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Cooperation and Conflict

DOI: 10.1177/0010836708092837 2008; 43; 267 Cooperation and Conflict

Karl Magnus Johansson Affairs: The Case of Sweden

Chief Executive Organization and Advisory Arrangements for Foreign

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Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies AssociationVol. 43(3): 267–287. © NISA 2008 www.nisanet.orgSAGE Publications, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore www.sagepublications.com0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836708092837

Chief Executive Organization and AdvisoryArrangements for Foreign Affairs

The Case of Sweden

KARL MAGNUS JOHANSSON

ABSTRACTAs prime ministers are drawn into international relations and the for-eign policy process, they are in need of advisory structures for foreignaffairs in their offices. This article examines the system and the role offoreign affairs advisers to the Prime Minister (PM), the chief executive,in Sweden. The article centres on the organization for foreign affairs, ingeneral terms of institutional and staffing arrangements, and onleader–adviser relationships. As the right hand of the PM, inner circleadvisers in foreign affairs have a direct role in overseeing foreign pol-icy on the key issues and do more than just serve in an advisory capacityby being operative in diplomacy and in policy coordination. Theseadvisers can therefore wield influence on policy and the governmentbased on their own expertise and position at the centre of power and atthe frontier between the chief executive and the outside world.

Keywords: adviser; chief executive; foreign affairs; process

Introduction

Research Problem

A former Swedish ambassador to London, when asked in an interview withthe author who his principal was, testified that he clearly considered thePrime Minister’s Office (PMO) as ‘employer’ and that his personal experi-ence was that he was working for them.1 As ambassador he stayed in con-tact with the PM’s state secretary for foreign and European Union (EU)affairs and received ‘instructions’ directly from him and not from officialsin the line organization at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), withwhich collaborators at the embassy communicated.2 The state secretarygave ‘feedback’ on reports and so, occasionally, did the PM. The directinvolvement of the PM was in clear ‘contrast’ to this ambassador’s previousexperiences before Sweden became a member of the EU. The ambassadoralso had sporadic contacts with the political adviser at the PMO handlingforeign policy.3




This story serves to highlight the main research problem of this article,which is the role and significance of chief executive organization and advis-ory arrangements for foreign affairs generally, and specifically in the con-text of Sweden and EU membership. Likewise, the testimony illustrates thegeneral research theme of principal–agent relationships. In foreign policy-making, and for diplomats in the field, the government can be conceived ofas a collective principal.At the same time, for these diplomats the real prin-cipal is not necessarily the foreign minister (Hill, 2003: 53; Jönsson and Hall,2005: 109).As our ambassador above testifies, the most immediate principalfor diplomats in the field, themselves acting in an advisory capacity, may bethe PM’s closest and trusted aides and, most notably, the chief foreign pol-icy adviser. It is a common observation among the interviewees of the studythat the office of the chief executive has become more centrally involved inthe foreign policy process. EU membership is the key factor here, alongsidetendencies towards globalization more broadly.

Against this background, and given the sheer existence and numbers ofchief executive aides in foreign and EU affairs, it is worth raising questionsabout the institutional and staffing arrangements in these areas at thecentre of executive power. Such arrangements can be seen as a threat to thebalance inside the foreign policy executive and can accentuate rather thanrelieve the strains between ministers as well as between political appointeesand civil servants.

While PMs have to deal with many different issues, they can choose tobecome engaged in any area in which they take a special interest. Whetheror not they intend to, however, heads of government ‘are invariably drawninto foreign affairs, and a large proportion of their time is spent upon it’(Hill, 2003: 53). And, as argued by Hill (2003: 56), ‘the international envir-onment still presents a long and steep learning-curve for any politicianwishing to feel at home in it’. The PM — who must be a generalist eventhough he or she may have specialized in an area such as foreign and secur-ity policy — must rely on professional expertise and qualified advice fromcivil servants, special advisers or political advisers. Time and again, there isneed for counsel from advisers.

Research Aims

The purpose of this article is to examine the institutionalization and role ofthe evolving advisory system in foreign affairs, in broad terms, within thecontext of the foreign policy process and the office of chief executive inSweden. I address this topic through a focus on institutional and staffingarrangements for foreign affairs and on leader–adviser relations, accountingfor the contexts and institutions within which actors are embedded. The article is guided by the overarching research question of what characterizesthe features of the organization and the advisory role, systems andrelationships in this vital field of policy-making at chief executive level in the case of Sweden.

268 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(3)




I argue that organization and advisory systems for foreign affairs in officesof chief executives have become a more pressing concern as heads of gov-ernment are increasingly, and invariably it seems, drawn into internationalrelations. I claim that this problematique is under-researched and that there isan important gap in our knowledge and understanding concerning the roleand the real or potential influence advisers have on policy decisions in theforeign policy process. This study aims to fill part of this gap and, in a mod-est way, to increase our knowledge of this phenomenon. The article offers aclose reconstruction of the key organizational features and the micro-dynamics of advisory systems, and presents a new approach to the study ofthe office of the Swedish chief executive, specifically with regard to the for-eign policy process.

Existing Research

In addition to key country-specific or contextual factors and features, thearticle can be placed within a wider International Relations debate becauseit speaks to existing research and literature on internationalization of politicsmore broadly as well as on foreign policy-making and systems. Writings andinsights of scholars in the subfield of foreign policy analysis are in the back-ground of this article. Despite the many qualities of this strand of research,it suffers from a focus on the domestic systemic level and on structures, inparticular the state, whereas micro-processes including those at the level ofpersonal chief executive–adviser relationships tend to go unnoticed. Onereason for this research gap may be the difficulties involved in researchingthis lower level of analysis.

Surprisingly little systematic research has been done on advisory systemsor chief executive–adviser relations. To some extent, the topic is covered inresearch on the organization for foreign affairs in the executive branch ofthe US government (e.g. Destler, 1972; George and George, 1998).The issueof organization is central for the achievement of presidential control overforeign policy. In this connection, relevant problems in the foreign affairsorganization concern clearance requirements, planning, coordination andliaison arrangements. Such processes involve foreign policy staff and,among them, key officials and advisers. In the US, personal advisers to thePresident have been prominent, and some of them have undoubtedlyplayed a central role in the definition of US national interests during theirperiods of influence. The article draws on research into the role and use ofadvisory structures or systems in presidential decision-making in the US(George, 1980; Preston, 2001).

