthe Western hemisphere.Both
economiesaregrowingrapidly.Owingtothelateestablishmentofdiplomatic
relationsandapolicyonbothsidesoftreatingdevelopedcountriesastheir
diplomaticpriority,investmentandeconomiccooperationbetweenthetwo
countriesstartedratherlate.However,inthepastfiveyears,thenumberof
economiccooperationprojectsbetweenthetwocountrieshasbeenincreasing,as
hasthesizeofinvestments.
ChinastartedeconomiccooperationwithBrazilin1984,firstintheformof
304 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
projectcontractsandexportoflabourservices.Successfullycompletedprojects
includeaerialsurveysforBrazilsterritorialmanagementandportdredging.By
October2008,ChinahadsignedUSD3.3billionworthoflabourservicesand
designconsultancycontracts,withUSD2.09billionalreadyrealised.
AccordingtoChineseMinistryofCommercedata,bytheendofSeptember
2008,ChinasnonfinancialsectordirectinvestmentsinBrazilamountedtoUSD
210million,mainlyintheareasofmining,timberprocessing,motorcycle
manufacturingandhouseapplianceassembly.ByOctober2008,447Brazilian
investedforeignenterpriseshadbeensetupinChina,withatotalinvestmentofUSD
270million,mainlyintheareasofregionalaircraftmanufacturing,compressor
manufacturing,coal,realestate,carpartsmanufacturing,hydropower,textilesand
garments(ChineseMinistryofCommerce2010).
Largecompaniesonbothsidesareshowinganinterestinformingalliances.
BaoSteelinShanghaiformedajointventurewithBrazilsCompanhiaValedoRio
Doce(CVRD),theworldslargestironoreproducerandexporter,tooperate
minesandsteelmillsinBrazil.Chinalcosignedaframeworkagreementwith
CVRDtobuildanaluminaplantinBrazilwithanannualcapacityof1.8million
tonnes.SinopecsignedaframeworkagreementwithBrazilsPetrobrastoexplore
andexploitoilandnaturalgasinBrazilorathirdcountry.Theregionalaircraft
productionlinein Harbin,ajointventurebetweenEmpresaBrasileirade
Aeronutica(EMBRAER)andChinaAviationIndustryCorporationI I(AVIC
I I),wasputintooperationin2003.LargenationalorprivatebanksfromBrazil
havealsosetuprepresentativeofficesinChinatoprovidefinancialservicesto
companiesinbothcountries.
TheSinoBrazilian Earth Resources Satellite Projecthasbeen going
smoothlysinceitscommencementin1988.Bytheendof2007,thecollaboration
betweentwocountrieshadresultedinresearchanddevelopment(R&D),aswell
asthelaunchingofthreeearthresourcessatellites,thedatagatheredbywhich
areprovidedfreetootherdevelopingcountries.Twomoresatellitesaretobe
launchedbefore2013.InJanuary2009,theFederalUniversityofRiodeJaneiro
setuptheBrazilChinaCentreofInnovativeTechnologyResearchtogetherwith
TsinghuaUniversitytoconductresearchonglobalclimatechangeandenergy
security.Chinaalsoisplayinganincreasinglyimportantrolein Brazils
infrastructureanddeepseaoilexploration.
DuringthevisitbyBrazilianPresidentLuladeSilvatoChinainMay2009,
thetwocountriesagreedtofurtherdiversifytheirbilateraltradestructureandto
increasebilateraltradevolumes.Inthecontextofthecurrentglobalfinancial
crisis,theyalsoagreedtodeepencooperationincustoms,animalandplant
OpportunitiesandChallengesFacingChinaandMERCOSURintheContextoftheFinancialCrisis 305
inspectionandquarantine,toremoveobstaclesintheabovementionedareasand
tofacilitateandsecurebilateraltrade.Bothsidesarecommittedtolaunching
initiativestoencourageandsupport mutualinvestmentinsuchareasas
infrastructure,energy,minerals,agricultureandindustry,especiallyinhigh
techandbiofuels.ThefruitfuleconomiccooperationbetweenChinaandBrazil
hasbecomearolemodelforSouthSouthcooperation.
犛犻狀狅犃狉犵犲狀狋犻狀犲犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
SimilarprogresshasbeenmadeineconomiccooperationbetweenChinaand
anothermajorMERCOSURcountry,Argentina.WhenChinesePresidentHu
Jintaovisited Argentinain November2004,thetwocountriesreacheda
consensusontheestablishmentanddevelopmentofastrategicpartnership.The
ArgentinegovernmentrecognisedChinasmarketeconomystatus.Thetwosides
signedtheFrameworkAgreementbetweenChinaandArgentinaonCooperation
in the Peaceful Utilisation of Space Technology,a Memorandum of
Understanding(MOU)ontheImplementationPlanofChineseTouristGroupsto
Argentina,anMOUonCooperationintheRailwayProjectandanMOUonthe
EnhancementofExchangeandCooperationintheFieldofEducation.
Whenitcomestothecommercialisationofsatelliteimagery,Argentinacan
provideawealthofsatelliteimagesfortheuseofagriculture,forestry,banks
andinsurancecompanies,municipalplanning,oilandgas,aswellasmine
exploration.The Federal Society for Applied Research (Investigaciones
AplicadasSociedaddelEstado,INVAP),awellestablishedcompanyinthis
area,islookingforwardtocooperatingwithChina.
Owingtothelackofinvestmentaftertheprivatisationofenergycompaniesin
Argentina,needsforoilandgasstorage,warehousingandtransportationcanhardlybe
met.Inordertotackletheproblemfromthegroundup,theArgentinegovernment
developedanewenergystrategyandimplementedaseriesofmeasures,includingthe
establishmentofagovernmentledenergyjointventure,EnergíaArgentinaSociedad
Anónima(Enarsa).ThiscompanybelievesthatChineseoilcompanieshavesufficient
capitalandtechnologytoparticipateinoilandgasexplorationandexploitationin
Argentina.IthopestocooperatewithitsChinesecounterparts.
InJuly2008,CherySocmaS.A.,ajointventureformedbypartnersfrom
China,ArgentinaandUruguay,announcedthattheentryintotheArgentine
marketoftheCheryTiggosassembledinUruguayhadmetwithconsiderable
success.Bycooperatingactivelywithlocalcompanies,Cheryisgrowingtogether
withitsforeignpartners,tothebenefitofbothparties.
Thecasespresentedhereshowclearlythedynamicofbilateraleconomic
306 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
cooperation.AccordingtotheChineseMinistryofCommerce,byJune2008,
ChinasaccumulatednonfinancialsectorinvestmentinArgentinaamountedto
USD172million.ChineseinvestmentinArgentinafocusesonmanufacturing,
navigation,resourceexploitation,importsandexports.Chinesecompanies
startedtoundertakeprojectsin1985.ByOctober2008,Chinesecompanieshad
landedprojectandlabourservicescontractsinArgentinaworthUSD530million
andachievedaturnoverofUSD594million.ByOctober2008,therewere386
ArgentineinvestedcompaniesinChina,withatotalcontractedinvestmentof
USD481millionandatotalrealisedinvestmentofUSD158million(Chinese
MinistryofCommerce2010).
犛犻狀狅犝狉狌犵狌犪狔犪狀犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
EconomiccooperationbetweenChinaandUruguayhasbeenwideranging.
TherehasbeenfriendlycooperationbetweenChinaandUruguayinagriculture,
includingsmallscalecooperationinricegrowingandviniculture,andinpickup
truckassembly.
In2004,HuaweiofChinasignedaletterofintentoncooperationwith
UruguaysstateownedtelecommunicationscompanyAdministraciónNacionalde
Telecomunicaciones(ANTEL)tobuildanexperimental3Gmobilecommunica
tionnetwork(WidebandCodeDivisionMultipleAccess,WCDMA)inUruguay.
InJuly2005,thenetworkwasofficiallyputintooperation.Itsupportssuch
valueaddingmobilephoneservicesasvideoconferencing,webTVandInternet
access,coveringmostofUruguayscapital,Montevideo.Itisthefirst3Gmobile
phonenetworkinLatinAmerica.
In2007,CherySocmaS.A,setupaplantinUruguaytoproducemotor
vehicles.ItisthefirstoverseasjointventureforChery,anditslargest
investment.In May2008,thecommissioningoftheproductionline was
complete,andthefirstbatchofCheryTiggosrolledofftheline.Carsmadeby
thisplantaresoldmainlyinArgentinaandUruguay.
InJanuary2008,UruguaysMinistryofInternalAffairssignedapublicsecurity
projectcontractwithZhongXingTelecommunicationEquipmentCompanyLimited
(ZTE)ofChina.Thiscontractcoversninesystems,includingemergencyresponse,
datatransferandVoiceoverInternetProtocol(VoIP)videomonitoring.Oncethe
projectiscompleted,theinfrastructureoftheMinistryofInternalAffairswillbe
greatlyenhanced,makingintegratedcommandandrapidresponsepossible,providing
effectivetechnicalbackupforemergencies.ZTEisresponsibleforequipmentsupply,
installation,trainingandaftersalesservice.
TheChinesegovernmentalsohelpsUruguaytotrainmanagersandtechnology
OpportunitiesandChallengesFacingChinaandMERCOSURintheContextoftheFinancialCrisis 307
experts.Inthepast20years,Uruguayhassentasubstantialnumberofofficialsand
technologicalprofessionalstotailormadetrainingcoursesinChina.
OntheUruguayanside,in2006,FrigorificoCanelones,thelargestmeat
refrigerationcompanyinUruguay,obtainedapprovaltosetupChinasfirst
whollyforeignownedmeatimportingbusiness.Thisnewcompanysold25
tonnesofmeatinasinglemonthinShanghai.Itsmajorclientsaretophotelsand
restaurants.Uruguayanbusinesseshavealsosetupwhollyownedcompaniesor
jointventuresinBeijing,TianjinandLiaoning.
2.犃犖犲狑犛狋犪犵犲狅犳犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋牶犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犉犪犮犻狀犵犛犻狀狅犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犜狉犪犱犲
ThefinancialcrisistriggeredbythesubprimecrisisinSeptember2008has
hadanenormousnegativeimpactontheglobaleconomy.China,anactive
participantineconomicglobalisation,hasnotbeenspared.BetweenNovember
2008andJune2009,Chinasforeigntradewentdownforeightconsecutive
months,whichwasunprecedentedinits60yearhistory.SinoLatinAmerican
trade,whichhadbeengrowingrapidlyuntilDecember2008,alsofelldrastically
duringthefirstfourmonthsof2009.Moreover,thefallwasmuchgreaterthan
averageinChinasforeigntradeduringthesameperiod.
Inthefirstfourmonthsof2009,tradebetweenChinaandthetwomajor
MERCOSURcountries,BrazilandArgentina,alsowentdown.Liketrade
betweenChinaandmostothercountriesorregionsintheworld,asaresultof
thefinancialcrisistradebetweenChinaandMERCOSURendedsixyearsofhigh
growth.Anewstageofgrowthhasbegun,however.
Chinaexportsmainlymanufacturedgoods,whileimportingprimaryproducts.
Althoughthisisdeterminedbytheeconomicstructureofbothsides,aswellassupply
anddemand,thereismorepotentialtobetappedinbilateraltrade.
ChinahasatradedeficitwithMERCOSUR.Inthefirsteightyearsofthetwenty
firstcentury,itsexport/importratioaveraged0.54,orapproximately1∶2.
犜犪犫犾犲2 犛犻狀狅犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犜狉犪犱犲犅犪犾犪狀犮犲,20032008(犝犛犇100犿犻犾犾犻狅狀)
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Imports/Exports -58.16 -71.36 -73.33 -68.3 -90.1 -141.95
Exports/Imports 0.68 0.48 0.33 0.43 0.50 0.60
Source:GeneralAdministrationofCustomsofPRChina2009.
ChinahashadatradedeficitwithBrazilforalongtime.Inthepastnine
308 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
years,thedeficithasincreasedfromUSD397million(2000)toUSD11billion
(2008).TheratiobetweenChinasexportstoBrazilanditsimportsfromBrazil
peakedat0.76(2000)andbottomedoutatamere0.37(2003).
犜犪犫犾犲3 犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犅狉犪狕犻犾(犝犛犇100犿犻犾犾犻狅狀)
Year Exports Imports ExportsImports ExportsImports
2000 12.24 16.21 -3.97 0.76
2001 13.51 23.47 -9.96 0.58
2002 14.66 30.03 -15.37 0.49
2003 21.45 58.44 -36.99 0.37
2004 36.75 86.84 -50.09 0.42
2005 48.28 99.89 -51.61 0.48
2006 73.8 129.2 -55.40 0.57
2007 113.72 183.33 -69.61 0.62
2008 187.5 297.5 -110.00 0.63
Source:GeneralAdministrationofCustomsofPRChina2009.
Inthepastnineyears,thetradedeficitbetweenChinaandArgentinahas
risenfrom USD120million(2000)toUSD4.32billion(2008).Theratio
betweenChinasexportsandimportsfromArgentinapeakedat0.87(2000)and
bottomedoutatamere0.15(2002),beforerisingstronglyagain(Table4).
犜犪犫犾犲4 犜狉犪犱犲犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犃狉犵犲狀狋犻狀犪(犝犛犇100犿犻犾犾犻狅狀)
Year Exports Imports ExportsImports ExportsImports
2000 8.10 9.30 -1.20 0.87
2001 5.74 12.81 -7.07 0.45
2002 1.80 12.40 -10.60 0.15
2003 4.47 27.29 -22.82 0.16
2004 8.52 32.55 -24.03 0.26
2005 13.25 37.99 -24.74 0.35
2006 20.04 37.00 -16.96 0.54
2007 35.67 63.35 -27.68 0.56
2008 50.40 93.60 -43.20 0.54
Source:GeneralAdministrationofCustomsofPRChina2009.
OpportunitiesandChallengesFacingChinaandMERCOSURintheContextoftheFinancialCrisis 309
DuringtheyearsinwhichSinoMERCOSURtradewasgrowingrapidly,the
pricesofprimaryproductsintheinternationalmarketroseconsiderably.In
particular,crudeoilpricesrosedramaticallyfromthefirsthalfof2008,peaking
atUSD150perbarrel.Thepriceofgrainandmetalsroseseveraltimesinthe
sameperiod.Meanwhile,thepricesofmanufacturedgoodsexperiencedageneral
downturn.Freightratesshotupasoilpricesrose.Theimpactofsuchprice
differentialshasbeendeeplyfeltbyChinesecompanieswhospecialiseinthe
productionoflabourintensivegoodswithalowtechnologycontent.
TherapidgrowthofSinoMERCOSURtraderesultedinagreatdealof
friction.AccordingtotheWTO,inthefirst14yearsafteritsestablishment
(19952008),ArgentinaandBrazilinstituted,respectively,61and37anti
dumpinginvestigationsagainstChineseproducts,accountingfor9percentand
5.5percentofsuchinvestigationsbyWTOmembers.Duringthesameperiod,
ArgentinaandBrazilimposed,respectively,40and21antidumpingmeasureson
Chineseproducts,accountingfor8.4percentand4.4percentofsuchmeasures
byWTOmembers(WTO2008).
Generallyspeaking,those WTO membersthatinstituteantidumping
investigationsorimposeantidumping measureshaverelativelylargetrade
deficits.However,BrazilandArgentinahavehugesurplusesintheirtradewith
China.AlthoughbothcountrieshaverecognisedChinasmarketeconomystatus,
theyhavenotreducedantidumpinginvestigationsormeasuresagainstChina.
Instead,theyhaveaddedantisubsidyandsafeguardmeasurestothepackage.
Sincetheoutbreakofthefinancialcrisis,therehasbeenasurgeinthese
activities,includingbothshorttermandlongtermmeasures.Therefore,trade
protectionismremainsfairlystronginMERCOSUR.
TherehasbeenanimbalanceinthegrowthofSinoMERCOSURinvestment.
ChinasinvestmentinMERCOSURisrelativelysmall,andChinesecompaniesdonot
thinkthattheinvestmentenvironmentinSouthAmericaisideal.AlthoughSouth
Americancountriesclaimtheyencourageforeigndirectinvestment,theentrybarriers
areveryhigh.Lowefficiency,poorinfrastructure,strongtradeunionsandhuge
culturaldifferencesmakeiteventougherforChinesecompaniestoinvestin
SouthAmerica.Ontheotherhand,Chinesecompaniesstillhavesomewaytogo
indevelopingtheircapabilitiesfor“goinginternational”.Theymustfurther
improvehumanresources,capitalandmanagementexpertise.
3.犘狅狋犲狀狋犻犪犾犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋狊犻狀狋犺犲犠犪犽犲狅犳狋犺犲犉犻狀犪狀犮犻犪犾犆狉犻狊犻狊
Althoughthefinancialcrisiswasgenerallyunexpected,retrospectivelyits
310 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
occurrenceisperfectlylogical.ItisnocoincidencethatSinoMERCOSURtradefell
drasticallyfromJanuary2009.ThehighgrowthperiodinSinoMERCOSURtradehas
givenplacetoanewphase.Thefinancialcrisisposesbothseverechallengesandrare
opportunitiesforthefurtherdevelopmentofSinoMERCOSURtrade.Onbalance,
therearemorefavourablethanunfavourableconditions.
3.1!FavourableConditions
Together,ChinaandMERCOSURconstituteahugemarketcoveringawide
area,andwithrichresourcesandahugepopulation.Bilateraleconomicand
tradecooperationbenefitfromsolidfoundations:Chinahasformaldiplomatic
relationswiththreeoutofthefourMERCOSURcountries:Brazil,Argentina
andUruguay.Therearehealthypolitical,economicandculturalrelations,and
nofundamentalconflictsofinterest.Althoughtherearenoformaldiplomatic
relationsbetweenChinaandParaguay,tradehasalreadystarted.Thereisevery
prospectthatChinaandMERCOSURwilldeveloptheireconomicandtrade
relations.Itisintheinterestofthepeopleonbothsides,aswellasfromthe
pointofviewofcooperationbetweendevelopingcountries.
Chinahassigned,withBrazil,ArgentinaandUruguay,theintergovernmental
tradeagreement,andagreementsoneconomicandtechnicalcooperationandonocean
goingshipping,aswellasonencouragingandprotectingmutualinvestments.In
addition,China hassigned MOUs withthethreecountries onfishery
cooperation,tourismcooperationandloanagreements,aswellasonenergy
cooperation.
Chinahasalsoestablishedanintergovernmentalcommitteeoneconomyand
tradewithBrazil,ArgentinaandUruguaytocoordinatethedevelopmentof
bilateraleconomicandtraderelations.Atthesametime,ChinasNational
DevelopmentandReform Commission,MinistryofCommerce,Ministryof
Agriculture,MinistryofHealth,MinistryofTransportation,Ministryofthe
InformationIndustry,GeneralAdministrationofQualitySupervision,Inspection
andQuarantine,NationalTourismAdministration,CouncilforthePromotionof
InternationalTrade,theBankofChinaandtheExportImportBankofChina
haveestablishedcooperationwiththeircounterpartsinthethreecountries.
Inrecentyears,SouthAmericancountriessuchasBrazilandArgentinahave
attachedgrowingimportancetoAsianmarketssuchasChinaandIndia.Their
enthusiasm for expanding economic and trade relations with China is
unprecedented.TheirtraderelationswithEastAsiancountrieshavebeen
intensified.
Theoutbreakofthefinancialcrisisheraldsamajorchangeineconomic
OpportunitiesandChallengesFacingChinaandMERCOSURintheContextoftheFinancialCrisis 311
globalisationfollowingover20yearsrapidgrowth.Atthesametime,itexposes
someunderlyingproblemsintheeconomicdevelopmentofdevelopingcountries,
includingChinaandMERCOSURmembers.Fromthisperspective,thefinancial
crisismaybegoodnewsforChinaandMERCOSUR,sinceitprovidesthelatter
withastrategicopportunitytochangetheirgrowth modeand maketheir
economicrelationsmoresustainable.
3.2!SuggestionsfortheNearFuture
Anopen,equitableandmultilateraltrademechanismisconducivetothe
healthygrowthoftheworldeconomy.ChinaandMERCOSURshouldmaintaina
steadfastcommitmenttothemultilateraltrademechanism,supporttheDoha
Roundtalks,resisttradeprotectionismandpromotetheearlyresumptionofthe
DohaRoundtalksandacomprehensive,wellbalancedoutcome.
Freetradezonesrepresentanimportantsupplementtothemultilateraltrade
mechanism.ThesuccessfulconclusionoffreetradeagreementsbetweenChina
andLatinAmericancountriesprovidesbothfavourableconditionsandvaluable
lessonsforChinaandMERCOSURandshouldencouragethemtostartsimilar
negotiationsintheneartomediumterm.Wesuggestthatsuchnegotiationsstart
asearlyaspossible,sothatcrosscontinentfreetradezonescanbeestablished.
Confrontedbythefinancialcrisis,ChinaandLatinAmericancountries
shouldgiveprioritytostrengtheningfinancialcooperation,soastomitigatethe
negativeimpactofthefinancialcrisisonbilateraltrade.Theliquiditysqueeze
causedbytherampagingglobalfinancialcrisishasalreadycreatedgreat
difficultiesfortheexportorientedtradesystemsinAsiaandLatinAmerica.
Exportshavefallendramatically.ExchangeratesfluctuateagainsttheUSdollar
andriskisgrowingininternationaltrade.Manyinitiativescouldbelaunched,
includingnegotiationsoncurrencyswapagreements.
Currencyswapsareakindofforeignexchangeagreementbetweentwo
countriestoavoidexchangeraterisks.Afteracertainperiodoftimeanda
certainquantityofexchangeshaveoccurred,thecentralbanksofthetwo
countriessettleup.By meansofsuch mechanisms,tradingorexporting
businessesinthetwocountriescanreceivepaymentsintheirdomesticcurrency,
therebybenefitingbybothavoidingexchangeraterisksandreductionsin
currencyconversioncharges.Partiesinacurrencyswapusuallyagreeona
quota.Oncetheswaphasbeenlaunched,thetwocountriescanprovideshort
termliquiditysupportforeachotherbyexchanginglocalcurrencies,thereby
facilitatingfinancing between localcommercial banks and theirforeign
counterparts,promotingbilateraltrade.
312 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Shortlyaftertheoutbreakofthefinancialcrisis,BrazilandArgentina
activatedalocalcurrencysettlementsystemintheirbilateraltradeinOctober
2008.Theyalsoplantoextendthesystem—whichaimsateliminatingtheUS
dollarasvehiclecurrency—totherestofMERCOSUR,therebyoffsettingimport
limitsimposedbyanumberofcountriesthatlackUSdollarreserves.
StartinginDecember2008,Chinasignedcurrencyswapagreementswiththe
monetaryauthoritiesinSouthKorea,Malaysia,IndonesiaandBelarus,the
ChinamainlandalsosignedcurrencyswapagreementwithHongKong.On29
March2009,ChinasignedaRMB70billion(USD10.25billion)framework
currencyswapagreementwithArgentina,thefirstofitskind—andalsothe
largestfinancialdeal—betweenChinaandaLatinAmericancountry.Bytheend
ofMarch2009,currencyswapagreementsbetweenChinaandothercountriesor
regionsamountedtoRMB650billion,about5percentofChinasforeign
reserves(Xinhuanet2009).
Atpresent,USdollarsarecommonlyusedininternationaltrade.Countries
notonlysettletheirtradeinUSdollars,butalsokeepUSdollarsasforeign
reserves.Thesubprimecrisisdealtablowtotheeconomyofcountrieswithlarge
USdollarforeignreserves.InordertoensurefurthergrowthofSinoLatin
Americaneconomicandtraderelations,ChinaanditsmajorLatinAmerican
partnercountriesshouldstrengtheneffectivecooperationinthefinancialsector,
includingthenegotiationandsigningofcurrencyswapagreements.
Duringthenewstageofgrowth,ChinaandMERCOSURshouldtrytheir
besttotapintothepotentialofservicetradeaswellastradeingoods.Service
tradebetweenChinaandMERCOSURisnewbutexciting.Forexample,large
companiesfrom ChinaandBrazilhavejoinedhandsinmetallurgy,mining,
energy,aviation,aerospaceandfinance,achievingsatisfactoryresultswhich
indicatethehugepotentialofcooperationbetweenthetwosidesinhigh
technologyandservicetrade.
Havingrelativelydevelopedeconomies,BrazilandArgentinaenjoydistinct
advantagesinautomobiles,metallurgy,minerals,nuclearpower,medicine,
finance,insurance,tourism,educationandinvestment.Theyarewellplacedto
intensifycooperationwithChinesecompaniesintheseareas.
TheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeandits
KyotoProtocoldemandthatcountriesadheretotheprincipleofcommonbut
differentiatedresponsibilities,activelyimplementtheBaliRoadmaptalksand
adopteffectivemeasurestomitigateclimatechangethatareinlinewiththeir
particularcircumstances.Forestprotectionisanimportant partofthe
cooperationagainstclimatechange.In2007,ChinaproposedtheAsiaPacific
OpportunitiesandChallengesFacingChinaandMERCOSURintheContextoftheFinancialCrisis 313
NetworkforSustainableForestManagementandRehabilitationinitiative,in
whichbothChinaandMERCOSURcanplayimportantroles.
Sinceitisoftenbeyondthecapabilitiesofonecountrytocopewithacatastrophic
naturaldisaster,supportfromtheinternationalcommunityisneeded.In2008,China
putforwardthe“BasicPrincipleforDealingwithDisastersandCooperation
withintheAPEC”withaviewtostrengtheningexchangeandcooperationinthis
areaintheAsiaPacificregion.ChinaandMERCOSURcouldconsidersome
longtermcooperationprojectsinpostdisasterconstruction.
Foodandenergysecurityisvitalnotonlytotheeconomyandlife,butalso
globaldevelopmentandsecurity.Asmajorfoodproducersandconsumers,China
andMERCOSURshouldtakeactivemeasurestoensureworldfoodandenergy
security.Bothsidesshouldattachgreatimportancetofoodproduction,increase
investment,relyonscienceandtechnology,increasefoodsupply,improvethe
foodtradeenvironment,establishafairandequitabletradesystemforfarmproduce,
strengthenmacrocontrol,curboverspeculationinthemarketandstabilisefoodprices.
Bothsidesshouldstrengthenmutuallybeneficialcooperationinenergydevelopment,as
wellaspolicycoordination,diversifyenergysupply,setupanadvancedsystemfor
thedevelopmentanddisseminationofenergytechnologyandadvocategreateruse
ofcleanenergyandrenewableenergy.
4.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
Beforethefinancialcrisis,economicandtraderelationsbetweenChinaand
MERCOSURhadtakenadvantageofeconomicglobalisationandgrownrapidly,
whichlaidasolidfoundationforthefurtherdevelopmentofstrategiccomplementarities
betweenthetwosides.Thefinancialcrisishashadaverynegativeimpactonthe
worldeconomy,includingChinaandMERCOSUR.Itisnotyetbehindus.
However,thankstotherelativelysolideconomicfoundationsinChinaand
MERCOSUR,aswellasthemeasurestakenimmediatelytoaddressthecrisis,
ChinaandMERCOSURarestillconfidentoffurtherdevelopingtheireconomic
andtraderelations,which willmakeaconstructivecontributionto world
economicrecovery.Chinaand MERCOSURshouldseizetheopportunities
presentedbythefinancialcrisis,strengthenanddeepenbilateralcooperationand
furthercontributetotherecoveryandstablegrowthoftheworldeconomy.
Notes
1.Unlessotherwisespecified,thetradedatareferredtointhischapterwerecollectedand
analysedbytheauthorbasedontheannualstatisticalyearbookofthe General
AdministrationofCustomsofPRChina.
314 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
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html(24September2010).
General Administration of Customs of PR China (2009),online:http://www.
chinacustomsstat.com/customsstat/,April2009.
Hu,Jintao(2008),“AdheringtotheConceptofOpeningUpandCooperation,Seeking
MutualBenefitsandWinWinResults,”Speechatthe16thAPECInformalLeadership
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WTO(2008),犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犜狉犪犱犲犛狋犪狋犻狊狋犻犮狊2008,online:http://www.wto.org(2September
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11110010.htm(1October2010).
书书书
CurrentandFutureCooperationundertheEUMERCOSURAgreement 315
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉8
犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犪狀犱犉狌狋狌狉犲犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀狌狀犱犲狉
狋犺犲犈犝犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犃犵狉犲犲犿犲狀狋
!"#$ %&'(
1.犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
TheSouthernCommonMarket(MERCOSUR)wasestablishedin1991bythe
TreatyofAsunción.TheOuroPretoProtocolof1994setoutitsinstitutionalstructure
inmoredetail.ItiscomposedofBrazil,Argentina,UruguayandParaguay.Without
muchvisibleimpact,BoliviaandChilejoinedMERCOSURin1996asassociate
members,followedbyPeruin2003andVenezuela,EcuadorandColombiain2004.
Venezuelaisnowintheprocessofbecomingafullmember.Biregionalrelationsbetween
theEuropeanUnion(EU)andMERCOSURarebasedonthe1995interregional
FrameworkCooperationAgreement,whichprovidesthebasisforpoliticaldialogueand
cooperationbetweenthetworegions.Inrecentyears,relationshavebeendominatedby
thedifficultprocessofnegotiationsonanAssociationAgreement,whichwerelaunchedin
2000buthavenotbeenconcluded.Followingthesuspensionoftradenegotiationsin20041
attherequestofMERCOSUR,whichwantedfirsttoseetheoutcomeofthemultilateral
Doharound,relationshaveundergoneasubstantialslowdown.
Somehavespokenof“neverstarting”ratherthan“neverending”negotiations.
Frustrationsonbothsideswithregardtoinsufficientorevenreducednegotiationoffers
haveledtofriction.Itdoesnotmatterwhoseperceptionismorecorrect,realityiswhat
eachsideperceivesassuch.However,sincetheendof2007,newimpetuswasinjected
ThischaptertakesuppartsofshortspeakingpointsinitiallymadebymycolleagueBeatrizMartins,then
inchargeofMERCOSURattheDirectorateGeneralfortheExternalRelations(DGRELEX)ofthe
EuropeanCommission.However,responsibilityforthetextisentirelymineand,asusual,theviews
expressedinthischapterarethoseoftheauthorandshouldinnowaybeconsideredasexpressingthe
officialpositionoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionoranyofitsofficials.
316 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
intotherelationship,withaseriesofhighlevelvisitsandmeetingsatworkinglevel.
AttheEUMERCOSURsummitinLimainMay2008,thepartiesconfirmed“the
importanceofreachinganambitiousandbalancedAssociationAgreementandtheir
commitmenttocarrynegotiationsthroughtoasuccessfulconclusion”,adding“as
conditionspermit”.Similarannouncementsweremadebeforeandafter.TheEUhas
beenfrustratedthataftersuchhighlevelcommitments,noprogresswasvisiblewhen
negotiatorsmetagain.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthenewcommitmentsmadeatthe
IVEUMERCOSURSummiton17May2010inMadridwillfinallyleadtonew
advances(EUCouncildoc.9870/10).
Thetaskofthepresentchapterisnottodealwiththethornyissueofoverall
tradenegotiationsaimedatbiregionalfreetrade.However,someaspectsofthe
tradeissuemustbeoutlinedtobetterunderstandthepossibleevolutionof
biregionalcooperation.MERCOSURranksonlyeighthamongEUtrading
partners,withjust2.7percentoftotalEUtrade,whereastheEUaccountsfor
27percentofMERCOSURsexportsand20percentofitsimports.2EvenBrazil
isonlytheEUseleventhlargestmarket.AggregateEUinvestment,however,
exceedsEUstocksinChina,IndiaorevenJapan.EUinvestmentstandsoutin
nonprimarysectorsandisthereforecontributingmoretolocaladdedvalueand
jobs.SixtypercentofFDIisrelatedtoservices.Asamajorsourceoftrade
relatedassistance,theEUreinforcesthecompetitivenessofitscompetitors(EU
Councildoc.8695/09).Thenegotiationproblemsindicatea NorthSouth
cleavage.TheEU wantsacomprehensiveagreementwithresultsexceeding
thosetobereachedonthemultilaterallevel—a “Dohaplus”.Otherwise,
additionalandparallelnegotiationsonasubDoha,biregionallevelwouldnot
makemuchsense.LeadingCommissionfiguresaskedpubliclyin2007whether
anEUofferaslargeastheonemadeatthemultilaterallevelcouldreallybe
expectedinthisbiregionalcontext.Servicesrepresent70percentofGDPand
jobsintheEU,whichthushasanunderstandableinterestinfreetradeinthis
area.InMERCOSUR,theyrepresentlessthan20percent.Itwascalculated
thataFreeTradeAgreement(FTA)wouldaddEUR57billiontoservices;the
costofafailuretoreachagreementisoverEUR5billion,andnearlyEUR4
billioningoods.
InnegotiationswiththeEU,MERCOSURfocusesonagriculturalproducts,
andrelatedsubsidies.Understandably,thereareclearreasons—notalways
economicones—whyagricultureplayssuchadecisiverole.Butitisworth
stressingthattheEUisMERCOSURsprimarymarketforagriculturalexports.
Thereisawisesayinginbusinessthatyoudonotinsultyourbestclient.Inthe
CurrentandFutureCooperationundertheEUMERCOSURAgreement 317
Dohatalks,theEUofferedtocutitsfarmtariffsbymorethanhalf,reduce
domesticfarmsubsidiesby70percentandeliminateexportsubsidiesby2013,if
othersofferedsomethingsimilar.Itshouldalsobekeptinmindthat:
(1)achangeinexchangeratesandglobaldynamicscanhaveabigger
influencethanchangesintariffsandtariffquotas;
(2)manyweakerdevelopingcountrieshavecometoseetheBrazilianrequest
intheDoharoundoftotalliberalisationofagriculturaltradeasathreat
totheirown,lesscompetitiveproduction;
(3)meanwhilewithrisingglobaldemandforagriculturalproducts,therealissue
willbewhetherallproducerstogethercandeliverenough,nothowandhow
mucheachofthemsubsidisesitsexports.Thus,agricultureshouldhenceforth
belessofastumblingblock.
2.犜犺犲犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犛狋犪狋犲狅犳犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
Asthefourthlargesteconomicgroupintheworld,MERCOSURisthemost
potentareainLatinAmerica.However,itsintegrationprocesshasadvancedata
snailspace.AsstatedintheEuropeanCommissionsRegionalStrategyPaper
(200713:4),
MERCOSURhassufferedfromalackofpoliticalinvolvementandchanging
politicalpriorities,resultingindisparateprojects...Thelistofincrementalstepsis
impressive.However,theeconomicintegrationprocessisstillfarfromcomplete
andtradedisputesareendemic...Manyunilateraltrademeasureshavebeen
adoptedbyindividualmemberswithlittlepriorconsultationoftheothermembers,
leadingtoaperceivedsenseofdisillusionwithinthebloc,despitetheaffinityamong
themoderateleftwingpartiesinpowerinthreeofthefourMERCOSURstates.
(EuropeanCommissionsRegionalStrategyPaper:7)
Some,albeitlimited,progresshasbeenmadeinsettingupinstitutions,
suchasthe MERCOSUR Parliament,the TechnicalSecretariatandthe
MERCOSURCoreper.KeydecisionsonaMERCOSURcustomsunioncontinue
tobedelayed.Newinternaltradebarriershavebeenintroducedagainstother
MERCOSURmembers.MERCOSURisnotfunctioningasafullyfreetrade
area,asinternalbarriersarestillwidespread.Onlyasrecentlyas2010were
MERCOSURmembersabletoagreeontheabolitionofthedoubletariffson
importsfromthirdcountrieswhicharethenreexportedinsidethebloc.This
wasdisappointing,alsoforprogressinbiregionalnegotiations.Thusinternal
criticismof MERCOSUR hasincreasedfurther,sothatsomeclaim that
MERCOSURhasfailed:
(1)ForParaguaysPresidentFernandoLugo,“MERCOSURcomesofage
318 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
buthasnotyetgrownup”(BrazilandSouthernConereportJan.15,2009).
(2)Brazilseemswearyofandhasoutgrowntheorganisation;theprivate
sectorurgestheauthoritiestochooseadealwiththeEUovercontinuingin
MERCOSUR(BrazilandSouthernConereport,Jan.15,2009).
(3)SmallermembersUruguayandParaguaycontinuallycomplainthattheir
interestsarenottakenintoaccount.
(4)TensionswithinMERCOSURattheEURIOGroupministerialmeeting
inMay2009inPragueweresuchthatMERCOSURcouldnotagreeonthe
presenceoftheMERCOSUR“presidency”atapressconference.
(5)Thereisalackofastrongendogenousbaseforintegration,includinga
productionpatternfittingmoretheinterestsoftherich,lessbroadinternaldemand.
Intraregionaltradehasnotgrownasexpected.AccordingtofiguresfromEurostatand
theUNEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(CEPAL),the
intraregionalshareinoverallexportsofgoodsamountedin2007tojust13percentin
MERCOSUR,comparedtoEUfiguresofaround67percent.Chinahasalargershare
inBrazilsmarketthanArgentina(8.6percentvs.10.5percent),whileMexico
investedsomeUSD3billioninBrazilbetween2003and2007,ChileinvestedUSD869
million,andColombiainvestedUSD400million;ArgentinasFDItherewasamere
USD388million(MERCOSURabcMar.26,2009).
(6)MERCOSUR wasperceivedashavingdifficultiesinprovidingan
efficientframeworktopreventorsettleinternaldisputes.FelixPeasaid:“We
needtobuildaMERCOSURofpartners,notofhostages.”
(7)MERCOSURhassofarbeenunabletoestablishacommonstanceintheDoha
DevelopmentAgenda(DDA)negotiations.TheMERCOSUREuropeBusinessForum
(MEBF)hasrepeatedlyexpressedfrustration,regrettingthat“thecostsofinternal
coordinationofMERCOSURsnegotiatingpositionsgrewsignificantly”,anddenounced
“MERCOSURsinternaldynamicsas moreanobstaclethananincentivefor
negotiations”(ElPaisDec.25,2009).TheysawMERCOSURasjustaplatformfor
foreignpolicyposturing,andclaimeditiseasiertoexporttotheEU—recentlyaccused
ofbeinga“fortress”—thanwithinMERCOSUR.
3.犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犐狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀
Europeanintegrationisneitherauniversal“model”norperfect.Nevertheless,it
showsanumberofthingsthatareessentialforprogress,butmeanwhilealsothata
lackofpoliticalwillandseriousnesscanundoit.Itwasbuiltonastrong,sustained
politicalcommitment,theconstructionofajudicialsystemandsomesupranational
institutions,aswellascommonpoliciesandjointactions.Memberstatesusually
complywithit.JeanMonnetsaidthattogeneratenewideasyouneedpersons,butto
CurrentandFutureCooperationundertheEUMERCOSURAgreement 319
sustainthemyouneedinstitutions.TheEUsystemhasbeensufficientlyflexibleto
adaptitsadvancementtospecialcircumstances.Ithasmeanwhileexperienceda
considerablevarietyof“differentiatedintegration”,correspondingtoagrowing
varietyofbasicexperiences,politicalculturesandlongtermobjectives,from
enlargingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC)ofsixmemberstotheEU
of27membersoftoday.
MERCOSURsharessomeofthetypicalcharacteristics—onemightalsosay
weaknesses—ofotherLatinAmericaandCaribbean(LAC)schemesofregional
orsubregionalintegration(RI):
(1)aplethoraofconcepts morerapidlyreplacedbynew onesthan
implemented;
(2)alackofdefinitionandvision,withimprovisationastheresult;
(3)anexcessivedominanceofextraregionaltradeandslowimprovementof
intraregionaltrade,aswellasinequitabledistributionofbenefits;
(4)theabsenceofarealcommontradepolicy;
(5)limitedcoordinationofmacroeconomicpolicies;
(6)weaknationaland,evenmoreso,regionalinstitutionsandinsufficient
fundsforboth;and
(7)agrowingbeliefinsomecountriesthatregionalintegrationispartofthe
problem,butnotofthesolution(Caetano2009;RuedaJunquera2009;
Sukup2001).3
SometalkofLACasa“burialgroundforzombieintegrationschemes”.In
LatinAmerica,withitstraditionalstrongemphasisonnational“sovereignty”,it
takestimetounderstandthattherealproblemisnotthelossofsovereignty,but
thelossofinfluence—toseeregionalintegrationasaremedyandnotacauseof
decreasingnationalinfluence.Toacceptthatinamodernsocietyandglobal
world,actingsovereignlyalsomeansbeingableandwillingtodecideonthemost
efficientlevelatwhichtasksshouldbeperformed,whichsometimeswillbethe
regionalone.
Asaconsequence,theintergovernmentalconceptconcentratesdecisionstoo
muchonsummitsandishostagetounanimity,afaultthathasalsoplaguedthe
EUattimes.Pea,althougha “professionaloptimist”,seesariskofa
deteriorationofMERCOSURscredibilitybecauseoftheprecariousstateofits
procedures.Moreover,from1991until2007,only47percentofcommon
MERCOSURnorms weretransposedtonationallegalframeworks.Some
nationalcourtsstillhavedifficultyregardingandacceptingMERCOSURpolitical
orlegaldecisionsasguidingorbinding.Untilrecently,suchdecisionswerenot
evenregularlypublished.Thesituationprovokedseriousquestionsconcerning
320 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
whopaysfordamagesduetononimplementationofthejudgmentsofthe
MERCOSURTribunalPermanentedeRevision.AnewJusticeTribunalwas
agreedpolitically,buttofunctionitwouldneedchangesinsomenational
constitutions.
Butsomelessonshavebeenlearned.MERCOSURhasseentheweaknessofitsad
hocsystemsfortradedisputesettlement,butthenewTradePolicyReviewMechanism
(TPRM),createdin2004,hasyettoproveitsefficiency.Again,inflexiblepositions
onallegedriskstonationalsovereigntyblockprogress.Inaddition,theEUideaof
compensationandsolidarityfundshasmadesomegroundinLatinAmerica—for
example,theStructuralConvergenceFundMERCOSUR(FOCEM)—butitstillhas
insufficientresources(USD100million).
4.犆狌狉狉犲狀狋犈犝犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
CooperationwithMERCOSURusingfundsfromthebudgetoftheEuropean
Community(managedbytheCommission)startedin1991,notablyinsupportof
itsnewlyestablishedstructures.The20022006RegionalStrategyPaper(RSP)
provided,inadditiontobilateralCountryStrategyPapersandfunding,EUR48
millionto supportimplementation ofthe MERCOSUR internal market,
institutionalisationandcivilsociety.TheEUcontributed,certainlyalsoinits
owninterest,withtechnicalassistanceonthesettingofregionalstandardsand
procedures.Fortheperiod200713,withintheoverall“regionalindicative
programme”fortheMERCOSURarea(EUR556million=21percentofthe
globalallocationsforLatinAmerica),EUR50millionareearmarkedtofinance
MERCOSURintegrationprojectsinthreepriorityareas:
(1)strengtheninginstitutions(10percent),
(2)supportingintegrationandpreparingfortheimplementationofan
AssociationAgreement(70percent)and
(3)fosteringtheparticipationofcivilsocietyintheintegrationprocess,including
disseminatinginformationandincreasingitsvisibility(20percent).Thismakesthe
EUbyfarthelargestprovideroffinancialassistancefortheintegrationofMERCOSUR
(EuropeanCommission2007).
Politically,theEUcooperationprogrammewasdesignedontheassumption
thatMERCOSURwouldcontinuetostrengthenitsinstitutionsanddeepenits
integrationatasustainedpace.However,theprogrammeisexperiencing
difficultieswithregardtopolitical,technicalandadministrativeimplementation.
ThereisnoMERCOSURinstitutionwhichcouldbethepartnerorbeneficiaryof
theProgramme.Eachprojectismanagedasanadhocarrangementwitha
nationalagency,whichthenactsasthecoordinatorwithinMERCOSUR.This
CurrentandFutureCooperationundertheEUMERCOSURAgreement 321
processiscomplicatedanddifficult.Recently,EUsupporttoFOCEMandthe
MERCOSURtribunalhadtobedecommittedduetoMERCOSURswithdrawal
fromcertainprojects.
Theideaofauthenticintegrationsecretariatswithindependentcivilservants
hasnottakenhold.Asecretariatwithjustahandfulofhigherofficials,30staff
altogetherandabudgetofonlyUSD1million,asinMERCOSUR,issimplynot
capableofpromotingintegration.Atbest,itcanprovidetechnicalassistancefor
intergovernmentalprocedures.EUcooperationwithMERCOSURinstitutions
andplayers,aswellasstandardsettingiswelcome.TheEUhasaroleas
tentative“externalfederator”.Sincetheearly1990s,theEUhasbeenalong
termandimportantsourceforthestafftrainingofallLatinAmericanintegration
schemes,including MERCOSURsprotemporepresidencies,itsembryonic
Parliamentandthejointparliamentarycommittee,aswellasthePermanent
Review Tribunal.TheEU hashelpedto modernisecustomsprocedures,
statisticsandsanitaryandphytosanitarystandards,amongotherthings.Thisis
somewhatastonishinginrelationtocountries,mostlyinthemiddleincome
category,whicharesoproudoftheir“sovereignty”.Theoutcomeofthe2010
midtermreviewprocessremainstobeseen.
5.犈犝犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚—犠犺犻犮犺犠犪狔犃犺犲犪犱?
AskedwhethertheygiveMERCOSURandbiregionalnegotiationsmuch
chance,someanswerwiththeBavariansaying:“Idswear,butIdneverbeton
it!”TheEUisunlikelytosharethedesperationoftheParaguayanForeign
Ministerthatthegroupisina“terminalstate”(OEstadodeSoPaolo,24.7.
2009).Nevertheless,anumberofquestionswereasked.Forexample,whether
agreementsshouldbepursuedeveniftheyhadbeendesignedunderdifferent
circumstances?Also,shouldtheEUoptforsomethingwhichopensuprelations
moreorsettleforsomething morespecific,but more modest?Whatif
negotiationsdonotresume?TheEUclearlyfavoursregionalintegrationandthus
biregionalnegotiations,andwillcertainlynotwishtobeseenasthepartyresponsible
forscuttlingintegrationschemesbysinglingoutindividualcountries.ButtheEU
cannotimposeitsfavouredapproachandthereforeisnolongerfundamentalistonthe
issue.ThiswasillustratedwhentheEUovercameBoliviasobstructionofAndean
negotiationswiththeEU.Furthermore,theEUproceededwiththosewhowishedto
continue,butleftthedooropenforotherstojoinlater.Inthisway,theEUrespects
thesovereignwillofboththewillingandthereluctant.
Anumberofsuggestionsmadeinthiscontextseemtoberatherpremature,
suchasthefusionof MERCOSURandthe Andean Communityorrapid
322 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
negotiationsonanoverallEULatinAmericaAssociationAgreement,including
freetrade.Political,economic,proceduralandideologicaldivergenceswithin
LatinAmericaanditsregionsorbetweentheEUandLatinAmericapromiseno
success.Nevertheless,thereissomepotentialinEUMERCOSURrelationsand
cooperation.Also,aclearturnaroundisdiscernibleinofficialEUdocuments
(COM2009),MERCOSURspositionsandacademicresearchinthedirectionof
Realpolitik,withsuggestionsonwhereprogressmightbemade.
Thecurrentglobalcrisismakesthecaseforinterregionalandintraregional
cooperationevenstronger.ThisisthemessageofastudybytheLatinAmerican
TradeNetwork (Heidrich2007),whichrecommendsanewstartinLatin
Americaonthebasisofintensifiedcooperationininfrastructureandproductive
integration,oratleastinterconnectivity.Alongthesamelines,andalwayskeen
toseekawayout,Pea(2009b)developedthreescenarios.First,integrational
inertiaduetoinsufficientinnovation;second,a“foundationalsyndrome”which
throwsmostoptionsoverboard;andathirdoption whichcapitaliseson
accumulatedexperienceandresults.IdeasdiscussedbytheEUandimplemented
toacertaindegreeinthecourseofitsowndevelopment,suchas“géographie
variable”,amultispeedEuropeandsoon,haverecentlybeentakenupinofficial
MERCOSURcirclesbothforEUMERCOSURnegotiationsandfordevelopment
withinMERCOSUR.
Inacademiccircles,Pea,delArenalandFloressuggestasimilarchangeof
emphasisandpragmaticadvanceinregionalandEUMERCOSURrelations.Onthe
biregionallevel,the1995EUMERCOSURagreementanditsevolutionclausecouldbe
used,andthepartiesconcernedmightlookintopartial,temporaryprogressin
economicrelationsto(re)buildconfidence(delArenal2009).
5.1 PoliticalDialogue
Thenegotiatorofthe1995agreement,UruguayandiplomatGuillermo
Valles,recalledataconferenceinParisthattheinitiallogicinEUMERCOSUR
relationswasabetterbalanceinglobalaffairsandrebalancingtheEUpresence
inLatinAmerica,withanemphasisondealingwithissuesatamultilaterallevel,
withinamultipolarglobalsystem.Therewasageopoliticaldimensionthat
shouldnotbeforgotten.Thisalsofitsinwiththeviewsofotheranalysts:
MERCOSURcanbecomeapoliticalschemeratherthanjustaregionaleconomic
integrationarea.MERCOSURhasshownitsvalueinsecuringstabilityinthe
region,asinthecaseofParaguay.Itcanthusbeanimportantbaseforfarther
reachingconcepts,suchastheUnionofSouthAmericanNations(UNASUR)
which,despiteideologicalclashes,didpreventahemisphericcrisisfrombreaking
CurrentandFutureCooperationundertheEUMERCOSURAgreement 323
outorbecomingviolent.TheregionofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeancan
buildonthereinforcedmultilevelprocessofpoliticalconcertation,suchasthe
“new”RIOGroup,meanwhilecoveringallLatinAmericaandagrowingnumber
ofCaribbeancountries,orUNASUR.Suchprocesseshavebeenextended
beyondthe politicalareainto security and health care. This creates
psychological,socialanddiplomaticgroundsformoreandregularcoordination.
Sofar,politicaldialoguewith MERCOSUR—aswithotherintegration
schemes—hasbeenuseful,butbynomeansasmuchasitmighthavebeen:ina
biregionalcontext,issuesconcerningsingle membercountriescannotbe
discussed;butthisistrueforbothsides(Buck2009a).Tocircumventthis,such
dialoguemustnotbelimitedtothelevelofministersorhighofficials.The
growingcontactsbetweenparliamentariansonbothsides,orcivilsocietiesand
theirorganisations,suchastheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommitteeand
theCommitteeoftheRegionsormeetingsbetweenlocaladministrationsofthe
kindwhichtookplacein2007inParis,areencouraginginitiatives.Itisalso
strikingthatallofthesixpoliticalfoundationsinGermanyhavetakenupthe
issuesofsecurityinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.Some,suchasthe
KonradAdenauerStiftung or the FriedrichEbertStiftung, already have
longstandingexperiencethroughbiregionalseminars,whichbringtogether
researchers,politicians,securityexpertsandactors.
Sofar,theissueseemstohavebeenoffthepoliticalagenda,butsituations
likethoseinMexicoandHaitiorthefightagainstdrugshaveledtoconcrete
cooperation,experienceandexchangeofbestpractices.
5.2 OtherIssuesofa“PostliberalAgenda”(Sanahuja2008)
Theissueswhichwouldbenefitfrommorebiregionalcooperationinclude
energy,infrastructure,migration,environment,healthcare,andsocialand
regionalasymmetries.Inrecentyears,atEULAC,biregionalorbilaterallevels
(cf.thestrategicpartnershipswithBrazilandMexicoandtheirjointaction
plans,ortheEUChileAssociationforDevelopmentandInnovation),numerous
狊犲犮狋狅狉犪犾dialogueshavebeencreatedandshowntheirvalue,leadingtobetter
understanding,technicalassistanceandeventoinitiativesatthemultilateral
level(Buck2008).AttheirministerialmeetinginPraguein2009,theEU
TroikaandMERCOSURagreedonsuchconcreteinitiativesandworkshopsin
ordertotakethediscussionsforward(EUCouncil2009).
Opponentsoffreetradeareas(FTAs)underlinedtherisktotheweaker
partyinasymmetricalrelations.Againstthat,onemightreplythat,when
talkingwithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,theEUknowsasaconsequence
324 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
ofitsownbeginningsandlaterenlargementswhat“asymmetry”means,andit
probablyknowsbetterthananyotherorganisationhowtodealwithit.Living
standardsattheleveloftheregionsintheEUdifferbyaratioof1to30.EU
solidarityfundscushionsomeoftheunwantedeffectsofeconomicintegration.
The EULAC Summit2008in Lima established a special programme,
EUrosociAL,withinitialfundingofEUR30million.
Adequateandfunctioningphysical犻狀犳狉犪狊狋狉狌犮狋狌狉犲isthekeytodevelopment;
itreduces,amongotherthings,thecostoftransactionsandofthetransportof
goodsandworkers.TherewasalwaysinsufficientLatinAmericaninvestmentin
thisfield,incontrasttothesituationinAsia.Traditionally,LatinAmerican
transportinfrastructurewasdesignedforextraregionaltrade,basicallywith
Europe,butmeanwhilehasbeenextendedtoencompassresourcesneededby
China.Studiesshowthattransportcosts,togetherwiththebureaucratic
burden,arefarhigherthanthecustomsdutiesappliedineachcasestudied.The
InitiativefortheIntegrationoftheRegionalInfrastructureofSouthAmerica
(IIRSA)shouldnotablyimprovetheproductivityandcompetitivenessoftheSouth
Americancountriesintheareasofenergy,transportandtelecommunications.Butso
farithasgivenprioritytoroadprojects,whichaccountfor74percentofplanned
investmentsupuntil2010.Butroadsarenotthebestwayeitherofmovinglowvalue
nonperishablegoodsorofprotectingtheenvironment.Todate,IIRSAhasdonelittle
bywayofimplementation;ofthe348potentialprojectswhichhavebeenidentified,31
havebeenselectedsofar,butlessthan10percentoftheslatedinvestmenthasbeen
made.PartoftheproblemisLatinAmericastraditionallowsavingsrateandtax
revenues,whichputsitatalongtermdisadvantageinrelationtoEastAsia.Projects
alsosufferfromrapidlychangingpoliticalrelationsor,asinthecaseofenergy(for
example,“gasoductodelsur”),fromnewdiscoverieswhichmakesuchprojectsless
vitalnationally.
InternationalexpertsandorganisationshavestronglyurgedLatinAmerican
authoritiesto remedy the situation. As in the history of the EU,
interconnectivityisagoodmotivebutnotasufficientconditionforintegration.
Theenergysectorcouldbeastrongpullfactor,kickstartingintegrationbasedon
“functional”logic,astheEuropeanCommunityforCoalandSteeldidfortheEU
(Heidrich2007).Butsofar,“inSouthAmerica,energyisaninterconnection
issuewhichdoesnotfosterintegration”(Honty2006).
5.3 Trade
Bilateralagreementsbetween Latin AmericancountriesandnonLatin
Americanpartnersaregrowing,risingfrom20in1990to86in2000,and159in
CurrentandFutureCooperationundertheEUMERCOSURAgreement 325
2007.In2005,tradecoveredbypreferentialagreementsreached63percent—12
percentintraregionaland51percentextraregional—whichwasexpectedtorise
to72percentin2007.Traditionalintegrationschemesseemtohavelost
relevancefortheinternationalagendasoftheirmembers.
Inlightofproblemswiththepronouncedpolitical,economicandsocial
heterogeneityofLatinAmericancountries—andthuswiththeacceptanceand
negotiationoffullblown Association Agreements with an FTA—it was
recommendedtoseekformulaswhichmakearegionalbasedstrategycompatible
withbilateralapproaches.Proceedinginadifferentiatedmanner,withtailored
gradualcalendarsandscopeaccordingtothevariouscapacitiesofthoseinvolved
isonewayforward,assuggestedbyrepresentativesoftheprivatesectorin
BraziltotheEUMERCOSURmeetingon12November2009.Inordertomake
progress,Argentinaseemedtosuggestabandoningtheusualnegotiating
approachof“nothingisagreeduntileverythingisagreed”toclosechapterson
whichprovisionalagreementhasalreadybeenreached,aswellastoaddress
tradeandotheropenissueswithpossibleadaptationclauses(forexample,to
smooththingsoverindifficultsituationswithregardtocompetition).Itremains
tobeseenwhethersuchanunusualapproachwillwork.
Initsrecentcommunicationon“LatinAmericaandtheEU—AnAssociation
ofGlobalPartners”,theEuropeanCommissiontakesasimilarline.Inaddition,
itsuggestsaparticularMechanismforInvestmentinLatinAmerica(MIAL)—
liketheEuropeanNeighbourhoodMechanism,withstartingfundsfromtheEU
budget.Itshouldprivilegecooperationininterconnectivity,infrastructure,
socialfieldsandtheenvironment,aswellasfosteringsmallandmediumsized
enterprises.Thisisinlinewiththeoverarchingtopicforthe6thEULAC
SummitinMay2010inSpain.
ApartfromthisnewapproachtoEUMERCOSURrelations,negotiations
andcooperation,norealchancefortrilateralcooperationbyeitherpartner
outsidetheirregionsisapparent.Thisis,ifatall,possibleonlyinbilateral
relations,suchEUBrazil,orwithMexicoorChile.Intheconcreteactionplans
agreedwiththem,trilateralcooperationismentioned.Indeed,BrazilandtheEU
recentlyconvenedtostudyjointcooperationindevelopingbioelectricityandbio
fuelinMozambique(seealsoEUCouncil2008).
6.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
IntegrationschemessuchastheAndeanCommunityofNations(CAN)or
MERCOSUR stillseem inadequateforreaching such objectives asthe
326 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
establishmentofcommonmarketsandbeyond,andprogressinintegration,of
thekindrepresentedbytheEU,seemneitherintendednorexpected.TheEU
haslostinfluenceasasoft,normsettingpowerduetothearrivalofstrong
playerswhoseemnottohaveanyinterestinspreadinggloballyacceptednorms.
Iargueinmysecondpaperinthisbookthattheseplayersmayseetheadvantages
ofspreadingsuchnormslaterintheprocessoftheirowndevelopment.
Forthemoment,integrationagreementsmayserveinLatinAmericalessas
aimsinthemselvesthanasplatformsforcommonefforts,confidencebuilding
andbetterpositioninginglobalmarkets.TimeisnotnecessarilyonLACsside.
Themajorriskisnotthateconomic,socialandotherpoliciesmayfail,butthat
theymaynotprovideresultsquicklyenough.Biregionalrelationscanbeusefulin
thisconnection,buttheycanonlycomplementnationalandregionalefforts.
Notes
1.Asamatteroffact,MERCOSURtookupearlierhesitationsbytheEuropeanCommission
DirectorateGeneralTradeaboutariskofblockagewhensuchtradenegotiationswereheld
simultaneouslyattwolevels,multilateralandbioregional—sincewhatisofferedatone
levelislostasanegotiatingchipattheother.
2.Itshouldbementionedthatfiguresvaryaccordingtosourcesandtime,especiallywith
regardtoChina.
3.SeethearticlesbyF.PealistedintheBibliographyandforupdatedinformationconsult
hiswebsite,www.felixpena.com.arg.Anexcellenthistoricalanalysisisgivenby
Sanahuja(2008).
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europea?,in:犖狌犲狏犪犛狅犮犻犲犱犪犱,219,JanuaryFebruary,5975.
Sanahuja,JoséAntonio(2009),Del“regionalismoabierto”al“regionalismopostliberal”—
crisisycambioenlaintegraciónregionalenAL,in:犃狀狌犪狉犻狅犱犲犾犪犐狀狋犲犵狉犪犮犻ó狀犚犲犵犻狅狀犪犾
犱犲犃犔狔犲犾犌狉犪狀犆犪狉犻犫犲,7,20082009,1154.
Sukup,Viktor (2001),犃 犛狅狌狋犺 犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀 犆狅犿犿狅狀 犕犪狉犽犲狋—犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚:犗狉犻犵犻狀,
犗犫犼犲犮狋犻狏犲狊,犘犲狉狊狆犲犮狋犻狏犲狊,2April,Brussels:EC.
!331
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉9
犆犺犻狀犪狊犃狆狆狉狅犪犮犺狋狅犈狀犲狉犵狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲
)& *+,-.&",
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
Climatechangehasemergedasoneofthetopsecuritychallengesoftheearly
twentyfirstcentury.UNSecretaryGeneralBanKiMoonrecentlystatedthat
“climatechangeisalteringthegeopoliticallandscape”,as manifestedby
increasedcompetitionoverArcticresources,increasedintrastateandinterstate
migrationandrisingsealevels(FederalNewsService2009).Promotedbythe
bullmarketinenergypricesandtheascenttoanewleveloftheclimatechange
issueafewyearsago,anewefforttodevelopnewenergysourcesandrenewable
energyhasbeenevidentaroundtheworld.Clearly,climatechangeandenergy
securityissueshavecaughtpeoplesattention.Therelationshipbetweenenergy
securityandclimatechangehaschangedbeyondrecognition,anditposesagreat
challengetobothpractitionersandacademics.Moreover,climatechangeand
energysecurityissueshavemovedfromthemargintothecentreofsecurity
policies,particularlysincetheendoftheColdWar.Ontheonehand,climate
changeandenergysecurityhavebeenrecognisedasanimportantsourceof
threatstohumansurvivaloverthepastfewdecades.Humandependenceona
modernenergysupplyforasustainablefutureinmodernsocietiesisvastly
greaterthanitwasinanagrariansociety.Ontheotherhand,itisnow
universallyacknowledgedthatinternationalcooperationorcollectiveactionare
notenoughtoresolvethecrisiscausedbyclimatechangeandenergysecurity.
Internationalcollectiveactiononclimatechangeandenergysecurityisasocial
andpoliticalchallenge,aswellasaneconomicone.Itinvolvesvarioussectorsof
thenationalsocialeconomyandsohasanimportantbearingonthepolitical
legitimacyandstabilityofallnations.Theneedforaccesstoenergyandother
naturalresourceshasincreasedandmorestatesareingreatercompetitionfor
332 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
themthaneverbefore.
Asthescarcityoftraditionalenergyandclimatechangeemergedasserious
problems,economicgrowthpatternsinvariouscountriesgraduallyevolvedina
directionthatsuitednewenergysources.TheEUandtheUnitedStates,as
globalsuperpowers,aspiretocornerfutureenergymarketsthroughnegotiations
onreducingcarbonemissions,coupledwithadesiretodominatethedrivetoward
cleanenergyandenergyefficiencyandinnovationbybuildingaclimatechange
regime.However,manydevelopingcountries,includingChina,whicharestill
attheindustrialisationstage,arestillpursuingtheWesterncountrieseconomic
model—whichisgrowthoriented,unsustainableandresourceconstrained—
datingfromthelateeighteenthcentury.Chinahasanurgentneedtopromote
developmentwhilejoiningintheglobalstruggleagainstglobalwarmingand
contributingtoglobalenergysecurity.Sincethe1990s,Chinahaspaid
increasingattentiontoenvironmentalprotectionandthegrowinghazardsposed
byclimatechange.Infact,inits2008whitepaperonclimatechange,the
Chinesegovernmentacknowledgedthat“Chinaisoneofthecountriesmost
susceptibletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechange,mainlyinthefieldsof
agriculture,livestockbreeding,forestry,naturalecosystems,waterresources
andcoastalzones”(BBCMonitoringAsiaPacificPolitical2008).Asoneofthe
worldsleadingeconomicpowers,Chinaiscentraltoregionalandglobalefforts
tofightglobalwarmingandclimatechange.Anysuccessfulinternationaleffort
tomitigatethreatstohumanandnationalsecurityposedbyclimatechangemust
inevitablyincludeChina(Harris2004;Elliott2002).Chinaspopulationhasnow
reached1.3billion,anditseconomyisoneoftheworldslargestandfastest
growing.Consequently,Chinaisexperiencing widespreadandoftenacute
environmentalchallengeswithseverelocal,nationalandregionalconsequences
(Smil1993;JapanEnvironmentalCouncil2000;WorldBank1997).Ithas
producedvastamountsofgreenhousegases,especiallycarbondioxidefromthe
burningoffossilfuels(coal,oilandnaturalgas).Duetoitshigheconomic
developmentandlowenergyefficiency,Chinaintheearly1990sbecamethe
secondlargestnationalsourceofgreenhousegasesanditwillbecomethelargest
sourceby2020 (UNFCCC2003;Chinas OfficeofNationalCoordination
CommitteeforClimateChange2003).ConcerningChinashighcarbonenergy
mix,itisnowtheprincipalemitterofgreenhousegasesandshouldbearglobal
responsibilityforaddressingtheproblemofclimatechangeandenergysecurity.
Chinaspracticewithregardtoclimatechangeandenergymustsafeguardand
coordinatebalanceddevelopmentbetweenenergyconsumption,theearths
climateandeconomicgrowth.
ChinasApproachtoEnergyandClimateChange 333
Withtheseconsiderationsinmind,thischapterwillfirstexaminesomeof
theimplicationsandconsequencesofclimatechangeandenergysecurity;second,
itwilldescribeChinasenergymixandemissionsstructure;andfinallyitwill
discussChinasenergyandclimatechangepractices.Intheconclusion,
comparisonswillbedrawntotheLatinAmericanregion.
2.犜犺犲犔狅犵犻犮犪狀犱犐犿狆犾犻犮犪狋犻狅狀狊狅犳犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犪狀犱犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔
Thecontemporaryworldisbasedonoil,andglobalenergysecurityis
crucialtoeconomicgrowthandpeopleslivelihoodsinallcountries.Energyis
alsofundamentaltotheprosperityandsecurityofnations.Theadventof
globalisation,thegrowinggapbetweenrichandpoorandtheneedtofightglobal
warmingareallintertwinedwithenergyconcerns.Thereisapressingneedfor
strategicthinkingabouttheinternationalenergysystem.Supplyanddemandon
theinternationalenergymarketsareunbalanced.Areasrichinoilresourcesare
stillatthecentreofgeopolitical,politicaland militaryconflicts.Energy
exportingnationsuseenergyweaponstopursuetheirpoliticalandeconomic
goals.Majorenergysuppliers—fromRussiathroughIrantoVenezuela—have
beenincreasinglyableandwillingtousetheirenergyresourcestopursuetheir
strategicandpoliticalobjectives(ForeignRelationsCouncil2006).Itisalso
importanttotakealongtermperspective,deepenenergycooperation,increase
energyefficiencyandfacilitatethedevelopmentanduseofnewenergyresources.
Evidently,thereisacorrelationbetweenenergycompetitiondrivenby
climatechangeandtheinternationalpoliticalandeconomicenvironment,know
how,capacitiesandpossessionofresources.Theinteractionofthesefactors
constitutesacompleteenergychain.Theenergychaincomprisestheinstitutions
andactivitiesrelatedtothesearchfor,developmentandutilisationofenergy
resources.Thediscoveryofnewenergysources,revolutionarychangesinthe
energychainandthecorrespondingchangesinpoliticaleconomyandinnovation
systemshavecombinedtolaythegroundworkforamoreeffectiveuseofenergy,
whichisfundamentaltotheriseofmajorpowers.
Energyisfundamentaltotheprosperityandsecurityofnations.Thenext
generationenergy willdeterminenotonlythefutureoftheinternational
economicsystem,butalsopowershifts.Competitionintheenergychainwill
determinetheresultofthepowerstrugglebasedoninnovationandinfluencethe
evolutionofpowerinternationally.New energysourcesarenotonlyan
importantconstituentofthenextgenerationenergysystem,butalsowillchange
futureinternationalpowerconfigurations.Therequisiteconditionofsignificant
structuralchangeintheinternationalsystemisanenergyrevolutionbasedonthe
334 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
emergenceofnextgenerationenergyledcountries (Yergin2006;Kennedy
1968).Technologicalinnovationisofkeyimportanceintheenergypower
structure.Modelskislongcycletheory,Kondratievslongwavetheoryand
Schumpeterseconomiccycletheoryhaveallconfirmedthehistoricalcontribution
oftechnologicalrevolutionsandinstitutionalinnovationtotheriseandfallof
greatpowers(Modelski1987;Kindleberger1973).Theyallemphasisetheeffect
of“greattechnologicalbreakthroughs”ontheworldeconomiccycle,indicating
thatthecycleowesitsrisetotechnologicalbreakthroughs,which mainly
happenedwithregardtoenergy,suchaselectricity,thesteamengineandthe
internalcombustionengine.MichaelE.Porter,inhisbook犜犺犲犆狅犿狆犲狋犻狋犻狏犲
犃犱狏犪狀狋犪犵犲狅犳犖犪狋犻狅狀狊,explainedwhynationsshouldmakeaninnovationbased
modelofcomparativeadvantagesapriorityindevelopingtheircompetitive
advantage(Porter1990).
Asthedebateoncollectiveactionagainstclimatechangehasheatedup,
Westerncountrieshavemonopolisedthefutureenergysystembasedonnewand
alternativeenergy.PeterEvansoncepointedoutthateverymajorpowerthat
cametodominatetheinternationalsystem hadsomeknowhowadvantages
(Evans1985).Fornow,itseemsthatalowcarboneconomyandcleanenergy
willultimatelydeterminethefutureofenergypowertransitions.Jonathanand
otherscholarsrecognisethattheEUsenvironmentalpolicy,gearedtoward
boostingtheblocscompetitivenessandpromotingclimatenegotiations,could
alsoboostitscreativityandcompetitiveadvantage(Golub1998).In2007,the
犛狋犲狉狀犚犲狏犻犲狑犚犲狆狅狉狋狅狀狋犺犲犈犮狅狀狅犿犻犮狊狅犳犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犪狀犱狋犺犲犔狅狑犆犪狉犫狅狀
犈犮狅狀狅犿狔犚犲狆狅狉狋bytheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairsbothconfirmed
thattheEUpromotesclimatenegotiationsnotjustbecauseitisaforerunnerin
thelowcarboneconomy,butalsobecauseitwantstoachievedominancein
globalgovernanceandlaythefoundationsforthefutureeconomy.SeniorUS
politiciansPaulaDobriansky,RichardLeeArmitageandJoseph Nyeonce
proposedthatUSinvolvementinclimatenegotiationsshouldenhancethenations
“smartpower”andthecompetitivenessofitsindustry (ForeignRelations
Council2006).
Westerncountriesalwaysusetherapidlygrowingcarbonemissionsinemerging
economiesasa majorexplanationofglobalwarming.Nationalcompetitive
advantagesareassociatedwithcarbonemissionsreductions.Forthosewhoadvocate
climatediplomacy,environmentalcapacityisanimportantpartofastates
comprehensivenationalpower.JamesN.Rosenauusestheconceptofa“balanceof
payments”insteadofa“balanceofpower”inglobalenvironmentalgovernance,and
arguesthatdevelopingcountriesshouldsharethecostsandresponsibilitiesofglobal
ChinasApproachtoEnergyandClimateChange 335
environmentalprotection(RosenauandCzempiel1992:1214).Historically,the
emergenceofgreatpowershasbeenaccompaniedbytheriseofanewgenerationof
energy.Sincetheestablishmentofthemoderninternationalsystem,theenergy
chainhasundergonetwomajorchanges.Thefirstchangewasthefirstindustrial
revolutionofthe1860susheredinbytheUnitedKingdomandmarkedbya
transitionfrom“thefuelwoodorbiofueltimes”tothe“coalera”.Thesecond
changewasthesecondindustrialrevolutionofthe1920sstartedbytheUnited
Statesandmarkedbyatransitionfromthe“coalera”tothe“oilage”.Today,a
thirdrevolutionistakingplacebasedoncleanandlowcarbonenergy.Underthe
longcycletheory,possessionanduseofnewenergyiscloselyrelatedtonational
technologicalandinstitutionaladvances.Countrieswithadominantpositionin
newenergyarelikelytohaveaninstitutionalandtechnicaladvantagestemming
fromtheirpossessionanduseofnewenergy.Theyhavetobreakthroughthe
constraintsimposedbypreviouseconomicandpoliticalstructuresandideology,
whichwillleadtomajorchangesintheglobalindustrialchain,allocationof
resourcesandnationalcompetitiveness.Therefore,wehaveeveryreasonto
believethatthosenewenergypowerhouseswillultimatelychangetheglobal
arrangementofpowerthroughinternationalcompetitioninthefuture.As
historyshows,everysignificantstructuralchangeintheinternationalsystemhas
beenduetoarevolutionintheenergychain.Thecountryornonstateentitythat
seizedanewenergychainorapartofitattemptedtochallengetheinternational
statusquo.
Theimplicationsofglobalgovernanceforclimatechangeandenergyare
twofold.First,developedcountriescontinuetodominateinternationalclimate
changenegotiations.Thefightagainstglobalwarmingcanbedescribedinterms
ofcommongoods.Eventhoughtherearemanyinternalcontradictionsamong
richcountries,theyshareacommoninterestintryingtomaintainandeven
widenthedevelopmentgapandinstavingofftheriseofemergingpowers.Asa
result,wealthycountriesmaintaintheirleadingpositioninthepostKyoto
climateregimebuildingprocess.Developedcountriesinitiallycommunicatedwith
andconsultedmajorgreenhousegasemittersinabidtoestablisharationaland
efficientpostKyotosystem thatwouldsafeguardandcoordinatebalanced
developmentbetweenenergyconsumption,theEarthsclimateandeconomic
growth.Atthesametime,developedcountriestriedtopersuadedeveloping
countriestoacceptsoftandhardenvironmentalconstraints.Second,duetothe
earlydevelopmentadvantageofdevelopedcountriesandthelatedevelopment
advantageofdevelopingcountries,anymajorenergyinnovationwouldbring
aboutanewindustrialrevolutionandthereallocationofglobalindustry.
336 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Developedcountrieshaveevenlaunchedaclimateorcarbontaxtosetlimitson
theeconomicgrowthofthedevelopingworld,particularlyChina.Developing
countriesaregraduallyassumingtheobligationsofstabilisinggreenhousegases.
Butbecausetheylacknewenergysourcesandadvancedtechnology,developing
countriesonlybecomeemergingmarketsforWesternmultinationalcompanies,
whiledevelopedcountriesaremakingfulluseofclimatechangeopportunitiesto
strengthentheirtechnicalandcompetitiveedge.Asaresult,theycontinueto
dominatetheinternationalsystem.Obviously,thesituationisthesameforthe
environmentaltraderegime,whichwouldletdevelopingcountriesbearthe
programmedbaselinecosts,whiledevelopedcountriesbearincrementalcosts.
Developedcountriesaredoingthattoincreasetheenvironmentalconstraintson
developingcountriesandeventuallyrestrictthedevelopmentofdeveloping
countriesintermsofbindingrules.
3.犆犺犻狀犪狊犈狀犲狉犵狔犛狋狉狌犮狋狌狉犲犪狀犱犈犿犻狊狊犻狅狀狊犛狋犪狋狌狊
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)s Fourth
AssessmentReportestimatesthatcarbondioxideemissionsfromenergyuse
couldrisebybetween45percentand110percentbetween2000and2030.The
reportindicatesthattwothirdstothreequartersoftheincreasedemissions
wouldcomefromdevelopingcountries.Thereportalsomakesitclearthatthe
greatertheeffortstoreduceglobalgreenhousegasemissions,thelesssevere
wouldbetheimpactofclimatechange.
AsoneoftheworldsleadingdevelopingcountriesChinaiscentralto
regionalandglobaleffortstofightglobalwarmingandclimatechange.Any
successfulinternationalefforttomitigatethreatstohumanandnationalsecurity
posedbyclimatechangemustinevitablyincludeChina.Chinasroleinclimate
changederivesfromitsenergyintensiveeconomicstructure.Chinastransition
fromalightmanufacturingeconomytoonefeaturingmoreenergyintensive
industries,includingiron,steel,cement,chemicalsandaluminium,isamajor
factorbehindthistrend.Chinaaccountsforabout35percentofworldsteel
productionandabout50percentoftheworldsproductionofcement(Federal
NewsService2008).Theseindustriesandassociatedactivitiesare“layinga
foundationforwhatwemightcallaconsumptionledChineseenergychallenge
downtheroad”(FederalNewsService2008).Chineseconsumersincreasing
tendencytopurchaseautomobilesandairconditioners,amongotherproducts,is
establishingthebasisforChinasfutureenergychallenge(FederalNewsService
2008).Italreadyproducesvastamountsofgreenhousegases,especiallycarbon
dioxidefromtheburningoffossilfuels.
ChinasApproachtoEnergyandClimateChange 337
Chinaisamajorenergyproducer.Sincethe1990s,Chinahasalwaysmet
over90percentofitsoverallenergyneedsonitsown.Chinawilladheretothe
policyofmeetingitsenergyneedsmainlythroughdomesticsupply,andpriority
willbegiventoraisingenergyefficiency.Chinasshorttermgoalistomeetthe
targetofa20percentreductioninenergyconsumptionperunitofGDPby2020.
However,Chinascurrentpercapitaconsumptionofenergyisverylow.Itis
only66percentoftheworldaverage,13.4percentofthatoftheUnitedStates,
26.7percentofthatofJapanand28.1percentofthatofBritain.Chinasper
capitaoilimportsareonlyaquarteroftheworldaverageandonetwentiethofthose
ofboththeUSandJapan.Ithasbeenonly14yearssinceChinabecameanetoil
importerin1993,andonlyfouryearssinceChinafinallybecameacountryimporting
over100milliontonnesofoilperyear.However,Chinasoilimportshavesurgedsince
2003whenitreplacedJapanasthesecondlargestconsumerofpetroleumproductsin
theworld.TheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA)predictsthatby2030importswill
accountfor85percentofChinastotaloilconsumption(Chinascrudeoilimports
increasedby14.5percentin2006alone).Thus,energyshortageisapossible
bottleneckineconomicdevelopmentandinthelongterm,ifthisisnotresolved,
Chinaseconomicfuturewillbeveryunstable.
In2008,ChinaovertooktheUnitedStatestobecomethelargestemitterofcarbon
dioxideintheworld.By2020Chinasaveragepercapitaenergyconsumptionis
expectedtomatchthecurrentglobalaverage,meaningthatChinaalonewillaccountfor
almostonethirdoftheworldstotalgreenhousegasemissionsbetween1990and2020
(PaulandYu2005).Thus,Chinaclearlymatterswhenitcomestoclimatechange.
WithoutsubstantialeffortsonthepartofChinatolimitfuturecarbonemissions,any
measuresundertakenbyothercountriestoaddresstheclimatechangequestionwillbe
negated—hence,theimportanceofChinasapproachtoclimatechangeanditsrolein
internationalnegotiations.
Basedoncurrentprojections,therefore,fossilfuelsareexpectedtoremaina
keypartofChinasenergymix,withoilplayinganincreasinglyprominentrole.
Globally,oildemandisexpectedtogrowby1.3percentayear,from83.7
millionbarrelsperdayin2005to98.5millionbarrelsperdayin2015,and116.3
millionbarrelsperdayin2030.Roughly42percentofthisincreaseddemand
willcomefromIndiaandChina,while“Chinaaccountsforthebiggestincreasein
oildemandinabsolutetermsofanycountryorregion”(InternationalEnergy
Agency2007:79).
Inthefuture,theexpansionofChinastransportationsectorisexpectedto
sharplyincreasethecountrysdemandforoil.Bytheyear2030,automobile
ownershipispredictedtoincreaseto400millionfromonly27millionin2004.
338 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Consequently,oilconsumptioninChinaisexpectedtorisefromthecurrent7.
58millionbarrelsofoilperdayto1012millionbarrelsperdayby2015,the
majorityofwhichisexpectedtobeimported.Currently,Chinaimports53per
centoftheoilthatisconsumed.Similartooil,thedemandforcoalisalso
projectedtorisefrom4,154milliontonnesofcoalequivalent(Mtce)in2005
to7173 Mtcein2030,withdemandfromChinaandIndiaaccountingfor
threequartersoftheprojectedincreaseupto2030.CoalisthebasisofChinas
powergenerationinfrastructure;80percentofelectricitygeneratedinChina
canbelinkedtocoal,whichisalsotiedtoapproximately80percentofallof
ChinasCO2emissions.Mostexpertsbelievethatfortheforeseeablefuture—at
least30years—thisfundamentalrelianceoncoalwillremain,ifnotincrease
dramatically(OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense2008:10).By2030,coalwill
constitute63percentofChinasenergydemandmix(InternationalEnergy
Agency2007).ThedominantroleofcoalinChinasenergymixcomplicates
Beijingsabilitytoachievecertainabatementobjectives.AstheChinese
governmentarticulatedinits2008 whitepaper:“Chinascoaldominated
energymixcannotbesubstantiallychangedinthenearfuture,thusmakingthe
controlofgreenhousegasemissionsratherdifficult”(BBC MonitoringAsia
PacificPolitical2008).