Of most immediate relevance is the study by Preston (2001) of the advi-sory process in foreign affairs in the US. He combines institutional and per-son-based approaches. The institutional arrangements include organizationfor foreign policy within a wider institutional environment. At the personallevel, the nature of the leader–adviser relationship may depend on the rela-tive interests and priorities of the chief executive as well as leadership style.

JOHANSSON: FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE CASE OF SWEDEN 269




Moreover, the nature and impact of this staffing arrangement could dependon the personalities and ambitions of the individual adviser.The chief execu-tive interacts with leading officials and advisers and turns to advisers forinformation and professional advice. Personal or inner circle advisers cantherefore have a significant impact on policy decisions and, potentially, exertimportant influence in the different stages of the policy process (agenda-setting, formulation, deliberation, decision and implementation). Theirimpact is mainly conditioned on the extent of chief executive power and ofcentralized control over policy within a government. In foreign policy, thedynamics of leader–adviser relationships depends partly on how forcefullyleaders assert control and partly on their own positions on policy issues onthe basis of prior foreign policy experience or expertise (Preston, 2001:11–12, 259–61). Adviser impact on policy decision can potentially be signifi-cant, but is contingent upon the degree of presidential policy experience(Preston, 2001: 261–2; see also George, 1980).As Preston (2001: 11) suggests:‘Leaders with a high degree of prior policy experience are more likely toinsist upon personal involvement or control over policy making than arethose low in prior policy experience, who will tend to be more dependentupon the views of expert advisers.’ In other words, the room for advisers andtheir potential influence can be assumed to vary from one leader–adviserrelationship to another. The nature of leader–adviser interactions may alsovary and be contingent on a range of circumstances, including personalcharacteristics.

The article draws on research into the core executive, which according tothe standard definition in the literature is defined ‘functionally to include allthose organizations and structures which primarily serve to pull togetherand integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within theexecutive of conflicts between different elements of the governmentmachine’ (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990: 4).The term could therefore be usedto denote the office of head of government/chief executive — the highestresponsible political authority at the executive level (e.g. Peters et al., 2000;Poguntke and Webb, 2005). However, depending on the nature of the polit-ical system, core executive could also mean head of state or a minister, otherthan the head of government, holding the highest responsible politicalauthority in a particular issue area (Moravcsik, 1994: 4). In any event, minis-terial advisers belong to the central players in the core executive.

As a result of interdependence and similar international pressures on gov-ernments, almost all chief/core executive administrations recruit diplomatsand technocrats alongside politicians (Peters et al., 2000: 16). This adds tostaffing at the centre of executive power and may provide further impetus forthe centralization or concentration of power in offices of chief executives.Foreign and EU affairs advisory systems, as explored in this article, are proneto the hybridization of staffing arrangements at the core executive level(Peters et al., 2000).The line between the roles — political, policy and admin-istrative — is blurred or fluid, and these roles may be inconsistent or incom-patible ‘as political appointees assume administrative tasks and civil servantsare drawn into the murky waters of partisan politics’ (Peters et al., 2000: 21).This hybridization of staffing at the core executive administration could





therefore result in tensions between political appointees and civil servantsand perhaps even in malfunctions in the advisory process. A key questiontherefore concerns the boundary lines between staffers who are either polit-ical appointees or public officials.

Research into treaty negotiations in the EU, notably over the Maastrichttreaty in the early 1990s, revealed the existence of a tightly knit group ofnational civil servants and ‘politico-administrative hybrids’ who operateas both national and Community actors (Mazzucelli, 1997: 171). Such‘politico-administrative hybrids’ are often well placed under the ministeriallevel of negotiation and operate in transgovernmental networks at theinterface between the EU system and their own national administrations.And where issues are dealt with via intergovernmental negotiation ‘thisshifts power to the heads of governments and some of their key advisers orgovernmental colleagues’ (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 13–14; see also Peterset al., 2000: 7–8).

In the EU context, officials at the core executive serve as ‘boundary man-agers’, as agents or individuals who act and manage the interface betweenthe domestic and the European (Laffan, 2007: 135–7). We know relativelylittle about the actual role and everyday operations of such ‘boundary man-agers’. Overall, core executive staffers engaged in EU affairs are not merelyconcerned with administration, they are also crucial actors in the definitionand coordination of national as well as European interests.

For the Swedish case, the article draws in particular on a comparativestudy of foreign policy coordination or management in Finland andSweden under the influence of internationalization and interdependence(Karvonen and Sundelius, 1987). The study in question did not include theoffice of chief executive, but its role as domestic agency involved in foreignpolicy coordination and international dealings was recognized. Karvonenand Sundelius (1987: 64) noted that this office had expanded and that itsinternational orientation can become very pronounced due to the partici-pation of the PM in foreign policy formulation and in international activ-ities, and that it ‘has been customary for some time to assign a professionaldiplomat to this staff, for personal assistance and for a smoother liaisonwith the Foreign Ministry’. They also called attention to the special author-ity of the PM in the area of national security, where he ‘may shoulder hisresponsibility as head of the government and work directly with a fewtrusted assistants’ (Karvonen and Sundelius, 1987: 64). This study alsoaimed at making a contribution to our knowledge of the dynamics of organ-ization for foreign policy more generally, including coordination (see alsoEkengren and Sundelius, 2004).

Research Strategy

The study has more of an exploratory rather than a confirmatory character,through careful within-case analysis (e.g. George and Bennett, 2005).In-depth empirical case study research is necessary to ascertain in what waythe advisory systems function, matter and have evolved over time.





Information and evidence for the study come mainly from a series of eliteinterviews conducted in the period 2005 to 2008. A list of select interviewsappears in the appendix. Several of the interviewees have extensive experi-ence of Swedish foreign policy-making and have served in an advisorycapacity in the office of the chief executive. In the study as a whole, I con-ducted almost 50 interviews, i.e. with acting or former diplomats, senior andeven top-level officials as well as other civil servants, foreign policy advis-ers, political advisers and politicians, including ministers (among them twoformer PMs and six former foreign ministers). I have also drawn on inter-views conducted in previous research projects, notably with former PMIngvar Carlsson. The interviews were generally recorded and most of theinterviewees agreed in principle to appear on record, whereas others specif-ically requested, and were granted, anonymity. For this article, intervieweesserved as information sources and, with a few notable exceptions, we aretherefore dealing mainly with informant interviews rather than respondentinterviews where interviewees were also objects of analysis. In addition tothe interviews, the article draws on conversations with informants whoserve or have served in an advisory capacity in the PMO. Since they explic-itly requested anonymity, all these conversations are on deep backgroundin the article.

To some extent, the empirical analysis is also based on hard primarysources. This material includes information about the organization in thePMO. I have also gained knowledge of Swedish foreign policy-making fromquite a few memoirs and biographies. In 2007, and very timely for myresearch purposes, the memoirs of both the former PM Göran Persson andhis chief foreign policy adviser and state secretary Lars Danielsson werepublished (Danielsson, 2007; Persson, 2007), as was a publication drawn onregular and numerous interviews with PM Persson during his 1996–2006tenure (Fichtelius, 2007).

Time Frame

The article covers the period from 1982 to early 2008, but mainly the yearsfrom 1995, when Sweden joined the EU as a full member, and onwards.During most of this period the social democrats were alone in government,with one and the same party and government leader. Inevitably, this situationhas left a deep imprint also on the empirical analysis of this article. Duringthis period, the office of the chief executive gained ground significantly andseemingly over all sectoral ministries, not least the MFA. The new govern-ment taking office in October 2006 is a four-party centre–right coalition. Themost important institutional novelty — compared to the chief executive insti-tutional context in the previous government — is the political coordinationmachinery consisting of political advisers/appointees from each of the fourparties in the governing coalition. As we shall see, however, the basic organ-ization for foreign affairs in the PMO was retained, that is to say considerablestability is built into this institutionalized system or structure.





Structure of the Article

Subsequently, the article is organized within three substantive sections.The first presents the organization for foreign affairs in the office of chiefexecutive, thereby investigating its key functions and staffing arrangementsin this policy field. The second section elaborates further on the institution-alization of advisory systems and the role of individual advisers in foreignaffairs. The third section focuses on personal leader–adviser relationships.The concluding section summarizes and discusses the main findings andtheir generalizability and outlines the broader implications of this articlefor future research.

Organization for Foreign Affairs in the Chief Executive Office

In this section, I present the organization for foreign affairs within the insti-tutional setting of the internationalized office of the chief executive inSweden. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) (Statsrådsberedningen) is thehighest responsible political authority at the executive level. Over time, per-sonnel in this office of head of government/chief executive have been sub-stantially augmented.4 Personnel includes a growing number of specialistadvisers and the PMO comprises both career civil servants and politicallyappointed advisers. The addition of resource and influence to the PMO hasempowered it to speak with more authority to sectoral ministries and indi-vidual ministers (e.g. Elder and Page, 2000; Aylott, 2005; Ruin, 2007).

The areas of responsibility nowadays include coordination of Sweden’sEU policy. EU membership has strengthened the need for the PMO to havea capacity for, and be operative in, foreign affairs. At the top level, the PMmust be supported in his activities relating to the European Council con-sisting of heads of state and government of EU member states. The PMOhas grown steadily to support the direct involvement of the PM in foreignand European affairs.

To this end, a foreign affairs organization has been established incre-mentally at the PMO. The institutional and staffing arrangements for for-eign affairs have changed with time. Since the early 1980s, foreign affairshas become one of the main topic areas into which the part of the PMOconcerned with serving the PM is organized.

A special foreign affairs division established at the PMO in 1984 wassmall and hardly a division in its own right in organizational terms (inter-view Larsson). At the time, it comprised the chief foreign policy adviser, hisdeputy and one secretary (interview Dahlgren). The fact that the organiza-tion for foreign affairs was so small reflects the normative thinking andreflex among successive PMs that the PMO should be slim overall. OlofPalme was reluctant to expand the PMO, as was his successor, IngvarCarlsson (interview Carlsson). Furthermore, Palme did not want to build upan organization that could ‘demoralize’ the MFA (interview Eliasson).While keeping the organization limited, Palme set up an inter-ministerial





group for deliberations over security policy.5 This group was formed inorder to ‘keep an eye on’ the foreign minister, according to one of themcentrally involved.6 When Carl Bildt became PM in 1991 he set up a secur-ity policy analysis group in his office.7 This was a novelty in the Swedishcontext. Staff were drawn from the MFA and the military. With the excep-tion of this group, there was no separate unit for foreign affairs at the chiefexecutive level during Bildt’s 1991–4 tenure.The foreign affairs division wasre-established when the social democrats returned to government inOctober 1994. This division was given responsibility for issues pertainingto the EU, which Sweden joined as full member in 1995. After GöranPersson had become PM in 1996, a new organizational unit was the BalticGroup established in his office (Elder and Page, 2000: 141).

A new entity established in the late 1990s was the EU Department, withincreasing responsibilities for policy formulations concerning EU issues andcross-ministry priorities.Among other things, staff served the PM in relationto European Council summits.The number of staff at the PMO handling EUpolicy increased substantially in the early 2000s as a result of the SwedishEU presidency (2001), where the EU Department had a central coordinat-ing role under the PM’s state secretary for foreign and EU affairs (see nextsection), the European Convention (2002–3) and the IntergovernmentalConference (2003–4).

In 2004, the foreign affairs division and the EU Department merged tobecome the International and EU Affairs Division (Utrikes- och EU-enheten). Located in the PM’s Secretariat, political responsibility for thedivision fell under the PM’s state secretary for foreign and EU affairs. Itprovided support and advice for the PM, and the deputy PM, in foreign andEU affairs and constituted a liaison organization vis-à-vis the MFA. Thekey role of the division was to oversee the political aspects of anythingrelating to EU affairs. The division had a role in EU policy coordination —whenever it involved the General Affairs and External Relations Council(GAERC), European Council summits and high-level talks — as well as inpolitical coordination. According to interviewees, the division dealt morewith counsel on technical issues and with coordination than with policy for-mulation per se.

In 2006, staff at the International and EU Affairs Division numberedseven. With the exception of the director, on leave from the diplomatic ser-vice, the staff included one special adviser and one political adviser for mat-ters relating to internal EU affairs, one political adviser for the Lisbonprocess and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) in theEU, one political adviser for external affairs and protocol, one desk officerfor external affairs and one administrative assistant handling office man-agement and protocol.