4.犆犺犻狀犪狊犃狆狆狉狅犪犮犺狋狅犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犪狀犱犈狀犲狉犵狔
Chinaisthenewestplayerinworldenergymarkets.MajorChineseoil
companiesstartedinternationaloperationsinthe1990sandhavemadeimpressive
progress.Peacefulenergydevelopmentandinternationalenergycooperationare
theinternationaldimensionsofChinasenergypolicy.Chinasenergyintensity—
definedastheratioofenergyconsumptiontoameasureofthedemandfor
services—isonlyonefifthofthatoftheEuropeanUnion.ButBeijingisseeking
amodelthatwillallowittoresolvetheconflictsbetweenenergyconsumption
andenvironmentaldegradation.
4.1 InternalCapacityBuildingtoMeettheClimateChangeandEnergyChallenge
Chinaisdevelopingdiverseenergyresourcesandputtinginplaceasystem
thatsuppliesstable,economicalandcleanenergy.Chinaisworkinghardto
developarecyclingeconomysothatitwillgarnerthehighestpossibleeconomic
andsocialbenefitswiththelowestpossibleenergyconsumption.Chinahaslaid
outmanytasks,policiesandmeasuresfordevelopingaresourceconserving
societyandarecyclingeconomy,forexampletheConservationLaw(1997)and
ChinasApproachtoEnergyandClimateChange 339
theRenewableEnergyLaw(2005).
Chinahaspersistedinrelyingonitsdomesticresourcesandconstantly
increasingthesupplyofdomesticenergy.Chinaisnotonlyamajorenergy
consumingcountry,butalsoamajorenergyproducer.Sincethe1990s,China
hasobtainedabove90percentofitsenergyfromdomesticsources(thefigurefor
2005is93percent).Thepotentialofitsdomesticenergysupplyisstillgreat.
From1980to2001,withaverageGDPgrowthratesofabout10percent,China
hadabouta5percentgrowthrateinenergyconsumption.Chinaseconomyhas
managedtothrivedespitethelimitationswithregardtoenergysupply.China
hasconsistentlypursuedthegoalofrelyingonitsdomesticresourcesand
constantlyincreasingthedomesticsupplyofenergy.Chinas11thFiveYear
Programme (20052010)for National Economic and Social Development
announcedthe“doublingofthe2000percapitagrossdomesticproduct(GDP)in
2010andreducingenergyconsumptionperunitofGDPbysome20percent”.
ChinesePremierWenJiabaocalledforenergysavingsof50milliontonnesofcoal
equivalentinthepowerindustryand20milliontonnesofcoalequivalentin1000
majorstateownedindustries.“TheChinesegovernment,whilecommittedto
economicdevelopment,istryinginaresponsiblewaytochangetheeconomic
growthpatternbyadjustingtheeconomicstructureandenergymix.”(Industry
Updates2007)Underthesenewcircumstances,theChinesegovernmentis
shiftingfromthepreviousdevelopmentprincipleof“fastandhealthygrowth”to
“healthyandfastgrowth”(IndustryUpdates2007).
Furthermore,ChinaissueditsNationalActionPlanonClimateChangein
June2007,andtheChinesegovernmenthasselectedthefollowinggoalstobe
achievedby2010:reducingenergyconsumptionby20percent;increasingthe
shareofrenewableenergy(includinglargescalehydropower)to10percentof
itsprimaryenergymix;increasingcoalbedmethaneproductionto10bncubic
metresayear;andpromotingnuclearpower(XinhuaNewsAgency2007).
4.2 WinwinCooperationforEnergySecurity
Asarisingpowerpursuingapeacefuldevelopmentpath,Chinasenergy
strategyischaracterisedbymutualbenefitsandapolicyofbuildingaharmonious
world.Chinahastakenanactivepartinenergycooperationwithothercountries
onthebasisofmutualinteresttoensurethestabilityofregionalandglobal
energymarkets.PresidentHuJintaohasdeclaredthat“[the]coreofChinas
energystrategyistogivehighprioritytoconservation,relymainlyondomestic
supply,developdiverseenergyresources,protecttheenvironment,stepup
internationalcooperation[basedon]mutualbenefitandensurethestablesupply
340 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
ofeconomicalandcleanenergies”(Hu2006).Hehasalsodevelopedanew
energysecurityconceptthatcallsformutuallybeneficialcooperation,diversified
formsofdevelopmentandcommonenergysecuritythroughcoordination.
Inordertoencouragetheworldskeyenergyconsumingcountriesto
strengthenmutualcooperation,Chinahostedamajorenergyconferencewiththe
participationoftopoilconsumers(theUS,Japan,SouthKoreaandIndia)in
December2006.ChinaandOPEChavebeenengagedsince2005inanenergy
dialogueaimedatensuringasteadyenergysupply.Chinasdiplomacytoolsfor
energysecurityincludedialogueandcooperation,andthegoalistomaintainthe
stabilityandsecurityofinternationalenergysupplies.Inparticular,China
wishestoengageandcooperatewithkeyplayersinworldenergypolitics,which
includesOPECandnonOPECenergyproductioncountries,aswellastheG8,
theG20andthemajoroilconsumingcountries.Atpresent,Chinasmainsources
ofoilimportsaretheMiddleEastandAfrica,whereanumberofcountriesare
unstable.Moreover,thetransportationofoiltakesplacelargelyontheopen
sea,andalsothroughtheStraitsofMalacca,whereChinafacesthedangerof
piratesandterroristattacks.Therefore,inordertoguaranteethesecurityof
energysupplies,Chinamustdiversifyitsenergyimportsourcesandseekto
importoilfromRussia,CentralAsiaandSoutheastAsia,amongothers.
TherearethreekindsofoverseasareasinwhichChinaisengagedwith
regardtoenergy.Thefirstcomprisesmarketseekingcountrieswhichwantto
retaincontrolofoilresourcesandusesovereignwealthfundstoexchangetheir
crudeoilresourcesformarketinfluence(RussiaandSaudiArabia).SaudiArabia
accountsforabout17percentofChinasimportedoil.In2006,thetwostates
signedapactonenergycooperationthatcallsforincreasedcooperationandjoint
investmentinoil,naturalgasandmineraldeposits.SaudiArabiasAramco
OverseasCo.hasprovided USD750 millionofthetotalUSD3billionin
investmenttoconstructapetrochemicalcomplexinFujianprovinceinsouth
easternChinathatwillprocess8milliontonnesofSaudicrudeoilperyear.In
October2005,CNPCcompletedaUSD4.18billiontakeoverofPetroKazakhstan,Inc.
Thesecondcategoryconsistsofcountriesinpoorregionsthatneed
unconditionalforeignaidandinvestment(Angola,NigeriaandotherAfrican
countries).ChinaandNigeriasigneddealsthatgaveChinafouroilexploration
licensesinNigeriainreturnforacommitmenttoinvestUSD4billioninNigerian
infrastructure.ChinaandKenyaalsosignedanagreementforlicensesallowing
ChinasNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC)toexploreforoiloffthe
coastofKenya.
ThethirdcategoryisthosecountriesinwhichtheUSandother Western
ChinasApproachtoEnergyandClimateChange 341
governmentsforbidtheircompaniestoinvest(Iran,Sudan,Myanmar).Chineseoil
companieshavesignedlongtermcontractsvaluedatUSD200billionwithIran,
makingChinaIransbiggestoilandgascustomer.InJuly2007,CNOOCobtained
permissiontosearchforoilinpartsofSomalia.ChinahasinvestedheavilyinSudan,
establishingoilexplorationrightsin1995,andnowoverhalfofSudansoilexportsgo
toChina,accountingfor5percentofChinastotaloilimports.
Oilresourceintenseareasstilltendtobeaffectedbygeopolitical,political
andmilitaryconflicts.TheinstabilityinIraq,theIrannuclearcrisis,terrorist
threatsandattacks,thehumanitariancrisisandfragiledemocratictransitionsin
subSaharanAfricaandstrikesinNigeriaandBrazilallposemajorchallengesto
Chinasnationaloilcompanies.
4.3 EquitableDevelopmentbyvirtueof“CommonButDifferentResponsibilities”
Chinaandotherdevelopingcountriesadherencetothisstandardreflects,as
manypoliticiansandlegalanalystshavenoted,abasicstructuralshortcoming
withintheKyotoProtocolregimetotheextentthatdevelopingcountriesare,in
essence,exemptedfromuniversalabatementobligations.Thisisparticularly
problematicbecause,asonelegalanalysthasnoted:“Developingcountrieswill
beresponsibleforhalftheworldsemissionsby2020orearlier”(Gerber2008:
333).Nevertheless,ChineseleadersoftenrespondthateachpersonintheUS
nowemitsmorethanfivetonnesofcarbonperyear,whileinChinathefigureis
onlyonetonneperyear.SincethestartoftheIndustrialRevolution—thatis,
overthepasttwocenturies—theUSandEuropehaveaccountedformorethan50
percentoftotal,accumulatedglobalemissions,whileChinahasaccountedfor
lessthan8percent.The50leastdevelopedcountrieshavetogethercontributed
lessthan0.5percentofglobalcumulativeemissionsover200years(M2
Presswire2007).
ForChina,thelargestdevelopingcountry,globalwarmingissuesare
intimatelylinkedtoeffortstomodernisetheeconomyandtheenergystrategy
neededtobringaboutsuchmodernisation.Furthermore,theglobaldilemma
withregard to energy and the environmentshould be solved through
internationalcoordination,cooperationandmutualassistanceincleanenergy
development.Developingcountriesaredeeply dissatisfied with developed
countriesinthisrespectbecausethelatterrefusetopaythenecessaryregardto
theconstraintsimposedbydevelopingcountrieslackofdevelopment.Wealthy
countries,forinstance,placealowpriorityontechnologytransfers,andinsist
onimposingahighpriceontheintellectualpropertyrightspertainingtothese
technologies.ThroughCleanDevelopmentMechanisms(CDMs),theindustrialised
342 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
countriescouldalsomeetpartoftheirobligationsforreducingemissionsunderthe
KyotoProtocolbyreceivingcreditsforinvestinginprojectsthatreducecarbon
emissionsindevelopingcountries.However,developedcountriescouldalso
adopta moreambitiousprogrammeoftransferringadvancedcleanenergy
technologiestothedevelopingworld.Chinahasjoinedwithotherdeveloping
countriestodemandthatdevelopedcountriesprovidenoncommercialtechnology
assistancetodevelopingcountriestohelpthemcopewithclimatechangeand
cultivatelowcarbonemissioneconomies.
Byshiftingthefocusofclimatetalkstoadaptation,andawayfrom
mitigation,boththerichandpoorcountriescouldavoiddoingwhattheyhave
dreadedthemost:demandingthatcountrieswithentrenchedeconomicinterests
reducetheirgreenhousegasemissions.Chinahasresistedproposalstoimposea
globalcarbontax(aproposalsupportedbytheEU)asamitigationmeasurefrom
whichrevenuecouldbeusedtofinancetechnologicaltransfers.Ahighertrade
dependencewouldresultinasharingoftheburdenassociatedwithChinas
energyintensiveindustriesandresultingcarbonemissions.In2005,Chinas
GDPwasRMB18,670billion,anditsexportsofgoodsandservicestotalled
aroundRMB6,858billion.In2006,ChinasGDPwasRMB21,438billionand
itsexportsofgoodsandservicesRMB8,396billion(EconomistIntelligenceUnit
2007).ChinaisagainsttheglobalcarbontaxproposedbytheEUbecauseit
believesitwouldhinderitseconomicdevelopment.
4.4 ChinasShifttoaLowcarbonEconomy
Thegloballowcarbonfutureandtheemergenceoflowcarbontechnology
willenhancetheenergyindustryworldwide,aswellasthestrategicpositionof
theequipmentmanufacturingindustry.Chinaisfacingbothunprecedented
competitivepressureandopportunitiesfordevelopment.Intheprocess,China
hasstrengtheneditslaws,regulations,policies,systemsand management
mechanismstoactivelyaddressclimatechange,andalsotocreateastrong
institutional,policyandmarketenvironmentforthelowcarbondevelopmentof
enterprises.Withregardtoitsindustrialinfrastructureandcapacities,Chinahas
carriedoutindustrialupgrades,eliminatedoutdatedproductioncapacityand
focusedonenergyefficiencyandpositiveinvestmentsingreenenergy.More
importantly,arangeoftoolshavebeen usedto helpestablish market
mechanismsandindustrialsystems,suchasencouragingtechnicalinnovation,
promotinglegislation,changingconsumptionpatternsandestablishingacarbon
market.Atthesametime,Chinahasalsoappropriatelyadjusteditstradepolicy,
imposedrestrictionsontheexportofhighenergyconsumptionproductsand
ChinasApproachtoEnergyandClimateChange 343
expandedtheimportofmanufacturedgoods.
Technologyisthemostimportantlongtermstrategyfordealingwith
climatechange.Inthisregard,Chinesescienceandtechnologyhaveprovided
someusefultoolsforaddressingclimatechange.Chinaisvigorouslydeveloping
energysavingandenergyefficienttechnologies,renewableenergyandnew
energytechnologies,and“cleancoal”.OthertechnologiesChinaisexploringand
utilisingincludeadvancednuclearenergy,carboncaptureandstorage,bio
sequestrationandcarbonsequestration.Thedevelopmentofenergytechnologies
willhelptoreducethenearlyonetrillionUSdollarcostofeach.Chinahasalso
emphasisedraisingpublicawarenessofthelowcarbonissue.Experiencehas
shownthateffectivesocialparticipationisthebasisforatransitiontoalow
carboneconomy.
5.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
TherearesimilaritiesbetweenSinoLatinAmericanrelationsandSinoEU
relationsineconomicterms,althoughtheEUhasgreaterinfluenceandthe
relativelypooreconomicperformanceofLatinAmericahithertoislargelydueto
competitionfromtheEUratherthanfromChina.Despitebearingrelativelylittle
responsibilityforthecurrentimpactofclimatechange,likeChina,Latin
Americancountrieshavedeterminedthatitisintheirowninteresttobepartof
thesolution.Mexicohasdevelopedaneconomywideplantohalveitsprojected
emissionsby2050viaacapandtradeprogramme.Braziliscommittedto
reducingannualdeforestationby70percentby2018:deforestationisthelargest
sourceofemissionsinBrazil,andwhenitisincluded,Brazilisoneoftheworlds
topemitters.Thistargetisthereforeasignificantsteptowardsmeetingglobal
emissionstrajectoriesthatgofurthesttowardsreducingclimatechange.EU
LatinAmericanrelationsaremoreinstitutionalisedthanSinoLatinAmerican
relations.ThemaindifficultycharacterisingEULatinAmericanrelationsat
presentistheEUsprioritisationofEasternEuropeandAsiaPacificcountries.
ChinaisheavilyinvolvedinSouthernmarkets,butneedstomoveforward.
AlthoughLatinAmericaisnotamajorimportmarketforChineseenergy,itwill
haveasignificantroletoplayinthediversificationofChinasenergyimports.
Chineseinvestmentsintheenergysectorwillalsohelptoalleviatetheshortage
offinancialresourcesintheregion,andLatinAmericanenergycooperation
wouldbemutuallybeneficial.LatinAmericancountrieshavethewherewithalin
termsofenergy,resourcesand biologicaldiversityto maketheregion
independentinitsexternalinteractions,aswellastoovercomeitscurrent
344 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
vulnerabilityandlowenergyefficiency.CooperationbetweenChina,Latin
AmericaandtheEU hasgreatpotential,bothonatripartitebasisand
multilaterally,includingthereformofmultilateralmechanisms,newenergy
cooperationandsoon.
Moreimportantly,Chinasresponsetoenergyandclimatechangehasa
numberofsocial,politicalandeconomicimplications.First,itisclearthatChina
hasproactivelyaddressedthechallengeinmultipleways,includinginpolicy,
legalandtechnicalterms.Anumberofwealthycountries,includingtheUnited
States,have been unabletoimplementadequate measurestofacilitate
greenhousegasemissionsreduction.Theyhavesoughtonlytoadoptincremental
measuresdomesticallywhileavoidinginternationalobligations.Notwithstanding
thisstateofaffairs,Chinahasdecidedtomoveforward.Chinahasuseditsdual
statusasadevelopingcountry(withrightstoandneedfordevelopment)andits
growingroleasamajorcontributortoglobalenvironmentalproblems(suchas
greenhousegasemissions)toacquiresubstantialinfluenceininternational
environmentalnegotiations.AsPresidentHuJintaodeclaredatthe2009UN
ClimateSummit,Chinawilldecreasecarbondioxideemissionsbyasignificant
quantityby2020incomparisonto2005levels,forexample,byincreasingthe
shareofnonfossilfuelsinprimaryenergyconsumptiontoaround15percentby
2020(FuJing2009).Tobesure,Chinaiswellpositionedtoleapfrogontoa
cleanenergydevelopmentpath.Inthelongerterm,however,Chinawouldshow
trueleadershiponclimatechangeinthedevelopingworldbyadoptingaconcerted
transitiontoaneconomythatproducesfewercarbonemissions.Suchachoice
wouldbegreatlyfacilitated(andexpedited)withfinancialandtechnicalaidfrom
developedcountries.Nevertheless,evenintheabsenceofsuchaid,itisclear
thatthe Chinese government should integrate climate changeinto its
developmentpolicy.
Againstthebackgroundofenvironmentalcrisisandthepoliticaldilemmas
concerningclimatechange,whicharebeingdiscussedandnegotiatedalloverthe
world,theCopenhagenAccordwassignedin2009andwillserveasabasisfor
China,LatinAmericaandtheEUfortheforeseeablefuture.Thesecountries
shouldworktogethertoaddressthedeadlockinCopenhagenandreachconsensus
onalowcarboneconomyandthepost2012climatechangeregime.Thiswill
requirecoordinationtoensurebalanceddevelopment,preservingtheenvironment
whilemaintainingeconomicgrowth.
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犆犺犪狆狋犲狉10
犗犻犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
/&, *+,-0+
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
Inrecentyears,energycooperationbetweenChinaandLatinAmericahas
becomeahotlydebatedtopicinresearchonSinoLatinAmericanrelations.With
ChinasentryintoLatinAmerica,thereareconcernsaboutwhetheritwill
challengetheexistingenergyorderintheWesternhemisphere.Thedominant
thinkingonthisissuecanbeclassifiedintermsofthreegroups.Thefirst,which
isbasedonthelogicofazerosumgame,arguesthatChinawillthreatenUS
energysecuritygeopolitically:themoreoilChinaimportsfromLatinAmerica,
thelessoiltheUSwillget.ThesecondgroupofscholarsdescribesChinaasa
newcolonialisthungeringforoilandotherstrategicnaturalresources.Finally,
somescholarsholdthatChinasparticipationinLatinAmericaislimited,whilea
numberofcountrieswithabundantenergyresourcesregardChinasentryasa
positivedevelopmentwhichwillenablethemtodiversifytheirexternalenergy
cooperation.
Mostoftheexistingliteraturedoesnotanalysethisissueeitherobjectively
orcomprehensivelyinaccordancewiththefacts,remainingsatisfied with
politicisedexplanationsofChinasinvolvementinthe Westernhemisphere.
Somescholarshaveadoptedarealistanalyticalframework,takingonlyUSoil
interestsintoconsideration.Infact,ChinacanplayaconstructiveroleinLatin
Americaforbothsideswithaviewtoachievingsustainabledevelopmentinthe
energysector.Inordertobetterunderstandthis,weshalltrytoanswerthe
followingquestions.First,howshouldChinasroleandstrategyinLatin
Americanenergymarketsbedescribed?Second,whatpotentialdothetwo
sideshavetodrawontodeepentheircooperation?Third,whatchallengeswill
theyhavetoface?
348 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
2.犆犺犻狀犪狊犈狀犲狉犵狔犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犛狋狉犪狋犲犵狔狋狅狑犪狉犱狊犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
Inthepastdecade,Chinasoilimportshaveexperiencedstronggrowth.In
1993,Chinabecameanetoilimportingcountry.Asaresultofitsrapideconomic
development,Chinabecamethesecondlargestoilconsumerandimporterin
2004,behindtheUS.Between2002and2007,Chinasoilimportsroseto183.51
milliontonnesfrom77.74milliontonnes(CNPC2008).AccordingtoaChinese
NationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC)reportin2008,Chinasexternaloil
dependenceroserapidly,from31.2percentto49.6percent,duringthesame
period.Upto2030,Chinasoilneedswillbeconsiderable,becauseitseconomy
islikelytomaintainstronggrowth,withanupgradingofitsconsumption
structureandrapidindustrialisationandurbanisation.Inordertosafeguardits
oilsupply,Chinahasimplementedanimportdiversificationstrategy.At
present,theMiddleEast,AfricaandformerSovietUnionstatesareChinas
mainoilsuppliers(BP2008).Undoubtedly,however,itisriskyforChinato
concentrateitsoilimportsintheseregions.
LatinAmericaisplayinganincreasinglyimportantroleinChinaseffortsto
diversifyitsoilimports.In1993,CNPCwonanoilexplorationtenderinPeru,
makingLatin Americathefirstregionin whichChinahasparticipatedin
internationalenergycooperation.
Duringtheperiod1993to2007,ChinaandLatinAmericaimplementedover
20cooperationprogrammesintheenergyfield,coveringoilexploration,
development,refineries,technicalservicesandpipelineconstruction.These
programsarelocatedmainlyinPeru,Ecuador,VenezuelaandColombia.In
otherwords,theAndeancountriesareChinasprincipalcooperationpartners.
AlthoughChinahassignedvariousoilaccordswithgovernmentsinLatin
America,itscrudeoilimportsfromLatinAmericaaccountforonlyabout7per
centofChinastotalimports.Therefore,LatinAmericaisnotyetregardedasa
majorsupplier.However,itcanbeseenasanalternativeregionenablingChina
tosafeguarditsoilsupply.AccordingtoChineseCustomsStatistics,Angola,
SaudiArabiaandIranwerethetopthreeoilexporterstoChina,supplying87.58
milliontonnesofcrudeoilin2008.
Fortheforeseeablefuture,LatinAmericawillbeanalternativestrategic
choiceforChinawithregardtodiversificationofitsoilimports,enablingitto
reduceitsexcessivedependenceontheMiddleEastandAfrica.Tosummarise
Chinasenergystrategy,itsoilcooperationeffortstowardsLatinAmericashould
betargetedonthreeobjectives,includingmarketentry,investmentprotection
andoilimports.
OilCooperationbetweenChinaandLatinAmerica 349
犜犪犫犾犲1 犆犺犻狀犲狊犲犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犈狀犲狉犵狔犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犘狉狅犵狉犪犿犿犲狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀1993犪狀犱2007
Exploration
blocks
Production
equity
Service
contractIntotal
Peru 3 3 6
Venezuela 2 2 5 9
Ecuador 1 6 3 10
Colombia N/A 1 1 2
Brazil N/A N/A 2 2
Mexico N/A N/A 1 1
Source:Authorscalculations,accordingtoinformationonthewebsitesofCNPC,SINOPEC
andtheMinistryofCommerceofP.R.China.
犉犻犵狌狉犲1 犆犺犻狀犪狊犈狓狋犲狉狀犪犾犗犻犾犇犲狆犲狀犱犲狀犮犲,20022008
Source:CNPCAnnualReport:2008WorldOilandGasIndustry.
犉犻犵狌狉犲2 犆犺犻狀犪狊犗犻犾犐犿狆狅狉狋狊犫狔犆狅狌狀狋狉狔狅犳犗狉犻犵犻狀,2007
Source:BP2008.
350 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
犉犻犵狌狉犲3 犆犺犻狀犪狊犗犻犾犐犿狆狅狉狋狊犳狉狅犿犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪(犜犲狀犜犺狅狌狊犪狀犱犜狅狀狊)
Source:CNPC2008.
3.犘狅狋犲狀狋犻犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犅犲狀犲犳犻狋狊
GivenChinashighenergydemandanditslargeaccumulationofforeign
currencyreserves,somegovernmentsinLatinAmericahavemadegreatefforts
toattractChineseinvestmentintheoilsector.Particularlyundertheimpactof
thefinancialcrisisinthisregion,theyareinurgentneedofforeigncapital,so
therearenewcooperationopportunitiesforChinaandLatinAmericaintheoil
industry.
Ontheonehand,withChinasrobusteconomicgrowth,itsoildemandin
themediumtolongterm willcontinueatahighlevel.Accordingtothe
InternationalEnergyAgency(IEA2007),Chinawillneedtoimportupto80per
centofitscrudeoiland50percentofitsnaturalgasby2030.Atthesametime,
Chinasabundantforeign currencyreserves have boostedtheinvestment
capabilitiesofitsnationaloilcompanies(NOCs).
Ontheotherhand,keepingtheoilindustryopenisstillthemainstream
policyinLatinAmerica.Althoughleftwinggovernmentsstrengthenedtheir
controlofoilresourcesandsectoralregulationsintheperiod20052007,theydid
notreallyintendtodriveoutforeignoilcompanies,butrathertoincreasethe
governmentsshareinrisingoilprices.ThemostimportantthingforChinais
thatleftwingleadersarepoliticallyinclinedtopromoteoilcooperationwith
Chinabecausetheyconsideroiltobeadiplomatictool.Basedonthefavourable
changesinthesituationmentionedabove,thepotentialforoilcooperation
betweenChinaandLatinAmericacanbedepictedasfollows.
First,LatinAmericaisastrategicalternativesourceenablingChinato
diversifyitsoilimports.Inrecentyears,BrazilandVenezuelahavediscovered
largenewoilfields.AccordingtoBPWorldEnergyStatistics2008,provedoil
OilCooperationbetweenChinaandLatinAmerica 351
reservesinVenezuelaandBrazilamountedto87billionbarrelsand12.6billion
barrels,respectively,accountingfor7percentand2percentofglobalproved
reserves.InMay2008,theMinisterforEnergyandPetroleumandPresidentof
PetroleosdeVenezuela,RafaelRamirez,announcedthathiscountrysoil
reserveswerenow130billionbarrels.InNovember2007andApril2008,Brazil
discoveredtwomajoroilfieldscontainingover30billionbarrels,basedon
NationalPetroleumAgencyestimates.Therefore,Brazil,Venezuelaandother
countriescanbeconsideredpotentialpartnersforChina.
Second,Chineseoilcompaniescantakeadvantageofopportunitiestobuild
oilindustryrelated regionalinfrastructure.In recent years,insufficient
investmentsandslowmodernisationofequipmentandtechnologyhaveledtothe
declineofprovenreserves,productionandrefinerycapacityinMexico,Ecuador
andPeru.Forexample,onlyinBrazilandColombiadidoilproductionincrease—
marginally—in2007,while Mexico,Venezuela and Ecuadorexperienced
productionfallsof5.5percent,7.2percentand4.5percent,respectively,
comparedto2006.Inparticular,LatinAmericaneconomicgrowthhasslowed
down,sufferingtheadverseeffectsoftheinternationalfinancialcrisissince
2008.Thesecountriesthereforehopetoattractforeigninvestment.As
economiesrecoverinthelongterm,thereisnodoubtthatLatinAmericamust
urgentlystrengthenoilandgasexploration,developmentandinfrastructure.
Atthesametime,inresponsetotheglobalfinancialcrisis,somecountries
hopetobeabletoincreasetheiroilexportsatareasonablepricebyincreasingoil
production,becausetheirfiscalrevenuesdependstronglyonoilandgasexports.
Forinstance,inordertoachievesustainabledevelopment,Brazilimplementedan
AccelerationProgrammeforNationalGrowth,aneconomicplaninvolving183
energyprogrammesin2007,emphasisingoilandgasexploration,aswellas
development.Fortheforeseeablefuture,LatinAmericawillcontinuetoabsorb
foreigndirectinvestment,improvingoilandgasexploration,productionand
refiningcapacities.From Chinasperspective,thereare manycooperation
opportunitiesinthesefields.
Moreover,Mexico,BrazilandColombiahavedevelopedeconomicstimulus
planstopromoterecovery,includinginfrastructureprogrammesinoilandgas.
Attheendof2008,theCalderóngovernmentproposedaUSD50billion
investmentscheme,includingenergyreform(Villarreal2010).InJanuary2009,
ColombiaalsolaunchedaneconomicstimuluspackageworthUSD24.5billion,
expectinghigherprivateandforeigncapitalparticipationintheenergysector.
Meanwhile,BrazilalsoexpandeditsGrowthAccelerationProgramme(Programa
de Acelerao do Crescimento,PAC)for theimprovement of energy
352 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
infrastructure.
Finally,keepingtheoilsectoropenisstillamainstreampolicyinLatin
America.This policy orientation should notonly eliminate Chinese oil
companiesconcernsaboutpolicyuncertainty,butalsoprovideafavourable
investmentenvironmentforChinesecapital.Duringtheperiod20052007,
Venezuela,EcuadorandBoliviaadjustedtheiroilandgaspolicies,increasing
theirstateownedoilcompaniessharesinjointventures.Infact,thesethree
countriesconfinedthemselvestoreasonablemeasurestostrengthencontrolover
nationaloilresources.However,insomepartsofthemediaandacademiathese
policychangeshavebeenmisinterpreted,soundingthealarmthatleftwing
governmentshavetakenradicalactiontonationaliseoilandgas.Ifanalysed
properly,thesepoliciesmakeitclearthatthesegovernmentshavenotrenounced
theiropenpolicyintheenergysector.
AsfarasBrazil,Mexico,ColombiaandPeruareconcerned,theyhave
maintainedastableenergycooperationpolicy.Attheendofthe1990s,Brazil,
MexicoandColombiastartedtoopenuptheirenergysectorsbuttoaverylimited
extent,sothatitwasdifficultforprivateorforeignoilcompaniestoentertheir
oilindustries.Duringtheperiod19972007,however,Brazilorganisedmore
thaneightinternationaloilfieldtenders.Onlyafter2004didforeignoil
companieshaveanopportunitytoenterBrazil.Withimprovementsinitssecurity
situation,Colombiahasgraduallybecomeanimportantforeigndirectinvestment
destination.Forexample,theColombianstateownedcompanysigned15oil
cooperationcontractswithothercountriesbetween2006and2008.Although
Mexicobegantoallowprivatecapitaltoparticipateinthedownstreamsectorin
1995,itwasonlyin2003that MexicanPetroleum(Petróleos Mexicanos,
PEMEX),theMexicannationaloilcompany,organisedthefirstinternational
tender.
Duetotheimpactofthefinancialcrisis,somecountriesdependentonoil
exportshavesufferedgreatlyfromlowoilprices.Thesecountriescouldreadjust
theirenergycooperationpoliciesbyopeninguptheiroilsectorsfurther.For
example,Venezuela,becauseofthesharpdeclineinoilprices,hasbeenina
tightfiscalpositionsincetheendof2008.InMexico,theCongresspassedan
energyreformpackageproposedbyPresidentCalderóninOctober2008,which
wasstronglyopposedbyoppositionparties.Thereformpackagewillgivemore
rightstoPEMEXtocooperatewithforeigncompaniesandwillopenuptheoil
sectorfurther,attracting moreprivateandforeigncapitalandadvanced
technology.InDecember2008,PEMEXlaunchedapublictenderconcerning
explorationprogrammes,thelargestinternationaltenderinitshistory.After
OilCooperationbetweenChinaandLatinAmerica 353
Brazildiscoveredtwolargeoffshoreoilfields,theLulaadministrationactively
negotiatedwithChinatostrengthenexplorationcooperation.InFebruary2009,
ChinaandBrazilsignedaMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)involvingUSD
10billioninloansforoilimports.
4.犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犳狅狉犉狌狉狋犺犲狉犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
Basedontheanalysispresentedabove,oilcooperationbetweenChinaand
LatinAmericahasabrightfuture.However,thereareafewpotentialbarriers
orchallengesthatshouldnotbeneglectedandwhichmightleadtofrictionin
cooperationbetweenthetwosides.Forexample,oilshipmentsandrefiningare
headachesforChineseoilcompanies.CrudeoilfromLatinAmericaisheavyand
sour,requiringadifferentkindofrefiningtechnologyandequipmenttoprocess.
Thefollowingfactorsshouldalsobetakenintoconsiderationwithaviewto
deepeningcooperationbetweenthetworegions.
First,politicaluncertaintiescannotbeoverlooked.Intheshortandmedium
term,militaryconflictisunlikelyinLatinAmerica.However,someunstable
politicalfactorsshouldbenotedwhichmightimpactonChinasoilinvestmentsin
theAndeanregion.InMarch2009,theColombianarmycrossedtheEcuador
borderinpursuitoftheRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia,leadingtoa
diplomaticcrisisbetweenEcuador,Colombia,VenezuelaandNicaragua.In
short,politicalstabilityshouldbeexaminedcarefullywhenassessingChinese
investmentsecurity.
Second,policyuncertaintystillexists.Sincethe1990s,energypoliciesin
LatinAmericahaveexperiencedtwoperiodsofreadjustment.Inthefirstperiod,
duringthemiddleandendofthe1990s,mostLatinAmericancountriesstarted
toprivatiseandopenuptheirenergysectors.Thesecondperiodofpolicy
adjustmenthappenedbetween2001and2007,strengtheninggovernmentcontrol
overenergyresources.Policyadjustmentscanbedividedintotwogroupsof
countries.ThefirstgroupincludesVenezuela,BoliviaandEcuador,which
adoptedradicalpolicies,increasingtheirshareoftheprofitsfromrapidlyrising
oilpricesorraisingtheirnationaloilcompaniessharesinjointventures.The
othergroupincludesMexico,Brazil,PeruandColombia.Thesefourcountries
implemented a policy oflimited openness butalso one ofconsiderable
consistency.SinceJuly2008,internationaloilpriceshavefluctuatedstrongly.
ThereisnodoubtthatmajorLatinAmericanoilproducingcountriesmaychange
theirpoliciesagaintoattractforeigncapital.However,uncertaintiesconcerning
policychangesinLatinAmericaremain,representingariskfactorwithregardto
futureoilcooperation.
354 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Third,itishardtocontrolsocialrisks.Socialriskshererefertoeventsof
thekindthatcaninterruptnormaloilproductionandareoutofcompanies
control.Inrecentyears,ChinasoiloperationsinLatinAmericahavesometimes
beendisturbedbynativeactivistgroupsseekinghigherwelfarebenefits.InJuly
2007,ChinasoilprogrammesintheEcuadorianpartoftheAmazonbasinwere
partlydestroyedbynativepeople,leadingtoseriouseconomiclosses.Other
foreignoilcompanieshavehadsimilarexperiences.Furthermore,terrorist
attacksstillsometimestakeplaceinthisregion.
Fourth,environmentalrequirementshaverisenconsiderably.Between1990
and2005,20percentoftheforestryinEcuadorwasdestroyedbyoilexploration
andproduction(OPEC2007:48).Inordertoimproveenvironmentalprotection,
somegovernmentsrequirethatforeigncompaniesagreetostrictenvironmental
protectionclauseswhentheynegotiateoilcontracts.Environmentalprotectionis
sometimesalsoforcedbylocalprotestsintheaffectedregions.Forexample,
Peruviannativesarmedwithbows,arrowsandriflesblockedoilproductionat
ArgentinecrudeproducerPluspetrolwhichwasforcedtoshutdownits50,000
barrelsperdayoiloperationinPerusnorthernjungle.Thecompanyfinally
promisedtoworkwiththegovernmentandlocalcommunitiestocleanuprivers
anddevelopprojectssuchasfishfarms.InSinoLatinAmericanoilcooperation
programmes,bothsidesattachgreatimportancetoenvironmentalprotection.
Therefore,forChineseoilcompanies,itisevidentthatmorecapitalisneededto
meetenvironmentalprotectionrequirements.
Fifth,theroleoftheUScannotbeneglected.TheUSexertsadominant
influenceintheWesternhemispherebotheconomicallyandgeopolitically,and
LatinAmericadependsheavilyontheUSenergymarketintermsofoilexports.
AccordingtoBP WorldEnergyStatistics2008,theUSimported204million
tonnesin2007,accountingfor74.43percentofLatinAmericancrudeoil
exports.WiththerapiddevelopmentofSinoLatinAmericanoilcooperation,US
scholarsarguethatChinaspenetrationofLatinAmericacouldposeathreatto
USenergysecurity.Suchviewsarebasedonazerosumlogic:inotherwords,
themoreoilChinaimportsfromLatinAmerica,thelessoilwillbeavailableto
theUS.
InadditionitmustbetakenintoconsiderationthatEuropeanandUSoil
companiesdominatetheLatinAmericanoilmarket.Onlyinrecentyearshave
Russia,IndiaandIranenteredtheLatinAmericanoilsector.Chinaisonlyone
strategic partner enabling Latin American countries to diversify their
cooperation.ChinawillfacefiercecompetitionintheLatinAmericanoilmarket.
OilCooperationbetweenChinaandLatinAmerica 355
5.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
Todate,LatinAmericahasnotbeenamajoroilsupplierforChina.
However,LatinAmericacouldbeastrategicalternativeenablingChinato
diversifyitsoilsupplyinthelongterm.Infact,ChinasentryintoLatin
Americacanpartlybeexplainedbynationaloilcompaniesownbusiness
developmentstrategiesintheageofglobalisation.MajorLatinAmericanoil
producingcountriesmayadjusttheirpoliciestoattractforeigninvestment
becauseofthefinancialcrisisandslowriseininternationaloilprices.Mexico,
Brazil,ColombiaandotherLatinAmericancountrieswanttoincreasetheir
investmentsinexploration,production,refiningandtransportation,which
providesChina withnew opportunitiestoexpandcooperation.However,
politicaluncertaintyandsocialriskscannotbeoverlooked.Otherissues,suchas
environmentalprotectionandlabourrights,willrequireadditionalinvestment.
Increasinglyintensecompetitionisalsoanunavoidablereality.Inthefaceof
suchchallenges,Chinasoilcompaniesmustcontinuetodeepencooperationwith
stateownedoilenterprisesinthehostcountries,explorenewcooperation
models,increaselocalemploymentandcontributemoretolocalcommunities.
Reference
Arriagada,Genaro(2006),犘犲狋狉狅狆狅犾犻狋犻犮狊犻狀犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪,WashingtonD.C.:Inter
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犗狆狆狅狉狋狌狀犻狋犻犲狊狅狀犈狀犲狉犵狔犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀,NewYork:CounciloftheAmericas,11March.
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犈狀犲狉犵狔犘狅犾犻犮狔犻狀犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪.犚犲狆狅狉狋犳狅狉狋犺犲犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犆狅犿犿犻狋狋犲犲狅犳狋犺犲
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Jiang,Wenran(2006),ChinasEnergyEngagementwithLatinAmerica,in:犆犺犻狀犪犅狉犻犲犳,
VI,16,2August.
OPECBulletin (2007),犕犲犿犫犲狉犆狅狌狀狋狉狔犘狉狅犳犻犾犲:犈犮狌犪犱狅狉狉犲犼狅犻狀狊犗犘犈犆,December,
Vienna.
Valera,JoseL.(2007),ChangingOilandGasFiscalandRegulatoryRegimesinLatin
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TheUSCongressionalResearchService,9September.
356 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉11
犜犺犲犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犘狅犾犻犮犻犲狊
犪狀犱犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔—犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犱犅犲狔狅狀犱
!"#$ %&'"&#(
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
ClimatechangeandenergysecurityarecentraltoenergypoliciesinEurope
andabroad.Roughly60percentofglobalgreenhousegasemissionscomefrom
theuseoffossilfuels.IntheEU,energyrelatedemissionsaccountforabout80
percentofallgreenhousegasemissions.Climatechangepoliciesbasedon
ambitiousemissionsreductiontargetswillrequireprofoundchangesinglobal
energysystems.Climatechangeisthusplayinganeverincreasingroleinenergy
policymakingandthevalueofconsideringinteractionsbetweenglobalwarming
andenergysecurityisincreasinglybeingrecognised.Europeanandinternational
policymakersarenowundermountingpressuretoaddressthischallengeandto
buildupcosteffectivepoliciesthatwillreducegreenhousegasemissions,while
ensuringadequate,reliableandaffordableenergysupplies.
Intermsofclimatechange,theEUiscommittedtolimitingglobalwarming
to2℃abovepreindustriallevels.Thiswillrequirecutsinglobalemissionsofat
least50percentby2050relativeto1990levels,andreductionsforindustrialised
countriesinthemagnitudeof8095percentbythesameyear.TheEUandother
industrialisedcountries willneedtotakethelead duetotheirhistoric
responsibilityofhavingemittedmostofthecurrentgreenhousegas(GHG)
emissionsstockintheatmospherethatisresponsibleforclimatechange.While
theEUhasstartedtoaddresstheclimatechangechallengewithitsenergyand
climatechangepackage,adoptedinlate2008,whichaimstounilaterallydecrease
GHGemissionsto20percentbelow1990levelsby2020,itwillrequireaglobal
alliancetoavoiddangerousclimatechange.KeepinginmindthattheEUwas
responsibleforonlyaround11percentofglobalGHGemissionsin2004and
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 357
giventhatthissharecontinuestodecrease,theEUsabilitytohaveadirect
effectonglobalGHGemissionsislimited.Thisiswellillustratedbythefact
thatEUcumulativeCO2savingsbetween2008and2020(witha20percentCO2
emissionsreductiontarget)wouldrepresentonly40percentofChinasannual
CO2emissionsin2020.ButevenifalloftheOrganisationforEconomic
CooperationandDevelopment(OECD)countriesweretoreducetheirGHG
emissionstozeroby2030(whichishighlyunrealistic),nonOECDcountries
alonewouldexceedglobalemissionslevelsinlinewiththe2℃threshold(IEA
2009).Effectiveinternationalclimatechangecooperationthusneedsthe
involvementofdevelopingcountries,andespeciallyoffastgrowingemerging
economies.
Inaddition,decarbonisationofglobalenergysystemsneedstobeachieved
withoutcompromisingthesecurityofenergysupplies.IntheEuropeancontext,
thesupplyofelectricity,heatandmobilityisconsideredsecureifithappenson
anadequate,reliableandaffordablebasis.Inaddition,environmentalconcerns
maybetakenintoaccountwhenevaluatingthesecurityofEuropeanenergy
supplies.However,therearedifferentpointsofviewabouthowadequacy,
reliabilityandaffordabilityofenergysuppliescanbeachieved.Thosestressing
theeconomicperspectivefocusonmarketrulesandtheirabilitytoequatesupply
anddemand,renderingtheconceptofenergysecuritymeaningless.Inlinewith
thisview,neithertheworldnortheEUarecurrentlyfacingsevereenergy
securitychallengestobedealtwithwithinareinforcedinternationalframework,
byheavygovernmentinterventionorevenbymilitarymeans.Acontraryviewis
heldbyforeign policy analysts who are convinced thattheincreasing
nationalisationofenergyresourcesandthepoliticisationofenergymanagement
byresourcerichcountrieshavemadeenergysecuritya matterofnational
security.Accordingtothem,themarketaloneisnotabletodealwiththemounting
andmultifacetedchallengesthatenergyconsumingcountriesmustfaceinaglobalised
world.Energysecuritythereforerequiresinternationalcooperation,government
interventionandmilitarycontrol.Neitherofthesetwointerpretationscanbedismissed
nordotheycapturethewholepictureofsecurityofsupply.Infact,theeconomicand
thesocalledpoliticalinterpretationaretwosidesofthesamecoin:theycomplement
eachotherandbotharenecessarytoexplainthechallenges,aswellasthesolutionsto
thesecurityofenergysupplyinEurope.
Itiswidelyassumedthatclimatechangepolicyinthecontextofambitious
greenhousegasreductiontargetscanbebeneficialtosecurityofsupply.
However,thereisageneralmisconceptionthatenergysecurityrisksarelargely
relatedtoimportdependence.WhileitistruethattheEUisfacedwith
358 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
increasingimportdependency,whichmightreach70percentin2030,thereare
manyothersupplyrisksthatneedtobetakenintoaccountwhendesigningfuture
energysystems.Notalloftheserisksareexternal.Infact,mostoftherecent
supplydisruptioninEuropehaddomesticcausesconnectedtostrikes,weather
relatedsystemsfailures,lackofcapitalinvestmentorgenerallythepoor
conditionoftheenergysystem.Itisthusimportanttoassesslowcarbonenergy
sourcesinlightofthecomplexityofsupplyrisks.
2.犚犲狀犲狑犪犫犾犲犈狀犲狉犵狔犛狅狌狉犮犲狊
In2005,renewablesaccountedfor8.5percentoffinalenergyconsumption
intheEU(EuropeanCommission2008).Withtheagreementon17December
2008ontheEUenergyandclimatepackage,thenewRenewablesDirectivewas
sealed,whichsetstheframeworkforincreasingtheoverallshareofrenewables
inEUenergyconsumptionto20percentby2020.TheEUadoptedthisbinding
renewablestargetintheconvictionthatrenewableenergiesreduceairpollution
andgreenhousegasemissionsandthatthey“promisestrategicimprovementsin
thesecurityofsupply,reducethelongtermpricevolatilitytowhichtheEUis
subjectedasapricetakerforfossilfuelsandcouldofferanenhancedcompetitiveedge
fortheEUenergytechnologyindustry”(EuropeanCommission2007).Furthermore,
renewableenergysources“facilitateimprovementintheeconomicandsocialprospects
ofruralandisolatedregionsinindustrialisedcountriesandhelpmeetbasicenergyneeds
indevelopingcountries”(EuropeanCommission2007).
Renewablescanalsoplayapivotalroleinsecuringenergy,protectingthe
environment(bothintermsofreducingGHGemissionsandairpollution)and
stabilisingeconomiesindevelopingcountries.Developingcountriesnotonlyhave
largepotentialforexpandingtheuseofrenewables,butin2006theyalreadyhad
ashareof43percentofglobalrenewableelectricitycapacity(REN212008),
mainlyintheformofbiomassandsmallhydropower.China,forexample,has
theworldslargestinstalledcapacity,totallingaround52GW,accountingfor25per
centofglobalcapacity.ThisisalmosttwicethesizeofcapacitiesinGermanyor
theUSA.Similarly,Chinawasleadinginnewcapacityinvestmentsin2006,
secondonlytoGermany.
Substituting renewables for conventionalfossil energy sources can
contributesignificantlytodomesticGHGemissionsreductionsinelectricity
production,heatingandcooling,aswellasinthetransportsector.Solar
photovoltaic,hydroelectric,biomassandwindhavenodirectemissionsandtheir
indirectlifecycleemissionsareonlyafractionoftotalemissionsofcoalandgas.
Togetherwithotherrenewables,suchasgeothermalandtidalpower,thereisa
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 359
broadportfolioofrenewablesthatcanbeusedtoachieveGHGreductiontargets
withadiversifiedfuelmix.InthecaseoftheEU,mostoftheseresourcesare
domesticallyavailable (biomassandconcentratingsolarpowercanbean
exception).Aswitchtorenewablesthusgenerallyreducesimportdependency.
However,whetherthisisasecurityofsupplybenefitdependsonwhetherimport
dependenceisregardedasarisktoadequate,reliableandaffordableelectricity.
Globaloilandcoalmarketsarerelativelyopenandwellfunctioning,andprices—
aswellastheirvolatility—aremuchmoreofasecurityofsupplyconcernthan
importdependencyperse.Intermsofgas,however,pricesarelargelyregulated
orlinkedtooilprices,andarethusmuchlessabletobalancesupplyand
demand.Inaddition,theEUisregionallylinkedtoonlyafewsuppliersviafixed
infrastructure,whichmakesphysicalunavailabilityofgasmoreofaconcern.If
renewablescanincreasetheirshareattheexpenseofgasimports,itcouldthus
bearguedthattherearesomesecurityofsupplygains.However,intermsof
GHGemissionsreductions,anincreaseofrenewablessubstitutingforelectricity
productionfromcoalwouldbepreferable.Duetotheintermittenceofmany
renewableenergytechnologies(seebelow),theyarenotwellsuitedtoserve
peakdemand,butinsteadlikelytodisplacetypicalbaseloadgenerationplants.
TheIEA(2007)thusassumesthat“coal,gasand—inthecaseofarenewable
energypolicy,nuclear—aredisplacedproportionallytotheirroleinthefuel
mix”.
Moreimportantintermsofenergysecurityistheriskofintermittencefroman
increasingshareofrenewablesintheenergymix.Intermittenceinthecaseof
renewablesreferstoundesiredoruncontrolledvariabilityofoutput(Sinden2005).At
thesametime,renewablesarecharacterisedbyreduceddispatchabilityor
manoeuvrability,whichreferstotheirabilitytoincreaseordecreaseoutput
quicklyondemand(KuntzandDawe2005).Notallrenewablesareequally“unreliable”: Large hydro, bioenergy and geothermal resources and
concentratingsolarpower(CSP)“offercomparablelevelsoffirmcapacitiesto
conventionalfossilfuelbasedplants”(IEA2007).Biomass,ontheonehand,
canbestoredandusedwhenrequiredandthusprovidesamoreorlessconstant
electricitysupply.Solarphotovoltaicapplications,wind,smallhydropower
plantsandfuture waveenergyresources,ontheotherhand,are more
intermittentandvariableinsupplyingelectricity(IEA2007).IncurrentEU
electricitysystems,intermittencyisnotgenerallyaproblem becausethe
penetrationofintermittentrenewablesisstilllow (although withstrong
variationsamongmemberstates).However,theelectricitygridwilleventually
needtoadapttohighersharesofintermittentelectricity,althoughthereisno
360 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
consensusonhowmuchintermittentelectricitycanbesustainedbythegrid.
Maximumpenetrationofintermittentrenewableenergytechnologywillprobably
bedeterminedbyeconomicefficiencyandcostconsiderationsratherthanby
technicalfeasibility.
Thereareseveraloptionswithregardtodealingwithintermittencein
electricitysystems,whichincludeinvestmentinmorereliableinfrastructureand
bettergrid interconnection,and balancing a mix ofrenewable energy
technologieswithdifferentnaturalcycles.Ingeneral,itcanbearguedthat
renewableswithhighershorttermvariabilityaremoreriskyforsupplysecurity,
unlesscombinedwithrenewableswithdifferentnaturalcyclesorappropriate
backupcapacity.Theneedforbackupcapacityforintermittentrenewablescan
bereducediftheyareusedincombinationwithamixofotherrenewableenergy
technologiesthatarelessintermittent.Forexample,windpowercanbe
complementedbylargehydroinstallations,orpossiblyevenwithhydrogen
poweredplants.However,largescaleintegration ofrenewablesintothe
electricitygridwillalsorequireinvestmentinbackupcapacitiesandelectricity
storagetocompensatetheremaininguncertaintiesofthegrid.
Similarly,appropriatedemandside managementstrategieswillhelpto
regulatedemand,forexample,bysettingpriceincentivesandincreasingprice
transparencytoreducetheuseofelectricityduringpeakhours.
Inanefforttoovercomesomeoftherisksassociatedwithrenewableenergy
sourcesandtoimproveinternationalcooperationtofacilitatethetransition
towardsthewidespreaduseofrenewablesintheworld,theInternational
RenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA)wasestablishedon26January2009.While
itistooearlytoassesstheeffectivenessoftheorganisation,itseemsthatit
couldpotentiallymakeasubstantialcontributiontodecarbonisetheglobalenergy
sectorbyimprovingtheknowledgebase,providingpolicyadvice,promoting
technologytransferandstimulatingresearch.IncontrasttotheIEA,IRENA
SignatoryStatesincludebothindustrialisedanddevelopingeconomiesfrom
Africa,Asia,EuropeandLatinAmerica.However,thetwolargestglobal
greenhousegasemitters—ChinaandtheUSA—havenot(yet)joinedIRENA.
Tohaveatrulyglobalreach,theAgencywillneedtheseandothercountriesto
participate(forexample,Australia,Brazil,Mexico,Russia,SouthAfricaand
theUnitedKingdom,aswellassomeofthemainoilproducingcountries).Only
withbroad membershipwillIRENA beabletopursueaglobalstrategy,
providingafocalpointforallglobalrenewableenergyissues.Ontheotherhand,
someindustrialisedcountriesmaybenefitfromincreasedglobaleffortswith
regardtorenewables,hopingto“reapcommercialgainsfromtheirtechnological
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 361
leadershipinareassuchasadvancedwindturbinedesignandmanufacturing”
(Sioshansi2009).Butsomeemergingeconomies—andespeciallyChina—willbe
abletobenefitfromanexpandingglobalrenewablessectoraswell,being
producersofcleanenergytechnologiesthemselves.China,forexample,isthe
worldslargestproducerofphotovoltaiccells(ofwhich98percentarefor
export)andBrazilistheworldssecondlargestproducerofethanolandthe
worldslargestexporter.Itisthusamisconceptiontoconsidercleantechnology
transfermerelyasa“NorthSouth”traderelationship.Withproductionoflow
carbontechnologiesmaturinginemergingeconomies,therewillincreasinglybe
tradeflowsintoindustrialisedcountries,assumingthatmarketforcesare
allowedtofunctionfreely.
Finally,broadeningthemandateofIRENAshouldbeconsideredtoextend
itintoaglobalplatformforalllowcarbontechnologies(exceptnuclear,which
hasitsownagencyintheformoftheIAEA).IfIRENAfocussedalsoonenergy
efficiencyandonothercleanenergytypes(forexample,cleancoal)itmight
makeabettercontributiontodecarbonisingglobalenergysystems.
3.犖犪狋狌狉犪犾犌犪狊
Naturalgasmaybeanimportantintermediatesolutiontoclimatechangeas
itproduceslessCO2perunitofenergythancoaloroil.Itmaythusbeadvisable
totemporarilyincreasetheshareofnaturalgas—asasubstituteforcoaloroil—
untilrenewabletechnologiesaremarketreadyonalargescale,althoughthis
wouldbeatthecostofincreasingimportdependencefurther.Atthesame
time,effortstoincreasesecurityofenergysupply mayleadto measures
substitutinggaswithcoaloroil,thusincreasinggreenhousegasemissions,at
leastintheshortterm.Thishasbeenthecaseinnationalresponsestothe
RussiaUkrainetransitdisputeundrelateddecreasesinRussiangasdeliveriesin
January2009.
Withashareofalmost25percentofgrossinlandenergyconsumption,
naturalgasisthesecondmostimportantenergycarrierintheEU.Atthesame
time,about60percentofthegasconsumedintheEUneedstobeimportedfrom
abroadandtheEuropeanCommissionestimatesthatthissharewillincreaseto
over80percentby2030.Europeangasimportsarehighlyconcentrated,with
almost90percentoriginatinginonlythreecountries(EuropeanCommission
2008),wherethegasmarketistightlycontrolledbygovernments.Inthis
respect,fearsof“gascartels”orofenergybeingusedasapoliticaloreconomic
weapondonotseemcompletelyunfounded (forexample,inthecontextof
recurringRussiaUkrainegasdisputes whichrepeatedlyaffectseveralEU
362 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
memberstatesgassupply).Similarly,thereisariskofalackofinvestmentin
exploration,productionandtransportation,despitereservesbeingabundantly
availableinareassurroundingEurope(forexample,Mueller2007).
Currentenergyscenariosshowthatareductionofdependencyongas
throughanincreaseindomesticproductionorthroughenergysavingsisnot
credible.Thesituationisdifferentwithregardtothediversificationofexporting
countries.Europespositionintheworldmarketcouldbemorefavourabledepending
onwhetherAfricanand MiddleEasternexportsgrowsubstantially,backedby
significantvolumesofLiquefiedNaturalGas(LNG).ThedevelopmentofLNGspot
marketsisexpectedtoeasesomeconcernsaboutsecurityofsupply,especiallyin
termsof pipeline diplomacy,due to its advantages offlexibility and
diversification.Currently,about10percentofEuropesgasimportsareinthe
formofLNG.Thissharecouldroughlydoubleby2020.However,some
drawbacksremain.BesidethefactthatLNGtechnologyissensitivetophysical
threats,exportershavenotkeptupwithincreasingfacilitiesinimporting
countries,leadingtosomeregasificationterminalsstandingidle.Inaddition,the
EUisexpectedtofacefiercecompetitionfromotherimportingcountries,suchas
theUS(Larsson2007).
AnothercriticalfactoristransportcapacitytowardsEurope,asitseems
verylikelythatprojectedinfrastructurewillnotbeableto meetexpected
demand.Thisimpliestheneedtogainaccesstogasreserves,toopenup
producingareastointernationalinvestmentandtodevoteattentiontothe
stabilityof“transitcountries”.Severalinfrastructureprojectsarecurrently
beingplannedintheEU,twoofwhichwillincreasethedependenceonRussian
gasimports(albeitreducingthetransitrisk)andoneofwhichwilldiversify
importstowardstheCaspianregionandtheMiddleEast(thatis,theNabucco
pipelineproject).Itshouldbenotedthatcurrentgasinfrastructureprojects
(bothpipelinesandLNG)willdeterminefuturegreenhousegasemissions
becausetheylockEuropeintoacarbonintensiveenergypatternwhichisnotin
linewiththetargetedgreenhousegasemissionstoavoiddangerousclimate
change.Withalifetimeof2050years(andbeyond)newlybuiltgaspipelines
willincreaseEuropesdependenceongasfurther,renderingcarbonneutral
energysystemsby2050lesslikely.
Inaddition,thefuturecarbonpricewillhaveanimpactonthefutureofthe
gasmarkets.Mostgascompanieshaveadjustedtheirgas marketgrowth
expectationsdownwardsafterthefirstcarbonmarketexperience,duetothe
competitionofgaswithcoalandnuclearforpowergeneration.However,if
naturalgasisunabletotakealargershareinpowergeneration,itwillnotbe
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 363
abletoliveuptoitsexpectationstobea“bridge”toalowcarboneconomyand
mayevenbecomeasunsetindustry.
4.犆狅犪犾犪狀犱狋犺犲犚狅犾犲狅犳犆犪狉犫狅狀犆犪狆狋狌狉犲犪狀犱犛狋狅狉犪犵犲(犆犆犛)
Ontheglobalscale,coaliscurrentlythefastestgrowingfossilenergy
carrierandcontinuestobethesecondmostimportantfossilfuel,slowlyclosing
thegapwithoil.InthereferencescenarioofitsWorldEnergyOutlook,theIEA
(2008)predictsa61percentincreaseinglobalconsumptionofcoalbetween2006
and2030.Overthenext10years,Chinaalonewillinstallmorepowergeneration
capacitybasedoncoalthanEuropesentirecurrentstock.
IntheEU,however,primarycoaldemandhasdecreasedconsiderablysince
the1980s,largelyduetotheswitchfromcoaltogasfiredpowerproductionin
WesternEuropeandeconomictransitionintheEast.Thistrendisexpectedto
continue,withdemanddecreasingbyalmost20percentbetween2006and2030.
Similarly,thevolumeofcoalproduceddomesticallywithintheEU27 will
continuetodecrease.Asaresult,theEU willbecomemoredependenton
importsdespiteowningconsiderabledomesticreserves(3.5percentofglobal
reserves).Domesticcoalproductionisforecasttofallto48percentof
consumptionby2030,downfrom59percentin2006.
Coalimportsarefarmoreregionallydiversifiedthannaturalgasimports,for
example,andmostexportingcountriesqualifyasstabledemocracies,which
largelyrespectthesamemarketandpoliticalrulesastheEU.Inaddition,the
coalmarketisatrulyglobal,openandwellfunctioningone,notdominatedbya
singlesupplier,suchasOPEC.Atthesametime,therearestillconsiderable
globalprovencoalreserves,which—atthecurrentglobalrateofproduction—
maybesufficientforanother133years(BP2008).Finally,coalisrelativelysafe
totransportandstore.Itcanbetransportedquicklybyshipandrail,without
theneedforexpensivelongruninfrastructureandrelatedtransportandtransit
securityissues.AllthesefactorscontributetotheassessmentthatEuropean
importdependencydoesnotposeanelevatedrisktoitsuninterruptedsupplyof
coalinthelongrun(althoughtherearesomerisksintheshortrunstemming
fromweatherandotherunforeseeablefactorsinproducercountries,aswellas
increasingdemandinsomeemergingeconomies).
Giventhatimportdependenceisnotamajorlongtermsecurityissueinthe
caseofcoal,thereareotherrisksthatneedtobedealtwith.Ontheglobalscale,
thegreatestenvironmentalthreatinthelongtermisclimatechange.Theuseof
coalinelectricityproductioncausesfarmoregreenhousegasemissionsthanthe
useofanyotherenergycarrier.Toputthisintoperspective,at28percent,coal
364 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
isthesecondlargestsourceofelectricitygenerationintheEU27,justbehind
nuclear(30percent).Insomecountries,thisshareisconsiderablyhigher,such
asinPoland(91percent),Estonia(91percent),theCzechRepublic(59per
cent)andGreece (59percent)(EuropeanCommission2008).Inviewof
Europesambitiousenergyandclimatechangetargets,cleancoaltechnologies
mustbedevelopedquickly,otherwisecoalcannotcontinuetoplayamajorrolein
Europesenergymix.ThesameappliestoChina,whichderivesaround70per
centofitsenergymixfromcoal.
Asindicatedintheintroduction,industrialisedcountriesareexpectedtocut
greenhousegasemissionsby8095percentinordertoallowglobalemissionsto
dropto50percentof1990levelsby2050.ThecurrentenergymixofEU27is
largelycharacterisedbycarbonintensivefossilfuelswhichmadeup79percent
ofGrossInlandConsumptionin2005(EuropeanCommission2008).Giventhe
carbonintensity ofthe European energy mix andthe possibility ofa
“renaissance”ofcoalonsecurityofsupplygrounds,Europecanonlyachieve
suchambitiousgreenhousegasreductiontargetsifitdevelopscarboncaptureand
storage(CCS)focusedoncoalfiredpowerproduction,butalsoonemissions
fromotherfossilbasedformsofpowerproductionandemissionsfromindustry.
Undercurrenttechnologicalconditions,CCSprocessescancapturearound85per
centoftheCO2emittedatsource.However,theseprocessesreducethethermal
efficiencyofplantsby812percent(IEA2008)andthusincreasetheneedfor
coalinputs.
ThesuccessoftheCCStechnologywilllargelydependonthesuccessofthe
demonstrationphase,publicacceptance,thespeedofadoptingEUlegislation
andtheprovisionofasecurelegalframework,aswellasonthesuccessofthe
EUETSandthepriceofCO2.ToimproveliabilityandreducethecostsofCCS
technologies,itisimportantintheshorttomediumtermtodevelopappropriate
demonstrationprojects,inwhichcurrentlyusedCCStechnologiesareadapted
foruseinlargescalepowerplantsandimprovedthroughresearch and
development.TheEUdecidedinDecember2008toraisefundingforthese
commercialdemonstrationprojectsbysettingaside300millioncarbonallowances
intheEUEmissionsTradingScheme(ETS)startingin2013,equivalentto
aboutEUR9billionatapriceofEUR30pertonneofCO2.TheEUwillalso
needtoacceleratedomesticresearchandwillneedtoincreaseinvolvementin
internationalresearchcooperation,forexamplewithChina.Afterall,CCSis
notjustanopportunityfortheEUtocontinuebenefitingfromtheadvantagesof
coalbutalsoforcleaningChinaspowersectorandrelatedtechnologyexport
opportunities.
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 365
5.犖狌犮犾犲犪狉犈狀犲狉犵狔
Nuclearenergyiscurrentlythelargestsinglesourceoflowcarbonelectricity
intheEU.In2007,itaccountedfor14percentoftheEUtotalenergysupply
andprovided31percentoftheelectricitygenerated.Overall,thereare145
nuclearpowerplantsinoperationacross15EUmemberstates(mostofwhich
werebuiltbetweenthe1970sand1980s)(EuropeanNuclearSociety2009),with
anotherfournuclearpowerplantscurrentlyunderconstruction.EU member
statescontinuetobedividedaboutnuclearenergy.Eventhoughsomemember
statesrecentlycameforward withplansfornew plants,itwouldbean
exaggerationtospeakofa‘nuclearrenaissance’.Evenifallcurrentlyplanned
nuclearpowerplantswerebuiltinEurope,theywouldhardlybeabletoreplace
theageingnuclearinfrastructure,letaloneaddtoexistingcapacity,should
Germanyphaseoutits17nuclearpowerplantscurrentlyinoperation.
Thoseinfavourarguethatnuclearenergycouldcontributetoincrease
Europessecurityofenergysupplyandcontributesignificantlytoreachingthe
EUsclimateobjectives.First,thissupportcomesfrom theincreasing
competitivenessofelectricitygenerationfromnuclear.Thisisduetodeclining
fuel(includingenrichment),operatingandmaintenancecosts,whiletheplant
concernedhasbeenpaidfor(WorldNuclearAssociation2008).However,it
shouldbenotedthatlargecapitalcostsforconstructionofnewplantsremain
problematic,especiallywithcapitalinshortsupplyduetothecurrentfinancial
crisis.Inaddition,decliningoilpriceshavemademanynuclearprojectsless
competitive(atleastintheshortterm).Second,theindigenousnatureof
nuclearpowerproductionreassuresmemberstatesagainstrisksrelatedtoimport
dependency.ItisnotsurprisingthatcentralandeasternEuropeancountries—
withthehighestdependencyonRussiangasimports—aremostsupportiveof
nuclearpower.Whilealmost100percentofEUuraniumrequirementsare
importedfromabroad,itsavailabilityinreliablecountriessuchasCanadaand
Australia—accountingfor45percentofEUuraniumrequirements—usuallydoes
notraiseimportdependencyconcerns.Thethirdreasonfornuclearsupportis
relatedtothefactthat,togetherwithrenewableenergysources,nuclearenergy
isoneoftheleastcarbonintensivesourcesofenergy.Thisargumentisoften
usedbyproponentsofnuclearenergyinrelationtoachievingclimatechange
objectivesatcurrentlevelsofenergyconsumption.
DespitetherecentdeclarationsofintentbymanyEuropeancountriesto
undertakenewnuclearprojects,somescepticismexistsonarealboosttonuclear
powergenerationinEurope.Withoutmassiveinvestmentstoreplaceageing
366 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
facilitiesandtobuildnewplants,Europesnucleargeneratingcapacityisinfact
expectedtoshrinkratherthantogrow.Accordingly,theIEAforecaststhat
electricitygenerationfromnuclearwilldecreasefrom31percentto21percent
by2020(IEA2008).Themainreasonsforthepossiblestagnationanddeclineof
nuclearpowergenerationarecostssuchasstartupcosts,decommissioningand
wastemanagement.Moreover,safety (thelackofacommonapproachto
European safety standards),public opinion and perception, waste and
proliferation(MIT2003)arealsoimportantreasons.Inaddition,thenuclear
powersectorsuffersfromanageingworkforceandageneralshortageofqualified
labour,aswellasfromashortageofkeycomponentsofthesupplychain.
6.犈狀犲狉犵狔犈犳犳犻犮犻犲狀犮狔
EnergyefficiencyhasbecomeacornerstoneoftheEuropeanCommissions
energypolicy.TheEUhassetitselfanonbindingtargetofsaving20percentof
energyconsumptionby2020throughenergyefficiency,whichmaysaveupto
EUR100billionandanestimated800milliontonnesofCO2peryear(European
Commission2008).AccordingtotheCommission ActionPlanon Energy
Efficiency (European Commission2006),thelargestcosteffectivesavings
potentialsareinthehouseholdandtertiarysectors,at27percentand30per
cent,respectively.Formanufacturingindustry,theoverallpotentialisestimated
tobearound25percent,whilefortransportthefigureis26percent.
Onaglobalscale,improvingenergyefficiencywillalsoallowdeveloping
countriestoreducethegrowthofenergydemandandgreenhousegasemissions,
aswellastosavecostsofenergyproduction.ArecentstudybyMcKinsey
(2009)showedthatsome65percentofglobalpositivereturnenergyefficiency
opportunitiesareindevelopingcountries.Chinahasthelargestpotential(22per
centofglobalopportunities),followedbythe MiddleEast(10percent),
EasternEurope(10percent),LatinAmerica(8percent)andIndia(7per
cent).TheworldspoorestcountriesinSoutheastAsiaandAfricaareless
attractivefromanenergyefficiencyperspective,offeringonly5percentand4
percentofglobalopportunities,respectively.
Energyefficiencyachievedbyreducingdemandincreasestheflexibilityof
thewholeenergychainandtherebyprovidesanadditionalmarginforsecurity.
Putanotherway,iftheflexibilityneededtocopewithsupplyfailureisa
proportionofoverallenergydemand,thenthecostofprovidingaconstantlevel
ofsecurityofsupplydecreasesiftheoverallenergydemandisreduced
(EgenhoferandLegge2001).
However,therearesomedoubtsaboutthecorrelationbetweenincreasing
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 367
energyefficiencyandreducingimportdependency,atleastinEurope.TheIEA
(2008)reportsthatEuropesenergyefficiencyhasconsistentlyimprovedover
time:from1,200MillionTonnesofOilEquivalent(Mtoe)ofNegajoules(that
is,avoidedenergyconsumptionthroughenergysavings)in1970,to2,000Mtoe
in1990and2,800Mtoein2005.However,thisimprovementhasnottranslated
intoaparalleldownwardtrendforEuropestotalprimaryenergyimports:
Europesimportdependencegrewfrom42percentin1990to52percentin2005
(IEA2008).Accordingly,evenassumingthefullapplicationoftheexistingEU
directivesonenergyefficiency,importdependencyisprojectedtoincreasefrom
47.2percentin2000to65.5percentin2030.Withenergydemanddecreasing
fasterthanEUdomesticenergyproduction,importdependencein2010and2020
willbeslightlylowerthanin2000.Inthelongterm(thatis,until2030),the
reductionindemandforelectricityproducedfromnuclearandindigenoussolid
fuelswillleadtolowerexploitationofEuropeanenergysources,whichmore
thancounterbalancesthedeclineinprimaryenergyconsumption.Asaresult,
importdependenceinthe“energyefficiencycase”in2030maybeslightlyhigher
thaninthebaseline(EuropeanCommission2006).
Theabsenceofastrongcorrelationbetweenenergyefficiency,ontheonehand,
energyimportsandsecurityofsupply,ontheother,hasseveral—complementary—
explanations.TheprogressiveexhaustionofEuropesindigenousresources—especially
oilandgas—isone.Second,thereisthesocalled“reboundeffect”.Improvementsin
energyefficiencymakeenergyservices(forexample,heatormobility)cheaper,thus
encouragingtheirfurtheruse.Thiscanresultinanoverallincreaseinenergy
consumption,despitetheinitialdemandreduction.Thereboundeffectisverydifficultto
measureanditcanhavedifferentimpactsindifferentsectorsbut,generallyspeaking,its
impacthassofarbeenunderestimated.Inindustrialisedcountries,foranyincreasein
energyefficiencythereisareboundeffectofatleast10percent(uptoover50percent).
Thismeansthattheactualreductioninenergyconsumptionisequaltoonlyacertain
percentageoftheexpectedenergysaving(UKEnergyResearchCentre2007).
Energyefficiency measuresareoneofthe key areasforimproved
internationalcooperation.Thestrongprojectedgrowthofenergydemandin
developingandtransitioncountriesisexpectedtoleveloffanypossibleenergy
efficiencyimprovementintheEU,bothfromthesecurityofsupplyandtheCO2
emissionsperspectives(EgenhoferandLegge2001).WhileEuropesprimary
energydemandisexpectedtoincreaseby4.5percentbetween2006and2030,
thebiggestemergingconsumercountryintheworld,namelyChina,willregister
agrowthofmorethan100percent(IEA2008).ThismeansthatiftheEUwas
abletosave20percentofenergyconsumption,Chinaalonewouldmakeupfor
368 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
morethanEuropesimprovements.Inotherwords,Europeseffortstoreduce
greenhousegaseswillbeneutralisedbyChina.Thispointisreinforcedwhen
takingintoaccounttheprojecteddemandgrowthofotheremergingeconomies—
suchasIndia—andtransitioneconomies.Energyefficiencyorconservation
measuresinemergingeconomiesortransitioncountrieswouldbefarmore
beneficialbothforglobalenergysecurityandGHGreductionmeasures.Forthis
reason,theEUpropagatesproactivecooperationwithkeythirdcountries.Its
aim wouldbetodevelopa multilateralpartnershipforenergyefficiency
involving,atfirst,membercountriesoftheOECD withapossiblefuture
enlargementtootherpartners.Theagreementcouldincludevariousissueareas
ofcooperation,suchasregulatorycooperation,informationexchangeonenergy
savingstrategies,methodsofmeasurementandresearchcooperationonenergy
efficiencytechnologies.
7.犃犱犪狆狋犪狋犻狅狀牶狋犺犲犆犪狊犲狅犳犈犾犲犮狋狉犻犮犻狋狔
TheelectricitysectorplaysacentralroleintheEuropeanUnionseffortsto
achievegreenhousegas(GHG)reductionsofatleast20percentby2020
comparedto1990levels.Whiletheelectricitysectoriscurrentlyresponsiblefor
aboutonethirdofEuropestotalenergyrelatedGHGemissions,thereisconsiderable
potentialforreducingemissions.Mitigationstrategieswillneedtofocusnotonlyon
moreefficientelectricityuse,butalsoonimprovedconversionratesandnew
technologies,suchasrenewablesandcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS).
Apartfromthemitigationofclimatechange,thesectorwillalsohavetoadaptto
climatechangetoprovidesecureanduninterruptedservice(foramoredetailedanalysis
ofadaptationintheEuropeanelectricitysector,seeEskelandetal.2008).Global
warmingwillhaveasignificantimpactontheabilitytogenerateelectricityandto
deliveritwithoutinterruption.Southerncountrieswillmostlikelybefacedwithless
demandforheatingbutsubstantiallyincreaseddemandforairconditioning.Theymay
alsoexperiencelossesinhydropowerandproblemswithcoolingofthermalpower
plants.Northerncountrieswillequallyexperiencelessdemandforheatingandmay
gainpotentialforelectricityproductionfromhydropower.Atthesametime,theymay
havetoadapttomorestormsandheavyprecipitation.Inbothregions,electricitysupply
disruptionsduetostorms,floodsandheatwavesmayincreasetheneedformore
decentralisedelectricitygenerationinordertoavoidnegativeimpactsonelectricityusers.
8.犆狅狀犮犾狌狊犻狅狀
Thischapterhasshownthatclimatechangepolicyinthecontextof
ambitiousgreenhousegasreductiontargetsmaybebeneficialtosecurityof
TheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangePoliciesandEnergySecurity!EuropeandBeyond 369
supply.Renewableenergysources,energyefficiency,cleancoal,nuclearenergy
and,generally,anewinnovationdriveareexamplesofmutuallybeneficialareas.
However,manysecurityofsupplybenefitsarenotalwaysstraightforward.
Renewablesareoftenintermittent,thuscausingadditional—albeitdifferent—
securityofsupplyproblems.Energyefficiencyreducesimportdependenceonlyin
theshortandmediumterm.Andeventhisisnotautomaticallypositive,given
thatimportdependenceisnotproblematicperseinthecurrentEUenergy
system.Nuclearenergyhasitsownsecurityrisksandcleancoalisnotyet
available,withcarboncaptureandstoragetechnologiesyettobedemonstrated
onalargecommercialscale.
Whileitcangenerallybearguedthatclimatechangerelatedpoliciesare—at
leasttosomeextent—beneficialtosecurityofenergysupply,theoppositedoes
notalwaysholdtrue.Especiallygaspipelinepoliticsandrelatedinfrastructure
projectswillpredefineenergysuppliesin2050yearstocomeduetothelong
lifetimeofpipelinesand/orLNGinstallations,ifproperlymaintained.Inother
words,unlessequippedwithCCStechnologies,gassupplydiversificationefforts
maylockenergyconsumingcountriesintoanenergypatternthatisnotinline
withgreenhousegasemissionsrequirementstoavoiddangerousclimatechange.
However,whenlinkedtothesubstitutionofcoal,gascouldbeanintermediate
steptowardsreducingemissions.Otherexamplesoftechnologiesthatincrease
securityofsupplyatthecostofclimatechangearetarsands,oilshales,coalor
coaltoliquids.Thesetechnologiesshouldbeavoidedinthefuture.
Internationalcooperationwillbecrucialinachievingacleanandsecure
globalenergysystem.Someemergingeconomiesarenotonlymajorgreenhouse
gasemittersbutalsoproducersofcleanenergytechnologies.IRENAisastepin
therightdirection,butitneedstoinvolveallmajorglobalenergyusersand
producerstobeeffective.Similarly,itmaybeusefultoextenditsmandateto
othercleanenergytechnologies,includingenergyefficiency.
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EuropeanCommission (2007),犌狉犲犲狀犘犪狆犲狉犉狅犾犾狅狑狌狆 犃犮狋犻狅狀犚犲狆狅狉狋狅狀犘狉狅犵狉犲狊狊犻狀
370 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
犚犲狀犲狑犪犫犾犲犈犾犲犮狋狉犻犮犻狋狔,COM(2006)849,10January.
EuropeanCommission(2008),犈犝犈狀犲狉犵狔犪狀犱犜狉犪狀狊狆狅狉狋犻狀犉犻犵狌狉犲狊,StatisticalPocketbook
2008,Brussels.
EuropeanNuclearSociety(2009),犖狌犮犾犲犪狉犘狅狑犲狉犘犾犪狀狋狊犻狀犈狌狉狅狆犲,online:http://www.
euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclearpowerplanteurope.htm (February24,
2009).
IEAInternationalEnergyAgency(2007),犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犘狅犾犻犮狔—犃狊狊犲狊狊犻狀犵
犐狀狋犲狉犪犮狋犻狅狀狊,Paris:OECD/IEA.
IEAInternationalEnergyAgency(2008),犠狅狉犾犱犈狀犲狉犵狔犗狌狋犾狅狅犽2008,OECD/IEA,Paris
IEAInternationalEnergyAgency(2009),犘狉犲狊犲狀狋犪狋犻狅狀狅犳犉犪狋犻犺犅犻狉狅犾犪狋狋犺犲4狋犺犃狀狀狌犪犾
犆犈犘犛/犈狆狊犻犾狅狀犈狀犲狉犵狔犆狅狀犳犲狉犲狀犮犲,17March,Brussels.
Kuntz,M.andJ.Dawe(2005),犚犲狀犲狑犪犫犾犲.犚犲犮犺犪狉犵犲犪犫犾犲.犚犲犿犪狉犽犪犫犾犲,MechanicalEngineering,
online: http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/membersonly/oct05/features/rerere/
rerere.html(January13,2009).
Larsson,R.(2007),犜犪犮犽犾犻狀犵犇犲狆犲狀犱犲狀犮狔:犜犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犻狋狊犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊,
Stockholm:SwedishDefenceAgency.
McKinsey(2009),PromotingEnergyEfficiencyintheDevelopingWorld,in:犜犺犲犕犮犓犻狀狊犲狔
犙狌犪狉狋犲狉犾狔,February2009.
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology (2003),犜犺犲犉狌狋狌狉犲狅犳 犖狌犮犾犲犪狉犘狅狑犲狉.犃狀
犐狀狋犲狉犱犻狊犮犻狆犾犻狀犪狉狔犕犐犜犛狋狌犱狔,Boston.
Mueller,F.(2007),犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔—犇犲犿犪狀犱狊犐犿狆狅狊犲犱狅狀犌犲狉犿犪狀犪狀犱犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀
犉狅狉犲犻犵狀犘狅犾犻犮狔犫狔犪犆犺犪狀犵犲犱犆狅狀犳犻犵狌狉犪狋犻狅狀犻狀狋犺犲犠狅狉犾犱犈狀犲狉犵狔 犕犪狉犽犲狋,SWP
ResearchPaper2,Berlin:SWP.
REN21(2008),犚犲狀犲狑犪犫犾犲狊2007犌犾狅犫犪犾犛狋犪狋狌狊犚犲狆狅狉狋,REN21SecretariatandWashington,
D.C.,WorldwatchInstitute,Paris.
Sinden,G.(2005),犃狊狊犲狊狊犻狀犵狋犺犲犆狅狊狋狊狅犳犐狀狋犲狉犿犻狋狋犲狀狋犘狅狑犲狉犌犲狀犲狉犪狋犻狅狀,UKEnergy
ResearchCentre,5July.
Sioshansi,F.(2009),犐犚犈犖犃:犇狅犠犲犖犲犲犱犢犲狋犃狀狅狋犺犲狉犈狀犲狉犵狔犃犵犲狀犮狔?online:http://
www.energypolicyblog.com/2009/03/09/irenadoweneedyetanotherenergyagency/
(November30,2010).
UKEnergyResearchCentre(2007),犜犺犲犚犲犫狅狌狀犱犈犳犳犲犮狋:犪狀犃狊狊犲狊狊犿犲狀狋狅犳狋犺犲犈狏犻犱犲狀犮犲
犳狅狉犈犮狅狀狅犿狔狑犻犱犲犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犪狏犻狀犵狊犳狉狅犿犐犿狆狉狅狏犲犱犈狀犲狉犵狔犈犳犳犻犮犻犲狀犮狔,TheSussex
EnergyGroup,October,Sussex.