In the new government, formed in October 2006, the division was namedthe Foreign and EU Affairs Division. As in the previous government, thedivision served under the PM’s state secretary for foreign affairs.8 The num-ber of division staff diminished into the director, who was a specialist on EUforeign and security policy and recruited from the MFA like his predecessor,and two political advisers (both from the premier’s political party, the





Moderates).Another diplomat, with extensive experience of EU affairs, wasrecruited in early 2007. Later that year she took over as director when theformer head of the division returned to the MFA. The same year anotherdiplomat was recruited. At the time of writing, division staff numbers four,including: the director, dealing mainly with EU affairs except for her over-arching responsibility for the division, another official at the rank of deputydirector, handling foreign and security policy in particular, one politicaladviser, working with the PM’s agenda, and one administrative officer.

The fact that the division was scaled down can be interpreted as a gestureto improve PMO–MFA relations, reflecting a less interventionist approachon the part of the office of the chief executive compared to the previousgovernment. Still, however, the division maintains direct contacts with offi-cials in the line organization of individual departments at the MFA, such asthe EU Department, in order to prepare briefing notes and so on for thePM. Meanwhile, the EU Coordination Secretariat in the PMO todayhandles many European matters, for example the Lisbon agenda/process,and serves the PM via the Foreign and EU Affairs Division.

In an interview with the author, the director of the Foreign and EUAffairs Division described the work of the division as ‘activity based’ anddetermined by the PM’s agenda (interview Areskoug Mascarenhas). Thekey task is to support the PM in his foreign and EU affairs activities,notably the regular European Council summits and all foreign trips as wellas incoming visits. The division also covers ‘what happens in the world’ andkeeps the PM informed.

The organization for foreign affairs in the office of the chief executiveencompasses the arrangements for political coordination and liaison vis-à-vis the MFA. From 1998 until 2003, a political adviser served in the capacityof liaison officer. He was a party political appointee and belonged to thePolitical Secretariat in the PM’s Secretariat. His successor was the officialwho became director of the new International and EU Affairs Division in2004. Significantly, foreign policy was now the only sector where liaisonwith another ministry from the office of the chief executive was handled bya special division outside the Political Secretariat. In the current four-partycoalition government, adding an element of complexity to policy-makingand coordination more generally, such tasks are carried out together by thedivision in question and the Coordination Secretariat. It consists of fourseparate secretariats, one for each party in government, and is led by a statesecretary. These staffers are all political appointees who relinquish theirposts when there is a change of government.

The chief executive organization for foreign affairs more broadly can beexplained functionally by the need to serve the PM as he is increasinglydrawn into this policy field and into international relations. Not unexpec-tedly, this functional explanation is generally favoured among interviewees,including key political actors. In an interview with the author, the formerPM’s state secretary Lars Danielsson emphasized that the organization (forforeign and EU affairs) at the PMO has grown from the fact that, today, thePM has such great needs in foreign policy, that he ‘does so much today inforeign policy that he must have a more clear direct link …’. The regular





interaction at the highest political level ‘requires that the prime ministersget to know the big foreign policy dossiers’. A great deal happens todaythrough heads of governments/states ‘calling each other at the highest leveland it is clear that often it goes fast and we cannot order informationfrom the MFA’. There is not enough time. To prepare for every talk, wemust therefore maintain a certain level (at the PMO) where ‘we can man-age things on our own’ (cf. Danielsson, 2007: 155–6).

At the same time, however, organization may also be surrounded by con-troversy and tug-of-war between core executive actors. Key actors havecome up with a modus operandi serving their own work and the aim ofachieving proper structures as well as coordination through the centre onpolicy. This power-centred explanation also points to a political logic,namely the struggle for control over policy generally and specifically overthe substance of issues of particular political salience.

In sum, foreign and EU affairs today are major components in the inter-nal organization and structure of the PMO. Essentially, the framing of for-eign policy as a distinct field in need of a special organization implies thatforeign policy, and to some extent also EU affairs, has remained separate inthe policy process politically as well as organizationally.

Chief Executive Foreign Affairs Advisers

In the previous section, I presented the organization for foreign affairswithin the setting of the internationalized office of the chief executive inSweden. This section presents and centres on the institutionalized systemand role of PM adviser in foreign affairs.The institutionalization of this roleand the advisory system could give added impetus to centralization andshifting boundaries in the foreign policy process.

Foreign policy advisers to chief executives traditionally tend to have abad name in the diplomatic service, notably in the UK, and be seen as a signof growing politicization of staffing and of the civil service more generally.In the final analysis, this concerns a rivalry over influence in the policyprocess.

As for our Swedish case, the staffing arrangement of appointing a foreignaffairs adviser to the PM is not new; what has been novel is the institution-alized role of such advisers as the PM’s right hand and their direct role inoverseeing foreign policy on the key issues. The fact that the PMO con-tinues to employ MFA career civil servants as foreign affairs advisers sug-gests that there is a need for special expertise in these areas.

The institutionalization of the chief executive foreign policy advisoryarrangement can be traced back at least to 1982. However, at the time, thenumber of officials for the handling of foreign policy issues numbered onlyone or two. Arguably, the PM, Olof Palme, relied on ‘key individuals withinthe Foreign Ministry, instead of building an independent staff of foreignpolicy advisors’ (Karvonen and Sundelius, 1987: 113). Initially, Jan Eliassonserved as diplomatic adviser to PM Palme from 1982 to 1983.9 From 1983to 1991, Hans Dahlgren was the chief foreign policy adviser.10 During his





tenure, he was given the rank of ambassador. As noted above, the specialforeign affairs division at the PMO established in 1984 was small, at thetime comprising only two foreign policy aides. In 1990, another official wasrecruited from the MFA. Along with a secretary there were three peoplewho worked at the foreign affairs division at the PMO, including the head,his deputy and one additional official. Initially, until 1987, foreign policyadvisers remained employed by the MFA, from where they were seconded.This arrangement reflected the established view that the PMO should notgrow and have too many permanent positions, nor should it ‘demoralize’the MFA. The fact that foreign policy aides to the PM have later been onleave from the MFA can be seen as a sign of further institutionalization.During the years of the non-Socialist government, 1991–94, there was a for-eign affairs aide to the PM but without a division of his own. The PM, CarlBildt, had foreign and security policy as his main fields of interest andexpertise. Yet, he recruited advisers to the new security policy analysisgroup, including one from the military.

When the social democrats returned to government in October 1994,and the foreign affairs division was re-established, Lars Danielsson took overas ambassador and head of the foreign affairs division after Hans Dahlgrenhad been appointed state secretary to the PM. The PM made Danielssonambassador in order to ‘strengthen him’ (interview Carlsson). Danielsson hadpreviously served as foreign policy aide in the office of the PM, from 1989 to1991. He was no political appointee, but an official recruited from the MFA.At first, Danielsson too had only one aide, but the division was enlarged in thecourse of time.

When Göran Persson became PM in 1996 he inherited key advisers,including the chief foreign policy adviser, Lars Danielsson.At the outset, thePersson clique of prime ministerial advisers included a political adviser, PärNuder, who became secretary of state in 1997 and the closest and mosttrusted of the PM’s aides (see further in next section).

It was only in 1999 that the status of the chief executive adviser on for-eign policy and Europe was raised to the position of state secretary. Thisappointment was directly related to the Swedish EU presidency due for2001 (interview Danielsson). The new state secretary, Lars Danielsson, hadalready become the PM’s personal adviser on EU matters. Danielssonmaintained his role as ‘general foreign policy adviser’ (interviewDanielsson). After the 2002 general elections he became the PM’s chiefstate secretary (after Nuder). Danielsson continued to serve as state sec-retary for EU and foreign affairs and effectively also as the PM’s chief for-eign policy adviser.

A common observation among the informants was that Danielssonexerted major influence. Speaking on deep background, one experiencedSwedish diplomat shrewdly described him as an immensely competent ‘man-darin’, meaning an important government/civil service official or adviserworking under strict hierarchical order. Acting on the direct mandate of thePM, and as he grew into the office, Danielsson increasingly created a sort ofunitary command and control structure where seemingly all roads leddirectly to his office or to his retinue of support staff, at least as far as EU





policy of particular political salience was concerned. The state secretaryintervened in the instructions given from different ministries/ministers andfunctioned in practice as the EU minister. He emerged into the real Europeminister in the context of the Swedish presidency in 2001 (Ruin, 2002: 50).During this period, his direct role and involvement were ‘extremely import-ant’ (Ekengren, 2004: 215). At least from 2004, until spring 2006, Danielssonseemed to have a more profound influence than individual ministers, and inreality he was the acting European affairs minister in all but name — tosome extent even acting foreign minister. In some areas, policy was takenout of the hands of the foreign minister by this state secretary. He had adirect political mandate from the PM. He served as the PM’s personaladviser on foreign and EU affairs and took on the task of coordinating andplanning Sweden’s EU policies. Officials in the MFA too reported to him ona number of EU issue areas. Danielsson was especially instrumental in pro-viding political advice on European matters, formulating Swedish negoti-ating positions, and ensuring consistency and coherence in national positionsin the EU. Danielsson, who was known to be a hard worker, functioned as atrue chief/core executive ‘politico-administrative hybrid’ and ‘boundarymanager’, that is, as agent acting and managing the interface between thedomestic and the European. In 2005 he was Sweden’s chief negotiator on thefinancial perspective in the EU, including the long-term budget.At the PMOhe effectively provided political leadership of the International and EUAffairs Division as well as the EU Coordination Secretariat. Moreover, heled the Friday lunch meetings that emerged within the major forum forinter-ministerial coordination of EU affairs (interview Danielsson). Just likeNuder, when the PM’s state secretary, Danielsson was involved in theappointment process including the diplomatic service (Danielsson, 2007:164–6). The PM was known to use the power of appointment actively andalso over key diplomatic posts (Svenning, 2005: 167). Presumably, loyaltywas expected from the appointed envoys in return.

As already noted, envoys may also act in an advisory capacity throughdirect communication with the chief executive and his key officials or ad-visers. Occasionally, the state secretary summoned individual Swedishambassadors in key EU countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, tomeetings at the PMO, sometimes at short notice. This indicates that he waseffectively the most immediate principal to these heads of foreign missions.He considered it as self-evident and natural that an ambassador, who had thegovernment as its principal, worked closely together with the state secretaryto the PM. As shown in the Introduction above, the state secretary issuedinstructions to the Swedish ambassador to London. Similarly, the permanentrepresentative to the EU in Brussels requested and received instructionsfrom the state secretary, who was the main contact person at home. A con-crete example of the issuing of instructions was in spring 2001 when an offi-cial at the Swedish Mission to the UN asked state secretary Danielsson foradvice before a vote on the Middle East (Svenning, 2005: 293–4). Presumably,further examples can be found.

Danielsson had no direct experience of party politics when he wasrecruited to the PMO in 1989. Yet, he would be serving the PM, who was





also the leader of the Social Democrats, for example by writing speeches. Inthe interview, Danielsson commented that one did not have to be a partymember to be recruited to the PMO to handle international affairs, and thatthese people had usually been officials and not political advisers. At thesame time, however, Danielsson further testified that a prerequisite forbeing recruited in the first place was that the individuals were ‘loyal to thevalues of the government’ (cf. Danielsson, 2007: 238). He added that in prin-ciple this applied to everyone working in Government Offices, but that thedemand for loyalty clearly was larger still in the PMO.

In his book, Danielsson (2007: 38) writes that when working in the PMOyou get a political ‘stamp’ anyway, describing it as a balancing act betweenthe role of civil servant and the political environment. At the beginning, hewas seen more as the ‘extended arm’ of the MFA with the PM (Danielsson,2007: 39). Over time, however, his loyalty clearly shifted towards the chiefexecutive.

In practice, the same standard of political neutrality could not be appliedto an adviser to the PM as to civil servants, or career diplomats, in the diplo-matic service. In chief executive policy formulation, including EU policies,it is pivotal not only to identify Swedish national interests but also to takeaccount of domestic political concerns and priorities, not least in view ofhow groups inside the party or parties in government may react. Whenissues become subject to party politicization, advisers and civil servants riskbeing drawn into party politics and even into media ‘spin’.