WorldNuclearAssociation(2008),犜犺犲犈犮狅狀狅犿犻犮狊狅犳犖狌犮犾犲犪狉犘狅狑犲狉,online:http://
www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf02.html.
"371
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉12
犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲犻狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝,犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犕犪犼狅狉
犆犺犪犾犾犲狀犵犲狊犪狀犱犃狉犲犪狊犳狅狉犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
)*"í* +",(-,#* .,/0* 1*"&2*(
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
From astrategicandgeopoliticalperspective,energyisanimportant
bargainingchipininternationalrelations.Furthermore,globalwarmingisoneof
themainworriesforthefutureoftheplanet;ithasbeendirectlylinkedtothe
lifestylesofpeoplelivingintheindustrialisedcountriesandthekindsofenergy
theyconsume.Nowadays,climatechangeisnotamatteronlyfordiscussion
amongenvironmentalistsorotherexperts,asinthepast,butincreasinglya
significantpoliticalissue,relatedtohumansurvival.
Withregardtoenvironmentalandenergyissues,LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
(LAC)countrieshavebrokenthetrendsofshortageanddependencythattraditionally
characterisedtheirrelationswiththedevelopedworld.Thus,LACcountrieshavea
specialroletoplayandmuchtosayinexternaldialoguesregardingthesetwosubjects.
Thischapterwillfirstgivesomegeneralbackgroundaboutenvironmental
andenergyresourcesinLAC,providingsomecluesforabetterunderstandingof
theregionalsituation,followedbyacloserlookatintraregionalLACdialogues
andcooperation,aswellaswiththeEUandChina.Finally,theinterestsof
LACwithintheframeworkofglobalmultilateralismandthelatestresponsesof
globalregulatorymechanismsareexamined.
2.犔犃犆犛犻狋狌犪狋犻狅狀狑犻狋犺狉犲犵犪狉犱狋狅犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔犪狀犱犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲
Inthefieldofenergysecurity,LACsharesasetofcommongoalsandchallenges,
suchasseekingtodiversifytheenergygrid,incorporatingrenewableenergiesasakey
elementinnationalindependenceandadoptingsustainableenergystrategies.Allthese
372 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
thingswouldgivetheregionastrongerpositiontocompeteinworldmarkets.
TheLACregionhasenormouspotentialintermsofenvironmentaland
energyresources.Itisoneoftherichestbiologicalzonesontheplanet,hosting
40percentoftheworldsanimalandplantspecies(CEPAL2010:120),fresh
waterresources,enormousfertilelandsandfossilfuelreserves.
Withregardtorenewableenergies,LACisparticipatinginthesearchfor
geothermal,water,solarandwindpower,amongotherthings.Ithaslarge
expansesofsoilslyingfallowandlow productivityperhectare,increasing
developmentofmonoculturesforbiomass(sugarcane,soy,palmtree)andincipient
developmentofsecondgenerationbiofuels(notreadyforcommercialisationforadecade
orso).
2.1 RenewableversusNonrenewableEnergy
Intheirreversibleprocessofbuildingupaglobalbiofuelsmarket,LAC
countriesareparticipatinginvariousways,althoughBrazilistheprincipalactor
inthissector.However,biofuelsarenotseenasthesolutiontoenergyneedsin
LAC.Theyarenotpromotedbythesamekindofenthusiasticpropagandaasin
theEuropeanUnion,beingconsideredacomplementaryenergysupply,together
withotheralternatives,suchasbiogas,solar,wind,hydroelectricandgeothermal
power,andeven—despitethecontroversy—nuclearpower.Furthermore,biofuels
productionisthesubjectofheateddebate,asitisaproventhreattofoodsecurityand
canleadtohungerinvulnerablepopulations.
Intermsofnonrenewableenergy,someLatinAmericaneconomiesare
basedongasandoilproduction,especiallyVenezuelaandBolivia.Nevertheless,
itisestimatedthatin2010oilproductionwillreachitspeakandthenstartto
decline(Sohr2009:2223).VenezuelasreservesexceedthoseofSaudiArabia,
however,andithasthelargestnaturalgasdepositsinSouthAmerica.Oil
productionisalreadydeclininginmostproducercountriesinLAC,dueto
inefficiencyandalackofexternalinvestment—foreigndirectinvestmentfellby
41percentinBoliviain2007andby34percentinEcuador(WWC/FLACSO
2008:23).Thisshowsthatpoliticalandsocialstabilityisaconditionthatmost
ofLACcountriesstillcannotguarantee.
Despitetheinternalandexternalproblems,thisdeficitcouldbeovercomeby
meansoftheunmeasuredcapacityoflightoilfieldslocatedoffshore,mainlyoffBrazil
(CariocaandTupireserves).LatinAmericastillhasalotofsurfaceoiltoexploit,and
althoughthishasbeendepleted,itcouldevenshifttothenextstageof“type2
petroleum”,whichwillrequirelargerinvestmentsinordertobecomeoperationalinthe
nearfuture.Clearly,the“oilissue”isnotoveranddonewithinLAC.
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation373
Besides,nuclearenergyisbeingpromoted—evenwithintheframeworkof
theOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)—asavalidsupplyoptioninLAC,
giventhattheregionwillneedtosatisfyincreasingenergydemand,likelyto
growby75percentby2030,accordingtotheInterAmericanDevelopmentBank
(IADB)(Cruz2008:20).Thisisacontroversialissueas,intermsofthe
greenhousegasemissions(GGE)responsibleforglobalwarming,nuclearpower
ischeaperthanfossilfueloptionsandlesspolluting.
2.2 LatinAmericanStrengths
Inenergyterms,LatinAmericaistheonlyoccidentalregioncapableof
beingselfsupplying.Inthissense,itcanbeseenastheonly“sovereignregion”,
asitdoesnotdependonexternalsupplies.
Asalreadymentioned,ithaslargescaleresourcesintermsoffossilfuels,
butalsorenewables.Inagriculture,ithasgreatpotentialforincreasingits
cultureandproductivityperhectare.Furthermore,itsbiomassenergypotentialupto
2050couldrepresentbetween17and26percentofglobalenergy,largerthanany
otherregionintheworld(CEPAL2007:12).Suitablelandavailabilityisoneofthe
mainstrengthsofLatinAmericancountries,complementedbywaterresourcesand
stable,warmtemperatures,concentratedinwettropicalzones,essentialforhigheryields
insomekeyproductsusedforbiofuelsproduction,suchassugarcaneandpalmtrees.
2.3 LatinAmericanWeaknesses
Butthegreatbenefitofhavingenormousnaturalresourcesis,atthesametime,
Latin Americas Achillesheel,asitisextremely vulnerableto ecosystem
transformationsresultingfromglobalwarming.Infact,LatinAmericaisoneofthe
mostvulnerableregions,andisalreadysufferingfromdesertification,droughts,
floods,thaws,aloweringoffreshwateravailabilityandexpansionoftropicaldiseases,
amongotherthings.ThisismadeworsebythefactthatLACeconomiesaremostly
dependantonrawmaterialsandnaturalresourcesforexportsandconsumption.
AlthoughtheLACregionisenergyselfsufficient,about12percentofthe
populationstilldonothaveaccesstoelectricityand33donotevenhaveaccessto
drinkablewater(WorldBank2010:58).Besides,theregionisinefficientin
energyconsumption—theEUusesonlyhalfasmuchenergyforproduction—and
itisunabletosetcommongoals,toagreeonlongtermpoliciesortobuilda
coordinatedenergymarket.Itmakesuseofenergyresourcestopromotenational
interestsandpayslittleattentiontoenvironmentaldegradation.Evenmoredisturbing
isthefactthatgreenawarenessisverylowamongcitizensofLACcountries.
374 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
2.4 GeopoliticalValueofEnergy
Asalready mentioned,energyin Latin Americaisafactorpromoting“independence”,inthesensethatitdoesnotneedexternalresources.Atthesame
time,itisafactorinpoliticalrestructuring,aligningthedifferentLACcountries
accordingtotheirenergycapabilities.Thismeansthattheyaredividedinto“energy
producers”and“energyconsumers”.CountriessuchasBrazil,Venezuela,Mexico,
BoliviaandEcuadorareenergyproducers,whileChileisanetconsumer,andinthe
middle,therearemanycountriestryingtoestablishabalance.Inaddition,anew
categoryof“energynationalism”hasemergedincountriesthatseektousetheir
advantageasproducerstoestablishanewregionalpowerbalance.
3.犜犺狉犲犲犐犿狆狅狉狋犪狀狋犆狅狀狊犻犱犲狉犪狋犻狅狀狊犠犺犲狀犃狆狆狉狅犪犮犺犻狀犵犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
3.1 FirstConsideration:LatinAmericasDiversity
AgoodstartingpointforunderstandingLatinAmericaistothinkofitasa
puzzle,composedofdifferentorevenoppositezones.LatinAmericaandthe
Caribbeancannotbethoughtofasawhole,andextraregionaldialoguemust
takethisintoaccount.Infact,itisaregionofsubregions.
Ingeographicalterms,theLACregioncanbedescribedasfoursubregionsandtwo
nonintegratedcountries.FromNorthtoSouth,thereisMexicoatthetop;thenCentral
AmericaandtheCaribbean,whicharegroupedintheCentralAmericanIntegration
System(SICA)andtheCaribbeanCommunity(CARICOM).InSouthAmerica,there
aretheAndean(CANgroup)andtheAtlanticcountries(MERCOSUR).Thesetwo
SouthAmericansystemshavenowcreatedanewmechanism,calledUNASUR.Atthe
bottomofthemap,thereisChile,whichisanisolatedcountry.
Thissubregionaldistributionembodiesawiderangeofcharacteristics,as
wellasdifferentdiagnosesandresponsestoenvironmentalandenergymatters.
Eachsubregionhasitsownenvironmentalinstitutionsandavarietyofsub
regionalandnationalpolicies,prioritiesandstrategies,showingthevaried
relevancegiventoclimatechangeandenergyinLACsubsystems(Box1).
犆犲狀狋狉犪犾犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犐狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀犛狔狊狋犲犿(犛犐犆犃)
犕犪犻狀犳犲犪狋狌狉犲狊
ItincludessevenCentralAmericancountries(Guatemala,Belize,El
Salvador,Honduras,Nicaragua,CostaRicaandPanama)andoneCaribbean
country(DominicanRepublic)withhighoilandgasdependency.Halfof
thesecountriesarealliedtoPetrocaribe,aVenezuelaninitiative.
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation375
犛狆犲犮犻犳犻犮狉犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犻狀狊狋犻狋狌狋犻狅狀狊犻狀犛犐犆犃
TheCentralAmericanCommissionforEnvironmentandDevelopment
(CCAD)wascreatedin1989.Itbringstogetheralltheenvironment
ministriesandhostsavarietyofinstitutions,includingPREVDA(fornatural
disasterprevention)andPRESANCA(forfoodsecurity).
犕犪犻狀狅犫犼犲犮狋犻狏犲狊
TheCCADsmissionisto“contributetosustainabledevelopmentinthe
CentralAmericanregion,strengtheningtheregimeofcooperationand
integrationforenvironmentalmanagement”.Thisistobeachievedbya2005
2010EnvironmentalPlanfortheCentralAmericanRegion,withtwomain
tasks:preventionandcontrolofenvironmentalpollution,andconservation
andsustainableuseofnaturalheritage.
Withinthisframework,in2007theCCADdesigneda “Sustainable
EnergyStrategy”upto2020,aimedatreducingdemandforproductsderived
fromcrudeoil,reducingenergydependence,increasingrenewablesources,
improvingefficiencyandpromotingthejudicioususeofenergytoincorporate
newtechnologiesandlesspollutingenergysources,increaseaccesstoenergy
servicesamonglowincomeandisolatedpopulations,relievetheeffectsof
energyuseandproductionontheenvironmentanddevelopenergyprojects
compatiblewiththeenvironmentandhumansettlement.Thisstrategyis
followedupatregionalsummitsonclimatechangeandtheenvironment.
Source:www.sica.int/ccad.
犃狀犱犲犪狀犆狅犿犿狌狀犻狋狔(犆犃犖)
犕犪犻狀犳犲犪狋狌狉犲狊
CANincludesfourAndeancountries(Colombia,Ecuador,Peruand
Bolivia),allofthemselfsufficientenergyexporters(gas,petroleum).A
totalof28percentoftheirenergyisclean(CEPAL2005:5)and,including
Venezuela,theyaccountforasmuchas25percentofglobalecological
diversity.Theyarehighlyvulnerabletoclimatechange,astheglobal
temperaturehasincreasedintheAndeanregionby70percentmorethanthe
globalaverage,causingseveredamage(forexample,duringthepast35years
Peruvianglaciershavedecreasedby22percent,affectingwateravailability)
(SGCAN2008:9,14,17).
犛狆犲犮犻犳犻犮狉犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犻狀狊狋犻狋狌狋犻狅狀狊犻狀犆犃犖
OfficialcoordinationmechanismsintheAndeanIntegrationSystemare:
AndeanEnergyAlliance,AndeanEnvironmentalAgenda.
376 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
犕犪犻狀狅犫犼犲犮狋犻狏犲狊
Intheenergyfield,CANisfocusingonelectricityandgasinterconnection,as
wellasthecreationofenergyclustersandthedevelopmentofrenewableenergies,
linkedtoanintegratedsocialdevelopmentplan.
Intheenvironmentalfield,theAndeanAgenda(20062010)includes
fouritems:climatechange,biodiversity,waterresourcemanagementand
preventionofnaturaldisasters.Thereisalsoregionalcoordinationofnational
authoritieswithintheframeworkofCleanDevelopmentMechanismsforthe
mitigationoftheeffectsofgreenhousegases.
Source:www.comunidadandina.org.
犛狅狌狋犺犲狉狀犆狅犿犿狅狀犕犪狉犽犲狋(犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚)
犕犪犻狀犳犲犪狋狌狉犲狊
ThisincludesfivecountriesfromtheeasternsideofSouthAmerica,
includingthemainoilproducer(Venezuela),themainbiofuelsproducer
(Brazil)andoneofthebiggestagricultureproducers(Argentina),together
withtwosmall,energydependantcountries:UruguayandParaguay.This
regionhaswideexpansesofarablelandandamajorundergroundwater
reserve(1,190000km2).
犛狆犲犮犻犳犻犮狉犲犵犻狅狀犪犾犻狀狊狋犻狋狌狋犻狅狀狊犻狀犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚
None.
犕犪犻狀狅犫犼犲犮狋犻狏犲狊牶
Therearedifferentnationalgoals.Thecommonobjectivesarerelated
mainlytotheenvironment,includingbiodiversity,biosecurityandecotourism,with
specificactionagainstdesertification,earthdegradation,droughtandairquality.In
2007,MERCOSURcountriesagreedonacommonpolicyforthepromotionof
andcooperationinsustainableproductionandconsumption,aimingto
generate “initiativesforimprovingenvironmentalperformanceandthe
efficiencyofproductionprocesses,aswellascooperationintheadoptionof
sustainableproductionandconsumptionpractices,inanattempttoincrease
competitivenessandreduceriskstohumanhealthandtheenvironment”
(MERCOSUR/CMC2007:Art.2°).
Theirinstitutionalandpolicydevelopmentsindicatethatthethreemainsub
regionsinLatinAmericahavedifferentapproachestoenergyandenvironmental
issues.Lately,however,therehasbeensomemovementinacommondirection,
asinSICAandMERCOSUR—regardingbiofuelproduction(ledmainlybyBrazil
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation377
andGuatemala).TheconsensuswasreachedBetweenCANandMERCOSUR
withintheframeworkofUNASURattheMargaritaIslandSummitin2007,
wherethe12SouthAmericancountriesestablishedthebasisforaregional
energyintegrationstrategy.InMay2008,aSouthAmericanEnergyCouncilwas
launchedinordertodrawupaRegionalEnergyTreatyfortacklingissuesrelated
topetroleum,gas,powersavingandalternativeenergy(biofuels,wind,solar
andwaterenergy).Twoyearslater,inMay2010,theguidelinesfortheSouth
AmericanEnergyStrategy,aswellasanActionPlanandadraftstructureofthe
EnergyTreaty,wereapproved.Itisexpected,therefore,thatby2011South
AmericashouldhavedevelopeditsfirstregionalEnergyTreaty.
Innationalterms,althoughtheLACregionisanetoilexporter,threecountries
accountforalmost80percentofoilproductionandover90percentofoilreserves
(Venezuela,BrazilandMexico).Ontheotherhand,mostofthesmallercountriesare
oildependant(OLADE2008:2122).Therefore,thereisneitherhomogeneitynor
acommondiscourseaboutenergyintheLACregion.Therearevariousnational
interests—mainlybetweenoilproducingcountriesandagriculturalcountries—
heterogeneouslawsandpoliticalvisions(VenezuelaandBrazil,thetwomain
countriesingeopoliticalenergyterms,areatoddsinthisrespect),aswellas
politicisedandconflictualenergyrelationsbetweenLACnations.
ThisdiversitycanbeillustratedbydataonthebiofuelssituationinLAC
economies.
犜犪犫犾犲1 犛犿犪犾犾犪狀犱犕犲犱犻狌犿犛犻狕犲犱犔犃犆犆狅狌狀狋狉犻犲狊犻狀狋犺犲犉狌犲犾犕犪狉犽犲狋
犉犲犪狋狌狉犲狊 Biomass
producersand
oilexporters
Biomass
producersand
oilimporters
Biomass
exportersand
oilexporters
Biomass
exportersand
oilimporters
犆狅狌狀狋狉犻犲狊 Mexico
Venezuela
ChileDominican
Republic
Nicaragua
Panama
Argentina
BoliviaColombia
Ecuador
PeruParaguay
UruguayCosta
RicaGuatemala
Honduras
Source:IADB2007.
犜犪犫犾犲2 犖犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犌狅犪犾狊狑犻狋犺狉犲犵犪狉犱狋狅犅犻狅犳狌犲犾狊犻狀犔犃犆犆狅狌狀狋狉犻犲狊
Country Bioethanol Biodiesel
Argentina 5%—2010 5%—2010
Bolivia — 2,5%—2007,20%—2015
Brazil 22%,25%—2001 5%—2010,20%—2020
378 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Country Bioethanol Biodiesel
Colombia 10%—2006(byregions) 5%—2008
CostaRica 7%,5%—2010 2%
Ecuador 20%—2020
Honduras 30%
Mexico Testinguntil2010
Panama,
Nicaragua,
ElSalvador,
Guatemala
15%replacementoffossilfuels
Paraguay 18%1%—2007,3%—2008,5%—
2009
Peru7%,8%—2006(byregions,
progressive)
5%—2008(byregions,
progressive)
Dominican
Republic15%—2015 2%—2015
Uruguay 5%—2014 2%—2011,5%—2012
Source:IICA2010.
犜犪犫犾犲3 犔犲犵犻狊犾犪狋犻狅狀狅狀犅犻狅犳狌犲犾狊犻狀犔犃犆犆狅狌狀狋狉犻犲狊
CountryLawsestablishing
ethanolincorporation
Lawsestablishing
ethanolproduction
incentives
Lawsandregulations
definingethanol
quality
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
CostaRica None None
DominicanRepublic None None None
ElSalvador None None
Guatemala None None
Jamaica None None None
Mexico None None None
Paraguay None
Peru None None
Source:IICA2007.
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation379
3.2 SecondConsideration:LatinAmericaIsMorethanJustBrazil
BesidesthediversitybetweensmallandmediumsizedLACcountries,as
wellasbetweenthedifferentLACsubregions,adistinctionmustbemade
betweenBrazilandtherestoftheregion.
Inmostextraregionaldialogues(US,G20,G5andsoon),Brazilis
increasingly acting as Latin Americas representative. With regard to
environmentalandenergyissues,however,itisimportanttonoteBrazils
distinctiveness.
Brazilispromotingbiofuelsproduction,inwhichitistheworldleader.
Afterpursuingthispolicyfor30years,itistheprimarybioethanolexporterin
theworld market(OLADE2008:84).Ithasthenecessarytechnological
capacities,consolidatedinstitutionsandgovernmentpolicies,aswellasthemost
extensiveterritory.However,whileBrazilisenhancingitsparticipationinthe
multilateralsystem,LACspresenceisstillveryweak.
3.3 ThirdConsideration:LACIsNotOneoftheMainCulpritswithregardto
GlobalWarming
LAChasbeenstronglyaffectedbyglobalwarming—whichoriginatedin
greenhousegases—andispayingthepricefortheenergyabuseofthe
industrialisedeconomies.LACisresponsibleforonlyaround10percentof
greenhousegasesworldwide(CEPAL2009:109).Atthesametime,itis
expectedtoproduceaccordingtocleanstandardsandtohaveanequalsharein
thecostsofsolvingtheproblem.Inaddition,helpfromdevelopedcountriesis
focusedmainlyonthepromotionofacarbonmarket,whichwouldenablethe
developingcountriestobuy“therighttopollute”.
Animportantsourceofgreenhousegasesisthedeforestationoftropical
rainforests,asforestscapturecarbonintheirplants,treesandsoils.Tropical
forestsabsorb18percentofCO2,asakindof“freegift”fromnature.The
situationisparticularlyseriousinLatinAmerica,wheretherateofdeforestation
isdoubletheglobalaverage:between1990and2005,forexample,Central
Americalost23.3percentofitsforests(CEPAL2009:47).
Fromanotherperspective,globalwarmingisnot“fair”,asitaffectssome
regionsoftheplanetadverselyandfavoursothers.Regardingthedistributionof
impactsandvulnerabilities,the UNsIntergovernmentalPanelonClimate
Change(IPCC)clearlystatedthat“therearesharpdifferencesacrossregionsand
thoseintheweakesteconomicpositionareoftenthemostvulnerabletoclimate
changeandarefrequentlythemostsusceptibletoclimaterelateddamages”
(UNIPCC2007:65).Thus,thosewithawarmclimatecouldhardlybearrises
380 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
of1degree,whileinthecountriesoftheNorth,evenathreedegreerisecould
leadtogrowthinagriculturalproductionandenergysavingsinthewinter.
ClimatechangecouldcausehungerintheLACregion,asgrainsarethemost
susceptiblecrops(mainlycorn,riceandcoffee)inthisrespect.Forinstance,
theIPCCpredictsa70percentdiminutionofthesecropsinBrazilandMexicoby
2050.Thesituationcouldturnouttobeevenmoreserious,however,asthe
costsof water pumping will make the exploitation of water reserves
unsustainableby2030.
4.犈犝犔犃犆犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊狅狀犈狀犲狉犵狔犪狀犱犈狀狏犻狉狅狀犿犲狀狋犪犾犐狊狊狌犲狊
TheEU andtheLACregionareengagedindialogueonsustainable
development.ItwasoneofthetopicsdiscussedattheEULACLimaSummit,in
May2008,togetherwithpovertyandsocialcohesion,andalsoattheMadrid
SummitinMay2010fromtheperspectiveoftechnologyandinnovation.Three
topicsareofparticularimportancewithregardtosustainabledevelopment:the
environment,climatechangeandenergy.Thisdialogueisintendedtoproducea
globalenvironmentalandenergypact.
Withregardtoenvironmentalandenergyissues,relationsbetweenLatin
AmericaandtheEuropeanUnionarebasedonthefactthatLACisthesupplier
andtheEUthecustomer.Inenergymarkets,thisrelationshipendowsLAC
withenormousadvantages:theEUisdependentonexternalenergyandtheLAC
regionisautonomousinthatrespect;theEU haslimitedcapacitiesfor
agriculturalbiomassdevelopmentandLAChasenormouscapacityforenergy
production,bothrenewableandfossil.
IncontrasttotheLACregion,theEUdoeshaveacommonenergypolicy,anda
20/20/20Plan,aimedatreducinggreenhousegasesby20percentby2020in
comparisonto1990levels,increasingrenewableenergyuseby20percentandreducing
energyconsumptionby20percent.By2020,biofuelsshouldrepresent10percentof
totalfuelconsumptionintheEU.Toachievethis,alargeshareofbiomasswillbe
importedfromtheSouth,especiallyfromLatinAmerica(Fritz2008:4).
LACistheonlyWesternregioncapableofsupplyingitsownfirstgeneration
biofuelneeds,whiletheEU—aswellastheUnitedStates—willfacesignificant
shortandmediumtermproblemsinthisrespect(CEPAL2008:21).Inthis
sense,theEUneedstheLACregiontomeetitsgoals.
AccordingtoECLAC,in2005theEUwasalreadyusing60percentofthe
landdedicatedtomajorcropsforbiodieselproduction,andwouldhavetotriple
theareatomeetthe2020demand.TheEUsnonfoodcropcapacityisabout8.2
millionhectaresandasimilarquantityoflandislyingfallow,butforits2020
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation381
targetsitwillneed23millionhectares,andsomustlookbeyonditsbordersfor
newcultivablelands.Withinthesametimehorizon,LACwillneedonly9per
centofitsarablelandtosatisfyitsownbiofuelneeds,leavinggreatpotentialfor
newcrops.Thus,itisestimatedthatdemandinLACwillincrease,possibly
affectingtheregionsruralenvironment(CEPAL2008:2122).
Asaconsequence,theEUstrategyforbiofuelshaslaiddownthreemain
objectives,twoofthemaimingtopromotebiofuelproductionindeveloping
countries,whileatthesametimeexpressingitscommitmenttosustainable
developmentandcompetitiveness(EC2006:4).
In2007,withastrategysimilartoonepreviouslyimplementedbytheUS,
theEUforgedastrategicalliancewithBrazil,includingcooperationinrenewable
energy,especiallyinbiofuelsandenergytechnologiesbasedonlowcarbon
emissions,aswellasincreasedenergyefficiency.Brazilisthemainregional
exporterofenergytotheEU,followedbyGuatemalaandPeru.
Itisimportanttonotethat,besidesthiskindofexchange,bothregions
havedifferentregionalobjectives.FortheEU,theprioritiesaretoensureits
energysupply,toimproveenergyefficiencyandtocompleteitsinternalenergy
market.TheLACregionisaimingatclimatechangemitigation,thepreservation
ofbiodiversity andthe prevention ofnaturaldisasters.These different
perspectivesshouldmakecooperationbetweenthetworegionsveryfruitful.
5.犆犺犻狀犪犔犃犆犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊狅狀犈狀犲狉犵狔犪狀犱犈狀狏犻狉狅狀犿犲狀狋犪犾犐狊狊狌犲狊
Eventhough Chinaandthe LACregionarenominallybothinthe
“developing”category,theyareclearlynotthesame.Moreover,China,likethe
EU,operatesinLatinAmericaasadonor,investorandsupplierofgoods.In
thissense,ChinaviewsitsrelationswithLAC,fromastrategicviewpoint,as
directedtowardsbuildinga “comprehensiveandcooperativepartnership”
(ChineseGovernment2008),alongthesamelinesastheobjectivesproposedby
theEUand,recently,bytheUnitedStates.Tradestatisticsillustratethisvery
well:inthepastdecade,commercebetweenChinaandtheLACcountrieshas
increasedtenfold,risingfromUSD12.595billionin2000toUSD120.61billion
in2009(SELA2010:21).Since2007,ChinaLACbusinesssummitshavetaken
placeonanannualbasis,helpingtoincreasetradeandinvestment.
In2008,theChinesegovernmentissueditsfirstpolicypaperonLatinAmerica
andtheCaribbean.InitsWhitePaperontheLACregion,Chinaoutlinesrelationsin
fourareas:(1)politics,(2)economics,(3)cultureandsocialpolicyand(4)peace,
securityandlegalaffairs.ChinaspolicypaperonLACisa34pointstrategy,oneof
which,intheareaofeconomics,isdevotedto“ResourceandEnergyCooperation”.
382 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Thematterisaddressedverybrieflyandgenerally,statingonlythat“the
Chinesesidewishestoexpandanddeepenmutuallybeneficialcooperationwith
LatinAmericanandCaribbeancountriesinresourcesandenergywithinbilateral
cooperationframeworks”(ChineseGovernment2008).
Intheenergysector,ChinahasgrowinginterestsinLAC:alliances,loans
andinvestmentsinminerals,carbon,gasandpetroleum,mainlywithBraziland
Venezuela.Butenvironmentalissuesstillarenotonthebilateralagenda.
Chinahasbeenconfirmedasaworldpowerwithintheframeworkofthe
G20.Itnowhastodecidewhatkindofpoweritwillbe.Undoubtedly,Chinahas
aroletoplayintheLACregionand,atthesametime,needstoreinforceits
internationalinfluencebyestablishingapositivepresenceinemergingregions.In
thiscontext,itisimportanttomentionChinasjoiningoftheInterAmerican
DevelopmentBankas48thmember,thefreetradeagreementswithChile,Peru
andCostaRica,aswapagreementwith Argentina—permittingcommercial
exchangesbasedontheyuan,withoutusingtheUSdollar—aswellasthe
expansionofinvestmentsinmining(copper,aluminiumandironore)andenergy(petroleumandgas)inLatinAmerica.
6.犔犃犆犐狀狋犲狉犲狊狋狊犻狀犈狓狋犲狉狀犪犾犇犻犪犾狅犵狌犲狊狅狀犈狀犲狉犵狔犪狀犱狋犺犲犈狀狏犻狉狅狀犿犲狀狋
AnyglobalortrilateralagreementmusttakeintoaccounttheLACregions
heterogeneity,includingBrazilsdifferentenergysituationcomparedtotheother
LACcountries,andLACslowcontributiontoglobalwarming,whilebeingthe
mostadverselyaffectedregion.Asaconsequence,whateverthescenario,some
basicprinciplesmustbeestablished,suchastherecognitionofasymmetries,the
specificneedsanddemandsofindividualcountriesorsubregionsandsustainable
development.
6.1 AgreementsandFunding
Giventheasymmetrictrilateralrelations,theLACregionshouldbenefit
fromthestatusofspeciallyfavouredpartyininternationalagreements.LACs
commitmentsmusttakeintoaccountthedamagecausedbytheregionandthe
responsibilityofother parties;in other words,commitments based on
responsibilityorcapacities(emissionsorGDP),ashasbeenproposedbythe
EuropeanCommission.
Atthesametime,asymmetriesalsorequirehigherspendingandforeign
investments,inorder,forexample,todevelopcleantechnologies,create
infrastructureandsupportextractiveactivitiesthatcouldhelptheLACregionto
bemorecompetitive.Also,researchinvestmentsmustbeapriority.
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation383
6.2 FocusedCooperation
LAChasthelandcapacity,but—withtheexceptionofBrazil—itdoesnotyet
havethecapitalandtechnology,institutionalcapacitiesandpoliticalandlegislative
frameworksrequiredtoattainsustainabledevelopmentwithregardtoenergy.
Cooperationmustfocuson犪犱犪狆狋犪狋犻狅狀犪狀犱狋犺犲犿犻狋犻犵犪狋犻狅狀狅犳犮犾犻犿犪狋犲犮犺犪狀犵犲,
helpingtopreventitsnegativeconsequences,suchaslossofbiodiversityor
deforestation.ThemaintenanceofCentralAmericanandAmazonforestsisvitalfor
carbonemissionsreduction,butthepressurefornewarablelandspartlyduetothe
increasingdemandforbiofuelproductionrunscountertothisobjective.
Asecondpriorityisthesearchforrenewableenergies,takinggoodcareto
preservethenaturalheritageandfoodsecurity,andtakingintoconsideration
nationalandsubregionalspecificities.TheEUhasbeenagoodexampleofthis
kindofcooperation,supportingrenewableenergyprojects—suchastheEnergy
andEnvironmentPartnershipwithCentralAmerica,financedbyFinnishand
Austriancooperation.However,狉犲狀犲狑犪犫犾犲犲狀犲狉犵狔犿狌狊狋犫犲狌狀犱犲狉狊狋狅狅犱犳狉狅犿狋犺犲
狆犲狉狊狆犲犮狋犻狏犲狅犳狆狉狅犿狅狋犻狀犵犪犱犻狏犲狉狊犻犳犻犲犱犵狉犻犱,notonlybiofuels,whichcanbe
hazardousforLACdevelopment.
InitiativessuchasEUrocLima,launchedatthe5thEULACsummit,Lima
2008andaimedatstemmingclimatechange,isastartingpointforbiregional
cooperation,butitisstillinitsinitialstagesandmustbedeepenedtohaveareal
impact.TheMadridActionPlanadoptedatthelastEULACsummitinMay
2010hastakennewstepsinthisdirection.
6.3 AWinWinSituation
Fromacommercialpointofview,theLACregioncangainafootholdinthe
marketforcarboncredits.Butacarbonmarketisnotnecessarilyaneffective
solution.Itrelievesotherregionsofresponsibilityforgreenhousegases,but
LACexportsmustbepromoted.Sometradebarriersmustbecarefullyanalysed,
astheyaffecttheLACregionscompetitivenessintheenergyandgreen
markets—mainlyagriculturalsubsidies,butalsoecolabelling,fueltaxesand
CivilAviationpolicyintheEU.Intermsofinvestments,theinstallationofclean
standardindustriesisdesirable,inordertoboostgoodpracticesinproductionin
LACcountries.
Regardingdemandforbiofuels,anumberofrequirementsmustbetaken
intoconsideration,suchastheloweringofagriculturalsubsidiestoallowfair
competition,theimpactofbiomassproductiononfoodpricesandaproper
balanceintheuseoflandandwater.Definingtheenergybasewithregardto
384 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
biomassmusttakeintoconsiderationfoodsecurityinaccordancewithreaching
theMillenniumGoalsinLACcountries.Theperspectivesofregionalbodiessuch
astheEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(ECLAC)or
theFoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO)canhelporientatethesearchfora
basicconsensus.
The狋狉犪狀狊犳犲狉犲狀犮犲狅犳犲犮狅狋犲犮犺狀狅犾狅犵犻犲狊isalsoarequirementforlowcarbon
development.ThiswillallowtheLACregiontoincreaseitsenergyefficiency
and,atthesametime,openupnewmarketsforcleandevelopmentproducts
(solarcells,windturbinesandotherthings)fromindustrialisedcountries.
Lastbutnotleast,climatechangemitigationisnotonlyamatterforgovernments
andregionalormultilateralbodies.Firstofall,societiesandindividualsmustchange
theirbehaviour.Enhancingpublicawarenessbymeansofactivitiesdirectedtowards
buildinganew“greenpublicopinion”isurgentlyneeded.Inthisarea,theEUisa
goodmodel,aswellasapotentialcooperationpartner.
7.犜犺犲犈犝,犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱狋犺犲犔犃犆犚犲犵犻狅狀犻狀犕狌犾狋犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犅狅犱犻犲狊
Therearemorethan15multilateralenvironmentalagreementsdealingwith
virtuallyeverykeyissue:wetlands,culturalandnaturalheritage,endangered
species,migratoryspecies,theseas,theozonelayer,hazardous waste,
chemicalsandpesticides,organicpollutants,biologicaldiversity,desertification
andbiotechnology.Butintheenergysector,thereareonlyanumberofbilateral
orregionalagreements—forinstance,theEnergyCharterTreatyintheEurasian
regionortheEnergySecurityTreatywithintheframeworkofthePetrocaribe
initiative—asitisconsideredprimarilyastrategiceconomicissue,ratheran
environmentalone.
Energysecurity—understoodsimplyastheneedtosafeguardenergy
supplies—cannotbereducedtoeconomicconsiderations;itisamultidimensional
issue.Ifthisvitalmatterisledbymarketforcesorreducedtoenergydialogue
betweenpartialstakeholders,globalsurveillanceinthisrespectwillfail.In
energysecurityandclimatechangemitigationacoordinatedmultilateralapproach
istheonlywaytosucceed.
FortheLACregion,energysecurityisnotjustamatterofstablesupplyat
lowerprices.Othercomponentsarecrucial,suchasenvironmentalpreservation
andsocialconditions.Thesedimensionsmustguideanyglobalagreement.
Themainmultilateralcommitmentwithregardtoclimatechangeislaid
downintheKyotoProtocol,whichiscurrentlybeingupdated.Therecent
ConferenceofthePartiestotheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange
(COP15)inCopenhagendidnotreachaglobalconsensus,buttherewillbe
EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation385
anotheropportunityinCancún(COP16)attheendofthisyear.However,and
despitetheintentionsoftheEUandChinatoimplementpreventivemeasures
withintheframeworkof“Kyotoplus”—thatis,toreducetheiremissionsfar
beyondtheKyotogoals—thepossibilityofimplementinganeffectiveglobalpact
seemsuncertain.Itisexpectedthat,duetothecurrentconfigurationoftheUS
Congress,thelargestpollutercountryisunlikelytogetonboard.
Tobereallyefficientinreducingtheimpactofglobalwarming,allthe
parties—mainlytheEU,China,theUSandIndia—mustactinacoordinated
way.Thisalsoentailsthatthelargereconomiesshouldmakeagreatereffortand
smalleconomiesshouldbehelpedtoparticipateinthiscommonpursuit,finding
innovativefundingmechanismstosupportaglobalgreendevelopmentmodel.
Atthesametime,itisdesirabletocomplementandcoordinatetheKyoto
agreementswithotherforums,suchastheAsiaPacificAssociationforClean
DevelopmentandClimate,thesocalledCarbonPact,joinedbyChinain2008,
whichincludesalsotheUSandIndia.Althoughtherearerecognisedbodies,
suchastheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,thatcanprovidereal
guidance,itisalsoimportanttokeepinmindthatenergysecurityandclimate
changearenotjustrestrictedtospecialisedforums.Thereisagreatdealthatcan
bedoneincommercial,military,politicalandotherareas.Aclearexampleisthe
needforastandardisedclassificationofbiofuelswithintheWTO:currently,
biodieselisconsideredanindustrialinputandbioethanolachemicalproduct,so
onlybioethanolcanbeincludedinagriculturaltreaties.
Besides,inordertoreachagreementonstrongmultilateralinstruments,
suchastheKyotoProtocol,previoussuccessfulexperiencesmustbeexamined.
TheMontrealProtocol—aimedatpreservingtheozonelayer—isagoodexample
ofmultilateralcoordinatedaction.Thisinstrument—datingback20yearsand
nowincluding191nations—isparticularlyinterestingasitencompassesa
differentiatedapproach,givingdevelopingcountrieslongertoachievetargets.It
alsoincludesaspecialfundforhelpingthesecountriesto meetProtocol
objectives.Allmembersareobligedtomonitoradvancesthroughannualreports.
Incaseoffailure,thisfollowupsystemallowsfortheestablishmentofspecial
planstogetbackontrack.
8.犜狅狑犪狉犱狊犖犲狑犠狅狉犾犱犚犲犵狌犾犪狋狅狉狔犕犲犮犺犪狀犻狊犿狊
Caringfortheplanetrequiresnewandrepresentativemultilateralbodies.
Despitetheessentialroleofmanyexistinginstances,manyofthem are
constructed on the basis oftwentiethcentury notions or have limited
386 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
representation,suchastheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),whichincludes
onlyOECDmembers,andtheWorldEnergyCouncil,onlysevenofwhose93
memberscomefromtheLACregion.
Inthiscontext,theInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA),
foundedinJanuary2009,isagoodexampleofamodernmechanismincluding
bothindustrialisedanddevelopingcountries.IRENAsvisionisfor“aworld
wheremodernandeffectiverenewableenergyisaccessibleinallcountriesand
becomesoneofthemajorenergysources”.Infact,148countriesandtheEU
havesignedthestatuteoftheAgency,17fromtheLACregion.However,
importantcountries,suchasBrazilandChina,havenotyetsignedtheTreaty(www.irena.org).
IRENAwillincreasethecontributionofallformsofrenewableenergyto
environmentalandclimateprotection,economicgrowthandsocialcohesion,
includingpovertyalleviationandintergenerationalequity.Ittakesintoaccount
domesticprioritiesandalsoaimsatimplementingenergyefficiencymeasures.
ThisiswhattheLACregionisaskingfor,asbothobjectivescanhelptostemits
vulnerability.
Finally,thealleviationofglobalwarmingandenergysecurityareamatter
ofintergenerationaljustice.Sincethedaysofplentifulandeasyenergyseemto
beover,theinternationalcommunityshouldfindabalanced,mutuallyrespectful
andinnovativewayofsecuringenergysupplyandpreservingtheenvironment.
Thus,aprudentChina,EUandLACstrategicpartnershipforthefutureshould
bebasedupontheseprinciplesandpriorities,notonlytobuildabetterworld,
buttomaintainaworldtolivein.
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EnergySecurityandClimateChangeinRelationsbetweentheEU,Chinaand
LatinAmerica:MajorChallengesandAreasforInternationalCooperation387
犛狌狊狋犪犻狀犪犫犾犲犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犻狀犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犪狀犱狋犺犲犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀,Santiago:CEPAL.