Since it was established in 2004, staffing at the foreign and EU affairsdivision at the PMO has combined political appointees and public officials,illustrating the hybridization of staff in core executives. The former dir-ector, Helen Eduards, testified in an author interview that although she wasnon-partisan she served in a political capacity by being loyal to the govern-ment and the PM and remarked that this was ‘somewhat of an anomaly’.When she was first recruited to serve in the PMO she was one of the namesproposed by the MFA, and the subsequent appointment of a young womanas director was apparently controversial (Danielsson, 2007: 222–3). Duringher first years at the PMO, the state secretary had to make clear to someambassadors that she was responsible for the foreign activities of the PMand that there was no point in trying to overrule with him what she said(Danielsson, 2007: 223).

For her part, the current director, Katarina Areskoug Mascarenhas, wasasked by the PMO directly whether she wanted to take up a position there,at the rank of director (departementsråd), just like her predecessor in theformer government. It may be noted that neither of these successive femaledirectors was given the title of ambassador, unlike the two men who heldthe corresponding position in the 1980s and 1990s.

While the director is not a political appointee, he/she is expected to beloyal to the government and to the PM as chief principal. Institutionalizationof the advisory arrangement and role suggests that the individual adviser willidentify with this institutional and operational environment — ‘where youstand depends on where you sit’. Meanwhile, the MFA expects loyalty froman official temporarily on leave for service at the PMO. Almost exclusively,





foreign policy advisers to the PM have been recruited from the MFA. In aninterview, a former foreign minister said the MFA had an interest in second-ing the best and expected ‘loyalty’ in return. The question remains as to whothese chief executive foreign affairs advisers should be loyal to where thereare different preferences and actual or potential conflicts of loyalty. Theywork for the PM but have been recruited from the MFA, where they usuallyreturn to continue their diplomatic career, but while they are members ofstaff in his office, the chief executive can demand total loyalty. Now let us turnto an examination of leader–adviser relationships in the field of foreignaffairs.

Leader–Adviser Relationships in Foreign Affairs

This section presents some particularly important leader–adviser relation-ships in foreign affairs in Sweden, thereby illustrating the role and interactivedynamics of such personal relations in this policy field. These dynamicsdepend, partly at least, on how forcefully leaders assert control and on theirown positions on policy issues based on prior foreign policy experience orexpertise as well as leadership style (Preston, 2001).

Inner circle advisers could be expected to be influential in shaping policydecisions. They could exert influence by bringing a particular issue to theattention of the PM and by giving advice on how it should be pursued. Atthe same time, however, advisory systems are not necessarily unitary, butcould be characterized by infighting and rivalry among members of staffover competing advice. In the words of Destler (1972: 245), drawing onexperiences from the US: ‘Staffs are often compared to kings’ courts, withmembers forever intriguing to win the sovereign’s favor.’

Olof Palme had aides who competed to win his attention and favour.Meanwhile, he had substantial experience and expertise in foreign affairshimself. So did Carl Bildt, whereas Göran Persson and Fredrik Reinfeldtwere relatively inexperienced and less assured in foreign affairs than indomestic policy when they entered office. One would therefore haveexpected them to be more dependent on expert advice in foreign policy.

As for leadership style, this also varies and some premiers are more col-legial whereas others can have a tendency to centralize (e.g. Ruin, 2007).Göran Persson illustrates the type of leader who tends to centralize decision-making within a tight inner circle of advisers and assert personal control overthe policy process while imposing fairly hierarchical advisory structures. Hispredecessor, Ingvar Carlsson, had a more collegial style.

Ingvar Carlsson had long-standing experience of work in government,but was still relatively less experienced in foreign affairs. Yet, it was underhim that the government took the critical decision to seek membership ofthe EU. In an interview with the author, Carlsson said membership of theEU was a ‘gigantic foreign policy issue’ and that ‘no other foreign policyissue’ held anything like such importance. His closest political aides, includ-ing his chief foreign policy adviser Hans Dahlgren, were in favour of an ini-tiative over the issue (Carlsson, 2003: 408). Presumably, this close adviser to





the PM conveyed privileged and relevant information from key foreignmissions (Gustavsson, 1998: 163).

After his return to office in 1994, and when Sweden’s EU membershiphad been secured, Carlsson would attend a series of European Councilsummits. In an author interview he pointed out that meetings like these hadto be prepared and that, increasingly, the PM had become dependent onadvisers and experts, including aides to the PM in foreign and EU affairs. Inhis memoirs, he draws attention to the great efforts of his aide LarsDanielsson in the shaping of policy during the initial years of EU member-ship (Carlsson, 2003: 595). Carlsson here recognizes the important role ofhis adviser on foreign affairs, also in regard to policy-making. Being a for-mer diplomat, Danielsson became one of the PM’s key aides and exertedinfluence with the government early on.

Danielsson, who continued to serve in the same function under Carlsson’ssuccessor Göran Persson, attended every European Council summit whereSweden was represented from December 1994 to March 2006, and ‘held thepen’ on numerous occasions. Since Danielsson had become state secretary in1999, it often happened that he was asked by the PM to take the seat next tohim, whereas the foreign minister was sent away, unless the matter to handwas about ‘normal’ foreign policy (Danielsson, 2007: 109).

Göran Persson had very little experience of foreign policy when he tookoffice in March 1996. Prior to this, he presented Danielsson with the follow-ing message: ‘I do not know a lot about foreign and EU affairs so I trust youto handle this’ (quoted in Danielsson, 2007: 59). Danielsson, who by now hadsignificant experience, quickly established a rapport with the new PM.

In search of a concrete mission for himself and his office, Göran Perssoninitially made the Baltic Sea cooperation a top priority (Fichtelius, 2007:31–2; Persson, 2007: 143–8).The centre of attention was the Visby Baltic Seasummit in May 1996, initiated under the former PM. This summit allegedlyimplied the ‘breakthrough’ of the new PM in the field of foreign affairs(Danielsson, 2007: 63). In this connection, his chief foreign policy adviserhad an important role. After the Visby summit in May 1996, the PM initi-ated the Baltic Sea States Support Group to coordinate cooperation at thelevel of heads of government in the region (Elder and Page, 2000: 141). Therepresentative of the PM was one of his political advisers, Pär Nuder, whobecame the PM’s state secretary in 1997.11 Nuder, who has an Estonianfamily background, shared Persson’s concern with the Baltic States and theBaltic Sea Region.

Nuder also represented the PM in the working group preparing the con-ference on the holocaust, first held in Stockholm in January 2000, as well asvis-à-vis the Middle East, as a kind of special envoy. During Persson’s sec-ond term in office from 1998 to 2002 he brought substantial change toSweden’s Middle East policy in reorienting it in a more pro-Israeli direction(e.g. Fichtelius, 2007: ch. 8). It was an important foreign policy change whichresulted in tension between his state secretary, Pär Nuder, and the foreignminister, Anna Lindh (e.g. Danielsson, 2007: 157–61; Persson, 2007: 264).

From the outset, Nuder belonged to the PM’s inner circle of trustedadvisers. Nuder gave advice on, and got involved in, foreign affairs, and





clearly held sway with the PM. They had a direct and close relationship. Byand large they talked to each other almost daily from 1996 onward, andNuder had close contacts with leading politicians of other countries(Fichtelius, 2007: 110). He has been described as the adviser who ‘whispersadvice in the ear of the boss’ (Fichtelius, 2007: 113). In his memoirs, Persson(2007: 375) writes that Nuder was his ‘closest aide’ in his capacity as statesecretary. Moreover, Persson has testified that Nuder was involved in most‘big decisions’ (quoted in Fichtelius, 2007: 114). Danielsson (2007: 175)notes that Nuder as the PM’s state secretary for almost six years had ‘a verycentral role and influential position’. Nuder and Danielsson were the PM’s‘closest aides’ (Persson, 2007: 373). However, Persson’s relationship withDanielsson was more strictly professional and not as close on a personalplane as the relations between Persson and Nuder (Fichtelius, 2007: 114;Persson, 2007: 337).

Anyway, the PM grew increasingly dependent on his experienced statesecretary and adviser on Europe, who turned into the real minister for EUaffairs. Persson (2007: 422) retained his ‘confidence’ in Danielsson, consid-ering him ‘an important aide with an irreplaceable network of contacts anda great knowledge of the EU politics’. In May 2006, PM Persson testifiedthat Danielsson fulfilled a ‘big role’ for him, claiming that he was ‘the mostexperienced political official in the entire EU system’ (quoted in Fichtelius,2007: 505).

During the period of the Swedish EU presidency in 2001 the PM wasmore or less in permanent contact with his state secretary and chief foreignand EU affairs adviser. Persson (2007: 286) writes that he himself workedalmost full time with the presidency. In the ensuing years from his re-election in 2002, the PM became even more involved in foreign affairs andhis aides had to follow suit (Danielsson, 2007: 163). The PM moved on tothe international stage and had numerous contacts with global leaders.Over time, leaders gain more experience and expertise. They develop theirown personal networks and this may impact on the style as well as the sub-stance of foreign and EU affairs. When Göran Persson resigned after 10years in office he had acquired considerable experience and authority inthese fields, too. Yet, he remained dependent on expert advice and supportfor his various international activities from personal advisers and centralstaffers in his office. In 2005–6, the Swedish PM relied on his personalforeign affairs aides in his capacity of chairperson of a group preparingproposals for UN reform; a ‘reform network’ consisting of personal re-presentatives of a number of political leaders worldwide (Danielsson,2007: 221, 228).

A close leader–adviser and professional relationship seemingly alsoexisted between the PM and the foreign affairs aide recruited in 2003,Helen Eduards, who in 2004 became director of the new International andEU Affairs Division located in the PM’s Secretariat. She held this ‘veryimportant post’ in the PMO based on the confidence of and closeness to thePM (Fichtelius, 2007: 506). She continued to accompany the PM on foreigntrips. In general, directors of the foreign and EU affairs division could be





expected to be protected by the PM and his state secretary. These personalrelationships are dynamic rather than fixed.

As pointed out at the start of this article, the PM established a direct rela-tionship with favoured ambassadors, who thereby performed advisory roles.One of them was the permanent representative to the EU in Brussels.12 Hegot together with the PM prior to Friday meetings at the PMO and in thepresence of the PM’s state secretary, who initiated these get-togethers (inter-view Petersson). This was particularly useful in relation to the EuropeanCouncil.The new government retained the EU ambassador who travelled toStockholm to brief the PM, Fredrik Reinfeldt, on a regular basis beforeEuropean Council summits. Of particular concern for the new PM was theSwedish EU presidency scheduled for the second half of 2009. The prepara-tions for the EU presidency were well under way and increasingly occupiedthe PM and his staff from 2007 onward.

The closest personal foreign and European affairs adviser to the PM isthe state secretary for foreign affairs, who previously served as a diplomatand as senior adviser to the Moderate Party leadership including the cur-rent PM. She was appointed as his personal representative, or ‘Sherpa’, in theconfidential talks or negotiations during the German presidency in the firsthalf of 2007 over the new EU treaty, subsequently adopted as the Lisbontreaty. In this process they were together in several bilaterals, includingthose with the German Chancellor. Hence, the state secretary is trusted andenjoyed the PM’s confidence. This PM too needs professional advice, to bebriefed and alerted to issues or events. Insofar as he is less assured in for-eign affairs than in domestic policy the influence of the state secretary withthe PM could be expected to be significant, but to what extent is still tooearly to tell. But there are good reasons to expect that key advisers will con-tinue to wield influence over policy in the foreign affairs sector morebroadly and particularly in relation to the European Council, where theSwedish PM acts together with chief executives in other EU member states.

Conclusions

In this article, I have examined the chief executive organization and advi-sory arrangements for foreign affairs as well as leader–adviser relationshipsin this vital field of policy-making in Sweden. This concluding section sum-marizes and discusses the main findings and their generalizability, and out-lines the broader implications for future research.

The office of the chief executive in Sweden has become more centrallyinvolved in the foreign policy process and not least in EU policy. I concludethat the requirements of EU membership have reinforced this pattern. Ithas reinforced the organizational needs and led to an increase in the size ofsupport structures. The organization and staffing arrangements can partlybe functionally explained. The entire organization for foreign affairs at hisoffice is established to provide support to the PM. As the chief executive isincreasingly drawn into international relations and the foreign policy





process, he is in greater need of advisory structures for foreign affairs in hisoffice. In Sweden, such advisory structures have been institutionalized andstrengthened with time. This strengthening of advisory arrangements hasintroduced further centralization of policy and led to conflicting relationswith the MFA. Over time, the office of the chief executive has clearlygained ground at the expense of the MFA.