ChineseGovernment(2008),犆犺犻狀犪狊犘狅犾犻犮狔犘犪狆犲狉狅狀犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犪狀犱狋犺犲犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀,5
November,online:http://english.gov.cn/.
ChineseMinistryofCommerce(2008),犆犺犻狀犪犎犪狊犪犛狋犲犪犱犻犾狔犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犻狀犵犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆狑犻狋犺
狋犺犲犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犪狀犱犗犮犲犪狀犻犪狀犃狉犲犪犻狀狋犺犲30犢犲犪狉狊狅犳犚犲犳狅狉犿犪狀犱犗狆犲狀犻狀犵犝狆,25
December,online:http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/.
Cruz,Germn(2008),犈狀犲狉犵狔犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔,IADBPresentationattheSummitImplementation
ReviewGroup(SIRG)IADB/OAS,SixthRegularMeetingof2008,ElSalvador/Central
America.
EuropeanCommission (2006),犃狀犈犝 犛狋狉犪狋犲犵狔犳狅狉犅犻狅犳狌犲犾狊,Communicationfromthe
Commission,CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,COM(2006)34final,8February,
Brussels.
Fritz,Thomas(2008),犃犵狉狅犲狀犲狉犵í犪犲狀犃犿é狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪.犝狀犲狊狋狌犱犻狅犱犲犮犪狊狅狊犱犲犮狌犪狋狉狅
狆犪í狊犲狊:犅狉犪狊犻犾,犃狉犵犲狀狋犻狀犪,犘犪狉犪犵狌犪狔狔犆狅犾狅犿犫犻犪,BrotfürdieWelt—FDCL,May,
Berlin.
Globaldata,犌犾狅犫犪犾犅犻狅犱犻犲狊犲犾犕犪狉犽犲狋犃狀犪犾狔狊犻狊犪狀犱犉狅狉犲犮犪狊狋狊狋狅2020,online:http://www.
globaldata.com/reportstore.
IADB (2009),犃 犅犾狌犲 犘狉犻狀狋犳狅狉 犌狉犲犲狀 犈狀犲狉犵狔犻狀狋犺犲 犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狊,InterAmerican
DevelopmentBank.
IICA(2010),犃狋犾犪狊犱犲犾犪犪犵狉狅犲狀犲狉犵í犪狔犾狅狊犫犻狅犮狅犿犫狌狊狋犻犫犾犲狊犲狀犾犪狊犃犿é狉犻犮犪狊:犐犐犅犻狅犱犻犲狊犲犾,
SanJose:InstitutoInteramericanodeCooperaciónparalaAgricultura.
MERCOSUR/CMC(2007),犘狅犾í狋犻犮犪犱犲狆狉狅犿狅犮犻ó狀狔犮狅狅狆犲狉犪犮犻ó狀犲狀狆狉狅犱狌犮犮犻ó狀狔犮狅狀狊狌犿狅
狊狅狊狋犲狀犻犫犾犲狊犲狀犲犾犕犈犚犆犗犛犝犚,26December.
OLADE (2008),犈狀犲狉犵狔 犛狋犪狋犻狊狋犻犮狊 犚犲狆狅狉狋2007,Quito:Latin American Energy
Organization.
SGCAN(2008),犈犾犮犪犿犫犻狅犮犾犻犿狋犻犮狅狀狅狋犻犲狀犲犳狉狅狀狋犲狉犪狊.犐犿狆犪犮狋狅犱犲犾犮犪犿犫犻狅犮犾犻犿狋犻犮狅犲狀犾犪
犆狅犿狌狀犻犱犪犱犃狀犱犻狀犪,GeneralSecretariatoftheAndeanCommunity,May.
SELA(2010),犈狏狅犾狌犮犻ó狀狉犲犮犻犲狀狋犲犱犲犾犪狊狉犲犾犪犮犻狅狀犲狊犲犮狅狀ó犿犻犮犪狊犲狀狋狉犲犾犪犚犲狆ú犫犾犻犮犪犘狅狆狌犾犪狉
犆犺犻狀犪狔犃犿é狉犻犮犪犔犪狋犻狀犪狔犲犾犆犪狉犻犫犲.犕犲犮犪狀犻狊犿狅狊犻狀狊狋犻狋狌犮犻狅狀犪犾犲狊狔犱犲犮狅狅狆犲狉犪犮犻ó狀狆犪狉犪狊狌
犳狅狉狋犪犾犲犮犻犿犻犲狀狋狅,LatinAmericanandCaribbeanEconomicSystem,SELA,October.
Sohr,Raúl(2009),犆犺犪狅狆犲狋狉ó犾犲狅.犈犾犿狌狀犱狅狔犾犪狊犲狀犲狉犵í犪狊犱犲犾犳狌狋狌狉狅,Ed.Debate,Chile.
UNIPCCUnitedNations,IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(2007),犐犘犆犆
犉狅狌狉狋犺犃狊狊犲狊狊犿犲狀狋犚犲狆狅狉狋(犃犚4):犆犾犻犿犪狋犲犆犺犪狀犵犲2007,犛狔狀狋犺犲狊犻狊犚犲狆狅狉狋,November.
WorldBank/JoséMolinas,RicardoPaesdeBarros,JaimeSaavedraandMarceloGiugale
(2010),犇狅狅狌狉犆犺犻犾犱狉犲狀犺犪狏犲犪犆犺犪狀犮犲?犜犺犲2010犎狌犿犪狀犗狆狆狅狉狋狌狀犻狋狔犚犲狆狅狉狋犳狅狉
犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犪狀犱狋犺犲犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀.
WWC/FLACSO Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Facultad
LatinoamericanadeCienciasSociales(2008),犈狀犲狉犵狔犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犻狀犛狅狌狋犺犃犿犲狉犻犮犪:
犆狅狀犳犾犻犮狋犪狀犱犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀,Washington:WWIC,LatinAmericanProgram.
! 391
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉13
犃犖犲狑犔狅狅犽犪狋狋犺犲犜狉犻犪狀犵狌犾犪狋犻狅狀犫犲狋狑犲犲狀狋犺犲犈犝,
犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪
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1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
AccordingtoanEUdocument,inaworldfilledwithnewthreatsand
opportunities,Europe,asanactorontheworldstage,needstoconsolidate
relationswithitsclosestpartnersaroundtheworld,andoneofthemisLatin
America.ForEurope,LatinAmericaisastrategicpartner,whichsharesa
commonhistoryandculture.Fewregionsintheworldoffersomanyreasonsto
buildagenuineallianceasEuropeandLatinAmerica(EuropeanCommission
2006).
ForChina,“LatinAmericanandCaribbeancountriesareanimportantpart
ofthedevelopingworldandamajorforceintheinternationalarena.Undernew
circumstances,thedevelopmentofrelationsbetweenChinaandLatinAmerican
andCaribbeancountriesisrepletewithnewopportunities”(ChineseGovernment
2008).ThatexplainswhyChinasrelationswithLatinAmericahavebeen
developingveryrapidlyoverthepastfewyears.
UnliketheUnitedStates,whichhasbeenuneasyaboutChinasgrowing
presenceintheWesternHemisphereinrecentyears,Europe,particularlySpain,
wishestoofferChinaahelpinghandtofurtherdevelopitsrelationswithLatin
America.Thischapterreviewsthetwosetsofbilateralrelationships:between
theEUandLatinAmerica,andbetweenChinaandLatinAmerica.Italso
comparesthetwosetsofrelationships.Finally,ittriestodeterminewhetherand
howtheEU(andSpain)canhelpChinainthisregard.
2.犈犝犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
TheUnitedStatesestablishedthesocalled MonroeDoctrinein1823,
392 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
warningothercountries,particularlytheEuropeanpowers,torefrainfrom
expandingtheirinfluenceintheWesternHemisphere.Thedoctrineassertedthat
theAmericancontinents“arehenceforthnottobeconsideredassubjectfor
futurecolonizationbyanyEuropeanpower”(Smith1996:20).Butinfact,the
USwasnotpowerfulenoughinthenineteenthcenturytoenforcethedoctrine.
Forinstance,FrancesetuptheempireofMaximilianinMexicofrom1864to
1867.France even intended to name the continent of Latin America
“Francoamerica”.GreatBritaindidnottakemuchnoticeofthedoctrine.It
continuedtoprovidemuchofthecapitalandtechnologyforLatinAmericainthe
nineteenthcentury.Britishfirmsbuiltrailwaysandtelegraphandtelephone
systems,investedinminingandestablishedmanufacturingplantsinsomeLatin
Americancountries(Hillman1997:158).
AftertheSecond World War,Europewasoccupiedwithitsowneconomic
reconstructionandintegration.Consequently,itfailedtoattachmuchimportanceand
urgencytothedevelopmentofitsrelationswithLatinAmerica.
Thisbenignneglectstartedtodisappearinthe1970s.InFebruary1975,the
EuropeanCommunity(EC)andsomeAfrican,CaribbeanandPacific(ACP)countries
signedtheFirstLoméConvention,whichcameintoforceinApril1976,andwas
designedtoprovideanewframeworkofcooperationbetweenthethenEuropean
Community(EC)anddevelopingACPcountries,inparticularformerBritish,Dutch,
BelgianandFrenchcolonies.TheECalsoconcludedafewnonpreferential,shortterm
tradeagreementswithArgentina,Brazil,MexicoandUruguay(Black1991:266).
However,economictiesbetweenEuropeandLatinAmericadidnotdevelop
smoothly.TheCommonAgriculturalPolicyadoptedbytheECmadeithardfor
LatinAmericasagriculturalproductstoenterEurope.Thiscouldexplainwhy
ArgentinaturnedtotheSoviet Unionasa majorbuyerofits wheat.
Furthermore,theentryintotheECofPortugalandSpainin1986didnotrealise
thehopesLatinAmericahadplacedinit.
TheFalklands(Malvinas)WarbetweenArgentinaandGreatBritainin1982
putpressureonrelationsbetweenEuropeandLatinAmerica.TheECstood
alongsideGreatBritainandevenimposedeconomicsanctionsonArgentina.Most
LatinAmericancountriessympathisedwithArgentina.
Inthe1980s,conflictsinCentralAmericaprovidedEuropeandLatin
Americawitharareopportunitytomoveclosertogether.CentralAmericascivil
warswereoftenintheinternationalheadlines.AlongwiththeUnitedNations
andtheOrganizationofAmericanStates,theECmadearemarkablecontribution
tothepeaceprocessthere.Forinstance,itstronglysupportedtheeffortsmade
bytheContadoracountries.In1984,theSanJosédialoguebetweentheECand
ANewLookattheTriangulationbetweentheEU,ChinaandLatinAmerica 393
theCentralAmericancountrieswaslaunched.Itsobjectivewastoseeksolutions
tothearmedconflictsbymeansofnegotiations.In1985,theEUCentral
AmericanCooperationAgreementwassigned.
Enteringthe1990s,LatinAmericastartedtoundergoimportantpolitical,
economicandsocialreformsandtransformations.Theregionsforeignpolicy
alsomadeprogressbypursuingcloserrelationsnotonlywiththeUS,butalso
withotherregionsoftheworld.TheEUacknowledgedthesepolicychangesand
seizedtheseopportunitiestopromoteitsrelationswithLatinAmerica.Spain
participatedactivelyintheregionsprivatisationcampaign.
In1995,theEUissuedacommunicationentitled“EuropeanUnion—Latin
America:ThePresentSituationandProspectsforCloserPartnership:1996
2000”,whichexpresseditsinterestinstrengtheningthepartnershipbetweenthe
twosides.Thedocumentacknowledgedthechangesthathadtakenplaceinboth
regionsandatworldlevelduringthepastdecadeandhighlightedtheshared
interestinfacingglobalandregionalchallenges.Italsostressedtheneedfor
differentiatedapproachestoLatinAmericainaccordancewithspecificnational
andsubregionalcircumstances.
ThemostnotabledevelopmentinbilateralrelationsbetweenEuropeand
LatinAmericawasthefirstEULatinAmericaSummitinRiodeJaneiro,Brazil,
inJune1999.Theobjectiveofthesummitwastofosterpolitical,economicand
culturalunderstandingbetweenthetworegionsinordertodevelopastrategic
partnership.Inthepoliticalfield,itwasagreedthateffortswouldbemadeto
reinforceinstitutionaldialoguebetweenthetworegions,preservedemocracy,
promoteandprotecthumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsandworktogether
toaddressthreatstointernationalpeaceandsecurity.Intheeconomicfield,
leadersfrombothsidesoftheAtlanticdeclaredthattheyweredeterminedto
strengthenthemultilateraltradesystemandopenregionalismandtointensify
economicrelationsbetweenthetworegions.Theiraimsincludedpromotingthe
liberalisationoftradeasameansofincreasingprosperityandcombatingthe
destabilisingeffectsofvolatilefinancialflows,devotingparticularattention,
supportandincentivestoproductiveinvestmentinsmallereconomies.Inthe
cultural,educational,scientific,technological,socialandhumanfields,thetwo
sidesalsoexpressedaninterestinpromotingtherehabilitationandpreservation
oftheenormousculturalheritageinbothregions,facilitatinguniversalaccessto
educationandencouragingculturaldiversity(EULatinAmericaSummit1999).
Atthissummit,itwasannouncedthattheEUandLatinAmericahad
agreedtoestablishastrategicpartnership.Thispartnershipwastobebuiltona
commonculturalinheritance,aswellassharedvalues,andencompassedclose
394 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
cooperationinthefieldsofpolitics,economics,cultureandscienceand
technology.Thebiregionalpartnershiphasbeenfurtherdevelopedandrefinedat
thelaterEULatinAmericasummits.
Thelatestsummit,thesixth,tookplaceon18May2010,inMadrid,
Spain,withthetheme “Towardsanew phaseofbiregionalassociation:
innovationandtechnologyforsustainabledevelopmentandsocialinclusion”.In
hisopeningspeech,SpanishPrimeMinisterJoseLuisRodriguezZapaterosaid
thatprogressinrelationsbetweenbothcontinentsoverthepastdecadehave
madethem“globalpartnersfacingglobalchallenges”.
On30September2009,theEUissuedapressreleaseentitled“EULatin
America:10YearsofStrategicPartnership”,whichofferedasatisfactory
reviewofthebilateralrelationship.Itsaid,“Overthepastdecade,relations
betweentheEUandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanhavebeenconsiderably
strengthened withthesupportandfirm commitmentparticularlyofthe
EuropeanCommission.”TheEUwassatisfiedtoseethat,eversincethefirst
SummitinRiodeJaneiroin1999,thetworegionshavecooperatedonajoint
agendainanumberofbiregional,bilateral,multilateralandsectorspecific
forumsonissuessuchasresearch,scienceandtechnologyandsocialcohesion.
Overthepasttenyears,theEuropeanCommissionhasfinancedmorethan450
projectsandprogrammes,amountingto morethan EUR 3 billion (EU
2009a).
Apartfrompoliticaltalks,theEUandLatinAmericahavealsoachieved
winwin outcomes on some important economic issues. For instance,
ambassadorsfromtheEUandLatinAmericancountriesmeetingattheWorld
TradeOrganization(WTO)inGenevaon15December2009agreedtoenda15
yeardisputeoverEUbananaimports.Aspartofthedeal,theEUwillcutits
importtariffonbananasfromthecurrentrateofEUR176pertonnetoEUR114
pertonnein2017,attheearliest;andmakethebiggestcutfirst—theEUwill
firstcutitstariffbyEUR28pertonnetoEUR148pertonne,onceallparties
signthedeal.Inreturn,LatinAmericancountrieswillnotdemandfurthercuts,
anddropcasesagainsttheEUattheWTO,someofwhichdatebackasfaras
1993(EU2009b).
Commentingontheagreement,European TradeCommissionerBenita
FerreroWaldnersaid:“todayisaverygooddayforbananaproducersworldwide
andforconsumers,aswefinallyseethe‘longesttradedisputeinhistory
solved.Afteryearsoftediousnegotiationsthedealreachedwillprovidean
importantpushforprogressintheDohaRoundtalksandformultilateraltrading
systemsingeneral.”(EU2009b)
ANewLookattheTriangulationbetweentheEU,ChinaandLatinAmerica 395
3.犆犺犻狀犪犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
NomatterwhofirstlandedintheAmericas,provencontactsbetweenChina
andLatinAmericacanbedatedbacktothe1570s,whenSinoLatinAmerican
tradestartedtoflourishacrossthePacific.1ViaManila,Chinaexportedsilk,
porcelainandcottonyarntoMexicoandPeru,inexchangeforsilvercoinsand
otheritems.Inthemiddleofthenineteenthcentury,peasantsfromsouthern
ChinawenttoSouthAmericaandtheCaribbeanas“contractlabourers”working
inminesandplantations.
AfterthePeoplesRepublicofChinawasfoundedin1949,afewLatin
Americancountriessoughtdiplomaticrelations.DuetoUSopposition,however,
theireffortsdidnotmaterialise.
ThevictoryoftheCubanRevolutionin1959attractedimmediatemoraland
politicalsupportfromChina.CubawasthefirstLatinAmericancountryto
recognisethenewChina.ChinawasthereforereadytosupportCubainreturn.
InSeptember1960,ChinesePremierZhouEnlaitoldFidelCastro:“ifnecessary,
ChinawillfurnishallnecessaryassistancetotheCubanpeopleintheirfightfor
freedom.”(Zhang1995:91).
On15December1970,ChilebecamethefirstSouthAmericancountryto
establishdiplomatictieswithChina.AfterUSPresidentNixonmadehishistoric
visittoBeijingin1972,manyLatinAmericancountriesstartedtochangetheir
attitudestowardsChinaandevenexpressedtheirinterestindevelopingrelations
withit.The1970switnessedtheestablishmentofdiplomaticrelationsbetween
ChinaandmorethantenLatinAmericancountries.
UndertheleadershipofDengXiaoping,Chinastartedtoimplementreform
andopendoorpoliciesin1978.TheimageofChinainLatinAmericachanged
veryquickly.Inthe1980sand1990s,anothertenLatinAmericancountries
establisheddiplomaticrelationswithChina.Cooperationandcontactsinthe
economic,politicalandculturalareasproceededsteadily.
InNovember2004,ChinesePresidentHuJintaovisitedLatinAmerica,
followedbyVicePresidentZengQinghonginearly2005,onlytwomonthslater.
Thiskindoffrequentvisithappenedagainduring2008and2009.PresidentHu
JintaowenttoLatinAmericainNovember2008andVicePresidentXiJinping
followedinearly2009.Incontemporaryinternationalrelations,noothercountry
haseversenttopleaderstoLatinAmericawithsuchahighfrequency.
Between2001and2008,bilateraltradebetweenChinaandLatinAmerica
increasedalmosttenfold.In November2005,Chinasignedafreetrade
agreement(FTA)withChile.Asamatteroffact,thefirstcountrywithwhich
396 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
ChinareachedanFTAwasChile.InNovember2008,ChinaandPeruconcluded
theirFTAnegotiations.Inearly2009,ChinaandCostaRicaofficiallystarted
theirfirstFTAtalks.
After15 yearsofefforts,ChinasentranceintotheInterAmerican
DevelopmentBank(IDB)wasapprovedbytheothermembercountriesina
votingprocesswhichendedon15October2008.Inearly2009,Chinaformally
joinedtheIDB,thusbecomingtheBanks48thmembernation,contributing
USD350milliontovariousprogrammes.Chinapurchased184shares,or0.004
percentoftheIDBsordinarycapital,whichbecameavailableafterthebreakup
ofYugoslavia.
ChinaandBraziljointlylaunchedthreeremotesensingsatellitesin1999,
2003and2007,respectively.Thiscooperationhasbeenrecognisedasan
outstandingexampleofSouthSouthcooperationinthehightechfield.In
October2008,ChinasuccessfullysentaVenezuelantelecommunicationsatellite
intospace.The satellite,produced by Chinas Aerospace Science and
TechnologyCorporationwithadesignedlongevityof15years,isVenezuelas
firsttelecomsatelliteandisusedinbroadcasting,teleeducationandmedical
services.
InOctober2004,a95memberunitofofficersfromChinasriotpoliceforce
wassenttoHaititojointheUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperationthere.This
isthefirsttimeChinahasincludedmembersofitsriotpoliceforceinoverseas
peacekeepingduties.Itstaskwastosupporttheinternationalpeacekeeping
presenceandlocalpolicetoenforcelaws,dealwith masspublicsecurity
emergencies,serveasguardsonimportantpublicoccasionsandorganiseand
trainalocalriotpolice.Thistaskwasaccomplishedsuccessfully.InJanuary
2005,theChinesepeacekeeperswereawardedaUNpeacemedalfortheir
outstandingperformanceinthecrisistorncountry.
Therearealsonongovernmentalorpeopletopeoplecontactsandexchanges
betweenChinaandLatinAmerica.Morethanonehundredprovincesandcities
havebeentwinned.
InNovember2008,ChinapublishedapolicypaperonLatin America,
outlining35areasofcooperation.ItexpressedforthefirsttimetheChinese
Governmentsdesireto“viewitsrelationswithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
instrategicterms”.ItalsoreiteratedtheChineseGovernmentscommitmentto
theoneChinapolicyanddeclaresitthepoliticalbasisfortheestablishmentand
developmentofrelationsbetweenChinaandLatinAmericanandCaribbean
countriesandregionalorganisations.2
ANewLookattheTriangulationbetweentheEU,ChinaandLatinAmerica 397
4.犆狅犿狆犪狉犻狀犵狋犺犲犜狑狅犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犺犻狆狊
AcomparisonofrelationsbetweentheEUandLatinAmericaandbetween
ChinaandLatinAmericaleadstothefollowingconclusions:
(1)Inhistorical,politicalandculturalterms,Europehascloserrelations
andaffinitieswithLatinAmericathanChinadoes.
(2)EuropedevelopeditsrelationswithLatinAmericamuchearlierthan
Chinadid.Asamatteroffact,ChinastartedtomovetowardsLatinAmerica
onlyafewyearsago.TheChinaLatinAmericarelationshipisstillinitsinitial
stages,whereastheEULatinAmericarelationshipismuchmoremature.
(3)EuropesrelationswithLatinAmericaaremoreinstitutionalisedthan
Chinas.ApartfromtheEULatinAmericasummit,thereistheIberoAmerican
summitandotherdialoguemechanisms.ThechancesofconveningaChinaLatin
Americansummitareveryslim.Moreover,theEUhaspublishedmorepolicy
documentsonLatinAmericathanChina.
(4)ChinaLatinAmericarelationsareovershadowedbytheUSfactor.The
USissomewhatconcernedbythepresenceofChinainitsbackyard.US
CongressmanDanBurtonsaid:“IbelieveChinasrisingeconomic,politicaland
militaryinfluenceintheWesternHemisphereposesseriouschallengestothe
UnitedStatesintheyearsahead...Ibelieveweshouldbecautiousandviewthe
riseofChinesepowerassomethingtobecounterbalancedorcontained,and
perhapsgosofarastoconsiderChinasactionsinLatin Americaasthe
movementofahegemonicpowerintoourHemisphere.”(Burton2005)Europe
LatinAmericanrelationsarenotamajorissuefortheUS.
(5)EuropeseconomictieswithLatin Americaaremuchcloserthan
Chinas.In2008,EULatinAmericantradewasworthEUR189billion,while
ChineseLatinAmericantradewasworthUSD145billion,althoughithasbeen
growingrapidlyoverthepastfewyears.In2007,thetotalstockofEU
investmentinLatinAmericastoodatEUR228billion,whileforChinaitwas
onlyUSD25billion(ChineseMinistryofCommerce2010).
(6)EuropehasestablishedastrategicpartnershipwithLatinAmerica,
whereasChinahassetupsuchpartnershipswithonlyafewLatinAmerican
countries:Brazil(1993),Mexico (2003),Argentina (2004)andPeru
(2010). (7)ThepoliticaldimensionoftheEULatinAmericanrelationshipdiffers
fromthatbetweenChinaandLatinAmerica.ItseemsthatEuropeismuchmore
concernedaboutLatinAmericasdemocracy,humanrights,ruleoflawandso
on,whileChinaemphasisespoliticalconsensusonsuchissuesasThirdWorld
398 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
unity,amultipolarworldorder,oppositiontohegemonismandpowerpolitics
andsoon.
(8)Duetohistoricalandculturalreasons,mutualunderstandingbetween
EuropeandLatinAmericaismuchdeeperthanthatbetweenChinaandLatin
America.ChinadoesnotknowmuchaboutLatinAmericaandviceversa.
(9)BothEuropeandChinaseeLatinAmericaasanimportantsourceof
naturalresourcesandamarketof560millionconsumers.AnimportantEU
documentstatesthat“theregionhasconsiderablenaturalresources,especially
miningandenergyresources,aswellasexceptionalenvironmentalwealth,
notablytheAmazonianforestwithitshugebiologicaldiversity”(European
Commission2002).InitspolicypaperonLatinAmerica,Chinaalsoexpressed
aninterestinopeninguptheregionsresources.
(10)BothEuropeandChinaattachimportancetothesocialproblemsin
LatinAmerica.ChinaspolicypaperonLatinAmericadeclared:“TheChinese
GovernmentwillstrengthenexchangesandcooperationwithLatinAmericanand
Caribbeancountriesinreducingpovertyandnarrowingthegapbetweentherich
andthepoor,andwillencouragepovertyalleviationinstitutionsonbothsidesto
establishbroadcooperativerelationstoshareinformationandconductjoint
research”(ChineseGovernment2008).ForEurope,promotingsocialcohesion—
thatis,thefightagainstpoverty,inequalityandexclusion—isoneoftheEUs
strategicpolicyobjectives.Moreover,thenotionofsocialcohesionhasbeen
acceptedbytheUNEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
(ECLAC)asaguidingprinciplefortheregionssocialdevelopmentstrategy(ECLAC2007).
5.犆犪狀狋犺犲犈犝/犛狆犪犻狀犺犲犾狆犆犺犻狀犪狋狅犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犻狋狊犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊狑犻狋犺犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪?
TheUSisworriedaboutthecloserrelationsbetweenChinaandLatin
America.Europe,ontheotherhand,isnotworriedatall.Spainevenwishesto
offerChinaahelpinghandtopromoteitsrelationswithLatinAmerica.
TriangulationbetweenSpain,LatinAmericaandAsiaPacificisoneofthe
initiativesoftheSpanishgovernmentsAsiaPacificFrameworkPlan20002002
(Bustelo2002).InJuly2005,visitingSpanishPrimeMinisterZapaterosaidto
hisChinesehostthatSpainwouldbereadytoserveasa“bridge”forChinato
developitsrelationswithLatinAmerica.WhenPresidentHuJintaovisitedSpain
inNovember2005,ChinaandSpainissuedajointcommuniquédeclaringthat
bothsides had expressed a willingnesstocooperatearoundthe globe,
particularlyinLatinAmerica.
Undoubtedly,Spainisinagoodpositiontoplaytheroleofa“bridge”for
ANewLookattheTriangulationbetweentheEU,ChinaandLatinAmerica 399
Chinaand Latin America.Itsadvantagesinclude historicalconnections,
language,culturalsimilaritiesandastrongeconomicpresenceinLatinAmerica.
BeforeChinasentitstradedelegationtoEuropeattheendofFebruary
2009,theSpanishAmbassadortoBeijing,CarlosBlascoVilla,toldtheChinese
newspaper21狊狋犆犲狀狋狌狉狔犅狌狊犻狀犲狊狊犎犲狉犪犾犱thatSpainwouldbehappytoseeChina
investinLatinAmerica.WhenhewasaskedwhethertheinterestsofChinaand
SpainwerebeginningtoconflictsinceChinasrelationswithLatinAmericahad
startedtobecomecloser,Blascosaid:“Justtheopposite.Ithinkcloserrelations
betweenChinaandLatinAmericawouldcontributetothecooperationbetween
themandencouragefurtherinvestmentinLatinAmerica.”Theambassadoralso
saidthat“SpainwouldproposethatLatinAmericanotrelyontheUSsomuch,
norontheEU”.Heevenofferedoneexampleoftriangularcooperation:
“HuaweiandZhongxinhavesoldequipmenttoSpanishcompanieswhichusethe
ChineseproductstobuildtelecomtowersinLatinAmerica”(Yuan2009).The
questionnowiswhetherandhowtheEU/SpaincanhelpChinatodevelopits
relationswithLatinAmerica.
Toanswerthisquestion,wemusttrytounderstandwhatChinawantstodo
inand/orwithLatinAmerica.AccordingtoChinaspolicypaperonLatin
Americathereare35areasofcooperation.Insomeareas,itislikelythatthe
EU/Spaincanhelp;inothers,itisunlikely.
犜犪犫犾犲1 犃狉犲犪狊狅犳犘狅狊狊犻犫犾犲犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪犪狀犱
犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪犻狀狑犺犻犮犺狋犺犲犈犝/犛狆犪犻狀犆狅狌犾犱犘狉狅狏犻犱犲犃狊狊犻狊狋犪狀犮犲
Areasofcooperation Possibility Reason
Exchangesofhighlevelvisits Low
Thearrangementofsuchhighlevel
visitsinvolvesdiplomaticsecrecy
andotherissuesthatneednohelp
fromanythirdparty
Exchangesbetweenlegislatures Low
Chinahasnodifficultycontacting
legislative bodies in Latin
Americadirectly
Exchangesbetweenpoliticalparties Low
TheCommunistPartyofChinahas
itsownapproachtoestablishing
workingrelationswithpoliticalpar
tiesinforeigncountries
Consultationmechanisms Low
Thingswouldbecomemorecompli
catedifathirdpartywasinvolved
insuchbilateralmechanisms
400 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Areasofcooperation Possibility Reason
Cooperationininternational
affairs,suchasUNreformsHigh
Internationalaffairshavebecome
moreandmoreglobalisedand
multilateraldialoguesand
consultationsareneeded,
particularlywhendeadlockoccurs
Localgovernmentexchanges High
Theseexchangesmainlyinclude
cooperationineconomicandother
areas,aswellasestablishingtwin
provincesortwincities.TheEU/
Spaincanofferexpertisein
thisregard
Trade High
TheEU/Spainhasawell
establishedmarketingnetwork,
whichisveryvaluableforChinese
businessmen,whodonotknow
muchaboutthemarket
conditionsthere
Investmentcooperation High
TheChinesegovernmenthas
designeda“goingglobal”
strategy,whichencouragesdirect
investmentsinLatinAmericaand
otherpartsoftheworld.The
EU/SpaincanhelpChinaby
findinginvestmentopportunities
orevenestablishingjoint
investmentfunds
Financialcooperation High
Chinesebankswanttoopenupthe
marketinLatinAmericaand
Spanishbankshaveastrong
presencethere
Agriculturalcooperation,suchas
technicaltrainingHigh
TheEU/Spainhasboth
sophisticatedtechnologyandmore
experienceinthisarea
Industrialcooperation High
EU/Spainhasbothsophisticated
technologyandmoreexperiencein
thisarea
ANewLookattheTriangulationbetweentheEU,ChinaandLatinAmerica 401
Areasofcooperation Possibility Reason
Infrastructureconstruction High
ChinaandtheEU/Spaincan
cooperatetoinvestinLatin
Americaspoorinfrastructure
Resourcesandenergycooperation Medium
Therearemanyopportunitiesfor
cooperationinthisarea.Butboth
ChinaandtheEU/Spainwishto
exploitLatinAmericasresources
andenergy.Therefore,
competitionmightemergein
somecases
Customscooperation LowItinvolvesnationalsovereigntyand
legalmatters
Cooperationonqualityinspection Low
Itinvolvespoliciesonnontariff
barriersandsometimes
nationalsovereignty
Tourismcooperation High
SomanyChinesewishtovisit
LatinAmerica,butthetourist
industryinChinaislessdeveloped
thanthatoftheEU/Spain
Debtreductionandcancellation LowChinaasacreditorwouldmakeits
owndecisionsonthismatter
Economicandtechnicalassistance HighTheEU/Spainhasaccumulated
muchexperienceinthisarea
Multilateralcooperationin
multilateraltradeandfinancial
institutionsandregimes
High
Globalissuesareinvolvedinthis
area,andmultilateralcoordination
andconsultationisneeded
Chamberofcommercecooperation High
Cooperationwithathirdparty
mightfacilitateexchangesof
marketinformation
Culturalandsportsexchanges High
TheEU/Spainisverygoodat
promotingculturalandsports
exchangeswithLatinAmerica
Cooperationinscience,technology
andeducationHigh
TheEU/Spainhasadvantagesin
thisareaandhasaccumulated
muchexperienceofhowto
cooperatewithLatin
Americancountries
402 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Areasofcooperation Possibility Reason
Cooperationinmedicaland
healthcareHigh
Collectiveactioncanachieve
betterresults
Consularcooperationand
personnelexchangesLow
Itofteninvolves
nationalsovereignty
Mediacooperation LowChinahasitsownapproachto
themedia
Peopletopeopleexchanges HighGettingathirdpartyinvolvedcan
facilitatemutualunderstanding
Cooperationin
environmentalprotectionHigh Thisissueneedsglobalaction
Cooperationincombating
climatechangeHigh
Thisissueinvolvesmultilateral
negotiationsandcoordination
Cooperationinhumanresources
andsocialsecurityHigh
TheEU/Spaincanofferits
expertise,experiencesandlessons
forChinaandLatinAmerica
Disasterreduction,disasterrelief
andhumanitarianassistanceHigh
Multilateralactioncanbehelpful
towardsthisend
Cooperationinpovertyalleviation HighCombatingpovertyalsoneeds
multilateralactions
Militaryexchangesandcooperation LowItinvolvesmilitarysecretsand
nationalsovereignty
Cooperationinjudicialand
policeaffairsLow Thisisasensitivearea
Nontraditionalsecurityissues Low
Someissuesrequireglobalaction,
butsomeinvolve
nationalsovereignty
Inconclusion,theEU/Spainmightbeabletoactasa“bridge”forChinato
developitsrelationswithLatinAmericainsomeareas,butbynomeansall.
Generallyspeaking,itisintheeconomic,culturalandsocialareasthattheEU/
SpaincanbeparticularlyhelpfultoChina.
6.犆狅狀犮犾狌犱犻狀犵犚犲犿犪狉犽狊
Inaglobalperspective,theworldismovingincreasinglyinthedirectionof
multilateralism.Asaresult,ChinasrelationswithLatinAmericaareoften
ANewLookattheTriangulationbetweentheEU,ChinaandLatinAmerica 403
influencedbytrilateralorevenmultilateralinteractions.WhileEuropetendsto
haveacriticalorsometimesevennegativeviewofChinaspresenceinAfrica,it
wishestoofferahelpinghandtostrengthenbilateralrelationsbetweenChina
andLatinAmerica.Thisisaverypositiveandconstructiveattitude,andthe
threepartiesneedtoworktogetherforbettertriangulation.
FromtheChinesestandpoint,whetherandhowtheEU/Spaincanhelp
ChinadevelopitsrelationswithLatinAmericadependsonthefutureprospectsof
ChinasrelationswithbothLatinAmericaandtheEU/Spain.Itiscertainthat,
ifChinasrelationswithLatinAmericadevelopfurther,theprospectsofthe
EU/Spainplayingtheroleofa“bridge”betweenChinaandLatinAmericawill
bebrighter.Duetohistoricalandculturalfactors,Europehasmaintainedclose
relationswithLatinAmerica.ChinasrelationswithLatinAmericahavebegun
todeveloponlyrecently.EuropecouldserveasamodelforChinainsome
respects.
UnliketheUnitedStates,whichviewsChinaspresenceinLatinAmericaas
athreattoits“backyard”,theEU/Spainwishestoplaytheroleofa“bridge”
thatcanhelpChinatodevelopitsrelationswithLatinAmerica.Thisbenign
intentioniswelcomeandconstructive.However,giventhedifferencesbetween
LatinAmericanrelationswithChinaandwithEurope,respectively,itsrole
shouldnotbeexaggerated.Insomeareas,a“bridge”wouldbeuseful,butin
otherareas—forexample,touchingonnationalsovereigntyandothersensitive
issues—itisunlikelyandmayevencreate“transactioncosts”.
Notes
1.Asearlyas1761,theFrenchsinologistDeGiognesproposedthattheNewWorldwas
discoverednotbyColumbus,butbytheChinese.Chinesescholarslaterfoundthat,as
earlyasinthefifthcentury,aChinesemonk(ormaster)namedHuiShen(慧深)arrived
inwhatiscalledMexicotoday,thencalledFusang(扶桑)inChinese.Britishauthor
GavinMenziessaidinhis1421牶犜犺犲犢犲犪狉犆犺犻狀犪犇犻狊犮狅狏犲狉犲犱犃犿犲狉犻犮犪 (2003)thatthe
ancientChinesesailor,ZhengHe(郑和),“discovered”theAmericas70yearsearlierthan
Columbus.
2.Twentythreecountries,including12inLatin America,stillmaintain “diplomatic
relations”withTaiwan.
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! 405
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉14
犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊犫犲狋狑犲犲狀犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱
犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犔犻狋狋犾犲犈狓狆犲狉犻犲狀犮犲,犅狌狋犅犻犵犘狅狋犲狀狋犻犪犾
+#,- .)/0
1.犐狀狋狉狅犱狌犮狋犻狅狀
Inrecentyears,ourchallengeshavebecomeglobalandthedestiniesof
nationshavebecomedeeplyinterconnected.Nomatterwhereintheworldwe
live,wearetouchedbythesuccessesandfailuresoftodaysglobalorder.
Nevertheless,responsestoglobalproblemsremainverydifferent,notonlyasa
resultofcompetinginterests,butalso—andlargely—becauseculturaldifference
isthelensthroughwhichweseetheseglobalchallenges.Culturaldiversityisnot
necessarilyasourceofconflict.Crossculturalencountersoftenbringabout
creativechange.Iseemorechancesforissuebasedandflexiblecoalitionsamong
developingandemergingcountriesthanthesomewhatideologicalNorthSouth
confrontationsofthepast.Collaborationacrossbordersisgrowingprimarilyin
thearea ofbusinessand economicactivity.Collaborative networksfor
innovation,productionanddistributionareemergingasthesinglemostpowerful
shaperoftheglobaleconomy.
Trustisanessentialcurrencyofsocialcollaboration.Oursuccessin
addressingtheglobalchallengesofeconomicprosperity,politicalrelationsand
socialpeaceisafunctionofthedegreeoftrustthatnationsandculturesareable
tosustaininternationally.Dialoguecandemystify,beittherealimpactof
bioethanolproductioninBrazilontheenvironmentorfoodsecurityorthereal
impactoftheEuropeancommonagriculturalpolicyonglobaltrade.Dialogue
thusbuildsknowledgeoftheunfamiliar,andseeksoutareasofcommonground
Theviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthorandshouldnotinanywaybeconsidered
toexpressanofficialpositionoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionoranyofitsofficers.
406 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
anchoredinavisionofacommonfuturegroundedinidealsofequalityand
respect.
Wehavelittleexperienceoftriangularcooperationand,attheprojectlevel,
whatwehaveisnotencouraging.However,thisisnoreasonnottoconsiderits
potential—quitethecontrary.Trilateralcooperation,notablyonglobalissues,
ispossiblewhenpartnershavetheweight,butalsothewillingnessandthe
meanstoacttogether.Weightneednottobeamatterofsheersize;itcanalso
haveamoraldimensionthatwinsothersover.Trilateralcooperationmakes
sensewhenothersregardthepromotionofissuesorvaluesbycoreactorsas
persuasiveor,usuallyatprojectlevel,whentrilateralcooperationmakesit
possibletoreducepoliticalorrealcoststhroughtheuseofthecomparative
advantagesofeachactor.
Suchcooperationcantakeplaceatvariouslevelsandwithvaryingscopeand
intensity:from exchangesofviews,dialogue,experiencesharingandbest
practicestosectoraldialogue,internationalcoordination,jointpromotionand,
finally,jointeffortsonnormsettingorcreatingagloballyrepresentative,active
andefficientinternationalinstitutionalarchitecturewithmorelegitimacy.The
venuesareUNforumsinNewYork,GenevaandVienna,butinternational
conferencesandmissionsarealsoimportant.