My conclusion is that through EU membership power has shifted to keyadvisers to the chief executive. As has been shown in this article, Swedishchief executives have surrounded themselves with advisers who effectivelybelonged to the inner circle of policy-makers. Their precise influenceon policy formulation is, of course, difficult to isolate in practice. But theseadvisers do more than just serve in an advisory role — they are also opera-tive in diplomacy and are in a position to influence policy. Arguably, theseabilities and activities are not entirely in accord with traditional civil servicenorms.The role of some of these advisers has gone far beyond that of a neu-tral civil servant. In reality, inevitably perhaps, they overstep the linebetween the official and the political domains. Therefore, these advisershave in practice redefined the very role of adviser.

From their position at the centre of power, foreign and EU affairs advisersto chief executives can wield influence over policy and the government basedon their own expertise and by placing themselves at the frontier betweenchief executives and the outside world. The input of these well-placed andclose advisers is also based on trust and to some extent contingent on theinterest the PM takes in foreign affairs. Partly, the overall internationalengagement of chief executives is a matter of personalities and relative inter-ests. Leader–adviser relationships can generally be expected to be highly con-tingent upon interpersonal trust.

We must account for the domestic political context as well as the idiosyn-cracy or contingency of chief executives, such as the features of government(coalition/single party government, PM–foreign minister relationship) and thedifferent personalities and leadership styles of individual political leaders.Therole of personalities and personal relationships — of actors and their interac-tions — could have a dynamic effect by shifting the centre of gravity and per-haps by giving rise to centralizing tendencies in the core executive.

The case study examined in this article suggests that the chief executiveand support staff, notably close and trusted advisers, have transformed theforeign policy process and brought about change in the substance and style offoreign policy. To be able to generalize our findings further, we will have toplace this case in a broader comparative context. Overall, we need more sys-tematic research to explore tendencies towards either uniformity or diversityin organization and advisory arrangements for foreign affairs across nationalcontexts, cases and time. Further research is needed to clarify more preciselyunder what conditions the advisers matter in the policy process, and exertinfluence over policy and the government. Except for further in-depth singlecase studies, systematic comparison between cases should illuminate the con-texts and institutions within which actors are embedded, as well as the rela-tive weight of agency and structure overall in the foreign policy process. An





additional and related area for future research concerns the ‘hybridization’ ofstaffing at the core or chief executive administration, with a focus on theboundary lines in the policy and advisory process between staffers who areeither political appointees or public officials. Another area is the role of coreexecutive ‘politico-administrative hybrids’ and ‘boundary managers’ whooperate at the interface between the national and the European or interna-tional in a transgovernmental policy-making context.

Appendix: List of Selected Interviews Referred to in the Case Study

The title or function of the interviewee is given as held at the time of theinterview, and in the capacity that he or she is relevant for the article.

Katarina Areskoug Mascarenhas, Director, Foreign and EU AffairsDivision, Prime Minister’s Office. 18 March 2008.Mats Bergquist, former Ambassador to London and Helsinki. 20 December2006.Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister. 22 October 1997 and 29 August2005.Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for ForeignAffairs, former Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister (Olof Palmeand Ingvar Carlsson). 25 October 2005.Lars Danielsson, State Secretary for Foreign and EU Affairs, PrimeMinister’s Office, and former Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister(Ingvar Carlsson and Göran Persson). 28 September 2005.Helen Eduards, Director, International and EU Affairs Division, PrimeMinister’s Office. 6 October 2005.Jan Eliasson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, former State Secretary forForeign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy Adviser tothe Prime Minister (Olof Palme). 4 October 2006.Ulf Larsson, Political Adviser, former State Secretary, Prime Minister’sOffice. 14 June 2006.Sven-Olof Petersson, Permanent Representative to the EU. 5 October 2007.

Notes

This article is produced in the research programme entitled ‘The GovernmentOffices and the Organization of Society’, funded by the Bank of SwedenTercentenary Foundation. I am grateful for this funding. I thank all the people whowere willing to be interviewed and the three anonymous referees for their com-ments.

1. The ambassador in question is Mats Bergquist, a seasoned diplomat in theinner circle of Swedish foreign policy-making. He was ambassador to London from1997 until 2004 and previously to Helsinki. According to a biography on the formerPM, Göran Persson, Bergquist was one of Persson’s favourite ambassadors(Svenning, 2005: 252).





2. The state secretary, Lars Danielsson, was the chief foreign and EU affairsadviser to the PM, Göran Persson, and served as foreign policy aide to a formerPM, Ingvar Carlsson. The empirical analysis illuminates the key advisory role ofDanielsson.

3. As political adviser he was politically appointed and had previously served atthe international department of the Social Democratic Party.

4. In early 2008, PMO staff numbered about 135 and, of these, some 30 workedin the EU Coordination Secretariat, which was established in 2005.

5. The National Security Council, the NSC, at the White House was a referencepoint for people involved in this group. However, Palme made it clear that hewanted no public reference to the NSC, as revealed by one of them involved.

6. The foreign minister, Lennart Bodström, had relatively little foreign policyexperience when he was appointed in 1982.

7. The security policy analysis group clearly emulated, albeit in a much moremodest version, the White House National Security Council.

8. Following the 2006 change of government, there is also a state secretary serv-ing under the minister for EU affairs of the Liberal Party.

9. In 1983, Eliasson became Director-General for political affairs in the MFA, inreality appointed by the PM. Eliasson later moved on to various top positions ininternational diplomacy, and served as Sweden’s foreign minister in 2006.

10. Dahlgren likewise became a top diplomat, serving as ambassador to the UNbefore he succeeded Eliasson as state secretary for foreign affairs in the MFA in theyear 2000.

11. Nuder was appointed minister for coordination in 2002 and finance ministerin 2004.

12. The permanent representative, Sven-Olof Petersson, was reportedly close toPM Persson and was one his favourite ambassadors (Svenning, 2005: 252).

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KARL MAGNUS JOHANSSON is Associate Professor of PoliticalScience at the School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University College,Sweden.Address: Karl Magnus Johansson, School of Social Sciences, SödertörnUniversity College, SE-114 89 Huddinge, Sweden. [email: [email protected]]