AsHenry Kissingerpointedout,the “veryunsettlednatureofthe
internationalsystemgeneratesauniqueopportunityforcreativediplomacy.The
alternativetoanewinternationalorderischaos”.Chinasroleiscrucial,asare
thoseofotherpartnersontheirwaytobecomingmajorpowers.Thepastdecade
hasseenadeclineinthepowerofnationstates,butwithoutbeingreplacedby
sufficientlyeffectiveglobalgovernance.Insomeareas,therecognitionof
“commonbutdifferentialresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities”isinitselfa
promisingstartforconstructingcommoninterestsamongpartnerswithdifferent
potentials.Thereis clearinterestin the establishment of multilateral
developmentnorms,goals,proceduresandpoliciessuchasthe Millennium
DevelopmentGoals,theOECDsDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)or
theParisAgendawhichincreasesbeneficiarycountries“ownership”andthe
harmonisationofdonorpolicies.Earlierdominanceby Westerncountriesin
framingthesediscussionshasbeenerodedandrisingnewpartnersareplayingan
activeroleinpolicies,trade,aidandinvestment.Thus,morefundsarenow
available,aswellasgreaterdiversityofaidsources.
2.犜狉犲狀犱狊犪狀犱犗狆狆狅狉狋狌狀犻狋犻犲狊犻狀犛狅狌狋犺犛狅狌狋犺犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
China,LatinAmericaandtheEUalreadyhavesomeelaboratebilateraland
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 407
biregionalformsofcooperation,andtheyhaveproventheirinterestinshaping
theworld.Recently,political,economicandfinancialrelationsbetweenChina
andtheLatinAmericanCountries(LAC)havebeenconsiderablyreinforced.
Theoutreachofallthreebeyondtheirimmediateneighbourhoodandthe
advancesinSouthSouthrelationsandcooperation,beiteconomicorpolitical,
arepromisingbasesformoretrilateralcooperation.Valuableexperiencecan
comefromoutreachprogrammesoftheOECD/DAC,the WorldBankand
regionaldevelopmentbanks,orevenfromtheEUorcountryinitiatives,suchas
thoseoftheUKandGermany.Dialogueonprogrammeorientedapproachesin
thedonorcommunityshouldpreparetheterrainforconcretetrilateralprojects.
AccordingtotheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment
(UNCTAD2008,2009),SouthSouthFDIhasreached12percentofglobal
FDI,andthecorrespondingfigurefortradeis20percent.AsUNCTAD
SecretaryGeneralSupachaiPanitchpakdipointedoutinhisspeechinearly
February2009totheExpertMeetingonInternationalCooperation,SouthSouth
Cooperation and Regional Integration: “SouthSouth cooperation holds
significantpotentialforincreasedtradeandinvestmentflows,therebysupporting
industrializationandstrengtheningtheservicessector.Inrecentyears,the
renewedinterestamongdevelopingcountriesinmutualcooperationhasledtoan
increasingnumberofbilateralandregionalagreementsamongthemintheareas
oftrade,investmentsandfinance,butalsohealth,educationandculture.”
Thistrendhasbeendrivenbythestronggrowthintradeflowsbetween
developingcountries.Since1995,SouthSouthtradehasgrownfasterthanany
othertradeflows,averaging13percentperyear,comparedtotheglobal
averagegrowthrateof9percent,and10percentfortradeamongdeveloped
countries.Theamountinvaluetermsisequallyimpressive.Forexample,
SouthSouthmerchandisetradein2007amountedtoUSD2.4trillion,or20per
centofworldtrade.The1990salsosaw atakeoffin FDIflowsfrom
transnationalcooperation(TNC)intheSouth,withtheshareofSouthSouth
FDIintotalflowsgrowingfrom5percentinthe1990sto12percentin2006.
But,astheSecretaryGeneralalsounderlined,SouthSouthisnotasimple
substituteforNorthSouth(UNCTAD2009).
SincethetraditionalNorthSouthcooperationiscomplementedbygreater
SouthSouthcooperation,thisopensspacefortrilateralcooperation.Thetrends
towardsamultipolarworldanddiversificationofrelationsaretwosidesofthe
samecoin.“Emerging”donorsarebynomeansnewintheaidbusiness:China,
theArabcountriesandtheEasternblochavebeenactiveoverthepast50years,
408 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
ashavevariousLatinAmerican(LA)partners,suchasBrazil,Mexico,Chile
andVenezuela.Theirlargenewcushionsofforeignreservesandtheirexpertise
helpmanypeople.
Theendofthebipolarworldcan,withsomeexceptions,leadtoless
ideologicalandmoreissuebasedinterests,whichcanbemore“negotiable”
(Phillips2008;Schmitzand Messner2008).Trilateralcooperationbetween
LatinAmericaandtheEUexistedinthe1980s,whenLatinAmericancountries
invitedtheEuropeanCommunitytocooperateinendingthecivilwarsinCentral
Americawhichwerefosterednotonlybyscandaloussocialinjusticebutalsoby
thetwosuperpowers,neitherofwhichcouldwithdraw withoutlosingface.
PreciselythefactthatneitherLatin AmericancountriesnortheEuropean
countriescouldbeseenasa militarythreatallowedthemtoreachpeace
agreementsandtorebuildthedisruptedsocieties.
Someremarksongeneralconditions,methodsandproceduresfortrilateral
cooperationontheEU side.Asapreliminaryobservation,itshouldbe
mentionedthatintheEU,atthetechnicallevel,thereisanunofficialdistinction
betweentrilateralandtriangularcooperation.“Trilateral”meansjointfunding,
forexample,bytheEUandMexico,ofaprojectinCentralAmerica.This
happensrarely.“Triangular”meansthattheEUusesandfunds,forexample,
Chileanwaterexpertsor—andwhynotinthefuture—Cubanhealthexpertsina
projectin,forexample,Zimbabwe,totakeadvantageoftheparticularaccess,
expertiseandreducedcostsofnonEUexperts.Thisshouldalsohelptopromote
endogenousregionalsolutions.
3.犉犻犲犾犱狊狅犳犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
3.1 CooperationonGlobalInstitutionalArchitecture,MultilateralNorms,
Actions,ProceduresandObjectives
Ratherthanaworldinwhichoneortwosuperpowerstakeunilateraldecisions,
theEU,ChinaandLatinAmericaprefer,inmyview,an“interpolar”system(Grevi
2009)wherestrongplayerscooperateandpossiblyreachdecisionswiththehighestand
broadestpossibleinternationallegitimacytoaddressglobalissuesandchallenges,orto
preventandtacklecrises.Asglobalisationshrinksdistancesandissuesbecome
increasinglyinterconnected,thecomparativeadvantageofaneffectiveUNsystem
becomesmoreevident.Interpolarityislikelytobealessconflictualschemethan
thebipolarpast,notleastduetoeconomicinterdependence,butittakespolitical
willto support strong, more representative and efficientinternational
institutions,capableof“globalgovernance”(GrevianddeVasconcelos2009;
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 409
MGI2008;Phillips2008).Withoutreforms,theseinstitutionswillnot(re)gain
thelegitimacytheyneedtoact.Theycanfunctionefficientlyonlyifthereisa
minimumofcommonvaluesandaims.
Alookattheinternationalweightandengagementofmajorpartnersis
encouraging.TheEU27commandoneeighthofthevotesintheUnitedNations
GeneralAssembly(UNGA),theEUandLACtogetheronethird.EUmember
statesusuallyvoteunanimously(97percentsince1998/99),provide39percent
oftheUNsregularbudget,andtheEUplusmemberstatesare,together,by
farthelargestdonorofdevelopmentassistance,with55percent.EUmember
statesarelikewisethelargestfinancialcontributorto UN peacekeeping,
missionswithsome40percentin2007.Theythereforeprovidehalfthebudget
ofUNfundsandprogrammes(GowanandBrantner2008).
Inmyview,thereisnodoubtthatweneedcomprehensivereformandrevitalisation
oftheUNsystemandoftheinternationalfinancialarchitecture.Thisisnecessaryto
reinforcetheirdemocraticnature,transparency,accountabilityandefficiency,andtheir
representativeness,whichmustcorrespondtotodaysworld,nottothatof1945.Ialso
considervetorightsasoutdated,andIregretnonconstructivebehaviourincertain
“reformed”institutions.Ontheotherhand,achangeinvotingrightsisnoguarantee
ofgreaterefficiency,asillustratedbytheWTOorthenewCouncilonHumanRights.
Chinahasalsotakenanactiveroleindealingwithfinancialcriseselsewhere,
beitin1997ortoday.Itspresenceininternationalorganisationsorinternational
nongovernmentorganisations(INGOs)hasincreasedsince1977from21to50
internationalorganisationsandfrom71tosome1,300INGOs.Brazilhas
fosteredcoalitionsforcooperationwithinLatinAmericaandbeyond.TheUnion
ofSouthAmericanNations(UNASURUnióndeNacionesSuramericanas),the
creationofaSouthAmericanDefenceCouncilandtheIndiaBrazilSouthAfrica
DialogueForum(IBSA),allcanhaveabeneficialimpactonregionalsecurity.
IBSAiscertainlyahighlyasymmetricalandheterogeneousscheme,butoffers
particularpotentialasaninitiativebetweenregionalmiddlerangepowerswith
multiethnicandmulticulturalsocieties,andexperienceofdialogue,bargaining
andpeacefulconflictresolution.Brazilisreachingouttootherlusophone
(Portuguesespeaking)countriesandtheCaribbeanwithitsbestpractices,for
example,withregardtoHIV/AIDS.Mexicoisnotonlyaleadingeconomyin
LatinAmericaandamemberoftheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAssociation
(NAFTA),butalsooftheOECD,anobserverattheCouncilofEurope,the
largestLACcontributortotheUNbudgetandpartnertosome40freetrade
agreements(FTA)aroundtheworld.Mexicohastakenmanyinitiativesandis
theauthorofimportantresolutionsandconventions,promotedandadopted—
410 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
oftenwithEUsupport—in UNforums.Itscooperationisfocusedonits
neighbourhood,notablyCentralAmericandevelopmentviaitsPlanPuebla
Panama.VariousLACcountrieshaveregularlyparticipatedininternational
peacekeepingmissions.ChilecontributestotheEUcrisismanagementmission
inBosniaand Herzegovina,andoffersjointregionalactions withinthe
frameworkoftherecentEUChileAssociationforDevelopmentandInnovation.
Withthesecountries,thereisanimpressiveconvergenceofpositionsandvisions
whichshouldnotbeoverlookedalongsideconflictualtradeissues.BothChileand
Mexicohavesomeexperiencewithtrilateralcooperationwithmajordonorssuch
asJapan,Canada,EUmemberstates,theInterAmericanDevelopmentBank
(IADB),theFoodandAgricultureOrganisation(FAO)andtheUnitedNations
DevelopmentProgramme(UNDP).Thereisalsogrowingcoordinationbetween
thetworiftsofthePacific,asintheAsianPacificEconomicCooperation
(APEC)orthe ArcoPacificoschemes,which wererecentlyreinforced.
Venezuelahasobtainedconsiderableregionalgratitudeasaresultofits
preferentialdeliveriesofoil,promotionofgreaterfinancialindependencefor
LAC countries from international financial institutions and trilateral
humanitarianandsocialmissionstogetherwithCuba.Weshouldprofitfrom
thesenumerousexperiencesontheground,forexample,withregardtopoverty
reductionandsocialcohesion,but wecouldalsotakeupthenumerous
commitmentsinourEULatinAmericanagreements,whichoftensuggestthe
possibilityoftrilateralcooperation.
3.2 LabourandHumanRights
Multilateralismlacarteisonlyasecondbestsolution.Internationalnorms
are,inmanycases,preferabletobilateralagreements,sincetheyreflecta
broaderrangeofinterests.Thisisnotmerelyamatterofsoftpowerand
“bleedinghearts”.Weareconvincedthatmoreeconomicdevelopmentand
broaderproductrangesleadtomoreattentionbeingpaidtobroadlyaccepted
norms—inourownnationalorregionalinterest.
ThisiswhytheEUpromotescoreUNorInternationalLabourOrganization
(ILO)conventionsonhumanandlabourrightsandrequeststheirratificationand
effectiveimplementationasabasisforitsunilateralschemeofgeneralised
preferencesforlessadvancedcountries.Iseeacommoninterestinworking
towardsconventionsonminimumlabourandsocialstandards.NotonlyPortugal
andMexicobutalso,morerecently,Chinaislosingcompetitivenessandthus
jobstootherevenmore“lowcost”countries.Thisisinthelongterminterestof
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 411
usall:themoreregionssuchasAfricaandLatinAmericabecomemarketsfor
Chineseproducts,themoreChinawillhaveaninterestinfutureconsumerswith
themeanstopurchase.
Weallwanttosell,soweshouldcooperateinfosteringsuchsocialdevelop
ments.DuringoneofhisvisitstoEurope,ChinesePrimeMinisterWenJiabao
recalledAdamSmiths犜犺犲狅狉狔狅犳 犕狅狉犪犾犛犲狀狋犻犿犲狀狋狊,underliningthatifthe
fruitsofeconomicdevelopmentarenotsharedbyall,thatis“morallyunsound”
andathreattostability.Hence,China,LatinAmericaandtheEUcancooperate
inexchangesofexperiencesonreinforcingsocialcohesion,andinalargersense,
sustainabledevelopment.
Likesomeothercountries,notablyintheG77,Chinahasbeenparticularlyaware
oftheissueofsovereignty,stronglydefendingnoninterferenceandrefrainingfrom
givingothergovernmentsmoralsermons.Stressingstatesovereigntyandnon
interferenceininternalaffairsis,inourview,notsufficient,however;theEUstrongly
promotesthenotionthatpeople havetherightand governments havethe
“responsibilitytoprotect”(R2P),adoptedatthe2005UNSummit,tosomeextent
puttingpeopleatthesamelevelasstates.
Peopleexpecttobeprotectedandtheimmunityofstatesmenintheexercise
oftheirfunctionsshouldnotbepervertedintoimpunityinthenameofnon
interferenceincaseoftheheinouscrimesforwhichR2Pwasconceived.Inthe
Pinochetcase,forexample,theBritishHighCourtstressedthiswiththesimple
statementthat“itisnotamongastatesmansfunctionstotorturehiscitizens”.
TheEUbelievesinthe“narrowbutdeep”conceptofR2P:fourcrimesandthree
pillars.Thepreventivedimensionandassistancetostatestobuildtheircapacity
toensuretheirownresponsibilitytoprotectarecrucial.Thisconceptdoesnot
encroachonnationalsovereigntysinceitisinrealityaboutprevention,notabout
intervention.R2PwouldmaketheUNSecurityCouncilsuseofChapterVII
moredifficult.Thus,theEUconsidersacceptanceoftheprincipleofR2Pasa
meansofenhancingconflictprevention.
MostLACcountriesbelieveintheideaformulatedintheEuropeanSecurity
Strategy(12December2003)that“thebestprotectionforoursecurityisaworld
ofwellgoverneddemocraticstates”.“Spreadinggoodgovernance,supporting
socialandpoliticalreform,dealing withcorruptionandabuseofpower,
establishingtheruleoflawandprotectinghumanrightsarethebestmeansof
strengtheningtheinternationalorder.”Thebackgroundforthisphilosophyisof
coursetheEUsownrecenthistory.
Chinasredefinedviewofinternationalrelationshasreaffirmedsomefamiliar
positions,butalsoexpressesawillingnesstoengageinconstructiveengagement
412 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
withregardtoglobalgovernanceinthemanagementof“Weltinnenpolitik”
(globaldomesticpolicy).Withrisingstrengthcomerisingresponsibilities,but
thereverseisalsotrue.WeallhaveaninterestinparticipatinginUNpeace
keepingmissionsorfightinginsecurity—forexample,intheseasaroundthe
HornofAfrica.ItisencouragingthatAsianstatesarenowmoreoutspokenin
theircriticismsofandengagementinsuchsituationsasMyanmar.Chinahas
comearoundtotheviewthatallshouldencourageprogresstowardsdemocracy,
lestitbecomeadangertosecurityandstabilityintheregion.
Withregardtothenew Human RightsCouncil (HRC)orUN anti
corruptionconventions,nooneshouldbeallowedtomakeadeclamatoryand
acclamatorymockeryofwhatwasmeanttobeaconstructivelearningprocessof
bestpractices.RecentbadexperiencespointtotheHRCaspossiblyafailing
institution.SimilardeplorabletrendswereseenintheThirdCommitteeofthe
UNGA,andalltooobviousattacksoncountryresolutions.Thereareother,
moreencouragingexamples,however:theEU welcomedtheAssociationof
SouthEastAsianNations(ASEAN)fortheestablishmentoftheTermsof
Referenceforthenew IntergovernmentalCommission on Human Rights
(AICHR)on20July2009,whichisagoodbasisfromwhichfuturepartnership
couldevolve.
Also,thepeopleoftheworldwillnotunderstandifsomecountriesobstruct
progresswithregardtotheUN Conventionagainstcorruption.Corruption
distortsthecriteriabywhichpublicpoliciesarechosen,andtherebyundermines
theefficiency,efficacyandtransparencyofthosepolicies.Corruptionisequally
perniciousamongindividualcitizens,weakeningthebasictrustthatisatthecore
ofmostconceptionsofrobust,highqualitydemocracy.Politicalcorruption
mattersmoreindemocraciesthaninotherregimetypesbecauseiterodestwo
basicpillarsofdemocraticregimes:theequalityofcitizensandtheopennessof
decisionmaking.Butthoughcorruptionexistseverywhere,itseffectsaremore
dramaticthepooreracountryis.Wemustcooperateonthefullimplementation
oftheUNConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrimeandsupplementary
protocolsonthefightagainstorganisedcrimeandtheUNConventionagainst
Corruption.
Otherareasforcooperationshouldbementioned,notasashoppinglistbut
becausetheyhaveobviouspotentialfortrilateralormultilateralcooperation.
Clearly,therehasrecentlybeenatrendawayfrommultilateralsolutionsand
agreementsandtheinfluenceoftheEUhasdecreasedasanormsettingpower.
ThegeneralcarrotbasedapproachoftheEUasasoftpowershouldalsobe
underlined,withitsoffersofassistanceandrespectforthesovereigntyof
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 413
recipientcountriesthroughtheprincipleof“ownership”andnegotiatedfunds,
programmesandprojects.
Thereisinsufficientspacehereforadiscussionoftheconsiderablepotential
fortrilateralcooperationonthebasisoftheelaboratebilateral,sectoraland
policydialoguesexistingorbeingestablishedbilaterallybetweentheEUand
China(24sectoraldialoguessofar),orinthestrategicpartnershipsbetweenthe
EUandBrazilandtheEUandMexicoandtheirjointactionplans,aswellasthe
AssociationforDevelopmentandInnovationwithChile,reinforceddialogues
withArgentinaandVenezuela,anddialoguesinwhichtheEUistakingthelead
withregardtohumanrightsornonproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction
(WMD)togetherwithnumerousothercountries.Someareasarebetterdealt
withbilaterally,butothers—includingcohesionpolicy,issuesofmegacity
management,urbanruralrelations,civilaviation,sanitaryandphytosanitary
issues,theenvironment,energyandinformationtechnology—clearlyhavemore
trilateralorevenmultilateralpotential.
3.3 CooperationwithintheWTOandBenefitsBeyondIt
Inaglobalisedworld,thereareadvantagesinnormswhicharesharedas
globallyaspossible,as wellasinacceptedprocedures,beyondbilateral
arrangements.Wecannotlimitourselvestorepeateddeclarationsaimedatsaving
orrevitalisingtheDohaprocess,suchas“confirmingourwillingnesstoreachan
ambitious,comprehensiveandbalancedagreementthatfulfilsthedevelopment
objectivesoftheRoundandsignificantlyfosterstradeflowsinagriculture,
industrialgoodsandservicesamongandbetweendevelopedanddeveloping
countries,aswellaspromoteseffectivetraderules”.Thisisnotaneasytask.It
isclearfromtheDohaprocessthatnoonecanclaimtoknowautomaticallywhat
bestservesdevelopingcountries.Inthepast,theEUwasrightlycriticisedfor
itsagriculturalsubsidies—however,thishasbeendramaticallyrectified.Brazil,
too,becameawarethatitscallforcompleteliberalisationofagriculturaltrade
wasseenasathreatbylessefficientagriproducingcountries.
China withits (too)stronglyexportorientedeconomy mustbecome
interestedin—somewouldsay,itisdependenton—behaviourandrulesleading
tomorepredictabilityinrelations.Agreednormsandproceduresaremeanttodo
justthat.ThisisonereasonwhytheEU,whoseopenmarkethasbeenalarge
contributortoChinasexportledgrowth,wasastrongsupporterofChinas
accessiontotheWTOinlate2001,followedbyabroadEUChinastrategic
partnershipin2004andin2007bynegotiationsonanappropriateframework
414 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
agreement.
AsformerTradeCommissionerPeterMandelsonsaid,theEUexpects
tangibleresultsintheform ofmarketaccess,enforcementofintellectual
propertyrights(IPR),consumersafetyandsoon.Probablynoothercountry
hasgainedmorefromglobalisationthanChina.Nationalstandardswhichdiffer
significantlyfrominternationalonescausehighcompliancecostsanddelays.
EasingaccesstotheChinesemarketisanobjectivetheEUshareswithkey
developingoremergingcountries.
Idonotsharetheworriessometimesexpressedaboutimpendingcatastrophe
withregardtoclearlyshiftingcentresofgravityintheworldeconomy.Itakea
moreoptimistic,cooperativeview.Apparently,inChinese,thesignfor“crisis”
isalsothesignfor“opportunity”.Economicactivitiestosomeextentmoving
awayfromEuropeandtheUSandevenLatinAmericashouldnotbeseenmerely
asaonewayprocess.First,weretainlongacquiredtechnologicalcapabilities.
Second,suchmovescanalsogenerateincomeforEuropeanenterprises,directly
orthroughlicencefees.Third,generaldevelopmentandknowhowgeneratedin
Asiaand Latin Americacreateconsiderabledemandforcertain European
industries,suchasrenewableenergytechnology,transportandsoforth,and
providegroundsforresearch,whichcanbecomemorecooperative.Also,itis
simplistictoseethegrowingChinesepresenceonbothEUandLatinAmerican
marketsasathreat,mainlyduetocheaplabour.Itshouldbeseenasawakeup
callforthose whohavesofarfailedtoelaboratenationalandregional
developmentandreformstrategies.Chinahasapointinstressingthatitslow
pricedexportproductscanbepurchasedbythepoorinLatinAmerican,butitis
alsotruethattoallowthepoortobuyanythingtheyneedjobs,whichcanbe
endangeredbysuchlowpriceimports.Ontheotherhand,forLACthereare
risksofbeingstuckinthelowvaluerawmaterialexportcorner(TheEconomist
2005:43;OECD2006;IABD2006;Buck2006;deFreitasBarbosa2007).1
Chinahasconfirmeditsinterestinprotectingintellectualpropertyrights
(IPR)andincontrollingproductsafety.Theirresponsiblebehaviourofsome
producersthreatensChinesecompaniesjustasmuchasanyothers.Underan
agreementof2006,theEUpassesoninformationaboutdangerousgoodstothe
Chineseauthorities. Weshould welcomethefactthat,despitegrowing
problems,cooperationhasimprovedrapidly.Suchcooperationcouldbeextended
tootherpartners.Itshouldalsobeaddedthat,duetoitsrapiddevelopment,
Chinaisalsobecomingthevictimofunfairorcriminalproductionelsewhere.In
April2009,forthefirsttimeaGermancourtprotectedaChinesefirmagainst
counterfeitingbyaGermanfirm(althoughitshouldalsobenotedthatitsowner
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 415
wasaChineseexpatriate).
Thereisclearlyacommoninterestinworkingoutamutuallyagreedand
balancedapproachtotheenforcementofintellectualpropertyrights,whichcan
providethebasisforthepromotionofinnovationandtheestablishmentofan
objective dialogue on the common challenges of fighting piracy and
counterfeiting.On30January2009,theEUandChinasignedanactionplanon
customscooperationintacklingpiracyandcounterfeiting,as wellasan
agreementondrugprecursors.
The Chinese agreement to discuss opening service markets,the
MERCOSURChilebusinessseminarontheadvantagesoftriangulationinMay
2009,theEUChinaBiodiversityProgrammeandsimilarcommitmentswithinthe
frameworkoftheEULACsummitprocessarepromisingstepsinotherareas.
Anotherimportantaspectisthefactthatweallmaybenefitinthelongterm
fromChineseinvestmentinAfghanistan,PakistanandIran,wherethebuilding
ofroads,mines,transportandinfrastructure,althoughcertainlydoneinChinas
owninterest,also contributes to economic development there and to
interdependence,bothofwhicharealwaysgoodbasesformorestability.
Asalreadymentioned,multilateralismàlacarteisonlyasecondbest
solution,withthedangerofclashingregulatorypolicies.Takeinvestment:the
moreChinawishestoinvestabroad,includingtomakethebestofitshugedollar
reservesinturbulenttimes,themoreitislikelytodevelopaninterestin
agreeingoninternationalstandards,rulesorcodesofconduct.Addingtoa
growinginternational“spaghettibowl”inthisarea,Chinahasbeenacommitted
signatoryofbilateralinvestmenttreaties.Sincethe1980s,about120havebeen
signed,mostlywithseriousreservations.Inthisway,ofcourse,thereisarisk
thatdevelopingcountrieswillseetheirregulatoryautonomyfurtherreduced,and
somequestionwhetherChinaisactinginaccordancewithitsrhetoriconmutual
beneficialSouthSouthcooperation(Berger2008:1822).Ontheotherhand,in
thisrespect,theindustrialisedcountriesarenotabovereproach:EUmember
statesjealouslytrytodefendtheirindividualinvestmentprotectionagreements
againstanEUwideharmonisedapproach.Furthermore,industrialisedcountries
alsokeeptheireconomiesclosedtoChineseorLatinAmericaninvestment,under
thealltooeasyprofessionof “vitalnationalinterests”oreven “economic
patriotism”.
3.4!犈犱狌犮犪狋犻狅狀犪狀犱犐狀狀狅狏犪狋犻狅狀
Highereducationisbothapublicresponsibilityandapublicasset.
Investmentintheeconomycreatesjobs,incomes,progressandaddedvalue.
416 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
Investmentinthehighereducationofthebestbrainsinoursocietiesandin
internationalscientificandeducationalexchangealsohelpstoachievethis.But
suchinvestmenthasadditionallongterm value:itfostersunderstanding,
friendshipandsolidarityamongequals.Itmakesacriticalcontributionto
genuineandsolidpartnerships.
Internationalcomparativeanalysessincethe1970sshowthatoneofthe
majorfactorsexplainingwhysomecountriesinEastandSouthEastAsia,in
contrasttothefairlyslowprogressinLatinAmerica,havebeenabletoleapfrog
othersindevelopmenttermswastheirmassiveinvestmentinhumancapital,
combinedwithfocussedindustrialpolicies(Karlssonetal.1994).Chinais
alreadyoneofthemajorspendersonR&Dandhas—likeBrazil—reachedvery
highlevelsintermsofcontributionstosciencepublications.InChinaeachyear
therearehalfamillionnewpostgraduatesinscience,medicineandengineering;
inLatinAmerica,ontheotherhand,thepreferredcareerisstillthatoflawyer
ornotary(SchmitzandMessner2008:28).OnlyBrazil,ChileandCubaallocate
morethan0.5percentofGDPtoscienceandtechnology(EuropeanParliament
2008:27),comparedtotheaverageof2.4percentintheOECDand2percent
intheEUandChina,whichaspiresto2.5percentin2020.Meanwhile,studies
showthatoftensucheffortsarestillaccompaniedbyunequalaccessto
education—asituationfamiliarin mostsocieties (Grevi2009:19).Beijing
recentlyemphasisedsocialinvestmentasessentialtoChinaseconomicstability
andgrowth,withhealthandeducationatthetopofthelist.
VariousLACcountrieshavemadeconsiderableeffortstoimproveaccessto
education,andpromotingeducation,R&Dandexchangesofstudentsand
professorsareapriorityamongthecommitmentsmadeattheEULACsummits.
AsthefirstEULACsummitin1999inRiostressed,“thereisnobetter
investmentthandevelopinghumanresources,whichisbothacommitmentto
socialjusticeandarequirementforlongtermeconomicgrowth”(EUCouncil
1999).TheEUandLACplantoestablishaCommonSpaceforhighereducation
by2015.
IntheirJointActionPlan(JAP),BrazilandtheEUarecommittedtothe
buildingofa peoplecentred,nondiscriminatoryand developmentoriented
informationsociety,envisagedbytheWorldSummitontheInformationSociety(WSIS),aswellastheestablishmentofmultilateral,transparentanddemocratic
multistakeholdermechanismsforthegovernanceoftheglobalinternet.All
countriesrecognisetheimportanceofandcouldbenefitfromcooperationwith
regardtoinformationandcommunicationtechnologies (ICTs),whichare
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 417
essentialforfosteringinnovation,competitivenessand economicgrowth,
creatingjobsandincreasingtheefficiencyofthepublicsector.Moreover,ICTs
haveafundamentalroleinpromotingdigitalinclusionandimprovingsocial
cohesion,increasingthequalityoflifeandreducingpoverty.Itisessentialforall
countriestoworkinclosecoordinationinallrelevantinternationalforumsin
ordertofacilitatethefullimplementationofWSISoutcomes.Itwouldalsobe
worthlaunchingpublictendersforthejointselectionandfundingofR&D
projects,assuggestedintheEUBrazilJAP.
Besidespurelylanguagedrivencooperation programmes,the EU can
developtrilateralfutureactionswithintheframeworkofitswellestablishedand
largescale academic exchange and R&D framework programmes. The
“Euraxess”link,meanttoprovideanetworkingtoolforEuropeanresearchers
livingabroad,hasrecentlybeenextendedtoChina(afterUSAandJapan)and
canhelptofostermorethanbilateralcontactsandcooperation.
3.5!犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犅犪狊犲犱狅狀犪犅狉狅犪犱犲狉犆狅狀犮犲狆狋狅犳犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔
Securityclearlyconcernsmorethanmilitaryandborderissues.LiketheEU
andLatinAmerica,Chinahasadoptedanenlargedconceptofsecurity,involving
threatssuch asdrugsandtransnationalorganised crime,terrorism and
pandemics.Itshouldbepossibletocooperateonthesenewthreatsand
challenges,evenifitisdifficultwithregardtoclassicmilitaryissues.
ApromisingtrendinLatinAmericaisitswillingnessandcapacitytoaddress
itsownsecurityissues,withoutreferringnecessarilytotheOrganizationof
AmericanStates(OAS).Thisnewapproachhasalreadyshowngoodresultsin
crisispreventionandmanagement.TherecentlycreatedSouthAmericanDefence
Council(CDS)isnotaclassicoperationalmilitaryalliancealongthelinesofthe
NorthAmericanTreatyOrganisation (NATO),butrathera “method”of
confidencebuilding,safeguardingpeaceandassertingtheprimacyofcivilianover
militarypowerintheregion,aswellasreinforcingcooperationondefence
policies.TheCDSwillnothaveanoperationalmandate,butmayfacilitatejoint
militarytrainingandcouldsendcombinedunitstoparticipateindealingwith
regionalemergencies.
TheEUandLAChaveincommonthatnobodycanseriouslyconsiderthema
militarythreat.TogetherwithChina,however,bothshareawillingnessand
capacitiesforpeacekeeping,crisispreventionandpostcrisismanagement.It
mightalsobeworthmentioningherethatthegenderperspectiveisparticularly
importantforsuccessinthisarea.WecanbuildonexperienceasinHaitibefore
theearthquake,andengagetheinternationalcommunityinabroaderdialogueon
418 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
improvingresourcesandpracticesinUNpeacebuildingactivities.Thereisno
needtostressthatfightingterrorismanditsfundingisachallengeweallshare.
Weallhaveaninterestinmorestabilityandinpreventingtheemergenceof
breedinggroundsforterrorism,whichalsoaffectChineseinterests.Cooperation
intermsofinternationalefforts,strategiesandrecommendationsshould
thereforebesteppedup.
Another aspect of security cooperation is disaster prevention and
management.TheEUhasjustadoptedastrategyforsupportingdisasterrisk
reductionindevelopingcountries,whichistobeintegratedinitsdevelopment
policiesandthepromotionofdialogueandconcreteactionwithallinterested
parties.Thedramain Haitioffersnotonlyalongterm opportunity,but
representsan obligation forinternationalcooperation beyond ideological
considerationsandnationalinterests.Referenceshouldalsobemadeinthis
connectionto Global Climate Change Action (GCCA)and the Global
EnvironmentFacility(GEF).Cooperationintherunuptoandintheagreement
onthesecondGlobalPlatformonDisasterRiskReduction(DRR)inJune2009
wasveryimportant.
4.犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀犻狀犇犲狏犲犾狅狆犿犲狀狋犪狀犱犛犲犮狌狉犻狋狔—犃犳狉犻犮犪
TheEUhasaninterestinengagingandconsultingwithbothChinaand
LatinAmerica,aswellasinpromotingdevelopmentinareastowhichtheyhave
betteraccessorparticularexperienceandadvantages:insomeAfricancountries,
forexample.Thegrowingnumberofhighlevelvisitshasunderlinedthis.The
traditionaldonorrecipient,charitybasedapproachisoutdated.IntheEUBrazil
JAP,both willjoinforcestoimproveprogresstowardsthe Millennium
DevelopmentGoal(MDG)priorities,andhavestressedtheroleoftriangular
cooperation.Indeed,theEU,astheworldslargestgrantdonor,andourLatin
Americanpartners,asincreasinglyengagedactors,shouldcombinetheirefforts
withChinatobringdevelopmentskillsandprosperitytodevelopingcountries.
ThisalsomeansthatChinaandmajorLatinAmericancountriesmayhaveto
shoulderanincreasingaidbill.
Accordingto UN datareportedin EU internaldocuments,Chinas
engagementinAfricaisconsiderable.Itisnowthecontinentsthirdlargest
tradingpartner,with(2006figures)over800Chinesecompaniesinvesting,some
500jointventures,80,000Chineseworkers,thecancellationofdebtsworth
morethan1billionUSdollarsowedby31Africancountries,theabolitionof
tariffsonnumerousgoodsfromtheleastdevelopedcountries,18,000scholarshipsfor
50countriesand16,000medicalpersonneltreating240millionpatientsin47countries.
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 419
Since1999,Chinahassuccessivelydispatchedover7,000peacekeepers,comprising
militaryobservers,militaryengineersandcivilpolicetotakepartin21peace
keepingmissionsacrosstheworld,morethantherestoftheUNSecurity
Councilspermanentfivememberscombined.Currently,Chinaisthethirteenth
largestcontributorofpeacekeepingtroops.MostoftheChinesepeacekeepers
weredeployedonallsevenongoingUNAfricanmissions.
Chinahasgainedexperienceasapeacekeeperandapeacekeepingtrainer;it
isnolongerpurelyaparticipant,butalsoanactiveorganiser,like,forexample,
BrazilinHaiti.Pursuingnationalinterestsisabsolutelylegitimate.Inthepast,
Chinasengagementwasviewedwithsuspicioninsomequarters;someactions
weresaidtoundermineeffortstoimprovedemocracy,liberty,humanrights,
socialandenvironmentalstandards,transparencyoraccountabilityandgood
governance.Unlikethe EUsassistance,Chineseaidistiedto Chinese
companiesandlabour—whichseemstocopya Westernapproachrightly
criticisedsomedecadesago.EUassistanceisthusmoreopentotrilateralaction.
CommissionerLouisMichelhasexplicitlywelcomedChinassupportforAfrica.
Recipientcountries—butalsoEurope—benefitmoreifanagendaislaiddown
whichunderlinescomplementarity,comparativeadvantageandsynergy,evenif
approachesmaysometimescompetewitheachother.Noonebenefitsfrom
adversecompetitioninthisrespect.Sometimes,internationalrulesandpractices
inaidmanagementwereestablishedwithoutChinabeinginvitedorparticipating.
Nobodycanbeaskedtocomplywithrulesiftheyhavenotbeendiscussedwith
them.Thismustberemedied.Thus,dialogueisthefirststep.Butweneedto
gobeyondstatementsofgoodintentions.Wefirstneedtoassesseachothers
strategiesandapproaches狊犻狀犲犻狉犪犲狋狊狋狌犱犻狅.Thenwemustadvance,building
experienceandtrustintrilateralrelations.Trilateralcooperationinaregion
mustbeacornerstoneofstrategicpartnershipinandonglobalaffairs.
AbasishasbeenlaidforthisintermsofEULACorbilateralstrategic
partnershipsandjointactionplans,orintheEUChinadialogueonAfricas
peace,stabilityandsustainabledevelopment.Wecanstartbycooperatingin
areasthatarerelativelyuncontroversialintermsofvaluesandobjectives,such
aspublicsectorsupport,infrastructureorhealth,notablyinAfrica.Wealready
havesomecommonbasesformore,asChineseandBrazilianrepresentativesare
attimesinvolvedintheworkingoutofEUprojectsinWestAfrica.Wealso
shareinitiativesonresponsibletrade,suchastheForestLawandenvironmental
governance,orthe Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.Itis
regrettablethatAfricancountrieshavesofarshownlittleinterestintriangular
cooperation.Ofcourse,itiseasierforsomeleadersnottocommittocooperation
420 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
whichmighthavepoliticalandsocialramificationswhichwouldnotsuitthem.
5.犆狅狀犮犾狌犱犻狀犵犜犲犮犺狀犻犮犪犾犪狀犱犃犱犿犻狀犻狊狋狉犪狋犻狏犲犆狅犿犿犲狀狋狊
Fortriangularcooperationbasedonconcreteprojects,wealsoneedpolitical
guidancebeyondpurelycommercialinterests.Chinahasrecentlytakensuch
stepsamongitsministries,butitsstateownedenterprisesshouldfollowsuit.
Corporatesocialresponsibilityisgaininggroundandshouldbepromotedinthese
timesofcrisis.
Donorcoordinationandsimplificationofproceduresisessentialtoavoid
wasteandtheoverloadofbeneficiariesadministrations.TheParisDeclarationof
the OECDDAC,the Accra Agenda and the “European consensusfor
development”help.National“ownership”mustberespectedbutalsodemanded.
Thegoalistoactinconcert,creatinglocallyownedsolutionsfordevelopment,
onvariouslevels.
Inplanningandimplementingpossibletriangularcooperation,wemustall
beawarethatournationalandregionaldecisionmakingsystemsinvolveelements
ofdecentralisation,localpoliticalautonomy,liberalelementsinthebusiness
sector—andsometimesproblemsofoverarchingcontrol—bothinChinaandthe
EU.WhentalkingabouttheEU,weshouldmentiontheEuropeanInvestment
Bank(EIB),withitslargecapacities,butalsospecificandindependentrules.
Triangularcooperationcomplicatescoordination,and maycausehigher
transactioncosts.HeretheremaybeaproblemwiththeoverlycomplexEU
internaldecisionmakingandaccountabilityprocess,created withthebest
intentionsoftransparencybutoftencriticisedasslowandinflexible.Whereas
VenezuelasPresidentChavezliterallycanpullachequeoutofhispocketwhen
accompanyingPresidentMoralestomeetpeasantsinBolivia,theEuropean
Commissionmustsubmitprojectsofacertainsizeforapprovalbymemberstates
andsometimesbythe European Parliament,negotiateacceptancebythe
beneficiarycountrywithinitsownprogramme,thenlaunchEUwidetenders,
obtainsignaturesfromvariousDirectorateGeneralsandlevelswithinCOMand
otherthingsbesides.
ThecurrentcrisisillustratestheEUsweaknesses.Intrilateralcooperation,
therefore,itwouldbewisetotakethemintoaccount,butalsototrytodeal
withthem,includingstructuralproblemswhichdonotaffectonlyemerging
powers,suchassocialcohesion,sustainabledevelopment,infrastructure,
administrativeculturesandtheenvironment.Reducingexpenditureonsuch
fieldsinneedofreformcanbedangerousinthelongterm.Trilateralcooperation
isanopportunityforlearning.
TrilateralRelationsbetweenChina,theEUandLatinAmerica:LittleExperience,ButBigPotential 421
Lastbutcertainlynotleast,wemustalsopromotepeopletopeoplecontacts
andculturalexchangestofacilitatetriangularinitiatives.Frommyexperiencein
EULACrelationsI muststress how much we both benefitfrom the
interparliamentarymeetingsandconsultationsbetweenourcivilsocietiesas
valuableforumsforbetterunderstanding,promotingbiregionalinitiatives,with
closercontactswithourconstituents,andconsolidatingourdemocraticbases.
AsthereportoftheSecretaryGeneraltotheUNGAin2005underlined:
“States...cannotdothejobalone...Weneedanactivecivilsocietyanda
dynamicprivatesector.Itisplainthatthegoalsoutlinedherewillnotbe
achievedwithouttheirfullengagement.”
Finally,asKissingerrecommended,“weallmustlearntooperatewiththe
attainableandbepreparedtopursueendsbytheaccumulationofnuance”.
Kissingeralsostressedthatmoralandotherobjectivesmustbeinharmonywith
ourcapacitiesforaction.Unrealisticexpectationsundermineaction.Inpoliticsit
isnotenoughtobe“right”—inanycase,itisoftenhighlycolouredideologically.
Onealsoneedsthecapacitytopushthroughwhatoneconsiders“right”andto
seizethemoment,notgettingboggeddownindetails.
Notes
1.FormoreontheCaribbean,seeErikson(2009)andECLAC(2008).
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! 423
犆犺犪狆狋犲狉15
犆犺犻狀犪,狋犺犲犈犝犪狀犱犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪牶犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犚犲犾犪狋犻狅狀狊
犪狀犱犛犮狅狆犲犳狅狉犕狌犾狋犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犻狊犿
1#,/*- 23,4)$# ."#43
1.犃犛狔狊狋犲犿犻犮犆狉犻狊犻狊牶犜犺犲犆犪狊犲犳狅狉犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀
Thecurrentglobalcrisishasbroughthomewithunprecedentedandpainful
forcethatthereisapotentialdownsidetoglobalisation.Amiddramaticsignsof
recession,losttradeandcreditsqueeze,theinternationalrecession has
underscoredtheimportanceofcoordinationanddialogueindealingwithatruly
systemicphenomenon.Theriskofeachcountrygoingitsownwayandtryingto
dealinisolationwitheconomichardship,blinkeredbynarrowselfinterest,has
beenclearforalltoseeasprotectionismraisesitshead.Thisexplainsrecent
moves,unprecedentedintheirscale,towardsinternationalcooperationin
mattersoffinance,currencyandtrade,asshowcasedduringtheG20Summitsin
2009and2010.
Butthepersistenceofmajorstumblingblocksontheroadtorecovery,
stemmingfromdivergentperceptionsofthenatureanddepthofthecrisis,points
totheneedforevengreaterandmoreagilecollaboration.Thesummoningbythe
PresidentoftheGeneralAssemblyofaUNConferenceonthecrisisinJune2009
demonstratedarecognitionthatamoreholisticandintegratedoutlookisrequired
ifthemultipleandinterconnectedchallengesfacingtheplanetaretobedealt
withsuccessfully.
Multilateralismisnodoubtacrucialpartoftheanswer,astheworld
communitystrivestoovercomescepticismabouttheusefulnessofinternational
institutionsatalllevels.Thecumbersomenatureofmultilateraldecisionmaking
reinforcesahealthysenseofurgencyaboutaddressingglobalchallenges.While
nosubstituteforglobalinstitutions,oneislefttoponderwhetherenhancing
mechanismsfordialogueandchannelsofcooperationbetweenfarflungpartsof
424 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
theworldisnotpartoftheanswerifglobalisationistoretainitspromise.
Itiswithinthiscontextthatproposalsforenhancedtrilateralrelationsare
gainingcurrency.Thisnotionencouragescountriesandregionstotakethelead
inworkingtogetheracrossawiderangeofcommonintereststhatgenerate
mutuallyreinforcing benefits.Ideally,this would be achieved through
institutionalarrangementsthatforgelinksbetweencountriesandregions
geographicallyorhistoricallydistant.
InthecaseofLatinAmerica,theEuropeanUnionandChinathisisstillan
ambitiousconceptinthemaking.Asofnow,therearefewconcreteexampleson
offer.Outsidethetraditionaltranscontinentalimperialregimesofthepast,this
concepthasbecomeconceivableonlyinthecontextofglobalisationasunderstood
fromthelatetwentiethcenturyonwards.Itisonlythegrowinginterdependence
betweenthemostfarflungcornersoftheworldundertheaegisofglobalflows
ofcapital,technologyand knowledgethathave madethisnotiontruly
meaningfulandpotentiallyoperational.Thebestpathforwardwouldseemtobe
toworkupthroughpreexistingtwowayrelationshipssoastoidentifypointsof
symmetryandconvergencethatwouldhelpconnectthethreepoles.
2.犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪,狋犺犲犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀犪狀犱狋犺犲犈狌狉狅狆犲犪狀犝狀犻狅狀牶犆狅犾狅狀犻犪犾犘犪狊狋犪狀犱
犘狉犲狊犲狀狋犱犪狔犃犾犾犻犪狀犮犲
InthecaseofLatinAmericaandEurope,tiesarelongstandinganddate
backtoEuropeancolonisationoftheAmericasintheearlysixteenthcentury,
havingsurvivedthestrainsimposedbytheindependencestrugglesoftheearly
nineteenthcentury.Overrecentdecades,asLatinAmericanandEuropean
integrationhaveadvancedoneithersideoftheAtlantic,aseriesofbiregional
dialogueandcooperationmechanismshaveevolved.
ThemostsignificantandfarreachingoftheseistheLatinAmericaand
CaribbeanEuropeanUnionHeadsofStateandGovernmentSummitprocess,or
EULAC.Setupin1999,itmeetseverytwoyearsinaccordancewithaflexible
formatthataccommodatesthevariouspoliticalandeconomicarrangements
within Latin America. These include the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR),the Rio Group,1 the Andean Community (CAN),the
CaribbeanCommunity (CARICOM)andtheCentralAmericanIntegration
System(SICA).Fromalargenumberofprioritiesfirstestablishedin1999,the
latestSummit,inLima(2008),decidedtonarrowthefocustotwocentral
overarchingthemes:first,reducingpoverty,inequalityandexclusion;and
second,sustainabledevelopment,whichencapsulatestheenvironment,climate
changeandenergy.Onthewhole,thedialoguehassoughttoemphasise
China,theEUandLatinAmerica:TrilateralRelationsandScopeforMultilateralism 425
cooperationprojects,exchangeprogrammes,capacitybuildinganddialogueon
globalagendaissues.SpainandPortugalhavetraditionallytakenaleadinmost
cooperationprojects,beitthroughtheIberianAmericansummitmechanismor
byplayingaparticularlyactiveroleintheEULACdialogue.
Theresultshave,onthewhole,beenmodest,duetothelackofaclear
focusandconflictingpriorities.Ontrade,thedifficultiesinvolvedinconcluding
anassociationagreementbetweentheEUand MERCOSURortheAndean
Communityreflectprotectionistpressuresonbothsides.Projectsinthefieldof
technical and technological cooperation have been fragmented, with
understandablylittle measurableimpactintermsofpromotingsustainable
developmentinLatinAmerica.Thishasbeenunderscoreddramaticallyand
painfullyinthebitterdisputeovermigrationcontrolsinvolvingLatinAmerican
nationalslivinginEurope.Anotherboneofcontention,especiallyasregards
Brazil,istheissueofEUrestrictionsonbiofuelimports.Giventhedivergent
viewsontheseandothermajorissues,thisgenerallackofcoherenceandsenseof
focuswasverymuchinevidenceduringtheLimaSummit.Thepictureis
aggravatedbytheEUsgrowingprioritisationofcooperationwithCentraland
EasternEurope.ThishasledSpainandPortugal,giventheirhistoricallycloser
linkstotheregion,tobankrolltheIberoAmericansummitprocess,whichtends
toconcentrateonculturalandtechnicalcooperation.2Noneofthishasdetracted
fromincreasedEuropeandirectinvestmentintheregion,probablyitsmost
consistentandlastingcontributiontoLatinAmericandevelopment,although
ironicallythisisalsoincreasinglyanirritantinthefaceofrisingeconomic
nationalisminsomeLatinAmericancountries.
3.犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪,狋犺犲犆犪狉犻犫犫犲犪狀犪狀犱犆犺犻狀犪牶犌狉狅狑犻狀犵犘犪犻狀狊
InthecaseofLatinAmericaandChina,historydoesnotcastsolonga
shadow.Onlyrecentlyhavetiesgainedgreaterweight,astheresultofgrowing
economicandcommerciallinks.Tradehasinfactjumpedquitedramaticallywith
mostcountriesoftheregion,accompaniedbytheestablishmentofdiplomatic
relationswithalmostallcountries.IncontrasttoLatinAmericaEUrelations,
thereisnocomparableinstitutionaliseddialoguemechanismbetweenChinaand
LatinAmerica;however,theMacauForum,forexample,bringstogetherChina
andPortuguesespeakingcountriesinthreecontinents.Existingmechanismsare
largelybilateralandfocusedonspecificlinks,whicharestilllargelytradeand
investmentdriven.Aswithmostcountriesandgroupings,theRioGrouphasa
regulardialoguemechanismwithChina,whichnormallymeetsatthemarginsof
majorforums.Whileitservesasausefulopportunityforgeneralexchangeson
426 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
politicalandcooperationissues,ithasnotprovidedameaningfulplatformfor
effectivepartnering.ChinaandLatin Americastillspeaklargelythrough
bilateralvoices.
4.犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犆狅狅狆犲狉犪狋犻狅狀牶犠狅狉犽犻狀犘狉狅犵狉犲狊狊
Understandably,nomatureinstitutionalframeworkfortrilateralexchange
hasyetbeenestablished.Anadditionaldifficultyhastodowiththeenormous
heterogeneitywithinLatinAmericaitself,assuggestedbythemultiplicityof
regionalforumsspeakingonbehalfoftheirdisparate membercountries.
Differentcountriesandsubregionshaveachievedvaryinglevelsofsocial,
economicandtechnologicalprogress,makingitnearlyimpossibletomoulda
uniformandcoherentsetofbiregionalstrategiesandpoliciesfocusingoncommon
prioritiesandobjectives.LatinAmericaisatamuchearlierstageofintegration
andcommonpolicydevelopmentthantheEU.Theregionhasnotachieveda
comparabledegreeofcohesiveandstructuredinternalpolicycoordinationthat
caterstoissuesofasymmetryandthebalancedgrowthrequiredtoforgeatruly
integratedmarketandforeignpolicy.Thisisclearlyvisible,forexample,inthe
slowpacedprogressofbringingtogetherthevarioussubregionalintegration
dynamicsmentionedabove.
Whileaninstitutionalframeworkfortrilateralrelationsstillliesinthe
future,thereisalreadyampleroomforcooperationonprojectsthatseekto
exploitspecificcomplementaritiesbetweenmultipleoverseaspartners.Brazilhas
takenaleadhere,havingacquiredextensiveexperienceinawiderangeoffields.
ThishasincreasinglytakentheformofmarryingBraziliantechnicalexpertiseand
technologicalknowhow withdevelopedcountryresources withaview to
promotingjointcooperationprojectsindevelopingcountries.Whilestilla
relativelynovelexperiment,successfulpartnershipshavebeentestedinthefields
oftropicalagriculture,governmentmodernisation,institutionbuildinginsocial
policy,alternativefuelsanddiseaseeradication.ThemainpartnersareinEurope
andtheUSA,thebeneficiariesnormallyinLatinAmericaandAfrica.
ThereareasyetnosuchsignificantprojectsinvolvingChina,theEUand
LatinAmerica.Thisshouldnotholdthemback,giventhatboththeEUand
Chinaareknowntobekeenondevelopingjointpartnershipsoverseas,especially
inAfrica,whileBrazilalreadyboastsextensiveexperienceincooperation
projects.LatinAmericashouldalsoaffordopportunitiesgivenBrazilsevenmore
wideranginghistoryofprovidingtechnicalandinstitutionalhelptoalmostall
countriesinSouthandCentralAmericaandincreasinglyintheCaribbeanas
well.ThestrongpresenceofEuropean,BrazilianandmoreandmoreChinese
China,theEUandLatinAmerica:TrilateralRelationsandScopeforMultilateralism 427
enterprisesinbothAfricaandLatinAmericashouldhelpopenavenuesforjoint
work.ThisisencouragedbythefactthatEuropeancountriesaswellasChina
are,orareconsidering,joiningasassociatemembersthemajorfinancefor
developmentinstrumentsin Latin America,such astheInterAmerican
Development Bank (IADB),the Central American Bank for Economic
IntegrationandtheAndeanDevelopmentCorporation(CorporaciónAndinade
Fomento,CAF).
Therearesomeobviousopportunitiestoemploybiregionalmechanismsas
springboards for threeway collaboration. The EU maintains Strategic
PartnershipswithallBRICcountries.Oneusefullineforjointactionwouldbeto
identifythematiccoincidencescuttingacrossStrategicPartnerships.Thisis
underscoredbythefactthattheStrategicPartnershipActionPlanrecognises
Brazilsrole—presumablythesameappliestoChina—asaglobalplayerandsets
outproposalsforcooperationandconsultationonaseriesofglobalagendas,
includingtriangularcooperationbenefitingdevelopingcountries.
Afewareasforjointactioncometomindimmediately.Thefirstareais
scienceandtechnology,more particularlyin aerospace,Brazilenjoysa
flourishingpartnershipwithChina,whichwasenhancedduringthevisitof
PresidentLuladaSilvatoBeijinginMay2009.Itcentresonsatelliteimagery,
especiallyusefulforenvironmentalandweathermonitoringinLatinAmericaand
China.AsimilarpartnershipexistswithFrance.
A second area with enormouspotentialisbiofuels.Brazils30year
experienceindevelopingcleanandcompetitivelypricedethanoland,more
recently,biodiesel offers a truly exceptional opportunity for trilateral
cooperationinacriticalfieldthatshouldbedeveloped.BothChinaandtheEU
arealreadyinactivedialoguewithBrazilonbiofuels.TheInternationalForum
onEthanol,whichfosterscollaborativeworkincertification,technological
developmentanddevelopingproduction,offersavaluablelocusfortrilateral
projects.BrazilspartnershipwiththeUSinthisfieldmightprovideavaluable
model.Signedin2007,thisagreementprovidesforBrazilianexpertiseinethanol
productiontoencourageethanolproductioninLatinAmericanandAfrican
countriesintheexpectationofreceivingfavouredaccesstotheUSmarketby
beingexemptedfromthe54centtariffcurrentlyappliedtoBrazilianethanol
imports.
5.犃犔犪狋犻狀犃犿犲狉犻犮犪狀犘犲狉狊狆犲犮狋犻狏犲牶犐狀狋犲犵狉犪狋犻狅狀
Brazilianexperienceintrilateralcooperationofferspointersbuthardlyaroad
mapfortheconstructionoftrilateralrelationswiththeEUandChina.As
428 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
previouslymentioned,widediscrepanciesintechnicalandtechnologicaladvance
withinLatinAmerica—asinotherdevelopingcontinents—considerablyrestricts
thescopeforwideranging,ambitiousinitiativesofthisnature.
ThishashelpedfuelabroadlyheldperceptionofLatinAmericaaslargelya
recipientofforeignaidandabeneficiaryofdevelopedcountrycooperation,with
littletoofferinitsownright.Inotherwords,itisseenasapassiveobserverof
theongoingrestructuringoftrade,financialandtechnologicalflowsthatgoesby
thenameof“globalisation”.ThisissomethingBrazilwishestoseechangeasit
endeavourstouseintegrationasthebasisfortheregionjoiningmoreeffectively
andintelligentlyintheworldeconomy.Itmightthereforedealwiththe
questions:WhatistherelevanceoftheEUandChinaforLatinAmerica?Or,in
otherwords,howshouldLatinAmericareacttothechallengesofglobalisation
andhowdoesBrazilseeitsroleinthis?
FromaLatinAmericanperspective,themainchallengeistoavoidbeing
suckedintowhatmostLatinAmericanswouldcall“neocolonialism”revisited,
wherebytheregioncontinuestosupplyrawmaterialstodevelopedeconomiesin
exchangeforvalueaddedproductsandservices.Escapingthistraphasalways
beenacentralplankofLatinAmericaneconomicthinking.Underlyingthis
perceptionisastronglyheldsenseofalonghistoryofexpropriationofthe
regionsnaturalresourcesatthehandsofpowerfullocalelitesoperatingatthe
behestofforeigninterests.Itisthereforeunderstandablethatpublicopinionin
someofthesecountriesiseasilyledtointerpretinstarktermsattemptsby
foreignenterprisesandgovernmentstoensurelongtermaccesstolocalraw
materials.Theelectioninrecentyearsofleftwinggovernmentsthroughoutthe
regiongoessomewaytowardsexplaininggrowingeconomic,especiallyenergy,
nationalism.Itexpressestheunderlyingaspirationtoensurethattheregions
richesgenerateprosperitybackhomeandforall,notjustafavouredfew.
Thissenseofnotwantingtobesomeones“backyard”,eithereconomically
orstrategically,hastakenonnewmeaningandforceastheworldcomesunder
thefullforceoftheglobalisationrevolution.Itisunderstoodthatthenew
competitiveglobalmarketisopeningupnovelopportunitiestodevelopthe
regionsnaturalendowmentsandsignificantconsumermarketsinamanner
whichwillfostersustainablegrowth.Brazilhasbeenattheforefrontofefforts
todeveloptheintegratedregionaleconomyrequiredifLatinAmericanisto
overcomethestructurallimitationsthathavehistoricallyheldtheregionback.
This means using the promise ofglobal marketstoinvest heavilyin
infrastructuralinvestmentsintransport,communicationsandenergythatwill
China,theEUandLatinAmerica:TrilateralRelationsandScopeforMultilateralism 429
mouldaneconomicpowerhouseabletocompeteglobally.
6.犃犌犾狅犫犪犾犖犲狑犇犲犪犾?
However,thepresentcrisishasalsoreinforcedasenseofthevulnerability
ofdevelopingcountrieswithregardtoglobalisationtakingplaceinaccordance
witheconomicandfinancialrulesnotoftheirmakingandfrequentlyweighted
againstthem.Thisisnottosaythatglobalisationshouldbereignedinor,much
less,reversed.Quitethecontrary,mostofLatin Americaopposestrade
protectionismasananswertothedownsideofglobalisation.
Thefinancialcollapsehasputinstarktermswhatclimatechangehad
alreadymadeclear:globalgovernanceinitspresentformatisunsustainable.The
inabilityofoldcoalitionsthat,traditionally,decidedmostissuestoprovide
leadershipandcredibleguidancehasbeenhighlightedbythefranticsearchfora
replacementfortheG8oreventhe UN SecurityCouncil.Butemerging
markets—thatcontributedlittletothepresentcrisisortoglobalwarming—have
becomecentraltoanysolutiontothesequestions,giventheirgrowingroleinthe
worldeconomy.Atthesametime,theircitizensaretheimmediatevictimsof
bothcrises.Thisexplainsthegrowingclamourforanewglobalcompactthat
redistributesresponsibilitiesmoreequitably.Underlyingthesedevelopmentsis
therealisationthatthecontemporaryworldisfundamentallyunbalanced:onthe
onehand,richcountriesdesiretoretainwhatisclearlyanunsustainableliving
standard,while,ontheotherhand,emerginganddevelopingnationsaspireto
higherlevelsofprosperity.Thishighlycomplexandsometimesperversesocial,
technological and economic interconnectivity—which we loosely call
globalisation—hasacceleratedwiththegrowthoftheemergingeconomies.Given
theirincorporationunderextremelycompetitiveconditionsintotheglobal
divisionoflabour,thesecountriesareachievinglevelsofproductivity—and
thereforeofconsumption—thataregraduallyclosingthegapwithdeveloped
regions.Theresultisgrowingpressureontheglobalsupplyoffood,mineraland
energyresources,ontheonehand,andthemigrationofjobs,peopleand
investmentsfrom NorthtoSouth,ontheotherhand.Thedownsideofthis
phenomenonissplashedovernewspaperheadlines:foodriots,backlashes
againstforeignworkersandbruisingcompetitionforaccesstoincreasinglyscarce
resources,temporarilyhaltedduetothepresentdownturn.
Undersuchchallengingcircumstances,leadersandentrepreneursinemergingand
developingregionshavebeguntoaskanumberofpointedquestions:
(1)Willrichcountriesacceptgloballysanctionedsolutionsthatinvolve
430 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
alteringtheglobalbalanceofpower?
(2)Willthey,forexample,supportsupranationalsupervisionoftheir
financialmarketsand,inthecaseoftheUSA,avoidabusingthestatusofthe
dollarasaninternationalreservecurrency?Onlyinthiswaywillitbepossibleto
avoidthe massivefinancialimbalancesthat madefor massivespeculative
bubbles.This wouldallow,complementarily,thecontainmentofequally
monumentalgrowthinexportsfromdevelopingcountriesaspartofastrategyto
amasscurrencyreservestoprotectthemselvesagainstunpredictableassetand
currencyfluctuations.
(3)WilldevelopedcountriesloosentheirstrangleholdovertheBrettonWoods
institutions,whileatthesametimemakingavailabletoboththeIMFandtheWorld
Banktheresourcesnecessarytofinancetheemergencyandlongtermrequirementsof
poorregions?Onlythuswillincreasinglycomplexandriskyfinancialproductsin
maturemarketsbediscouragedinfavouroffosteringinvestmentinhighreturn
developingmarkets,wheregrowthismosturgentlyneeded.
(4)Willtheyagreetocovertheretoolingcostsrequiredforemerging
countriestochangeovertolowcarbontechnologiesandthusboosttheir
populationsprosperitywithoutdamagingtheglobalenvironment?Inother
words,areindustrialisedcountries—whichlaunchedglobalwarmingovertwo
centuriesago—readytopaythegreaterpartofthebillforrenovatingtheworlds
environmentunfriendlyenergygrid?
(5)Finally,aretheypreparedtodoawaywithprotectionistpolicieslargely
responsiblefor makingagriculturalproductionin many Africancountries
unprofitable?Otherwise,theseregionswillremainindefinitelysubjecttothe
whimsofmarketpricesanddonorgenerosity.Willtheyremoveimporttariffson
ethanolgrownindevelopingcountriesandthusallowclean,renewableandcheap
energysourcestocomeonstream withtheadded bonusofgenerating
employmentinpoordevelopingregions?
Theanswertothesequestionswilldeterminethelikelihoodofusmoving
awayfromaproductionsystemthatissowastefulandyetcondemnsmillionsthe
worldovertosubhumanlivingconditions.Asolutionmustbefound,insum,to
theproblemofhowtodistributemoreequitablytheinevitablecostsofreversing
economicandenvironmentaldegradationthataffectseveryone.
7.犐狀狀狅狏犪狋犻狏犲犆狅犪犾犻狋犻狅狀狊
Atatimewhenanewsharingofresponsibilitiesandobligationsiscalled
for,multilateralinstitutionshaveneverbeenmorenecessary.However,they
China,theEUandLatinAmerica:TrilateralRelationsandScopeforMultilateralism 431
haveneverbeensodeficientandsoincapableinofferingleadershipandguidance.
Weliveamidstnewandgrowingthreats,suchasglobalwarming,international
terrorism,intrastateviolenceandnowfinancialcollapse.Butoldchallenges
suchasdisarmament,widespreadhungerandpovertyremainunanswered.What
isworse,manyoftheseproblemsaremutuallyreinforcing.Armstrafficking,
forexample,drainsresourcesfromthefightagainsthungerinpoorcountries,
whileatthesametimestoking civil warsthataggravate poverty and
deforestation.
Whatmodicumofprogresshasbeenachievedonmanyoftheseissuesis
oftencentredinareasinwhichspecificcoalitionsoflikemindeddeveloping
countrieshavebeenabletoworktogetheraroundsharplyhonedagendaswith
clearcutgoals.An“axisofgood”isevolving.
ThemostnotableoftheseisdoubtlesstheG20atthe WorldTrade
Organization (WTO). Representing 22 per cent of world agricultural
production,over70percentoffarmersand60percentoftheplanets
population,itsarrivalonthescenehasensured,attheveryleast,thatno
furtherWTOtradedistortingagreementswillbefoistedonfarmersinLatin
America,AfricaandAsia.
Piecemealreviewofintellectualpropertyprotectionclauseshasalsobeen
achieved,underpressurefromdevelopingcountries,manywithnascentdrug
industries.AsaresultofadecisionbytheWTOin2001ontheAgreementon
TradeRelatedAspectsofIntellectualProperty Rights (TRIPS)onPublic
Health,patentrightsandtheaccruingprofitsofpharmaceuticalsnolonger
automaticallytrumppublicwelfarepolicyandgeneralaccesstocheapgeneric
drugs,asinthecaseofantiretroviralsinAIDStreatments.Furthermore,rich
countriesagreedtohelpfundgenericdrugsprogrammesinpoorcountries.Here
againisapolicytoempowerdevelopingcountriestohelpthemselves.
Nowhereistheneedforareviewofthegroundrulesgoverninginternational
relationsmoreobviousthanindevelopmentfinancing.Atpresent,abattleis
beingwagedfortheheartandsouloftheBretton Woodsinstitutions,as
developingcountriesdemandaccesstoadequatefundingforinfrastructural
investmentsrequiredforlongterm growthandjobcreation.Theendto
hereditaryclaimsonthetoppostattheIMF,whichgoestoEuropeans,andat
theWorldBank,whichgoestoAmericans,isafirstandnecessarystepin
ensuringthatemergingeconomieshaveagreatersayindecisionmakingand
thereforeagreaterwillingnesstocontributehumanandmaterialresourcesto
helpmaketheseinstitutionsworkeffectively.
AsharedcommitmenttoopenandsoundgovernmentisbehindtheIndia,
432 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
BrazilandSouthAfricaDialogueForum(IBSA).Itencouragescooperationona
widerangeoftrade,security,scienceandtechnologyissuesbetweencountries
withleadershipcredentialsintheirregions,whichhappentobethethreelargest
democraciesinthedevelopingworld.IBSAhassetupafundwithintheUnited
NationsDevelopmentProgrammetoidentifyandfinancegoodpracticesin
education,healthandbasicsanitationprojectsinpoorcountriesineachregion.
TheBRICs—Brazil,Russia,IndiaandChina—constituteafurtherexample
ofmajoremergingeconomiesworkingtogethertoencouragereviewofthe
buildingblocksoftheinternationalsystem as weknowit.Theirjoint
communiquéleading uptothe G20 Summitin Londonlast April was
instrumentalinmovingaheadthedebateonaBrettonWoodsII.
South Americanintegration providesaregionalplatform for global
negotiationson manyoftheissuesmentionedabove.Furthermore,trade,
financingandinfrastructureinitiativeswhichareunderwaytoovercomeregional
socialandeconomicdisparities,alsoofferausefulsoundingboardforinnovative
proposalsontheglobalstage.
ThepoliticalgroundworkformuchofthishasbeenencouragedbytheSouth
AmericaArabCountriesSummit(Brasilia,2005;Doha,2009),andtheSouth
AmericaAfricaSummit(Abuja,2006).Thesearethefirstlargeinternational
meetingsinrecentmemoryoutsidetheregularscheduleoftheUnitedNations
aimedatjoininglargeblocksofdevelopingcountries.Bysettinguptransatlantic
partnerships,spanningmajorgeographical,culturalandpoliticalpoles,these
initiativeshavehelpedtoreinforceasenseofcommonpurposeandforged
commitment.
Cooperationprogrammesrangefromimprovementsinmanioccultivationin
theislandnationofSoToméandPrincipetosettingupapharmaceuticalplant
forAidsdrugsinMozambique.Bytakingpartindevelopmentschemesand
technicalcooperationprojectsaimedatcapacitybuilding,Brazilseeksto
contributetothe New Partnershipfor Africas Development (NEPAD).
“Africanownership”,asAfricansproudlycallit,takestheformofspecific
commitmentson questionsofadministrativetransparency and democratic
practices,humanrightsprotectionandpriorityinvestmentineducationand
health.These undertakings and attendant oversight schemes offer an
encouragingframeworkforattractingmuchneededinternationalcooperationand
longtermforeigninvestment.
Thisprocessofdomesticreformismatchedattheregionallevelbythe
creationoftheAfricanUnion(AU)whichreplacedthelonglivedOrganization
ofAfricanUnity.Theinstitutionalchangesinvolvedreflectanewwillingnesson
China,theEUandLatinAmerica:TrilateralRelationsandScopeforMultilateralism 433
thepartofmuchofAfricasleadershiptoactinconcerttooutlaw military
adventurisminthecontinent.TheAUhasprovidedsupport,directlyorviasub
regionalsecurityandcooperationarrangements,topeacekeepingandpeace
buildingmissions.Brazilhasbeenactivelyengaged,inparticularthroughthe
CommunityofPortugueseLanguageCountries (CPLP),inthecontinents
effortstomeettherequirementsofpostconflictreconstructionandreconciliation
inAngola,GuineaBissau,SoToméandPríncipe,andtheDemocraticRepublic
oftheCongo,whereBraziltookpartinthe2003peacekeeping mission
coordinatedbytheEuropeanUnion.
Brazilsdeterminationtoshowthatsecurityanddevelopmentmustgohand
inhandisbestdisplayedin Haiti.Theinternationalcommunityfacesthe
challengeofputtinginplaceanambitiousmixofeconomic,socialandsecurity
policiestohelpthecountrytograduallyedgebackfromendemicinstability.
BrazilsdecisiontoacceptthechallengeofleadingthemilitaryarmoftheUN
mandatedstabilisingmissiontoHaiti(MINUSTAH)wasmotivatedbyadesire
tohelpdevelopandapplyintegratedpoliciestodealwiththemultipronged
challengesbesettingcountriesunderthethreatofbecomingfailedstates.
Therefore,Brazillobbiedstronglyforeconomicandsocialgoalstotakecentre
stageinthepeaceoperationsinEastTimorandGuineaBissau.
Possiblythemostinnovativeandpotentiallyfarreachingofthesecoalitions
istheInternationalActionPlanagainstHungerandExtremePoverty,launched
byBrazil,ChileandFrancein2004.AnonsectarianfusionoftheDavosand
PortoAlegreagendas,3itoffersaframeworkforcivilsocietytoengagemore
directlyin raising the resources necessary to achieve the Millennium
DevelopmentGoals.Oneofitsmostmeaningfuloutcomessofarhasbeenthe
settingupoftheInternationalDrugPurchaseFacility(UNITAID),bringing
togetherdonorsfromallcontinentstohelpfinancethefightagainstAidsand
“poorpeoplesdiseases”,suchasmalariaandtuberculosis.
8.犜狉犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犕狌犾狋犻犾犪狋犲狉犪犾犻狊犿牶犅狉犪狕犻犾狊犆狅狀狋狉犻犫狌狋犻狅狀
Theseinitiativescollectivelyformwhatonemightcalla“coalitionofthe
willing”amongcountriesoftheGlobalSouthactingascatalystsforreformof
globalgovernance.Suchadhocpartnershipscanserveasnecessarybuilding
blocksingraduallybuildingconsensusamongdevelopingcountriesforchangeon
apparentlyintractableissueshavingtodowithsustainablegrowthandpoverty
eradication.Thisisnottosaythatthereisnoroomforcooperationwithadvanced
economies.Quitethecontrary,thepresentglobalcrisishasunderscoredthatlong
lastingsolutionstothechallengeofgrowinginterdependencearepossibleonlywithina
434 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
multilateralframework.Butalltoooften,theconstraintsoflargenumbersand
overwhelmingshortterm prioritiescanderailgoodfaithattemptsatreconciling
positions.Byproposingnegotiatedchangetounsustainableandoutdatedmodelsand
structures,thesecoalitionscanreachovertheNorthSouthdivideandhelpmusterthe
requiredconsensusforachievingmultilateralbreakthroughs.
Trilateraldialogueandcooperationprojectscanplayameaningfulrolein
generatingpracticalresults,aswellashelpingtobuildupgoodwill.Onmanyof
theissuesmentionedabove,whichtouchoncriticalchallengesfacingthe
internationalcommunity,thereisampleroomforjointaction,giventhatboth
ChinaandtheEuropeanUnionarekeenactorsinallofthesetheatres.Butan
effectivetrilateralforumrequiresameasurabledegreeofpoliticalconvergence.
ThisexistsbetweenLatinAmericaandtheEUonculturalandhumanrights
issues,forexample,butislimitedontrade,asshownbydifficultiesin
negotiatingbiregionaltradeagreements.Ontheotherhand,thereissignificant
agreementbetween Latin Americaand Chinaontradeandenvironmental
matters,butnotnecessarilyonothers.
Ratherthanaimingforabsolutelycoincidentpositions,effortsshouldgo
intoopeninguproomforgradualconvergence.Someforums,whilenotstrictly
trilateral,mayhelpingeneratingtheinstitutionalbackdropforcommonaction
andcloserties.ThisisthecasewithregardtotheForumforEastAsianand
LatinAmericanCooperation(FEALAC).Similarly,theRioGroupboastsan
institutionaliseddialoguewithbothChinaandtheEU,providingausefulstaging
groundforthreewayexchanges.Equally,IBSA,bringingtogetherIndia,Brazil
andSouthAfrica,isanexampleofhowtofostertrilateralactivities,giventhe
sponsorshipofpovertyalleviationmeasuresincountriesinAfrica,LatinAmerica
andSouthEastAsia.
Allofferopportunitiesforspilloverintobilateralagendas,whichare
especiallyimportantformanyLatinAmericancountrieswithlimitedscopefor
activeinitiativesfarbeyondtheirimmediateneighbourhood.
Ontheenvironment,forexample,thereareobviousopportunitiesfor
developingsuchpartnerships.Inbiofuels,Brazilwishestoseeitsmodelof
sugarcanebasedethanolusedtopromotesustainableagricultureindeveloping
countriesandtohelpusmovetoagloballowcarboneconomy.Giventhat
China,ontheonehand,wishestoreduceitsoildependency,whiletheEuropean
Commissionrecentlysetaunilateralgoalofreducinggreenhousegasemissions
by20percentby2020,thereisampleroomforjointworkonclean,cheapand
sustainablealternativefuels.Ontheotherhand,Brazilsmodelfordeforestation
controlhasbeeninternationallyacclaimed,asindicatedbyNorwaysUSD1
China,theEUandLatinAmerica:TrilateralRelationsandScopeforMultilateralism 435
billionpledgeoveratenyearperiodtotheAmazonFund,setupbytheBrazilian
governmenttoprovideincentivesforsustainablemanagementoftropicalforests.
HopefullythiscouldhelpbreakthelogjamintheCopenhagenConference,as
Brazilshowsonewayfordevelopingcountriestoengageconstructivelyin
preservingtheenvironment,giventherightfinancialandinstitutionalbacking.
Brazilsalreadymentionedaerospacecooperationonsatellitemonitoringwith
bothFranceandChinacouldbeapowerfulcomplementtotheseefforts.
OntheMonterreyagenda,itistobehopedthatthejointpositionadopted
bytheBRICsonreformoftheBrettonWoodsinstitutionswillhelptoovercome
Europeanresistancetospeedierchange.Ontheotherhand,LatinAmerican,EU
andChinesesupportduringtheLondon G20Summitfor morestringent
internationaloversightoffinancialinstitutionsshouldequallyhelpbringtheUSA
onboardonthiscontentiousissue.
Ontradeissues,LatinAmerican,ChineseandEUsupportfortheproposalonthe
tabletoconcludetheDohaRoundcanbeinstrumentalinbringingroundtheUSAand
India,whichweredirectlyresponsibleforthefailuretoclinchadealin2008.
Ultimately,onlybyfindingcommongroundfor mutuallysustainable
developmentitwillbepossibletorebalanceglobalgrowthinamannerthatis
trulysustainable,toavoidassetbubblesandtoallowalltobenefitfromthe
prosperitythatglobalisationcanmultiply.Asglobalisationandinterdependence
steadilyandinexorablyadvance,thechallengeoffindingcreativeandinnovative
opportunitiesfordialogueandpartnershipsthatbridgegeography,cultureand
historyhasbecomeanimperativeofthehighestorderjoiningLatinAmerica,
ChinaandtheEuropeanUnion.
Notes
1.TheRioGroupwasbornin1986asaforumforLatinAmericanandCaribbeandialogueon
majorregionalquestionsaffectingregionalsecurityanddevelopment.
2.TheIberianprocesscouldclaimuntilquiterecentlytobetheonlyLatinAmericanand
CaribbeanforuminwhichCubahadaseat.ThischangedinDecember2008,whenCuba
joinedtheRioGroup.
3.TheWorldSocialForum,knownasthePortoAlegreForum,wassetupasacounterpoint
totheWorldEconomicForum,heldyearlyatDavos.Commonlyassociatedwiththeanti
globalisationmovement,thePortoAlegreForumbringstogetherNGOsandothercivil
societyactorstodiscussissuesrelatedtoglobalgovernance.
436 !
犃犫狅狌狋狋犺犲犆狅狀狋狉犻犫狌狋狅狉狊
作 者 简 介
WelberBarral,SecretaryofInternationalTrade,BrazilianMinistryofDevelop
ment,IndustryandForeignTrade(MDIC),Brasilia
韦尔贝尔·巴拉尔,巴西发展、工业和贸易部国际贸易秘书,巴西利亚
Arno Behrens, Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS),Brussels
阿诺·贝伦斯,欧洲政策研究中心研究员,布鲁塞尔
KarlBuck,FormerHeadofRelationswithLatinAmericaandCaribbean,EU
CouncilofMinisters,Brussels
卡尔·巴克,欧盟部长理事会拉美与加勒比关系部前主任,布鲁塞尔
CarlosCarvalloSpalding,EconomicAdvisor,MERCOSURSecretariat,Monte
video
卡洛斯·卡瓦罗·斯伯丁,南方共同市场秘书处经济顾问,蒙特维多
MarcelFortunaBiato,Ambassador,ForeignPolicyAdvisorGrouptothePresi
dent,Brasilia
马塞尔·福尔图纳·比亚托,巴西总统外交政策顾问组成员、大使,巴西利亚
JiangShixue,ProfessorandDeputyDirector,InstituteofEuropeanStudies,
ChineseAcademyofSocialSciences,Beijing江时学,中国社会科学院欧洲研究所副所长、教授,北京
BirteKlemm,ResearchFellow,FriedrichEbertStiftung,OfficeforInternation
alCooperation,Shanghai
AbouttheContributors("#$%) 437
克敏,弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会国际合作办公室研究员,上海
LuGuozheng,FormerDiplomattoSpanishspeakingcountriesandChiefEditor
ofthejournal犆犺犻狀犪狊犐狀狋犲狉狀犪狋犻狅狀犪犾犜狉犪犱犲,MinistryofCommerce,Beijing卢国正,中国前驻西语国家外交官,《中国国际贸易》主编,中国商务部,北京
GüntherMaihold,DeputyDirector,GermanInstituteforInternationalandSecu
rityAffairs(SWP)andProfessorattheInstituteforLatinAmericaStudies,
FreeUniversityofBerlin,Berlin
甘瑟·麦霍尔德,德国国际与安全事务研究所副所长、柏林自由大学拉美研究所
教授,柏林
NiuHaibin,ResearchFellowandAssistantDirector,InstituteforInternational
StrategicStudies,ShanghaiInstitutesforInternationalStudies,Shanghai
牛海彬,中国上海国际问题研究院国际战略研究所所长助理、助理研究员,上海
GustavoRibeiro,DirectorofRulesandCompetitivenessinForeignTrade(DE
NOC)SecretariatofForeignTrade(SECEX),Brasilia
古斯塔沃·里贝罗,巴西对外贸易秘书处对外贸易规则与竞争部主任,巴西利亚
ErikaRuizSandoval,VisitingProfessorandResearcher,DivisionofInternation
alStudies,CentrodeInvestigaciónyDocenciaEconómicas(CIDE),MexicoCity艾丽卡·鲁伊兹·桑多瓦尔,经济研究和教学中心国际研究部研究员和访问教
授,墨西哥城
JoséAntonioSanahuja,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsandHeadoftheDe
partmentofDevelopmentCooperation,ComplutenseInstituteofInternational
Studies(ICEI),Madrid
何塞·安东尼奥·萨纳乌哈,孔普鲁德赛国际关系研究所发展合作部主任、国际
关系教授,马德里
MaríaCristinaSilvaParejas,SeniorExpertforRegionalIntegrationProcesses/
EuropeanLatinAmericanandCaribbeanRelations,LatinAmericanCentrefor
RelationswithEurope,Santiago
玛丽亚·克里斯蒂娜·西瓦·帕雷哈斯,拉美对欧关系研究中心欧拉关系和地区
一体化进程的资深研究员,圣地亚哥
SunHongbo,ResearchFellow,InstituteofLatinAmericanStudies,Chinese
438 China,theEUandLatinAmerica:CurrentIssuesandFutureCooperation
AcademyofSocialSciences,Beijing孙洪波,中国社会科学院拉丁美洲研究所助理研究员,北京
YuHongyuan,AssociateProfessorandDeputyDirector,CentreofInternational
OrganizationsandLaws,ShanghaiInstitutesforInternationalStudies,Shanghai
于宏源,中国上海国际问题研究院国际组织与国际法中心副主任、副研究员,上海
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